MACAILING v.

ANDRADA

FACTS:

In this appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato ruling that defendant heirs of Salvador
Andrada have lost their right to appeal from a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources1 and
that, accordingly, defendant Executive Secretary, in behalf of the President, may no longer review such decision, we
have for factual backdrop the following:

A dispute over four (4) parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato, arose between plaintiffs, settlers thereon occupying four
hectares each, and Salvador Andrada (later substituted by his heirs), sales applicant of a bigger parcel, which
includes the lands occupied by plaintiffs. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in plaintiffs' favor, excluded
the four parcels of land claimed by plaintiffs. The Director of Lands, however, reversed, declared that the portions
adjudged to the four plaintiffs "shall be restored to the heirs (of Salvador Andrada) who should include them
proportionately in the new application to be filed by them respectively."

Appeal having been taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the latter, on October 27, 1956, in
turn reversed the Director of Lands by awarding to plaintiffs the lands they claimed. Defendants sought
reconsideration. On May 30, 1957, the Secretary denied. Defendants moved once more to reconsider. On September
12, 1957, the Secretary rejected the reconsideration, ruled that his judgment in the case "had long become final and
executory," and said: "Upon a review of the records, we found that the decision sought to be reconsidered in the
present motion had long become final and executory. Consequently, this Office has no more jurisdiction to entertain
the said motion." The Secretary categorically stated that the case was "considered a closed matter insofar as this
Office is concerned." Defendants received copy of this denial on October 14, 1957.

On October 23, 1957, defendants appealed to the Office of the President.

On August 20, 1959, in a letter-decision, Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, "[b]y authority of the
President reversed the decision of the Secretary and declared that the lands involved "should be restored to the heirs
of Andrada to be included in their individual applications."

Plaintiffs, on December 23, 1959, started the present suit in the Cotabato court. They raised the issue of finality of the
decision of the Secretary.

ISSUES:

W/n the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality of the decision of the SANR.

RULING:

In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for
such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial
review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review
or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law
stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.
Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must have jurisdiction over the Corporation,
Board, Officer or person whose acts are in question and not the jurisdiction over the SM of the case, the
doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are inapplicable. Here the sole point in
issue is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and, without
going into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be
confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to
the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the
questioned decisions are being enforced."
The provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 are thus brought to the fore. Section 12
thereof provides:
 12. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.—The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce (now Agriculture and Natural Resources) or the Under Secretary on an appealed case
shall become final, unless otherwise specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
the date of its receipt by the interested parties.
Section 13 following reads:
13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.—After a decision or order of the Secretary of
Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands has become final,
no motion or petition for reconsideration of such decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be
entertained by the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources] the Under Secretary or the
Director of Lands, as the case may be, except as provided in Section 14 hereof.
And Section 14 is to this effect:
"Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources],
the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
decision, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
default or excusable neglect: Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time
but in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision, order or proceeding was taken."
Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary's decision of October 27,
1956 — within 30 days from their receipt thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on October 23,
1957. They merely contend that their appeal was but 9 days after October 14, 1957, the date defendants
received the September 12, 1957 ruling of the Secretary denying their second motion for reconsideration.
That ruling, it must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary's decision "had long
become final and executory." By reason of which, declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had
no more jurisdiction to entertain the said motion."1

OCA VS LOPEZ

In an administrative case, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. The dismissal of the
criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the
administrative case.

An Information dated 12 January 2004 was filed against respondent Claudio M. Lopez (respondent),
Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court of Sudipen, La Union, for violation of Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as follows: 

That on or about the 21st day of October 2003, in the Municipality of Sudipen, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and possess in his custody and
control Seven Hundred Ninety Point Six (790.6) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, without
first securing the necessary permit or authority from the government agency. 1

Consonant with the En Banc Resolution dated 12 March 1981 authorizing the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to initiate motu proprio the filing of administrative complaint against judges and/or
employees of the inferior courts who have been convicted and/or charged before the Sandiganbayan or
the courts, the OCA, in its Report dated 17 February 2009, 2recommended the filing of an administrative
complaint against respondent for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee.
The Court, in its Resolution of 18 March 2009,3 approved the OCAs recommendation and required
respondent to comment on the complaint.

1
On 29 April 2009, respondent submitted a one-page answer/comment 4 alleging that a criminal case
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3064 for violation of RA 9165 was pending before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union (RTC-Br. 34) and that from the evidence presented, it was clear that
the prosecution failed to prove its case and that the case might be dismissed. Respondent prayed that the
instant complaint be dismissed.

On 17 June 2009, this Court issued a Resolution5 noting respondents answer/comment and referred the
administrative matter to the OCA for designation of an investigating judge to conduct an investigation.

Judge Ferdinand A. Fe (Investigating Judge), Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC-Br. 34, was designated
investigating judge to conduct the investigation and thereafter submit a report and recommendation on the
administrative matter.6 

During the investigation, respondent informed the Investigating Judge that he was adopting the demurrer
to evidence he earlier filed in Criminal Case No. 3064 and offered the same as evidence in this
administrative case. He claimed the prosecution failed to prove its case. But since this is an administrative
case, the Investigating Judge was of the view that only substantial evidence is required and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the criminal case, the Investigating Judge found that by
virtue of a search warrant issued by the presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Bannayoyo-Lidlidda-San Emilio, Ilocos Sur, police officers searched the boarding house which
respondent rented. Respondent was not in his boarding house when the search team and
the barangay officials arrived. The police officers presented the search warrant to respondents live-in
partner, Babes Caedo (Caedo). One block of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 790.6 grams wrapped
in a newspaper and plastic bag was recovered inside the room and under respondents bed. When
respondent arrived, the police officers confronted him but respondent denied ownership of the dried
marijuana fruiting tops. Respondent likewise refused to sign the Certification of Orderly Search
but Caedo and Barangay Captain Ronnie A. Guzman and Barangay Kagawad Charito Bayan signed the
certification.

The confiscated items were brought to the Sudipen Police Station. After preliminary investigation,
respondent was charged with violation of RA 9165.

In his demurrer to evidence which he adopted as evidence in this administrative case, respondent
maintained that the presiding judge who issued the search warrant had no territorial jurisdiction
over Sudipen, La Union, the place where it was enforced and hence, the items seized by virtue thereof
were inadmissible in evidence. He likewise argued that the police officers who enforced the search
warrant violated Rule 126 concerning the presence of witnesses and the accused during the search.

The Investigating Judge believed that the issues on the legality of the issuance of the search warrant and
violation of Rule 126 should be threshed out in the criminal case and not in the instant administrative
case. The Investigating Judge observed that since the place that was searched was the room rented by
respondent, the lawful occupant is the respondent and not Erlinda Estrada, the owner of the house.
Moreover, the presence of the lawful occupant may be dispensed with if there is any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.

From the evidence adduced and the admission of respondent in his demurrer to evidence which he
adopted in this administrative case, the Investigating Judge concluded that respondent kept in his custody
and control 790.6 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without first securing the necessary permit or
authority from the appropriate government agency. Respondents acts constituted flagrant violation of the
law and undermined the peoples faith in the judiciary. 

The Investigating Judge found respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a
Government Employee and recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of all benefits, except accrued leave benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations. 

The OCA agreed with the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Judge and that the act of
respondent fell short of the standards of high moral conduct which court employees are bound to
maintain. The OCA likewise found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a
court employee and thus recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service. 

As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Judge, to sustain a finding of administrative culpability, only
substantial evidence is required. The present case is an administrative case, not a criminal case, against
respondent. Therefore, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence to
support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the
respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. We
emphasize the well-settled rule that a criminal case is different from an administrative case and each must
be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. 7

The evidence showed that respondent is the occupant of the place where the 790.6 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops were recovered. Respondent did not have the necessary permit or authority from
the appropriate government agency to possess the same. This is a flagrant violation of the law and is
considered a grave misconduct.

The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. 8 The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. 9 As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct,
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others. An act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact,
crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative
Code.10 We agree with the findings and recommendation of both the Investigating Judge and the OCA
that respondent committed grave misconduct which, under Section 52 (A)(3), Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases, is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.

Once again, we stress that court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public
servants in an office dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be
in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of
uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the peoples respect and faith in the judiciary. They should
avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those
connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. 11 
 WHEREFORE, we DISMISS respondent Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server of the Muncipal Trial
Court of Sudipen, La Union, from the service with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave
benefits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED

Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA G.R. No. 88550 (184 SCRA 462) Case Digest
Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Facts:
·       Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry
of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks.
·       IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
(MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and
interests to MMIC.
·       IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy
Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks
prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation be granted back.
·       Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of
MMIC. It was dismissed
·       Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
·       RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.
·       CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil
contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be
rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop
coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract
over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-
development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance,
IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the
operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the
Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and
directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are
matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that
the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is
also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in
such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view" 

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal
areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over
said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of
the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide
matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of
mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts
to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the
Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator
Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate
President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to
the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the
Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and
not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved
that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole,
which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the
application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the
need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUES:

[1] Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, an indispensable party in this
petition?
[2] Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?
[3] Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection?
[4] Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under
Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution?
[5] Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their effectivity?

HELD: [1] An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that
a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In this case,
Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that
she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case
are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be
resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.

[2] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not
require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary,
the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
[3] While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is
within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the
investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the
investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics
Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to
equal protection.

[4] The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not
violate Senator Villar's right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own
rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules
of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules
need not be published,unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take
effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that
the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. PARTIALLY GRANTED.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section,
except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters
relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities
and colleges. 

Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book: 

(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the
National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant
rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions;
government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation
or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. 

(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a
law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its
regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration
or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. 

(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms,
including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or
regulation to be observed and followed by any person. 
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 

(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties
or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be
determined after hearing. 

(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private

(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and
entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall
be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited
purposes. 

(8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory
character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter,
including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. 

(9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. 

(10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport,
clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of
permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. 

(11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation,
suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a
license. 

(12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting
the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the
destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages,
reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of
license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. 

(13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority,
privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege,
exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. 

(14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication
and licensing. 

1. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. 
 CHAPTER 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS

Section 3. Filing. - 

(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons. 

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. 

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to
public inspection. 

Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may
be affected by them. 

Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: 

(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding
quarter; and 

(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together
with a complete index and appropriate tables. 

Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. - 

(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification
any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but
copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the
bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new
copies thereof may be obtained. 

(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a
crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. 

Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center
shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements
to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the
codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress
may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution
costs. 
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly
filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. 

Section 9. Public Participation. - 

(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior
to the adoption of any rule. 

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have
been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first
hearing thereon. 

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. 

CHAPTER 3
ADJUDICATION

Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting
rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage
amicable settlement, comprise and arbitration. 

Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. - 

(1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be
served at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place
of the hearing. 

(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not
precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed
settlement or default. 

(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings. 

Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case: 

(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. 

(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not
readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with
the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof
may be accepted. 

(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to
submit rebuttal evidence. 
 (4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable
technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and
afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. 

Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance
of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any
party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose
jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as
contempt. 

Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and
shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each
case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision
personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them. 

Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15)
days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an
administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration
may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period. 

Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. - 

(1) Every agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final
orders in the adjudication of contested cases. 

(2) It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his equivalent functionary to prepare
a register or compilation of those decisions or final orders for use by the public. 

Section 17. Licensing Procedure. - 

(1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by
notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable. 

(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public
security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or
annulled without notice and hearing. 

Section 18. Non-expiration of License. - Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application
for the renewal of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall
not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the agency. 

CHAPTER 4
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL IN CONTESTED CASES

Section 19. Appeal. - Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from a final
decision of the agency may be taken to the Department head. 

Section 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. - 

(2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal
during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If
the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal. 

(3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the records of the case to the
appellate agency. 

Section 21. Effect of Appeal. - The appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless otherwise
provided by law, or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal, as it may deem just,
considering the nature and circumstances of the case. 

Section 22. Action on Appeal. - The appellate agency shall review the records of the proceedings and
may, on its own initiative or upon motion, receive additional evidence. 

Section 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency. - In any contested case, the decision of the appellate
agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the parties of a copy
thereof. 

Section 24. Hearing Officers. - 

(1) Each agency shall have such number of qualified and competent members of the base as
hearing officers as may be necessary for the hearing and adjudication of contested cases. 

(2) No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of prosecuting functions in any contested
case or any factually related case. 

Section 25. Judicial Review. - 

(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and
applicable laws. 

(2) Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek judicial review. 

(3) The action for judicial review may be brought against the agency, or its officers, and all
indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the Rules of Court. 

(4) Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a
petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all
parties of record. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the
grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order
appealed from, together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to
 therein and other supporting papers. The petition shall be under oath and shall how, by stating the
specific material dates, that it was filed within the period fixed in this chapter. 

(5) The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the final
administrative decision. One (1) motion for reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is
denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the appellant
shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal.

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by statute or, in the absence
thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
Rules of Court. 

(7) Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The findings of fact of the
agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically provided
otherwise by law. 

Section 26. Transmittal of Record. - Within fifteen (15) days from the service of the petition for review,
the agency shall transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the entire records of the
proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the
proceedings. The court may require or permit subsequent correction or additions to the record.

Laurel v Desierto digest

Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial
Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He
was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A
controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the
petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the
petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which
was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition
for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer
since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC
is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies.
Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC
performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is
therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it
less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his
tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.
THE VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
Hon. ANGELO T. REYES; and Hon. EDGARDO E. BATENGA
G. R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006

FACTS:

The Veterans Federation of the Philippines was created under Rep. Act No. 2640. The DND Secretary
issued the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 entitled, "Further Implementing the Provisions of
Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 2640.

Pursuant to the assailed Circular, the DND sought to audit VFP. The VFP complained about the alleged
broadness of the scope of the management audit and requested its suspension. This was denied.

VFP argued that it is a private non-government organization. To support its argument, it contended: (1)
that it does not possess the elements of a public office, particularly the possession/delegation of a portion
of sovereign power of government; (2) that its funds are not public funds because it receives no
government funds as its funds come from membership dues, and the lease rentals; (3) that it retains its
essential character as a private, civilian federation of veterans voluntarily formed by the veterans
themselves where membership is voluntary and is governed by the Labor Code and SSS law; (4) that the
Administrative Code of 1987 does not provide that the VFP is an attached agency; and (5) that the DBM
declared that the VFP is a non-government organization and issued a certificate that the VFP has not been
a direct recipient of any funds released by the DBM.

ISSUES:

Central Issue: Whether or not the Veterans Federation of the Philippines is a private corporation.

• Whether or not the challenged department circular passed in the valid exercise of the respondent
Secretary’s "control and supervision."
• Whether or not the challenged department circular validly lay standards classifying the VFP, an
essentially civilian organization, within the ambit of statutes only applying to government entities.
• Whether or not the department circular unduly encroached on the prerogatives of VFP’s
governing body.

RULING:

The Court ruled the following: (1) assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 does not supplant nor
modify and is, on the contrary, perfectly in consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640; and (2) that VFP is a
public corporation. As such, it can be placed under the control and supervision of the Secretary of
National Defense, who consequently has the power to conduct an extensive management audit of VFP.

The functions of the VFP are executive functions

The delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government is "[t]he most
important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

In several cases, the Court has dealt with this issue which deals with activities not immediately apparent
to be sovereign functions. It upheld the public sovereign nature of operations needed either to promote
social justice or to stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country.
In the case at bar, the functions of the VFP fall within the category of sovereign functions. The protection
of the interests of war veterans is not only meant to promote social justice, but is also intended to reward
patriotism.
The functions of the VFP are executive functions to provide immediate and adequate care, benefits and
other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and
orphans.

VFP funds are public funds

The fact that no budgetary appropriations have been released to the VFP by the DBM does not prove that
it is a private corporation. Assuming that the DBM believed that the VFP is a private corporation, it is an
accepted principle that the erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent
correct application of the law.

The funds in the hands of the VFP from whatever source are public funds, and can be used only for public
purposes. As the Court ruled in Republic v. COCOFED, "(e)ven if the money is allocated for a special
purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character." There is nothing wrong, whether
legally or morally, from raising revenues through non-traditional methods.

Membership of the VFP is not the individual membership of the affiliate organizations

VFP claims that the Secretary of National Defense "historically did not indulge in the direct or
‘micromanagement’ of the VFP. This reliance of petitioner on what has "historically" been done is
erroneous, since laws are not repealed by disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary.

Neither is the civilian nature of VFP relevant because the Constitution does not contain any prohibition
against the grant of control and/or supervision to the Secretary of National Defense over a civilian
organization.

The Administrative Code did not repeal or modify RA 2640

The Administrative Code, by giving definitions of the various entities covered by it, acknowledges that its
enumeration is not exclusive. The Administrative Code could not be said to have repealed nor
enormously modified RA 2640 by implication, as such repeal or enormous modification by implication is
not favored in statutory construction.

DBM opinion is not persuasive

VFP’s claim that the supposed declaration of the DBM that petitioner is a non-government organization is
not persuasive, since DBM is not a quasi-judicial agency. The persuasiveness of the DBM opinion has,
however, been overcome by all the previous explanations we have laid so far.
The fate of Department Circular No. 04

The Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former to that of the latter." The power of supervision, on the other hand, means "overseeing, or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties."

Since the Court has also previously determined that VFP funds are public funds, there is likewise no
reason to declare this provision invalid. Having in their possession public funds, the officers of the VFP,
especially its fiscal officers, must indeed share in the fiscal responsibility to the greatest extent.
SANTOS VS SECRETARY OF LABOR

          Segundo Santos was, for a number of years, employed as Labor Conciliator I (Regional Office No.
4) of the Department of Labor. His monthly pay was P259 per month, or P3,108 per annum. On August
24, 1960, he was extended an appointment (promotion) as Labor Conciliator II (Regional Office No. 3,
Manila) with compensation per annum of P3,493, vice Juan Mendoza, Jr., resigned. This appointment,
effective September 1, 1960, was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962, and
released to the Department of Labor on May 25, 1962.

          In June of 1962, respondent Secretary of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco, one of the respondents,
to the same position of Labor Conciliator II. 1

          Petitioner's demand for the revocation of respondent Tionco's appointment and payment to him
(Santos) of salary differentials was rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor.

          From the foregoing events stemmed the present petition for mandamus filed on August 20,
1962 three days before Santos actually retired from the service which was an August 23, 1962. 2 The
petition prays, inter alia, that respondents be commanded to nullify the appointment of Tiongco, and to
uphold as legal and existing petitioner's appointment, as Labor Conciliator II, from September 1, 1960;
and that the salary differentials aforesaid be paid petitioner. Respondents seasonably answered the
petition.

          Before the case could be tried on the merits that is, on February 14, 1963, Santos died. A motion to
substitute the "Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased." represented by Rodolfo Santos, one of the heirs, was
filed. This triggered a move on respondents' part to seek dismissal of the case.

          The court, on April 10, 1963, dismissed the petition without costs. Hence, this appeal on purely
questions of law.

          1. The threshold question is this: May the Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased, be substituted in
place of petitioner herein?

          Public office is a public trust. 3 It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto. In this
sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None of the heirs may replace him in that position. It is
in this context that we say that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may not press Santos' claim that
he be allowed to continue holding office as Labor Conciliator II. Actio personalis moritur cum persona.

          But jurisdiction of the court had attached before the death of Santos. That jurisdiction continues
until the termination of the suit. It is true that what is left is a money claim for salary differentials. But
death will not dislodge jurisdiction on that money claim — it subsists. Resolution of this
question depends upon the right of Segundo Santos to the position of Labor Conciliator II.

          We rule that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may be substituted for him in the present
proceedings. We do so now.1äwphï1.ñët

          2. We go to the merits.
          Stripped of unnecessary details, the facts are: On August 24, 1960, petitioner, a second grade
eligible, was appointed Labor Conciliator II at an annual compensation of P3,493 effective September 1,
1960. As far as salary is concerned, no law, rule or regulation has been violated. Because, an annual pay
of P3,493 is well within the range provided for second grade civil service eligibles. 4

          Respondents challenge the legality of petitioner's appointment as Labor Conciliator II. They say
that such appointment is within the prohibition set forth in the memorandum circular of the Civil Service
Commission dated February 16, 1961, thus: "Employees should not be assigned or promoted to positions
the initial rate of the salary allocation of which exceed the maximum allowable for their eligibility."
Respondents likewise aver that it was because of this circular, that the appointment of petitioner as Labor
Conciliator II was recalled on September 7, 1961. The circular was not violated.

          And the withdrawal of petitioner's appointment is not a proven fact. What the record clearly
discloses is that the original appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was not taken out of the
Civil Service Commission; it was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962 and
released to the Secretary of Labor on May 25, 1962.

          More important now is that the defense of recall has been abandoned by respondents. The case was
ready for trial below. They did not go to trial. Instead, they thought it advantageous to them — upon
petitioner's death — to submit their case on their motion to dismissed solely on legal grounds, namely,
that the death of petitioner extinguished the controversy, and that the remaining claim for damages is
ancillary to mandamus and is also abated by death.

          The money claim here involved, however, descended to Santos' heirs. And, as we have earlier in
this opinion stated, his Estate may prosecute that claim to its conclusion.

          It will not be in harmony with our sense of justice to return this case to the court below — at this
stage — just to allow respondents to prove their defense of recall of petitioner's appointment.

          Respondents had a choice: To go to trial on the merits upon the issues raised in their answer; or,
seek to overthrow petitioner's case on legal issues. They did elect the latter. They cannot be permitted
once again to return to the lower court for a trial on the merits.  5 Suitors should not normally be allowed to
gamble with court proceedings in the hope of obtaining beneficial results. It is unfair that this case should,
on respondents' choice, be made to bounce from the lower court to this Court, and back to the lower court
and perhaps only to be appealed once again to an appellate court. The ensuing delay, increased cost of
litigation, and trouble and anxiety and harassment to be caused to the adverse party, the wastage of the
courts' time — these are reasons potent enough to support this view.

          At all events, petitioner's right to salary differentials and the duty to pay him are both clear. Civil
Service approval completed petitioner's appointment,  6 clinched the case for him.

          3. The rest is a question of mathematical computation. Petitioner's pay as Labor Conciliator I was at
the rate of P259 per month or P3,108 per annum. His increased compensation as Labor Conciliator II
from September 1, 1960, to August 23, 1962, the date of his retirement, is at the late of P3,493 per
annum, specified in his promotional appointment, and reiterated in the 5th indorsement of the
Commissioner of Civil Service to the Secretary of Labor dated May 22, 1962. He is entitled only to the
pay set forth in his appointment, and no more — absent a legal adjustment thereof. There is no such
adjustment here. Petitioner's salary differentials during the period covered amounts to P761.68. And this
should be paid to his Estate.
          Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to reverse the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated April 10, 1963, and to direct the Secretary of Labor and the corresponding Cashier to pay
the Estate of the deceased petitioner Segundo Santos the sum of P761.68.

          No costs. So ordered.

CASE DIGEST: ABEJA VS TANADA236 SCRA 60

FACTS: Petitioner Abeja and respondent Radovan (deceased) were contenders for the office of municipal
mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the 1992 elections. The election contest was a very close fight.
Thereafter, Abeja filed an election contest covering. Consequently, Radovan filed a Counter-Protest
covering 36 precincts. Radovan prayed that the ballots of the 36 counter-protested precincts should only
be revised and recounted if it is shown after the revision of the contested ballots of the 22 precincts that
petitioner leads by at least one (1) vote. Radovan died with the case left on pendency. He was substituted
by Vice-Mayor Conrado de Rama and,surprisingly, by his surviving spouse, Ediltrudes Radovan. The
case was left by Judge Lopez and was turned over to Judge Tanada. In the interim,
private respondent failed to commence the revision of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts.
Eventually, the respondents prayed for the prompt resolution to the pending cases.

ISSUES: Whether or not the surviving spouse of the Respondent has the right for a counter-claim on the
matter?
HELD: No. The substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow, Ediltrudes Radovan, on the
ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for damages is completely erroneous. "Public office is
personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs." The heirs may no longer
prosecute the deceased protestee's counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was
extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested office. Hence, SC granted the
petition.

NLTDRA VS CA
Petitioner: Nat’l Land Titles and Deeds Registration Admin (NALTDRA)
Respondent: CSC; Violeta Garcia
Ponente: Campos, Jr.

FACTS:
 Garcia was an LLB grad and a first grade civil service.
 She was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII.
 She was later appointed as Deputy Register of Deeds III, upon reclassification of the position.
 She was designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
 Executive Order No. 649 was enacted.
 It authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration, and it regionalized the offices of the registers therein.
 The law imposed a new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment
as Deputy Register od Deeds II or higher.
 Garcia issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on temporary status for not being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
 Sec. of Justice notified Garcia of the termination of her services on the ground that she was receiving
Bribe Money.
  Garcia appealed, but the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dropped her appeal on the
ground that the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary
appointment.
 The CSC issued a resolution, directing that Garcia be restored to her position.
 According to the CSC, under the vested right theory, the new requirement of the BAR
membership will not apply to her but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer position on or after
Feb 9, 1981, the date the order took effect.
 NALTDRA assailed the validity of the CSC Resolution

ISSUE: WON membership in the bar, which is a qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to
the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO. No. 649, Section 4, should be applied only to new
applicants and not to those who were already in service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time
of the issuance and implementation of the EO.

HELD: No. The requirement shall also apply to those already in service.

RATIO:
 EO No. 649, in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions:
 Section 8. Abolition of Existing Positions. All structural units in the LRC and in the registries of
deeds, and all positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in the implementing
order to be issued by the president pursuant to the preceding par. The pertinent functions,
applicable appropriations, records, equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate
staff or offices therein created.
 The law, therefore, mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions
in the LRC is deemed non-existent. This is NOT removal. Removal implied post subsists and one
is merely separated therefrom, while here, there is no position at all. Thus, there can be no tenure
to speak of.
 Abolition of office is valid if (1) carried out by a legitimate body and (2) done in good faith.
(1) LEGITIMATE BODY
 In this case, it was by LEGITIMATE BODY. There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a
valid reorganization in any branch/agency of gov’t under Sec 8, Article XVII of the 1973 Consti.
(2) GOOD FAITH
 Re: good faith, if the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions,
duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished,
even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office, it will be considered an
abolition and creation of new one. The same is true if the office is abolished and its duties, for
reasons of economy, are given to an existing office.
 In this case, EO No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the LRC.
The requirement of Bar membership was imposed to meet changing circumstnaces and new
developments. It was imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
 Re: “Vested right theory,” no such thing as a vested interest or estate in an office, except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure.

JUDGMENT: Garcia has no vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office. She cannot
be reinstated to her former position. CSC Resolution reinstating Garcia was set aside.