People Vs Suela

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G.R. Nos.

133570-71            January 15, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
NERIO SUELA y HEMBRA, EDGAR SUELA y HEMBRA and EDGARDO BATOCAN, appellants.

For automatic review by this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, (Branch 95), finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and simple robbery

Facts:

The Information was filed against Nerio Suela and Edgar Suela, Edgardo Batocan charging them of robbery with
homicide and simple robbery. When arraigned, appellants, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty." In due
course, they were tried and found guilty by the court a quo.

On the version of the defense, Edgardo Batocan testified that After his arrest he was brought to Quezon City and
investigated. He had no knowledge nor any participation in the crime that occurred at the residence of John Doe (not his
real name). He was forced and threatened by the police officers to admit and confess to the crimes. He was also forced to
sign a typewritten extrajudicial confession, the contents of which he did not know as he was not allowed to read it nor was
it read to him. No lawyer was present at that time and he only met Atty. Rous for the first time in court. He was brought
before the Assistant City Prosecutor for inquest but the fiscal did not explain to him the contents of his written statement.
He was not adept at reading because he only reached first year high school.

Nerio Suela also testified that he had no knowledge nor participation in the killing of Gerry Gabilo nor in the
robbery that occurred at the residence of John Doe (not his real name). After his arrest, he was brought to Danarra Hotel
where he was manhandled and boxed and his head submerged in the toilet bowl. He was forced to sign a piece of paper.
He also met his brother Edgar at the same hotel. He was not allowed to read the paper which he was forced to sign. He
found out later on that this was the statement or his supposed extra-judicial confession.

Also,during the investigation of Edgar Suela, the police employed threats, intimidation and physical force to make
him admit to the crime, and to sign a statement or confession.

Issue: Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions of the accused are admissible as evidence against them

Held:

No. The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence.

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

x x x           x x x           x x x."

In People v. Labtan, the Court explained that "[t]he right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a
mere presence of the lawyer beside the accused." Furthermore, an effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and
logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant
answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the
lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands
the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent."

True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade the person under investigation from confessing. But his
bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his clients on the nature and consequences of an extrajudicial confession.

With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his extrajudicial confession was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first year high school. Yet Atty. Rous, who is touted by the
prosecution as a competent and independent counsel, interviewed Batocan -- before the latter gave his
confession -- for only around "five minutes." After this initial interview, Atty. Rous just listened nonchalantly to the
questions propounded by the police and to the answers given by Batocan. Counsel was not even sure that he had
explained to appellant the consequences of his extrajudicial confession. Furthermore, Atty. Rous' attention was
divided while attending the custodial investigation as he was also looking over another paper work on his desk.

In view of these proven circumstances, we are not convinced that counsel had fully explained to Batocan his
constitutional rights and what they entailed or the nature and the consequences of an extrajudicial confession --
explanations that would have enabled him to make an informed judgment on whether to confess; and if so, on what
matters. There is no showing that Atty. Rous properly explained the choices or options open to appellant, a duty expected
of any counsel under the circumstances. In sum, he did not turn out to be the competent and independent counsel
envisioned by the Constitution.

We now go to the extrajudicial confessions of Edgar and Nerio Suela. Atty. Sansano supposedly stood as counsel
for the Suela brothers during their custodial investigation.

Evidently, Atty. Sansano did not understand the exact nature of appellants' rights to counsel and to remain silent
during their custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to answer as an obstruction in the investigation. This shows that
he was incapable or unwilling to advise appellants that remaining silent was a right they could freely exercise without fear
of any untoward consequence. As counsel, he could have stopped his clients from answering the propounded questions
and advised them of their right to remain silent, if they preferred to do so. That the process of investigation could have
been "obstructed" should not have concerned him because his duty was to his clients and not to the prosecution or to the
police investigators.

Moreover, when he interviewed appellants, he did not even bother to find out the gist of their proposed statements
in order to be able to inform them properly of the nature and consequences of their extrajudicial confessions. Clearly and
sadly, appellants were not accorded competent and independent

Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that
the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial
confession cannot be given any probative value.

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