EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-17750. August 31, 1962.]

A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INC. and

CONSOLIDATED AUTO LINES, INC. , petitioners, vs. JOSE BORJA ,
respondent.

Manuel O. Chan for petitioners.

Madrid Law Office for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR; LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF LABOR STATUTES; SCOPE OF TERM

"ACTION" UNDER REPUBLIC ACT 1994. — Republic Act 1994, being a labor statute,
must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. (Art. 1702, New Civil
Code) Consequently, the term "actions" should include every judicial and administrative
proceeding intended to enforce a right or secure redress for a wrong already
committed.
2. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION; CLAIM FOR
REINSTATEMENT DEDUCED FROM ALLEGATIONS AND PRAYER IN COMPLAINT. — The
allegation in the complaint led by the respondent employee that he "was separated
automatically from the said employment with defendants, and notwithstanding pleas
for reinstatement defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate plaintiff", and his
prayer for speci c reliefs and "other reliefs", justify the conclusion that said respondent
sought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. The case, therefore, was within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.

DECISION

DIZON , J : p

Appeal by certiorari taken by A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. and

Consolidated Auto Lines, Inc. from an Order of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case
No. 6-V Bicol dated May 9, 1960 and its Resolution of August 27, 1960 denying their
motion for reconsideration. The dispositive part of the appealed order is as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondents are hereby ordered to pay
petitioner for the services rendered by the latter in excess of eight hours a day
from January 1, 1952 up to and including March 10, 1957. In connection herewith,
the Chief Examiner and Economist of this Court or his duly authorized
representative is hereby directed to proceed to the premises of the respondents
and make the necessary computations to determine the exact amount due to the
petitioner. The computation of the number of hours worked in excess of eight
hours a day should be based on the inspector's notebook of the petitioner and/or
the abstract thereof in the possession of the respondents. The count should start
from the rst inspection up to the last, as stated in said inspector's notebooks.
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 But in no case shall the count be stopped until 6:00 P.M. because if the last
inspection was terminated before said time, petitioner was given investigation
work.

"The bonus of P30.00 a month is to be included as part of the basic salary

of the petitioner, it having been regularly given by respondents since 1951 for
some meritorious work rendered by petitioner and should, therefore, be deemed as
part of his regular salary. However, an allowance of 30 minutes a day for lunch
break should be deducted from the total number of working hours rendered by
petitioner. Further, the work not in excess of eight hours a day, rendered by
petitioner for respondents during Sundays and holidays should not be considered
as compensable overtime work because the respondents are public service
corporations."

Respondent Jose Borja was employed by petitioners as Supervising Inspector,

with a basic salary P180.00 a month, P3.00 daily per diems, and a monthly bonus of
P30.00, from January 1, 1952 to March 10, 1957 when he was dismissed from the
service.
On April 15, 1958 respondent led an action against petitioners in the Court of
First Instance of Albay (Civil Case No. 1905) to recover compensation for overtime
work rendered by him during the above-mentioned period, and damages. In their
answer, petitioners denied respondent's claim for overtime pay, and alleged, by way of
a rmative defense, that respondent had led the same claim with the Department of
Labor, Regional O ce No. IV at Naga City on May 29, 1957 but the same was
dismissed with prejudice upon the latter's petition, on April 30, 1958.
Pending trial of the abovementioned case, respondent commenced the present
proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations substantially reproducing the claim
involved in Civil Case No. 1905. Petitioners, after likewise reproducing their answer in
said case, asserted, by way of additional affirmative defense, the pendency of Civil Case
No. 1905 between the same parties and for the same cause.
After due trial, the Court of Industrial Relations issued its order of May 9, 1960
and its resolution of August 27, 1960 subject of the present appeal.
To reverse the order and resolution appealed from, petitioner contends that the
Court of Industrial Relations erred rstly, in not holding that respondent's cause of
action has prescribed; secondly, in taking cognizance of this case although it had no
jurisdiction over the same; the respondent prohibiting him to work in excess of eight
and lastly, in disregarding petitioner's memorandum to (8) hours daily.
On the question of prescription, petitioner claims that respondent's action was
commenced only in December 1958; that in accordance with Republic Act 1994,
amending Common wealth Act No. 444, any action to enforce a cause of action under
said act shall be commenced within three (3) years after its accrual; that respondent's
cause of action having accrued more than three years before December 1958, his
action was filed too late.
We nd petitioner's contention to be untenable. The Court of Industrial Relations
made a nding of fact to the effect that respondent had commenced his action against
petitioner before June 22, 1957 — the effective date of Republic Act No. 1994,
amending Commonwealth Act No. 444. This finding is not now reviewable.
But even on the merits, petitioner's contention is without merit. Respondent itself
admitted in its answer dated May 6, 1959, led in the above-mentioned case No. 6-V
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 Bicol, that petitioner had originally led his complaint with the Department of Labor,
Regional O ce No. 4 on May 29, 1957. It is clear therefore that his action had already
been commenced before the effective date of Republic Act 1994, and is covered by, the
exception provided for therein.
But petitioner contends in this regard that the phrase "actions already
commenced" employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions
led in a regular court of justice. With this limited and narrow interpretation, we can not
agree. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute and, as such,
must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. (Art. 1702, New Civil
Code) Consequently, the term "actions" should include every judicial and administrative
proceeding intended to enforce a right or secure redress for a wrong already
committed. Since respondent admittedly rst led his claim against petitioner with the
Department of Labor on May 20, 1957, in accordance with laws then in force, it seems
clear that, as already stated, it is covered by the exception provided for in Republic Act
No. 1994, whose date of effectivity was June 22, 1957.
On the question of jurisdiction, petitioner claims that, as respondent sought to
collect overtime wages, and nothing more, this case was not within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations.
This is also without merit. The complaint led by respondent with the Court of
Industrial Relations alleged, inter alia, that he "was separated automatically from the
said employment with defendants, and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement
defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate plaintiff", and, aside from some speci c
reliefs, respondent herein also asked that "other reliefs be granted him".
A reasonable interpretation of respondent's pleading fully justi es the opinion of
the Court of Industrial Relations to the effect that respondent, aside from overtime
wages, also sought reinstatement. The case, therefore, was within the jurisdiction of
said court.
In connection with its last contention, petitioner claims that the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in disregarding the memorandum of the company prohibiting
respondent from working in excess of eight hours daily. Such memorandum could not
fairly apply to respondent because, according to the Court of Industrial Relations, there
was su cient evidence showing that in spite of it, respondent had received verbal
instructions from superior authority to inspect the rst trip, noon trip, and last trip; that
in this connection he had submitted to petitioner a daily report of inspection which
stated the period or number of hours he had worked for the day, and that since January
1, 1952 up to and including March 10, 1957, respondent had been rendering overtime
service with full knowledge of petitioner. All these show conclusively that the Court of
Industrial Relations was right in awarding to respondent the corresponding overtime
compensation.
WHEREFORE, the order and resolution appealed from are affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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