Statutory Construction

Case Digests
Atty. Edgardo Luardo
(Professor)

_____________________________________________________________

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

1
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc. v. Pedro Jimenez
Arroyo v. De Venecia 2
Astorga v. Villegas 3

Parts of the Law

(Title)
Lidasan v. Comelec 4
Tobias v. Abalos 5
6
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary

Effectivity
(Publication Requirement)
Tañada v. Tuvera 7
8
Phil. Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Vega

(Prospective Application)
Exception to prospectivity – favor the accused
Pang v. People 9
Hernan v. Sandiganbayan 10

Exception to prospectivity – rules of procedure

Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes 11

Exception to the exception – intended to apply prospectively

People v. Lacson 12

Exception to the exception – substantive in character

In Re Atty. Abelito B. Diuyan 13
 1

BARA LIDASAN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

FACTS:

A statute, RA 4790, took effect on June 18, 1966. The republic act was entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur". RA 4790 creates
a new municipality called Dianaton within Lanao del Sur with its seat found in Togaig, a
barrio within the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato and additionally it annexes several
barrios including two municipalities of Cotabato – Parang and Buldon, which is not in
the jurisdiction of Lanao del Sur. Bara

Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato requested
for certiorari and prohibition and declare RA 4790 as unconstitutional as its title is
misleading and invoked the provision of the Constitution that the title of a bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", is constitutional?

RULING:

NO. RA 4790 is not constitutional.

The Constitution provides that “every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The principal purpose of the
constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title is to apprise the legislators of the object, nature, and scope of the
provisions of the bill. This provision is mandatory, and a law enacted in violation thereof
is unconstitutional.

In this case, the title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur”— projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," fails to inform the
legislators or the public that the said act includes barrios from other municipalities of
Cotabato which is a separate province from Lanao del Sur.

For the reasons given, it was declared that Republic Act 4790 null and void as it violates
the constitutional provision of “single subject rule”. The Republic Act is not only creating
a municipality within Lanao del Sur but it also annexes several barrios of the two
municipalities of Cotabato, that of Parang and Buldon. Thus, RA 4790 is deemed
unconstitutional. 0
TOBIAS v. ABALOS
 2

G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, otherwise known as “An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong”, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof. They allege that
the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely:

(1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and

(2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two
separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforementioned subject is not germane to the
subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.
Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of
the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional as it violates the one subject-one bill
rule?

RULING:

NO. R.A. No. 7675 did not violate the constitutional provision of one subject-one bill
rule.

In Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), the court ruled that the constitutional
requirement one subject-one bill rule "should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general
subject."

In the case Tobias v. Abalos, the Court ruled that the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion
but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the
title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly
Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under
Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Thus, the
case filed against the respondent is dismissed as R.A. 7675 is in accordance with the
constitutional provision one subject-one bill rule. 0
 3

RODOLFO FARINAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

FACTS:

A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA

9006 or “The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices” as it repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office of an
elected official who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-
President.

It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law,
the same embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to Article 6 Section 26(1) –
One Subject One Bill Rule.

Article 6 Section 26(1): Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 violates the one subject-one bill rule?

RULING:

NO. Republic Act No. 9006 does not violate the one subject-one bill provision of the
Constitution.

In the case of Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, 66 Phil. 483,
the Court ruled that, “Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles
of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede power
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title
be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of the object. Mere details need not be set forth. The
title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.”

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed
in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. In this case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of
the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the
members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of
Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their
votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision
 4

repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, R.A. 9006 did not violate the
constitutional provision. 0
TAÑADA v. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish in

the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative
orders.

This petition was made to be invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Phil. Constitution
and on the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates as responders contend?

RULING:

YES. The publication in the Official Gazette is still required.

Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden on the people are “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability”. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby.

In this case, for the Presidential Decrees to be valid and enforceable, they must be
published in the Official Gazette regardless if there is an effectivity date provided
therein. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette must be made since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the law. 0
 5

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION v. VEGA

G.R. No. 105364, June 28, 2001 (deviation from Tañada v. Tuvera)

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of
Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and
for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to
reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued
with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette
on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992?

RULING:

YES. R.A. 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

Article 2 of the Civil Code, as further amended by Executive Order no. 200 of 1987,
states that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.”

In this case, Section 10 of R.A 7169 provided for its effectivity which stated that said
Act shall take effect upon its approval, and on January 2, 1992, R.A. 7169 was enacted
by Congress and signed by Aquino into law. The subsequent publication was not
necessary for it effectivity as the Act is of internal in nature and does not have a
general application. Thus, R.A. 7169 it took effect on the date provided for. 0
 6

HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011

FACTS:

Thirteen Hongkong nationals came to the Philippines and landed at Ninoy Aquino
International Airport. Upon presenting their belongings together with a Baggage
Declaration Form to Customs Examiner, Gilda Cinco found boxes of chocolates in the
bag of Ho Wai Pang which, when further examined, contained white crystalline
substances instead of chocolates. Then after, they were brought to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found
evidence for violation of Section 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, only as against petitioner and his five co-accused. They
were then found guilty of said violation.

On April of 1995, the RTC rendered a decision finding all the accused guilty of Section
15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as later on amended in R.A. 7659, and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six reclusion perpetua and to pay each a fine
amounting to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) applying the amended Act’s penalty
which has a less stricter penalty as opposed to the penalty of life imprisonment. The
imposed fine of thirty thousand (P30,000) is pursuant to the old Act it being more
favorable to the accused than that provided in R.A. 7659 which would be immediate
deportation after service of sentence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the retroactive application of the penalty of reclusion perpetua is

constitutional?

RULING:

YES. The retroactivity of the penalty is in accordance with the constitution.

In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994), the Court ruled that the
amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application.
Furthermore, in People v. Jones (343 Phil. 865, 878 [1997]), reclusion perpetua is
found to be a lighter penalty than life imprisonment.

So the court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under
R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment and allowing the retroactivity of the
amendatory law as it is more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less
stricter punishment. Thus, the retroactive application of the law is constitutional in this
case. 0
 7

OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

GR No. 217874, December 5, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By

virtue of his position, she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection
officer.
As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for
the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The
collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.

Hernan was later found guilty of malversation of public funds and was sentenced her to
suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor medium
period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum
period to reclusion temporal maximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P11,300.00 with an additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification. Such penalty
was then modified by Sandiganbayan to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum, together
with the accessory penalties under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that
interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by
the accused.

Multiple appeals by the petitioner was denied by the court before finally becoming final
and executory. However, upon passing of R.A. 10951, the case was reopened, not for
further reception of evidence, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by said court.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant
amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the
Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the
objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable
penalties to be imposed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court may modify a judgement that has already acquired finality
and apply an amendatory law which has a retroactive application on said case?

RULING:

YES. The judgement of said case may be modified.

 8

Section 3(c) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as
amended) provides that cases raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the
Court en bane. Also note that when an amendatory law is more lenient and favorable to
the accused, the same should be accorded retroactive application, as in the case of
People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994).

In the case Hernan v. Sandiganbayad, a novel situation exists wherein the judgment
convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and
yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of an
amendatory law. In accordance with Section 3(c) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, cases like such are to be acted upon by the Court en bane. Thus, in order to
effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity
of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and
recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan. 0
 9

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. REYES

G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015

FACTS:

1. GR.180771 Petitioners themselves the status of “legal guardians” of whales, dolphins,

porpoises and other cetacean species. Human petitioners also impleaded Former Pres.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as “unwilling co-petitioner” for “her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon Strait”.

2. GR. 181527 FIDEC Petitioners files for as real parties in interest and as
representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungahan Cebu and the present and future generations of Filipinos whose rights
are similarly affected.

3. The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected their
source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest.
The actual, direct and material damage they suffered, which has potential long term
effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.

4. Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the PROCEDURAL

REQUIREMENTS of obtaining an ECC. At any rate, they assert that the activities covered
by SC-46 fell under Section14 of the NIPAS, which they interpret to be an exception to
Section 12. They argue that ECC is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46
since
a. TS is not a nature reserve or natural park
b. Exploration was merely for gathering information
c. Measures were in place to ensure that exploration caused the least possible
damage to the area
5. Public respondents DID NOT VALIDLY OBTAIN and ECC for SC-46. Based on the
records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the second
subphase of its project, with the Environmental Management Bureau of Region VII
granting the project an ECC on March 6, 2007.

6. Public Respondents failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the
execution and existence of SC-46. The failure to report to Congress about SC-46
effectively took away any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms
and conditions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Service Contract SC-46 is illegal and unconstitutional

 10

RULING:

YES. SC-46 is both illegal and unconstitutional.

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states that the President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development
and use of local scientific and technical resources.

Take note that the deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of
agreements the President may enter into with foreign-owned corporations for
exploration and utilization of resources means that service contracts are no longer
allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution, 38 this inconsistency renders the law invalid and ineffective. Thus, SC 46
is unconstitutional and therefore void. 0
 11

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LACSON

G.R No. 149453, April 1, 2003

FACTS:

Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated
May 28, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application
of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures on the dismissal of the
criminal cases Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent.

Sec. 8 of Rule 117. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally

dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding

six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1)
year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived.

The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons
bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The court ruled in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases
were with the express consent of the respondent when he filed for judicial
determination.

The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application
are attendant.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure were complied with the Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the
heirs of the victims?

2. Whether or not time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or

retroactively.
 12

RULING:

Motion granted.

1. Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions are not met for
its applicability, namely:
• Prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for
provisional dismissal
• Offended Party ratified
• Court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally
• Public prosecutor served with a copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the
defendant’s burden to prove, which in this case has not been done.

a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through
counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a
provisional dismissal thereof
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was
given to the heirs of the victims.

2. Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be

applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve
intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes
to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be
prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March
29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec. 1, 2000, it would only in effect give
them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At the time, they had no
knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that.
“Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must be balance; justice is not to be dispensed
for the accused alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of
both State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused.
To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the
administration of justice.

1. In Re Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan, A.C. 9676, April 2, 2018

FACTS:
- The Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) furnished the Court a copy of a decision
finding it unsettling for Respondent Atty. Robelito Diuyan to notarize a Deed of Partition
on July 23, 2003 wherein one of the signatories has already died.

- The Court treated the decision as an administrative complaint against Atty. Diuyan
which requires the latter to file a comment thereon.

- By way of comment, the Respondent admitted notarizing said Deed of Partition,

asking those people who come before him on the truthfulness of said document by
which the latter affirmed. The affiants presented their Community Tax Certificates
(CTC).
 13

- The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation of which a mandatory conference was set. However,
respondent failed to attend same and that he was required to submit a position paper.

- In his paper, he affirmed that the affiants personally appeared to him and
acknowledged that they were the same parties in the document by showing their CTC.

- The IBP- Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found the respondent guilty of violating
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and recommends revocation of his notarial
commission, if any, for one (1) year. The IBP-Board of Governors (BOG) recommends
an increase in penalty to immediate revocation of the respondent’s notarial commission
and disqualification for being commissioned for two years and suspended from the
practice of law for 6 months.

ISSUE/S:
- Whether or not Atty. Robelito Diuyan can be held administratively liable for notarizing
a Deed of Partition on the basis of affiant’s Community Tax Certificate

RULING:
- The Court found no irregularities in the respondent’s act of notarizing the Deed of
Partition on July 23, 2003. The respondent notarized the deed on July 23, 2003 prior to
the effectivity of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The applicable law relative thereto
requires the presentation of cedula when acknowledging documents before a notary
public.
- The Complainant against Respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

ROSEMARIE T. SARTE
1L- M5

2. DEMETRIA ESTRADA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ULDARICO CASESA,

Defendant-Appellee

G.R. No. L-1560, October 25, 1949

Demetria Estrada sought to reverse the judgement of the municipal court declaring that
Uldarico Caseca may not be ejected from the premises in question on the basis of
Commonwealth Act No. 689.

FACTS:
On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer, alleging
that defendant leased from her a part of a dwelling at a monthly rental of P26; that on
August 11, 1945, plaintiff notified defendant in writing to vacate the premises under
lease, because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the first of
the following month; that defendant refused to leave.
 14

On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave
judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1,1945, at
the rate of P26 a month.

In reversing the judgment of the municipal court, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, said that "Commonwealth Act No. 689, as
amended only provides three grounds for ejecting a lessee or occupant from a building
destined solely for dwelling, namely (1) for willful and deliberate non-payment of rents,
(2) when the lessor has to occupy the building leased, and (3) when the lessee shall
have subleased the building or any part thereof as dwelling or for dwelling purpose
without the written consent of the proprietor."

The above requirements were provided in Commonwealth Act No. 689, which was
approved October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided that the same "shall be in
force for a period of two years after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved
October 18, 1946, amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as
follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its
approval."

ISSUE
1. When did this four-year period commence to run?
2. Is the present lease still within his period?

RULING
An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been
repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its
stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action after the
adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its
amended form. The amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had
always been contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation of
contractual relations between the state and others. Where an amendment leaves
certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions are continued in force,
with the same meaning and effect they had before the amendment. So where an
amendatory act provides that are existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in
the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or
substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new
enactment. (59 C. J., 1096, 1097.)lawphi1.nêt

In accordance with this rule, the provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending
section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be computed
from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The period
as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Tuason declared that he judgment
of Judge Dinglasan was correct, but, the period reckoned by the trial court being now
over, judgment shall be rendered ejecting defendant from the house described in the
 15

complaint and ordering him to pay rent at the rate of P26 a month from October 1,
1945.

3. DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON.

ARTHUR A. FAMINI

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2019

Ponente: Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.

Facts:
Dreamworks Construction, Inc. (petitioner), through its representatives, filed a
complaint against Cleofe S. Janiola (private respondent) for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22) on October 5, 2004. Petitioner also filed criminal cases against the
respondent for violation of BP 22 with the MTC on February 2, 2005. The subject of the
criminal cases filed by petitioner before the MTC.were the respondent’s issued checks in
consideration of an alleged construction agreement between the two parties.

Subsequently, the private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the
rescission of the alleged construction agreement between the two, as well as for
damages. This case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City.

On July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the
criminal case filed by petitioner with the MTC on grounds of Prejudicial Question,
claiming that the civil case filed previously by the respondent posed a prejudicial
question as against the criminal cases filed by petitioner.

The petitioner opposed the suspension of proceedings on grounds that:

(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract
upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue
from the issue of whether the private respondent violated BP 22; and
(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a
prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action”; thus, this element is missing as the criminal cases preceded the civil
case filed.

Later, MTC granted the respondent’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and reasoned that
the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are
without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22
must be dismissed. Following the said grant of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, MTC
denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

According to MTC, the belated filing of the civil case by the respondent did not detract
from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action
may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised
Rules of Court).
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Petitioner again appealed to the RTC but was denied. Hence, this petition raised.

Issues:

Whether or not the Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts erred in its discretion to
suspend proceedings in the criminal cases filed by petition on the basis of Prejudicial
Question in the subsequent civil case filed by respondent

Ruling:

Yes. The court granted the petition as no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it
are inapplicable.

The elements of a prejudicial question as amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111 are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can
be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The
civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. The phrase
“previously instituted” was inserted in the amendment of the provision to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal
action. This interpretation is further supported by the insertion of "subsequent" directly
before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the
amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the
civil action must precede the criminal action.

Furthermore, the resolution of the civil case wherein the respondent filed for the
rescission of the alleged construction agreement is not determinative of the prosecution
of the criminal action in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Even if the said
agreement was rescinded, this will not affect the prosecution of the private respondent
in the criminal case. It is the fact that the respondent issued checks that were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds that is in violation of BP 22.

In this case, the criminal case was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint
in the civil case filed by the respondent with the RTC. Therefore, the second element
required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists.

4. People vs. Guillermo Manantan

G.R. No 14129. July 31, 1962

Ponente: Regala, J.

FACTS:
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1. Guillermo Manantan, the defendant, was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code in the Province of Pangasinan in Pangasinan
Section 54- Active intervention of public officers and employees.- No justice,
judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army,
no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence
in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a public officer.

2. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the
peace the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.

3. The lower court denied the said motion holding that a justice of the peace is within
the purview of Section 54.

4. The defense counsel filed a second motion who cited in support thereof the decision
of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp.
1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

5. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of
the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Justice of the Peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code.

RULING:
Yes. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact
that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present
case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has
only been a substitution of terms.

On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First
Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the
scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance
justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations. . . .

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the
rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius in arriving at the conclusion that justices of
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the peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature
had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither
the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed,
there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est
exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.

“To God be the glory!”