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VOL. 22, JANUARY 29, 1968 231

Fabian vs. Fabian

No. L-20449. January 29, 1968.

ESPERANZA FABIAN, BENITA FABIAN and DAMASO

PAPA y FABIAN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. SILBINA
FABIAN, FELICIANO LANDRITO, TEODORA FABIAN
and FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, defendants-appellees.

Friar Lands Act; Sale of Friar Land Estate; Meaning of the

legal reservation under section 15 of Act 1120.·Under section 15 of
Act 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Land Act, title to the land
sold is reserved to the Government until the purchaser makes full
payment of all the required installments and the interests thereon.
This legal reservation refers "to the bare, naked title." The
equitable and beneficial title really went to the purchaser the
moment he paid the first installment and was given a certificate of
sale. The reservation of the title in favor of the Government is made
merely to protect the "interest of the Government so as to preclude
or prevent the purchaser from encumbering or disposing of the lot
purchased before the payment in full of the purchase price. Outside
of this protection the Government retains no right as owner.
Civil Law; Trust; Express Trust and Constructi Distinguished.
·Express trusts are created by the intention of the parties, while
or implied t ru sts are exclu- sively created by law, the latter not
being trusts in their technical sense. The express trusts disable the
trustee from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed
to his management or custody, at least while he does not openly
repudiate the trust, and makes such repudiation known to the
beneficiary

_______________

15 Hortillosa vs. Ganzon, supra.

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or cestui que trust. But in constructive trusts the rule is that laches
constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the trust, and no repudiation
is required, unless there is a concealment of the facts giving rise to
the trust.
Same; A person who acquired property through fraud is
considered a trustee of an implied trust.·The principle is that: If
property is acquired through fraud, the person obtaining it is
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes (Gayondato vs. Insular Treasurer,
49 Phil. 244).
Same; Action for reconveyance of property based upon a
constructive trust may be barred by the statute of limitations.
·Overruling previous decisions to the contrary, the Court in
Gerona vs. De Guzman, et al., L-19060, May 29, 1964, held that an
action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive
or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute
of limitations, and that the action therefor may be filed within four
years from the discovery of the fraud, the discovery in that case
being deemed to have taken place when new certificates of title
were issued exclusively in the names of the respondent therein.

Same; Acquisitive prescription under section 41 of Act 190.

·Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be
the owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent,
grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have
been commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant
or possessor of such land a full and complete title (see Sec. 41, Act
190).

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Rizal.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Felix Law Office for plaintiffs-appellants.
J.G. Mendoza for defendants-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is the appeal taken by Esperanza Fabian, Benita

I Fabian and Damaso Papa y Fabian from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed their
complaint for reconveyance, in civil case 295R, filed against
the defendants spouses Silbina Fabian and Feliciano
Landrito, and Teodora Fabian and Francisco del Monte,
upon the ground that the latter had acquired a valid and
complete title to the land in question by acquisitive
prescription.

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Fabian vs. Fabian

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This case traces its origin way back to January 1, 1909

when Pablo Fabian bought from the Philippine
Government lot 164 of the Friar Lands Estate in
Muntinlupa, Rizal, of an area 1 hectare, 42 ares and 80
centares, for the sum of P112 payable in installments. By
virtue of this purchase, he was issued sale certificate 547.
He died on August 2, 1928, survived 1
by four children,
namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II, and Silbina.
On October 5, 1928 Silbina Fabian and Teodora Fabian,
niece of the deceased, executed an affidavit, reciting,
among other things,

"Que el finado Pablo Fabian, no dejo ningun otro heredero sino los
declarantes, con derecho a heredar el lote No, 164 de la hacienda
Muntinlupa, relicto por dicho finado Pablo Fabian y para la
aprobacion de traspaso a nosotros el referido lote No. 164,
prestamos esta declaracion para todos los efectos que pueden
covenir a la Oficina de Terenos a defender por nuestro mayor
derecho de heredar dicho lote contra las reclamaciones juntas de
quien las presentare."

On the strength of this affidavit, sale certificate 547 was

assigned to them. On November 14, 1928 the acting
Director of Lands, on behalf of the Government, sold lot
164, under deed 17272, to Silbina Fabian, married to
Feliciano Landrito, and to Teodora Fabian, married to
Francisco del Monte, for the sum of P120. The vendees
spouses forthwith in 1929 took physical possession thereof,
cultivated it, and appropriated the produce therefrom (and
concededly have up to the present been appropriat- ing the
fruits from the land exclusively for themselves). In that
same year, they declared the lot in their names for taxation
purposes under tax declaration 3374. This tax declaration
was later cancelled, and in lieu thereof two tax declarations
(2418 and 2419) were issued in favor of Teodora Fabian and
Silbina Fabian, respectively. Since 1929 up to the present,
they have been paying the real estate taxes thereon. In
1937 the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued TCT 33203 over
lot 164 in their names. And on May 4, 1945, they
subdivided the lot into two equal parts; TCT 33203 was
then cancelled and TCT 38095 was

______________

1 Benita II Fabian died on October 8, 1937. Her only surviving child,

Damaso Papa y Fabian, is one of the three plaintif f s-appellants.

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ried to Feliciano Landrito, and TCT 38096 was issued over

lot 164-B in the name of Teodora Fabian, married to
Francisco del Monte.
On July 18, 1960 the plaintiffs filed the present action
for reconveyance against the defendants spouses, averring
that Silbina and Teodora, through fraud perpetrated in
their affidavit aforesaid, made it appear that "el finado
Pablo Fabian no dejo ningun otro heredero sino los
declarantes con derecho a heredar el lote No. 164 de la
hacienda de Muntinlupa", which is a false narration of
facts because Silbina knew that she is not the only
daughter and heir of the deceased Pablo Fabian, and
Teodora likewise knew all along that, as a mere niece of the
deceased, she was precluded from inheriting from him in
the presence of his f our surviving daughters; that by virtue
of this affidavit, the said defendants succeeded in having
sale certificate 547 assigned to them and thereafter in
having lot 164 covered by said certificate transferred in
their names; and that by virtue also of these assignment
and transfer, the defendants succeeded fraudulently in
having lot 164 registered in their names under TCT 33203.
They further allege that the land has not been transferred
to an innocent purchaser for value. A reconveyance thereof
is prayed for, aside from P3,000 attorney's 2fees and costs.
In their answer of August 31, 1960, the defendants
spouses claim that Pablo Fabian was not the owner of lot
164 at the time of his death on August 2, 1928 because he
had not paid in full the amortizations on the lot; that they
are the absolute owners thereof, having purchased it from
the Government for the sum of P120, and from that year
having exercised all the attributes of ownership thereof up
to the present; and that the present action for reconveyance
has already prescribed. The dismissal of the complaint is
prayed for.
On the basis of a partial stipulation of facts together

______________

2 On February 19, 1962 the defendants filed an amended answer

impleading Florencio and Gavino Landrito in substitution of their
mother Silbina Fabian who had died on the previous February 12.

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VOL . 22, JANUARY 29, 1968 235

Fabian vs. Fabian

with annexes, the lower court rendered judgment on June

28, 1962, declaring that the defendants spouses had
acquired a valid and complete title to the property by
acquisitive prescription, and accordingly dismissed the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs. The latter's

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motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied.

Hence, the present recourse.
The three resulting issues of law tendered for resolution
in this appeal, by the formulation of the parties, are: (1)
Was Pablo Fabian the owner of lot 164 at the time of his
death, in the face of the fact, admitted by the defendants-
appellees, that he had not then paid the entire purchase
price thereof ? (2) May laches constitute a bar to an action
to enforce a constructive trust? (3) Has title to the land
vested in the appellees through the mode of acquisitive
prescription?

1. Lot 164 was a part of the Friar Lands Estate of

Muntinlupa, Rizal; its sale to Pablo Fabian was
therefore governed by Act 1120, otherwise known as
the Friar Lands Act. While under section 15 of the
said Act, title to the land sold is reserved to the
Governmen t unt il the chaser makes f ull payment
of all the required installments and the interest
thereon, this legal reservation refers

"to the bare, naked title. The equitable and beneficial title really
went to the purchaser the moment he paid the first installment and
was given a certificate of sale. The reservation of the title in favor of
the Government is made merely to protect the interest of the
Government so as to preclude or prevent the purchaser from
encumbering or disposing of the lot purchased before the payment
in full of the purchase price. Outside of this protection the
Government retains no right as an owner. For instance, after
issuance of the sales certificate and pending payment in full of the
purchase price, the Government may not sell the lot to another. It
may not even encumber it. It may not occupy the land to use or
cultivate; neither may it lease it or even participate or share in its
fruits. In other words, the Government does not and cannot exercise
the rights and prerogatives of owner. And when said purchaser f
inally pays the f inal installment on the purchase price and is given
a deed of conveyance and a certif icate of title, the title at least in
equity, retroacts to the time he first occupied the land, paid the first
installment and was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. In
other words, pending the completion of the payment of the purchase
price, the purchaser is entitled to all

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Fabian vs. Fabian

the benefits and advantages which may accrue to the land as well
3
as suffer the losses that may befall it."

That Pablo Fabian had paid five annual installments to the

Government, and in fact been issued sale certificate 547 in
his name, are conceded. He was therefore the owner of lot

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164 at the time of his death. He left four daughters,

namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II and Silbina to
whom all his rights and interest over lot 164 passed upon
his demise.

"In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed
and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the
certificate shall descend and deed shall issue to the person who
under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the
title been perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate,
upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the
4
requirements of the certificate."

The assignment and sale of the lot to the defendants

Silbina and Teodora were therefore null and void as to that
portion sold to Teodora, and as well as to that portion
which lawfully devolved in favor of the appellants. To the
extent- of the participation of the appellants, application
must be made of the principle that if property is acquired
through fraud, the person obtaining it is considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes (Gayondato vs. Insular
Treasurer, 49 Phil. 244).

2. In Diaz, et al. vs. Gorricho, et al., 103 Phil. 264-265

(1958), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, declared in no uncertain terms that
laches may bar an action brought to enforce a
constructive trust such as the one in the case at bar.
Illuminating are the following excerpts from the
decision penned by Mr. Justice Reyes:

"Article 1456 of the new Civil Code, while not retroactive in

character, merely expresses a rule already recognized by our courts
prior to the Code's promulgation (see Gayondato vs. Insular
Treasurer, 49 Phil. 244). Appellants are, however, in error in
believing that like express trust, such constructive

_______________

3 Director of Lands, et al. vs. Rizal, et al., 87 Phil. v. 810811.

4 Sec. 16, Act 1120.

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Fabian vs. Fabian

trusts may not be barred by lapse of time. The American law on

trusts has always maintained a distinction between express trusts
created by the intention of the parties, and the implied or
constructive trusts that are exclusively created by law, the latter
not being trusts in their technical sense (Gayondato vs. Insular

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Treasurer, supra). The express trusts disable the trustee from

acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his
management or custody, at least while he does not openly repudiate
the trust, and makes such repudiation known to the beneficiary or
cestui que trust. For this reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act 190) declared that the rules on adverse possession does not
apply to 'continuing and subsist-ing' (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts.
But in constructive trusts, x x x the rule is that laches
constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the trust, and repudiation is
not required, unless there is a concealment of the facts giving rise to
the trust (54 Am. Jur., secs. 580, 581; 65 C.J., secs. 956, 957; Amer.
Law Institute, Restatement of Trusts, section 219; on Restitution,
section 179; Stianson vs. Stianson, 6 ALR 287; Claridad vs.
Benares, 97 Phil. 973."

The assignment of sale certificate 547 was effected on

October 5, 1928, and the actual transfer of lot 164 was
made on the following November 14. It was only on July 8,
1960, 32 big years later, that the appellants for the first
time came forward with their claim to the land. The record
does not reveal, and it is not seriously asserted, that the
appellees concealed the facts giving rise to the trust. Upon
the contrary, paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts of the
parties states with striking clarity "that defendants herein
have been in possession -of the land in question since 1928
up to the present publicl y a nd c tinuously under claim of
ownership; they have cultivated it, harvested and
appropriated the fruits for themselves." (italics supplied.)

3. Six years later, in Gerona, et al. vs. De Guzman, et

al., L-19060, May 29, 1964, the factual setting
attending which is substantially similar to that
obtaining in the case at bar, this Court, in an
excellently-phrased decision penned by Chief
Justice, then Associate Justice, Roberto Concepcion,
unequivocally reaffirmed the rule, overruling
previous decisions to the contrary, that "an action
for reconveyance of real property based upon a
constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud,
may be barred by the statute of limitations," and
further that "the action there

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Fabian vs. Fabian

for may be filed within four years from the discovery ofthe
fraud," the discovery in that case being deemed tohave
taken place when new certificates of title were issued
exclusively in the names of the respondents therein.The
following is what Justice Concepcion, speaking forthe

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Court, said:

"[A]lthough, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-

heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants
do not hold the property in question under an adverse title (Cordova
vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of limitations
operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is
asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos v. Ramos, 45 Phil.,
362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857; Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. ,
23
"When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-
judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the
late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of
title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from
the estate of the deceased, and consequently, set up a title adverse
to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the
annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted
with fraud.
"Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v.
Mendoza, L-12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison v. Fernandez, L-
11764, January 31, 1959; Marabiles v. Quito, L10408, October 18,
1956 and Sevilla v. De los Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it
is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance
of real property based upon a constructive or implied trusts,
resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations
(Candelaria vs. Romero, L-12149, September 30, 1960; Alzona v.
Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).
"Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed
of 'extra-judicial settlement' upon the ground of fraud in the
execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4)
years from the discovery of the fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-
11072, September 24, 1959), Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of the respondents
exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement constitutes constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz
v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958; Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578,
May 14, 1958: J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539,
January 30, 1962; Lopez v. Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964)."
(Emphasis supplied.)

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Upon the undisputed facts in the case at bar, not only had
laches set in when the appellants instituted their action for
reconveyance in 1960, but as well their right
5
to enforce the
constructive trust had already prescribed.
It logically follows from the above disquisition that

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acquisitive prescription has likewise operated to vest

absolute title in the appellees, pursuant to the provisions of
section 41 ,of Act 190 that

"Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be

the owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent,
grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have
commenced or continued,6 shall vest in every actual occupant or
possessor of such land a full and complete title x x x". (Italcis ours.)

The stringent mandate of said section 41 that "the

possession by the claimant or by the person under or
through whom he claims must have been actual, open,
public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any
other right and adverse to all other claimants," was
adjudged by the lower court as having been fulfilled in the
case at hand. And we agree. Although paragraph 13 of the
stipulation of facts hereinbefore adverted to does not
explicitly employ the word "adverse" to characterize the
possession of the defendants from 1928 up to the filing of
the complaint in 1960, the words, "defendants have been

_______________

5 See Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 870, 872 (1920) which held that
'under the Spanish law an heir can acquire by prescription the ownership
of an inheritance to the prejudice of his coheirs and that article 1965 of
the Civil Code is only applied to an action for the partition of an
inheritance, i.e., to an action wherein the rights of all parties to their
respective shares of the inheritance is (sic) taken for granted but not to
an action wherein the plaintiff s right to participate in the inheritance is
denied," and the "acquisitive prescription of ownership (acquired by one
of the co-owners, coheirs, and administrator, depositary, or lessee by
means of an adverse possession under claim of title and after the lapse of
the time fixed by law) can completely extinguish the right of the other co-
owners, coheirs, or owners of the property in the possession of the one
claiming ownership by prescription."
6 See Garcia, et al. vs. de Guzman, L-15988, August 30, 1962, cited in
Garcia, et al. vs. Bello, et al., L-24702 and L-26357, Sept. 23, 1966, 18
Supreme Court Reports Annotated 101.

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Fabian vs. Fabian

in possession of the land since 1928 up to the present

[1960] publicly and continuously under claim of ownership;
they have cultivated it, harvested and appropriated the
fruits for themselves," clearly delineate, and can have no
other logical meaning than, the adverse character of the
possession exercised by the appellees over the land. If the

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import of the abovequoted portion of the stipulation of facts

is at all doubted, such doubt is dispelled completely by
additional cumulative facts in the record which are
uncontroverted. Thus, the appellees declared the lot for
taxation purposes in their names, and the resulting tax
declaration was later concelled and two tax declarations
were issued in favor of Silbina Fabian and Teodora Fabian,
respectively. They have been paying the real estate taxes
thereon from 1929 to the present. And in 1945 they
subdivided the lot into two equal parts, and two transfer
certificates of title were issued separately in their names.
Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold not only that
the appellants' action to enforce the constructive trust
created in their favor has prescribed, but as well that a
valid, full and complete title has vested in the appellees by
acquisitive prescription.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, dismissing the
complaint, is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Bengzon,

J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Judgment affirmed.

Note.·As to trust and prescription, see Julio vs.

Dalandan, L-19012, Oct. 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543; Cuaycong
vs. Cuaycong, L-21616, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1192;
Pascual vs. Meneses, L-18838, May 25, 1967, 20 SCRA 219;
Araneta vs. Perez, L-18872, July 15, 1966, 17 SCRA 643; De
Buencamino vs, De Matias, L-19397, April 30, 1966, 16
SCRA 849.

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