Manly Sportswear V Dadodette Digest

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CASE: MANLY SPORTSWEAR MANUFACTURING, INC., petitioner, vs.

DADODETTE ENTERPRISES
AND/OR HERMES SPORTS CENTER, respondents.

DOCTRINE: Where there is sufficient proof that the copyrighted products are not original creations but
are readily available in the market under various brands, as in this case, validity and originality will not
be presumed and the trial court may properly quash the issued warrant for lack of probable cause.

FACTS:

Special investigator of NBI applied for a search warrant before the RTC of QC based on the information
that respondents were in possession of goods, the copyright of which belonged to the petitioner
MANLY. After finding reasonable grounds, search warrant was issued in violation of Secs. 172 and 217 of
RA 8293. Respondents moved to quash and annul the search warrant contending that it is invalid since
the sporting goods manufactured by the petitioners are ordinary and common. Hence, it is not among
the classes of work protected under Sec. 172 of RA 8293.

RTC granted the motion to quash and declared the warrant null and void for products of MANLY do not
appear to be original creations and were being manufactured and distributed by different companies
locally and abroad under various brands. Hence, it is unqualified for protection under Sec. 172 of RA
8293. MANLY’s certificate of registrations were only issued in 2002, whereas there were certificates for
the same sport articles which were issued earlier than MANLY’s. CA affirmed the decision of RTC and
ruled that its ruling in the ancillary proceeding did not preempt the findings of the intellectual property
court as it did not resolve with finality the status or character of the seized items.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and to quash the search warrant? YES
2. Whether or not the products of petitioner can be protected under copyright law? NO

RULING:

1. The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of
their judicial function. The power to quash the same also rests solely with them. Trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it entertained the motion to quash considering that no criminal
action has yet been instituted when it was filed. There was no probable cause in the first place
to justify its issuance. Since the copyrighted products do not appear to be original creations of
MANLY, they are not among the work enumerated under Section 172 of RA 8293. The court
cannot be faulted for overturning its initial assessment that there was probable cause in view of
its inherent power to issue warrants and quash the same.

Moreover, the trial court was acting within bounds when it ruled, in an ancillary proceeding,
that the copyrighted products of petitioner are not original creations. As correctly observed by
the Court of Appeals, the trial court's finding that the seized products are not copyrightable was
merely preliminary as it did not finally and permanently adjudicate on the status and character
of the seized items. MANLY could still file a separate copyright infringement suit against the
respondents because the order for the issuance or quashal of a warrant is not res judicata.
2. The copyright certificates issued in favor of MANLY constitute merely prima facie evidence of
validity and ownership. However, no presumption of validity is created where other evidence
exist that may cast doubt on the copyright validity. Hence, where there is sufficient proof that
the copyrighted products are not original creations but are readily available in the market under
various brands, as in this case, validity and originality will not be presumed and the trial court
may properly quash the issued warrant for lack of probable cause.

Besides, no copyright accrues in favor of MANLY despite issuance of the certificates of


registration and deposit pursuant to Section 2, Rule 7 of the Copyrights Safeguards and
Regulations which states:

Sec. 2Effects of Registration and Deposit of Work. — The registration and deposit of
the work is purely for recording the date of registration and deposit of the work and
shall not be conclusive as to copyright ownership or the term of the copyrights or the
rights of the copyright owner, including neighboring rights

At most, the certificates of registration and deposit issued by the National Library and the
Supreme Court Library serve merely as a notice of recording and registration of the work but do
not confer any right or title upon the registered copyright owner or automatically put his work
under the protective mantle of the copyright law. It is not a conclusive proof of copyright
ownership. As it is, nonregistration and deposit of the work within the prescribed period only
makes the copyright owner liable to pay a fine.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed

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