Agrarian Reform

GREGORIO CASTILLO v. COURT OF APPEALS and question; that he did not ask permission from the private respondent
ALBERTO IGNACIO to construct a rest house on subject land, since as owner thereof, he
G.R. No. 98028 : January 27, 1992 had the right to do so; that he was merely exercising his right of
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
ownership when he cut certain trees in the subject premises; that
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision which when the barangay captain failed to settle the conflict and the matter
reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court in was referred to the MAR-BALA (Ministry of Agrarian Reform-
Civil Case No. 8302-M and declared respondent Alberto Ignacio as Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance) Office in Malolos, Bulacan,
agricultural tenant of the petitioner. Atty. Benjamin Yambao of the MAR (Ministry of Agrarian Reform)
prepared the "Kasunduan" attached to the respondent's complaint,
On July 18, 1985, a complaint for injunction was filed by private but when he (petitioner) said that he had some misgivings about
respondent Alberto Ignacio against petitioner Gregorio Castillo with some words therein, Atty. Yambao assured him that he need not
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. worry because the respondent could not be a "kasamang magsasaka"
of his mango land because there is nothing to cultivate or till in said
It is alleged in the complaint that the respondent is the agricultural land, but he still corrected the last part of par. 4 of said "Kasunduan"
tenant of the petitioner in the latter's parcel of land consisting of by making it read "sa kanilang matiwasay na kaugnayan" before
9,920 square meters with fruit-bearing trees situated in Cut-cut, signing the same.
Pulilan, Bulacan; that sometime in April 1985, the petitioner
requested the respondent to allow him to construct a resthouse in said On September 28, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring
land, and as a token of goodwill, the respondent agreed, which that no tenancy relationship exists between the petitioner and the
agreement is embodied in a "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") between private respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
them; that in violation of said agreement, the petitioner started to cut follows:
fruit-bearing trees on the land in question and filled with adobe
stones the area devoted by the private respondent to the planting of WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
vegetables. a) dismissing the above-entitled case, with costs against the plaintiff;
The complaint asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary b) lifting the preliminary injunction issued on September 18, 1985
injunction to enjoin the petitioner from further cutting fruit-bearing and declaring the same legally inefficacious henceforth; and
trees and from committing further acts of dispossession against the
private respondent. The injunction was granted. c) directing the plaintiff no pay unto the defendant the amount of
P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the private
respondent is not his agricultural tenant; that respondent Alberto From the above decision, the private respondent appealed to the
Ignacio is merely a "magsisiga" (smudger) of the landholding in Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the

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trial court. The respondent appellate court declared that there exists a The Court of Appeals committed clear and patent error in not
tenancy relationship between Alberto Ignacio and Gregorio Castillo ordering the termination of any and all relationships between
and permanently enjoined the latter from disturbing the respondent's petitioner and private respondent, the latter having failed to perform
peaceful possession as tenant of said land. the work of "magsisiga" on the subject parcel of land and instead he
obstructs the driveway by scattering rubbish, dry leaves, dirt and
Hence, the instant petition was filed, with the petitioner assigning the other rubbish, preventing the petitioner from proceeding to the
following errors as the issues raised to us: premises of the land by putting up a barb wire fence which are acts
of harrassment, disturbing the peaceful possession of petitioner and
I
which acts are inimical to the continuation of any kind of
The Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) committed clear and patent relationship between Gregorio Castillo and Alberto Ignacio.
error in reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which is
The issue to be resolved in the present petition is whether or not a
fully supported not only by substantial evidence but by
tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
overwhelming evidence.
The Agricultural Tenancy Act defines "agricultural tenancy" as —
II
. . . the physical possession by a person of a land devoted to
The Court of Appeals committed clear and reversible error and grave
agriculture belonging to or legally possessed by, another for the
abuse of discretion in declaring that "the relationship between
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee over the mango land in
members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of
question as one of agricultural tenancy" despite the patent judicial
which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay
admission of respondent Ignacio that he is merely a "magsisiga" of
a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both. (Sec. 3,
the mango land under litigation.
R.A. No. 1199; 50 O.G. 4655-56).
III
As held in the case of Qua v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 236
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in [1991]), the essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: (1) the
permanently enjoining petitioner "from disturbing plaintiff- parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
appellant's peaceful possession as tenant of said land," although agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; (4) there
private respondent is not in physical possession of the land, is consideration which consist of sharing the harvest; (5) there is
respondent Ignacio being merely and admittedly a "magsisiga" of the consent to the tenant to work on the land and (6) there is personal
mango land in question. cultivation by him.

IV From the foregoing definition, the petitioner insists that for a person
to claim tenancy relationship, he must be an occupant or must be in

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physical possession of the agricultural land. He alleges that, Alberto petitioner and the members of his family could enter said land
Ignacio, being a mere smudger (magsisiga) of the mango land, no without said petitioner's written permission.
tenancy relationship can exist between them absent the element of
physical possession. We agree with the trial court that the element of personal cultivation
is absent. The main thrust of the petitioner's argument is that the
In Gagola v. Court of Agrarian Relations (18 SCRA 992 [1966]), the respondent Court of Appeals is mandated by law to affirm the
Court held that a tenant has possession of the land only through decision of the Regional Trial Court, acting as an Agrarian Court, if
personal cultivation. Thus, in the instant case, the key factor in the findings of fact in said decision are supported by substantial
ascertaining the existence of a landowner-tenant relationship is evidence and the conclusions stated therein are not clearly against
whether or not there is personal cultivation of the land by the private the law and jurisprudence. On the other hand, the private respondent
respondent. contends that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court.
The trial court noted that:
After painstakingly going over the records of the petition, we find no
Let alone or notwithstanding the use of the phrase "kasamang strong and cogent reason which justifies the appellate court's
magsasaka" in the Kasunduan (Exhibit C) relied upon by the deviation from the findings and conclusions of the trial court. As
plaintiff, there is no dispute that the actual role ever played by the pointed out in Hernandez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189
plaintiff vis-a-vis the land in litigation was that of a mere SCRA 758 [1990]), in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere
"magsisiga" (smudger). Stated differently, plaintiff has never substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact
performed on the property in question any of the acts of cultivation which went beyond the minimum evidentiary support demanded by
contemplated by the law as essential to the creation of an agricultural law, that is supported by substantial evidence, are final and
tenancy relationship. In fine, it is the sense of the Court that absent conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunal.
the important factor of cultivation, no tenancy relationship has ever
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant over the property Moreover, and as significantly held in Qua v. Court of Appeals
involved in the instant case. At most and at best, the contractual (supra), the fact that the source of livelihood of the private
relationship between them was purely civil nature consisting solely respondents is not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting
of the seasonal engagement of plaintiff's services as "magsisiga" or is indicative of non-agricultural tenancy relationship.
"taga-suob."
Under the facts obtaining in the case, respondent Ignacio is a
On this matter, the appellate court disagreed and noted instead that businessman by occupation and this is his principal source of
personal cultivation by respondent Ignacio of petitioner land is income. He manufacturers hollow blocks. He also has a piggery and
clearly spelled out or admitted in the "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") in poultry farm as well as a hardware store on the land adjoining the
view of the aforementioned provision therein that nobody except subject land. To add to that, the respondent farms the riceland of one

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Dr. Luis Santos. It is thus evident that the working hours of the petitioner has correctly argued that the receipt is inadmissible on the
respondent as a businessman and his other activities do not permit ground that he did not participate in its execution.
him to undertake the work and obligations of a real tenant. This is
further supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent cannot The maxim "res inter alios acta altere nocere non debet," found in
even personally perform the work of a smudger because on October Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court applies, for as stated in Gevero
22, 1986, the respondent hired some 20 people who are not members v. Intermediate Appellant Court (189 SCRA 201 [1990]) the right of
of his family to cut and burn the grass in the premises of the subject a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
land. another.

Anent the element of consent, the petitioner contends that the best Also in pari materia is Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform
evidence and imperishable proof of the relationship of the parties is (168 SCRA 247 [1988]), that the fact of sharing alone is not
that shown in the complaint filed by private respondent with the sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Well-settled is the rule
barangay captain Tomas Mercado that he is a mere "magsisiga" of that all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
the mango trees on the subject parcel of land. On the other hand, the relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more
respondent appellate court said that the best proof of the existence of requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
tenancy relationship is the "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") and that under contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, 'when the subject person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program
admissible other than the original document itself,' subject only to of the Government under existing tenancy laws. (Qua v. Court of
certain exceptions. Inasmuch as substantial evidence does not only Appeals, supra citing Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482
require the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence (Berenguer, Jr. v. [1984]).
CA, 164 SCRA 433 [1988] citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial However, with respect to the award of attorney's fees by the trial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]), we rule that there is no concrete court, the award of P10,000.00 is unwarranted since the action
evidence on record sufficient to establish that the element of consent appears to have been filed in good faith. There should be no penalty
is present. But even assuming arguendo that the element of consent on the right to litigate. (Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of
is present, we declared in De los Reyes v. Espineli (30 SCRA 574 Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989] citing Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,
[1969]) that absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be 137 SCRA 50 [1985]).
a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the
parties. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
With respect to the requisite of sharing the harvests, the respondent and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with
appellate court considered the receipt (Exhibit "E") signed by the the MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is DELETED.
petitioner's son Walderado Castillo as its evidence. On this point, the

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SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

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