Garcia vs Drilon (2013)

Summary Cases:

● Garcia vs. Drilon (RTC Judge of Bacolod City)

Subject:

Equal Protection, Void for Vagueness, Judicial Power

Facts:

Republic Act No. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children) defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom the woman has a common child. The law provides for protection orders from the barangay
and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC.

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her 3 minor children, a verified petition before the
RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband,
Jesus Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to RA 9262.

Rosalie alleged that during the marriage, her husband admitted to an ongoing affair with a bank manager.
The infidelity spawned a series of fights that left her physically and emotionally wounded and the children
traumatized. She is determined to leave her husband but he threatened to deny her financial support.

The RTC initially issued a Temporary Protection Order effective for 30 days which was repeatedly
renewed. Notwithstanding the TPO, the husband allegedly failed to give them financial support and
continued to commit new acts of harassment.

The petitioner husband assails the constitutionality R.A. 9262 of as being violative of the equal protection
and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

Held:

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Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute

1. Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts (RTC). The Supreme
Court designate the Family Courts from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts. The
designated Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children.

2. In spite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority
as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.

3. RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute. The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in the
Supreme Court, but in all RTCs.

Failure to raise the constitutionality issue at the earliest opportunity

4. The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 could have been raised by petitioner at the earliest
opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which
had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of the Supreme Court.

5. Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an Opposition to the petition and not an
answer. The rule prescribes that the opposition shall exclude any counterclaim, cross-claim and/or
third-party complaint but these may be raised in a separate action.

6. Since the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complain, then it is not prohibited from being raised in the
Opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

7. That the proceedings are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the
same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does
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not need to be supported by evidence.

TRO issued against the Protection Order

8. Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day
TRO issued by the Court of Appeal against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto was improper.

9. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.

10. The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits
of the case. However, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such protection orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against VAWC.

Equal Protection

11. The deliberations of Congress reveals that the lawmakers intended to limit the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only, and to exclude men from the
protection under the said measure.

12. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate. (citing Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union)

13. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be (1) based
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; (2) that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) that it must apply equally to
each member of the class.
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14. While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the
Philippines, the same cannot render RA 9262 invalid. The mere fact that the legislative classification may
result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons
or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
invalid.

15. RA 9262 did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

(a) R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions-- The “gender-based violence” or the unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law.

(b) Classification is germane to the purpose of the law – the distinction between men and women is
germane to the purpose of the law which is to address violence committed against women and children

(c ) RA 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as
well.

(d) The law applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse

Void for vagueness

16. The “void for vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.

17. There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.

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RA 9262 does not single out male husbands

18. There is no merit to the contention that RA 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As
defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.

19. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code, allowing liability to extend even to parents-in-laws (see
Go-Tan vs Spouses Tan).

Due Process

20. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due process.

21. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary
to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence,
which is about to recur.

22. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The
victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition.

23. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Notably, when the TPO is issued ex parte,
the court shall order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition
within five (5) days from service.

Non-referral to a mediator is justified

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24. Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof
to a mediator.

25. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach
consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A
process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault.

Undue delegation of Judicial Power

26. Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the courts and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials
to issue protection orders.

27. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.

28. The Protection Order issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function
of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the
barangay.”

29. We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the
fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.”

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