Remegio v. People

6/26/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
818 Phil. 827
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 196945, September 27,

2017 ]
DANILO REMEGIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision,[1]

dated 16 September 2008, and Resolution,[2] dated 6 April 2011,
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00312, which
affirmed with modification the Decision,[3] dated 16 September
2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Culasi, Antique
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. C-358 finding petitioner Danilo
Remegio (petitioner) guilty of homicide as defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
THE FACTS
In an Information, dated 19 November 1999, petitioner was

charged with homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December 1998, in

the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then armed
with an illegally possessed firearm, with intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with said firearm one Felix
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/63487 1/18
Sumugat, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wound

on the vital part of his body which caused his
instantaneous death.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 249 of the

Revised Penal Code.[4]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In the pre-trial

conference, the parties stipulated on the fact that petitioner killed
Felix Sumugat (Sumugat) on 12 December 1998, at Barangay
Jalandoni, Culasi, Antique, without prejudice to petitioner's plea of
self-defense.[5] As a result of petitioner's claim of self-defense,
the order of trial was reversed.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented petitioner and Diosdado Bermudez

(Bermudez) as its witnesses. Their combined testimony tended to
establish the following:
Petitioner was the caretaker of a parcel of land belonging to his

brother-in-law, Isidro Dubria. The said land was planted with
various fruit- bearing trees as well as coconut, mahogany, and ipil-
ipil trees.[6] On 12 December 1998, at around nine o'clock in the
morning, petitioner heard the sound of a chainsaw. He then saw
the victim, Sumugat, cutting the ipil-ipil tree which was uprooted
during the typhoon that occurred on the previous day.[7]
Petitioner approached Sumugat. He told him to cut only the

branches of the ipil-ipil tree and not its trunk as it would be
placed in the warehouse because his in-laws would be arriving
from the United States. Sumugat became infuriated and shouted,
"You have nothing to do with this. You are only an in-law. I will
kill you." He then drew a revolver from his waist and aimed it at
petitioner.[8]
Petitioner raised both of his hands and told Sumugat that he

would not fight him, but Sumugat repeated that he would kill him.
Fearing for his life, petitioner grappled with Sumugat for
possession of the gun. He successfully took the gun from
Sumugat but the latter picked up the chainsaw, turned it on, and
advanced towards petitioner. Petitioner stepped back and shot at
the ground to warn Sumugat, but the latter continued thrusting
the chainsaw at him. Petitioner parried the chainsaw blade with his
left hand, but he lost his balance and accidentally pressed the
gun's trigger, thus firing a shot which hit Sumugat in the chest.[9]
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented Bernardo Caduada (Caduada), Hermie

Magturo (Magturo), Rolando Dubria, and Dr. Feman Rene M.
Autajay as its witnesses. Their combined testimony tended to
establish the following:
Petitioner approached Sumugat who was cutting the ipil-ipil tree

with the chainsaw.[10] He told Sumugat that if the latter did not
desist from cutting the tree, he would shoot him. Sumugat
answered that the tree was obstructing the way. Petitioner then
drew his gun and fired at Sumugat's direction, but he missed.[11]
Sumugat turned on the chainsaw, which provoked petitioner to
shoot him on the left foot. Infuriated, Sumugat continued to
brandish the chainsaw, but petitioner shot him in the chest.[12]
Before he fell down, Sumugat swung the chainsaw, hitting
petitioner in the palm. Petitioner then threw the gun into a canal.
[13]
Magturo and Caduada executed a Joint Affidavit[14] on 2 February

1999, narrating the incident they witnessed on 12 December
1998. In his direct examination, however, Magturo stated that he
did not understand the affidavit's contents at the time of signing.
[15] Moreover, he testified that he was unfamiliar with the
contents of the said affidavit because he did not witness the
incident.[16] On the other hand, Caduada, on cross-examination,

affirmed that he executed an Affidavit of Retraction[17] on 9
December 2002, because his conscience bothered him for telling a
narration of facts which he did not actually witness.[18]
The RTC Ruling
In its Decision, dated 16 September 2005, the RTC found

petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to
imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to
pay the heirs of Sumugat the amount of P300,000.00.
The RTC ruled that the act of petitioner in telling the victim to
stop cutting the tree was a provocation on his part. It added that
from the moment petitioner wrested the firearm from the victim,
his life was already free from any threat coming from the victim. It
opined that the firing of the gun was no longer justified as the
victim was already unarmed and was already crippled by the
gunshot wound he sustained on his left foot. Hence, it concluded
that petitioner's evidence in support of his theory of self-defense
did not meet the requirements of Article 11 of the RPC. The fallo
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, having admitted

the killing of Felix Sumugat, accused's evidence in the
Record claiming self-defense, being not clear, not
credible, not convincing, not justifiable, the Court
found the accused guilty of the crime of Homicide
which carries an imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal, a penalty divisible by three (3) periods.
Pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being one mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, in relation to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to an imprisonment often (10) years and one
(1) day as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight

(8) months as maximum. (same being the minimum of
Reclusion Temporal) and the Court hereby, pursuant
to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 1, Rule Ill of the Rules of Court, further orders
the accused Danilo Remegio to indemnify the heirs of
Felix Sumugat in the sum of P300,000.00.[19]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed before the CA. Meanwhile, he was

granted provisional liberty pending appeal after puting up a bail
bond in the amount of P40,000.00.[20]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision, dated 16 September 2008, the CA affirmed the

conviction of petitioner, but modified the penalty imposed to two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. It also ordered petitioner to pay the heirs of Sumugat
the amounts of P50,000.00 as funeral expenses and P50,000.00
as civil indemnity instead of the P300,000.00 imposed by the trial
court.
The CA held that the element of unlawful aggression was present.

It observed that the testimonies of petitioner and Bermudez were
consistent and supported by the medical certificate evidencing
that petitioner sustained wounds in his left hand due to parrying
the chainsaw which the victim thrust at him. The appellate court
declared that the prosecution's version was hardly believable
considering that Caduada retracted his testimony and Magturo
admitted that he was not around when the incident happened. It
further noted that Rolando Dubria, a 13-year-old child, spoke
only on 24 January 2005, or more than six years from the time
the incident occurred; and that he was never made to give his
account to the police authorities during the investigation stage.
The CA also stated that the child admitted on cross-examination
that Sumugat was able to inflict wounds on petitioner with the
use of the chainsaw.
The appellate court, however, ruled that the element of reasonable

necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression is
absent. It reasoned that there could have been several ways for
petitioner to repel the aggression without having to kill the victim,
considering that the latter was already wounded and he held a
chainsaw which was difficult to handle.
Finally, the CA adjudged that petitioner's act of telling the victim

not to cut the trunk of the uprooted ipil-ipil tree could not be
considered provocation. It disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION of the Regional Trial

Court Branch 13, Culasi, Antique in Criminal Case No.
C-358, convicting accused-appellant of HOMICIDE is
hereby AFFIRMED but with the following
modifications:
1. HE IS SENTENCED TO SUFFER THE

INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF 2 YEARS AND
4 MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS
MINIMUM, TO 6 YEARS AND 1 DAY OF
PRISION MAYOR AS MAXIMUM;
2. HE IS DIRECTED TO PAY THE HEIRS OF

FELIX SUMUGAT THE FOLLOWING SUMS:
i. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)

AS FUNERAL EXPENSES;
ii. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)

AS CIVIL INDEMNITY.[21] (emphasis in
the original)
Unconvinced, petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same

was denied by the CA in a Resolution, dated 6 April 2011.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO INVOKE

THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE.
Petitioner argues, citing US. v. Molina,[22] that the person

attacked is not duty bound to expose himself to be wounded or
killed and while the damages to his person or life subsist, he has a
perfect and indisputable right to repel such danger by wounding
his adversary, to disable him completely, so that he may not
continue the assault; and that from the inception of the incident,
until it ended, the victim did not desist from attacking the
petitioner, hence, the attending circumstance of reasonable
necessity of the means employed is present.[23]
In its Comment,[24] the Office of the Solicitor General avers that

the petition, anchored on the claim of self-defense, merely raises
a pure question of fact which had already been rejected by both
the trial and the appellate courts, hence, it should be denied
outright.
In his Reply,[25] petitioner counters that reasonableness of the

means employed does not depend on the harm done, but upon
the reality and imminence of the danger or injury to the person
defending himself; and that one who is persistently assaulted by
another cannot be expected to act in a normal manner, and to
follow the normal processes of reasoning, and weigh the necessity
of employing a certain means of defense.
THE COURT'S RULING
Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies

the admission by the accused that he committed the criminal act.
Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the
accused that he was in fact innocent. When the accused, however,
admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any
claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.
[26] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense
shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.

[27]
For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and

convincing evidence the following elements as provided under the
first paragraph, Article 11 of the RPC: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[28]
Unlawful aggression
In self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element.[29]

There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the
person who defended himself.[30] It presupposes an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and
limb of a person - not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude
- at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor.[31]
The pertinent parts of the transcript of stenographic notes

provide thus:
[Atty. Operiano:]
Q: What exactly did you tell Felix Sumugat

when you went near him while he was
sawing the ipil-ipil tree?
A: I told him. "Nong, please stop this first.
We have to talk."
Q: And what was the tone of your voice when

you uttered those words?
A: It was in a low voice because I still
respect him being older than me, s1r.
Q: What did Felix Sumugat do, if any when

you uttered those words?
A: He stopped the engine of the chainsaw
and then laid down on the ground and
said, "What?"
Q: What did Felix Sumugat say to you, if

any?
A: Felix Sumugat said, "So, what do you
mean to say?" I told him, "Nong, just cut
the branches and the main trunk will be
placed in the bodega because my father-
in-law and my brother-in-law will be
arriving in March."
Q: And what did Felix Sumugat say, if any?

A: He said, "You have nothing to do with
this. You are only an in-law. I will kill
you."
Q: When Felix Sumugat uttered those words,

what was the tone of his voice?
A: He was shouting, sir.
Q: And after he said, "I will kill you," what

happened, if any?
A: He drew his revolver and aimed at me, sir.
xxxx
Q: While Felix Sumugat was pointing that

gun at you, what did you do, if you did
anything?
A: I raised both my hands, sir.
Q: And when you raised both your hands,

what did you say, if any?
A: I said, "Nong, I will not fight you."
Q: What did Felix Sumugat do, if any after

you said you will not fight him, at the
same time raising both your hands?
A: He said, "I will kill you."
Q: How many times did he say, "I will kill

you"?
A: Twice, sir.
xxxx
Q: Now, after you were able to wrest the

possession of that gun from Felix
Sumugat, what did you intend to do with
the same?
A: I stepped a little backward but he was
fast in picking up the chainsaw and then
started its engine.
Q: And what did Felix Sumugat do with the

chainsaw after he picked it up and started
the engine?
A: He thrust the chainsaw towards me, sir.
Q: And what did you do when Felix Sumugat

made a forward thrust of that chainsaw
directed to you?
A: I stepped backward a little and with the
use of that firearm which I wrested from
him, I fired a shot to the ground, sir.
Q: What was your intention in firing that gun

on the ground?
A: Just to warn him that he will not assault
me, sir.
Q: Now, after you fired that gun pointed on

the ground, what did Felix Sumugat do, if

any?
A: He insisted in trying to reach me with the
chainsaw but I leaned backward, sir.
Q: Now, when you stepped backward and

leaned backward to evade the blade of
the chainsaw, what else happened, if any?
A: When I leaned backward at the same time
parrying the chainsaw, accidentally, I
pressed the trigger of that gun, sir.[32]
xxxx
Witness Bermudez, who was 40 meters away and saw what

transpired, corroborated petitioner's account[33] He remained
steadfast and unwavering even on cross-examination. Moreover,
petitioner's narration of the events is supported by the medico-
legal report[34] stating that he indeed suffered wounds in his left
hand.
Doubtless, the utterance of Sumugat to kill petitioner coupled by

his act of aiming a gun at him, and his continued thrusting of the
chainsaw that hit petitioner's palm constitute unlawful aggression.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed
In People v. Catbagan[35] the Court ruled that the means

employed by the person invoking self-defense is reasonable if
equivalent to the means of attack used by the original aggressor.
Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends
upon the nature or quality of the weapon; the physical condition,
the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor;
as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense, and also
the place and the occasion of the assault.[36]
In ruling that the element of "reasonable necessity of the means
employed" is absent, the appellate court opined that "[t]here

could have been several ways for petitioner to repel the
aggression without having to kill the victim, especially that the
latter was already wounded on the foot and physically feebler than
[petitioner]. More so, the victim only had a chainsaw, a crude
weapon more difficult to handle x x x."[37]
The Court disagrees with the CA.
First, it must be noted that the gun which petitioner grabbed

from the victim was the only weapon available to him and that the
victim was continuing to thrust the chainsaw towards him.
Indeed, a chainsaw is difficult to operate. It could be reasonably
inferred, however, that it was not the victim's first time to operate
a chainsaw considering that he was previously using the same to
cut the uprooted tree without any person assisting him for that
matter. Also, the chainsaw was switched on when the victim was
thrusting it towards petitioner. Hence, the danger that petitioner
would be cut into pieces by the chainsaw was very real. Perfect
balance between the weapon used by the one defending himself
and that of the aggressor is not required, because the person
assaulted loses sufficient tranquility of mind to think, to calculate
or to choose which weapon to use.[38] Certainly, it would have
been different if the vtctlm assaulted petitioner using a blunt
object for in that case, the use of a gun to repel such attack
would undoubtedly be unreasonable. The ruling of the Court in
Cano v. People[39] thus applies in this case, viz:
x x x the reasonableness of the means employed to

repel an actual and positive aggression should not be
gauged by the standards that the mind of a judge,
seated in a swivel chair in a comfortable office, free
from care and unperturbed in his security, may coolly
and dispassionately set down. The judge must place
himself in the position of the object of the aggression
or his defender and consider his feelings, his reactions
to the events or circumstances. It is easy for one to
state that the object of the aggression or his defender

could have taken such action, adopted such remedy,
or resorted to other means. But the defendant has no
time for cool deliberation, no equanimity of mind to
find the most reasonable action, remedy or means to.
He must act from impulse, without time for
deliberation. The reasonableness of the means
employed must be gauged by the defender's hopes
and sincere beliefs, not by the judge's.[40]
Second, the fact that the victim was older than petitioner is not
an accurate gauge to declare that the former was weaker than the
latter. Youth is not tantamount to strength as advanced age does
not connote frailty. In this case, the victim, despite being 62 years
of age at the time of the incident, was certainly not feeble
considering that he was able to operate the chainsaw to cut the
uprooted tree. Further, even if the victim's left foot was wounded
by the first shot fired, it is not entirely impossible that he
continued to assault petitioner using the chainsaw. In the same
way that petitioner was impelled by the instinct of self-
preservation, the victim, too, could have been driven by fury and
adrenaline in continuing to attack petitioner.
Third, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused

are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia.
[41] It is worthy to note that petitioner did not immediately shoot
the victim when he successfully took possession of the gun. He

shot Sumugat only when the latter continued to attack him with
the chainsaw. In addition, petitioner's first shot wounded the
victim on the left foot. It was only when he was slashed by the
chainsaw on his left hand that petitioner fired the fatal shot.
Finally, as stated in the case of People v. Boholst-Caballero:[42]
The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system

in the civilized world finds justification in man's natural
instinct to protect, repel and save his person or rights
from impending danger or peril; it is based on that

impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of
his nature as a human being.[43]
It would be wrong to compel petitioner to discern the legally

defensible response to the victim's attack when he himself was
staring at the evil eye of danger.[44] Our laws on self-defense are
supposed to approximate the natural human responses to
danger, and not serve as our inconvenient rulebook based on
which we should acclimatize our impulses in the face of peril.[45]
Lack of sufficient provocation
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating

circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, it
requires that the same be sufficient or proportionate to the act
committed and that it be adequate to arouse one to its
commission. It is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying.[46] Petitioner's act of telling the victim
not to cut the trunk of the uprooted tree could hardly be
considered provocation.
Under the law, a person does not incur any criminal liability if the
act committed is in defense of his person. Thus, all the elements
of self-defense having been established in this case, petitioner is
entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 16 September 2008

Decision and 6 April 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 00312 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Danilo Remegio is hereby ACQUITTED of homicide. The
bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is hereby cancelled and
ordered released to petitioner or his duly authorized
representative.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo,

JJ., concur.
October 19, 2017
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on September 27, 2017 a Decision, copy

attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the
above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this
Office on October 19, 2017 at 10:10 a.m.
Very truly
yours,
(SGD)
WILFREDO
V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk
of Court
[1] Rollo, pp. 23-42.
[2] Id. at 53-54.
[3] Records, Vol. II, pp. 597-613; penned by Judge Antonio B.
Bantolo.
[4] Records, Vol. I, p. 60.
[5] Id. at 72-73.
[6] TSN, 5 October 2000, pp. 4-5.
[7] Id. at 7-8.
[8] Id. at 8-10.
[9] Id. at 10-12.
[10] TSN, 24 January 2005, p. 16.
[11] Id. at 18-19.
[12] Id. at 22-23.
[13] Id. at 25-26.
[14] Records, Vol. I, pp. 9-10.
[15] TSN, 12 Apri1 2005, pp. 12-13.
[16] Id. at 17.
[17] Records, Vol. II, p. 388.
[18] TSN, 6 September 2004, pp. 7-12.
[19] Records, Vol. II, p. 613.
[20] Id. at 622.
[21] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[22] 19 Phil. 227, 232 (1911).
[23] Rollo, pp. 9 and 17-18.
[24] Id. at 62-69.
[25] Id. at 73-76.
[26] People v. Delos Santos, 739 Phil. 658, 666 (2014).
[27] People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 464 Phil. 680, 714 (2004).
[28] People v. Galvez, 424 Phil. 743, 751 (2002).
[29] Cano v. People, G.R. No. 155258, October 7, 2003, 459 Phil.
416, 430 (2003).
[30] People v. Samson, 768 Phil. 487, 496 (2015).
[31] Cano v. People, supra note 29.
[32] TSN, 5 October 2000, pp. 812.
[33] TSN, 7 September 2000, p. 18.
[34] Records, Vol. I, p. 180.
[35] 467 Phil. 1044, 1074 (2004).
[36] Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One,

Seventeenth Edition (2008), p. 180.
[37] Rollo, p. 37.
[38] Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One,

Seventeenth Edition (2008), p. 180.
[39] Cano v. People, supra note 29.
[40] Id. at 436.
[41] Nacnac v. People, 685 Phil. 223, 234 (2012).
[42] 158 Phil. 827 (1974).
[43] Id. at 832.
[44] Soplente v. People, 503 Phil. 241, 258 (2005).
[45] Id.
[46] Cano v. People, supra note 29 at 436-437.
Source : Supre m e C ourt E-Library

This page was dynam ically ge ne rate d
by the E-Library C onte nt Manage m e nt Syste m (E-LibC MS)

Remegio v. People

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Remegio v. People

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Remegio v. People

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

6/26/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

818 Phil. 827

[ G.R. No. 196945, September 27,

DANILO REMEGIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision,[1]

In an Information, dated 19 November 1999, petitioner was

That on or about the 12th day of December 1998, in

Sumugat, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wound

Contrary to the provisions of Article 249 of the

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In the pre-trial

Version of the Defense

The defense presented petitioner and Diosdado Bermudez

Petitioner was the caretaker of a parcel of land belonging to his

Petitioner approached Sumugat. He told him to cut only the

Petitioner raised both of his hands and told Sumugat that he

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Bernardo Caduada (Caduada), Hermie

Petitioner approached Sumugat who was cutting the ipil-ipil tree

Magturo and Caduada executed a Joint Affidavit[14] on 2 February

incident.[16] On the other hand, Caduada, on cross-examination,

The RTC Ruling

In its Decision, dated 16 September 2005, the RTC found

WHEREFORE, premises considered, having admitted

(1) day as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed before the CA. Meanwhile, he was

In a Decision, dated 16 September 2008, the CA affirmed the

The CA held that the element of unlawful aggression was present.

use of the chainsaw.

The appellate court, however, ruled that the element of reasonable

Finally, the CA adjudged that petitioner's act of telling the victim

WHEREFORE, the DECISION of the Regional Trial

1. HE IS SENTENCED TO SUFFER THE

2. HE IS DIRECTED TO PAY THE HEIRS OF

i. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)

ii. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)

Unconvinced, petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same

Hence, this petition.

WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO INVOKE

Petitioner argues, citing US. v. Molina,[22] that the person

In its Comment,[24] the Office of the Solicitor General avers that

In his Reply,[25] petitioner counters that reasonableness of the

THE COURT'S RULING

Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies

shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.

For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and

In self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element.[29]

The pertinent parts of the transcript of stenographic notes

Q: What exactly did you tell Felix Sumugat

Q: And what was the tone of your voice when

Q: What did Felix Sumugat do, if any when

Q: What did Felix Sumugat say to you, if

Q: And what did Felix Sumugat say, if any?

Q: When Felix Sumugat uttered those words,

Q: And after he said, "I will kill you," what

Q: While Felix Sumugat was pointing that

Q: And when you raised both your hands,

Q: What did Felix Sumugat do, if any after

Q: How many times did he say, "I will kill

Q: Now, after you were able to wrest the