1.

ELLEN NALIA

TOPIC : Obligations & Contracts-CONSIGNATION

SOURCE :ELIZABETH DEL CARMEN, vs. SPOUSES RESTITUTO SABORDO and MIMA G.R. No. 181723, August 11, 2014

PROBLEM:
The court ordered A to pay or reimburse B Php 100,000 for the recovery of Lot 123. A discovered that B mortgaged Lot 123 with X Bank
as security for a loan which, subsequently, became delinquent. Claiming that he is ready with the payment of P100,000.00, but alleging
that he cannot determine as to whom such payment shall be made and the subject lot is in danger of being foreclosed, A filed a complaint
with the RTC seeking to compel B and X Bank to interplead and litigate between themselves their respective interests on the
abovementioned sum of money. Upon filing of his complaint, A deposited the amount of P100,000.00 with the RTC. Is there a valid
consignation?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There is no valid consignation.
It is settled that compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation is mandatory. Failure to comply strictly with any of the requisites will
render the consignation void. One of these requisites is a valid prior tender of payment. Under Article 1256, the only instances where prior
tender of payment is excused are: (1) when the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment; (2) when the
creditor is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due; (3) when, without just cause, the creditor refuses to give a receipt; (4)
when two or more persons claim the same right to collect; and (5) when the title of the obligation has been lost.
None of these instances are present in the instant case. The fact that the subject lot is in danger of being foreclosed does not excuse A
from tendering payment to B, as directed by the court.

2. Mark Jason S. Tirol

TOPIC: PARENTAL CUSTODY, PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

SOURCE: A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326 January 30, 2013
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3692-RTJ) GEOFFREY BECKETT, Complainant, vs. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR.,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, Respondent.
CONTRIBUTOR: TIROL, MARK JASON S. (Executive Class)

PROBLEM:
Becket, an Australian national was married to Eltesa, a Filipina. In 2001, their marriage begot them a child and named him Geoffrey
Becket Jr. However, the marriage did not last long as series of events which materialized into suits were filed. Eltesa charged Becket with
a violation of RA 7610 and filed an action for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. On his part, Becket filed a criminal case for adultery
against Eltesa. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Sarmiento. However, a compromise agreement was entered into which contains
among others, that all civil and criminal actions filed will be dropped upon the assumption of parental custody of Beckett over Geoffrey
with the grant of visitorial rights to Eltesa.
Does the parental custody of a child grant the parent chosen by the court a permanent right thereto?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.
In all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the
best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case,
the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do
no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to
her physical, moral and intellectual development
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr., in favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule.
The more appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be
returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest
of a minor child.

3. Kim Esmeña

TOPIC: Succession; Hereditary succession as method in acquiring private lands by foreigners

SOURCE: PHILIP MATTHEWS, vs BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
CONTRIBUTOR: KIMBERLY MARIE F. ESMEÑA (Regular Class)

1
PROBLEM:
Benjamin A. Taylor, a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor, a Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot situated at Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn
and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and
tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. In 1992, Joselyn as lessor and Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property
for a period of 25 years. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his consent, Benjamin
instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn. Can the court validly annul the
Agreement of Lease on the ground that it was entered into by Joselyn without the consent of her husband?

ANSWER:
No. The court cannot annul the Agreement of Lease. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. Thus, Benjamin
has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of
said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such
acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his
expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the
spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on
the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

4. Jessa Faith

TOPIC: Torts and Damages SOURCE : BPI Express Card Corp vs. Armovit PROBLEM:
Maria Rodriguez was issued with a BPI Express Credit Card and treated her British friends from Hong Kong to lunch at Mario's
Restaurant in the Ortigas Center in Pasig. As the host, she handed to the waiter her credit card to settle the bill, but the waiter soon
returned to inform her that her credit card had been cancelled. Inasmuch as she was relying on her credit card because she did not then
carry enough cash that day, her guests were made to share the bill to her extreme embarrassment. Maria Rodrguez called BPI Express
Credit to verify the status of her credit card and was informed that her credit card had been summarily suspended for failure to re-apply for
reactivation after paying her default obligations for the three-month period. She insisted that she was not informed of the condition for
reactivation as the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement do not mention the same. Hence, she filed an action
for damages. Will such action prosper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, such action will prosper. The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a contractual one that is
governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between
the parties. In case of their breach, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.

In the said problem, BPI’s act of not clearly and categorically informing Maria that the submission of the new application form was the pre-
condition for the reactivation of her credit card, raised doubt as to whether the requirement had really been a pre-condition or not. Bereft
of the clear basis to continue with the suspension of the credit card privileges, BPI Express Credit acted in wanton disregard of its
contractual obligations with her and hence she is entitled for damages.

5. Cheska Geli

Persons Q: Basha and Popoy bought a residential lot in Marikina where they plan to build their home. Subsequently, the two got married
and lived in the subject property. One day, Basha who was then working in Israel as a domestic helper learned that Popoy had brought
home another woman, Trisha, into the family home and had been introducing to others as his wife. Outraged, Basha filed two cases
against Popoy: one for Concubinage and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property. In between the filing of these cases,
Basha learned that Popoy had the intention of selling the subject property. Basha then advised the interested buyers one of whom was

2
their neighbor Ana of the existence of the cases that she had filed against Popoy and cautioned her against buying the subject property
until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale, Popoy sold the subject property to Ana without
Basha’s consent in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00). Was the Deed of Absolute Sale void in its
entirety or void only as to Basha’s share and valid as to Popoy’s share in the property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Deed of Absolute Sale is void in its entirety. Under Article 96 of The Family Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a
communal property is states that in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. It is clear under the foregoing provision that Popoy could not sell the subject
property without the written consent of Basha or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void.

6. Eisone Brix Real Manuales

Topic: OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Rebusquillo vs. Spouses Rebusquillo-Gualvez
G.R. No. 204029, June 4, 2004

Q: What are the kinds of simulation of a contract? Give at least two distinctions.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter,
when the parties conceal their true agreement.
An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for
any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main
characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way
alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from
each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real
agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential
requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely
binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in interest.

7. Maylene Ukat

Persons and Fam

Case: Quiao vs. Quiao
G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012

PROBLEM:
A and B tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977 wherein the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386). A and B
did not agree on a marriage settlement; hence, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains. As time passes by, A committed repeated physical violence to B. Hence, their marital relationship turned sour and B
decided to file legal separation against A on August 3, 1989. If the case will prosper, what law shall govern on the dissolution of their
conjugal property?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 129 of the Family Code will be used on the dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains of A and B. The rationale behind the
prospective application of law is that, at the time of the dissolution of A and B’s marriage, the operative law is already the Family Code.
Thus, the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

8. Ailee Tejano

3
 PROPERTY: JUAN P. CABRERA, PETITIONER, VS. HENRY YSAAC, RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014 ]

Question:

Henry, Harvey and Harry are the heirs of Spouses Hector and Hazel Hughes and thus, co-owners of Lot 123 with an area of 1000 square
meters. Harry sold 333 square-meters of the property to Harold for a consideration P500,000.00 without the consent of Henry and Harvey.

Is the sale valid?

Answer:

No. If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-
owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned property.

The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or abstract quota" or "proportionate share." On the other hand, the
definite portion of the land refers to specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property.

The rules allow co-owner to sell his undivided interest in the co-ownership. However, this was not the object of the sale between Harry
and Harold. The object of the sale was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract
to petitioner, respondent has "no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because
his right over the thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication." Without the consent of his co-owners,
respondent could not sell a definite portion of the co-owned property.

9. Arnel Ricaplaza Patatag

Topic : Persons and Family – Conjugal Property; Liquidation

Source : Heirs of Protacio Go vs. Servacio, GR No. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011

Problem

In 1976, Protacio acquired a parcel of land with an area of 17,140 sq.m. In 1987, Marta, Protracio’s wife, died leaving him and their
children. In 1999, Protacio and one of his son sold portion of the lot 5,560 sq.m. The herein petitioners, the other heirs of Marta,
questioned the sale positing that the property sold was a conjugal property and so the sale of the property without prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Was the contention of the
petitioners correct?

Suggested answer

No. The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article
130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir
of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
In other words, the alienation made by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is not wholly void ab initio despite
Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the vendor. And rightly so,
because why invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property that will eventually be his/her share in the
final partition? Practically there is no reason for that view and it would be absurd.
Besides, the law requires that the requirement of prior liquidation must not prejudice vested right. In this case the buyer already acquired
the interest of the seller Protacio and one of his childred, as they themselves are heirs, who became the co-owners with the petitioners
pending liquidation of Marta’s estate.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the 17,140 square-meter conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than
what vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito B. Go will eventually get as their share in the final partition of the property. So the sale is still
valid.

10. Nina Grace Arañas

4
Civil Law Topic : Property
Source : Spouses Fortuna vs. Republic,G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014,Contributor : Arañas, Niña Grace
PROBLEM:
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application in the RTC for registration of a Lot situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando,
La Union. They acquired the lot through a deed of absolute sale from Rodolfo dated May 4, 1984. The spouses claimed that they and
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the said lot for more than 50 years,
and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment. The Republic opposed the
application, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been classified
as alienable and disposable agricultural land. The Spouses Fortune presented evidence, which includes a notation in the survey plan,
which states that, “This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940..
The spouses also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject parcel.” The Spouses
claim documents presented are adequate proof of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
If you were the judge, would you grant the Spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible
evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant has failed to show such positive act from the government. Mere notations
appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’ alienable and disposable character. The applicant, must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as
proclaimed by the President. The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary
has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the official
repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and
disposable.

11. Mhy JuroLan

:Oblicon - Mondragon Personal Sales Inc vs. Victoriano S. Sola Jr. - Legal Compensation. smile emoticon

Question:

JMC Corp., a corporation engaged in the business of selling various beauty products through a network of sales representatives, entered
into a Contract of Services with Natalia Hipolito for a period of two years. Under the said contract, Natalia, as service contractor, would
provide service facilities to JMC Corp.'s products in Pogapog City and as such, she was entitled to commission or service fee. Prior to the
execution of the contract, however, Natalias sister, Veronica Hipolito-Daz, had an existing obligation with JMC Corp. arising from her
Distributorship Agreement with the latter. On November 25, 2005, Natalia wrote a letter addressed to Antonio C. Uy, JMC Corp.'s Vice-
President for Finance, wherein she acknowledged and confirmed her sisters indebtedness to JMC in the amount of P500,000.00 and,
together with her sister, bound herself to pay on installment basis the said debt. Consequently, JMC withheld the payment of Natalia's
service fees from February to April 2006 and applied the same as partial payments to the debt which she obligated to pay. On April 29,
2006, Natalia closed and suspended operation of her office where JMC's products were stored. Natalia then filed a Complaint for
accounting and rescission against JMC alleging that the latter withheld portions of her service fees and averred that she was made to
believe that the sales commission contained in JMC's memorandum dated July 5, 2004 would be applicable to her; that it was improper
for JMC to confuse Natalia's transaction with that of her sister as it was divergent in nature and terms. Is Natalia correct?

Answer:

No, Natalia is not correct.

The law provides that compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the obligations of persons who in their own right
and as principals are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other.

In the problem given, by virtue of the letter executed by Natalia in favor of JMC, she solidarily bound herself to pay such debt. JMC
Corp.'s act of withholding Natalia's service fees/commissions and applying them to the latter's outstanding obligation with the former is
merely an acknowledgment of the legal compensation that occurred by operation of law between the parties.

5
12. Clifford Rivera

:Persons & Family Relations

Ardiente vs. Spouses Pastorfide (G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013)

A sold her house and lot to B. The contract stipulates that the water and power supply of the said property shall be for the account of B.
For four 4 years, the water supply remained under the name of A. B never complied with stipulation in the contract to change account
under B’s name. B has been delinquent in paying the water bills for 3 months. At the prodding of A, the water district cut off the water
supply. Without receiving notice of the disconnected, B complained at the water district. She was told of her delinquency and that the
disconnection was done at the instance of A, whose name remained on the account. B paid her delinquency but the water supply was not
reconnected. Aggrived, B filed a case for damages with RTC against A and the water district. A insisted that she could not be held liable
as she had no actual participation in the disconnection. Should both A and the water district be liable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, both should be liable. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. A’s acts which violated the abovementioned
provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the B’s water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify
respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of the water district, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection
and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
Hence, both of them are liable.

13. Mar Teresa Bas Siega

:TOPIC : OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

SOURCE : FIL-ESTATE PROPERTY vs SPOUSES RONQUILLO GR No. 185798. 1/13/14
CONTRIBUTOR: Mar Teresa B. Siega

PROBLEM:

Fil- Am Properties Inc is the owner and developer of the Park Tower. Spouses Roque purchased from Fil-Am an 82 sq-mtr condominium
unit for a pre-selling contract price of 5 Million. Spouses executed and signed a Reservation Application Agreement wherein they
deposited P200,000.00 as reservation fee. As agreed upon, respondents paid the full downpayment and had been paying the monthly
amortizations. Upon learning that construction works had stopped, spouses likewise stopped paying their monthly amortization, claiming
to have paid a total of 2Million pesos to Fil- Am. Spouses demanded a full refund of their payment with interest. Fil-Am contended that
they should not be made to reimburse since their delay in the construction works is due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Is the contention
of Fil-Am tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO.
Fil-Am’s failure to develop the condominium project is tantamount to a substantial breach which warrants a refund of the total amount
paid, including interest. Art 1191 of the New Civil Code provides that the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case
one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment, if
the later should become impossible.

14. Nic Gula

:TOPIC: Succession

SOURCE: Romero vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012

6
PROBLEM: Can the probate court decide a question of title or ownership?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: As a general rule, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership. But if the interested parties
are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

15. REBECCA JORDAN

Topic :Property
Source: Torres, Jr. vs. Lapinid G.R. No. 187987, November 26, 2014

PROBLEM:

Vicente, Mariano, Carlos and Jesus are co-owners of a land. On 1993 before partition, Jesus without notice to the other co-owners, sold
3000 sq. meter of the parcel of land to Lapinid. Vicente, Mariano and Carlos filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that it was without notice and that what was sold was a definite and specific portion of a co-owned property. Can
Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of another person?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

YES. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as
a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. The Supreme Court had repeatedly
held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only
possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before partition, such
disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to
the results of the partition.

16. Marje Legaspo

:PERSONS, FAMILY RELATIONS & ADOPTION

SOURCE: EFREN PANA vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR.
G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012

QUESTION:
Efren and Mely got married in 1985. In 1998, the spouses were accused of murder. The court acquitted Efren, however, it found Mely
gulity as charged. The court awarded damages to the family of the victim. The judgment then became final and executory. Upon motion
for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in
the names of Efren and Mely. Efren then questions the said writ claiming that the properties levied were conjugal assets, not paraphernal
assets of Melecia.
Can the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Mely be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the
murder case?

ANSWER:
Yes. Although the spouses were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains as stipulated in the Civil Code, the Family
Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil
Code.
Article 122 stipulates that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon

7
them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should
be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose
above-mentioned.
Hence, the civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on Mely may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

(Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate
children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties.)

17. Jo Reyna

:Topic:Persons and Family Relations; Family Relations; Property Relations

Source:Barrido vs. Nonato (G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014)

PROBLEM:
X and Y acquired a property consisting of house and lot during their marriage. However, their marriage was declared void on the ground
of psychological incapacity. X asked Y for partition, but the latter refused, thus, prompting X to file for a partition case. Y, in her affirmative
defense, claimed that the property was sold to their children. What provision in the Family Code has the application on the spouses'
property relations?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 147 of the Family Code specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations.
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.

18. Carolyn Sol

Topic: Property
Case: Heirs of Paciano Yabaw v Van Der Kolk
GR #: 207266, June 25, 2014
Question: Mr X filed a complaint for ownership and possession over a parcel of land against Mr Y who is currently occupying the land. Mr
X presented a tax declaration as evidence of his ownership over the land. For failure to file an answer, Mr Y was declared in default. The
trial court decided in favor of Mr X based on the allegations of the complaint. Is the action of the court proper?

Answer: No because a tax declaration is not a conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. The court should have required Mr X to

8
present evidence ex parte to substantiate their claims. A tax declaration can only be a strong indication of ownership if coupled with
possession. In this case, it was Mr Y who was in possession of the property and not Mr X.

19. Ghel Ygaña

OBLICON: PROBLEM: Several properties owned by late spouses Mr. and Mrs. Batongbakal became subject to Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) were valued by the Land Bank and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) at P10,000.00/hectare. The children contended that
such valuation was too low and so an action for compensation was commenced. However during the pendency of the action Land Bank
submitted to the Court a so-called Joint Manifestation and Motion(Re: Unconditional Acceptance of Revaluation) which consist there
compromise agreement and praying to resolve the case on the basis of the acceptance of payment by the children. If you were the judge,
will you grant the motion?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to
put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by
mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until
it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment.15 The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the
requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy and public order

20. Eula Parawan

Topic: Succession
Case: In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate for the Last Will and Testament of Enrique S. Lopez Richard Lopez vs. Lopez
G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012
PROBLEM:
X died leaving a will. Y, as his executor and administrator, filed a petition for probate of X’s will. W opposed the petition contending that
the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil
Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The court found that
while the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written, it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. Should the court disallow the probate of the will?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, the statement in the Acknowledgment
portion of the subject last will and testament cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence.

21. Mario Calvo's question:

TOPIC: Persons
CASE: Alano vs. Magud-Logmao G.R. No. 175540, April 7, 2014
PROBLEM:
Angelito Logmao was brought to the Western District Medical Center by sidewalk vendors who allegedly saw him fall at the Cubao City
overpass, wherein he was identified in the patient’s data sheet as Arnelito Lumogso. Considering his deteriorating condition and the
hospital has no vacancy, he was transferred to National Kidney Institute. He was not accompanied by any relatives, thus Jennifer, the
transplant coordinator was instructed to locate his family or relatives, she contacted several television and radio stations and sought the
assistance of the PNP to locate the whereabouts of Angelito’s family, but no one showed at the Institute. He was pronounced dead due to
the severity of brain injury. Dr. Ona, the Chairman of the Department of Surgery made a request from Dr. Alano, the Executive Director of
the Hospital for an authority to remove the organs of Angelito for organ transplantation which has been approved by Dr. Alano in a
Memorandum which provides that as long as the requisites has been complied and with approval of NBI, the removal of organs may be
done. Angelito’s organs were removed and were used for organ transplantation in the Hospital. The National Kidney Institute announced
in their press release the successful organ transplantation and a cousin of Angelito heard on the radio that the donor was a certain
Arnelito Lugmoso. Because of this discovery, Zenaida, Angelito’s mother filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Alano and several

9
doctors of NKI alleging that they conspired to remove the organs of Angelito while the latter was still alive. Only Dr. Alano was held liable
for damages by the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modification, by reducing the award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Is Dr. Alano liable for damages for authorizing the removal of the organs of Angelito?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, to be entitled to damages, under the Civil Code, negligence must be proven.Dr. Alano is not negligent, he gave authorization for the
removal of some of the internal organs to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with the law, i.e., giving his
subordinates instructions to exert all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of respondent's son. Announcements were
made through radio and television, the assistance of police authorities was sought, and the NBI was notified. There can be no cavil that
he employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. He did not violate the rights
of the respondent under the law thus having exercised due diligence in the performance of his duties, he is not liable for damages for the
death and removal of organs of Angelito.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages undereither Article
20 or Article 21 would be proper".

22. Marietes Espejo

Civil Law Topic : Obligations and Contracts; Demand to incur delay

Source : Rivera vs. Spouses Chua

G.R. No. 184458, January 14, 2015

Contributor : Sumampong-Espejo, Marietes

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Duterte obtained a loan from Santiago, a known money lender in their town, as evidenced by a Promissory Note which states that:

• The amount of P200,000.00 must be paid on November 30, 2013.

• In case of non-payment on the agreed date, a charge of 3% interest per month will be collected in addition to the principal amount until
full payment of the loan be made.
• In the event that legal action will be sought, an attorney’s fee shall be collected equivalent to 15% of the total amount due.

On July 2015, Duterte tendered payment by issuing a check in the amount of P50,000.00 but when presented to the bank for encashment
it was dishonored- account closed. After a month Santiago instituted an action against Duterte for the collection of the principal amount
and interest due from December 2013 until full payment be made. However, Duterte denied such indebtedness and even alleged forgery
on the PN executed. He contended that Santiago would not release such big amount without asking for collateral contrary to her imposed
policy. Further, he argues that even assuming the validity of the PN still cannot be made liable to the stipulated interest because no
demand was made to declare him in default.

Is Duterte correct in his contention that demand is necessary to hold him liable of the interest stipulated? Are there any exceptions?

10
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Generally, the obligor incurs delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands payment of the obligation as explicitly
provided under article 1169 of the Civil Code. However, same article also provides certain exceptions where demand is no longer
necessary in order that delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or

(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be
delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.

In the case at bar, demand is no longer necessary being that it falls within the exceptions provided under art. 1169 of the civil code to hold
Duterte liable of the stipulated interest. Scrutinizing from the PN, it was clearly agreed that Duterte will become liable of 3% monthly
interest from the moment the amount due is not paid. Therefore, Duterte is not correct with his contention that demand is still necessary to
incur delay in order to hold him liable of the interest.

23. Marion Thursday Regudo

TOPIC: Agency; Form of Contract of Agency

Sally Yoshi v. Joy Center of Aurora, Inc., G.R. No. 174978, July 31, 2013
PROBLEM:
Joy, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit religious educational institution. It was the registered owner of a parcel of land and the building thereon
(real properties) located in Baler, Aurora. The parcel of land was designated as Lot No. 123 and was covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-JJJ.
On November 10, 1998, the spouses Rich and Lyn Johnson sold the real properties in favor of the spouses Yoshi. The spouses Johnson
were members of Joy’s board of trustees at the time of sale. On December 7, 1998, TCT No. T-JJJ was cancelled and TCT No. T-YYY
was issued in the name of the spouses Yoshi.
Spouses Yoshi presents three pieces of evidence to prove that Joy Training specially authorized the spouses Johnson to sell the real
properties: (1) TCT No. T-JJJ, (2) the resolution, (3) and the certification.
TCT No. T-JJJ, entered in the Registry of Deeds on March 5, 1998, states:
A parcel of land x xx is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOY, INC., Rep.
by Sps. RICH A. JOHNSON and LYN S. JOHNSON, both of legal age, U.S. Citizen, and residents of P.O. Box 3246, Shawnee, Ks
66203, U.S.A.
On the other hand, the fifth paragraph of the certification provides:
Further, RichA. and Lyn J. Johnson were given FULL AUTHORITY for ALL SIGNATORY purposes for the corporation on ANY and all
matters and decisions regarding the property and ministry here. xxx
Is there a contract of agency to sell the real properties between Joy, Inc.and the spouses Johnson in this case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral. However, it must be written when the law requires a specific form. Specifically, Article
1874 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of agency must be written for the validity of the sale of a piece of land or any interest
therein. Otherwise, the sale shall be void. A related provision, Article 1878 of the Civil Code, states that special powers of attorney are
necessary to convey real rights over immovable properties.
The above documents do not establish the existence of the contract of agency to sell the real properties. TCT No. T-JJJ merely states
that Joy is represented by the spouses Johnson. The title does not explicitly confer to the spouses Johnson the authority to sell the parcel
of land and the building thereon. Moreover, the phrase "Rep. by Sps. RICHA. JOHNSON and LYN S. JOHNSON" only means that the
spouses Johnson represented Joy in land registration.
Moreover, the certification is a mere general power of attorney which comprises all of Joy Training’s business. Article 1877 of the Civil
Code clearly states that "an agency couched in general terms comprises only acts of administration, even if the principal should state that
he withholds no power or that the agent may execute such acts as he may consider appropriate, or even though the agency should
authorize a general and unlimited management."

24. Christine Joymarie Alpuerto Perias

11
 Property
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ G.R. No. 186639 February 5,2014
Question: X filed an application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land as there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order
of General Default and X was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. X claimed that the subject parcel of land was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that it was inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946 and that the subject property
had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial. RTC granted X application for registration. The Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application
pointed out that, although X declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject parcel of land since time
immemorial, the subject property was not classified as alienable and disposable land that may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years over which title by prescription can be acquired. Thus, the
requirement that those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open,
continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land was not satisfied.

Is the contention of the Solicitor General correct? What are the legal requirements for the registration of property under PD 1529 and in
the Civil Code?

Suggested Answer:
Yes, The requirement was not satisfied in this case, X failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of
title must sufficiently establish;
1. that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
2. that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the same;
3. that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Pursuant to Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion and
thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.

25. Rhea Yray

TOPIC: PROPERTY
SOURCE: Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran
G.R. No. 191667
April 17, 2013

PROBLEM:

The Municipality’s Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed certain resolutions to implement a multi-phased plan (Redevelopment Plan) to
redevelop the Rizal Plaza. The SB initially then authorized Mayor Antonio Luna to obtain a loan from Land Bank and incidental thereto,
mortgage a lot as collateral.

Bayan Bank then extended a P4,000,000.00 loan in favor of the Municipality (First Loan), the proceeds of which were used to construct
ten (10) kiosks at the northern and southern portions of the Imelda Garden (Phase 1).

On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution approving the construction of a COMMERCIAL CENTER on the RIZAL PLAZA Lot as part
of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan and in consequence, Bayan Bank granted a second loan in favor of the Municipality on October
20, 2006 in the principal amount of P28,000,000.00 (Second Loan).

Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction of the commercial center at the RIZAL PLAZA was vehemently objected to
by some residents of the Municipality.

Led by respondent Andres Bonifacio, these residents claimed that the conversion of the Rizal Public Plaza into a commercial center, as
funded by the proceeds from the First and Second Loans (Subject Loans), were "HIGHLY IRREGULAR, VIOLATIVE OF THE LAW, AND
DETRIMENTAL TO PUBLIC INTERESTS, AND WILL RESULT TO WANTON DESECRATION OF THE SAID HISTORICAL AND
PUBLIC PARK."

12
Is the petitioners' contention tenable?

__________________

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes.
It is well-settled that public plazas are properties for public use and therefore, belongs to the public dominion.

Art. 420 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.

In this relation, Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a contract whose purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy is considered void and as such, creates no rights or obligations or any juridical relations.

Hence, as public land used for public use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is subject to the administration and control of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Hence, without the said grant, the Municipality has no right to claim it as patrimonial property.

26. Ramy Armenion

:TOPIC: Wills; Attestation Clause

SOURCE: Felix Azuela vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
CONTRIBUTOR: ARMENION, RAMY D. (Executive class)

PROBLEM: Grace executed a notarial will and named Rudy as testamentary heir. Rudy filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for
probate of the notarial will of Grace. The will consisted of two (2) pages. The first page contained the entire text of the testamentary
dispositions and the second page contained the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. The attestation clause or any
part of the will failed to state the number of pages used in the will. The petition was opposed by Miriam, who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of Grace. Should the petition for probate of the notarial will be allowed?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. The petition for probate of the notarial should be denied. Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that the
attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on
which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase
or decrease in the pages. There is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is
comprised of. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there
is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

27. Dalisay Isidro

Topic> Marriage Contracts; Cancellation of Entries Note- this was asked in 2014 Bar Exams under Remedial Law) Republic vs. Olaybar
G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
PROBLEM:

Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Cebu City.

13
Olaybar has never contracted any marriage with anyone, she did not know the alleged husband, and the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers.

Olaybar filed with the RTC a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, especially
the entries in the wife portion thereof impleading the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as the alleged husband, as parties to the
case. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition, which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. Respondent presented as witness an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of
Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly,
a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.

The petition was granted by the RTC but the Solicitor General insisted that granting the cancellation of "all the entries in the wife portion of
the alleged marriage contract," is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.

Is the Solicitor General correct? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. It was clearly established that, as Olaybar claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369). In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent
showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery.

While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the
trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and
all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did
not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

28. Noelle Maico

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Transmission of Successional Rights

Source : Ining vs. Vega
G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013

PROBLEM: Adam Amping, married to Ava, is the owner of a 5,000-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Antique. The couple
died without issue. Adam was survived by his brothers,
Adonis and Apollo, who are now both deceased. Adonis was survived by his daughter, Aphrodite. Apollo, in turn, was survived by his
children, Athena and Atlas. Acting on the claim that one-half of the subject property belonged toher as Adonis’ surviving heir, Aphrodite
filed for partition, recovery of ownershipand possession, with damages, against Apollo’s heirs. Is the claim of Aphrodite correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, Aphrodite’s claim is correct.

Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the successionare transmitted from the moment of death.Since Adam died without issue,
his heirs are his siblings, Adonis and Apollo, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Adonis’ and Apollo’s heirs became
entitled to the property upon the brothers’ passing. Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Adonis and Apollo, Aphrodite,
Athena and Atlas became co-owners thereof.

29. Lucks Digaum

14
:Hi guys, il post 2 cases lng ha for back up in case mkahalata c sir.. hehehe..TOPIC: Obligations and Contracts; Fraud
SOURCE: ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., RUPERTO
V. TANKEH, VICENTE ARENAS, and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, G.R. No. 171428. November 11, 2013
CONTRIBUTOR: DIGAUM, LUCKS MAE D. (Executive class)

PROBLEM:

A and B are brothers. A has a shipping corporation. He approached his brother and asked him if he would like to join in his company and
the latter accepted his offer. He gave B free 1,000 shares worth P1 Million as a new stockholder and promised B that he will give his son
a position in the company. A upon analyzing the financial status of the corporation realized that he needs to acquire a new vessel for the
operation of his business, so he executed a promissory note signed by him and B and the other members of the board of directors in
favor of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) for the loan amounting to P50 Million which was eventually granted.

Although B was made a stockholder, he was not treated as one. He was only able to attend the board meeting only once and was not
allowed access to the financial statements of the corporation. This prompted B to severe all ties with the corporation and demanded that
he be released from any and all liability of the corporation specially with the promissory note executed in favor of DBP which he signed on
the ground of fraud. He was made to believe that as a stockholder he should be able to exercise the rights afforded to his position in the
corporation but was deprived from exercising it. He further alleged that he was only made a stockholder in order to help share the burden
embodied in the promissory note.

Question: Was there causal fraud employed in the execution of the said promissory note?

ANSWER:

No, there was no causal fraud employed when B signed the promissory note.

Causal fraud referred to in Article 1338 of the Civil Code, are those deceptions or misrepresentations of a serious character employed by
one party and without which the other party would not have entered into the contract.

There was no dolo causante or fraud used nor employed by A on B when the latter signed the said promissory note. There was no
showing in the case at bar that A employed any means to defraud B when he affixed his signature. Instead, he voluntarily signed such
instrument knowing fully well the consequences of affixing his signature in the promissory note. The exclusion of B from the management
in the affairs of the shipping corporation constituted fraud incidental to the performance of the obligation. In Geraldez, this Court defined
incidental fraud as “those which are not serious in character and without which the other party would still have entered into the contract.”

30. Lucks Digaum

TOPIC: Sales; Perfection of Contract of Sale

SOURCE: AQUILES RIOSA vs. TABACO LA SUERTE CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 2013786, October 23, 2013
CONTRIBUTOR: DIGAUM, LUCKS MAE D. (Executive class)
PROBLEM:
A and B are friends. A owns a house and lot in Tagaytay. A ‘s son was then diagnosed with leukemia so to defer the medical expenses,
he borrowed money from B in the amount of P1 Million. B then offered a deal that in exchange of the money borrowed he buys the house
and lot owned by A located in Tagaytay but the former vehemently refused and instead assured B that he will pay his loan. B just remain
silent and show A a document telling him that he needs to sign an undertaking of his loan. A signed the document and did not bother to
read the contents anymore as he trust B being his bestfriend.
The following year, A was shocked when he received a notice to vacate from his own property as the same had already been sold to C,
the corporation owned by B. A, angered by the situation filed a case with the RTC for Annulment of Deed of Sale against C and B. He
alleged that the Deed of Sale was void as he had no intention to sell his lot to B. He further alleged that the Deed of Sale was void as
there was no perfection of the said contract as he did not give his consent to such sale. Is the contention of A correct?
ANSWER:
Yes, A is correct.
One of the essential requirements of a valid contract of sale is the consent of the owner of the property. Under Article 1475 of the Civil
Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds on the thing which is the object of the contract and
on the price.
When there was no intention on the part of one party to transfer ownership or sell of the property in exchange for the amounts borrowed,

15
there is no contract of sale. There was no agreement between the parties, the element of consent or meeting of the minds was wanting in
this case. Thus, it is correctly argued that there was no contract of sale.

31. Jo Ko

TOPIC: PROPERTY
SOURCE: AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS vs. SPOUSES ALFREDO REVILLA AND THE HEIRS OF PAZ REVILLA [G.R. No. 190901.
November 12, 2014.]
CONTRIBUTOR: RON JUKO DACUDAO

PROBLEM. Alfredo and Paz Revilla (Revilla spouses) own an unregistered parcel of land in Silang, Cavite. Faced with financial difficulties
in raising funds for Alfredo's travel to Saudi Arabia, Paz borrowed money from Amada Zacarias (Amada), with the said property as
security.
Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled "KasulatanngBilihanngLupa" before the Provincial
Assessor of Cavite, with the Revilla spouses as sellers and Amada as buyer of the property. Consequently, Amada sold the property to
the spousesRodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sun spouses) who had no knowledge of the forgery.
Upon discovery that the property's tax declaration was already in the name of the Sun spouses, the Revilla spouses filed a complaint
before the Tagaytay Regional Trial Court for the annulment of sales and transfers of title and reconveyance of the property. The Sun
spouses argued good faith belief that Amada was the real owner of the property as Amada showed them a tax declaration in her name
and the "KasulatanngBilihanngLupa" allegedly executed by the Revilla spouses. Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER. The defense of the Sun spouses must fail. The rule in land registration law that the issue of whether the buyer
of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchase was made from the
registered owner whose title to the land is clean. Necessarily, those who rely in good faith on a clean title issued under the Torrens
system for registered lands must be protected. On the other hand, those who purchase unregistered lands do so at their own peril.

32. Ian Rene Fernandez Tabada

:Subject: Property
Topic: builder in Good Faith and his rights
Case in Point: Benedicto vs. Villaflores G.R. No. 185020, October 6, 2010

Question:
A owns a lot having an area of 277 square meters. He sold a part of it to her nephew B through a deed of absolute sale but B failed to
register the same with the register of deeds. B immediately took possession of the portion sold to him and built thereon a house made of
concrete materials and fenced it. A sold again the said parcel of land to C but this time it was the whole 277 square meters that was sold
through a deed of absolute sale and registered the same with the register of deeds of Cebu City. Is B a builder in good faith and if so,
what are his rights.

Suggested Answer:

Since B constructed the house before the sale in favor of C was made, not being aware of any flaw in his title. He believed being the
owner of the subject premises on account of the Deed of Sale thereof in his favor despite his inability to register the same. B is deemed to
be a Builder in Good Faith.

Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount
of indemnity, or sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.

B being a builder in good faith is entitled indemnity and reimbursement of his necessary expenses if the owner chooses to appropriate the
improvements as his own. However the owner may compel the builder of the improvements to pay the price of the land if the value of the
improvement exceeds the value of the land.

16
33. Rannex Guma

SUBJECT: Persons & Family Relations

TOPIC: Bigamy, need of judicial declaration of nullity, exception
CASE IN POINT: People vs. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013

QUESTION: Popoy and Basha got married in 1990. Basha went to abroad for work. 5 years later, Popoy, fell in love with another woman
and thus contracted marriage with Majarot. Thereafter, Popoy then filed a complaint before the RTC for judicial declaration of nullity of his
1st marriage on the ground that there was no valid marriage license. The court granted Popoy’s petition and declared that his 1st
marriage was void ab initio. Upon learning, Basha enraged that Popoy and her will no longer have a second chance, filed a case for
Bigamy against Popoy. Popoy then filed for the quashal of the information on the ground that he did not commit the crime of Bigamy since
his 1st has been judicially declared void. Decide.

ANSWER: Popoy is guilty of bigamy. Article 40 of the Family Code clearly provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground of defense. It has been held in a number of
cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. Since Popoy contracted his second marriage without first securing a judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage, it is clear then that he is guilty of bigamy.
It is true even if the first marriage is subsequently declared void ab initio as long as one contracted marriage before its declaration of
nullity.

However, the doctrine enunciated in MORIGO v. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 145226, February 6, 2004) may be considered as an exception.In
said case, the court has ruled that the private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy.

34. Xiaxel Therese

TOPIC: Obligations and Contracts; Resolutory Period

SOURCE: ROWENA R. SALONTE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (G.R. No. 207348; August 19, 2014)

PROBLEM:

The City of Minnipins entered into a 6-year contract with Outcast Construction to undertake the City’s reclamation project.

The parties also agreed that Outcast Construction will use a portion of a parcel of land of the City of Minnipins to be used by them in the
construction of their offices to house its personnel to supervise the City of Minnipins’ Reclamation Project.

Upon the completion of the City of Minnipins’ Reclamation Project, all improvements introduced by Outcast Construction to the portion of
the parcel of land existing upon the completion of the said City of Minnipins’ Reclamation Project shall ipso facto belong to the City of
Minnipins in ownership as compensation for the use of said parcel of land by Outcast Construction without any rental whatsoever.

Pursuant to the agreement, Outcast Construction proceeded to construct the housing units and other facilities.

Six years elapsed but the reclamation project is still underway. In the meantime, a road widening project was initiated by the Department
of Public Works which will affect the housing units and other facilities built by Outcast Corporation for its personnel supervising the
reclamation project.

Thereby, the road widening’s project director entered into an agreement with Outcast Corporation whereby the latter would demolish the
improvements outside of the boundary of the road widening project and, in return, receive the total amount of PhP 1 million in
compensation.

When the City of Minnipins learned of the transaction they contended that the payment should be made to the City, being the lawful
owner of the properties at the time the payment was made.

For their part, Outcast Construction countered that as long as the Reclamation Project has not yet been turned over, the ownership of the

17
said improvements still belongs to them.

If you were the judge, how would you rule on the opposing claims of the parties involved?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If I were the judge, I would rule in favor of Outcast Corporation.

The Civil Code provision on obligations with a period is relevant.

Article 1193 thereof provides:

Obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has been fixed, shall be demandable only when that day comes.

Obligations with a resolutory period take effect at once, but terminate upon arrival of the day certain.

A day certain is understood to be that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when.

If the uncertainty consists in whether the day will come or not, the obligation is conditional, and it shall be regulated by the rules of the
preceding Section.

The 6-year period provided for project completion, or, with like effect, termination of the contract was a mere estimate and cannot be
considered a period or a "day certain" in the context of the aforequoted Art. 1193.

Moreover, even if we consider the allotted 6 years within which Outcast Construction was supposed to complete the reclamation project,
the lapse thereof does not automatically mean that Outcast Corporation was in delay.

As may be noted, the City of Minnipins never made a demand for the fulfillment of its obligation under the Contract of Reclamation.

Article 1169 of the Civil Code on the interaction of demand and delay and the exceptions to the requirement of demand relevantly states:

Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from
them the fulfillment of their obligation.

However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declares; or

(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be
delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or

(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what
is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.

In the instant case, the records are bereft of any document whence to deduce that the City of Minnipins exacted from Outcast Corporation
the fulfillment of its obligation under the reclamation contract. And to be sure, not one of the exceptions to the requisite demand under Art.
1169 is established, let alone asserted.

As it were, the agreement of the parties states that the structures built by Outcast Construction on the property of the City will belong to
the latter only upon the completion of the project. Clearly, the completion of the project is a suspensive condition that has yet to be
fulfilled. Until the condition arises, ownership of the structures properly pertains to Outcast Construction.

35. Erl Amores

18
 Obligations and Contracts:PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ENRIQUE MANALO & ROSALINDA JACINTO,
ARNOLD J. MANALO, ARNEL J. MANALO, and ARMA J. MANALO, respondents
[G.R. No. 174433. February 24, 2014.]
Question:
Spouses Ariel and Eric Mermaid (Spouses Mermaid) applied for an All-Purpose Credit Facility in the amount of P1,000,000.00 with
Disney National Bank (DNB) to finance the construction of their house. After DNB granted their application, they executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of DNB over their property.
It was agreed upon that the Spouses Mermaid would make monthly payments on the interest.
The credit agreement executed succinctly stipulated that the loan would be subjected to interest at a rate "determined by the Bank to be
its prime rate plus applicable spread, prevailing at the current month." This stipulation was carried over to or adopted by the subsequent
renewals of the credit agreement.
DNB failed to specify the interest rate but still the Spouses continued to pay interest without protest.
After the Spouses Mermaid failed to settle their unpaid account, DNB foreclose the mortgage.
Spouses argue that they should not be paying the interest since the agreement contravenes the principle of mutuality of contracts under
the Civil Code.
On the other hand, DNB claims that the Spouses Mermaid's continuous payment of interest without protest indicated their assent to the
interest rates imposed.
Is the contention of the spouses tenable? (100%)

Answer:
Yes, their contention is meritorious.
Article 1308 of the Civil Code expresses what is known in law as the principle of mutuality of contracts. It provides that "the contract must
bind both the contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them."
This binding effect of a contract on both parties is based on the principle that the obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties, and there must be mutuality between them based essentially on their equality under which it is repugnant
to have one party bound by the contract while leaving the other free therefrom.
Jurisprudence provides that any contract which appears to be heavily weighted in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an
unconscionable result, thus partaking of the nature of a contract of adhesion, is void. Moreover, any obscurity will be construed against
the party who prepared the contract; the latter being presumed the stronger party to the agreement, and who caused the obscurity.
In the case at bar, based on the stipulation in the agreement, DNB failed to specifically indicate the rates of interest in the credit
agreement but arrogated unto itself the sole prerogative to determine and increase the interest rates imposed on the Spouses Mermaid.
Such a unilateral determination of the interest rates contravened the principle of mutuality of contracts embodied in Article 1308 of the
Civil Code.
Thus, the spouses cannot be bound by the agreement for payment of interest

36. Arief Mamao

TOPIC: SUCCESSION: Future inheritance

SOURCE: G.R. No. 165300 April 23, 2010 ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, vs. SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA
COMANDANTE and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN and ELIZABETH PANGAN

CONTRIBUTOR: MAMAO, ARIEF A. (Regular Class)

PROBLEM:

Katniss Everdeen sought financial accommodations from Atty. Peeta Mellark which totaled P500,000.00. As she could not practically
comply with her obligation, Atty. Peeta Mellark presented to Ms. Everdeen a document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over her parents' property.

Katniss' parents asserted that Atty. Mellark has no cause of action against them. They claimed that they do not even know him and that
they did not execute any SPA in favor of Katniss authorizing her to mortgage for the subject property. Is the waiver of hereditary rights in
favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed is null and void for being violative of Article
1347 of the Civil Code.

19
A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the
following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

Hence, adverse claim which was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or interest over the
property.

37. VRose Bacalso

Civil Law Topic : Succession

Source: Balus vs. Balus G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010

PROBLEM:
F, owner of Lot 1-A, had 3 children A,B,C. F mortgaged said property to the bank as a security for a loan. Due to F’s failure to pay the
loan, subject property was foreclosed and subsequently, a new title was issued in favor of the bank. After F’s death, his children continued
possession of said property. They executed an extra-judicial partition of the property apportioning 1/3 thereof for each of them, and
agreed to redeem the property from the bank. However, the period for redemption had elapsed. Hence B and C bought the property from
the bank. Acting as new owners, B and C wanted to divide the property between the two of them only. A opposed on the basis of his right
as heir of F and on the basis of the previous extra-judicial agreement. Does A have a right over the said property?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death (Art. 777). In addition, the inheritance of a person
consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession (Art. 781). In the present case, since F lost ownership of the subject property during his
lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may
lay claim. Stated differently, A,B,C never inherited the subject lot from their father. Instead, B and C acquired ownership over the property
pursuant to the sale. Therefore, A does not have any right over the property.

38. Cletus Villamor:

Obligations and Contracts -The Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. vs. Rosales G.R. No. 183204, January 13, 2014

PROBLEM:

R and M (mother of R) open a joint dollar account with ABC Bank. Later, R and M could no longer withdraw their deposit due to the hold-
out order issued by the bank because R is suspected of taking part on a fraudulent transaction that causes the bank to reimburse its
client, who also happens to be a client of R in her travel services. R filed a breach of contract against the bank. Is the action of R proper?
Decide with reason.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the action of R is proper.

The "Hold Out" clause applies only if there is a valid and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation enumerated in
Article 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi-delict. In this case, petitioner failed to show that
respondents have an obligation to it under any law, contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. And although a criminal case was filed
by petitioner against respondent Rosales, this is not enough reason for petitioner to issue a "Hold Out" order as the case is still pending
and no final judgment of conviction has been rendered against respondent Rosales. In fact, it is significant to note that at the time
petitioner issued the "Hold Out" order; the criminal complaint had not yet been filed. Thus, considering that respondent Rosales is not
liable under any of the five sources of obligation, there was no legal basis for petitioner to issue the "Hold Out" order. Accordingly, we
agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the "Hold Out" clause does not apply in the instant case.

20
39. Liljoy Udtohan

TOPIC: SUCCESSION
SOURCE: G.R. No. 208928, July 08, 2015
ANDY ANG, Petitioner, v. SEVERINO PACUNIO, TERESITA P. TORRALBA, SUSANA LOBERANES, CHRISTOPHER N. PACUNIO,
AND PEDRITO P. AZARCON, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, GALILEO P. TORRALBA, Respondents
QUESTION: L, M, N and O sought to declare the sale of land between A and U null and void. They contend that U who owned the land
was their grandmother and left it to them as their inheritance. They further asserted that the one who sold the land is an impostor since
their grandmother was already dead for more than 20 years when the sale occurred.
a. When does the right of representation occur?
b. Do L, M, N and O have the right to declare the sale null and void?

ANSWER:
a. The right of representation is available when the original heir had:
(a) predeceased; (b) is incapacitated to inherit; or (c) was disinherited, if decedent died testate.
b. NO. L, M, N and O have no right to declare the sale null and void.
Under the law, however, L, M, N and O will only be deemed to have a material interest over the subject land- and the rest of U's estate for
that matter if the right of representation provided under Article 970, in relation to Article 982, of the Civil Code is available to them. In this
situation, representatives will be called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented; and the representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. In the instant case, they claim to be
the successors-in-interest of the subject land just because they are U’s grandchildren.

40. Cristina Quiron

TOPIC: Agency

SOURCE: FLORENTINA BAUTISTA-SPILLE represented by her Attorney-in-fact, MANUEL B. FLORES,

JR., vs. NICORP MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, BENJAMIN G.
BAUTISTA and INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK.
G.R. No. 214057. October 19, 2015
CONTRIBUTOR: MARIA CRISTINA K. QUIRON –Executive Class

Problem: Kristian, executed a General Power of Attorney in favor of his brother,Ramon authorizing the later to administer all his
businesses and properties in the Philippines.
Ramon and Ayala Land Development Corporation entered into a contract to sell, pertaining to the land owned by Kristian for an agreed
price on P15,000.00. Ayala Land was to give a downpayment of 20% and the remaining balance in eight (8) months. It was agreed that
the TCT of the subject property would be deposited with Bank of Philippine Island and placed in escrow. Furthermore, Ramon was
required to submit a special power of attorney covering the sale transaction otherwise , the payment of the balance would be suspended
and a penalty of P150,000 every month would be imposed.
When Kristian discovered the sale, he immediately sent demand letters to Ayala Land and BPI informing them that he was opposing the
sale and that Ramon was not clothed with the authority to enter into a contract to sell, however both parties failed and refused to return
the title of the subject property for the reason that Ramon was empowered to enter into a contract to sell by virtue of the general power of
attorney. Consequently, Kristian filed a complaint against the respondents.
a) Was BPI and Ayala Land’s defense tenable?
Suggested Answer:
No, BPI and Ayala Land’s defense is not tenable. The well- established rule is when a sale of a parcel of land or any interest therein is
through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing, otherwise the sale shall be void. Article 1874 and 1878 of the Civil Code
provide:
Art. 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing;
otherwise, the sale shall be void.
Art. 1878. Special Powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
(1) xxx
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable
consideration.
From the foregoing, it is very clear that an SPA in the conveyance of real rights over immovable property is necessary. In the case at bar,

21
Ayala Land was fully aware that Ramon was not properly authorized to enter into any transaction regarding the sale of Kristian’s property,
evidence by the fact that Ayala Land Required Benjamin to secure the SPA from Kristian and even imposed a substantial amount of
penalty in the amount of P150,000,00 a month in case of non-compliance plus suspension of payment of the balance of contract price.

41. Gei Sayson

Topic: Persons and Family Relations

Source: Del Socorro v Van Wilsen, G.R. No. 193707 Dec. 10, 2014
Contributor: Sayson, Gerlyn Mae C.
Problem:
Norma married Erik in Holland. Norma is a Filipino citizen while Erik is a citizen of Holland. Their marriage was blessed with a son, Rod.
The marriage of Norma and Erik did not last long and a final decree of divorce was issued by the Court of Holland. Erik promised to
support his minor child. Thereafter, Norma and his son came home to the Philippines but Erik never gave support.
Upon learning that Erik was in the Philippines and married, Norma through a letter, demanded from Erik to support his son. However, Erik
refused to receive the letter. This act prompted Norma to file a criminal case against Erik in violation of RA 9262 for unjustified refusal to
render support as provided under Art. 195 of the Family Code. Is Erik obliged to support his minor son under the Philippine law?

Suggested Answer:
No, Erik has no obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law.
The Supreme Court ratiocinated that Norma cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from Erik, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 195 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. Insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since Erik is a citizen of Holland he is subject
to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.
However, this does not mean that respondent is not obliged to support his son altogether. Erik must prove that under the laws of Holland,
he is not obliged to support his minor son. The Supreme Court is not obliged to take judicial notice of the laws of the Netherlands.

42. JA Logs

TOPIC: Action that Survives

SOURCE: MEMORACION Z. CRUZ vs. OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, G.R. No. 173292 September 1, 2010

CONTRIBUTOR: Logroño, Joseph Alfie A. (Regular class)

PROBLEM:

Memoracion owned a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila. Later, she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred to Oswaldo
through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation. She filed for the reconveyance of the property but during the pendency of the
case she died. Oswaldo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a
party’s death. Will the Motion to Dismiss prosper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the
death of petitioner Memoracion.

Cedric Tiu Gutierrez II I will edit this post once i get the whole question.

22
Civil Law Topic : Persons and Family Relations; Human Relations; Presumptive Death Source Contributor : : Republic vs. Granada G.R.
No. 187512 Gutierrez II , Cedric , June 13, 2012

43. Ada Bonita Tohay 

HOLA!!!! I WILL BE ASKING THIS….

TOPIC: Succession; Repudiation of Inheritance

SOURCE: Guy vs. Court of Appeals GR. No. 163707, September 15, 2006
CONTRIBUTOR: TOHAY, ADA BONITA I. (Executive class)

PROBLEM:

Mara and Clara, who were represented by their mother Susan, filed a petition for Letters of Administration. They alleged that they are the
duly acknowledged children of Gorio. Jose (son of Gorio) filed an opposition claiming that their claim had been paid, waived and
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Susan’s Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and
educational assistance received, Susan and her minor children (Mara and Clara) discharged the estate of Gorio from any and all
liabilities. Is the Release and Waiver of Claim made by Susan in behalf of her minor children (Mara and Clara) a valid waiver of
inheritance?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

Under Article 1044 of the Civil Code, any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or Guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. Accordingly, repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. 

In the given case, the Release and Waiver of Claim made by Susan in behalf of her minor children (Mara and Clara) not having been
judicially authorized is void and will not bar them from asserting their rights as heirs of Gorio.

44. Marie Angelee Ygnacio 

TOPIC: Obligations and Contracts; perfection

SOURCE: Ignacio et. Al vs. HBST, G.R. No. 177783, January 23, 2013
CONTRIBUTOR: Marie Angelee V. Ygnacio

PROBLEM:
Alma Maureen was the owner of several parcels of land which were successfully foreclosed by ANC Bank after she (Alma) failed to pay
the loan it obtained from the bank. She likewise failed to redeem it on time. Despite the lapse of such period and the consolidation of titles
in the name of the bank, Alma offered to repurchase the properties. The bank sent her a letter which contained the terms and conditions
of the repurchase. Later, Alma sent the bank a letter laying down a different set of terms and conditions. Alma then requested the bank to
release the land to her but the bank turned down her request. This prompted her to cause the annotation of an adverse claim on the titles
of the land. However, before such annotation, the bank had already sold the land to Caren De Valle. Alma filed a complaint and argued
that the bank acted in bad faith when it sold the land to a third person after it entered into a contract for repurchase with her. ANC Bank’s
contention was that no contract was made between them. Decide on the perfection of the contract for the repurchase of the land.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: 

The contract was not perfected.

Contracts that are consensual in nature, like a contract of sale, are perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. Once there is concurrence
between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter, consideration, and terms of payment, a contract is produced. The offer
must be certain. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it must
be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the proposal.

23
A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal, constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer.
Consequently, when something is desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate
consent because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer.

In the present case, Alma’s acceptance was qualified as she laid down a different set of terms and conditions. Therefore, there was no
meeting of the minds and necessarily the contract was not perfected.

45. Rosane Canda Apatan

 My problem is very simple. Here you go:

Topic: Succession; Capacity to make a will
Mr. Old, Fil-American pensionado is 80 years old. He married Ms. Young who was only 23 years old. A little after two years of wedded
bliss, Mr. Old died. Before he died, he executed a notarial last will and testament where he bequeathed all his properties to his wife and
named her executrix. All the other formal requirements of a valid will had been complied with. Ms. Sista, the deceased sister assails the
validity will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time made the will. According to her there
was fraud as it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life to almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who
was thrice her age who happened to be a pensioner. Moreover the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83
years old therefore he was no longer of sound mind. 
Does the fact that the testator is already 83 years old make him of unsound mind hence not capable of making a valid will? What are the
requisites in order for a testator to be considered of sound mind?

Suggested Answer:
The fact that the testator is already 83 years does not necessarily make him of unsound mind. According to Article 799 of the Civil Code,
the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. 
Applying this test to the present case, it must be noted that despite Mr Old’s advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. He
knew the character of his act being gratuitous in nature, that his properties will be transferred to his wife at the moment of death.
Moreover, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution,
intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

(LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, vs.JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE

G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005)

46. Wawi Cataquis 

PROPERTY: CO-OWNERSHIP
RAUL ARAMBULO and TERESITA DELA CRUZ vs. GENARO and JEREMY NOLASCO [G.R. No. 189420; March 26, 2014]
PROBLEM:
Miguel, Nicolas, and Luisa(also deceased, married to Antonio, and has a son, Michael) are siblings who inherited a parcel of land from
their deceased parents. On February 11, 2006, the co-owners, excluding Luisa, decided to sell their respective shares of the property
including Luisa’s share. Nicolas and Miguel sought judicial relief based on Article 491 of the Civil Code alleging that Antonio and Michael
intentionally withheld their consent to prejudice the common interest. However, in their answer, Antonio and Michael stated that they were
not made aware of the intention of the other co-owners to sell the property and raised their defense based on Article 493 which provides
that they are the full owners of their share of the property and that any alienation of their share without their consent is void. Is their
defense valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YES. Antonio and Michael are correct. Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the co–owner, clearly establishing that each co–
owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits.Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–
owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by some co-owners of their parts shall not affect the full
ownership by the other co-owner the part that belongs to them.
It may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the

24
consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co–owner of the property.

47. In behalf of Jur Rep:

Problem:
Leah Sy and Clark Corporation entered into a Contract to Sell on covering one residential condominium unit, located in Makati City, with
an area of 137.30 square meters for the total price of P7,519,371.80, payable in equal monthly installments. Sy likewise purchased a
parking lot in the same condominium building for P600,000.00. Sy paid the full purchase price of P7,519,371.80 for the unit while making
a down payment of P20,000.00 for the parking lot. However, notwithstanding full payment of the contract price, petitioner failed to
complete and deliver the subject unit on time. Is rescission of the contract in the 
instant case proper?

Suggested Answer:
Yes, rescission of the contract is proper in the instant case. Article 1191 of the Civil Code sanctions the right to rescind the obligation in
the event that specific performance becomes impossible. It provides that the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in
case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and
the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing
the fixing of a period. In the case at bar, it is evident that there was breach on the part of Clark Corporation to deliver the condominium
unit on time. Hence, rescission is proper in the instant case.

48. CEDRIC GUTIERREZ:

PROBLEM: Jane and Josephus got married in 1995. In 1996, after being fired from his job, Josephus went to Papua New Guinea to seek
greener pasture and landed a job as a sales man in a department store. From that time, Jane was not able to receive communication from
him. Jane asked Josephus’ family on his whereabouts but none of them could give any definite answer. No other efforts were made by
Jane to locate Josephus. After 10 years of waiting, Jane filed a petition declaring Josephus presumptively dead. The Regional Trial Court
declared Josephus presumptively dead but was appealed by the Office of the Solicitor General alleging that Jane failed to prove her well
founded belief that Josephus was already dead. The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Was the appeal proper? Did the
RTC err in the grant of petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the efforts made by Jane?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the appeal was improper. The law provides that a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding “as provided
for” under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration
of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. In this case,
the Regional Trial Court has already given its verdict and cannot be remedied by mere notice of appeal. The RTC erred in granting the
decision in favor of Jane.

Jurisprudence provides that spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been 
absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before 
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is 
meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of 
an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may 
tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably 
founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, 
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and 
are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their 
disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate 
question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness 
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the 
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a 
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn 

25
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent 
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
In the case at bar, Jane did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. In 
short, Jane was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. If she were, she would 
have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other 
government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media 
for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
However, the decision of the RTC is final and executory, it becomes immutable and 
unalterable.

49. SOLON, BENJAMIN

TOPIC: Special Contracts (Lease)

SOURCE: Analita Inocencio vs. Hospicio de San Jose
G.R. No. 201787, September 25, 2013

PROBLEM:

H leased a parcel of land to G for a period of one year. The lease was renewable every year and provided that “This contract is non
transferable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in writing.” The last written contract was executed in 1951. G constructed two
buildings on the land which he subleased and designated his son R as administrator. G passed away in 1997, and R did not inform H of
such. Instead, he continued to receive rent and give H his share.

Later, H sent a letter stating that they would not longer continue the lease with R since he was leasing the property to others without the
consent of H. R tried to negotiate but H reiterated his stand. Later, when the termination date of the lease came, H sent notices to vacate
to R and the tenants subleasing the property. When R did not vacate the land H filed a case for unlawful detainer in court.

The court ruled that the lease contract could not be transmitted to R as G’s heir in view of the express stipulation found therein. On
appeal, appellate court affirmed the decision in toto and even the Court of Appeals.

Did the sublease by R to others violate of the terms of the contract?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, it did not. Article 1650 of the Civil Code provides: “When in the contract of lease of things there is no express prohibition, the lessee
may sublease the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the
lessor.”

Assignment or transfer of lease, which is covered by Article 1649 of the Civil Code, is different from a sublease arrangement, which is
governed by Article 1650 of the same Code. In a sublease, the lessee becomes in turn a lessor to a sublessee. The sublessee then
becomes liable to pay rentals to the original lessee. However, the juridical relation between the lessor and lessee is not dissolved. The
parties continue to be bound by the original lease contract. Thus, in a sublease arrangement, there are at least three parties and two
distinct juridical relations. 

R thus had a right to sublease the premises since the lease contract did not contain any stipulation forbidding subleasing.

50. DAVE PARILLA

TOPIC: Special Contracts – Lease; Implied New Lease

SOURCE: VIEGELY SAMELO versusMANOTOK SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 170509 June 27, 2012
CONTRIBUTOR: PARILLA, DAVE EDWARD VELASQUEZ (Executive Class)

PROBLEM:
H2T Inc. entered into a contract with Jesssel Jampas for the lease of Block 2 Lot 9 Pasadena, Nichols Heights Street, Cebu for a period
of one year. After the expiration of the lease contract, Jessel Jampas continued occupying the subject premises without paying rent.
H2T Inc. filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Jessel, and prayed among others that the latter be ordered to vacate the subject
premises, and to pay compensation for its use and occupancy. In her answer, Jessel contends that the respondent did not give her a
notice to vacate upon the expiration of the lease contract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on August 5, 1998), and
the latter continued enjoying the subject premises for more than 15 days, without objection from the respondent. By the inaction of the

26
respondent as lessor, there can be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract, and further alleged that there exist an
implied new lease contract between the parties.
Is Jessel’s contention tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, an implied new lease was therefore created pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code, which expressly provides:
Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the
lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease,
not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract
shall be revived.
"An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract
of lease has expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for
fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor."
In the present case, all these requisites have been fulfilled, hence, the existence of an implied lease contract.

51. LISA BAUTISTA

Civil Law Topic : Property; Ownership; Builder in Good faith

Source : Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs. Lagrosa

G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014

Contributor : Bautista, Mel-Lisanina

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

A land was sold by an agent on the basis of a SPA where there was palpable irregularity in its acknowledgment. Yet, the buyer relied
solely on the said document without further investigation on the alleged agent’s authority. Thereafter, a new certificate of title was
transferred to the name of buyer and he built his house. Is he a builder in good faith?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. He is a builder in bad faith.

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor
in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Good faith is
an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest
belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. 

The buyer knew – or at the very least, should have known – from the very beginning that they were dealing with a person who possibly
had no authority to sell the subject property considering the palpable irregularity in the subject SPA’s acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely
on said document and without any further investigation on the agent’s capacity to sell, the buyer still chose to proceed with its purchase
and even built a house thereon. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be seriously doubted that the buyer was actually aware of a flaw or
defect in their title or mode of acquisition and have consequently built the house on the subject property in bad faith under legal
contemplation.

52. ROBBIE CORBO

Topic: Property
Source: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE
JOSON, Respondent. [G.R. No. 163767 : March 10, 2014]
Contributor: CORBO, RHOBIE S. (Executive Class)

QUESTION: In the early, 1900’s Don Teburcio owned a vast parcels of land which composed primarily of ricefields in the Negros
Occidental. More than twenty years thereafter or in 1926, he decided to sell a portion of his ricefield with an area of 12,342 sq.m. to
Senyora Elisa and upon her death was inherited by her twin sister Donya Elisondra. Donya Elisondra had his unico hijo named Joselito
who was the sole heir to his mother’s wealth. In 1963, Donya Elisondra boarded on a plane bound to Manila which unfortunately crashed.
Joselito, inherited the parcel of land which was originally owned by Don Teburcio by virtue of succession and owning and possessing it

27
openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of owner since then as well as the taxes due on
the property. Sometime in 1981, Joselito filed for an application for land registration over the property under the courts of Negros.

Will Joselito’s application for land registration be granted?

ANSWER:
NO. Land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the President or
the Secretary of the DENR. This doctrine means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the
application for registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and
disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

In this case there was no evidence was presented that the subject land had been declared alienable and disposable by the State. 
Thus, the application for land registration cannot be granted.

53. NAIZA DE LOS SANTOS

Civil Law Topic : Obligations and Contracts; Obligations; Solidary ObligationSource :Contributor : De los Santos, Naiza MaeSpouses
Berot vs. SiapnoG.R. No. 188944, July 9, 2014-xxxx-A, B, and C contracted a loan from C in the amount of Php300,000 with annual
interest of 4% per annum. A certain parcel of land was mortgaged to cover as a security. The contract provides: “All debtors, for a single
loan, bind themselves to cede, transfer and convey by way of real estate mortgage all their rights, interest and participation in the subject
parcel of land including the improvements thereon in favor of the plaintiff and that should they fail to perform their obligation the mortgage
will be foreclosed.”A died in 2013. When the load became due, the debtors defaulted prompting the mortgagee to institute foreclosure
proceedings. In the course of the proceeding, the debtors admitted that a load was obtained among them. The court ruled that their
obligation is solidary. Is the obligation solidary?SUGGESTED ANSWER:NO. The obligation is not solidary, but joint. Under the law, when
there is a concurrence of two or more debtors under a single obligation, the obligation is presumed to be joint. Further, for it to be
considered as solidary, it must be made expressly by law, or by the nature of the obligation itself.In the instant case, the testimony of
debtors admitting that they contracted a loan established only the existence of the load. Hence, there being no express term of solidarity,
the presumption of joint liability will apply. It is incumbent upon the party alleging to prove otherwise with a preponderance of evidence
that obligation under the loan contract is indeed joint and several, or solidary.

54. JOBEY BERNALDEZ

Torts and Damages; Nominal Damages

Cathay Pacific vs. Reyes
PROBLEM:

Sometime in March 2015, Hewlett Packard made a travel reservation with Madrid Travel agency for his family’s trip to
Barcelona,Spain.HewlettpaidfortheCathyAirlinesround-tripairplaneticketsforManila-Capetown-Barcelona-Capetown-Manila.

Hewlett reconfirmed his family’s return flight with the Cathy Airlines office in Barcelona and the reservation was okay as scheduled.

On departure day Hewlett was informed by a staff from Cathy Airlines that they did not have confirmed reservations, and only his mother-
in-law's flight booking was confirmed. Nevertheless, they were allowed to board the flight to Cape town. But when they were in Cape
town, they were again informed of the same problem and were not allowed to board because the flight to Manila was fully booked.
Onlyhismother-in-law was allowed. Then extday, they were allowed to board the next flight to Manila.

Hewlett filed a Complaint for damages with attorney's fees against CathyAirlines and Madrid Travel agency.

CathyAirlinesarguedthatno validticketnumberwasinputtedinitssystemandithadtherighttocancelthebooking.

Madrid Travel Agency maintained that it made the necessary reservation with Cathy Airlines for respondents’ trip to Barcelona.After
getting confirmed bookings with Cathy Airlines, Madrid Travel agency issued the corresponding tickets to respondents.

Are both of them, Cathy Airlines and Madrid Travel agency liable fordamages?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Cathy Airlines and Madrid Travel agency are jointly and solidarily liable for nominaldamages. Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code,
nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating
or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff or any loss suffered.

28
Cathy Airlines and Madrid Travel agency acted together in creating the confusion in the bookings which led to the erroneous
cancellationofrespondents’bookings.Theirnegligenceistheproximatecauseofthetechnicalinjurysustainedbyrespondents.Therefore, they are
liable to pay Hewlett and his family nominal damages. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract
and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.

55. HOPE CESELY

TOPIC: Obligations and Contracts; Privity of Contracts

SOURCE: STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., INC., VS. SPOUSES 
STROEM
G.R. No. 204689 January 21, 2015

CONTRIBUTOR: BAQUERO, HOPE CESELY H. (Executive Class)

PROBLEM: Spouses Storm entered into an Owners-Contractor Agreement with Assist & Company, Inc. (Assist) for the construction of a
two-storey house on the lot owned by the former in Antipolo, Rizal. The latter secured the Performance Bond in the amount of
P4,500,000.00 from Stronger Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronger) and bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the Spouses the
agreed amount in the event that the construction project is not completed. Th project was not finished on time, subsequently rescinded
the agreement, and then hired an independent appraiser to evaluate the progress of the construction project. Stronger sent a letter to
Assist requesting that the company settle its obligations with the Spouses Storm. No response was received from Assist. Spouses Strong
filed a Complaint for breach of contract and for sum of money with a claim for damages against Assist and Stronger. Stronger argues that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement and considering that (R.A. 876)
explicitly confines the court’s authority only to pass upon the issue, and that they cannot be held liable as they are not privy to the contract
between the Spouses Storm and Assist & Co, Inc. Is Stronger Insurance Co., Inc.’s claim tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the claim is not tenable. It is in the Owners-Contractor Agreement that the arbitration clause is found. The
construction agreement was signed only by the Spouses and the contractor, Assist. As held in the case of STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
CO., INC., VS. SPOUSES STROEM, G.R. No. 204689, January 21, 2015, basic is the rule that "Contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs". Not being a party to the construction agreement, Stronger cannot invoke the arbitration clause and thus,
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC. Moreover, the invocation of the arbitration clause defeats the purpose of arbitration in relation
to the construction business. The state has continuously encouraged the use of dispute resolution mechanisms to promote party
autonomy. However, where a surety in a construction contract actively participates in a collection suit, as in the case of Stronger, it is
estopped from raising jurisdiction later. Assuming that Stronger is privy to the construction agreement, they cannot be allowed to invoke
arbitration at this late stage of the proceedings since to do so would go against the law's goal of prompt resolution of cases in the
construction industry.

56. AVENIDO, ANA MARIE

Topic: Persons and Family Relations

Source: AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in
behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON,
Gr. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
Contributor: Anna Mae R. Avenido
Problem: 

The love of Susana and Mario bore them a child name Samantha. At that time, Susana and Mario were both single and capacitated to
marry but decided to just live together as common law husband and wife. However, their love faded and they decided to part ways. 

Susana has the custody of Samantha. Mario, on the other hand, married Angela and had children with her. After fifteen years, Mario died
intestate. 

Samantha then filed for a Petition for Letters of Administration for the Estate of her father claiming that she is the natural child of Mario
having been conceived and born at the time when 

her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Susana impugned the validity of Mario’s marriage to Angela by claiming that it
was bigamous. Angela married Mario despite the subsistence of the former’s marriage with one Felipe. 

Can Samantha question the validity of the marriage of Angela and Mario? Decide

29
Answer: 

Yes, Samantha can question the validity of the marriage of Angela and Mario. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken
place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

There is no doubt that Samantha, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Angela, may impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking
the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such
as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Samantha, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
void marriage of Mario and Angela, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such 
cause of action.

57. MACATANGAY

G.R. No. 205664, June 9, 2014, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 

represented by its REGIONAL DIRECTOR TERESITA DOMALANTA, Petitioner, vs. MARIANO TULIAO, Respondent.

CONTRIBUTOR: MACATANGAY, MARIA THERESA T (Executive class)

PROBLEM: 
In March 2000, upon discovering that a structure was being constructed on the land in dispute, X demanded that the DepED cease and
desist and vacate the property as well as pay for reasonable rent. But these demands were ignored. On October 8, 2002, X filed an action
for recovery of possession and removal of structure with damages against the Department of Education (DepEd) with the MTC. X alleged
that he was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land, evidenced by a certificate of title and with a tax declaration and a tax
receipt, and that a portion of the said property was allowed by his predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary School
(AES) as an access road for the schoolchildren in going to and from the school. DepEd denied the material allegations, averred that it did
not state a cause of action, and even if there was, the same was already barred by prescription and/or laches. Its occupation of the
subject land was adverse, peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than fifty (50) years, evidenced by the testimony
of testimony of a lone witness who is a retired teacher. It also alleged that it did not receive a notice to cease and desist or notice to
vacate. As owner of the school site, it could not be compelled to pay rent or its reasonable value.

a) Who has a better right to the subject property?

b) Is X not barred by laches, in this case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The plaintiff X showed as evidence tax declarations and a certificate of title over the property, the lone testimonial evidence the DepEd
presented is not sufficient to controvert the landowner’s case. As between a certificate of title, which is an incontrovertible proof of
ownership, accompanied with a tax declaration and a tax receipt on one hand, and a testimony of a lone witness who is a retired teacher
on the other, the former prevails in establishing who has a better right of possession over the property, following the rule that testimonial
evidence cannot prevail over documentary evidence

b) The landowner’s claim is not barred by laches when the school’s possession of the property is not adverse, and when the landowner
brought suit two years after he learned that the school is constructing a gymnasium over the property.

58. IMPERIAL

Q&ACase: Rolando S. Abadilla Jr. vs Spouses Bonifacio P. Obrero and Bernabela N. 
Obrero GR No. 199448 November 12, 2014

CONTRIBUTOR: IMPERIAL, CHRTINE L (Executive class)

PROBLEM: 
Complainant Sps. Bonifacio P. Obrero and Bernabela N. Obrero initiated a case for forcible entry against defendant Rolando S. Abadilla,
Jr. Complainants claimed that they are the registered owners of the land in question based on a TCT registered under the name. They
claimed they were in possession thereof based on improvements erected therein utilized for residential and business purposes prior to
the alleged acts of Respondent who forcible fenced the perimeter of the land with barbed wire.

30
By way of defense, defendant claimed that the land was sold by complainants to his late father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Being one of the heirs, he is one of the owners thereof. In fact, they left a caretaker to oversee the land. Despite the sale, complainants
supposedly attempted to remove the fence and even built concrete structures on the land using it for dwelling purposes.

a) Is title or ownership to the property essential for an ejectment case to proper? 

b) Discuss the nature of a Torrens Title.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: 
a) In an ejectment case, title is not involved as the sole issue is the determination of who is entitled to the physical or material possession
of the premises or possession de facto. “Thus, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon that issue but only to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. As such, any adjudication of
the ownership issue is not final and binding; it is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.”

b) A certificate of title is evidence of indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. A title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes
possession. A Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished except in a direct proceeding. Thus, issues as to the validity of a party’s title can only
be definitively resolved in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTCs.”

59. JAEN

Topic: Persons and Family Relations 

G.R. No. 192718 February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, 
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Problem:

H filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, W was suffering from
psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and
responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when W exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a
wife and a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was H who did the cleaning of the room because W did not know how
to keep order; (2) it was W’s mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not
want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking
at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) H received anonymous letters reporting W loitering with
male students; (6) when H was not home, W would receive male visitors; (7) a certain K slept in their house when H was away; and (6) W
would contract loans without his knowledge.
Should the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage be granted based on Art. 36 of the Family Code?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The petition should be dismissed. The allegations of H failed to establish the psychological incapacity of W for psychological
incapacity as required by Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage.
It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

31