SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF PHARAK

PROSECUTOR V. NATHAN ORKHAN

Instructions

1. Proceedings: The hearing takes place in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’)
at the “confirmation of charges” stage pursuant to Article 61 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC
(‘Rome Statute’). At this stage, the Prosecutor must “support each charge with sufficient evidence
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged”. The
Accused may “object to the charges” and “challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor”.

2. Oral Pleading: For the purpose of the moot, the hearing comprises a main speech and a rebuttal
for the Prosecution and a main speech and a sur-rebuttal for the Defence (see Rule 12 of the Rules
for the competition).

3. Facts and evidence: The case is entirely fictional. The Statement of Agreed Facts includes all the
facts supported by evidence that have been transmitted to the Defence, as well as facts and evidence
presented by the Defence. Teams should confine themselves to the facts supplied. Neither the
Prosecutor nor the Defence may introduce new evidence or facts at the hearing (Article 61(6)(c)
of the Rome Statute is not applicable). Teams may nonetheless draw reasonable inferences from
the facts. They may also question the credibility or weight of the evidence.

4. Procedure: The problem is not intended to raise questions of procedure other than the rights of
the accused pursuant to Articles 66 and 67 of the Rome Statute. Any other procedural questions
should be ignored.

5. Jurisdiction and admissibility: Counsel may, only if relevant, address issues of jurisdiction and
admissibility.

6. Applicable law: In accordance with Article 21 of the Rome Statute:

a. The Court shall apply:
i. In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
ii. In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law,
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
iii. Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime,
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and
internationally recognized norms and standards.
b. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.

7. Teams are encouraged to look at the case law of international and national courts. If teams rely on
decisions of national courts, these should be leading decisions and teams should expect to be asked
for copies of the head note and the portion of the transcript or judgment referred to in their
argument.

8. Participation in treaties:

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At all material times, the treaties listed below were in force for the Kingdom of Khamri, the
Republic of Pharak and the State of Tilia:
- Charter of the United Nations
- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- Four Geneva Conventions of 1949
- Additional Protocol I and II of 1977
- Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery

The Republic of Pharak and the State of Tilia are parties to the Rome Statute. The Republic of
Pharak acceded to the Rome Statute on 13 May 2011, whereas the State of Tilia ratified the Rome
Statute on 12 April 1999.

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 Statement of Agreed Facts

1. The Kingdom of Khamri is a desert kingdom in which the royal family controls all aspects of
political life. King Sattri III, who ruled the kingdom from 1963 until 2009, modernized the
country and developed it economically. The Kingdom became one of the most prosperous
countries in the region. The Kingdom’s main export is oil and oil products, which make up 80%
of the Kingdom’s exports. During the reign of King Sattri III, Khamri maintained peaceful
relations with all its neighbours and other States in the region and with the international
community. The Kingdom mainly relied on diplomacy and had a small, but well-equipped military.
During his reign, the only significant dispute concerned the sovereignty over the Desert of Tusks;
a desert that contains one of the largest reserves of oil in the world. The Desert of Tusks is located
at the northern border of the Kingdom of Khamri. The desert is claimed by both the Kingdom
and its neighbour, the Republic of Pharak. In 1977, both countries agreed to submit the dispute
to international arbitration. In 1979, the arbitration panel awarded sovereignty to the Republic of
Pharak in an award that international law scholars have extensively criticized as a flawed
application of the relevant international laws. Consequently, the Kingdom of Khamri refused to
accept the outcome of the international arbitration. Despite some members of the royal family
urging King Sattri III to occupy the Desert of Tusks militarily, the King refused so as not to
endanger the prosperity and international standing of the Kingdom. Nonetheless, the Kingdom
continued to contest the sovereignty of the Desert of Tusks in international fora, whenever the
sovereignty of the Desert was on the agenda.

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2. On 2 September 2009, King Sattri III unexpectedly died and was succeeded by his oldest son,
who was crowned in a lavish ceremony one week later, on 9 September 2009, as King Sattri IV.
Like his father, King Sattri IV controls the government and is actively involved in foreign relations.
As head of State he is equally the supreme commander of all armed forces of the Kingdom. His
uncle, the younger brother of King Sattri III, Marshal Nathan Orkhan, is the chief of staff of the
armed forces. According to the International Morning Post, a well-respected newspaper in the
State of Tilia, Nathan Orkhan is a military hardliner. He fell out with his brother, King Sattri III,
due to his refusal to occupy the Desert of Tusks militarily.

3. Between 2009 and 2015, the Kingdom of Khamri utilised various international loans to build up
and strengthen its military forces and effectively became the dominant military power in the
region. On 15 February 2010, the International Morning Post published an interview with an
anonymous member of the royal family, who decried the influence Marshal Nathan Orkhan had
on King Sattri IV. According to the interviewee, Marshal Nathan Orkhan regularly reminded the
King of the history of military conquests by the Kingdom against its neighbours between the 13th
and 16th centuries and the importance of the King as a military figure. The interview was
corroborated by public statements of the King in 2009 in which he spoke with admiration of past
glories and a desire to restore Khamri to its former military greatness.

4. On 1 January 2016, Kham Oil, a wholly State-owned company incorporated in Khamri,

responsible for the exploitation of all oil resources, announced that it would negatively adjust the
oil reserves of the Kingdom since the oil supplies had been dwindling since 2010. The board of
Kham Oil, comprised of members of the royal family, therefore proposed to reduce the export
of oil and oil products between 5 to 10% per year. The reduction of exports and the repayment
of loans concluded to expand the Kingdom’s military led to a significant government deficit. To
reduce the deficit, the government cut social expenditure. On 16 March 2016, protests in the
capital Wahad against the proposed austerity measures led to riots and looting, which the police
managed to control after three days. Opinion polls conducted after the riots consistently showed
that approval of the government was between 48-51%.

5. The Republic of Pharak is the northern neighbour of the Kingdom of Khamri. Unlike its
neighbour, Pharak is one of the poorest States in the region and the world. Since its independence,
Pharak has been unstable due to the fact that different ethnic groups control different parts of
the country. In 2001 a failed coup by one of these ethnic groups caused the total collapse of the
government, leading to a civil war between the various ethnic groups that live in the Republic of
Pharak.

6. On 12 August 2010, the United Nations brokered a peace agreement between the different ethnic
groups pursuant to which the ethnic groups agreed to form a government of national unity.
Nonetheless, each ethnic group maintains their armed forces and remains effectively in control
of certain parts of the territory, in which they exercise governmental functions, such as
maintaining law and order, enforcing criminal law and collecting taxes. Formally, the armed forces
of the different ethnic groups compose the national defence force, but in reality, each leader of
the ethnic groups effectively controls its own militia comprised of members of that ethnic group.
Despite this, the government of national unity is capable to act occasionally, when there is
consensus between the ethnic groups. Furthermore, as part of the peace agreement, the Republic
of Pharak had to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. On 13 May 2011,

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 the Republic of Pharak deposited its instrument of accession to the Rome Statute with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. The newly found stability in the Republic of Pharak
attracted foreign investment, with a particular interest in the exploitation of the oil reserves of the
Desert of Tusks.

7. Historically, the Chaqua, a semi-nomadic ethnic group, control the Desert of Tusks, in which
they graze cattle. The Chaqua’s stronghold is the Viper Pass, in which the strategically important
oasis city of Antoch is located. Like other ethnic groups, the Chaqua ethnic group has an
organized militia, which extensively fought during the civil war. Although the militia is not as well
organized and disciplined as professional armed forces and its members do not wear any specific
uniform, they wear a red armband with a yellow scorpion to indicate membership of the militia
and carry weapons openly. The Chaqua militia was by all accounts one of the most formidable
and effective fighting forces during the civil war.

8. As the result of the outcome of the peace agreement, the leader of the Chaqua militia, Gilles
Kaiax, was appointed Secretary of Natural Resources. Under national law of the Republic of
Pharak, natural resources are the property of the State, which can grant concessions to exploit
the natural resources. On 4 October 2011, Exyl Oil, a multinational oil company incorporated in
the State of Tilia, concluded a concession agreement with the Republic of Pharak to exploit the
oil field in the Desert of Tusks. Under this agreement, a joint venture incorporated in Pharak is
set up, Pharak Oil, in which Exyl Oil obtains a share of 60% and the Republic of Pharak a share
of 40%, with the power to block any corporate decisions. Furthermore, Exyl Oil agrees to provide
a minimum supply of the pumped-up oil to the Republic of Pharak for the daily needs of its
citizens and the government, to build a refinery and processing facility, and a power plant in
Antoch, inter alia to supply these facilities with power. Exyl Oil may sell all the oil exceeding the
minimum supply at market price for 20 years from the commencement of operation of the oil
field.

9. On 1 January 2016, the oil field, refinery and processing facility and the power plant commenced
operation. Due to the absence of skilled manpower in the Republic of Pharak, the facilities were
primarily manned by personnel recruited and employed by Exyl Oil. Although some Pharaki
citizens were employed at the facilities, more than 90% of the staff were globally recruited,
although 50% thereof had the nationality of Tilia. In order to ensure the safety of its personnel,
Exyl Oil set up a wholly owned private security company, Tilia Secur, incorporated in Tilia, whose
security personnel was entirely comprised of former members of the armed forces of Tilia. On
17 February 2016, the secretary of internal security of the Republic of Pharak provided Tilia Secur
with a license to operate in Pharak. All members wore battledress uniforms with desert patterns,
which clearly displayed the logo of the company. The members were equipped with small arms
that were openly carried.

Tensions at the border

10. Since 2015, the Desert of Tusks has experienced more severe and longer droughts, leading to
higher mortality rates amongst the cattle of the Chaqua. Consequently, members of the Chaqua
occasionally crossed the border into the Kingdom of Khamri to steal cattle from nomads. In
response, the Kingdom of Khamri increased its border controls and set up military outposts along
the border. Although this measure deterred the incursions by the Chaqua to steal cattle, it
attracted members of the Chaqua militia to regularly attack and infiltrate the military outposts for
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 food, weapons and ammunition. Only rarely did the incursions result in hostilities, but some
Khamrian soldiers and members of the Chaqua militia have been wounded in such incursions.

11. Despite numerous diplomatic protests from the Kingdom of Khamri, the Republic of Pharak has
repeatedly denied any responsibility for the attacks since it claimed not to have control over the
Chaqua militia. Khamrian intelligence reports indicated that Gilles Kaiax and other commanders
are behind the incursions and raids, which provide the Chaqua militia with more modern weapons
and greater supplies of ammunition to be used in any potential future civil war. In a media
interview at a local radio station, when confronted by these accusations, Gilles Kaiax denied the
allegations. He acknowledged that certain members of the Chaqua militia may have lost purpose
after the end of the civil war and have become more difficult to control.

12. On 25 April 2017, at 11:00 pm, members of the Chaqua militia ambushed a Khamrian military
convoy during one of their raids. During the exchange of fire, 20 Khamrian soldiers were killed
along with an unidentified number of militia members. The members of the Chaqua militia
succeeded in capturing 10 military trucks containing small arms and machine guns, grenades,
rocket propelled grenades and ammunition. Under the cover of darkness, the trucks crossed the
border, into the Republic of Pharak.

13. On 27 April 2017, the Kingdom of Khamri issued a strongly worded protest against the raid and
ambush and demanded the return of the stolen trucks, weapons and ammunition, the arrest and
punishment of the responsible militia members and Gilles Kaiax, compensation for the loss of
life of its soldiers, and assurances of non-repetition. On the same day, in a note verbale to the
Security Council, the Kingdom of Khamri stated that it regarded the situation at its border as
constituting a threat to international peace and security. The UN Security Council however did
not adopt any resolution. On 28 April 2017, the Republic of Pharak again rejected any
international responsibility for the acts of the Chaqua militia and rejected the Khamrian demands.
In a broadcast on national television, Marshal Nathan Orkhan urged King Sattri IV to authorize
the army to avenge the fallen Khamrian soldiers and to halt the unlawful attacks against the
sovereignty of the Kingdom.

14. On 4 May 2017, the Kingdom of Khamri launched air and missile strikes primarily targeting the
Chaqua militia. However, it equally bombed roads and bridges leading from the Viper Pass and
the airport of the capital of Pharak, Zandri, in order to prevent reinforcements and ammunition
being sent to the Desert of Tusks and the Viper Pass. After three days of airstrikes, an artillery
bombardment into Chaqua-held positions in the Desert of Tusks allowed units of the Khamrian
armed forces to cross the border unopposed into the Republic of Pharak. The Pharak government
denounced the attack as an unlawful use of force against the territorial integrity of Pharak. In
reply, the Kingdom of Khamri stressed that it considers it to be in armed conflict with the Chaqua
militia, not with the Republic of Pharak, and that its military operations aim to remove the threat
the Chaqua militia poses. At the same time, it warned other armed groups in Pharak not to
intervene in the conflict or they would face military retaliation.

Capture of the oil field and installations in the Desert of Tusks

15. After crossing into Pharak, Khamrian armed forces made swift process towards the Viper Pass,
the bulwark of the Chaqua militia. Their advance came to a halt just before the Pass, where the
Chaqua militia had entrenched itself in the Pass and in the surrounding mountains. In addition,
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 during May and June 2017, the Khamrian armed forces faced guerrilla style attacks against supply
lines, which jeopardised the delivery of fuel to the armed forces in the field. This resulted in tanks
and armoured vehicles running out of fuel in the field and having to wait to be resupplied. Others
had to be abandoned and disabled in order to prevent them falling into enemy hands.

16. In light of the difficulties in delivering fuel, Marshal Nathan Orkhan, on 4 June 2017, issued an
order to redirect military units away from the Viper Pass to the east thereof for the purpose of
capturing the oil field and the adjacent refinery and processing facilities in the Desert of Tusks.
The order specifically stated that “the capture of the oil field and its installations is vital for the
continued military operations against the Chaqua. It is therefore imperative that the oil field and
its installations are captured undamaged in order to remedy supply to the front line”. The order
further declared that “all armed forces are permitted to utilize refined oil and fuel from the oilfield
in the Desert of Tusks and its installations for the duration of the conflict.”

17. On 6 June 2017 the Khamrian military units reached the oil field and its installations. They
immediately came under fire from the direction of the refinery. After briefly retreating and
undertaking a reconnoitre of the area, they identified members of the Chaqua militia and security
personnel of Tilia Secur who had taken up barricaded positions in the refinery. Furthermore, the
reconnaissance units reported that the Chaqua militia members and Tilia Secur security personnel
seemed to coordinate their defence of the refinery. After briefing the command centre, the
Khamrian military units received support from tanks and armoured vehicles.

18. During the one-hour exchange of fire, the Khamrian units seized the refinery virtually undamaged.
As a result of the fighting 29 Chaqua militia members and 17 security staff of Tilia Secur were
killed, with 11 and 13 respectively wounded. The Khamrian losses amounted to 15 killed and 4
soldiers wounded. In addition, 60 Chaqua militia members and 70 security staff of Tilia Secur
were taken prisoner. On the different oil field and refinery sites, the Khamrian military units
found the staff of Exyl Oil in their dormitories. The Khamrian military units provided assistance
to the wounded and organized the transport of the captured Chaqua militia members. The
captured security personnel of Tilia Secur were placed under guard in their quarters, whereas the
staff of Exyl Oil were ordered to stay inside their dormitories. The Khamrian military units
succeeded in securing the oil and fuel located in nearby warehouses.

19. On 7 June 2017, Pharak and Tilia publicly objected to the capture of the oil field and its facilities.
The Republic of Pharak accused the Kingdom of Khamri of pillaging its natural resources. The
State of Tilia declared that it regarded the seizure of the oil field, its installations and fuel as an
unlawful expropriation of the property of Exyl Oil. It also demanded that the captured security
personnel and the staff of Exyl Oil be treated in conformity with international law. During a press
conference, a Khamrian military spokesperson rejected these assertions and stated that under
international humanitarian law the Kingdom of Khamri has the right to seize oil and fuel for
military purposes.

20. During June and July 2017, dozens of Khamrian military vehicles continuously transported barrels
of oil and fuel from the oil field and its installations. On 2 August 2017, the Tilian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Alyssa Monte, organized a press conference in which she showed satellite images
of Khamrian military vehicles transporting barrels of oil and fuel across the border into Khamri.
She also unveiled photos of barrels with the logo of Pharak Oil in various warehouses in Khamri,
obtained by Tilian intelligence operatives. One of those photos showed barrels with the logo of
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 Pharak Oil in a warehouse owned by Kham Oil, located in the Khamrian capital, 75 km from the
Khamri-Pharak border. The Kingdom of Khamri vehemently denied the authenticity of the
photos. In addition, it declared that the military vehicles in the Tilian satellite images merely
transported oil and fuel to Khamrian military supply depots close to the border.

21. Publicly available documents indicated that, compared to the same period in 2016, in June and
July 2017 Kham Oil exported 10% more barrels of oil and its refineries had an increased output
of fuel of 5%. When questioned by reporters during a press conference, the spokesperson for the
Kingdom of Khamri stated that the increase in production was due to the need for increased
exports of oil and fuel to fund the on-going armed conflict.

Cyberattack against the Antoch power plant

22. After months of stalemate at the entrance of the Viper Pass, the Khamrian armed forces intended
to strike a decisive blow against the Chaqua militia by capturing their stronghold, the city of
Antoch. The historic city of Antoch is home to 500,000 people and is located in a large oasis that
is fed through an underground aquifer. The aquifer is the only source of drinkable water in the
Viper Pass and the surrounding area, supplying not only Antoch, but equally the nearby villages
with much needed water.

23. In the past, the local population could only obtain water from the aquifer by drilling wells. After
the conclusion of the concession agreement between Exyl Oil and Pharak, Exyl Oil constructed
the Antoch power plant, which operates on natural gas, delivered by underground pipeline from
the Pharak port city of Faros. The power plant provides power to the oil field and its installations
in the Desert of Tusks, but Gilles Kaiax ordered the power to the oil field and its installations to
be cut after their capture. The power plant equally provides power for local communications, the
pumping up of water from the aquifer, hospitals, civilian houses, etc. The Chaqua militia also
relied on the power plant for maintaining communications and to supply its troops with fresh
water.

24. On 4 September 2017, Marshal Nathan Orkhan ordered General Lucius Patek, chief of
operations of the Khamrian armed forces in the Desert of Tusks, to design plans to capture
Antoch “by all means necessary, thereby striking a final blow against the Chaqua militia”. The
order furthermore stated that the neutralization of the Antoch power plant is one of the “key
military objectives, which has to be achieved without compromising the overall functioning of
the power plant in light of its strategic importance for the provision of power to the oil field and
its installations”. The order concluded with “I give you full discretion how to successfully
complete this vital operation”.

25. General Lucius Patek, after considering several alternatives, opted for a cyberattack with a
specially designed computer virus that would compromise the software of the power plant,
forcing it to shut down, without causing any physical damage to the power plant. On 12
September 2017, the cyber unit of the Khamrian armed forces carried out the cyberattack, which
effectively shut down the power plant. When personnel of the power plant tried to reboot the
computer system of the power plant, they inadvertently made the computer virus delete all
software.

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26. Despite this, the Chaqua militia, hardened by years of fighting in the desert during the civil war
and determined to defend Antoch at all costs, continued fighting for two weeks. When Gilles
Kaiax realized that Khamrian armed forces had nearly encircled the city, he ordered the Chaqua
militia, under cover at darkness, to escape capture via secret paths in the Viper Pass. On 27
September 2017, Khamrian armed forces entered the city and captured the power plant and the
personnel of Exyl Oil working there. In his report to Marshal Nathan Orkhan, General Lucius
Patek noted that despite the capture of the city without significant casualties, the Chaqua militia
remained an effective fighting force.

27. When the Khamrian military units captured the power plant, they failed to restart the plant despite
the detailed instructions provided to them by the cyber unit of the Khamrian armed forces. After
arrival of the Khamrian cyber unit in Antoch they rapidly identified the problem and reported to
General Lucius Patek that it would take around 10 days to write software to make the power plant
operational. The cyber unit managed to write the software in 9 days and installed the software
on the 10th day, on 7 October 2017.

28. However, the loss of power from the power plant immediately impacted the lives of those living
in and around Antoch. While some residents had access to wells these provided little water
because they had fallen into disuse after the installation of piped water pumped by power from
the power plant. These old wells were mostly blocked by rubbish and/or collapsed sidewalls. The
loss of power directly impacted the normal functioning of the hospitals in Antoch. Initially these
hospitals operated by use of their emergency generators but after 48 hours all had run out of fuel
and the hospitals were without any power. On the third day after the loss of power people started
dying in Antoch and the surrounding villages. Most of the early deaths occurred in the hospitals
because the lack of power stopped necessary operations and many drugs perished due to the lack
of refrigeration. Many people returned to using water from those few wells that still operated but
most had been contaminated, resulting in various illnesses, such as diarrhoea, amoebiasis, cholera
and dysentery. Despite the concerted efforts of medical personnel, including medical officers
from the Khamrian military, many people died. A report compiled in June 2018 by the Pharak
Red Cross indicated that more than 500 wounded and sick died because of the failure to carry
out medical procedures or the lack of drugs; at least 750 civilians, in particular the elderly and
infants, succumbed from drinking contaminated water; and 100 civilians perished due to the lack
of air conditioning and drinking water in the desert temperatures.

Requisition of labour from personnel of Exyl Oil and Tilia Secur

29. Following the capture of Antoch, Marshall Orkan appointed Colonel Nerut Rasul as military
commander of Antoch and those parts of the Desert of Tusks and the Viper Pass controlled by
the Khamrian armed forces. Besides having to maintain local peace and security, the Colonel was
equally responsible for continuing and maintaining the operation of the oil fields and the Antoch
power plant and the general well-being of the local population.

30. Because of the lack of local qualified personnel to operate the power plant, the oil field and its
installations, Colonel Nerut Rasul requested his immediate commander, General Lucius Patek,
on 13 October 2017, permission to requisition the labour of the personnel of Exyl Oil and Tilia
Secur. The next day, General Lucius Patek authorized the requisition of labour; and the
authorization was mentioned in a general operations report sent to Marshal Nathan Orkhan.
However, Marshal Nathan Orkhan was hospitalized on 12 October 2017 for a serious back injury.
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 Medical records indicate that, during his stay at the hospital, Marshal Nathan Orkhan received a
number of pain killers, including a high dose of morphine. While in hospital, Marshal Nathan
Orkhan received all general operations reports on the ongoing conflict for review. Marshal
Nathan Orkhan was discharged from the hospital on 21 October 2017 and formally returned to
his duties on 30 October 2017. Throughout November and December 2017, he continued to
receive doses of morphine to combat his back pain.

31. On 15 October 2017, Colonel Nerut Rasul requisitioned the personnel of Exyl Oil and Tilia Secur
to take up work in the oil field, oil installations and power plant. Although some volunteered, the
overall majority refused to obey the Khamrian command. In response, the next day, Colonel
Nerut Rasul transferred the personnel from their dormitories and quarters to a specially
constructed barracks in a military camp in the Desert of Tusks. In total, 70 personnel of Tilia
Secur and 300 personnel of Exyl Oil were housed in the camp and barracks, in which they were
kept under constant guard. Colonel Nerut Rasul informed General Lucius Patek of the transfer.
In his general operations report to Marshal Nathan Orkhan, General Lucius Patek wrote: “upon
requisitioned personnel’s refusal to work, the workers were transferred to a barracks in a military
camp in the Desert of Tusks.”

32. Between October 2017 and February 2018, requisitioned personnel worked on average 65 hours
per week, with one day of rest. They were assigned work that they would normally perform and
for which they were technically qualified. The personnel of Tilia Secur, who did not have
qualifications to work in the oil field, its installations or the power plant, were assigned manual
labour. This labour included loading barrels of oil in trucks, repair works, and maintenance. At
all times, the personnel were under armed guard to prevent sabotage. Upon return to the camp,
they were locked into the barracks which had been surrounded with barbed wires and guard
towers. The personnel received the same rations as the Khamrian armed forces, were regularly
checked by medical personnel, and received the required medical care when needed.

33. On 25 January 2018, one member of Tilia Secur was injured during work when a fully loaded
barrel of oil fell from a truck during loading, crushing his leg. In the evening, when the workers
had returned to the barracks, they protested their treatment by refusing to return to their quarters
after dinner. When guards intervened, a fight erupted between the personnel of Tilia Secur and
the guards. The guards requested assistance from the military police at the base, which arrived in
riot gear and were able to subdue the altercation. Guards and personnel of Tilia Secur were treated
for minor injuries. As punishment, the personnel of Tilia Secur involved in the fighting had their
time in the recreation room of the barracks cancelled for one week.

34. On the evening of 10 February 2018 two members of Tilia Secur managed to overpower their
guard and escaped from the oil refinery. After two days of walking in the desert, they encountered
a unit of the Chaqua militia, who brought them to their secret headquarters. From there, they
went to Zandri, where they contacted the Tilian embassy to report the compulsory labour in the
oil fields, its installations and the power plant. On 14 February 2018, Tilia issued a strongly
worded diplomatic protest to the Kingdom of Khamri, demanding that the compulsory labour
of all personnel of Exyl Oil and Tilia Secur be halted immediately. Other countries, which had
nationals in the same situation, joined in the condemnation and threatened economic sanctions
against the Kingdom. On 15 February 2018, Marshal Nathan Orkhan ordered the suspension of
the labour of the personnel of Exyl Oil and Tilia Secur. In order to guarantee the continued

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 functioning of the Antoch power plant, the staff of Exyl Oil working at the power plant was
replaced with qualified staff from Khamri.

35. On 16 February 2018, Marshal Nathan Orkhan, relieved General Lucius Patek and Colonel Nerut
Rasul of their command and recalled them to Wahad, where they were consigned to military
quarters in a base pending a disciplinary hearing. On 2 March 2018, in a court martial, General
Lucius Patek was demoted to the rank of Colonel, whereas Colonel Nerut Rasul received a
suspended sentence and a dishonourable discharge from the armed forces.

End of hostilities and surrender to ICC

36. On 23 February 2018, a group of States, including the Republic of Pharak and the State of Tilia,
requested the UN Security Council to intervene. On 26 February 2018, the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter adopted Resolution 3000 (2018), demanding the immediate
cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all Khamrian armed forces from the Republic of
Pharak; the immediate repatriation of all personnel of Exyl Oil and Tilia Secur; and the surrender
of Marshal Nathan Orkhan and other key military figures to the International Criminal Court.
The Security Council confirmed in Resolution 3000 that failure to comply would result in
economic sanctions, including an embargo against oil and oil products from the Kingdom of
Khamri. The Kingdom of Khamri agreed to carry out the first two demands, but it refused to
surrender Marshal Nathan Orkhan and other key military leaders to the International Criminal
Court.

37. Due to the severe economic impact of the international sanctions, protests occurred in all parts
of Khamri. Protests in the capital of Wahad became increasingly violent, with riot police being
more and more unable to suppress the protests. In addition, due to the high number of military
casualties, opposition to the conflict in the Desert of Tusks within the Khamrian military was on
the rise. In order to stem the discontent and fearing a coup, elements in the royal family pled with
King Sattri IV to dismiss Marshal Nathan Orkhan and to surrender him to the International
Criminal Court.

38. On 2 May 2018, King Sattri IV announced in a nationally televised speech that his government
had dismissed Marshal Nathan Orkhan from all his official functions and that the Kingdom would
comply with the request of the internationally community to end hostilities in the Republic of
Pharak and surrender key military figures to the ICC. On 7 May 2018, Nathan Orkhan was
transferred into the custody of the ICC.

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 Charges

The Office of the Prosecution presents the following charges against the defendant, Nathan Orkhan:

Count 1

With respect to the decision of 4 June 2017 to capture the oil field and adjacent refinery and processing
facilities in the Desert of Tusks, the capture of the oil field and the adjacent refinery and processing
facilities on 6 June 2017, and the seizure of oil and fuel during June and July 2017:

On the basis of individual criminal responsibility for commission as perpetrator, pursuant to Article
25(3)(a) Rome Statute,

- The war crime of destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such destruction or seizure
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war under Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) Rome Statute;

Count 2

With respect to the decision to launch an attack against the Antoch power plant on 4 September 2017,
the preparation of the attack between 4 September 2017 and 11 September 2017, the cyberattack
against the Antoch power plant on 12 September 2017, and the loss of civilian life as the result of the
cyberattack, between 12 September 2017 and 7 October 2017:

On the basis of individual criminal responsibility for ordering, soliciting or inducing, pursuant to
Article 25(3)(b) Rome Statute,

- The war crime of intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated under
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute;

Count 3

With respect to the compulsory labour of the personnel of Exyl Oil and Tilia Secur at the oil field, oil
installations in the Desert of Tusks and the power plant in Antoch, from the moment of authorization
of the compulsory labour on 14 October 2017 until the suspension of the compulsory labour on 15
February 2018:

On the basis of command responsibility, pursuant to Article 28(a) Rome Statute,

- The crime against humanity of enslavement under Article 7(1)(c) ICC Statute.

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