Petitioner argues that it was denied due process when it was not given the opportunity to be heard to

prove that its failure to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal from the dismissal of its petition for
review was due to the failure of its employee to forward the copy of the September 10, 2003 Resolution
which constitutes excusable negligence.

on for relief from judgment, petitioner did not offer any reason for his failure to appeal; there was no
assertion that the RTC decision was entered against him through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence.

June 28, denying his motion for reconsideration and not his notice of appeal. This is not the order
contemplated by law which was entered against them through FAME or excusable negliegence as he
merely submitted receipts to imply that they filed their notice of appeal on time.

there was no assertion that the RTC decision was entered against him through fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence.

Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provide the requirements for a petition for relief from
judgment, thus:

SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order
is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

SEC. 3. Time for filing of petition; contents and verification. A petition for in either of the preceding
sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy provided by law to any person
against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no other available or adequate remedy.[6] When a party has another remedy available to him,
which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the lower court, and
he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or
taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rul

Motion for reconsideration is not mr to the decision

Undoubtedly, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for relief.
Considering the circumstances obtaining here, petitioners should not be made to suffer the
consequences of their counsels negligence. Hence, the period within which to file their petition for relief
should be reckoned from their actual receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration,
which is December 7, 1998. Accordingly, the petition for relief filed on December 16, 1998 was well
within the sixty-day period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.

The fundamental issues for our resolution are: 1) whether there was a valid service of the trial courts
order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Bagabuyo; 2) whether Atty. Bagabuyo
was negligent which prevented petitioners from filing a timely notice of appeal; and 3) if so, whether
such negligence is binding upon petitioners.

Failure of petitioners’ former counsel to

file the notice of appeal within the

reglementary period is not excusable

negligence

Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary
period, petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was
due to a mistake or excusable negligence.

Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be
filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence:

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only in exceptional cases.36 It
is not available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for new trial or appeal.37

To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the negligence must be so gross "that ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against."38 This is to prevent parties from "reviv[ing]
the right to appeal [already] lost through inexcusable negligence."39

Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary
period was "a mistake and an excusable negligence due to [their former counsel’s] age."40 This
argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens. It asks this court to assume that a person with
advanced age is prone to incompetence. This cannot be done.

There is also no showing that the negligence could have been prevented through ordinary diligence and
prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel’s negligence.41

Petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that their former counsel
received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision on
June 24, 2010.42 Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010,43 the trial court
correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.

RULE 41

APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

Section 1. Subject of appeal.

An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;

(c) An interlocutory order;

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;

(f) An order of execution;

(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court
allows an appeal therefrom; and

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

G.R. No. 141986. July 11, 2002]

The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and should not be
disregarded without the most compelling of reasons.

NEPLUM, INC., petitioner, vs. EVELYN V. ORBESO, respondent.

LETICIA A. CADENA,- versus – CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,G.R. No. 191412, January 17, 2012,

The respondents filed a Comment [11] dated September 6, 2002 reaffirming their position that
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and/or Petition for Relief from Judgment of the Resolution of
November 29, 2001 was properly denied for the reasons set forth by the Court of Appeals. Additionally,
the respondents emphasize that petitioners were equally negligent in failing to follow-up the status of
their appeal. Besides, they did not even file the appropriate administrative charges against their former
counsel. The respondents likewise insist that petitioners were not deprived of due process because a full
trial was accorded them by the RTC. Moreover, petitioners’ inaction on their appeal caused
considerable damage to the respondents’ real estate business.cralaw

owever, it was only on March 1, 2002, more than two (2) months after the deadline, that they filed their
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Petition for Relief from Judgment of the Resolution of November 29,
2001. Even their petition for relief (from the denial of their appeal) was filed beyond the period
provided under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules. [15] Hence, the appellate court again correctly denied
their motion. Cha
etitioners blame the alleged negligence of their former counsel for their failure to file an appellants’
brief on time. However, there is no rule more settled than that a client is bound by his counsel’s
conduct, negligence and mistake in handling the case. [16] 1 Besides, petitioners had an opportunity to
rectify their former counsel’s blunder by timely filing a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dismissing their appeal. As it is, their new counsel also belatedly filed their Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Petition for Relief from Judgment of the Resolution of November 29, 2001.cralaw

Parenthetically, petitioners explain that the Resolution dated November 29, 2001
was received on December 10, 2001, not by their new counsel but by their former
counsel, Atty. Fagutao. This despite the unequivocal statement in their Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Petition for Relief from Judgment of the Resolution of
November 29, 2001 that the questioned Resolution “was received by the herein
counsel (Atty. Solidum) on December 10, 2001.” [17] This explanation is but a
feeble attempt to justify the late filing of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and
does not hold favor with the Court. cralaw

While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast in stone, it is equally true that strict compliance with
the Rules is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious
dispatch of judicial business. [19] Unfortunately for them, petitioners failed to show that their counsels’
negligence was so gross and palpable as to call for the exercise of this Court’s equity jurisdiction.
Neither have they shown that the ends of justice will be better served by relaxing procedural rules. It
should be recalled that petitioners were accorded a full trial by the RTC although its Decision was
ultimately adverse to them. They cannot feign lack of due process. chanr 2

LETICIA A. CADENA,- versus – CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,G.R. No. 191412, January 17, 2012,

It did not immediately take steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to
file a motion to set aside order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only
“conveniently blamed its x x x counsel [for the late filing of the answer]”126 without offering any excuse
for the late filing. This is not excusable negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b)127 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err in refusing to set aside the
order of default.
1
labanzas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74697, November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA 304. chanrobles
2
HEIRS OF THE LATE CRUZ BARREDO,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 153306
August 27, 2004
-versus-
G.R. No. 153306
August 27, 2004

SPS. VIRGILIO L. ASIS AND MAUDE MASA ASIS,