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G.R. No. 144640. June 26, 2006.

RODOLFO TIGOY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. 705);

Environmental Law; There are two ways of violating Section 68 of
the Revised Forestry Code—(1) by cutting, gathering and/or
collecting timber or other forest products without a license, and, (2)
by possessing timber and other forest products without the
required legal documents.—Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by E.O. No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, provides: Section 68. Cutting,
Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products
Without License.—Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .
. There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1)
by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest
products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other
forest products without the required legal documents.
Same; Criminal Law; Mala Prohibita; Words and Phrases; In
offenses considered mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is
prohibited by a special law, the commission of the prohibited act
itself is a crime.—In offenses considered as mala prohibita or
when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in
the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime
itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate
the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done
knowingly and consciously.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Circumstantial Evidence; Direct
proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary
to prove conspiracy—conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial
evi-

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dence.—Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense

is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the mode,
method and manner by which the offense is perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. It is not even required that the participants have an
agreement for an appreciable period to commence it.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Go and Castro Law Offices for petitioner.
          Poloyapoy, Din, Cabahug, Mariano, Tan, Castor,
Bendali-an, Talip & Associates for Bondsman.
          Belen F. Siton-Pates collaborating counsel for the
Heirs of Nestor Sumagang and R. Tigoy.

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court assailing the decision and resolution, dated March 6,
2000 and August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 entitled “People of the
Philippines v. Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy,” acquitting
Nestor Ong for insufficiency of evidence, while convicting
Rodolfo Tigoy for violating Section 68 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No.
277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged
in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, was
allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong
Bertodazo who signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong
to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao
del Norte to

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Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly

entered into between Ong and Bertodazo, the salient
portions of which state:

1. That the party of the First Part is an owner of

Cargo Trucks with place of business at Iligan City;
2. That the party of the Second Part is a businessman
dealing in buy and sell of General Merchandise, dry
goods and construction materials;
3. That the party of the Second Part will engage the
services of the two (2) cargo trucks of the party of
the First Part;
4. That the services agreed upon should be rendered
by the party of the First Part on August 3, 1993
from Larapan, Linamon, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog
City for an agreed amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) Pesos per truck or a total of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency for the carriage of cement and other
merchandise owned by the party of the Second Part;
5. That any legal controversy involving the cargo or of
and when the cargo trucks are not actually used for
the purpose herein stipulated, it is agreed that the
same is the sole responsibility of the party of the
Second Part 1
without any liability of the party of the
First Part.

In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered

Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy who had
been employed by him as truck drivers for two (2) years
and ten (10) years, respectively, to bring the two trucks to
Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte which is
about fifteen (15) minutes away from Iligan City. He
instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan
for the loading of the construction materials by Lolong
Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the trip to Dipolog
City. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and
petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return to Larapan
at four o’clock in the morning the next day. When they
arrived, the trucks had been laden with

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1 Records, Exhibit “1,” p. 237.

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2
bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas. Before
departing, they allegedly checked the motor oil, water,
engine and tires of the trucks to determine if the same
were in good condition.
That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector
Rico Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis
City), while escorting Provincial Director Dionisio Coloma
at the ICC Arts Center in Ozamis City, along with the
members of the Special Operation Group, received a
dispatch from the 466th PNP Company situated at
Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City, informing him that two
trucks, a blue and green loaded with cement, that were
going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint.
Upon receiving the report, Tome, along with PO2 Peter
Paul Nuqui and PO3 Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol
vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to3 intercept the two trucks at
Lilian Terminal, Ozamis City.
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only
one in uniform among the police officers, flagged down the
two trucks but the same just sped away and proceeded
towards the direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their
patrol vehicle, they chased the trucks and overtook the
same at Barangay Manabay. They blocked the road with
their vehicle causing the two trucks to stop.
According to Senior Inspector Tome, he asked the driver
who had alighted from the green truck why he did not stop
at the checkpoint but the latter did not answer. When he
inquired what was loaded in the truck, the driver replied
that there4 is “S.O.P,” which means grease money in street
parlance. This raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks
were loaded with “hot items.”
Meanwhile, the blue truck which had been speeding
behind the green truck and was being driven by Sumagang
was in-

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2 TSN, August 23, 1996, p. 40.

3 TSN, September 13, 1990, pp. 12-14.
4 CA Rollo, p. 50.

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tercepted by PO3 Real. Upon inspection, the police officers

discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags
in both trucks. Tome inquired if the drivers had a permit
for the lumber but the latter could not produce any.
The drivers were brought and turned over to the
investigator at the City Hall in Ozamis City. The
truckmen, namely, Felix Arante and Doro Lopez, and
another passenger whom Tigoy identified as Lolong
Bertodazo, who were riding with them in the trucks, were
not investigated. According to Nuqui, they did not notice
that the group had left. It was later learned that they were
instructed by Sumagang to inform Nestor Ong of the
incident.
Afterwards, the group of Tome proceeded back to the
ICC Arts Center and informed the Provincial Director of
the apprehension. Meanwhile, the drivers, Tigoy and
Sumagang, were detained at the Ozamis 5 City Police
Station while Arante and Lopez were released.
Meanwhile, Ermelo delos Santos, Chief of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources—
Community and Environment6
and Natural Resources
Office (DENR-CENRO), after receiving a call from the
Ozamis City Police Station that two trucks were
apprehended transporting sawn lumber without a permit
and were brought to the City Hall, sent Rolando Dingal,
Forester of the DENR, together with Teodoro Echavez,
Juanito Taruc and Lucio Penaroya, to investigate.
Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal the
registration papers of the two trucks and appearing therein

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5 TSN, September 13, 1995, pp. 28-36.

6 The original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of “all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same” is vested in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary or a duly
authorized representative. The DENR has the supervision and control
over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife
laws, rules and regulations (Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 705).

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was the name of Nestor Ong as the owner. After

ascertaining that the sawn lumber loaded on the two
trucks did not have supporting documents, Dingal and his
companions scaled the subject lumber and prepared a tally
sheet. Loaded in the blue Nissan ten-wheeler truck were
229 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 6,232.46 board
feet; and, in the green Isuzu eight-wheeler truck, 333
pieces
7
of lumber with a total volume of 5,095.5 board
feet. Consequently, the lumber and the vehicles were seized
8
upon the order of the DENR Regional Executive Director.
On October 6, 1993, an Information was filed against
Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner
Tigoy for possession of forest products without legal permit,
thus:

“That on or about the 4th day of August, 1993 at Barangay

Catadman, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, for a
common design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and illegally possess and transport without the
necessary legal documents nor permit from the lawful authorities,
sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany), in the following
manner, to wit: accused Nestor Ong, being the owner of 2 ten
wheeler trucks with Plate Nos. GDA-279 and PNH-364 facilitated
and allowed the use and transport of above-stated sawn [lumber]
from Larapan, Lanao del Norte, but intercepted by the PNP
authorities in Ozamiz City; while the accused Lolong Bertodazo
facilitated the loading and transport of said sawn lumbers, while
accused Nestor Sumagang y Lacson drove the Nissan 10 wheeler
cargo truck bearing Plate No. GDA-279 which was loaded with
333 pieces of said sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine
Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent [to] 5,095.5 board feet
which was concealed under piled bags of cement, which lumbers
[were] valued at P134,242.36; while accused Rodolfo Tigoy drove
the 8 wheeler Isuzu truck bearing Plate No. PNH-364, which was
loaded and transported with 229 pieces of sawn diptero-

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7 CA Rollo, pp. 174-176.

8 Records, Exhibit “D,” p. 240.

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carp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent

to 6,232.46 board feet which was concealed under piled bags of
cement which lumbers [were] valued at P92,316.77 or total value
of P226,559.13, without, however, causing damage to the
government, inasmuch as the aforestated lumbers were recovered.
CONTRARY to Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987,
9
in relation
to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.”

Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during

the arraignment. Sumagang died after the case was filed
while the other co-accused, Lolong Bertodazo, was not
arrested and has remained at large.
On October 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered
its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy

[GUILTY] beyond reasonable doubt of possession of dipterocarp
lumber [VALUED] at more than P22,000.00 without the legal
documents as required by existing laws and regulations,
penalized as qualified theft, this Court sentences them to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to eighteen (18) years and three (3) months of reclusion
temporal. The lumber and the conveyances used are forfeited in
favor of the government. With costs.
The DENR is ordered to sell/dispose of the lumber and
conveyances in accordance with the existing laws, WITHOUT
DELAY. Let the Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division, before
which accused Ong’s appeal of this Court’s denial of his action for
replevin relative to his trucks is pending, be furnished with a copy
of this judgment.
With costs. 10
SO ORDERED.”

Declaring that “constructive possession” of unlicensed

lumber is not within the contemplation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, and for failure by the prosecution to prove the
complicity

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9 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

10 CA Rollo, pp. 51-52.

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of Ong, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on

March 6, 2000 modifying the ruling of the lower court,
thus:

“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby

MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Nestor Ong is acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence and his two (2) trucks are ordered
returned to him. The conviction of Rodolfo Tigoy is upheld and the
decision dated October
11
11, 1996 is AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.”

On March 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of

Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration praying for his
acquittal but the same was denied on August 23, 2000.
Hence, this petition, with the following assignment of
errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING

“COLLUSION” BETWEEN LOLONG BERTODAZO AND
PETITIONER TIGOY;

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY

DISREGARDING THE AFFIDAVIT OF LOLONG BERTODAZO
AGAINST HIS PENAL INTEREST;

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING

PETITIONER TIGOY TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
LUMBER HE WAS TRANSPORTING; AND,

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PETITIONER TIGOY HAD ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL
12
POSSESSION OF THE UNDOCUMENTED LUMBER.

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11 Rollo, p. 38.
12 Id., at p. 14.

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Tigoy vs. Court of Appeals

Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is whether or

not petitioner Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or
transporting lumber without the necessary permit in
violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other

Forest Products Without License.—Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code . . . .

There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above

Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or
other forest products without a license; and, 2) by
possessing timber or other forest products without the
required legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of
transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable
under Section 68 of the Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of
their companions were apprehended by the police officers
in flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject
lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City.
Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired
with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about the
unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed that what he
was transporting were bags of cement in view of the
contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not
around when Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber
hidden under the bags of cement.
This contention by petitioner, however, was not believed
by the lower court. In declaring that petitioner connived
with
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Bertodazo in transporting the subject lumber, the court a

quo noted:

“x x x The evidence of the prosecution established that the two

drivers of accused Ong refused to stop at a checkpoint, a fact
admitted by both in their affidavit, Exhs. “E” and “E-2.” Likewise,
the two drivers refused to stop on the national highway near a
bus terminal when required by a uniformed policeman. When
finally accosted, one of the drivers, whom witness Tome identified
as the driver of the green truck, Sumagang, but who actually was
Tigoy (as he was the driver of the green truck and who came to
the road block first, being the lead driver) offered “S.O.P.” which
to witness Tome meant that the trucks were carrying “hot items.”
Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they
fear inspection of their cargo? Why would “S.O.P.” (which in street
parlance is grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of
the trucks? The only logical answer to all these questions is that
the drivers knew that they were carrying contraband lumber.
This Court believes that the drivers had knowledge of the fact
that they were transporting and were 13
in possession of
undocumented lumber in violation of law.”

In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing

of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the
present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the
crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent
to perpetrate the act prohibited by the 14
special law, and that
it is done knowingly and consciously.
Direct proof of previous agreement15to commit an offense
is not necessary to prove conspiracy. 16
Conspiracy may be
proven by circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced
from the

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13 Rollo, p. 191.
14 United States v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909), citing Gardner v. The
People, 62 N.Y., 299.
15 Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123896, June 25, 2003, 404
SCRA 639.
16 People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 123917, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA
383.

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mode, method and manner by which the offense is

perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when
such acts point to a joint purpose 17
and design, concerted
action and community of interest. It is not even required
that the participants have
18
an agreement for an appreciable
period to commence it.
Petitioner’s actions adequately show that he
intentionally participated in the commission of the offense
for which he had been charged and found guilty by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Finding that petitioner’s conviction was reached without
arbitrariness and with sufficient basis, this Court upholds
the same. The Court accords high respect to the findings of
facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective
testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the
probative weight
19
of the evidence of the parties as well as its
conclusions especially when these are in agreement with
those of the Court of Appeals, which is the case here. As a
matter of fact, factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by 20the Court of Appeals, are
generally final and conclusive.

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17 People v. Gomez, G.R. No. 128378, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 210 .
18 People v. Miranda, supra note 16.
19 People v. Sibonga, G.R. No. 95901, June 16, 2003, 404 SCRA 10.
20 Serrano v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15, states: “Factual findings
of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are final and conclusive, and may not be reviewed on appeal except: (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when the Court of Appeals

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Tigoy vs. Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision

and Resolution, dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
20864 are hereby AFFIRMED.
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Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

          Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona

and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—Enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36 of

the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of
the Bureau of Customs which regular courts have no
authority to interfere with. (Provident Tree Farms, Inc. vs.
Batario, Jr., 231 SCRA 463 [1994])
Under an administrative seizure, the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. (Mustang
Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 [1996])
Where there was a violation of the Revised Forestry
Code and the seizure of the vehicles used in transporting
illegally cut timber was in accordance with law, the seized
vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis, hence they
could not be subject to an action for replevin. (Calub vs.
Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 55 [2000])

——o0o——

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manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties

and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and, (8) when the findings of fact are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.”

551

VOL. 492, JUNE 26, 2006 551

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bank
of the Philippine Islands

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