Enriquez V Sarmiento

IMELDA S.
ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR. Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The facts that gave rise to the filing of the present administrative case, as culled from the
rollo, follow:
Following the death in Cebu City of one Mark James Enriquez on July 21, 2003, Cebu
City Prosecutor Jesus P. Feliciano filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
on July 23, 2003 an Information 1 charging Sherwin Que a.k.a. Bungol, a certain Junjun,
and nine Does with Murder.
Warrants for the arrest 2 of Sherwin Que a.k.a. Bungol, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe,
Richard Doe, Arnold Doe, Dexter Doe, James Doe, Robert Doe, and Arthur Doe were
thereupon issued by the Executive Judge of the Cebu RTC.
On the invitation 3 of the 7th Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group Unit
(CIDGU) at Camp Sotero Cabahug in Cebu City, Anthony John Apura (Apura),
accompanied by his father, repaired to said office on August 1, 2003.
An "Inquest Investigation" of Apura was conducted on August 2, 2003, a Saturday, by a

prosecutor who recommended the impleading of Apura as co-accused in the case. A
warrant for Apura’s arrest was on even date issued by Judge Apolinario Taypin,
Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Cebu RTC, who was on duty that day. 4Apura was
immediately arrested and detained.
Apura assailed the legality of his arrest via a "Motion to Dismiss" the Information, which
he filed on August 5, 2003 before Branch 24 of the Cebu RTC to which the case was
raffled.
By Order of August 13, 2003, Branch 24 Presiding Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr.,
herein respondent, "believ[ing] that there [wa]s lack of preliminary investigation," ordered
the remand of the case against Apura to the Cebu City Prosecutor’s Office for
preliminary investigation, and ordered Apura’s release from custody on a bail of
P20,000. Respondent’s said Order reads:
Accused-movant Anthony John Apura alleged in his Motion to Dismiss that his arrest
was illegal because he [went] to the police station upon invitation but immediately
thereafter he was placed under custody of the police. His arrest does not fall under a
warrantless arrest nor it is within the purview of "hot pursuit" concept, considering that
the subject incident happened on July 19, 2003 and he was placed under arrest on
August 2, 2003.
The Court believes that there is lack of preliminary investigation on the part of accused
Anthony John Apura. The warrant of arrest issued on July 24, 2003 on the basis of the
original information filed on July 24, 2003 cannot be made as valid basis for the arrest of
the accused Anthony John Apura on August 2, 2003. The court notes that accused
Anthony John Apura is not the certain "Junjun" mentioned in the original Information.
What appalled the Court is the manner by which the accused was placed under custody.
The actuation wherein a person is invited to the police station for investigation and to
place said person under detention when his appearance therein was only to explain his
side thereof, is foreboding.
WHEREFORE, short of declaring the arrest of movant illegal, and acting on the Motion
to Dismiss, remand this case to the Cebu City Prosecution Office for Prosecutor Jesus
Feliciano to conduct preliminary investigation on Anthony John Apura and said accused
is ordered released from custody, being admitted to bail in the amount of PhP
20,000.000 in cash, pending preliminary investigation, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule
112.
Furnish parties and counsels copy of this Order and Prosecutor Feliciano, who is
directed to submit his preliminary investigation report sixty (60) days from
today. 5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint filed on September 7, 2004 by

petitioner Imelda S. Enriquez, the mother of the deceased Mark James Enriquez,
against respondent for knowingly rendering an unjust order and gross ignorance of the
law and procedure for ordering the release of Apura on bail without first conducting a
hearing for the purpose.
To the complaint, respondent gives the following comment:
Respondent judge was trying to check the abuse committed by the State through its law
enforcement agency upon the rights of an accused person guaranteed to him by no less
than the Constitution. The inquest proceedings which followed . . . the "invitation" was
[sic] highly irregular. The prosecutors knew this fact, which is why, during the hearing on
the "Motion to Dismiss", they agreed for [sic] the remand of the record for preliminary
investigation.
Had he granted the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Apura because of the illegal arrest, accused would be
released just the same. Yet, to strike a balance of the possible abuse on the rights of
accused and the effort of the police at prosecution of crimes, respondent did not
categorically declare the arrest illegal but allowed the accused to post cash bail bond
with an accompanying "hold-departure" order. At least, to get hold of the accused while
preliminary investigation is conducted. 6(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Report dated October 4, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), finding
that respondent violated Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
reading:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution,
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P21,000 for gross ignorance of
the law. 7
By Resolution 8 dated December 14, 2005, this Court ordered the parties to manifest
whether they are submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed
and submitted, within ten days from notice. Respondent responded in the affirmative in a
Manifestation 9 received on January 27, 2006 to which he attached additional papers in
support of his case. On petitioner’s part, she also responded in the affirmative by
Manifestation 10 received on January 31, 2006.
An application to bail from Murder, for which Apura was indicted on August 2, 2003
when it was a capital offense,11 now punishable by reclusion perpetua, calls for a
hearing, as called for under Section 8 of Rule 114 reading:
SEC. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an application for bail filed
by a person who is in custody of the commission of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the
court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside
the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify. (Italics in the original),
in order to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. 12
In the case at bar, respondent ordered Apura to be released on bail, without conducting
a prior hearing.
The lack of preliminary investigation, in light of the finding that Apura was not lawfully
arrested without warrant, he having gone to the CIDGU in response to its invitation, did
not justify respondent’s disregard of the mandatory procedure governing the grant of
bail.
Indeed, a preliminary investigation should have been conducted before the filing of the

Amended Information. A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an
inquest. A preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial." 13 An inquest is "a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of
determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person was based on probable
cause." 14
Where the penalty prescribed by law for an offense is at least four years, two months
and one day of imprisonment without regard to the fine, a preliminary investigation must
be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for such offense. 15 The
conduct of an inquest investigation does not fulfill the requirement for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation before the filing of an information or complaint involving any
such offenses, except when the accused was lawfully arrested without a warrant. 16
In the case at bar, the accused was not even arrested. He repaired to the CIDGU on its
invitation. He should thus have been subjected to a preliminary investigation, not a mere
inquest investigation. 17
An Amended Information was subsequently filed, however, upon which a Warrant of

Arrest was issued against Apura by Judge Taypin. By so issuing a warrant, Judge
Taypin is presumed to have , before issuing the warrant, previously regularly discharged
his duty to personally determine the existence of probable cause against the accused,
as mandated by Section 6 of Rule 112, which provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint
or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
At all events, the absence of a preliminary investigation did not justify Apura’s release,
the defect not having nullified the information and the warrant of arrest against him. Thus
this Court held in Larranaga v. CA: 18
We hold, therefore, that petitioner’s detention at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center
is legal in view of the information and the warrant of arrest against him. The absence of
a preliminary investigation will not justify petitioner’s release because such defect did not
nullify the information and the warrant of arrest against him. We ruled in Sanciangco, Jr.
v. People: 19
The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective;
but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
information, should conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted. (Citation omitted)
In fine, respondent’s release on bail of Apura, without priorly conducting a hearing for the
purpose, betrays his gross ignorance of the law, it being settled that where the law
involved is simple and elementary, lack of observance thereof constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. 20
Gross ignorance of the law may be punished with dismissal from the service, forfeiture of
all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000 but
not exceeding P40.000. 21
This Court, however, appreciates as mitigating in respondent’s favor his issuance of a

hold-departure order against the accused. 22 It is in this light that it reduces the
recommended penalty of fine to P15,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., is found guilty of gross

ignorance of the law and is FINED Fifteen Thousand (P15,000) Pesos, with warning that
a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO AND BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, Petitioners, v. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO A. I REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA,
GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, AND GRACE.
EVANGELISTA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
G.R. NO. 182132, June 19, 2013
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MUNTINLUPA, THE

PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA CITY,
BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, AND IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS,
ALBERTO, Petitioners, v. ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA, GIL
ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, AND GRACE
EVANGELISTA,Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 assailing the January
11, 2008 Decision2 and March 13, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97863 which revoked the December 11, 2006 Resolution 4 and December
22, 2006 Amended Resolution5(DOJ Resolutions) issued by then Department of Justice
(DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzalez (DOJ Secretary) directing the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City to file charges of Rape, 6 in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic
Act No. 76107 (RA 7610), Serious Illegal Detention8 and Forcible Abduction with
Rape9 against respondents.
The Facts
As culled from the assailed CA decision, the diametrically-opposed versions of the

relevant incidents in this case are as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
A. Incidents of December 28, 2001
Petitioners alleged that at around midnight of December 28, 2001, respondent Gil
Anthony Calianga (Gil) called petitioner Iris Kristine Alberto (Iris), then sixteen (16) years
old,10 informing her that he was at their garage with some food and drinks. For fear of
being scolded, Iris refused to see Gil. But due to his insistence, Iris finally went out to
meet Gil and thereafter, took the food and drinks which he brought. Eventually, while
they were talking, Iris felt weak and dizzy and thus, tried to return to her room. Gil
assisted Iris and when they reached the room, he laid her on the bed. A little later, Gil
started kissing Iris which prompted her to scream. Consequently, Gil covered Iris’ mouth
with a pillow and soon after, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Before
leaving, Gil warned Iris not to tell anyone about what happened or else he would kill
her.11
By way of rebuttal, respondents averred that Gil and Iris met at the Mormon Church in
Muntinlupa City and became sweethearts in 2001. They eventually developed an
amorous physical relationship and on the evening of December 28, 2001, secretly slept
together for the first time in Iris’ own bedroom.12
B. Incidents of April 23 to 24, 2002
As for the second set of incidents, petitioners claimed that on April 23, 2002, Gil called
Iris, then seventeen (17) years old,13 telling her that he would pick her up for them to go
to church in order to play volleyball. They met at about 5:30 in the afternoon in South
Green Heights and proceeded to Camella to meet Gil’s sister, respondent Jessebel
Calianga (Jessebel), and her friend, respondent Grace Evangelista (Grace). At around
6:30 in the evening, Gil and Iris boarded a tricycle. At the outset, Iris thought they would
be going to church for volleyball practice; but instead, Gil, while poking a knife at Iris’
side, told her that they were headed to a different destination. Eventually, they reached a
McDonald’s restaurant located in San Pedro, Laguna where they transferred to a car
driven by Grace’s common- law husband. They then returned to Camella and stayed
with a relative of Grace where they had dinner. While having dinner, Iris overheard
respondent Atty. Rodrigo Reyna (Atty. Reyna) giving instructions to Jessebel to take Iris
to Marikina City. When they finished their dinner, Atty. Reyna called again and told Iris
not to go out as her relatives were around the area, on board several cars. Iris pleaded
Gil to let her go, but her pleas were ignored. A little later, Jessebel and Grace led Gil and
Iris to a tree house where Gil forced her to enter a room. She tried to resist but he
threatened to kill her if she did not accede. Left with no option, Iris entered the room
where Gil, holding her at knifepoint, succeeded in once again having sexual intercourse
with her.14
The following day, or on April 24, 2002, at around 6:00 in the morning, Atty. Reyna
arrived and instructed Iris to tell her relatives, who had been worriedly looking for her,
that she voluntarily went with Gil; that she was treated with kindness; and that everything
that happened was to her own liking because of her love for Gil. Atty. Reyna then asked
Iris to go home but she refused because she did not know her way back. Because of Iris’
refusal, Atty. Reyna called up her Auntie Vilma and Uncle Albert and agreed to meet at
Chowking-Poblacion where Iris was finally released to her grandfather, petitioner
Benjamin Balois (Benjamin).15
In defense, respondents maintained that on April 23, 2002, Iris’ brother, Eldon Alberto
(Eldon), caught Gil inside Iris’ bedroom where he had spent the night. Fearing the
consequences of having been caught, Gil and Iris eloped and stayed at the house of
Grace’s grandfather. When Benjamin realized that Iris was missing, he sought the help
of Atty. Reyna, since he was a family friend from their church. Iris’ relatives also
suspected that she might be with Gil after learning from the entries in her journal that Iris
loved Gil very much. Coincidentally, Gil was the nephew of Atty. Reyna’s wife and so
they were hoping that Atty. Reyna would have some information as to Gil’s whereabouts.
Atty. Reyna and the Balois family searched together for Iris that night. In the course
thereof, Atty. Reyna called Jessebel and Grace to ask if they knew where Gil was. Both
stated that they were in Marikina but denied having any knowledge about Gil’s location.
Later, the party tried to search Gil’s house as well as Grace’s place (the latter being
referred to as the “tree house”). However, both yielded negative results.
In the morning of April 24, 2002, Atty. Reyna proceeded to look for Grace and again
asked where Gil and Iris were. Eventually, Grace admitted that the two were at her
grandfather’s house, which was only around 30 minutes away from her place. They
proceeded accordingly and there, found Iris and Gil who were both surprised to see Atty.
Reyna. Subsequently, Atty. Reyna asked Iris why she left home and she answered that
it was because of her brother Eldon’s warning that her family knew everything about her
relationship with Gil. Atty. Reyna confirmed the veracity of Eldon’s statement and went
on to advise Iris to just tell the truth. Iris heeded Atty. Reyna’s advice, allowing him to
contact the Baloises and arrange for her return. As it turned out, they agreed to meet at
Chowking-Poblacion for such purpose.16
In view of the incidents that transpired on December 28, 2001 and April 23 to 24, 2002,
Benjamin filed a criminal complaint for Rape, Serious Illegal Detention and Child Abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa (Muntinlupa Pros. Office),
docketed as I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22.17
C. Incidents of June 23 to November 9, 2003
Finally, as for the third set of incidents, petitioners asserted that on June 23, 2003, Iris
was abducted in front of Assumption College. This time, Gil conspired with Atty. Reyna
and respondent Arturo Calianga (Arturo), to take Iris in order to prevent her from
appearing at the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22 scheduled on June
25, 2003. In the afternoon of the same day, Iris’ family brought Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER) agents to Arturo’s house. Upon their arrival, Grace told
them that Gil left with some clothes and that he and Iris eloped and would proceed to
Cagayan de Oro City. Soon after the abduction on June 23, 2003, Gil, Atty. Reyna and
Arturo started their psychological manipulation of Iris.18
On June 27, 2003, Gil, with the help of two men, brought Iris to Cagayan de Oro City
and there, held her captive in a small room with a small mat, near a pigpen. They
controlled her movements, such as when she would eat, sleep, bathe or use the toilet.
Gil raped her almost every day even during her menstrual period and would beat her up
whenever she resisted. Also, Gil often told Iris that he would have her entire family killed
by his Moslem relatives.19
Disputing petitioners’ allegations, respondents denied that Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo
abducted Iris and instead, claimed that Gil and Iris eloped for the second time, after
visiting the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City where Iris declared that the
charges against respondents were all fabricated by her grandfather, Benjamin, and that
she wanted them dismissed. Respondents claimed that Iris was quite prepared during
her second elopement with Gil as she brought with her three bags containing several
personal effects and other relevant documents. Eventually, Iris’ family would discover
that the reason for her elopement with Gil was because she was being maltreated and
physically abused by her grandfather, Benjamin. Moreover, Iris could no longer stomach
the lies Benjamin wanted her to say about Gil.20
Subsequently, Benjamin filed a second complaint against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (Makati Pros. Office), docketed as I.S.
No. 03-G-14072-75. 21
On July 9, 2003, the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed the charges against
Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace for Rape and Serious Illegal Detention in I.S. No.
02-G-03020-22 for insufficiency of evidence. However, having found that he had sexual
intercourse with a minor, Gil was charged for Child Abuse. Consequently, a warrant of
arrest was issued against Gil.22
Determined to face the charges against him, Gil, together with Iris, returned from
Cagayan de Oro City to Manila where he posted bail for the Child Abuse case.23
On August 6, 2003, Iris executed an affidavit (August 6, 2003 affidavit), sworn before
Makati Assistant City Prosecutor George de Joya (Pros. de Joya), denying that she was
kidnapped, detained or raped by Gil. She also affirmed that she loved Gil and eloped
with him.24
On August 13, 2003, Iris and Gil appeared together on the GMA-7 television
network’s Frontpage news segment “Magkasintahan Pala” where Iris publicly declared
that she loved Gil and that she went with him freely.25
On August 19, 2003, Iris appeared before the 9th Division of the CA in the hearing of the
petition for habeas corpus filed by Benjamin in view of her second elopement on June
23, 2003.26 During the said hearing, Iris declared that she was never kidnapped,
detained or raped and that she loved Gil who was her boyfriend since December 2001.
She also confirmed that she executed the August 6, 2003 affidavit before Pros. de Joya
and that she appeared in “Magkasintahan Pala” on August 13, 2003. She also testified
that she visited the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa asking for the dismissal of
the erroneous charges filed by Benjamin. When the CA Justices asked with whom she
wanted to go home, she said that she wanted to go with Gil and his family. She added
that she did not want her grandfather to visit her. Hence, in line with her decision during
the foregoing proceedings, Iris and Gil freely cohabited beginning August 19, 2003 and
were seen in public, freely roaming around the city. They regularly went to church
together, underwent counseling and even planned to have their relationship bonded by
marriage as soon as they got the required parental consent.27
On November 9, 2003, Benjamin forcibly took Iris away from Gil as the two were going
to church. He subsequently kept Iris incommunicado for days and then had her declare
through radio, newspaper and television that she was kidnapped and raped by Gil and
his family. While in the company of her relatives, Iris was able to sneak out text
messages to Gil using the cellular phone of her grandfather, expressing her deep love
and concern for him and warning his family about Benjamin’s plans against them.28
On December 15, 2003, Iris, assisted by members of the groups Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption and Gabriela, proceeded to the DOJ Task Force on Women and
Children Protection (DOJ Task Force) and filed a third complaint against Gil for Forcible
Abduction with Rape and Obstruction of Justice, punished under Presidential Decree
No. 1829,29 docketed as I.S. No. 2004-127.30
Disposition of the Criminal Complaints
The three (3) criminal complaints filed by Iris and Benjamin against respondents were
disposed as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
First, in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, State Prosecutor II Lilian Doris S. Alejo (Pros. Alejo) of
the Muntinlupa Pros. Office issued the Resolution dated July 9, 2003,31 dismissing the
charges for Serious Illegal Detention and Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and
Grace for insufficiency of evidence. In gist, Pros. Alejo found that the pieces of evidence
showed that Gil and Iris were sweethearts and the sexual intercourse that transpired
between them was consensual. Likewise, she observed that the story narrated by Iris
was farfetched and, to a certain degree, unacceptable and unimaginable, intimating that
it was unbelievable that Iris would still go to volleyball practice with Gil after the first rape
he allegedly committed against her.32
Nonetheless, Pros. Alejo recommended the filing of informations for Child Abuse against
Gil for having sexual intercourse with Iris on December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2003 by
taking advantage of her minority and his moral influence as a pastor of their
church.33 Accordingly, Gil was charged under the following amended criminal
informations,34 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-549 and 03-
551:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 03-551
That on December 28, 2001, in the City of Muntinlupa,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above- named accused, by taking advantage of
his influence as Mormon priest of the church of which
herein victim, seventeen (17) year[s] old IRIS KRISTINE
ALBERTO y BALOIS is a member, and through moral
compulsion, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously engaged in sexual intercourse with said
minor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Muntinlupa City, July 9, 2003.
That on April 23, 2002, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
taking advantage of his influence as Mormon priest of the church of which
herein victim, seventeen (17) year old IRIS KRISTINE ALBERTO y
BALOIS is a member, and through moral compulsion, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engaged in sexual intercourse with
said minor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Muntinlupa City, July 9, 2003.
Second, in I.S. No. 03-G-14027-75, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Henry M. Salazar
(Pros. Salazar) of the Makati Pros. Office issued a Resolution dated March 5,
2004,35 equally dismissing the charges for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
Grave Coercion and Obstruction of Justice against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for lack of
merit and/or insufficiency of evidence. Anent the Kidnapping charge, Pros. Salazar found
that no evidence was submitted which would prove that Iris was forcibly taken away and
deprived of her liberty.36 Similarly, he observed that there was no evidence or any
particular allegation of facts in the complaint- affidavit constituting the acts which were
claimed as coercive.37 In the same vein, he found no evidence or any sufficient
allegation to support the charge of Obstruction of Justice.38
Pros. Salazar further noted that aside from the insufficiency of the
complainant’s39 evidence, the affidavit of Iris dated August 5, 2003, the news package
entitled “Magkasintahan Pala,” and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on
August 19, 2003 of the petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316 all support
the dismissal of the foregoing charges.40 He also observed that the complainant moved
for the suspension of the preliminary investigation due to the need to have Iris mentally
examined, alleging certain doubts on the voluntariness of her August 6, 2003 affidavit.
However, no mental examination report was submitted to verify such doubts. In addition,
Pros. Salazar took cognizance of the fact that while Iris was “rescued” on November 9,
2003, Benjamin only asked for the revival of the preliminary investigation of the case on
January 22, 2004.41
Finally, the counter-charge of Perjury was dismissed, also for lack of merit.42
Dissatisfied, Benjamin moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a

Resolution dated July 30, 2004.43
Third, in I.S. No. 2004-127, State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim (Pros. Lim) of the DOJ
Task Force issued a Resolution dated November 8, 2004,44 also dismissing the third
case for Forcible Abduction with Rape and Obstruction of Justice against Gil, Atty.
Reyna and Arturo on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
In addition to the above-stated incidents, complainant45 averred that Atty. Reyna and

Arturo also raped her in the month of August 2003. She alleged that Atty. Reyna gave
her a drink laced with some kind of chemical substance which made her dizzy and weak
and thereafter, succeeded to have sexual intercourse with her. Iris averred that Arturo
also did the same thing to her. She likewise claimed that Atty. Reyna and Arturo sexually
molested her every time they went to Taytay, while Gil continually raped her. After
the habeas corpus proceedings in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316, Gil brought her to Atty.
Reyna’s house in Putatan, Muntinlupa where she was repeatedly raped by Gil and Atty.
Reyna. According to Iris, Atty. Reyna also brought her to an apartment in Camella
Homes, Muntinlupa where Arturo raped her. She stayed at Atty. Reyna’s Putatan
residence for three (3) months and the latter would bring her to the Camella Homes
apartment whenever his wife sensed what they were doing to her.46
Pros. Lim found no probable cause for the crimes charged, holding that Iris was not a
credible witness because of her flip-flopping testimonies and the serious contradictions
therein. She observed that the fact that Iris admitted that she went back to school and
even got exemplary grades confirmed that she was of sound mind and acted with
volition when she went away with Gil on June 23, 2003. Her mental condition was also
adjudged to be normal by the CA justices who observed her personal demeanor during
the August 19, 2003 hearing in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316. Further, the fact that Iris was
not abducted but acted with free will was attested to by Gemma Cachuela (Cachuela), a
staff of the Muntinlupa Prosecutor’s Office, stating that Iris went to their office on June
23, 2003 to withdraw her complaint. Pros. Lim added that Cachuela had no reason or
motive to fabricate her statement. Likewise, she noted that the fact that the presentation
of the news program “Magkasintahan Pala” and Iris’ text messages to Gil as evidence
were suppressed meant that they were adverse to Iris’ cause. She also found the
assertion that Iris was made to undergo a mock trial twice a week to script her testimony
for the first habeas corpus proceedings to be untrue as Iris herself admitted that
respondents received the subpoena only on August 17, 2003, or two (2) days before the
August 19, 2003 hearing. Further, she deemed that it was incredible that respondents
would use a color-coding vehicle on the day of Iris’ purported abduction. Complainant’s
sweeping statements against Atty. Reyna and Arturo were also found to be inadequate
to establish their guilt, observing that if Iris were indeed drugged for the first time and
raped, she should not have acceded to drink the same substance for a second time.
Moreover, if she was indeed molested by Atty. Reyna and Arturo, she should have
declared such fact during the proceedings in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316. Yet, on the
contrary, Iris even praised Atty. Reyna and Arturo for being “mabubuting tao” (good
people).47 In closing, Pros. Lim held that no abduction with rape took place but rather,
the rule on two (2) consenting adults giving free reign to their emotions prevailed in this
case.48
Finally, anent the charge of Obstruction of Justice, Pros. Lim dismissed the same, also
for lack of sufficient evidence.49
Aggrieved, Iris and Benjamin appealed the dismissal of all the foregoing charges to the
DOJ.50
Proceedings Before the DOJ
On December 11, 2006, the DOJ Secretary issued the first assailed Resolution of even
date51 which he later modified through an Amended Resolution dated December 22,
2006 (Amended Resolution).52In the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary resolved
the consolidated petitions in I.S. No. 02-G-03020-22, I.S. No. 03-G-14027-75 and I.S.
No. 2004-127, finding probable cause to charge: (a) Gil for Rape, in relation to Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610, on account of the December 28, 2001 incidents; (b) Gil,
Jessebel, Atty. Reyna and Grace for one (1) count each of Serious Illegal Detention and
Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, on account of the April 23 to 24,
2002 incidents; and (c) Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for one (1) count each of Forcible
Abduction with Rape on account of the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents.53
In granting the consolidated petitions, the DOJ Secretary observed, among others, that
Gil merely interposed the sweetheart defense, which in itself was doubtful in view of Iris’
positive identification of him as the culprit of the December 28, 2001 incident. He further
held that it was error to have dismissed the charges against respondents on the basis of
the dismissal of the two (2) habeas corpus cases considering that the causes of action
therein were different and that the CA did not make any finding on the criminal liability of
the respondents. Also, he noted that Iris’ family reported to the authorities that she had
been abducted. Moreover, he found that respondents conspired with one another in the
abduction and consequent raping of Iris.54
On January 18, 2007, respondents moved for the reconsideration of the Amended
Resolution.55
Meanwhile, on February 5, 2007, two (2) separate criminal Informations were filed for
Forcible Abduction with Rape against Gil, Arturo, and Atty. Reyna, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 07-122, and for Serious Illegal Detention with Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna,
Jessebel, and Grace, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-128:
The undersigned Acting City Prosecutor upon sworn

complaint duly attached and made an integral part hereof
and marked as Annex “A,” executed on December 15,
2003 before the Violence Against Women and Children
Division (VAWCD) of the National Bureau of Investigation
by the offended party, IRIS KRISTINE ALBERTO Y
BALOIS, then eighteen (18) years old, accuses RODRIGO
A. REYNA, GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA and ARTURO
S. CALIANGA of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE
pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article
342 and Article 266 paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and committed in relation to the incidents that
occurred between June 23, 2003 until November 9, 2003
as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
That on June 23, 2003, in Makati City, Philippines and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, all the
above-named accused mutually helping, conspiring and
confederating with each other, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abducted the private
complainant, Iris Kristine Alberto y Balois, against her will
with the aid of two armed men in front of Assumption
College in Makati City using a Tamaraw FX vehicle with
plate number TRP-871, with lewd and unchaste designs
and for the purpose of preventing the private complainant
from pursuing her earlier complaint for rape, serious illegal
detention and violation of Republic Act No. 7610 in I.S. No.
02-G-03020-22 before the Muntinlupa City Prosecutor’s
Office against accused Gil Anthony M. Calianga, Rodrigo
A. Reyna and several other persons, and that thereafter
the private complainant was taken to the house of accused
Rodrigo A. Reyna at Unit 17, Dona Segundina
Townhomes, Muntinlupa City, where she was detained
against her will for two days, and later transferred to a
house in San Pedro, Laguna where she was also detained
against her will until June 27,
2003;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about June 27, 2003, all the above-named

accused, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously decided to hide the private complainant in
Mindanao and, with the help of armed men and with threat,
force and intimidation, accused Gil Anthony Calianga
brought the private complainant to Cagayan de Oro where
she was held captive in a house until about August 5, 2003
and where accused Gil Anthony M. Calianga had carnal
knowledge of her repeatedly against her will, by means of
threat, force, violence and intimidation and by making her
take drinks laced with drugs;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about August 5, 2003, accused Gil Anthony M.

Calianga, with the aid or several unknown persons,
brought the private complainant back to Metro Manila and
thereafter, together with accused Rodrigo A. Reyna and
Arturo S. Calianga, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
detain the private complainant in a house in Taytay, Rizal
until she was transferred to the house of accused Rodrigo
A. Reyna in Muntinlupa City where the three accused
continued to hold her against her will, at which different
places the three accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of threat, force, violence, intimidation
and psychological manipulation, and through the use of
drugs, took turns in repeatedly having carnal knowledge of
the private complainant against her will until she was
rescued on November 9, 2003 by her relatives and NBI
agents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, January 30, 2007.

The undersigned Acting City Prosecutor, upon sworn complaint duly
attached and made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex “A”,
executed on July 4, 2002 before the Women’s Desk, Muntinlupa City
Police Station by the offended party, IRIS KRISTINE ALBERTO Y
BALOIS, then seventeen (17) years old, assisted by her grandfather
Benjamin D. Balois, accuses RODRIGO A. REYNA, GIL ANTHONY M.
CALIANGA, JEZIBEL CALIANGA, GRACE EVANGELISTA confederating
and mutually helping each other in the crime of SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION and Rape of a minor as defined under Article 267,
paragraph 1(4) and paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
That at about 5:30 [sic] in the afternoon of April 23, 2002, in the City of
Muntinlupa and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, through fraudulent misrepresentation, by
means of force, threat and intimidation and by taking advantage of his
influence as priest of the Mormon Church of which the private
complainant Iris Kristine [Balois Alberto], female, then a minor, seventeen
(17) years of age, was also a member, then and there, and with lewd and
unchaste design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away
Iris Kristine Balois Alberto against her will and without legal cause, from
South Green Heights in Muntinlupa City and brought her to a tree house
located at Camella Homes, Muntinlupa City where said accused, by
means of threat, force, violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge of the private complainant against her
will in the evening of the said date and detained her until the morning of
April 24, 2002; that said accused Gil Anthony Calianga would not have
succeeded in detaining her until the morning of April 24, 2002 and in
having carnal knowledge of her against her will on the night of April 23,
2002 without the indispensable cooperation of accused JEZIBEL
CALIANGA and GRACE EVANGELISTA who padlocked the tree house
from the outside while the private complainant was detained inside, and
the indispensable cooperation of accused Atty. RODRIGO A. REYNA, a
high priest of the Mormon church, a close friend and associate of private
complainant’s grandfather and a member of the legal profession, who,
taking advantage of his ascendancy and moral persuasion, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously aided, abetted and cooperated with accused
Gil Anthony Calianga, Jezibel Calianga and Grace Evangelista by giving
them instructions through cellular phone and by misleading and actively
misrepresenting to the private complainant’s family her whereabouts.
Without such cooperation and unity in effort on the part of the above
named accused, Iris Kristine Balois Alberto, a minor at that time, would
not have been detained and raped on April 23 to 24, 2002.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, January 30, 2007.
For alleged reasons of extreme urgency, respondents filed a petition for certiorari58 with

the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97863, while the resolution of their January 18,
2007 Joint Motion for Reconsideration was still pending.
In the interim, a warrant of arrest59 was issued on February 23, 2007, by Presiding Judge
Philip A. Aguinaldo of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 207 against all the accused in
Criminal Case No. 07-128. Later, on January 14, 2008, Acting Presiding Judge Romulo
SG. Villanueva of the RTC, Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 issued a warrant of
arrest60 against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-122.
The CA Ruling
The CA gave due course to respondents’ petition for certiorari and on January 11, 2008
rendered its Decision61 which revoked the DOJ Resolutions.
It ruled that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in reversing the resolutions
of no less than three (3) investigative bodies which all found lack of probable cause and
in disregarding the overwhelming, credible and convincing evidence which negated the
charges filed against respondents.62 Of particular note to the CA were the inconsistent
and inherently improbable testimony of Iris, the existence of love letters and text
messages of love and concern between Iris and Gil, and the hiatus of evidence that
would show that Atty. Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and Grace conspired to rape or illegally
detain Iris.63
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,64 essentially arguing that the CA

erroneously assumed the function of public prosecutor when it determined the non-
existence of probable cause. The said motion was, however, denied in a Resolution
dated March 13, 2008.65
Issue Before The Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the CA
erred in revoking the DOJ Resolutions based on grave abuse of discretion.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public
prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the
general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the
determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an
executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and
balances,66 whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been
tasked by the present Constitution “to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.”67
In the case of Callo-Caridad v. Esteban,68 citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias

III, 69 the Court held:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In reviewing the findings of the [public prosecutor] on the matter of

probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially
executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the
respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to
believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.
On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s
determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for
certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited
sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such
intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear
demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference
to the doctrine of separation of powers. As the Court has postulated
in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts

have no right to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their
own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,
represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The
settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with
the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In the context of filing criminal charges, grave abuse of discretion exists in cases where
the determination of probable cause is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as
“grave” must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. 70 In this regard,
case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of
law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.71 As held in PCGG v. Jacobi:72
In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in
him by law. This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his
act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally
the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the
prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion
he reached. This requires the petitioner to establish that the
prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before
judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be
obtained. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To note, probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the
facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean “actual and positive
cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.73As pronounced in Reyes
v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.:74
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing

that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In order to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to
determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime
charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle
that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most,
no criminal offense.75
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds as

follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
First, the DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in finding that probable
cause exists for the crime of Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo.
Under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the elements of
Rape are: (a) that the offender is a man; (b) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (c) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.76
In particular, with respect to Gil, Iris averred that on December 28, 2001, Gil drugged her
and thereafter, through force and intimidation, succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her. She also claimed that on April 23, 2002, Gil, again through force and
intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her in the tree house. Likewise, beginning June
27, 2003, Gil raped her almost every day up until her rescue on November 9 of the same
year.
In defense, records show that Gil never denied any of the above-stated sexual
encounters, but merely maintained the he and Iris were sweethearts, as shown by
several love letters and text messages between them.
Ruling on the matter, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ
Secretary, as the elements of rape, more likely than not, appear to be present.
The first and second elements of the crime are beyond dispute as Gil does not deny
having carnal knowledge with Iris. Anent the third element of force and intimidation, Iris’s
version of the facts, as well as Gil’s sole reliance on the sweetheart defense, leads the
Court to believe that the said element, in all reasonable likelihood, appears to be
present, considering that: (a) mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
witness;77 (b) the sweetheart theory does not, by and of itself, negate the commission of
rape;78 and (c) the fact that Iris was a minor during the foregoing incidents casts serious
doubt on the efficacy of the consent purportedly given by her,79 especially in view of Gil’s
esteemed position of being a priest of the same congregation of which Iris belongs to.
Moreover, a perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes of the January 14, 2004
hearing in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 80624 (January 14, 2004 TSN) shows that Iris retracted her
previous testimony during the August 19, 2003 hearing in the first habeas
corpus case, i.e., CA-G.R. S.P. No. 78316, to the effect that her statements that Gil
never raped her and that she went with him on her own volition were merely “scripted”
and conjured only upon the instruction of Atty. Reyna.80 While case law holds that
recantations do not necessarily cancel out an earlier declaration, ultimately, it should still
be treated like any other testimony and as such, its credibility must be tested during
trial.81
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court finds reasonable bases to sustain the DOJ
Secretary’s finding of probable cause for Rape against Gil in connection with all three (3)
incidents of December 28, 2001, April 23, 2002 and June 23 to November 9, 2003. In
this respect, the DOJ Secretary committed no grave abuse of discretion.
Similarly, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJ Secretary’s finding of
probable cause for Rape against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, but only insofar as the June 23
to November 9, 2003 incidents are concerned.
The January 14, 2004 TSN reveals that Iris categorically declared in open court that she
was raped by Atty. Reyna and Arturo during the aforesaid five month period.82 It is a
standing rule that due to the nature of the commission of the crime of rape, the testimony
of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused, provided that such testimony is
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.83 Applying the same, the Court deems it prudent to test the credibility of Iris’s
testimony during trial, in which her demeanor and deportment would be properly
observable,84 and likewise be subject to cross- examination.85
On the contrary, there appears to be no ample justification to support the finding of

probable cause against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, with respect to the rape incidents of
December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002, as well as against Jessebel and Grace for all
three (3) incidents.
As may be gleaned from the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary indicted Atty.
Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and Grace for these incidents only by reason of conspiracy.
Yet, other than his general imputation thereof, the DOJ Secretary never provided any
rational explanation for his finding of conspiracy against the aforementioned
respondents. The rule is that conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as
the commission of the offense itself. It can be inferred from and established by the acts
of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interests.86 In this case, the Amended Resolution is bereft of
any showing as to how the particular acts of the foregoing respondents figured into the
common design of raping Iris and as such, the Court finds no reason to charge them for
the same.
Therefore, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the following respects, the Court
upholds the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable cause for the crime of Rape against Gil
for all three (3) rape incidents and against Atty. Reyna and Arturo for the incidents of
June 23 to November 9, 2003.
At this juncture, the Court observes that the DOJ charged Gil for Rape in relation to
Child Abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 761087 on account of the December 28,
2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents. Existing jurisprudence, however, proscribes charging
an accused for both crimes, rather, he may be charged only for either. As held in People
v. Pangilinan:88
[I]f the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged

with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under
Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the
same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a
single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of
Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code
(on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as
rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this light, while the Court also finds that probable cause exists for the crime of Child
Abuse against Gil for the same rape incidents of December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002
in view of the substantial identity of its elements89 with that of Rape, he cannot be
charged for both. Records disclose that there are standing charges against Gil for Child
Abuse in Criminal Case Nos. 03-551 and 03-549,90respectively on account of the same
occurrences. Thus, so as not to violate his right against double jeopardy, the Court finds
it proper to dismiss the charges of Rape against Gil with respect to the December 28,
2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents considering the subsisting charges of Child Abuse as
herein discussed.
Notably, Gil, as well as Atty. Reyna and Arturo, cannot be charged for Child Abuse with
respect to the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents since Iris had ceased to be a
minor by that time.91 Likewise, Atty. Reyna and Arturo cannot be indicted for Child Abuse
in connection with the December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 incidents as there appears
to be no sufficient bases to support the DOJ Secretary’s finding of conspiracy.
Second, the Court further holds that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in
finding that probable cause exists for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention.
The elements of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the RPC are:
(a) that the offender is a private individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention is illegal, not
being ordered by any competent authority nor allowed by law; and (d) that any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) that the detention lasts for more than five days; or
(2) that it is committed by simulating public authority; or (3) that any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or threats to kill him shall have been
made; or (4) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.92
Based on the Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary charges all the respondents for
Serious Illegal Detention for the incidents of April 23 to 24, 2002 and June 23 until
November 9, 2003. Related to this, records show that Iris retracted her previous
testimony wherein she stated that she voluntarily went with Gil.93 She also stated that
she was abducted on June 23, 2003 and brought to various places, such as Cagayan
De Oro, Taytay and San Pedro, within a period of five (5) months.94
Aside from Iris’s bare allegations, records are bereft of any evidence to support a finding
that Iris was illegally detained or restrained of her movement. On the contrary, based on
Pros. Lim’s Resolution dated November 8, 2004, several disinterested witnesses had
testified to the fact that Iris was seen freely roaming in public with Gil,95 negating the
quintessential element of deprivation of liberty.96
Towards the same end, the Court equally observes that the inherent inconsistencies in
Iris’s statements are too dire to ignore even only at the prosecutor’s level. Anent the April
23, 2002 incidents, the Court finds it contrary to both reason and logic that Gil would
stop-over at a McDonald’s restaurant, a place widely open to the public eye, in the
process of kidnapping Iris. Similarly, with respect to the June 23, 2003 incidents, if Iris
was indeed abducted and detained during that time, then it is highly incredible that she
would be voluntarily let go by her captors in order to attend a habeas corpus hearing
before justices of the CA.
It is well to note that while the Court had given substantial weight to Iris’s uncorroborated
testimony to sustain the DOJ Secretary’s finding of probable cause for the crime of
Rape, the same treatment cannot be applied to the crime of Serious Illegal Detention.
Comparing the two, Rape is an offense of secrecy97 which, more often than not, happens
in a private setting involving only the accused and the victim; likewise, the degree of
humiliation and disgrace befalling a rape victim who decides to come forward must be
taken into consideration.98 For these reasons, the testimony of the latter, even if
uncorroborated, can lead to a conviction. On the other hand, in Serious Illegal Detention,
the victim is usually taken from one place and transferred to another – which is in fact
what has been alleged in this case - making the commission of the offense susceptible
to public view. Unfortunately, petitioners never presented any evidence to show that Iris
was restrained of her liberty at any point in time during the period of her alleged captivity.
All told, given the clear absence of probable cause for the crime of Serious Illegal
Detention, the Court finds that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion in
charging respondents for the same.
Third, the DOJ Secretary also committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable
cause for the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.
The elements of Forcible Abduction under Article 342 of the RPC are: (a) that the person
abducted is any woman, regardless of her age or reputation; (b) that the abduction must
be against her will; and (c) that the abduction must be with lewd designs.99 As this crime
is complexed with the crime of Rape pursuant to Article 48 of the RPC, the elements of
the latter offense must also concur. Further, owing to its nature as a complex crime
proper,100 the Forcible Abduction must be shown to be a necessary means for
committing the crime of Rape.
As earlier discussed, there lies no evidence to prove that Iris was restrained of her liberty
during the period of her captivity from June 23 to November 9, 2003 thus, denying the
element of abduction. More importantly, even if it is assumed that there was some form
of abduction, it has not been shown – nor even sufficiently alleged – that the taking was
done with lewd designs. Lust or lewd design is an element that characterizes all crimes
against chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent of the offender. As such, the
said element must be always present in order that they may be so considered as a crime
of chastity in contemplation of law.101
Moreover, the Court observes that even if it is assumed that all of the elements of
Forcible Abduction were present, it was not shown nor sufficiently alleged how the said
abduction constituted a necessary means for committing the crime of Rape. As earlier
discussed, records disclose that there lies probable.cause to indict Gil, Atty. Reyna and
Arturo only for the component crime of Rape. In this accord, the charge of the complex
crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape was improper and, hence, there was grave
abuse of discretion.
In sum, the Court finds probable cause for Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo in
connection with the June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents. Consequently, the DOJ
Secretary is ordered to direct the City State Prosecutor of Muntinlupa or any of its
subordinates to file such charge. Meanwhile, the charges of Child Abuse against Gil in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-551 and 03-549 are deemed to subsist. Aside from the foregoing,
all other charges are hereby nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, in order to conform with the pronouncements made herein, the DOJ
Secretary is directed to drop (a) any subsisting charges against Jessebel and Grace in
connection with this case; (b) the charge of Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610, for the incidents of December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002 against Gil, Atty.
Reyna and Arturo; and (c) the charges of Serious Illegal Detention and Forcible
Abduction with Rape against all respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 11,
2008 and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97863
are hereby SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to issue the proper
resolution in accordance with this Decision.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
represented by MANOLO C.
FERNANDO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

VICENTE ATILANO, NAZAAR
LUIS, JOCELYN DELA DINGCO,
SHARON SEE VICENTE, and JOHN
DOES,
Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) challenging the decision[2] and the resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84248.

The Facts

Petitioner MERALCO is a domestic corporation doing business as an electric utility, and
represented herein by its Senior Manager and Head of Treasury Operations Group,
Manolo C. Fernando. Respondents are, at the time material to this case, officers of
Corporate Investments Philippines, Inc. (CIPI) a duly licensed investment house
engaged in securities brokerage, dealership and underwriting services: Vicente Atilano
(President); Nazaar Luis (Vice-President and General Counsel); Jocelyn dela Dingco
(First Vice-President, Funds Management Group); Sharon See Vicente (Assistant
Manager, Funds Management Group); and several John Does who are unidentified
employees and officers of CIPI.

On April 16, 2001, MERALCO filed a complaint for estafa, under Article 315, paragraphs
1(a), 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, against the respondents. MERALCO
alleged that in 1993, MERALCO started investing in commercial papers (CPs) through
CIPI. As of May 2000, MERALCOs investment with CIPI already amounted
to P75,000,000.00. At various points in time, MERALCO delivered funds to the
respondents for investment in CPs and government securities (GS). Sometime in May
2000, respondent Atilano, who was at that time the President of CIPI, conveyed to
Manuel Lopez, MERALCOs President, that CIPI was facing liquidity problems. Lopez
agreed to extend help to CIPI by placing investments through CIPI, on the condition that
CIPI would secure these investments with GS and CPs issued by the Lopez Group of
Companies (Lopez Group). Pursuant to this agreement, Fernando, who was at that time
the Head of MERALCOs Treasury Operations Group, and respondent Vicente, who was
the Assistant Manager of CIPIs Funds Management Group, allegedly entered into the
following transactions:

Date Amount Invested Term Securities
May 30, 2000 P20,000,000.00 30 days GS and CPs of
Lopez Group
May 31, 2000 P45,000,000.00 30 days CPs of Rockwell
and Benpres
Corporation

MERALCO further alleged that it informed CIPI of its requirement to have the
above-listed securities delivered to it within twenty-four (24) hours after the transaction,
which CIPI failed to deliver despite repeated demands. Contrary to its specific
instructions, MERALCO alleged that CIPI diverted MERALCOs funds by placing the
investments in CIPIs own promissory notes (PNs) and in CPs of companies that are not
members of the Lopez Group such as the investment of MERALCOs funds amounting
to P10,000,000.00 in Pilipino Telephone Corporation CPs.

On June 8, 2000, following CIPIs alleged failure to deliver the subject securities
within the period agreed upon, Fernando instructed Manolo Carpio and another staff of
MERALCOs Treasury Operations Group to proceed to CIPIs office and demand the
proper documentation of the subject transactions. Fernando followed his staff and met
with respondent Luis who was at that time the Vice-President and General Counsel of
CIPI. According to Fernando, respondent Atilano called him during the meeting to
reiterate CIPIs liquidity problems, and to assure him that it was only temporary. He said
that respondent Atilano promised to correct the irregularities committed by CIPI by
making changes in MERALCOs investment portfolio. MERALCO said that the proposed
changes in its investment portfolio, as promised by respondent Atilano, are reflected in
the Minutes of the June 8, 2000 Meeting, as follows:

1. For its investments, MERALCO shall accept only Government
Securities (GS) and Commercial Papers (CPs) of any Lopez Group
company as security.

2. As an interim arrangement, MERALCO will accept CIPIs Promissory
Notes detailed as follows for investments that are presently without
security:

Promissory Note No. 10010 in the amount of Pesos 18,000,000 +
interest
Promissory Note No. 10011 in the amount of Pesos 45,000,000 +
interest

3. That this interim arrangement shall be regularized by replacing the
aforementioned Promissory Notes detailed in Item #2 above with any
security stated in item number (1) above.

4. That Confirmation of Sale No. 29145 covered by securities: PILTEL
COMMERCIAL PAPER with a price of Pesos 10,000,000.00 shall
likewise be replaced with securities acceptable to MERALCO as
mentioned in item number (1) above.

5. That CIPI shall effect the changes stated in item numbers (3) and (4)
above not later than 12:00 NN of 9 June 2000.[4]

The Minutes were signed by respondent Luis and they indicated that the meeting
was attended by Fernando, Felix C. de Guzman, Manolo D. Carpio and Malou M.
Manlugon, on MERALCOs part, and by respondents Luis and Dela Dingco on CIPIs
part. However, notwithstanding the agreed deadline of June 9, 2000, CIPI allegedly
failed to fulfill its undertaking.

Thus, MERALCO argued that the respondents should be held liable for estafa under
Article 315, paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code for falsely
pretending that they possess power, influence and qualifications to buy CPs of the
Lopez Group and/or GS as agreed upon. MERALCO averred that it entrusted the
subject investments to CIPI because of CIPIs commitment to comply with the condition
that the investments would be secured by GS and/or CPs issued by a Lopez Group
company. MERALCO maintained that by substituting the required securities with PNs of
CIPI and CPs of non-Lopez Group companies, the respondents are guilty of converting
and misappropriating the subject funds to the prejudice of MERALCO.

In a resolution dated February 20, 2002, Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana dismissed
MERALCOs complaint for insufficiency of evidence. According to Prosecutor Pastrana,
the evidence presented by MERALCO failed to establish that the respondents committed
any act that would constitute estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code.

Prosecutor Pastrana said that there is no clear proof that the respondents
misappropriated or converted MERALCOs funds the core element in the offense
of estafa. He also found that MERALCO failed to prove the indispensable element of
deceit as the evidence showed that respondent Atilano revealed CIPIs liquidity problems
to MERALCO even before the latter placed its investment through CIPI.

Prosecutor Pastrana noted that considering the amount of money that
MERALCO invested, there was no documentary evidence to show any specific
instruction for CIPI to invest the funds only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group. MERALCO
merely relied on the Minutes of the June 8, 2000 Meeting to prove that MERALCO
indeed made such an instruction.

Thus, Prosecutor Pastrana concluded that the transaction between MERALCO
and CIPI was a money market transaction partaking of a loan transaction whose
nonpayment does not give rise to any criminal liability for estafa through
misappropriation or conversion. Prosecutor Pastrana ruled that in a money market
placement, the remedy of an unpaid investor (MERALCO) is to institute a civil action for
recovery against the middleman or dealer (CIPI) and not a criminal action, such as the
present recourse.

MERALCO moved to reconsider Prosecutor Pastranas resolution but the latter
denied the motion in a resolution dated May 8, 2002. On June 3, 2002, MERALCO filed
a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On December 17, 2002, then DOJ Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
dismissed the petition in accordance with Section 12(c), in relation to Section 7, of
Department Circular No. 70.[5] The Secretary of Justice ruled that after carefully
examining the petition and its attachments, she found no error on the part of the
handling prosecutor that would warrant a reversal of the challenged resolution. The DOJ
resolution further ruled that the challenged resolution was in accord with the evidence
and the law on the matter.

The DOJ resolution also noted MERALCOs failure to submit a legible true copy
of the confirmation of sale dated May 30, 2000 which was attached as Annex 2 of
respondent Vicentes counter-affidavit, in violation of Section 5[6] of Department Circular
No. 70.

MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution but the same was
denied in a resolution dated March 26, 2004.

Thereupon, on May 31, 2004, MERALCO filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the December 17, 2002 and March 26,
2004 resolutions of the DOJ.

In its decision dated September 29, 2004, the CA dismissed MERALCOs petition
and affirmed the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. It noted that the DOJ Minute
Resolution was not invalidated by the fact that it contained no further discussion of the
factual and legal issues because the reviewing authority expressed full concurrence with
the findings and conclusions made by the prosecutor.

The CA further ruled that the relationship between MERALCO and CIPI is that of
a creditor and debtor and, therefore, the remedy available to MERALCO is to file a civil
case for recovery and not a criminal case for estafa, citing Sesbreno v. CA.[7]

When the CA denied MERALCOs motion for reconsideration, the latter filed the
instant petition.

The Petition

MERALCO argues that (1) the DOJ Resolution violated the requirements laid down
under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, Section 14, Chapter III, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and the jurisprudential pronouncements of this Court on the
matter; (2) the said resolution violated the jurisprudential stricture against applying
technicalities to frustrate the ends of justice when it dismissed MERALCOs petition for
failing to attach an annex of an annex; and (3) the CA erred in affirming the resolution of
the handling prosecutor dismissing the complaint for estafa against respondents herein.
The Issues

The issues for this Courts determination are: first, whether the DOJ Resolution dated
December 17, 2002 complied with the constitutional requirement laid down in Section
14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution[8] and the requirement in Section 14, Chapter III,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987[9]; and second, whether or not this Court
can disturb the determination of probable cause made by the public prosecutor in the
case.
Our Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

A. The December 17, 2002 DOJ
resolution complied with the
requirement of the Constitution
and the Administrative Code of
1987

The December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution was issued in accordance with Section 12(c), in
relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70, dated July 3, 2000, which
authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if he finds it to be
patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein
are too insubstantial to require consideration.

In dismissing MERALCOs petition for review of the resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City, the Secretary of Justice ruled that after carefully
examining the petition and its attachments, no error on the part of the handling
prosecutor was found to have been committed which would warrant a reversal of the
challenged resolution. Thus, the December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution concluded that the
challenged resolution was in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter.

MERALCO considers the December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution invalid because of
the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which it is based, as required under
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 14, Chapter III, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987. MERALCO claims that the requirement to state the facts
and the law in a decision is a mandatory requirement and the DOJ is not exempt from
complying with the same.

In arguing as it did, MERALCO failed to note that Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution refers to courts, thereby excluding the DOJ Secretary and prosecutors who
are not members of the Judiciary. In Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio,[10] we ruled
that Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution does not x x x extend to resolutions issued
by the DOJ Secretary. In explaining the inapplicability of Section 4, Article VIII of the
Constitution to DOJ resolutions, the Court said that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body
and the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution
via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding.

This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals,
Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,[11] where we pointed out that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and its decisions
have the same effect as a judgment of a court.[12] [This] is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of
Justice [reviews] the former's order[s] or resolutions on determination of probable cause.
[13]

In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts
preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers.
Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of persons or entities
coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production
of documents.[14]This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of
concerned parties.[15]Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which sets a public
prosecutor apart from the court.

The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of
preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented to him,
he should take further action by filing a criminal complaint in court. In doing so, he does
not adjudicate upon the rights, obligations or liabilities of the parties before him. Since
the power exercised by the public prosecutor in this instance is merely investigative or
inquisitorial, it is subject to a different standard in terms of stating the facts and the law in
its determinations. This is also true in the case of the DOJ Secretary exercising her
review powers over decisions of public prosecutors. Thus, it is sufficient that in denying a
petition for review of a resolution of a prosecutor, the DOJ resolution state the law upon
which it is based.

We rule, therefore, that the DOJ resolution satisfactorily complied with
constitutional and legal requirements when it stated its legal basis for denying
MERALCOs petition for review which is Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70, which
authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if he finds it to be
patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein
are too insubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ resolution noted that MERALCO failed to submit a legible true copy of
the confirmation of sale dated May 30, 2000 and considered the omission in violation of
Section 5[16] of Department Circular No. 70. MERALCO assails the dismissal on this
ground as an overly technical application of the rules and claims that it frustrated the
ends of substantial justice. We note, however, that the failure to attach the document
was not the sole reason of the DOJs denial of MERALCOs petition for review. As
mentioned, the DOJ resolution dismissed the petition primarily because the prosecutors
resolution is in accord with the evidence and the law on the matter.

At this point, it becomes unnecessary to decide the legality of Section 7 of DOJ
Department Circular No. 70 allowing the outright dismissal of MERALCOs petition for
review. It is basic that this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.[17]

Also, DOJ Department Circular No. 70 is an enactment of an executive
department of the government and is designed for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice; before it was enacted, it is presumed to have been carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional. [18] Lest we be misunderstood, we do not
hereby evade our duty; in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, we merely
accord respect to the basic constitutional principle of separation of powers, which has
long guided our system of government.

B. The determination of probable
cause for the filing of an
information in court is an
executive function

[T]he determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an
executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then
to the Secretary of Justice.[19] As a rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion,
[c]ourts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive
branch;[20] the public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will
establish probable cause in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with
his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown.[21]

This notwithstanding, we have examined the records and found no error in the
public prosecutors determination that no probable cause existed to justify the filing of a
criminal complaint.

The respondents are being charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraphs
1(a), 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable for estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code[22] (estafa by conversion or
misappropriation), the following elements must concur:

(1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same;

(2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[23]

The records show that MERALCO failed to prove that the respondents
indeed misappropriated or converted its investments. As the handling prosecutor
found, aside from the Minutes of the June 8, 2000 Meeting, MERALCO did not present
any evidence that would prove that MERALCO indeed gave specific instructions
for CIPI to invest only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group.

According to the CA, the said Minutes do not have any probative value for being
hearsay because they attest to the existence of an agreement purportedly entered into
between respondent Atilano and Lopez whose testimony was never presented in
evidence. While respondent Atilano explicitly denied having received any specific
instructions from MERALCO on how its investments would be placed, MERALCO failed
to present any contrary evidence. MERALCO could have presented in evidence the
testimony of Lopez to prove that he gave specific instructions to CIPI to place its
investments only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group, but it failed to do so.

Absent any proof of specific instructions, CIPI cannot be said to have
misappropriated or diverted MERALCOs investments. We take note that in money
market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where investments are to be
placed, absent any agreement with or instruction from the investor to place the
investments in specific securities.

Money market transactions may be conducted in various ways. One instance is
when an investor enters into an investment contract with a dealer under terms that
oblige the dealer to place investments only in designated securities. Another is when
there is no stipulation for placement on designated securities; thus, the dealer is given
discretion to choose the placement of the investment made. Under the first situation, a
dealer who deviates from the specified instruction may be exposed to civil and criminal
prosecution; in contrast, the second situation may only give rise to a civil action for
recovery of the amount invested.

On the other hand, to be held liable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code[24] (estafa by means of deceit), the following elements must concur:

(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to
his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions;

(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud;

(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and

(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[25]

MERALCO argued that the respondents are guilty of falsely pretending that they
possess power, influence and qualifications to buy GS and CPs of the Lopez Group, to
induce MERALCO to part with its investment. We rule that the argument has no basis
precisely because no evidence exists showing that CIPI made false representations
regarding its capacity to deal with MERALCOs investments. In fact, the records will show
that respondent Atilano disclosed CIPIs liquidity problems to MERALCO even before
MERALCO placed its investment. We agree with the prosecutors finding that aside from
its allegations, MERALCO failed to present any evidence showing that any of the
respondents made any fraudulent misrepresentations or false statements prior to or
simultaneously with the delivery of MERALCOs funds to CIPI.

Finally, apart from its sweeping allegation that the respondents misappropriated
or converted its money placements, the handling prosecutor found that MERALCO failed
to establish, by evidence, the particular role or actual participation of each respondent in
the alleged criminal act. Neither was it shown that they assented to its commission. It is
basic that only corporate officers shown to have participated in the alleged anomalous
acts may be held criminally liable.[26]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated September 29, 2004
and the resolution dated January 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Enriquez V Sarmiento

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IMELDA S.

An "Inquest Investigation" of Apura was conducted on August 2, 2003, a Saturday, by a

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint filed on September 7, 2004 by

To the complaint, respondent gives the following comment:

SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

Indeed, a preliminary investigation should have been conducted before the filing of the

An Amended Information was subsequently filed, however, upon which a Warrant of

This Court, however, appreciates as mitigating in respondent’s favor his issuance of a

WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., is found guilty of gross

G.R. NO. 182132, June 19, 2013

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF MUNTINLUPA, THE

As culled from the assailed CA decision, the diametrically-opposed versions of the

A. Incidents of December 28, 2001

B. Incidents of April 23 to 24, 2002

C. Incidents of June 23 to November 9, 2003

Disposition of the Criminal Complaints

Criminal Case No. 03-551

That on December 28, 2001, in the City of Muntinlupa,

Criminal Case No. 03-549

Dissatisfied, Benjamin moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a

In addition to the above-stated incidents, complainant45 averred that Atty. Reyna and

Proceedings Before the DOJ

Criminal Case No. 07-12256

The undersigned Acting City Prosecutor upon sworn

That on June 23, 2003, in Makati City, Philippines and

That on or about June 27, 2003, all the above-named

That on or about August 5, 2003, accused Gil Anthony M.

Criminal Case No. 07-12857

For alleged reasons of extreme urgency, respondents filed a petition for certiorari58 with

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,64 essentially arguing that the CA

Issue Before The Court

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly meritorious.

In the case of Callo-Caridad v. Esteban,68 citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias

In reviewing the findings of the [public prosecutor] on the matter of

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds as

On the contrary, there appears to be no ample justification to support the finding of

[I]f the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged

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