SUGGESTED ANSWERS to the 018 BAR EXAMINATIONS IN LEGAL ETHICS, he lawyer's oath is a source of any lawyer's obligations and its violation sa ground for the lawyer's suspension, disbarment, or 01 Without stating your name and otler circumstances tantially write down the lawyer's oath that a person who has passed the bai xaminations is requiree to take and subscribe to before the Supreme Cour. 15%) disciplinary action, that will identity you do solemniy swear that 1 will maintain the Philippi legiaxése to the Republic of will support its Constitution and obey the aws as well as he iegal orders of the duly constitu 14 authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or villingiy promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent 0 the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will onduet myself as a Inwyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without ‘eservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. i in a complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (BP) against Atty. Cirilo Celis, a senior citizen, it was shown that: a) he failed to pay his IBP dues for six (6) years; b) he indicated uniformly in his pleadings for three 3} consecutive years “IBP Muntinlupa OR No. 12345” as proof of payment of IEP fees; and c) he did not indicate any Professional Tax Receipt number. to prove payment of his professional dues.In his defense, Atty. Celis alleged that he is only engaged in a “limited law practice, and his principal occupation, as disclosed in his income tax retum, 's thet of a farmer of a 30-hectare orchard and pineapple farm in Camarines Sur. He «ilso claimed that he believed in good faith that. as a senior citizen. he was exempt from payment of taxes, such as income tax, under Republic Act No. 7432 which grants senior citizens “exemption from the payment of individual income taxes provided that their annual taxable income docs not exceed the doverty level as determined by the NEDA for that year.” 4s a member of the [BP Board of Governors. decicle on the following: 2) the validity cf his claim that, being engaged in a limited practice of law and being a senior citizen who is exempt from the payment of axes, he is not required to pay his IBP and profession 2.5%) dues: a) {m accordance with Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A, Atty. Celis can engage in the practice of law only by paying his IBP dues, and it does not matter that his practice is “limited”. While it is irue that R.A, No. 7432, See. 4, grants serfor citizen exemption from the payment of individual income taxes provide that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year, the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues, which is not a tax (Santos, Jr. vs. Llamas, 322 SCRA 529 [2000)). cb) the obiigations, if any, under the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility that Atty. Celis may have violated. 12.5%) =A lawyer shall at legal professionSec. 10, Rule 139-A, Rules of Court ~ “Subject to the provision of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of ;x months shall warrant suspension of annual dues for ed Bar, and default in such payment for members in the Integra nd for removal of the name of the one year shall be a g1 delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.” ua Carina was dismissed by her employer for breach of trust and confidence, snd for willful violation of company rules and policies. She filed an action for ‘itegal dismissal ciaiming that her termination was without legal basis. The Lab ‘arbiter found thar she was illegally dismissed and awarded her the amount of PLP 30 million. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the avard was reduced 10 PhP 40 million as separation pay, plus PhP 5 million for the value of her stock option plans which would have vested if she were not illegelly dismissed from her job. Unsatisfied with the NLRC’s decision, she appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) the amount of monetary award granted by he NLRC. She engagec the services of Casal, Casos and Associates to handle ner appeal. Her retainer agreement with Casal, Casos and Associates provided for contingent fees equivalent to 10% of her claim for separation pay and 10% of ne value of stock options to be awarded to her The CA decision was not favorable to Carina, so she appealed the same to he Supreme Court (the Court). While the case was pending appeal with the Sour, Carina entered info a compromise agreement with her employer to ‘erminate the case upon payment fo her of the full amount of PhP 40 million, less he PhP [5 million previously paid to her by her employer. Before the conipromise agreement was finalized, Carina terminated the services of Casal, Sasos and Associates and asked them te withdraw from the case pending before he court. The parties negotiated the compromise agreement without the varticipation of their lawyers since the employer imposed the condition that no awyers showid be involved in the compromise negotiation, She, together with ser empioyer. then filed the Compromise Agreement for approval by the Court and sought the termination of the case. with prejudice. Casal, Casos and Associates filed a motion to intervene in the case pending with the Court, praying that Carina be ordered to pay them PhP 4 nillion, representing 10% of the amount received by Carina from her employer ny sevtlement of the case, plus 6% legal interest from the date of filing of the motion for intervention, until fully paid. The intervenors claimed that they were dismissed without justifiable cause prior to the signing of the compromise agreement for the reason that Carina, their client, wanted to evade payment of gal fees. Carina claimed they were dismissed because Attys. Casal and “asor who personally handled her case. had resigned from the law firm to join ‘ernment, and because of the negligence and failure of her lawyers to‘awtend xo hier case. in repiy, the intervenors said that the engagement was with the ‘aw firm and not with individual lawyers. The law firm also presented letters signed by their client commending them for work done well in the case (2) May lawyers legally charge their clients based on contingent fees? (2.5%) ANSWE! (a) Yes, Rule 21.01 (h) of the Code of Professional Responsibi provides the contingency or certainty of compensation as one of the factors in determining fair and reasonable fees. A contingent fee is intended to enable 2 poor person to avail of the services of a lawyer to protect his rights or redress his grievances. b) Should Casal, Casos and Associates be allowed to intervene in the case pending before the Court in order to follect their fees from Carina? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b) Yes. A lawyer is as much entitled to the judicial protection against injustice. imposition or fraud on the part of the client, as ‘ie client against abuse on the part of his counsel. Rule 10.03 of tive Code of Professional Responsibility permits the registration ofa lien although the lawyer concerned does not finish the case sucessfully in favor of his client. because “n lawyer who quits or is dismissed before the completion of his task is as much entitled to protection of the rule” (Palanca vs. Pecson, G.R. Nos. 1-6334 and L-6346, February 23. 1954). He may enforce his vight vo his fees by s separate action or intervention in the same the better practice since and extent of his i she judge is services.‘c) Can Carine refuse t0 pay attomeys’ fees on the ground that the lawyers who personally handled her case had already resigned from the law firm with which she had contracted? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (©) When a client engages a law firm to represent him, his contract is with a law firm and not with the individual lawyers. The resignation, illness or inability of some of their lawyers will not affect the ability of the Iaw firm to continue its services. Certainly, cannot be used to evade payment of attorneys’ fees due to the law firm. (d) May Carina’s employer. defendant in this case, be held solidarily jiable with Cavina for the payment of the attogneys” fees of Carina’s lawyers? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (@) If the evidence shows that the employer of Carina imposed the “no lawyers in the negotiation of the compromise agreement rule’ because of connivance in evading payment of Carina’s lawyers, then the defendant employer should be held solidarily ifable in the payment of attorneys’ fees to Carina’s lawyers. When the other party to the case is also guilty of fraud in the payment of legal fees, he becomes a joint tortfeasor and should be heid solidarily liable with Carina. By particip: ing in the laud, Carina’s employer also becomes liable even if Casals, Casos and Associates was hired only to represent Carina (Malvar v. Kraft Foods, GR. 183952, Sepember 8, 2013). 2) May ihe intervenore collect legal interest in addition to their attorneys” fees? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:siuorney's tees, the payment of attorneys? fees is different from ets. The Civil Code provisions: hy payment of legal rate of interest in the event of default apply nly to ordinary obligations and contracts (iach v. Onghike Kalaw Mayhit and Acorda Law Office, GR. No, 160334 WW Aiey, Cometio Carbon, 36 years of age, had always dreamed of becoming ive, but his legal career took a different tum. Upon owned financial institution where he worked Negotiable I ts Law in earby law nn active in his YBP Chapter and other wv organizations, How: -ars of practice, he has never done trial 's Any. Carbon engaged in the “practice of law"? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: ta) Yes, he is engaged in the practice of iaw, which has been defined “any activity in o out of court which requires the applicatio of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience” Cayetano ». Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 [19 Ip. Work in the government that requires the use of legal knowledge is dered practice of law (Lingan v. Calubaguib, 727 s ICRA 355 fo. 9018. April 20, 2016). “Lawyers wito teach law are considered engaged 2014}, Fajardo v, Alvares, A.C. the practice of law (Res Letter of the UP Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10- arch 8, 2011). SC, (b) 1s Auy. Carbon qualified to become a Regional Trial Court Judge? UGGESTED ANSWER: (b) Yes, as long as he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 35 years of age. and has practiced law or held public officerequiring practice of law for at least 10 years. There is no requirement that he should have done actual trial or litigation work, Carlos contracted two marriages: the first was with Consuelo, whom he left is the province, and the second was with Corinne in Manila, with whom he had six (6) children, Both women were unaware of Carlo's marriage to the other When Carlos entered law school, he met Cristina, a classmate, to whom he confided his marizai statis. Not long after, Carlos and Cristina became involved in an extramarital affaic, as a result of which Carlos Jeft Corinne and their shildren. During Carlos and Cristina’s senior year in law school, Consuelo passed away. Afer ther admission to the bar, Auy. Carlos and Atty. Cristina decided to get married in Hong Kong in a very private ceremony. When Corinne teamed of Carlos and Cristina’s wedding in Hong Kong, she filed a disbarment 2 against Atty. Carlos and Atty. Cristina on the ground of gross immorality. Atty, Carlos and Atty. Cristina raised the following defenses: the acts complained of took place before they were admitted to the bar; and ) Ay. Carlos’ marriage 10 Corinne was void ab initio due to his subsisting first marriage with Consuelo, and they were free to marry afier Consuelo died. Rule on each defense. (2.5% each) SUGGESTED ANSWE] (a) It is not important that the acts complained of were committed before they were admitted to the bar. The possession of good ‘moral character is both 2 condition precedent for admission to the bar and a continuing condition to remain a member of the legal profession. In the case of Garrido v. Garrido, (A.C. No. 593, February 4, 2010), involving the same facts, the Supreme re japaiel bees. |45 of the respondent before he became a lawyer, ission to the practice only creates the rebuttable nt has all the presumption that the appli qualivications to become a lawyer, this may be refuted ng, evidence to the contrary even after admis it) tw the same Garrido ease, the defense of the second marri Supreme Court held as follows: “While Atty. Valencia (Qhird wife) contends that Atty, Garrido’s marriage ‘vith Maelotises {second wife) was null and void, the fact remains that (s)he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garvido’s advances, as ne was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time, she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her Biaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maclotises and their children. Worse than this, because of au Vatencia's ee and willingness, eal outside of the prism of law. ‘We are not ummarriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.” vi Mrs. Conchita Conchu engaged the services of Atty. Carlo Colorado to act as private prosecutor 10 handle criminal case against persons suspected of slaying her husband. ity. Colorado performed his duties -he interviewed vimesses to build up his case and rel igiously attended hearings. However, he ‘ailee x0 attend one hearing (allegedly because he did not receive a notice) in which the ecurt, over Mrs, Concht's objections, granted bail to all the accused ‘Mrs. Conchs belligerently confronted Atty. Colorado abéut his absence, Stung sy Mrs. Conehu’s words, Atty. Colorado filed with the court a “Motion to Withdraw as Counsel". The motion did not bear the consent of Mrs. Conchu, as nn tac:, Mrs. Cone sefused 10 sign her conformity w Atty. Colorado's wvitharawal. Meanwhile. the hearing in the criminal case continued, but Atty. Foloiado no longer appeared at the hearings nor did he contact Mrs. Conchu. Mrs. Conchu then filed a complaint seeking disciplinary sanctions against Atty. Polorado. Asty. Colorado cited “loss of confidence” and “serious differences” with “ae client as his reasons for withdrawing his services unilaterally. ‘Can Any. Colorado be sanctioned for his actions? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Atty. Colorado can be sanctioned for his actions. Under the Rules of Court, an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates ‘9 carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without -easonable cause, A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudieation arises only from the client’s written consent or from the couyr’s approval of his motion to withdraw based on a good cause. Furthermore, being an officer of the court in whose favor a lawyer owes the ‘uty to assist in administering justice, he may not withdraw or be permitted © withdraw as counsel in a case if such withdrawal svat work injustice to a clien’ or frustrate the ends of justice ere ¥. Gaspar, 279 SCRA 479 (199 eeseps for the ammulmen: of his inarriage, began to tive with hiss openly as ishond and wife, One vay, Ady. Casis wife suddenly entered Miss Cerrada i ihe IP charging AMy. Caste with gross smamoralty and fowever, shortly afterwards, upon At notion 1a withdraw the Casis" pleas, Miss Cerrada Gled 3 the IBP had requited Atty. Casi to file an but he dic not do £0, relying on Miss Cerrada’s withdraw ‘ompiaint against him, Can the IP continue to investigate Aty of the Casis and ‘commend the imposition of sanctions against him, and for the Court 0 impose anctions, if warranted, rotwithstanding, Miss Certada’s filing of the motion to Withorw the eamplaint against him? (2.5%) The ISP can continue (0 investigate Atty. Casis. A disbarment aroceeding is sui generis, nel 4 civil or a erimi ial action, Not being a ‘vii section, che complainant is not @ plaintiff nor the respondent a Jefendant. ix involves no private interest and affords no redress for private Jevances. A disciplinary action is in reality an investigation by the court into the misconduct of its officer or an examination into his character. Desistance or withdrawal of the disbarment case does not exonerate the spondent. If the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be uspended or disbarred despite the deistance of {the complainant or his vieh ‘awal of the charges (Rayos-Ombac y. Rayos; 285 SCRA 93[1998)). vin iudge Celso Camarin posied in the bulietin board of his sala for two ‘veeks, an acvertisement which says: “Wanted attractive waitresses, personable vwaiters and cooks who may be snterested in applying for employment in my samily’s restaurant business. Interested applicants may submit applications to nch XX RTC of Camarines Sur.” The screening of some applicants was also conducted in the Judge’s office. What provisions, if any, of the Code of Judicial Conduct did Judge Camarin violate? (2.5%)SWER: In the case of Dionisio vs. Escano, 302 SCRA 411. February 1, 1999, nnvolving the same facts, the Supreme Court found the erring judge to have cial Ethics. violated the following rules of the Code of Jui Canou 11, Rule 2.00 — 4 Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Canon 3, Rule 5.02 — A judge refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere wvith the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement vith tawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A Judge should so manage investments and other financial interest to minimize the number of case y divest such ng grounds for disqualification, and if necessa nnvestment and interests. Divestment shall be made within one year from ite effectivity of this Code ar from appointment, as the ease may be. Rule 03 — Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may hoid and manage investment but should not serve as an oifice, director, advisor, or employee of any business except as director, or non-legal consultant of a family business. The corresponding provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduet cr the Philippine Judiciary would be: i, Section 1 ~ Judges shall avoid impropriety and the \ppearance of impropriety in all their activities. Section 7 ~ Judges shall inform themselves about their personal ‘iduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be ‘normed about the financial interest of the members of their family. ction § ~ Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial sfice « advanee their private interest, of of those f any member of their amily or of anyone else, no shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in -specis Position to Influence: them in the performance of their judicial duties.x in a case pending before the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan justices hhomselves actually took part in the questioning of a defense witness and the cd. The records snow that, while a winess was asked 16. questions on ions by the prosecutor amination, one justice interjected a total of 27.questions. After the cfense opted not to concct any re-direct examination, another justice asked 10 tions. With respect to one of the accused, both justices asked a total of tions after cross-examinasion, and with respect 16 the other accused. cial af 4 questions after eross-examination. More importantly, the questions of he ustices were in the natwe of crossexaminations characteristic of zonfiontation, probing, and insinuation, ‘examination by the defense counset and six (6) qu Is this manner of questioning proper? (5%) suGGI TED ANSWER: “This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question wesses with a view to satistying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a ease over which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking “clarificatory” questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used, for the rule is that the court should stay out of i€ as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, dese limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression t lied itself with, or (@ be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in prov © against Tabuens ond Po sxamined the witnesses, their cross-examination supplementing those made vy Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter’s questions in lengti. ‘he “cold newwality of an impartiai judge” requirement of due process was ninly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its were sumed the dual rule of magistrate and advocati Sunuliganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997). iabvewa in a complaint for disbarmeru. services of Aaty. Cesar Corpuz in th eed of Sale over a parcel of ‘onnie alleged that she en, aration gnd execution in her favor of a id from’ her common-law husband Subsequently, Atty. Corpue filed a civil case on behalf. of Constancia, the legal vife 2 Connie's common-law husband, for the annulment of the Deed of Sale, pleading Connie as deiendant in his defense, Atty. Corpuz asserted that, with the permission of onstancia, he wrote.a letter 0 Connie informing the iatier of Constancia’s adverse claira and urging her to settle the same, but Connie ignored his letter ie aiso said that Connie did not object to his handling of the case on behalf of ‘onstaneia; and therefore, he felt free to file the complaint against her. 1s Atty ‘upirz guilty ef miscond\ 8? (5%) for representing conflicting ing 2Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides thar a Invvyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of alt concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Atty. Corpus was clearly guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests, Not only tin the tid atcy. Corpuz agree to represent one client againstanother Jew engagement that reqi same action, he also accepted # oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal service had been previously retained. Atty. Corpuz did not qualify for the exception under Canon 15. He did not make a full disclosure of facts to Connie and Constancia before he accepted the new engagement from Constancia, He failed ¢o obtain the written consent of his two clients as required under AC. No. 5 (Josefina M. Anifion v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsand, Jr. 5098, April i, 2012) xt Atty. Claire Cortez, a member of the Philippine Bar who was also to the New York Bar, wvas disbarred from the practice of law in New York for violation of Anti-Money Laundering laws of that State. She returned to ‘ae Philippines in order to resume her Philippine daw practice, Can she also be disbarred from practicing law in the Philippines for the sane infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction?,(5%) Yes. she can, ifthe ground for which she wis disbarred in New York 5 also a ground for disbarment in the Philippines. But she is entitled to due process and sie can be disbarred here only after notice and hearing. The slisbarment decision in New York will only constitute prina facie evidence of her guilt (In rez Maquera 435 SCRA 417 (2004). XII From February to November 2004, Atty. ‘Calumpang, in fraudulent connivance with brokers, convinced Corinna to deliver to him advance money ‘or the titling 07 a beachf-ont property in Caramaan. Six rgonths had elapsed ‘andAy. Calumpang had made absolutely no progress in the titling of the land, He also 2ould nor return the advance money paid by Corinna because he had ‘onverted the money to his personal use. After almost a decade, and the property could still nor be titled in Corinna’s name, she filed én action with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) in 2014 for deceit, malpractice, and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar. In his defense, Atty. Calumpang asserted that, since the acts complained of took place moré than 10 years ago, the case had already prescribed. Rule on the defense of Aty. Calumpang. (5%) UGGESTED ANSWER: ‘A disbarment proceeding is impreseriptible. Unlike other proceedings, it is not subject to the defense of prescription. The ordinary statutes of ti nitations have no application to disbarment proceedings (Calo v. Degamo, 20 SCRA 1162 (1967}, Frias v. Bautista-Lozada;' 489 SCRA 349 (2006), Heck Sawstos, 423 SCRA 329 (2004). However, an unexplained long delay in the filing of an a inistrative case creates suspicion on the motives of the vompiainant (Salamanca v. Bautista, 8 SCRA 459 [1963]. Valdez v. Valera, 81 3CRA 246 [2015)). xm Dr. Ciele is @ well-known medical doctor Specializing in cosmetic surgery. , together with a team or doctors, performed a surgical buttocks ent procedure in her clinic on Ms. Cossette Concio (Concio). Unfortunately, after a couple of years, the implant introduced during the sninancement procedure caused infection and Concio became seriously ill nar Coneic filed a criminal action for medical shalpractice against Dr. Cielo which was eventuily dismissed for feilure to prove' that Dr. Cielo was negligent. Coneio was represented in this action by Atty. Cogie Ciguerra (Ciguerra). After they lost the medical malpractice case, Ciguerra started Writing a series of posts con his Facebook (FB) account containing insulting and verbally abuse language inst Dr, Cielo, Among others, Ciguerra called Dr. Cielo a quack doctor, reyna ng kapiastikan at kapalpakan", and accused her of maintaining a payola or extra-legal budget to pay off prosecutors and judges in order to win her cases ie also called on patients to boycott the clinic of Dr, Cielo, Dr. Ciele filed a disbarment case against Ciguerra for posting on his FB secount, sexist, vuigar, and obscene comments, and language disrespectful of women in his FB posts. Ciguerra’s defense is that his KB posts were private semarks on his private FB account and only meant to be sbared among his FB ‘iends. and Dr. Cielo was not part of them. He also elaimed that the disbarmentfiled in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy. The found that Cignerra’s FB account did not have privacy setting an Ciguersa be disbarred for the series of posts in his FB account against at. Cielo? (5%) ‘ SUGGESTED ANSWER: Ves. ju the case of Ma, Vieroria G. Belo-Henares v. Atty. Roberto nevarra, A.C. No. 1394, December |, 2076, involving thé same wreme Court, first of all debunked the ‘argee” C. Yaets. the Supreme Court, the Su respondent lawyer's defense of privacy by pointing out that he failed to prove that he used the privacy tools of Facebook to limit his messages to his fee that his friends will not “friend”, Even if ne did so there is no gua pass on his messages to their friends. With vegard (o the defense of freedom of speech, the Supreme Court uted! Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like ali constitutional freedoms, is not absoluce, While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person exerci ng them, as the Civil Cade stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone hhis due, and observe honesty and ghod faith. As such, the stitutfonal right of freedom of expression may not be availed co broadeast ties, half-truths) insult lothers, destroy thei hames. reputation of bring them into disrepute”. xIv Cacai, a iaw student, filed an administrative complaint against RTC Judge ‘asimiro Conde, her professor in iaw school, based on the following allegations: (a) ln a school convocation where Judge Conde was the guest speaker, Judge Conde openly disagreed and criticized a recently-decided jpreme Court decision and even stressed thatthe decision of the 7 Supreme Court in that case was a, serigus violation of the Constitution,a () In his clase discussions, Judge Conde named Cacai’s mother, an MTC judge, as one of the judges involved in a marriage seam. At that rime, the ease against her mother was still pending.” Judge once also inciuded in bis class discussion Cscai's brother whom . he referred to as a “court-noted drug addict.” Caeai assented that the acis of Judge Conde, were open displays of insensitivity, impropriety, and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive ani abusive conduct. She also aileged that Judge Conde acted with absolute disrespect for the Court and violated the “‘subjudice rule” when he discussed the marriage scam involving her mother because, at that time, the case was still ending, In his defense, Judge Conde argued that the case he discussed in the hocl convocation was already of public knowledge and had been published after it had become final. He also said it was part of his academic freedom to apeniy discuss and criticize a decision of the Court since it was already decided “vith finality, was patentiy erroneous, and clearly a violation of the Constitution. With respect to discussions in class about Cacai's mother, he said that the marriage scam where her mother was charged scandalized the Judiciary and ‘secare public knowledge when the Office of the Court Administrator held, a press conference on the matter and, that as a citizen, he could comment thereon n ths exercise of his vights <0 freedom of speech and expression. He also asserted that his discussions in both fora could not be the subject of an ‘administrative complaint because they were not done in the performance of his judicial duties, Rule on each of the charges raised by Cacai, and the corresponding -s raised by Judge Conde, (2.5% each) viefen: (a) The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges, like any other citizens. are entitled to freedom of expressions, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such right, they shall always conduct theiseives in such 4 manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impat lity of the judiciary. Judge Conde, however. should not have criticized in public the Supreme Court decision as a serious violation of the Constitution. He should have avoided any discussion in order to preserve the tra ional non-involvement, of the judici: public discission of controversial issues (Inv re: Query of the HTC Lawyers of Zambounga del Noite, A.M. No. 86-11-3690). 16tb) Judge Conde is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge in using intemperate language and unn essary comments tending to project Cacai’s mother as a corrupt and ignorant judge and her brother as a drug addict (in his class discussion). While, the Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes the right of judges co freedom of expression, this freedom should be exercised in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and espect for himself and judiciary as a whole, A magistrate should not descend (0 the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sareastic comments. Judge Conde can be held administratively able even though his improper comments were made in his class discussions because ethical conduct is expected of him judge aot only in the performance of his judicial duties. bur in inis professional and private activities as well. A judge, in order co promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of che judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, A judge's nfiicta! life cannot he detached or separated from his personal sristence. Judge Conde also violated the subjudice rule which restricts comments and disclosures pertaining ¢o judicial proceedings in order fo avoid obstructing the administration of justice. At the time Judge Conde discussed the marriage scam, still pending (Tormis v Paredes, M. No: RTJ-13. 2366, Februnty 4, 2015), “ONY Charo Conti engaged the services of Atty: Cesar Compostela for the egisuration of a property located in Cebu, and which property she had inherited ‘ogether with her siblings. It was agreed in writing that Charo would pay Atty. Compostela PhP 20,006 as acceptance fee and PhP 2,Q00 as appearance fee. During the last hearing: of the case, Atty. Compostela demanded an additional amount of PhP 20,000 for the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen Charo’s position, plus 20% of the total area of the property as additional fees for his services. Charo did not agree to Atty. Compostela's demands since they were contrary to their agreement. Besides, the property was co-owned with her siblings and she could not agree to Atty. Compostela's demands without the consent of her co-heirs. 17fas approved and the Four (4) years later, the petition for registration was appr Land Registration Authority notified Charo that the decree of registration and the original of the owner's duplicate copy of the title had already been transmitted to the Register of Deeds (RD). When Charo went to the RD, she was surprised to discover that the owner's duplicate copy of the title had already been claimed by, and released to, Atty. Compostela. Despite demand, Atv. Compostela refused to 4eliver the titie to Charo until she paid the additional attorneys” fees that he was :manding. Charo then instituted a complaint for' disbarment against him. In his defense, Atty. Composteia claimed that: (a) he had a right to retain the owner's duplicate of the title as his retaining lien; and b) ne was entitled to the payment of additional professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum merit. Rule oa Atty. Compostela’s defenses. (2.5% each} SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) A lawyer" has a right to retaining lien only of there is an agreement as fo the amount his fees. In this ease, there is no agreement as fo Atty. Copmpostela’s claim for additional fees. n fact, the client is opposed to the iawyer’s proposal for such adic al fees. (b) A lawyer is entitled to fees on the basis of quantum meruit only 1 the following cases: i. There is no agreement between the lawyer and the client as to the former's fees; 2. ‘There is am agreement but it is void; There is an agreement but}it has been set aside by the parties {hemselve | There is an agreement but the court has set it aside béeause it found the fees to be unconscionable; 5. There is an agreement but the services of the lawyer were terminated by the client for just cause. Nonevof these instances exist in this case. Atty. Compostela is not entitled to additional fees on the bas of quantum: meruit,XVI ‘ On March 1, 2017, sisters and business partners Carmina and Celeste xrominas borrowed PhP 500,000 from Carmen Carunungan. It was agreed that the amount will be paid in full one year after, or on March 1. 2018, with interest ue the tate of 10% per annum, without necessity of a demand. They also agreed to be bound jointly and severally. For this purpose, they executed a promisspry~ note, secured by a postdated check in the amount of PhP $50,000 drawn from ‘heir joint account, which check was dated March 1, 2018. When the debt became due, Carmen deposited the check but it was dishonored for insufficient funds. Carmen then’ sued Carmma and Celeste for staf through falsification of a commercial document. After finding probable vause, the prosecutor filed a criminal case in court, where the sisters were required to file their joint Judicial Affidavit. In their affidavit, they raised the defense that they couid not be guilty of estafa because: (i) the check was issired only as a form of security; (ii) even if issued as payment, it was for a pre-existing debt; and (iii} it was only upon Carmen's insistence that they issued the check. Before the case could be decided. the sisters offered to settle their debt rough a dacion en pago. They offeréd a Honda CRV which they jointly owned 1n ful’ settlement of the loan, Carmen agreed. Prepare the following documents in legally acceptable and enforceable ‘orms, based on the above facts (a) The Promissory Note (5%); GGESTE, WE! ta) Promissory Note For value received, We jointly and severally promise to pay Carmen Carunungan or order the sum of Five Hundred “ousted Pesos (P500,000.00), with interest thereon at 10% annum a, or before March 1, 2018, without necessity ‘of demand. i ‘Yo secure payment, we attach herewith Bank Cheek in the amount of P550,000.00, postdated March , 2078, and payable to Carmen Carynungan. " € Mani , March 1, 2017. (Sed) Carmina Corominas (Sed.) Celeste Corominas' 19(b) The Judicial Amfidavic (10%): and SUGGESTED ANSWER: Republic of the Philippines ) Metropolitan Manila) ss City of __ ) JOINT JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT OF CARMINA COROMINAS and CELESTE COROMINAS WE, CARMINA COROMINAS and CELESTE COROMINAS, of legal age and residents of, + after having been duly sworn, hereby depose and state: PRELIMINARY STATEMENT We ore bi ‘AY with address at ng examined by Aqty. The examination is being held at {in the presence of ABC, WE are answering Ine questions fully conscious that WE do so under oath and ma ‘nce criminal liability for false testimony. ‘Questions and Answers Please state your name and other personal circumstances. vi, WE are CARMINA COROMINAS and CELESTE COROMINAS both of legal age, single and residents of <2. Why are you executing this Judicial 4 flidavit? : \2. We are executing this Judicial Affidavit to support our defenses in the criminal case of estafa filed against us. 23. Why'were you charged with such cas We were charged with estafa because we issued a check in favor of Cérmen Carunungan which eventually bounced for insufficient funds,Q4. In answer to Q2, you mentioned that you are executing this Judicial Affidavic to support your defenses in the criminal ease of estafa filed against you. Why do you elieve you are not guilty? ‘We are not guilty because of the following reasons: ithe check was issued only as a form of security; ii, Even if issued as payment, it was for.a pre-existing debe, and iii Ie was only upon the Carmen Carunungan’s insistence that We issued the check. QS. is there anything else you want to add to the above? AS, No more sir. : ARFIANTS FURTHER SAYETH NAUGHT. Manila, November __, 2018. CARMINA COROMINAS CELESTE COROMINAS Affiant Affiant Witnesses: ABC ATTESTATION 1, Atty. “A” with) office address at do hereby attest as follows: 1. i personally conducted the exashination of Carmina Corominas and Celeste Corominas in question and answer form. . 2. I faithfully recorded the questions asked Carmi romiinas and Celeste Corominas and the corresponding answers they gave, and *3. Neither I nor any other person then present coached Carmina Corominas and Celeste Corominas regarding their IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I. hereunto affixed my signature this __ day of November 2018 at Atty. 8a Address IBP OR No. place and date of issuance PTR OR No. place and date of payment MCLE Exemption _ Z Date of Issue Valid until SURAT SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this day of November 2018 at __. affiants Carmina Celeste Corominas exhibiting co me their ‘ompetent evidence of identity, consisting of a Driver's License iring on ___. and 2 Driver's expiring on respectively, nt Atty. “A”, with Voter's ID issued by the WITNESS MY HAND AND SEA\ é Notary PublieCee (©) The Dacion en Pago (10%). KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: ‘This instrument, executed by CARMINA COROMINAS, of legal age and a resident of , and CELESTE ‘COROMINAS, of legal age and a resident of hereafter referred to as the DEBTORS, and CARMEN CARUNUNGAN, of legal age, and a resident of hereafter to be referred to as the CREDITOR, WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, the DEBTORS are indebted 1 the CREDITOR in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P550,000.00) WHEREAS, the DEBTORS aie the owners of a motor vehicle located in , and more specifically described as follows: Make Honda CRV Model 2018 Motor No. 12345 Chassis No. 56789 CRNo. WHEREAS, the DEBTORS are willing (0 give the said motor vehicle to the CREDITOR as.full payment of their aforesaid indebtedness to the latter; and WHEREAS, the CREDITOR is willing to accept the said motor vehicle as full, payment of the indebtedness of the DEBTOR: NOW, THEREFORE, premises considered, the DEBTORS have tra ferred. and conveyed, as they hereby wansfer and convey, the aforesaid ‘motor vehicle to the CREDITOR as payment in full of their indebtedness to her, andthe CREDITOR hereby of the said indebtedness to her. ecepts the said vehicle as full payment IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed these presents, at the City of Manila, on _ 2018. CARMINA COROMINAS CELESTE COROMINAS Debtor Debtor CARMEN CARUNUNGAN . >» Creditor WITNES \CKNOWLEDGMENT In the City +f Manila, this day of ____, 2018, before me personally appeared: CARMINA COROMINAS, with Philippine Passport No. issued at on and expiring on_¢ CELESTE COROMINAS, with Philippine Passport No. issued at on __.and CARMEN CARUNUNGAN, with Senior Ne. Issued at personally known to me to be the same persons who executedwledged to me that the ind they ack the foregoing instru same is their free and voluntary act and deed. WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL. NOTARY PUBLIC Until December 31, 2018 Doc. No. Page No, Book No. Series of 2018. "NOTE: No Dacion en Pogo in bar syllabus. This item should be given as bonus. . € -NOTHING FOLLOWS-