Enforcement of Maritime Claims in Jamaica PDF
Enforcement of Maritime Claims in Jamaica PDF
Enforcement of Maritime Claims in Jamaica PDF
1989
Recommended Citation
Hyman, Hugh Clifton, "Enforcement of maritime claims in Jamaica" (1989). World Maritime University Dissertations. 436.
http://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/436
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ENFORCEMENT OF MARITIME CLAIMS IN
JAMAICA:
BY
PSA-89
Jamaica
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE:
PREAMBLE:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
ABSTRACT:
ABBREVIATIONS:
CHAPTER 1: Introduction
B :TheAim
law pratice
G : The preliminary legalissues and
I: Some premises
K: Type of study
A: General Background
1. Legal Sources
(a) General
(i) Legislation
2. Literary Sources
1. General
3. Maritime Arbitration
1. General
(b) Treaties
by Jamaica
G: Concluding Comments
54
CHAPTER 3:
A: Introduction
C: Present Scope
E: Concluding Commen
84
CHAPTER 4:
Arrest of Ships
A: Introduction
ship arrests
6. Historical Jurisprudential theiries and
Jamaica
B: The law governing Arrest of Ships in
right of arrest
C: Types of claims which may give rise to
1. Maritime Liens
2. “Other Charges”
al Dim ension
3. Maritime Liens and the Internation
D: Required Procedures
1. Effecting Arrest
s Jamaica
1. The Arrest Convention implication for
-
al stipulations
2. Forced Sale of ship and internation
G: Concluding Comments
153
CHAPTER 5:
1. Introduction
(a) General
(i) General
(i) General
try’s law is to be
(d) If the court exercise’s Jurisdiction which coun
-
applied?
on and
B: International Convention Provisions and Jurisdicti
claimant
choice of Law issues implications for the maritime
-
C: Concluding Comments
CHAPTER 6
241
A: General Background
(1) Introduction
(and
(i) General
period
(iv) Other Maritime claims applying six year limitation
-
Law
(ii) International Convention procisions and Jamaican
C: Concluding Comments
318
CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSION
BII3LIOGRAPHY:
TABLE OF CASES:
TABLE OF STATUTES:
APPENDICES (1-20):
Preamble
main factors:
This desire was itself fuelled by two
dge, of any
1. The absence to the writer’s knowle
private practice of
2. the writer’s own experiences in the
ere.
research needs in the maritime law sph
ving
actu al spa n of the thes is is to som e extent a reflection of the writer’s stri
The
tioned desire.
towards fulfillment of the above men
could
int of theoretical analysis, the writer
Thus, admittedly from the standpo
r perspective
other relevant considerations, it would be more useful to take a broade
ution to the
This work is therefore a modest attempt to make an initial contrib
Admiralty
In so doing an attempt has been made to, inter alia, put Jamaica’s
cal, institutional,
Jurisdiction and its Maritime Law generally in a proper histori
n, the pith
This, at least, it is hoped might be of some future value. If, in additio
g to any given
the masculine gender “he” rather than “he or she”, in say, referrin
maritime claimant.
ts himself
In this time of environment conservation sensitivity, the writer conten
of the several
with the knowledge that by avoiding the two extra words on each
occasions that they could have been used, some paper have been saved.
in, some
While the precise quantitative impact on the tree population is uncerta
clear support for the approach adopted may be gleaned from the law itself.
y unashamedly provides that:
Section 4 of the Interpretation Act, 1968, apparentl
instead.
Of course, “she “ could (or perhaps should) have been similarly used
been dispelled.
Acknowledgements
Like many maritime endeavours this research effort has benefitted from the assistance
Thanks are due firstly to Professor Patrick Alderton, my course Professor, for his
helpful comments, general guidance and forbearance in the completion of this work.
The dissertation has profited from discussions the writer had with a number of
Among these were discussions with Professor Wiliam Tetley, at Mcgill University,
Montreal, Canada; visiting Lecturers, Professors Frank Wiswall and Edgar Gold and
Professor Jerry Mylnarzyck at the W.M.U.; Professor Sjur Braekhus at the Scandinavian
Maritime Law Institute, University of Oslo, Norway and Dr. Thomas Mensah (IMO
Visiting Professor) at the (1989) Law of the Sea Institute Conference, Noordwijk,
Holland.
the M.W.U.
I wish to specially thank Richard Poisson and Cecelia Lundhall of
my research at
Library for their assistance in procuring materials and generally facilitating
Norway, and
Also while at GARD P&I Club (Assuranceföreningen GARD), Arendal,
, Davidson
the Law Firms of Wikborg, Rein & Co. in Oslo, Norway and Brissett, Bishop
various in-house
in Montreal, Canada, I was availed and gained much from the use of the
libraries.
g easier my
I wish to thank the Librarians at the following institutions for makin
, the Norman
research work conducted there: The Jamaican Supreme Court Library
Library, Mona,
Manley Law School Library and the University of the West Indies Main
n: the Public
Jamaica; the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Univeristy of Londo
, The Library
Records Office, London, England; Mcgill University Law Faculty Library
Law Faculty
of the Palais de Justice, Montreal, Canada and the University of Lund
te Library,
Library, Lund, Sweden; and THe Scandinavian Maritime Law Institu
or making
Various persons kindly provided assistance by way of furnishing material
arrangements to facilitate my research. Here, I would like to thank Mr. Geoffery Brice
Q.C. and Mr. Donald Davies, Esq. of the English Bar, Messrs, David Colford,
Robert Cypihot and Trevor Bishop of Brissett, Bishop Davidson, Montreal; Mr.Sven
Henrik Svensen of GARD and Mr. Haakon Stang Lund of Wikborg Rein & Co.,
Norway.
Also very special assistance was obtained from friends in Jamaica (Garcia, Jennifer,
attendance at the W.M.U. possible; Ruby Mcreath, the U.N.D.P. and others in Jamaica
To my W.M.U. lecturers, from whom I learnt much, fellow students and others in
Sweden who helped to provide a conducive atmosphere for the study, I wish to
To my friend Stanley Cummings for arrangements for the typing, to Monique Fransen
for kindly initiating the process and to Madubuko Diakité, and Scarlett Warfvinge-Massel
Special thanks are due to Mr. Terje Groth, Mr. Gudmund Rognstad and SHIPDECO
and Mr. Odd Nielsen of Norway, Mr. Joe Carton, Mr. Robert Scott and Alcan Shipping
Yet thanks are due to others still. However, some space must be left for the thesis
itself.
specially of all,
nowledgements by thanking most
Hence, I wish to conclude my ack
iration.
an for their unfailing support and insp
my parents Metella and Douglas Hym
mentioned or
thes is might not at all refl ect the imprint of any of the persons
That the
responsibility
ise do thei r assi stan ce suff icie nt justice is but ample reminder that the
otherw
on my shoulders.
for the final product fell and remains
To my parents:
premises,
scope, raison d’ etre, conceptual framework,
methodology.
in
Chapter 2 outlines the broad legal setting with
ica
which maritime law exists and functions in Jama
rce
and in which the maritime claimant seeks to enfo
his claim.
eated.
scope of Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction is delin
time
Thus, it is shown what sort of claims the mari
Admiralty Court.
Also, the international dimension to the present
Jamaica.
are discussed.
claims in Jamaica.
Development
Trade Law
Introduction
1• 1
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
B: The Aim
I: Some premises
K: Type of study
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
on observes
A right without a remedy is practically not much of a right. Graves
have succeeded
It is hardly any consolation to a maritime claimant that he would
claim.
rt if there is
Likewise, a favourable court judgement in hand is of little comfo
provisionally secured
nothing on which it can bite. In short, where ones claim is not
a foreign shipowner
before a court trial on the merits, “victory obtained against, say,
ise accessible)
where none of his assets are within the courts jurisdiction (or are otherw
practical
This points to the fact that there are preliminary legal issues of much
e claim.
importance that need to be focused on as regards enforcement of any maritim
1 Graveson, R.H.O Conflict of Laws - Private International Law, 7th Edn., Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 1974, p. 590.
3
B: The Aim
cognizance of relevant
In so doing, an attempt is being made to take particular
to such issues.
provisions of international maritime conventions as these relate
an international legal
Thus, an underlying theme of the study is that there is often
garb.
before it:
whether it will
If the Court does have jurisdiction as regards the claim before it,
4
11 LLIC 4.Uui L , -
arrest?
maritime claim, in particular, by way of ship
Laws).
of 3
field of Private International Law (Conflict
l
incidentally with certain civil procedura
The study does not concern itself except
preliminary matters.
5
interrogatories, proof of foreign law, other evidentiary questions and the like.
on
The word “claim’ is used simply in the sense of a demand for one’s due or asserti
to a claim
The term Maritime claim” is used with more forensic significance. It refers
“
claims
The expression “Maritime related claim” is used generically to encompass all
constitute
that have some connection to the sea. From this it is clear that “Maritime claims”
of
The phrase: “Enforcement of maritime claims” is in this thesis used in the sense
the
This entails instituting legal proceedings towards obtaining legal redress,. Unless
alty
context indicates otherwise,”legal proceedings” refer to proceedings in the Admir
5
Jackso n in the major work: “Enforcement of Maritime claims”, notes that:
ensure that there will be assets available to turn a judgement into a material gain
(ii) The rules governing the bringing of an action to enforce a maritime claim (the
jurisdictional aspect):
4 See: Chapter 3.
5 Jackson, D.C.: Enforcement of Maritime Claims, Lloyds of London, 1985.
6
(in) me extent to wnicn a maritime ciaimant oeconies t I.1ULLfl un
security aspect)
6
This study is more concerned with the first two aspects. The third is dealt with
sparingly and only to the extent that it relates to the first two aspects.
It is the writer’s view that despite the importance of “the security aspect”, the subject
of liens around which this third aspect is centered, while meriting some attention in the
own right..
This, it is respectfully submitted to be even more the case, in the light of the
The writer takes some comfort as regards the approach adopted upon noting the title
The title is: “Maritime Liens and Claims”. Such a title and the distinction it emphasises
Moreover, under Jamaican Law (following the English Common Law position), only
a small minority of maritime claims have attached to them maritime lien status.
6 Thid,. p. lvii.
7 TeLley, William: Maritime Liens and Claims, Business Law Communications Ltd, London, 1985.
7
E: The raison cI’etre
considerations.
There is a definite need for Jamaica to modernize its maritime laws in general.
Typically, when thought is being given in Jamaica to the updating of such laws,
attention is focused only on substantive law matters. Thus, at present, efforts are directed
No attention is specifically paid to the preliminary legal issues such as those under
Indeed, there has been virtually no change in the relevant Rules of Court provisions
relating to Admiralty procedure and practice in Jamaica since their promulgation almost a
century ago.
8
Yet the substantive law rules dealing with various rights and liabilities or duties and
obligations can only be efficacious to the extent that they are facilitated and come to life
For example, it is obvious that any large oil spill within or near Jamaican territorial
waters is potentially catastrophic for the fragile local economy, whose foreign exchange
8 Vide: Chapter 4.
8
oil spill scenario.
which would probably be a major victim in any such
Law Clauses.
jurisdictions.
worth examining.
of a
which purport to terminate, absolutely, a party’s right to take action for breach
tion
charterparty after elapse of a contractually stipulated time period, without arbitra
in the
Further, Jamaica aims to strengthen its position as a major maritime centre
terminals
Jamaica has in the Port of Kingston, one of the finest container/transhipment
es.
in the Western Hemisphere alongside modern breakbulk roll on /roll off faciliti
built on
The Port of Kingston stands unrivaled among Caribbean ports and is
and almost
Kingston Harbour which is the seventh largest natural harbour in the world
landlocked.
n
Geographically, it lies in a very strategic position. It is positioned mid-way betwee
Panama Canal.
a major
This makes it a most convenient port for trading vessels and it remains today
transhipment port.
In addition, Jamaica is one of the major cruise shipping destinations of the world.
In the sphere of legal services it has a Bar and Bench of a very high standard.
10 Vide: Chapter 6.
10
-.-.—,
iaIflalLaIl J1.LLUIIIcy-aL Jaw
large measure to their efforts, Jamaica has been selected as the site of the International
Seabed Authority under the new Montigo Bay Law of the Sea Convention.
Various Private Sector and Governmental organizations operating within the shipping
sector also enhance the maritime development prospects of Jamaica. Other factors also
However Jamaica can only fully realize its maritime development capabilities and
optimize benefits from any such development if there is in place up to date legal services
For instance: a common concern of maritime claimants and their lawyers in any given
12 has commented:
Thus Hill
will likely pose is “where, how and when can I most advantageously arrest a ship in
claim?”
pursuit of my particular 3
Of much importance here are not only the national substantive law stipulations as these
pertain to the claim in issue, but also the requirements, efficiency and efficacy of the
In this respect, Jamaica needs to be able to compete in the regional and international
11 Vide:Chapter2.
12 Hill, Christopher et al: Arrest of Ships, Lloyds of London Press Ltd., 1985.
13 Ibid., p.v.
11
market place to attract utilization of its legal services, by way of upholding nign
standards. The fact is “Forum Shopping” is very much a part of international shipping
reality today. As Hill observes: “Forum Shopping” is an activity (cynics would call it a
sport) which has been commonly practiced by maritime claimants the world over”.
14
Convention provisions are more and more providing a setting for the operation of or are
principles:
This suggests that when Jamaica becomes a party to an international convention, such
14 Ibid., p. vi.
15 Tetley, William: The State of Maritime Law; Canada, U.S., U.K. and France, Meridith Memorial
Lectures, 1986, Faculty of Law, Mcgill University, pp 309-404.
16 Ibid., p. 390.
17 Vide: Infra.
12
iviore speciiiaiiy, LILc L1puiaLiJii —--.3
Where a Convention is silent on a point or allows some latitude for particular national
then it is
construction as in the case of the Hague Rules in respect of Jurisdiction Clauses,
regard
being contended that in addition to bearing in mind these three principles, due
Also, even where Jamaica is not a party to a maritime Convention, it can help in the
or seeking
realization of the objectives implicit in these three “principles” when applying
This, it can do for instance by taking due cognizance of relevant international maritime
international legal dimension as regards the preliminary issue, no derogation from the
All that is being contended is that the international legal dimension should also be
borne in mind. The case for such an approach is further strengthened in Jamaica’s
particular situation by the dearth of local court decisions and legal weitings as well as the
13
-
mind:
field”
there is comparatively little legislation or case law in this 19
s, this field of
Related to this fact and compounding matters, is the fact that it appear
Cardozo, J, when he
Here it may be borne in mind the words of the American Judge
stated:
ct of Laws, feels
“The average judge, when confronted by a problem in the Confli
2
straw
° .”
almost completely lost, and like a drowning man, will grasp at a
ct of Laws cases
In Jamaica, following the general trend in most countries, Confli
are
c area of focus of
Overall, there is a pancity of Jamaican cases infringing on the specifi
this thesis.
seemingly safest
This makes it most likely that judicial clutching to the nearest and
Authorities.
In practice this often means a virtual mechanical resort to English
, do not always
These authorities, although generally of sound and high quality
14
always free from deficiencies.
those of Jamaica.
d national economic
2
Bra 1
ekh us has for instance described how in effect veste
2
interest
British Shipowner and American Cargo 2 s.
“judicial interpretation”
focus in this thesis, perhaps at times by the device of
.
in mind in striving to develop one s own jurisprudence
ions.
broader informed basis for making the relevant decis
us countries.
necessary, references are made to the law of vario
e relevant.
and the C.M.I. as well as those of the U.N., wher
of thought.
experts representing different interests and schools
ingfully tap.
with an embryonic maritime jurisprudence can mean
law in Jamaica.
16
In many instances, local practitioners have been limited to just addressing preliminary
Even where the matter can be heard in Jamaica, the parties especially where they are
all foreigners, may choose to have the matter dealt with in London (or some other
international maritime and financial centre). In this case their legal representatives in
London (or elsewhere) may only seek advice of local legal counsel on preliminary issues
involving Jamaic
24 a.
Otherwise, it may simply be a case where after, say, a vessel is arrested and security
put in place for its release, negotiations between the parties result in adequate
Also from the standpoint of practice, these preliminary issues are not only of interest
in the context of legal proceedings. There is always the old adage that prevention is better
Thus, local counsel may try to avoid future bottlenecks by careful contract formulation
and drafting, advice to clients and in negotiations with foreign parties as pertain to such
issues. However, in light of the thesis topic, this aspect is not developed, but is to be
23 Vide: Hyman, Hugh and Barnett, Courteny: The Admiralty Courts and prospects for Caribbean
Maritime Developáment, Caribbean Shipping Journal, November 1985, p. 30.
see: Appendix 20
17
H: The practical Objectives
1: To analyse, discuss and make suggestions towards having particular areas of the
2: To make a contribution towards clarifying what the law is by stating what the law
appears to be at present.
I: Some Premises
1: Jamaica is a “cargo interests” rather than a “maritime carrier” country and its
interests are best served at the present time by taking (so-called) pro
cargo-interests positions.
2: Jamaica has a strong vested interest in promoting the economic welfare of its
seafarers.
18
3: Jamaica’s beaches (and other physical marine resources) constitute a vital
economic resource, damage to which, by say, a large oil spill or other pollution to
its laws both substantive and procedural as well as its adjudicatory machinery.
5: Jamaica needs to set the stage where it can become a significant provider of legal
The subject matter of this study may be viewed with different lenses.
One standpoint may be that of a private legal practitioner in Jamaica having to contend
Another might be that of an adjudicator dealing with the issues ex post facto after they
Thirdly, the perspective may be that of the policy maker involved in basic questions as
The study although inclined towards that of the first perspective, also attempts to take
19
The study is essentially a legal one. It basically entails an analysis of specified aspects
“No reasoning can purport to be a ‘legal’ one unless it is borne out by one or more
among the rules contained in one or more of these <recognized manifestations >of
law” 26
For Bos, such “recognized manifestations of law” are “...the phenomena which in a
given legal order one is allowed to invoke in order to legitimize a reasoning alledged to be
a legal one”.
27
Despite the basic nature of the study, it is recognized that the law does not operate in a
such as already indicated ultimately provide a practical context for the legal discussions.
Analysis of the law essentially takes place against the background of:
The research was carried out mainly by way of consulting and analysing various legal
publications and other written materials. The writer also had discussions with a number of
maritime law experts and other persons in the shipping and legal fields as regards
judgments; academic law treatisies; law practioner’s texts; article; seminar papers;
comniitte reports; Governmental and private sector documents and other writings.
Also consulted were historical, shipping and other materials relating to the area of
study.
Court files of Admiralty cases were perused at the Jamaican Supreme Court. Also
perused in Jamaica for the purposes of the thesis were files that the writer had worked on.
While at two different International Law Firms (in Canada and Norway, respectively)
which specialise in Maritime Law, and at a leading International P & I Club (in Norway),
further exposure was had to how some of the issues discussed developed and were
resolved in practice.
21
Here again, the writer was, inter alia, involved in the perusal of various files for the
organizations as well as the preparation of opinions on some of the matters in the said
At the Jamaican Supreme Court, records were consulted as regards the frequency of
Much of the legal-historical data in the thesis particularly that contained in Chapter 3
were obtained by the writer consulting old English and Canadian Maritime law
publications, various published historical accounts of Jamaica (and other former British
materials.
Searches were also carried out in respect of Chapter 3 at the Public Records Office,
London.
Overall, written materials for the thesis were collected in Jamaica, Canada, England,
The research was conducted also by way of mainly informal interviews with a number
Other persons consulted by way of informal interviews were in general from the
22
— ,— . flflb,tflfl.flL iLLS
was to gain both theoretical and practical insight on matters pertaining to the thesis
subject.
At times there were difficulties getting particular detailed information which were sent
for from Jamaica, but on the whole, the necessary information was obtained.
23
Chapter 2
24
Chapter 2
A. General Background
1 Legal Sources
a. General
i Legislation
ii Case Law
2 Literary Sources
25
C. Jamaica’s Court System
1 General
3 Maritime Arbitration
1 General
b. Treaties
G. Concluding Comments
26
Chapter 2
Maritime Law
Jamaican Law, Legal System and
A. General Background
3
Nat ions. The
is an indepe nde nt 2
uni tary state within the Commonwealth of
1
Jam aica
August 6, 1962. It is a
d was an English colo ny from 1655 until it gained independence on
islan
monarchy.
al 4
arms of government. The form
of government is that of a constitution
ngly influenced
their genesis in and today remain stro
The island’s law and legal system had
5
Jam aica.
re has been som e controversy abo ut the reception of English Law into
The
1 See Appendices 1 & 2 for basic data on Jamaica. U.S.A. and Canada.
2 As distinguished from Federal States such as the rning nations whose territories originally formed part of the
3 Association of the United Kingdom and self-gove
British Empire. a Republic: vide: eg.
but plans are afoot to make Jamaica into
4 The British Queen is legally Head of State nce referrable to as one
ica is still today, in English legal parla
Daily Gleaner, August 20, 1989, p. 8A. Jama
’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol 6.4
of “her majesty’s dominions”: vide: Haisbury rison, C. Dennis:
in the West Indies, 1972 J.LJ. 7 and Mor
5 See generally: Patchett, K.W.: Reception of Law , 43; Gran t, V.B. : Jama ican Land Law,
1 L.J., October 1979
The Reception of English Law in Jamaica: W
chapter 2.
6 As distinguished from statute law. Law Reform in the
H Aubrey: Legal Developments and
7 See eg. Patchett, 1972 J.L.J. 7, at p. 22; Fraser, Jama ica: Inter natio nal Encyclopedia for
Dorothy Claire:
West Indies 1972 J.L.J. 67, at p. 70; Gordon,
The Netherlands, 1984.
Labour Law. Kiuwer Law and Taxation Publishers;
27
ation in the island of
In 1728 statutory conf
8 irmation was given of the continued oper
then
“...
at any time esteemed, introduced, used, accepted
English enactments which were up to
in the
whether such an Act was at any time “used”
Jamaican law it is necessary to ascertain
1
diff 1
iculties.
28
generally to all dependent territories or only to named colonies. Such extensions are
may
2 Adoption through incorporation by reference to colonial legislation. Again this
tion in
4 Reception under the common law rules relating to statutes of general applica
conquest.”
force in England before a specified date usually that of settlement or 14
ture with
It is to be noted that soon after the English settlement, Jamaica was granted a legisla
new
power to repeal and alter the statute and common law of England and generally to make
By the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, (U.K.), English statute Law was not to be
deemed applicable to any colony unless it had been extended thereto either expressly or by
necessary implication.
Accordingly, no English Statute relating to maritime (or any other matter) enacted since 1655
16
applies to Jamaica unless it has been incorporated in accordnace with the foregoing.
14 Ibid., p. 55.
15 See Vol 19, Laws of Jamaica.
16 See Grant, ibid, p. 5.
29
the United Kingdom lost its
Most importantly, from the date of Jamaica’s independence ,
law thereof.”
“shall extend or be deemed to extend to Jamaica as part of the
provides that:
to amend or
(subject to amendment or repeal by the authority having power
repeal any such law) continue in force on and after that day...”
government of Jamiaca”.
17 The Jamaican Constitution is the supreme law of the island, and provides (per section 2) that if
any other law
extent of the consist ency, be void.” Thus, Carneg ie notes
is inconsistent with it such “other law shall, to the
in reference to the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty that: “In the Commonwealth Caribeacy an
Constitutions, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is ousted by the superior doctrin e of the suprem
of the constitution: Carnegie, A. Ralph: The Law of the sea in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The
Domestic Law context, Lecture notes on Coastal and Estuarine studies 27, A new Law of the sea for the
Caribbean, Gold, Edgar (ed.), Springer-Verlag, N.Y. 1988, 83 at p. 87.
30
Where an English statute is in force in Jamiaca under 1 Geo2, cap 1, section 2218, its
Common Law rule has been recognissed in Jamaica its abolotion in England does not render it
inoperative in Jamaica.
°
2
1 Legal Sources 21
a. General
The primary legal sources are (1) Legislation and (2) Case Law or Judicial Precedent.
(i) Legislation
Old and often outdzted statutory provisions inherited from England constitute the majority of
existing maritime legislation in Jamaica. Mainly these are local pre-independece local enactments
31
which adapted and apadted as necessary U.K. statutory provisions.
This process of extension at times creates particular difficulties in ascertaining the law on a
given maritime matter, This is as regards both physically finding the relevant law in the first
Section 9(1) of The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.) provides that: “This Act shall
. .“
extend throughout His Majesty’s dominions and to any territories under his protection.
Similarly, section 91 of The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (U:K) in reference to Part 1 of
that Act, provides that : “This Part of this Act shall apply to the whole of Her Majesty’s
Where there is such express extension in the “parent” U.K. Act itself as just quoted, then
there is relatively little difficulty in ascertaining whether particular U.K. statutory provisions
However, it appears that since the enactment of The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911,
(U.K.), this practice was discontinued. Instead, the practice has been typically to reserve
power in the British Crown to apply the relevant provisions to British possessions.
32
Labour Conventions)
For instance, Section 6(1) of The Merchant Shipping (International
possession...”
Conventions) Act,
Similarly section 36(1) of the Merchant Shipping (Safety and Load Line
y may by Order in
1932, (U.K.) provides in reference to Part 1 of that Act, that “His Majest
Council direct that the provisions of this Part of this Act and ... the provisions of any other Act
in force amending or
relating to Merchant Shipping, including any enactments for the time being
the Order, to
such exceptions, adaptations or modifications (if any) as may be specified in
any colony.”
The
An initial problem is of course that of locating the relevant Order in Council (if any).
not
problem in practice is exacerbated by the fact that extended U.K. statutory provisions are
Contained in any official local publication as is the case with the readily accessible locally
enacted legislation which are contained in printed offical volumes of Laws of Jamaca.
33
Other problems may arise as regards whether particular U.K. maritime statutory provsions
To further compound matters it appears that various U.K. statutory provisions have been
,
borrowed and used as if such provisions were was in fact extended to Jamaica. This apparently
has been the case even in respect of certain U.K. legislation passed after Jamaica’s
22
independence.
After a period of reliance on such legislation, persons using them may unwittingly regard
them as part of the maritime statutory law to which Jamaica is subject. This ultimately abets
Moreover, most of the maritime statutory provisions have never been adjudicated upon or
Since independence, the main areas of legislative activity in maritime matters have been
those pertaining to (1) Port Maritime Administration and to a lesser extent (2) Economic
Regulation of Shipping. Overall, the maritime area has received scant attention from local
legislators.
this appears to be so as regards use by, for example Government Authorities concerned with ship registration
22
and related matters of Merchant Shipping Acts., enacting in the U.K. after Jamaica’s independence. This has
happened because of traditional reliance on U.K. shipping Forme and Rules in this area based on the continued
application of an 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (U.K.) to Jamaica. Thus where the Law and
Concomitantly subsidiry rules and forms have changed in the U.K. since independence it appears the new rules and
fprms and in the final analysis the new laws, have been resorted to.
34
However, there is at present a number of draft bills, including a comprehensive Modern
Merchant Shipping Bill 23, due to replace The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (UK) still
presently relied on. Unfortunately, such bills have tended in the past to remain so
indefinitely 24
The area of Jamaican Maritime Adjectival Law remains essentially untouched by post-
independence legislation. The same is true for Jamaican Private International Law. In effect, the
area under study has not had any particular legislative indigenous input.
Criminal, Labour, or Landlord and Tenant Law where a fledgling Jamaican or West Indian
flavoured Jurisprudence may be said to be emerging and where there is a relative abundance of
25 However, Newton has observed that “...although in some areas of the law a number of important West
Indian cases are summarised in the West Indian Reports, yet legal practicioners seem to prefer citing English
cases in the courts.’ : Newton, Velma. Historical Perspective of Law-Reporting in the English-Speaking
Caribbean, W.I.LJ., October 1978, 37 at p. 38; see also infra re literary sources.
35
(iii) Other Sources
26
2. Literary Sources
27
legal material followed by law reports and treaties.”
36
Here, Carneigie laments that “. . .not even Jamaica has an official and comprehensive
Although this is so, information regarding Jamaica’s treaty undertakings can (albeit,
at times
bodies
belatedly) be obtained from the relevant Government Authorities and international
there are
As regards Law Reports, reliance is mainly placed on English Reports. However,
Court and
Jamaican and West Indian Law Reports. Also unreported judgments of the Supreme
decided maritime
Court of Appeal are available. In keeping with the small number of locally
simple
maritime law. These deficiencies as regards our literary sources raise more than
These deficiencies also ultimately make a mockery of the maxim: Ignorantia jurus non
excusat. It is also clear that not only is the claimant fettered but so too are those concerned with
28 Carneige, A. Ralph: The Law of the Sea in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Domestic Law Context: A
new Law of the Sea for the Caribbean, Gold, Edgar (Ed.) Springer Verlag, New York, 1988; See also:
-
Buergenthal, Thomas; Maier, Harold G: Public International Law in a Nutshell, West PubI., 1985, p. 235
for a comprehensive list of international law literary sources and F.N. 50 and quotation referred to.
This also reflects a broader problem. As Fenty observes: “Publishing as an industry inthe Commonwealth
Caribbean is not a vibrant enterprise. This can be attributed to several factors including the lack of organised
publishing houses especially in the area of law. Other reasons are an apparent lack of interest in writing by
both the academic and practitioners in their areas of expertise, and the absence of a large market for sales in
the region.”; Fenty, Leslie P.; The Literature of the Law: Law Reports and Treatises, The Caribbean
Librarian, Vol, 2, No. 2, July 1985, 30 at p. 32.
37
C: Jamaica’s Court System
30
The hierarchy of the Jamaican Courts are in descending order: The Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court (so called, but which is not supreme), the Resident Magistrates Court and the
Petty Sessions Court. There are also speciaiised courts: the Revenue Court, the Family Court,
the Traffic Court and the Coroners Court, the Gun Court and the Juvenile Court.
The Jamaican Constitution 31 provides for appeals to be made from the Court of Appeal to
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England. This conduit, in part serves to
perpetuate the umbilical nexus between Jamaican and English Law and legal systems.
In reality therefore, at present the apex of the Jamaican Court System is in England.
However, it appears plans are afoot to set up a Caribben Court of Appeal and abolish local
38
THE JAMAICAN COURT SYSTEM
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE
OF PRIVY COUNCIL
II
I (U1) I
COURT OF APPEAL
RDI[NUE
COURT
GUN
COURT
LzI[I1T FAMIL’r’ CORONERS TRAFFIC JUVENILE
CJRT COURT COURT
WISTRAT
oors COURT
I PETTY
I SESSIONS
LRTS
U)
SD
D: Stare Decisis Doctrine applied in Jamaica
The fundamental doctrine of binding precedent or stare decisis states that courts are bound
to follow the ratio decidendi of previous decisions of courts higher in the hierarchy in cases
This doctrine is applied in Jamaica in keeping with the hierarchy of the Jamaican Court
system outlined above. Thus, decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
England on appeal cases emanating from Jamaica have the most force in local courts.
Decisions of Jamaica’s past (pre-independence) Court of Appeal are treated as not binding
In practice, English decisions are most resorted to and often treated as if they are binding.
Although these decisions ought not to be treated as more than highly persuasive. 36
On occasions when a point of law was not covered directly by the Privy Council, English or
West Indian authority, Jamaican courts have looked at decisions from other jurisdictions,
Harris, Phil: An introduction to Law, 3rd Edn., Wiedenfield and Nicolson, London, 1988, at pp. 182 183;
-
Stott, Vanessa: English Legal System, Anderson Keenan Publishing, London, 1981, Chapter 3.
Burgess, A.D. : Judicial Precedent in the West Indies, W.I:L:J:, May, 1978, p. 27 at p. 29.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 33.
Ibid, p. 35.
40
It is submitted that more attention needs to be paid to such decisions and underlying
38<
As Burgess notes “. . .those decisions may on occasions provide more guidance for the
(1) General
Most maritime disputes are settled in Jamaica without resort to legal proceedings. Overall,
40
the amount of maritime claims adjudicated are relatively few.
Generally, maritime claims are dealt with by the Admiralty Division of the Supreme Court.
However, occasionally particular maritime related claims are filed and heard in the “Common
miniscule amount 43 ever reach the stage of final judgment. Understandably, there is no special
mid., p. 35
40 F.N.42 & F.N.43
Vide:
41 Generally up to J.$1O,000: The Judicature (Resident Magistrates) (Amendment) Act, 1987.
Normally not exceeding 20 cases annually on average (This estimate is based on inspection of the Supreme
Court Records by the writer.).
No more than two cases on average.
41
court dealing exclusively with Admiralty matters as such a court would be in practice very much
underemployed.
for Maritime Legislation: 44 There are a number of reasons which favour the establishment of
specialized courts for the adjudication of maritime disputes such as the specialized character of
maritime law, its international nature, the frequent involvement of technical problems and the
need for quick disposal of maritime disputes. The negative aspect may be the greater cost of
mentioned.’ 5
46 should be
In Jamaica’s particular situation, it seems to the writer that a commercial court
set up, and included among its purview should be admiralty matters. Such a Court dealing with a
wide range of commercial matters would certainly have more than enough to deal with while
benefiting from specialisation. Importantly, it would facilitate greater efficacy and efficiency in
dealing with particular features and requirements of maritime related and commercial matters in
general. Specialist judicial expertise could be better harnessed and honed. Jamalca’s Revenue
Court dealing with taxation matters has already manifested the benefits of such specialisation.
However, such a Commercial court would be most effective if certain other changes are
See: Scrutton on Charter parties, 18th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, section 23, on the Commercial Court
(of England).
42
implemented.
At present, Appeal Court and Supreme Court Judges become such by progressing through
Typically, most of their initial experience and grooming is in the criminal law sphere.
Whereas this has potentially unsatisfactory consequences for the administration of justice in the
civil law area in general, such potential consequences appear to loom larger in Admiralty
matters. This is so because of the lack of opportunity in practice to delve in such matters.
Moreover, the judge(s) concerned might have had limited academic 7 exposure as well to this
area of the law which in many respects is quite different from other areas of the civil law.
It is submitted that this is so despite the acknowledged very high standards maintained by
the Jamaican Judiciary in general. Hence, it is clear that for development of the process of
maritime adjudication, far reaching changes may be needed not only in terms of restructuring the
Supreme Court and setting up a new specialised court, but also as regards the preparation and
3. Maritime Arbitration
This takes place rather infrequently, and usually involves the relatively smaller claims. There
are no specially designated Rules for Maritime Arbitration. Like other private Arbitration in
or instance, in the law faculty of the regional university, The University of the West Indies, Admiralty Law
15not part of the curriculum.
43
Jamaica, it is governed by the Arbitration Act, 1900.
Typically, the relevant Arbitration clause stipulates London or some other International
Commercial Arbitration centre as the venue for arbitration hearings. However, where the scale,
cost-benefit analysis or other special circumstances of the claim concerned would render it
inadvisable to deal with the matter outside Jamaica, then resort will normally be had to maritime
arbitration locally.
Overall in Jamaica, it appears there is not sufficient sensitivity to the benefits of arbitration.
This also contributes to the lack of use of this method of maritime adjudication.
1. General
provides a list of the conventions to which Jamaica is a party. In the umbrella maritime sphere
of the Law of the Sea, Jamaica it has had a particularly high profile contributing significantly to
Jamaica was chosen as the seat of the proposed International Seabed Authority. Thus article
156 (4) of the new (3rd) United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (U.N.C.L.O.S.)
44
In general, it seems that Jamaica’s level of successful activity in this broader area of the
a
public international maritime law-making process, has generally not been matched by
commensurate level of effort as regards (1) timely updating or enactment of domestic maritime
party to
rules as required or contemplated by undertaken treaty obligations, or (2) becoming
narrower focused related maritime conventions dealing with, for instance, civil liability and
procedural issues. The particular area of focus of this thesis it appears, is very much a victim of
this incongruity.
The applicable principle is enunciated in R,v, Director of Public Prosecutions and another ex
There, Melville, J. stated that: “Customary rules of international law are deemed to be part
of our municipal law, subject, of course to two important qualifications. Lord Atkoin stated it
“The courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations accept among
themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to ascertain what the relevant rule is, and
having found it, they will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not
45
Importantly, the Jamaican Court will have to be convinced that what is asserted to be
public international law that it shall have attained the position of general acceptance by
the highest importance that the courts of this country before they give the force of law
within this realm to any doctrine of international law should be satisfied that it has the
(b) Treaties
A treaty does not become a part of Jamaican law unless it is specifically incorporated as
Ibid., p. 35
50 Compania
Naviera Vascongado v. SS Christina (1938) A.C., 497
See:Barnett, Lloyd G. : The Constitutional Law of Jamaica, Oxford University Press, 1977, at p. 287; Ott,
David H.: Public International Law in the modeern world, Pitman, London, 1987, at pp 38 39; Brownlie,
-
Ian: Principles of Public International Law, 3rd. Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford, at pp. 49 50; Wallace,
-
Rebecca, M.M.: International Law, A Student Introduction, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, at p. 38.
46
Jamaica’s approach is in keeping with the statement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
v. Attorney
Council in England in the appeal case from Canada: Attorney-General for Canada
“Within the British Empire there is a well established rule that the making of a treaty is an
executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the
existing domestic law, requires legislative action. Unlike some countries, the stipulations
of a treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the
force of law.”
“As with much of International Law, the question of treaty succession is muddled. Yet it
seems generally agreed that some rights and duties do devolve upon the new country,
particularly those rights and duties locally connected to the area gaining independence.
Particularly in reference to emerging nations the weight of authority supports the view
that new nations inherit the treaty obligation of the former colonies.”
This American case thus applied the principle of continuity. However, shortly after, by
1974, in the discussions of the International Law Commission (I.L.C.) it became clear that in
fact the majority view favoured the “clean slate” approach leaving the successor with a free
Choice: Draft Articles, Y.BJ.L.C., 1974, Vol. 2, pp 222, 214, 23i5, Articles. 15, 16, 23.
47
Thus in their commentary on Article 15, the I.L.C. stated that:
“The majority of writers take the view supported by State practice, that a newly
independent State begins its life with a clean slate, except in regard to ‘local’ or ‘real
obligations. The clean slate is generally recognized to be the ‘traditional’ view on the
matter. It has been applied to earlier cases of newly independent States emerging either
However, in the case R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions and Another, ex parte Dafney
Schwartz, 52 the Full Court of the Jamaican Supreme Court, after considering the relevant
ILC statements, held that: “It is . . . a moot point as to whether the clean slate theory has
hardened into a ‘customary rule’ of international law. If it has not, then it ought not to be
The matter of Jamaica’s succession to pre-independence treaties was dealt with in the
Exchange of Letters between the newly independent state of Jamaica and the United Kingdom:
Overall, the position appears to be that Jamaica succeeded at independence to the pre
Kingdom, subject to its right to denounce or otherwise take such actions in respect of such
52
Op.cit.
53.
iutd., per Melville, J. at p. 35.
48
te.
treaties as it may deem appropria
law
entions have found their way into Jamaican
Also, provisions of international conv
the case of
these conventions. This happens where, as in
without Jamaica becoming a party to
the Arrest of
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
the International Convention For
at the
dom becomes a party to a Convention without
Seagoing Ships, 1952, the United King
5 provisions of
ant enabling legislation
Subsequently the U.K. would enact concomit
Convention.
49
G. Concluding Remarks
and Legal
It has been shown that there are some deficiencies in respect of Jamaican Law
e consequences
System, especially in the Maritime Law sphere, which have potentially advers
Some of these deficiencies are legacies of a recent colonial past. Others reflect a lack of
Still others yet result from a basic lack of attention or sensitivity to the requirements of the
The fact that, for instance, Admiralty cases constitute a rather miniscule part of the work of
the Jamaican legal profession (both bench and bar), means that in the profession itself there is
less sensitivity to and advocacy for needed changes as would normally be the case.
related problem of lack of expertise, itself related to the perceived need or demand for such
expertise.
Governmental and other authorities concerned with allocating scarce resources between
competing ends may myopically look askance at the maritime law field when choosing priority
areas of focus. However, it appears to the writer that from the standpoint of long term national
50
nal
development and the potential contribution of legal and related services to the natio
maritime
need for the
fit analysis should readily vindicate the
economy, even a cursory cost-bene
dged
in the system to be built on such as the acknowle
suggested changes. There are strengths
.
and hopefully implemented sooner than later
51
Chapter 3
52
Chapter 3
A: Introduction
C: Present Scope
F: Concluding Comments
53
Chapter 3
The Jamaican Ad
1 miralty Jurisdiction
A: Introduction
term
2. In the context of this chapter, the
“Jurisdiction” is a multifaceted legal term
rt has competence.
tially rela tes to the var iou s typ es of subject-matters over which a cou
essen
reme Court of
s and issues that may be ente rtai ned by the Admiralty Division of the Sup
of claim
Jamaica.
may be
whether his claim is among those which
For, the Maritime claimant, it is crucial
iralty Jurisdiction.
dealt with in the “Admiralty Court” — that is those within The Jamaican Adm
c claim
rt in Jamaica” to determine his specifi
basis of that “there was no jurisdiction on the cou
,
1, 3 W.I.R. 515, 516. Most importantly
as happened in the case: De Osca v The Lady D., 196
54
onlY a claimant whose claim
is within the Admiralty Jurisdiction can properly institute or have
3 and have it
ing ship
instituted on his behalf civil proceedings directly against an offend
4
arrested.
tion. Its
The Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction is derived from imperial U.K. legisla
5
development to date.
present scope can best be appreciated by an examination of its origins and
3
Thatis, “in rem” proceedings, see, infra, chapter 4.
4 See, infra, chapter 4.
5 See: Co1ojal Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (U.K.), and infra.
55
Development
B: Origins and 6
The jurisdiction of the Vice-Admiralty courts was much influenced and at times constrained
appeals from
by that exercised by the High Court of Admiralty, which for a long time heard
these courts.’°
p
its
6 To date, there appears to be no published or available account of the historical development in Jamaica of
Admiralty Jurisdiction. In certain studies dealing with the History of the Courts inJamaica (eg. Chambers,
From
Hugh V.T.: Essays on the Jamaican Legal System and.. .A concise History of the Courts in Jamaica
Admiralty Court, yet alone its
1660 to the present time, 1974), no reference is made whatsoever to an
time
jurisdiction. This is paradoxical as in the early days of British Colonialism in Jamaica and for a long
after it appears that the Jamaican Vice-Admiralty Court (see F.N.7) was Jamaica’s most active court or at
accounts and the accompanyin g
least one of its most active and important courts. The dearth of published
paradox is reflected in Craton’s observation that American scholars have in their writing ignored
CaribbeanVice-Admiralty Courts, yet they were “more numerous and far busier than those of the mainland
territories” and “when in fact in the Caribbean Courts Prize Cases seem to have outnumbered all others by
ten to one, and the volume of business in Jamaica alone probably outran that of all the mainland Courts
added together.” .Between 1763 arid 1815, the Jamaican Vice-Admiralty Court handled 3, 700 cases of
“. .
which some 3, 400 were Prize Cases... Craton, Michael: The role of Caribbean Vice Admiralty Courts in
“:
“Courts having Admiralty jurisdiction in British possessions overseas. They acted under commissions from
the Crown Authorising governors of colonies to exercise such powers as in England appertained to the Lord
High Admiral”: Osborns Concise Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., pp 339 340. -
8 See: Crump, Helen J.: Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the seventh century, Longman, London, 1973 at
1657 and 1660,
p. 101 where she observes that in Jamaica: “There was an admiralty Court working between
but it was not established by the sdmirahy commissioners. ..The court rested simply on the authority of the
governor...”; Also see: Doty, Joseph D: The British Admiralty Board as a factor in Colonial Administrati on
20 where he notes that: “The earliest Vice-Admira
1689-1763, Philidelphia, 1930, p. lty Court in the
dcolonies appears to have been in existance in Jamaica by 1658”
9 See: Roscoe, Edmund: Roscoe’s Admiralty Practice, 5th Edn., 1931, p. 5.
10 Ibid., p. 15., See also Wiswall, jr. Fran: The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice since
1800, 1970, p. 98; Note: In 1833 by the Act of 3 & 4 Will 4, C. 41, 5.2 The Judicial Commtte Act
-
(U.K.), appeals from Vice-Admiralty Courts to the High Court of Admiralty was discontinued and
subsequently made to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England. Also see generally:
Hollander, Barnett: Colonial Justice, london, 1961.
56
j
ls from Colonial Vice
Wiswall notes that the High Court of Admiralty heard “appea
Admiralty
High Court of 1 2 .”
3
countr ies.’ Thus, as has been noted:
is the result of an
“Maritime law is not the product of a single legal system, instead, it
inimem4
1 orial”
Jurisdiction reached
Accordingly, it may likewise be emphasised that although Admiralty
an International
Admiralty Jurisdiction has its more immediate genesis in the provisions of
Maritime Con
1 5
vent ion.
history of the
For the present purposes, it is however only necessary to consider briefly the
alty
English Admiralty Jurisdiction to comprehend the development of Jamaica’s own Admir
57
The earliest distinct reference to a Court of Admiralty in England appears to be in 1357.16
The earliest statute relating to the English High Court of Admiralty Jurisdiction entitled “An Act
0
n cemng what things the Admiral and his deputy shall meddle” was enacted in 1389.17
From the early part of the fifteenth century there was one Lord Admiral and one High Court
of Admiralty in lieu of the several courts which previously existed. Since then the English Court
of Admiralty had been under two main divisions of Ordinary and Prize Jurisdiction.
18
In the Civil Jurisdiction, the law administered was English Maritime Law, which is basically
the law administered today except that it has lost much of its former international character and
As regards the criminal jurisdiction, until 1536, the Court of Admiralty had an exclusive
22 this
21 By a number of enactments
jurisdiction over crimes committed on the High Seas.
jurisdiction was transferred from the ambit of the Ordinary Jurisdiction or otherwise whittled
away.
l6See Marsden, R. G., op. cit., vol. 1, XXXV, XXXVI; Holdsworth, W.S. op. cit., p. 545. Fitzgerald,
Richard: Admiralty and Prize Jurisdiction in the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1948,60 Juridical
Review, 106.
17 See Roscoe, op. cit. p. 5.
18 See Fitzgerald, op.cit.,
p. 106.
19 Roscoe, op. cit. notes at 3, that ‘the word “Instance” seems to be used to describe a civil court one of
p.
Suits and processes as distinguished from a Prize Court which is not in fact one in which ordinary litigation
takes place.”
20 See, infra and Wiswall, op. cit., 8 and Fitzgeral, op.cit., p. 107.
p.
21 Fitzgeral op. cit., 108.
p.
22 Eg. 28 Henry VIII, C. 15; 39 Geo III, C. 37; 4 & 5 William IV, C. 36.
58
23 These
the shore.
Admiralty Droits were rights to property found at sea or stranded upon
Administraflve Contro
24 l.
governmental
“Prize’ is property of a belligerent captured at sea by a vessel acting under
nt until
Accordingly, in more recent times, the Prize jurisdiction normally lies dorma
tion was in
ressurected and invoked by the dictates of war. It appears the last such invoca
the mid seventeenth century when it operated with a contracted jurisdiction to around the mid
26. Then it was resuscitated and its civil jurisdiction enlarged by a number of
nineteenth century
27
enactm ents.
For the dormant period prior to the revival, that is going as far back as around the mid
matters
seventeenth centwy, the court’s civil jurisdiction was limited to the following 28
:
59
1. collision on the high seas;
contract existed;
5. claims for seamen’s wages where no special
e Court of Judicature
1, 1875. Then, by the operation of two Acts of Parliament: The Suprem
uted as one
along with other superior Courts in England were consolidated together and constit
ns having
Supreme Court of Judicature in England. This Court was divided into two divisio
exercised
The original jurisdiction included all the jurisdiction vested in or capable of being
either by the the High Court of Admiralty as well as that of the other courts with which it was
consolidated
60
as
High Court of Justice with original jurisdiction
Thus was constituted in England, the
a matter of
of Appeal. The High Court of Justice was as
aforementioned and The Court
divided into five divis ions one of which was called the
adminiStrat1 convenience further
sion.
probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divi
as a matter of
time law in Engl and. The Engl ish “Admiralty Court” exists today solely
mari
ed
t of the maritime cases and applying the specializ
administrative convenience handling mos
ns.
procedural rules relating to Admiralty actio
(U.K.).
Party.
61
H
ny to
Eng lish pra ctic e upo n the app ointment of a Governor to a new colo
It was the then
C causes.
rt of Nova
been stat ed by Dr. Cro ke, lear ned judge of the Vice-Admiralty Cou
Thus it has
Canada in: The Hir am, 181 3, Ste wart’s Nova Scotia Rep. 92, that:
cotia,
est the
govern ments, it was thought proper to inv
“Upon the establishment of colonial
er
maritime powers..
.“
[that is as were conferred upon form
governors with the same civil and
Lord High Admiral, or the
Vice-Admirals of England] “. . . and therefore it became usual for the
.”
mission of Vice-Admiralty to them
Lord Commissioners, to grant a com
tment of the first
precursor to Jam aica ’s Adm iralty Jurisdiction was thus the appoin
The vital
sion which, inter
to the then new colo ny of Jam aica in February 1661 by a Commis
Governor
be
ttle suc h Jud icatorie s for Civ il affares and for the Admiraltes as may
alia, directed him to “se
righ t and controversy
nd and.. .determine all matters of
proper to keep the peace of the Isla
9
Equit
according to Justice and 2 y.”
ernor and Co
3 1
unc il.”
and various Orders made by the Gov
the court.
part of the English Ad
miralty
s ac qu ies ce nc e on the
extent there wa
It appears that to some
t: The
Le Lo uis Fo res t 2 Do dson, 239, it was held tha
us, in the case
Court in all of this. Th
practice of the
k with ten de rne ss on the informalities in the
will loo
High Court of Admiralty
tur
Vice-Admiralty Co tts.
from its
Vice -A dm ira lty Co urt in Jamaica as it stood
ion of the
Nevertheless, the jurisdict
linea ted.
to the mid nin ete en th ce ntury may be roughly de
n
inceptio on
35 vations:
ret ch ap pears to ac co rd with Ubblehode obser
Its sk
local level they
Co urts op era ted on thr ee distinct levels. On the
“The colonial Vice-Admiralty
n. Late in the
of merchants and seame
. . .
63
chosen as tribunals
1696 the colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts were
imperial control of trade. In
tion
uting offenders aga inst the trade and navigation statutes. And the court’s jurisdic
for prosec
with authority to
internation al in time s of war, when the crown created them prize courts
beca me
6
3sels
ves .’
condemn captured enemy cargoes and
3 the
the passage of the Imp eria l Vice -Adm iralty Court Acts of 1863 and 1867,
With
Wor on, (1927) 17 Asp. M.L . 322 “The Vice-Admiralty Courts Acts of 1863
Yuri Maru, The
other amendments.” 38
which jurisdiction was newly conferred and specification of
36 Ibid., p. 12.
iralty Courts Act Amendment Act, 1867,
37 Vice Admiralty Courts Act, 1863, 26 Vict., Cap. 24; Vice Adm
-
-
64
ction of the
Section 10 of the Vice-Adiniralty Courts Act, 1863 defmed the civil jurisdi
Vice-AdmaltY Courts.
It provided as follows:
ction are as
‘The matters in respect of which the Vice-Admiralty Courts shall have jurisdi
follows:
(2) Claims for Master’s wages, and for his disbursements on account of ship
(8) Claims in respect of any mortgage where the ship has been sold by a decree of the Vice-
(9) Claims between the owners of any ship registered in the possession in which the Court
ship
(10) Claims for necessaries supplied in which the Court is established, to any ship of which
no owner or part owner is domiciled within the possession at the time of the necessaries
being supplied
65
British possession
ims in res pect of the buildin g, equipping, or repairing within any
(11) Cla
n at the
whi ch no ow ner or par t own er is domiciled within the possessio
of any ship of
ious
tur e (sup rem e Cou rt) Act was passed in Jamaica. By this Act var
In 1880, the Judica
e
Jam aica exe rcis ing jurisdic tion over different subject-matters wer
superior Courts in
of Jamaica.”
together and constituted into “the Supreme Court of Judicature
consolidated
that is to say —
al Causes,
The Court for Divorce and Matrimoni
66
consolidation of the Superior
Cou rt of Adm iralty was as shown above, included in the
High
Courts of England.
Court an
effec t of this omis sion was more than to render the then Vice-Admiralty
The
the most culpable
as regards the new cour t schema. The omission, it seems, constitutes
outcast
shown, the
s situation today, where as will be shortly
precursor to the existing anamolou
out of
nt Supreme Court resides on a footing quite
Admiralty Jurisdiction of the prese
jurisdiction.
consonance with the rest of the Court’s
this
Admiralty Act, 1890, (U.K.) was enacted. By
A decade later, the Colonial Courts of
ished
Jamaican Supr eme Cou rt was mad e a “Colonial Court of Admiralty.” The Act abol
Act the
rt.
the then existing Jamaican Vice-Admiralty Cou
COfliity of nations”.
67
this provision
n that was prompted by this provision was whether by virtue of
One questio
Kingdom. Thus, for
Admiralty Jurisdiction was coe xtensive with that of the United
the local
iction by
n aro se as to whether enlargement of the U.K. Admiralty Jurisd
instance, the questio
e certain claims
Court of Judica tur e (Conso lidation) Act, 1925 (U.K.) to includ
The Supreme
passed.” 9
Jamaica “40
39 Ibid.
40 op. cit., p. 518.
68
iralty in Jamaica was
“the jurisdiction of a court of Adm
The Court therefore held that
it conferred on the court in
by the Co lon ial Co urts of Admiralty Act, 1890, that
established
there
ilar to that pos sess ed by the Supreme Court in England, and that
janaica jurisdiction sim
mortgage of a
on on the cou rt in Jam aica to determine a claim in respect of the
was not jurisdicti
1
4ip.
sh ”
er maritime
ards the com pete nce of a Cou rt to hear ship mortgage and oth
The position as reg
n Admiralty Jurisdiction by the
h the enlargement of the Jamaica
claims has since changed wit
nt to
Jurisd icti on (Ja ma ica ) Or der in Council, 1962, (U.K.) pursua
passage of the Admiralty
C: Present Scope:
Cou ncil pro vid es that “Th e Co lonial Courts of Admiralty Act,
Section 2 of the Order in
erence in
to the Sup rem e Cou rt of Jam aica, have effect as if for the ref
1890, shall in relation
the Admiralty
of Sec tion Tw o thereof ther e were substituted a reference to
subsection (2)
of Justice Act,
tion of that cou rt as def med by Section One of the Administration
juri sdic
One.”
ain spe cified “ad apta tion s and modifications of the said Section
1956...” subject to cert
ur, Six, Seven
the ord er pro vid es that “T he provisions of Sections Three, Fo
Section 3 of
a with
Justice Act, 1956, shall extend to Jamaic
and Eight of Part 1 of the Administration of
tions.”
certain specified ‘adaptations and modifica
41 Seethid.,p 516
69
at present the
ordingly, the Adm iral ty Juri sdic tion of the Supreme Court encompasses
Acc
therein;
employment or
co-owners of a ship as to possession,
(b) any question arising between the
any claim in resp ect of a mo rtga ge of or charge on a ship or any share therein;
(c)
;
(d) any claim for damage done by a ship
a ship;
(e) any claim for damage received by
in a
m for loss of life or per son al inju ry sustained in consequence of any defect
(t) any clai
of the
of the wrongful act, neglect or default
ship or in her apparel or equipment, or
or
ion or control of a ship or of the master
owners, charterers or persons in possess
s the
whose wrongful acts, neglects or default
crew thereof or of any other person for
, being
ers, charterers or per sons in pos sess ion or control of a ship are responsible
own
,
neg lect or def ault in the nav igation or management of the ship, in the loading
an act,
carriage
or from the ship or in the embarkation,
carriage or discharge of goods on, in
the ship;
or disembarkation of person on, in or from
ds carried in a ship;
(g) any claim for loss of or damage to goo
or to
ting to the carriage of goods in a ship
(h) any claim arising out of any agreement rela
70
I (j) any claim in the nature of salvage (including
any claim arising by virtue of the
of a ship or an aircraft;
(1) any claim in the nature of pilotage in respect
maintenance.
or dues;
recovered;
account of a ship;
71
which are being
(s) any claim for the forfeiture or condemnation of a ship or of goods
for the
or have been carried, or have been attempted to be carried, in a ship, or
Admiralty.
restoration of a ship or any such goods after seizure, or for droits of
Court of
Together with any other jurisdiction which either was vested in the High
e Court of
Admiralty immediately before the date of the commencement of the Suprem
n hundred and
Judicature Act, 1873 (that is to say, the first day of November, eightee
on on or after
seventy five) or is conferred by or under an Act which came into operati
that date on the High Court as being a Court with Admiralty Jurisdiction.”
h Courts had at
Jamaican Admiralty jurisdiction in terms of what jurisdiction particular Englis
exercised by
certain times. In addition, certain qualifications are given to the Jurisdiction to be
present
Thus, although the list of claims is quite extensive and would normally cover most
day maritime related claims, where a claim is not enumerated, then in Jamaica, again resort will
ultimately have to be made to “what the law was in England” at a given time.
This circuitous journey to ascertain the law is ipso facto undesirable. It is not in keeping
anachronisms to resort to a foreign legal system to find out whether his particular maritime
72
alty Jurisdiction.
related claim is within our Admir
admini5t1at10n of justice.
ry provisions.
Supreme Court, all other of which are founded on local statuto
be said to be
Moreover, the list of maritime claims although quite extensive cannot
ry provisions. The
exhaustive. Thus, in another West Indian jurisdiction, with similar statuto
e (owners,
Barbadian High Court found in Cooper Stevedoring Co Inc v MV Passat Bonair
on the
Master and Crew) 1977 WJ.R., 36 that “As the matter stands the endorsement of claim
do
writ for stevedoring services does not come within any specified head of jurisdiction laid
claim
statute” and that in Barbados “A claim for remuneration for stevedoring is not a
by 43
Likewise claims for stevedoring services rendered are not within the Jamaican Admiralty
jutisthctjo Also excluded are others which will be considered in the following section.
42 See Chapter 2.
43 Ibid., p. 40.
44 Ibid.,p.4i.
73
D: The International Dimension
International
The list of claims set out are essentially derived from Article 1(1) of the
1952.
onvention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Arrest of Ships,
Such claims
The Convention specifies claims in respect of which a vessel may be arrested.
“Maritime Claim” means a claim arising out of one or more of the following:
ing in
(b) loss of life or personal injury caused by any ship either in collision or occurr
(c) salvage;
(d) agreement relating to the use or hire of any ship whether by charterparty or
other’’ise;
(e) agreement relating to the carriage of goods in any ship whether by charterparty or
otherwise;
74
(h) bottomry;
(i) towage;
(j) piotage;
aintenance;
r su pp lie d to a sh ip for her operation or m
(k) goods or materials whereve
and dues;
equipm ent of any ship or docks charges
ir of
(1) construction, repa
r, officers, or crew;
(m) wages of Maste
rs or
e by shippers, chartere
ursem en ts, including disbursements mad
(n) Master’s disb
gs of that ship;
employment or earnin
glish law.
Article 1 (1) provisions into En
in detail thei r respective
te ns iv e and it is not necessary to compare
Both lists are ex
idered.
ion s. ow ev er , on e im po rtant example will be cons
Stipulat H
n or otherwise”,
ag e ca us ed by an y ship either in collisio
For claim (a) in &rjcle 1 (1),
“dam
75
mage
d to co ve r all th os e situations where da
construed in Englan
w ords “or otherwise” were
te
negligent
w ith ou t ph ys ic al Co ntact, by wash or by a
one ship to another
is caused by
age done by
th e w or ding us ed is “any claim for dam
.),
in the 1956 Act (U.K
manoeuver. Thus
5
ship
a4 .”
976)2
in En gl an d he ld in The Eschersheim (1
Lords
ovision the House of
As regards this pr
the
m us t be th e ac tu al instrument by which
itsel f
that although the ship
Lloyd’s Report 1,
s the damage
ee n th e sh ip an d w hatever object sustain
“physical contact betw
damage was done,
is not essential”.
which
he ld th at w he re an y provision of the Act
me judgment it was
Significantly, in the sa
t may look at
rre st Co nv en tio n, is ambiguous, the Cour
ve effect to The A
appears to intend to gi
prefer
ng is to be 4 7red.
de ci di ng w hi ch m ea ni
to gain assistance in
the Convention in order
portant parts
to th e A rre st Co nv ention. However, im
ca is not a party
As already noted, Jamai
of extended
in to na tio na l la w through the backdoor
und their w ay
of this Convention have fo
described.
Imperial Legislation earlier
resort to
se en w he th er a Ja maican Court would
ains to be
In the circumstances, it rem
ambiguous
ai ca is no t a pa rty upon finding such an
which Ja m
Scrutiny of a Convention to
)
by Th e A dm ira lty Jurisdiction (Jamaica
tended to Jamai ca
provisi on in the list of claims ex
76
tutory
iple, it wo uld be de sir ab le purely as a matter of sta
writer, that in princ
Jt seems to the
nvention as
urt in an ap pro pri ate ca se to seeks the aid of the Co
a Jamaican Co
construction, for
lations extended
pro vis ion s to int erp ret ambiguous statutory stipu
urce of these
the original so
.
by the Order in Council
into Jamaican Law
ing given to
O an d UN CT AD , ac tiv e consideration is now be
s of IM
Under the joint auspice
the Article 1 (1)
n. On e of the ma in are as targeted for change is
Conven tio
amending the Arrest
ms.
clai8
list of maritime 4
ergovernmental Group of Experts on
(IMO/UNCTAD) Joint Int
As regards this list the
fmding:
s an d Re lat ed Su bje cts has made the following
gage
Maritime Liens and Mort
me claims
inc om ple te, ou tda ted and the description of so
“The list appears to
...
be
49.
regardless of the nature of such claims
resPect of claims against the owner
nt countries.
would be more susceptible to varying interpretations by differe
e related claims
while allowing to national law a limited degree of flexibility as regards maritim
the interest of
not enumerated in the list. If the limited area of flexibility cannot be agreed then in
claims, but not vice versa. Thus it seems essential that all claims that are granted maritime lien
However, some of the claims giving rise to maritime liens under the International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages,
Convention.
1926 are not fully covered under the “maritime claims” listed in the Arrest 51
Those claims not fully covered or not covered at all include the following:
49 Ibid., p. 5.
50
51 International Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages,
1967.
78
of the creditors in order to preserve the
(ii) Expenses incurred in the common interest
voyage.
3
5icle
preparation of Draft Art s for a new
Work has now reached an advanced stage on the
maritime liens —
s of the
the master, officer and other member
(a) wages and other sums due to
80
to ensure that like
fice it to say that effo rts are being made by the Joint Committee
Suf
ling separately
itime claims in future Conventions dea
1
rtr
0 ii11o is used in reference to mar
gY
ventions
and Maritim e Lie ns resp ecti vely and generally to ensure that such Con
with A1Test
operate in consort.
those
urin g full com pati bili ty betw een enumerated “Maritime Claims” and
The aim of ens
not.M
claim gives rise to a maritime lien or
Vide:infra, chapter 4.
’5
81
REMARKS
E: CONCLUDING
aican Adrnirality
ex am ining the ori gin s and development of the Jam
By tracing and
risdiction in
on s and pre sen t sco pe ha s been established. The Ju
foundati
Jurisdiction, its legal
ed for
pe ria l leg isl ati ve fou nd ations. There is urgent ne
t uneasily on its Im
significant respects res
of this situation.
legislative ratification
ime related claim
is pro ba ble tha t a cla im ant will find that his marit
it
As the law now stands,
hin the Jamaican
red by the ex ten siv e list of enumerated claims wit
is among those cove
bear in mind
en fac ed wit h the rel ev ant statutory provisions to
urt wh
Admiralty Jurisdiction Co
ions.
ec t in co ns tru ing or oth erwise applying these provis
this ultimate international asp
time
be tw ee n sep ara te list s of Maritime Claims and Mari
bility
The need to ensure compati
ould not miss
ern ati on al ma rit im e law making sphere. Jamaica sh
int
Liens is being tackled in the
ence benefit from
ou ld in tim e ens ure tha t its legislation and jurisprud
out on this process and sh
this process.
82
E: Concluding Remarks
Admiralty
ins and development of the Jamaican
By tracing and examining the orig
l fou nda tion and present scope has been established. The Jurisdiction in
Jurisdiction, its lega
ent need for
respects rest une asil y in its Imp erial statutory foundations. There is urg
significant
n.
legislative rectifications of this situatio
in the inte rna tion al mar itim e law making sphere. Jamaica should not miss
Liens is being tackj ecj
this process.
83
Chapter 4
Arrest of Ships
84
CHAPTER 4
Arrest of Ships
A: Introduction
me Claimant
1. Ship Arrest and the Mariti
ion
3. The International Dimens
an Admiralty Jurisdiction
4. Ship Arrest and the Jamaic
5. Functions of Arrest
t of shi ps in Jamaica
B: The law governing Arres
1. Maritime Liens
2. “Other Charges”
85
D: Required Procedures
1. Effecting Arrest
E: The InternationalDimension
G: Concluding Comments
86
Chapter 4:
Arrest of Shi
ps
n
A: Introductio
t.
t an d th e M aritime Claiman
Ship Arr es
1.
nal
portant to obtain provisio
iti m e C la im an t, it is particularly im
For the Mar
e
it s. A ls o of vi ta l importance is th
ing on the mer
rit y fo r his claim prior to its hear
secu
, its
it m ay ex er ci se and effectively so
n where
e court in a positio
basic need to put th
claim.
rds his particular
jurisdiction as rega
tentacles of the
an d ca n ea si ly move beyond the
e mobile
Overall, as ships ar
ry of the
is an im po rta nt device in the armou
arrest
the facility of ship
court’s jurisdiction,
his claim.
es of hi s qu es t for enforcement of
ag
the preliminary st
maritime claimant at
Arrest.
2. The Concept of
rtant to
stances, it is impo
a variety of circum
Since ships may be detained in
ed.
be sa id th at a sh ip has been arrest
n should it
clarify at the outset whe
ntion for
in ed fr om th e International Conve
t may be obta
Guidance on this poin
52.
to th e A rr es t of Seagoing Ships, 19
Rules Relatin g
the Unification of Certain
87
provides as follows:
Article 1(2) of this Convention
Authority
e 4 pro vid es tha t a shi p “m ay only be arrested under the
Further, Articl
in which the
the app rop ria te judicial aut hority of the contracting state
of a Court or of
arrest is made”.
/ n” of a
is cle ar tha t “A rre st” is not simply equivalent to “detentio
From this it
arily a judicial
ved and reg ulated by the Convention, “Arrest” is necess
ship. As concei
remedy.
re of a
also to be dis tin guishe d fro m attachment, that is the “seizu
“Arrest”, is
a judgement”.
ship in execution or satisfaction of
This
Co nve nti on, “A rre st” is als o a security obtaining device.
As defined in the
1
S ee: Chapter 3, part D.
88
Jurisdiction.
although
As previously noted, Jamaica is not a party to the Arrest Convention,
legislation.
“One distinct and basic feature of the Convention is the absence from it
of an international law of arrest. The law and procedural rules applicable is/are
those of the forum within which any particular arrest takes place” 3
an law pertaining
Convention are worthwhile considering in an examination of the Jamaic
to ship arrest.
Ltd., 1985.
2 Hill, Christopher et al: Arrest of Ships, Lloyds of London Press
Ibid., p.v.
89
mation, such examination is rooted in,
However, in accordance with Hill’s inti
s applicable in Jamaica.
necessitates foc usin g on the relevant municipal law stipulation
and
Admiralty Jurisdiction.
4. Ship Arrest and the Jamaican
the
ilable under Jamaican law pursuant to
The facility of ship arrest is only ava
proceedings.
5. Functions of Arrest.
90
Here, Jackson has noted as follows:
l edy a “saisse
a form of interim relief or provisiona rem
-
obviously, it is
itor may
conservatoire” (and in this context it should be noted that a cred
merits.
the 4
may provide ‘security’ for the claim on
s of arresting a vessel.
jurisdictions as to the legal implication
4
on Stevens & Sons, 1980, para 8 et seq.
See: Thomas, D.R.: Maritime Liens, Lond
ted to the historical conflict between the
A third theory, “the conflict theory” is rela
of Admiralty in England; Also see generally:
common law courts and the High Court
Price, Wiswall and Marsden, op. cit.
91
icial entity,
n the ory , the sh ip is viewed as a distinct jud
Under the personificatio
e ship is both
and ca pa cit y to co ntr act and commit torts,. Th
endowe d with a personality
of liability.
the source and limit
, an action
rec og niz es the pe rso nification theory. There
American jurisprudence
property. 6
y against the maritime
in rem is directed solel
an interest
property ap pe ar, the y do so as claimants of
Where the owners of the
.
nts (un les s joi ned as defendants in personam)
not as defenda
limited to the value
of an Am eri ca n Co urt in an action in rem is
The jurisdiction
give the Court
pe ara nc e by the ow ne r does not, without more,
of the property: an ap
jurisdiction in personam.
cedural theory
inc tio n, En gli sh jur isp rudence accedes to the pro
]n contradist
procedural to
the res by an ac tio n in rem, is held to be merely
whereby the seizure of
ted:
However, Tnomas has no
x Ltd.
, V: Th e sec uri ty of a Maritime Lien, Tribo
6 See: Harley, SJ. and Batra
92
r of
tor ica l pla nks on wh ich the theory is based are howeve
“The his
matter.
ts or idiosyncrasies,
it to say tha t des pit e any historical English anteceden
Suffice
best.
can fas hio n its own ma ritime jurisprudence as it deems
Jamaica
ss or
sug ges t how ever tha t as a matter of law, the correctne
This is not to
particular situatio ns.
dif fer ent on establish ing what the law on arrest is in
otherwise of the
es of English
ear lier intim ated any suc h voyage into the inner recess
However, as
‘
ibid.
93
on that although discussion of the
The writer contents himself with the observati
that at
found in any reported Jamaican case it appears
different theories are no where to be
Jamaica.
Admiralty Rules”,).
e manner prescribed by
Admiralty Act, 1890 (U.K.) and in keeping with “...th
amended by Section 1 of
Section 36 of the Judicature Law (Law 24 of 1979) as
31 of 1885) for
the Judicature Law, 1879, Amendment Law 1885. (Law
94
Supreme Court
to reg ula te the Pro ced ure and Practice of the said
framing Rules of Court
insonsistant, be repealed...”
uired.
in Council” is no longer req
The approval of “Her Majesty
nce Act, 1962
(5) of the Fi rst Sc he du le to the Jamaica Independe
Section
provides that:
0 ich
Courts of Admiralty Act, 189 (wh
section four of the Colonial
ty’s pleasure
tain laws to be res erv ed for the signification of Her Majes
requires cer
95
n of that Act as
or to contain a suspending clause), and so much of section seve
rt of Admiralty,
regulation the practice and procedure of a Colonial Cou
is so inconsistent, be repealed”.
provisions.
previously existing
Here it may be noted that the Act, despite abolishing the
e the Vice-Admiralty
Vice- Admiralty Courts, nevertheless saved the Rules applicabl to
n, Rules of
“If on the Commencement of this Act in any British possessio
Act, the
Court have not been approved by Her Majesty in pursuance of this
96
1863... shall so far as applicable, have effect in the Colonial Courts of
Admiralty of such possession... as Rules of Court under this Act, and may be
ng the
“All enactments and rules at the passing of this Act in force touchi
rules made in pursuance of this Act... and shall apply to the Colonial
an dmiralty Court
Hence the Rules of Court of the abolished Jamaic Vice-A
in Jamaica.
continued in operation in Jamaica when the Act took effect
Her Majesty’s
These Rules are the “Rules for the Vice-Admiralty Courts in
a on January 1,
Possessions Abroad”. They had earlier come into operation in Jamaic
1884.
ance
The Admiralty Rules do not expressly repeal these rules. Thus in accord
with the Section 7 stipulation, it appears they were on the coming into operation of the
97
e Rules.
Rul es rep eale d onl y to the extent that they were inconsistent with thes
Admiralty
iralty
direction of thinking that where the Adm
So far the examination leads in the
decessor Rules of
fail to cover a par ticular matter, then resort may be had to its pre
Rules
dmiralty Court.
the abolished Jamaican Vice-A
e
e Vice-Admiralty Court Rules provid
Here, it should be noted, that in turn, thes
practice.
for resort to English High Court
followed”.
Court of Justice of England shall be
Rules of
provisions of the “Civil Procedure Code 1888”. and the
far as they
Court regulating the general practice of the Supreme Court, shall so
”.
are applicable, apply to procedure and practice in Admiralty actions
Rules.
and Rules of Court to supplement the provisions of the Admiralty
98
Supreme Court Rules
This means resort to the Civil Procedure Code and the
of Court.
ides that:
However, section 686 of the Civil Procedure Code prov
by Rules of
“Where no other provision is expressly made by Law or
eme
Court, the procedure and practice for the Time being of the Supr
and the forms prescribed shall with such variations as circumstances may
require, be used”.
particular time.
stipulation.
A similar question may also be raised as regards to Rule 207
Court) in
edition of the U.K. “White Book” (“The Annual Practice of the U.K. Supreme
j
are divided
However, the position is not without its doubts as local legal counsel
99
on the true legal import of section 676.
tory foun
9 dations.
Rules of Court have always had different statu
ncil,
4. The Admiralty Jurisdiction (Jamaica) Order in Cou
1962.
.)
5. The Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (U.K
8
C annot find on man:
See: Chapter 3
9
100
e.
7. Applicable English Rules of Practice and Procedur
issued.
right of arrest.
of the Supreme
which in rem proceedings may be instituted in the Admiralty division
Court.
101
It is important to distinguish the two concepts.
to be
Indeed, Goffey notes that: “when arrest is contemplated the first thing
or merely a right in
considered is whether the cause of action confers a maritime lien
rem”. 11
1. Maritime Liens.
ish law.
There is to date no statutory definition of the term in Jamaican or Engl
Maritime
Also there is no international law definition. The 1926 and 1967 Convention on
Liens and Mortgages as well as the present Draft Articles for a new Convention on
Maritime Liens and Mortgages have all avoided any attempt at a distinct and
102
r
comprehe1i’e definition of the term.
JerviS.
be carried into
“...a maritime lien is ..a claim or privilege upon a thing to
.
.this claim or
effect by legal process... that process to be a proceeding in rem..
and when carried into effect by legal process by a proceeding in rem, related
Continental or
“The essence of the ‘privilege’ was and still is, whether in
dent
English law, that it comes into existence automatically without any antece
true charge on the ship and freight of a proprietary kind in favor of the
privileged creditor. The charge goes with the ship everywhere, even in the
hands of a purchaser for value without notice, and has a certain ranking with
13 (1851)
7 Moo. P.C. 267, 284
14(1 946) P. 135,150, cited by Thomas, ibid., para 10, who notes that the word
103
-
ars to have attracted some
Tetly has put forward a defmition which appe
international app
1 5
rov al.
16
any court action or any deed or any registration”.
attaches and gains priority without
by it,
(3) for service rendered to it or damage done
action arises,
unconditionally, and
(5) Travelling with the property secretively and
rem.
(6) enforced by an action in 18
concept of a maritime
Under Jamaican law following the English position, the
.
“privilage’ as used here is synonymous with “maritime lien”
see Chapter 6, F.N. 93
15
Ibid.
16
0p cit.
17
lbid., para 12
18
104
ognized as giving rise to maritime liens are:
The claims currently rec
ip.
1. damage done by a sh
2. Salvage.
r’s wages.
3. Seamen’s and maste
, and
4. Master’s disbursements
•19
ndentia
5. Bottomry and respo
e
se rep res en t the ‘pr inc ipal’ or ‘genuine’ maritim
t: “The
Here, Thomas notes tha
s:
extended to Ja
2 aica provides as follow
m1
other charge on any
an y ca se in wh ich the re is a maritime lien or
“In
miralty
oth er pro pe rty for the amount claimed, the Ad
or
ship, aircraft
a may be invoked by an
Supreme Court of Jamaic
Jurisdiction of the
aircraft or property”.
action in rem against that ship,
an y of the aforementioned
be anested in Jamaica for
Accordingly, a vessel may
105
to maritime lien.
claims giving rise
2. “Other charges”
invoked.
r charge” in section
Thomas suggests that the expression “maritime lien or othe
on from statutory
3(3) points to instances where maritime liens arise by implicati
enactment.
h were, in
“It may be that it is these implied statutory maritime liens whic
“maritime
Justice Act, 1956 Section 3(3), and wherein reference is made to a
lien or char2
other 2 ge”.
possibly be
He cites certain occasions when under U.K. law maritime liens may
2
Thom
2 as, op. cit., para 20
106
igations that may be
by stat ute. The se gen eral ly encompass certain unfulfilled obl
iniplied
ck
t auth orities suc h as unp aid fees and expenses of the Receiver of wre
due to governmen
“rights in
slative rights” which he describes as
Tetley has referred to special legi
5
wrec
2 k.
harbour charges and the removal of
exact
es, that there is doubt as regards the
Overall, it appears as Thomas intimat
charges”.
para 20 et seq.
0p cit., p.42
24
d., p43
Ibi5
2
107
matter.
In the final analysis, it suffices for immediate purposes to emphasize that any
of arrest.
such “other charge” falling within Section 3(3) will give rise to a right
for there
The problem of construing Section 3(3), inter alia, highlights the need
have a
to be a clear definition of a maritime lien. More importantly, there is a need to
there
statutorily enumerated exclusive list of maritime liens. Not only does it appear that
is no such definition to be found in Jamaican law, but there is no such list of liens.
26 This is
Section 68 of the draft Jamaica Shipping Bill now has such a list.
to be welcomed as this will bring more certainty as to which claims defmitely give rise to
maritime liens.
see chapter 3
26
108
that those claims which it has under its law as giving rise to maritime liens are compatible
As earlier noted the draft Bill provisions in this regard, is based on those of the
This highlights not only the general need to pay attention to this international
dimension in dealing with preliminary issues in the domestic maritime law context.
Importantly, it signifies the need for Jamaicas participation in international fora involved.
27
For present purposes it is important to emphasize the link between the maritime
lien and arrest of ships. This link is also recognized in the international context.
different international Conventions dealing respectively with maritime liens and arrest of
28
ships.
109
Basically, these are the claims within the Jamaican Admiralty jurisdiction which
Unlike the maritime lien which is a substantive right, the statutory right in rem, is
in essence, a procedural remedy. It accrues at the issue of the writ and is defeated by a
sale to a
Required Procedures
1. Effecting Arrest.
A Praecipe for warrant to arrest the vessel along with a supporting Affidavit, are
to be filed.
110
ssel arrested
on behalf of the pa rty seeking to have the ve
filed
The Affidavit to be
rtain particulars.
should contain ce
..may be issued
re m, a w ar ra nt fo r the arrest of property
“Jn actions in
en
an y tim e af te r th e w rit of summons has be
iff at
instance of the plaint
r
at the
ce, but no warrant of
arrest
pearan
the defendant after ap
filed or of
filed
or his agent has been
affidavit by the party
shall be issued until an
satisfied.
avit
ac tio n of w ag es , or of possession, the affid
(b) In an
111
and if against a foreign vessel, that notice of the
against:
annexed to the ’
1
affidav it.
However the Court or Judge may as deemed fit, allow the warrant to issue,
30
although the affidavit may not contain all the aforementioned particulars.
In an action for wages the court or Judge may also waive the service of the notice
Once the warrant of Arrest is issued, the writ of summons, along with the
activity, service of the writ of sunons is what is first required since this is what gives
3
O per Rule 4
lbid.
31
112
to “perfect
court juris dicti on over the vessel. The arresting of the vessel is then said
the
vessel.
the court’s jurisdiction over the
cular manner.
Summons must be carried out in a parti
mast
or warrant on the mainmast or on the single
by nailing or affixing a copy of the writ
or affixed. 32
of the vessel and leaving it there, nailed
3
bail or pay money into Court in lieu of bail.
court’s jurisdiction.
one gains access to the vessel so as to move it out of the
32: Rule 8.
See
5ee: Rule 5
33
113
Rule 25 provides that: ‘property arrested by warrant shall only be released under
the authority of an instrument issued from the office of the Registrar, to be called a
Release”
Normally, once a vessel has been arrested, its owner or other interested party,
Such ball or payment is to provide alternative security for the Plaintiffs claim and
The plaintiff is entitled to sufficient security to cover the amount of his claim,
together with interests and costs. Security is usually provided in the form of a bank
Bail or payment into court takes the place of the ship in the action and if after
this reason.
A person desirous of preventing the release of the vessel under arrest, is required
Once this is done, no order of the court affecting the vessel or money mentioned
5ee eg appendix 17
34
114
5
3ifie
ss the caveator is not d.
in the caveat, may be issued unle
ent lite.
or by default, or prior to judgement pend
s.
deteriorating condition and unpaid crew wage
ndants themselves.
importance here is the residual interest of the defe
that:
Others, 1968, 15 W.LR.280, 296 emphasized
35
Se e eg Georghadjis
115
executed by him
sale and the commission must be addressed to the bailiff and
of a valuable property, as a
The object of the appraisement is to prevent the sale
court directs.
advertised in such local and foreign newspapers as the
rwise directs”.
sale must be effected by the bailiff unless the court othe
doctrine of
in court for eventual payment out to the various claimants subject to the
priorities.
116
F: The International Dimension.
International Convention
Here, the convention that is of primary relevance is The
possibility of having
It provides the claimant having a “maritime claim” with the
s
the vessel arrested. At the same time, it restricts the power of arrest to the claim
Admiralty Jurisdiction.
particular ship in
The Convention provides that a claimant may arrest either the
ownership, except in
respect of which a claim is made, or any other ship in the same
37
arres ted.
s.
the shares therein are owned by the same person or person
y be given
“A ship shall not be arrested, nor shall bail or other securit
more than once in any one or more of the jurisdictions of any of the
claimant: and, if a ship has been arrested in any one of such jurisdictions, or
bail or other security has been given in such jurisdiction either to release the ship or
118
ship in
arrest, any subsequent arrest of the ship or of any
to avoid a threatened
ship
the same claimant shall be set aside, and the
the same ownership by
to each
ity to arrest to one ship in relation
The convention thus restricts the abil
claim.
came up for
sible to arrest the same ship twice,
which the issue of whether it is pos
a
in En
3 8
gla nd. In that case, the English Admiralty Court decided that
decision
er pursuant to
a fmal judgment against a shipown
judgement creditor who has obtained
on
in a fore ign Adm iral ty Cou rt, is permitted to bring a subsequent acti
proceedings in rem
Se
3 e HHI, op cit., pp 19-21
8
d., p. 21
1b19
3
119
English Law. Once this is the case then according to Hill, the
arrest took place or under
judgment.
“What cannot happen under any circumstances is for the same vessel to
be arrested twice, both times being the putting into effect of an in rem right
against the vessel whether or not the arrest is in the enforcement of a maritime
subsequent warrant of arrest may be taken out against the same vessel has come up for
4
decisio
’ n. There, it was held that the circumstances are such that the plaintiffs in the
first case were not yet ready to proceed to judgement and execution and the plaintiffs in
the second case were ready to proceed to judgment, it would be necessary and right for a
prejudice the second plaintiff would suffer by the first plaintiffs inability to take immediate
120
4
ac 2
tion.
e 3(3), since
ping with the provisions of Articl
The position in Cyprus is in kee
same
re inv olv ed. Wh at the con ven tion is basically against, is the
different claimants we
e. Such a
ing the sam e shi p in res pec t of the same claim more than onc
person arrest
e flow of maritime
ility wo uld pri ma fac ie, be ini mical to the interests of the fre
possib
chment.
p appears to be more skin to atta
terms of a second arrest of a shi
p in execution or
ear lier ind ica ted , “arr est” doe s not include the seizure of a shi
As
se is not ipso facto
ctio n of a jud gem ent . Th us, it appears The Despina G.K. Ca
satisfa
Convention.
e ship twice in the sense of the
concerned with arresting the sam
n, based on a
ervation in thi s context is, in the writers respectful opinio
Hill’s obs
Convention is concerned.
false notion, at least as far as the
same ship
er posing the que stio n as to whether it is possible to arrest the
Hill, aft
simple as that”.
‘
42 cit., p. 19
4ct.
lbi 3, p.19
4.
1b1d
4
121
this false notion which is the basis for the subsequent fallacious reasoning which in turn
underlines his reluctance to give a defmitive negative answer to the question he poses.
There appears to be no reported Jamaican case on this issue of the same claimant
This part of the Convention Provisions are not expressly enacted into the
Hence, this part of the Convention provisions have not had clear express
However, it is the writers submission that due regard should be had to these
action in Jamaica despite the fact that Jamaica is not a party to the Convention.
As earlier intimated, the Convention allows under specified conditions for the
arrest of a ship other than the one in relation to which the claim arose. This provision of
the Convention reflects a compromise between the traditional English position which
restricted arrest to the particular ship in respect of which the claim arose and the
122
st any chattel belonging
Eur ope an app roa ch which enabled the claimant to arre
Continental
shipowner concerned.
to the defendant
in Jamaican law
ions may be said to be reflected
The relevant Convention stipulat
or property in question.
123
ship, the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Jamaica may
(whether the claim gives rise to a maritime lien on the ship or not) be invoked
person; or
(b) any other ship which, at the time when the action is
be invoked by an action in rem against that aircraft if at the time when the
mentioned in paragraph (D) of subsection (1) of section one of this Act unless
the claim relates wholly or partly to wages (including any sum allotted out of
124
Admiralty jurisdiction, the Supreme
(6) Where, in the exercise of its
er property to be
Jamaica orders any ship, aircraft or oth
Court of
question
e jurisdiction to hear and determine any
sold, the court shall hav
proceeds of sale.
arising as to the title to the
place of business
assumed that he has his habitual residence or a
within Jamaica”.
Paragraph (a).
He notes that:
L.M.C.L.Q 422
Hazzelwo
4 6 od, Steven J: Gaps in the action in rem- p’ugged?
125
graphs operate
“-the more liberal construction is that the two para
owned by
independently with the effect that “any other ship” beneficially
an arrest.
al) ownership of
(4 could be successfully used to arrest a vessel under the (benefici
construction of section 3
The English Court of Appeal favored the more liberal
p.423
126
is not under the same
The decisio n thu s sanctioned the arrest of a vessel which
(4).
offending ship.
ownership of the involved or
which had formerly held sway in English
This did away with the restrictive view
Admiralty jurisprudence.
Courts had required a common
Prior to the Span Terza case, the english
selected
ip link betw een the offe nding or involved vessel and the alternative ship
ownersh
the same
be in effect “sister-ships”, that is, under
for arrest. The two vessels had to
their shares.
beneficial ownership as regards all
scope.
Convention.
which the
elalznaflt may arrest either the particular ship in respect of
127
maritime claim arose, or any other ship which is owned by the person who
was, at the time when the maritime claim arose, the owner of the particular
ship...
charterer and
(4) When in the case of a charter by demise of a ship the
relating to that
not the registered owner is liable in respect of a maritime claim
ship, the claimant may arrest such ship or any other ship in the
convention, but no other ship in the ownership of the registered owner shall be
in which a
The provisions of this paragraph shall apply to any case
time
person other than the registered owner is liable in respect of a mari
is to be read as being
The opening words of paragraph 1 clearly indicate that it
128
It does not require either of them to be owned by the person liable for the claim.
Thus a literal reading ofparagraph 1 alone would lead to the odd result where, if the
person liable in respect of the claim is not the owner of the offending ship, none of his
ships can be arrested while at the same time the offending ship owned by the innocent
shipowner as well as all other ships owned by him could be arrested. However,
The final sentence in paragraph 4 makes it clear that the paragraph applies not
only to demise charterers but also to any other person other than the involved or offending
ship’s registered owner. This surely is wide enough to encompass all ship charterers.
Paragraph (4) may be said to have three main effects in the present context.
Firstly, it exempts the other ships of the innocent owner from arrest. Secondly, it
confirms that the involved or offending ship itself may be arrested. Thirdly, it allows the
arrest of ships owned by a person other than the innocent registered owner of the
involved or offending ship. Here the relevant person is the one who is liable in respect of
the maritime claim. Accordingly his ships along with the involved or offending ship may
also be arrested.
Hence, from the provisions of Article 4, it is clear that there need not be an
129
The English draughtsmen in draughting the 1956 legislative provisions
in the enabling
purporting to give effect to Article 3, failed to include Article 3 (4)
restrictive judicial
legislation. As a consequence English law went off course with a
Happily, The Span Treza case as well as subsequent amendments to the 1956
provisions have helped to provide a rudder for a path more in keeping with the
Convention stipulations.
The matter of the interpretation of Section 3(4) has also come up for decision
In a 1973 Cyprus case, Elias Rigas v The Ship “Baalbeck” now lying
ch
at Larnaca Harbor (1973) 11 J.S.C. 1519 the then restrictive English approa
was followed. 48
I Lloyd’s Rep. 308. embraced the liberal approach and held that there was no
requirement for the offending and arrestable ships to be sisterships and allowed the arrest
of the defendant’s vessel where the defendant was merely a charterer of the vessel in
The Singapore Court of appeal declined following the then restrictive approach
adopted by the U.K. Rather this Singapore case in turn provided an important precedent
130
for the English Court in the Span Terza case.
Moreover, to the extent that the Section 3(4) provisions may be amenable to
ought to be preferred. It is therefore hoped that this approach will commend itself to a
“...The purpose of allowing the arrest of sister ships, in rem can only be
/
to found jurisdiction against the person liable and to give the plaintiff
security for his claim; there is no question of imputing liability to the ship
itself because of its part in the incident, as there is when <the offending
ship > is arrested because of a maritime lien. To serve this purpose, and to
avoid doing injustice to third parties, the only important requirement is that <
the ship to be arrested > be wholly owned by the person liable; no rational
131
purpose is served by any special relationship between <the offending ship>
Also as already shown the relevant Convention provisions clearly support the
liberal interpretation. Thus, in the present context, the question as to whether a Jamaican
court should in an appropriate case resort to this Convention to which Jamaica is not a
party to clarify any perceived ambiguities such as may be obtained in respect of Section
interpretation of Section 3(4) came before the English Court, it was held by Lane, J at
Convention, the Court may, in the event of, ambiguity, look at the
Ibid., p. 587
50
51
Ibid
132
me, 3 was approved.
the approach and holding of La
stated as follows:
There, Lord Denning, M.R.,
ent is passed so
that when an Act of Parliam
“It is now fully established
0; Post Office
(1966)2 Lloyds Rep. 46
Lloyd’s Rep.
ry Ra dio Lt d., (19 68 ) 2Q.B. 740; (1967) 2
v Estua
s not mention
, and this is to eve n tho ugh the Act of Parliament doe
299
the 5
Co tion”.
nven2
. and Jamaica.
Act, (U.K.) in respect of both U.K
the intent
stion is the int ent of the legislature. Where
Ultimately the important que
seems to
dly to giv e leg isla tiv e eff ect to a Convention, then it
of the enactment was decide
seek the aid
ht to be ove rrid ing con sid eration as regards whether to
the writer that this oug
p. 52
133
of the Convention Provisions in statutory interpretation.
Thus, whether the Country is or not a party to the Convention,is but one of the
factors that should enter into the matrix of Considerations. Hence it seems to the writer
that like the English Courts did in the case of The Banco, a Jamaican court may in an
appropriate case pray in aid the Convention provisions for purposes of construing
Also as earlier shown, support for The Banco approach may be found in The
The phrase “beneficially owned” is used in both paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 3(4). In The I Congress del Partido (1977) I Lloyd’s Rep. 536,
atp. 561, Robert Goff, J., at first instance stated that the phrase was introduced to take
not only who is the legal owner of its shares but also who has an equitable interest. It is
only by taking into account both legal and equitable ownership that the beneficial
134
qualificati0n the 1956 Act by virtue of the English trust notion has added some
complexitY to the matter which has been extended to Jamaica as well via the applicable
Under the Convention ,all questions relating to liability for wrongful arrest and
for the costs of providing security as well as all procedural matters are referred to the law
The basic procedural requirements in Jamaica for ship arrest have already been
noted, As regards wrongful arrest it appears damages will only be available for gross
arrester of the vessel in not mandatory and application for this has to be made to the
Court.
/
The Convention contains provisions regarding jurisdiction based on arrest
for hearing claims on the merits which are elaborated upon in the next chapter dealing
with Jurisdiction.
Here it may be briefly noted, that the Convention requires that where the court in
whose jurisdiction the ship was arrested has no jurisdiction to decide upon the merits, the
135
is to be held as security for the satisfaction
security given to procure the release of the ship
(or
Accordingly, the Convention, by necessary implication, provides for arrest
y for proceedings in
bail or other security in lien) in one Contracting State as securit
uent to the
The law of the United Kingdom has traditionally linked, and subseq
to
United Kingdom’s ratification of the Convention have continued to link arrest
of
Such linking of arrest to proceedings on the merits contravened the provision
the Convention. Thus there has been judicial criticism of the failure of the United
Conve0
Kingdom to implement this aspect of the 6 ntion.
It appears that Jamaican law follows the English traditional approach. It is very
doubul, whether at present a Jamaican Court would hold on to property over which it
58 Ibid.
see Jackson, op cit, p.
170; Articles 3(3), 5, 7(2) and (3)
60
see Jackson, ibid; The AndreaUrsula (1973) 1 Q.B.265; The Maritime Trader
(1981) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 153 (Sheen. J.)
136
has no jurisdiction on the merits.
Jurisdiction
This appears to follow from the basic principles concerning
procured.
of ships
Significantly, as regards Jamaica, the Conventions permits the arrest
61
permitted by the law of the Contracting State.
e claims
Thus the restriction of the right of arrest to the enumerated maritim
to secure any
in must civil law countries, the arrest of a vessel is generally permissible
ng states such as
claim, whether maritime or not, vessels flying the flag of non-contracti
are met.
e
..any Contracting state shall be entitled wholly or partly to exclud
61
see: Article 8
137
person who has not, at the time of his arrest, his
ntracting state or any
states”.
is rather miniscule.
The size of the fleet flying Jamaican flags
affected as aforesaid.
maritime liens.
as creating a right of
“Nothing in this Convention shall be construed
law or under
os creating any maritime liens which do not exist under such
applicable”
138
t to provisions of the Convention did not
Thus, the 1956 Act in giving effec
in respect of the
any new mari time liens, rather it allowed for arrest of a vessel
create
was
in the Convention. Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction
“waritime claims” set out
remained unaffected.
Stipulations.
2. Forced Sale of arrested Ship and International
pertaining to a
sale of the vessel. Earlier in this chapter the relevant local procedural rules
139
These will be noted only briefly here since although they may be related to ship
arrest, on the whole they are more concerned with the actual enforcement of security
interests. As such they do not necessarily fall within the framework of the preliminary
However, to the extent that they may affect procedures pertaining to ship arrest
Such stipulations are contained in the 1967 Convention on Maritime Liens and
Mortgages. Importantly as regards Jamaica, the Draft Articles for a new Convention on
The relevant provisions of these Draft Articles have been incorporated into the
various holders of security interests in the vessel as regards the time and place of its sale.
participate in the distribution of the proceeds of sale in accordance with their respective
priorities.
becomes law would bring about a significant change to this aspect of the procedural rules
140
pertaining to ship arrest and sale.
The other Sections 76-78 are basically concerned with ensuring a transfer of a
There
clean title in the vessel to the purchase and the issuing of a certificate to that effect.
a new
is provision as to the actual disposition of the proceeds of sale. However, until
ry
Maritime Liens and Mortgage Convention finally comes into being these draft statuto
provisions are likely to remain such and subject to change with changes in the Draft
Articles’ provisions.
In The Span Terza case, considered earlier, Donaldson L.J. in the course of
of
argument suggested to counsel that his cause, which he sought to protect by means
now
ship arrest, would be equally well served by employing instead the device which
as
The Law Lord suggested that in the particular case such a device would be just
and
effective in preventing the respondents from removing the vessel from the jurisdiction
giving rise to the provision of security “...in exactly the same way as security will, no
This firstly raises the question as to what exactly is the Mareva Injunction? A
62 (1981) I Lloyd’s Rep. 225, at p. 229; Also: see: Powles, David G: The Mareva
Injunction and Associated Orders, Professional Books Limited, 1985, at p. 119;
O’Neill, Terry 0 :Mareva Injunctions, Lecture 22nd June 1982, Mareva Injunctions,
The Tower Hill London One day Conference, Lloyds of London Press, 1982, at p.9.
141
second question is whether such a device is available under Jamaican law? Thirdly, there
is the question as to how in fact does it compare to the facility of ship arrest? In the latter
case, the suggestions of Donaldson, L.J. makes such an inquiry particularly pertinent.
such, it continues until final disposition of the action or until a further order is made.M
65 It was actually
The Mareva Injunction took its name from an English case.
developed in 1975 in England largely through the judicial initiative of Lord Denning.
prior to trial to restrain the defendant from disposing of or dealing with his assets. This
appears throughout the literature of the Common Law as the rule that there shall be no
bluntly stated that :“ you cannot get an injunction to restrain a man from parting with his
property”.
The Mareva Doctrine developed out of the increasing need for swift judicial
63 See Appendix 18
64 See eg: Mc Allister, Debra M.: Mareva Injunctions, Carswell, Canada, p.9
65 Mareva
Companie Naviera SA v. International Bulcarriers S.A. The Mareva,
(1975) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; However, the Injunction was earlier granted in
Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageoris (1975) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 137
66 See eg: Mc AHister, op cit. p. 18; Lister & Co. v. Stubbs 1890, 45 Ch. D.!.
142
moving his assets out of the jurisdiction so as to render
action to prevent a person
Such assets may be anything that has a pecuniary value such as a ship. Indeed,
the Mareva injunction has for some time now been applied to ships.
68
The conditions for the grant of the Mareva Injunction are basically the following:
69
jurisdiction;
4. There must be a real danger that the defendant will remove the assets
As regards the jurisdiction for its grant, it may be noted that it developed in the
67 See:
Harvey, Brian: Judicial Interpretation in Commercial Law- The Proper
Limits of Judicial Inventiveness, Paper 11A2(b), 8th Commonwealth Law
Conference, Ocho Rios, Jamaica, September 7-13, 1986, at p.3
8
See eg. Clipper Maritime Co. Ltd of Monrovia v. Mineralimport export, Tje
Marie Lernhardt (1981) 3 All E.R. 307, (1981) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 458.; The Rena
K (1979) I All E.R. 397; (1979) 3 W.L.R. 431
See: generally, Powles, op.cit, chapter 2
143
the wide discretionary power granted by Section 45 of the Supreme
U K. based on
H...
A mandamus or injunction may be granted or a receiver appointed by
just of convenient...”
various English decisions on the Mareva Injunction observed in reference to the section
45 provision that:
“It is because that provision is in pan materia with section 49 (h) of the
Judicature Supreme Court Act, that it is thought that these decisions and the subsequent
learning on Mareva injunctions in the United Kingdom may, in a proper case, be given
effect in Jamaica”.
71
However, since that Article was written, applications for Mareva Injunctions
have been often made and granted in Jamaica. Thus the device is definitely available
70
Morrison, C. Dennis: Interim and Interlocutory Injunctions in the Supreme
Court, W.I.L.J., Vol. 9, No. 1, May 1985, 3.
71 Ibid., p.16
144
under the law of Jamaica and now is an important facility in the practice of law in
Jamaica. 72
The basis for the grant is as Morrison contemplated, Section 49 (h) of the
Judicature Supreme Court Act 1880. The Section 49(h) provisions are originally based
on Section 25(8) of the Judicature Act, 1873 (U.K.) which was Section 45 of the
The essential similarity between ship arrest and the Mareva Injunction is that they
and
both operate to restrain the movement Out of the jurisdiction of the ship concerned
However, there are clear distinctions between them, which, inter alia, will affect
the advantages one may have over the other in any given situatio
74 n.
Firstly, an injunction can only operate in personam. It does not operate to give
Hence, such assets are accordingly available to satisfy the claims of other
claim.
creditors. The plaintiff caunot treat such assets as security for his yet undetermined
But now see : Section 37 (1) of The Supreme Court Act, 1981 (U.K.)
See Powles, op. cit., pp 7-10
145
operates in
On the other hand, Arrest of the vessel by the plaintiff necessarily
Lord Justice
rem and gives a priority and a security which the Mareva does not.
before security
However, it would not have assisted the arrester in that case if
he would not
This, no doubt operated strongly on the mind of counsel when
as an actual
A second important distinction in that whereas Arrest operates
an order, being
Defendant not to do certain things with his assets, breach of such
Mareva Injunction
Thirdly, an arrest must fasten is to a particular asset whereas a
as a ship. In
the defendant’s arrest in the toto and a fortiori, to a particular asset such
ion may be
An application for an interlocutory order such as a Mareva injunct
146
made at any time before or after trial. “Arrest” as defined in the 1952 Arrest Convention
I
is not a post trial device although it may be said cynically that “arrest” in the non-forensic
sense of “detention”, merely goes by a different name when it takes place after trial,
that
is, “attachment”.
Generally, applications for the Mareva may not be made before a writ
is issued
but in cases of urgency, this may be done. For an arrest to take place, as earlier
shown, a
writ in rem is required. Thus in this respect a Mareva may lend itself
to greater dispatch.
keeping with the conditions for the grant of the injunction, mentioned
earlier. But, it
speedy action.
147
Overall, the advantages of the Mareva injunction as applied to ships when
1. It prevents whatever assets are covered in the injunction and not only
the ship from being removed from the jurisdiction. Thus it can
prohibit the movement of more than one ship. Arrest is of a particular ship
and no more. (To the extent that the Mareva Injunction can prohibit the
movement of more than one ship, it is contrary to the provisions of the 1952 Arrest
Convention
in its exercise are not high. Where the ship is arrested, the custody of the ship
is with the Bailiff of the Supreme Court and the overall costs inclusive of
maintenance and security while the ship is in such custody may be very
high.
ship requires the plaintiff to actually take out a writ in rem and file an
The list of ‘advantages” are based on a list set out by Tetly : See Tetly, William
Attatchment, the Mareva Injunction and saisse conservatoire, L.M.C.L.Q., February
1985, 59 at pp 79-80
148
affidavit.
following:
court and
p arr est , the shi p is phy sically put into the custody of the
1. By shi
r is in effect
unction, the owner or maste
placed with the Bailiff. With a Mareva inj
tempt of
his shi p, the onl y rem edy for breach of this order is con
ordered not to move
court
creditor
p is arr est ed, the cla im ant arrestor becomes a secured
2. Where a shi
t
the wr it in rem and his cla im will receive priority as of tha
from the date of the issue of
st in the
inj unc tio n doe s not giv e the plaintiff any security intere
date. The Mareva
s
ship or any priority over other claimant
149
Mareva
that the arr est or of a ship is subject to damages, whereas a
4. It is seldom
ified or
tio n wil l enta il a dam age s suit if it is shown to have been unjust
Injunc
abusive.
to be
of respective “advtages” that care has
It is clear from the foregoing list
ticular situatio n.
ensure that the mo re app rop riate device is employed for the par
taken to
weapon.
practice seems to be a more potent
On the whole the Arrest device in
n Courts...”
procedural device in the Caribbea
powerful
what extent the
at tim e has alre ady in Jam aica . It remains to see how and to
Th
TS
F: CONCLUDING COMMEN
150
maritime claimant. However, certain procedural requirements need to be adhered to in
The relevant procedural and other rules pertaining to ship arrest are largely
extended or sanctioned by the U.K. Rules of Court promulgated a century ago remain
basically unchanged.
There is doubt surrounding the applicability of present U.K. Rules where there
is lacunae in the local stipulations. Also, with extended legislation has come certain
tive
deficiencies inherent in U.K. law such as relate to that country’s attempt to give legisla
Jamaica, it seems, may have to resort to this Convention to deal with some of
Also, it has been shown that there are possibly adverse consequences for
In the case of Maritime Liens, the incorporation of a list of maritime liens as well
ntion
which had its roots in the provisions of Draft Articles for a new International Conve
and related issues such as ship arrest. The need to take note of the relevant Convention
provisions therefore can hardly be overemphasized. Also it seems that in the case of the
151
e amendments seem advisable.
extended provisions of the 1956 U.K. Act, legislativ
Arrest Convention.
maritime matters.
152
CHAPTER 5
153
CHAPTER 5
1. Introduction
(a) General
(i) General
(i) General
applied?
154
B: International Maritime Convention Provisions and Jurisdiction and Choice If
Law issues implications for Jamaican law and the maritime claimant.
-
C: Concluding Remarks
155
CHAPTER 5
1. Introduction
They may for instance relate to any one of the vast number of maritime contracts entered into
In Jamaica, such contractual claims may be those of shippers or seafarers against foreign
shipowners or a local assured against a foreign marine underwriter. Also the maritime claimant
156
Otherwise, a claim may arise because a tort was committed a certain distance from shore
thus falling within a particular nationally proclaimed maritime zone. Thus Jamaican fishermen
may for instance, wish to claim damages from a foreign carrier which has spilled oil a certain
In general, as ships are always moving to and from different countries and maritime
zones, while occupying their central position in various international maritime transactions and
In today’s shipping world, the ownership, master, crew, management and registry of a
In the fmal analysis, different legal systems of different states may have an interest in a
particular claim. A related issue might ultimately be as regards what one state or the other may
As such, there is a necessary interplay between the umbrella public international law
governing relationships between states and the narrower circumscribed municipal law,
especially the conflict of laws of the particular state(s) concerned as regards maritime claims.
For the maritime claimant in Jamaica these preliminary issues, in this context, ultimately
translate into questions as to the “Jurisdiction” (if any) exercisable by the Jamaican Court in
157
2. The Public International Law Context
This competence embraces jurisdiction to prescribe and proscribe, to adjudicate and enforce
the law.
3
At the most basic level, the raison d’eire for a state’s exercise of jurisdiction is that the
state has some relationship to, or interest in the person or property concerned.
4
jurisdiction of a state is predicated either on the fact that as every state has sovereignty within its
own territory, that state can control and regulate matters concerning all persons, property and
acts done within its territory, 6 or alternatively, that a state has a right to exercise jurisdiction
1 See eg: Ott, David H.: Public International Law if the Modem World Pitrnan, London, 1987 at p 135
2 See eg: Wallace, Rebecca M.M; International Law A Student Introduction, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1986
atp. 101
Ibid.
‘
See. Ott,op cit
See, Brownlie, Ian; Principles of Public International Law, 3rd Edn, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1983 at p. 298
6 ie the territoriality principle, see eg. Ott, op cit, p136 and Bates,John W: United Kingdoms Marine Pollution
Law, Lloyds
of London press Ltd; 1985 at p. 9.
ie the nationality principle, see Ott, op. cit, p138; Bates, ibid.
158
3. Municipal Law Considerations
(a) General
Jurisdiction from the municipal law perspective basically refers to the competence of a
Here the initial concern of the maritime claimant wifi be whether the selected court will
Accordingly, an initial question for any party to potential litigation in Jamaican Court has
If yes, the next question is whether the court will agree to exercise its jurisdiction.
Thirdly, there is the related question of whether the Jamaican Court will apply Jamaican
(in) General
jurisdiction in respect of any maritime claim is based on service of a writ of summons (or other
matter the Court is not concerned with the connection the parties have with Jamaica.
° Such
1
8 See eg: Cheshire and North: Private International Law, London, Butterworths, 1987, Chapter 11.
Ibid, also see generally Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 10th Edn, London, Steven & Sons Ltd,
Chapter
9&10.
10 Vide: ibid.
159
considerations may only be relevant to whether the court will exercise jurisdiction.
Thus, the mere service of the writ on the defendant will give the Jamaican Court power
to try an action which may have no factual connection with Jamaica or is otherwise
In Jamaica, Maritime claims may be brought against the person liable on the claim,
through an t
‘
a ction in personam” or against property (ship, cargo or freight) with which the
160
(ii) Actions in Personam
(1) if the defendant (or his agent) is served with a writ in Jamaica;
(3) where the court assures jurisdiction under its discretionary power to permit the
service of the writ outside the jurisdiction of the defendant (or his agent).
The circumstances under which the Jamaican Supreme Court may assume “extra-
territorial” jurisdiction, that is, grant permission for service of a writ outside the jurisdiction is
(c) any relief is sought against any person domiciled of ordinarily resident within the
jurisdiction; or
.(e) the action is founded on any breach or alleged breach, within the jurisdiction, of and
contract wherever made, which according to the terms thereof ought to be executed according to
161
(ee) the action is founded on a tort committed within the jurisdiction
(g) any person out of the jurisdiction is a necessary or proper party to an action properly
brought against some other person duly served within the jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain an Admiralty action in rem if the writ is
served on the res in Jamaica or is deemed to have been duly served on the defendant.
14
(in) General
A mere balance of convenience is not sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the
(a) continuance of the proceedings will cause injustice to the defendant and,
See: chapter 4 and The Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Jamaica in the Admiralty Jurisdiction,
Rules 1 and 5.
162
Lord Diplock stated the applicable considerations thus:
(a) the defendant must satisfy the court that there is another forum to whose jurisdiction
he is amenable in which justice can be done between the parties at substantially less
(b) the stay must not deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage
One ground on which the court may be asked to interfere by staying Jamaican
proceedings is that simultaneous actions are pending in Jamaica and in a foreign country
between the same parties and involving the same or similar issues.
The court may be asked to stay an action in Jamaica in two distinct situations:
(a) where the same plaintiff sues the same defendant in Jamaica and abroad: or
163
r
The common law position is that where a contract provides that all disputes between the
parties are to be referred to the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal, the local court should
stay proceedings instituted in breach of such agreement, unless the plaintiff proves that it is just
(i) General
The presence of a foreign element of any kind in any dispute raises the possibility that
foreign law may be used by the Jamaican Court to resolve that dispute.
In order to determine which rules of foreign law (if any) are to be applied, a court will
classify a maritime claim or issue and attach to it its concomitant choice of law rule.
if the issue is a procedural one, then the law to be applied is the lex fori.
19 if it is a
substantive law issue the choice of law rule is selected and applied as is appropriate to the claim.
What rule is appropriate will depend on whether for instance, the claim is one arising from
18 See: Oland, A. Barry: Forum non conveniens in Canada: The Common Law position, The Federal Court of
Canada,
suggested Reform, Meredith Memorial Lectures, Richard de Boo Publishers, 1987; Dicey and Morris, op.
Cit., p255
19 the law of the forum or court in which the cases is tried.
164
(ii) Maritime Contracts
The basic principle applicable in Jamaica is that, subject to statutory provisions (if any),
and public policy considerations, issues will be referred to their proper law. Each maritime
states that:
the legal system by which the essential validity of a contract must be determined is
The proper law of the contract is the system of law by which the partied intended their
contract to be governed, or, where the intention is neither expressed nor to be inferred from the
circumstances, the system of law with which the transaction had its closest and most real
°
2
connection.
The law that governs maritime torts depends upon whether they have been committed
within the territorial waters of some state or upon the high seas”.
22
see eg. Scott, A:W:: Private International Law, (Conflict of Laws), 1979 at p. 208 quoting Dicey.
21 op cit.
165
If the tort is committed in the territorial waters of some foreign state, then the ordinary
As a general rule,
23 an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as such in
(a) actionable as a tort according to Jamaican law (lex fori) or to put it differently, is an
(b) actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it was done (lex loci
delicti commissi)
24
Thus, according to the common law position, where torts are committed within Jamaican
Where the tort is committed in the territorial sea of a foreign state, the locus delicti is
deemed to be the littoral state rather than the country of the ship’s flag and the applicable law is
For acts committed on the High Seas a distinction is made between torts having
consequences external to the ship and those having purely internal consequences.
In the latter case, the maritime claimant who sues in Jamaica, in respect of acts, all of
which have occurred on board a single foreign vessel, must prove that the conduct of the
defendant was actionable by the law of the flag and that it would have been actionable had it
Ibid.,p
The exceptional circumstances relate to where resort may also be had to the law of another country if this has
the most
significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties; see Dicey and Morris, p 927.
the law of the place where a tort has been committed, see Scott, op. cit; p.7
166
occurred in Jamaica.
All other acts occurring on the high seas and later put in Suit in Jamaica must be tested
(in) General
26
basis.”
Although this statement remains apposite today, there are a number of maritime
conventions with provisions dealing directly with the question of Jurisdictions and/or rather
Even where such issues are not at all adverted to by any provision in a maritime
convention, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law jurisprudential ramifications may yet be inferred for
Of the various Conventions dealing more directly with issues of Jurisdiction and (to a
lesser extent) Choice of Law, Jamaica is only party to those pertaining to the Law of the Sea.
In the case of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
167
Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of collision, 1952, provisions of this Convention have
slipped into Jamaican Law by way of extended Imperial Statutory provisions. This is by virtue
extending provisions of The Administration of Justice Act, 1956, (UK) which gave legislative
Convention Zone on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958 28 and The Geneva
Generally, these Conventions raise somewhat different issues as regards Jurisdiction and
Choice of law than the rest of the Conventions, provisions pertaining to such issues.
Accordingly, it is convenient for this reason as well as the fact that Jamaica is only a
party to the Law of the Sea Conventions to first consider for purposes of analysis these
However, as the relevant provisions of the two Geneva Conventions have been
essentially reproduced in the more recent and comprehensive Montego Bay Convention,
discussion will primarily be focused on the provisions of the Montego Bay Convention.
27 JamaicaratifiedMarch2l, 1983
Jamaica acceed October 8, 1965
Jamaica acceed October 8, 1965
168
(2) Law of the Sea Conventions
with the
Only one of the very extensive Montego Bay Convention deals exclusively
provides as
This Article is captioned ‘Civil Jurisdiction in relation to foreign ships. It
follows:
h the
1. The coastal state should not stop or divert a foreign ship passing throug
ship.
purpose of
2. The coastal state may not levy execution against or arrest the ship for the
or incurred by
any civil proceedings, save only in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed
of the coastal
the ship itself in the course or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters
state.
execution
3. Paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the right of the coastal state to levy
in the territorial
against or to arrest for the purpose of civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying
sea, or passing through the territorial sea after leaving international waters.”
person is
Accordingly, where a writ has been issued against a particular person, of that
stopping or
known to be on board a ship passing through the Jamaican Territorial Waters, the
169
diverting of the ship for the purpose of serving a writ (or other originating process) on such a
Thus, one may sardonically picture a frustrated maritime claimant sitting on a Jamaican
beach with his high powered binoculars, watching and lamenting: “there he goes cruising
through again! !“
Where a ship is not lying in or passing through the territorial sea on its way from local
internal waters (or otherwise within local jurisdiction) it may only be arrested in respect of
obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the purpose
preceding chapter.
One basic objective of the Article, it appears, is to ensure that innocent passage through
the territorial Sea is not fettered by the application of the littoral state’s civil jurisdiction. (There
is less restraint imposed on the coastal state as regards exercise of its criminal jurisdiction in
Article 28 (3) uses the expression “lying in the territorial sea”. Presumably this is not
If “lying” is to be taken to mean “stationary simpliciter” then it seems to the writer that
this would run counter to the objective referred to in light of Article 18 (2) of the Convention.
,
170
“Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and
anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary by force majeure or distress
or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger of distress”
Hence, if a vessel has stopped and is thus stationary, in the territorial sea solely for the
deemed as “lying” in the territorial sea so as to render it amenable to arrest, if it was not so
amenable before stopping. This appears to be so, since the good Samaritan vessel would be still
Although, clearly, it would be literally lying in the sense of being stationary in the
territorial sea.
It should be noted that except for a minor cosmetic change the third paragraph, Article
28 is identical in wording to that of its predecessor, Article 20 of the 1958 Convention on The
Further, Article 20 is already enacted into Jamaican Statute Law: Schedule to The
Territorial Sea Act, 1971. This Act was passed to give effect to the provisions of the said
As regards Article 20, SectionS of The Territorial Sea Act under the caption,”
“Nothing shall be lawful to any extent to which it is inconsistent with any provisions of
the convention in so far as they are restrictive of the taking, pursuant to Jamaica’s sovereignty
171
over The territorial sea of measures for the purposes of the execution of civil process of the
The territorial sea itself qua maritime zone within national jurisdiction, ipso facto,
ultimately entails consequences for the maritime claimant as regards Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law issues.
Starke 30 notes that “For the purpose of territorial jurisdiction, besides actual territory, it
Here, it should be borne in mind the provisions of Article 2 of the Montego Bay Convention
which (like its predecessor Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
“The sovereignty of a coastal state extends beyond its land territory and internal
“Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
The extent to which this is done by a particular state is left up to its municipal law. In the
case of Jamaica, its territorial sea breadth has already been established by The Territorial Sea
Act.
172
Section 3 (2) of this Act provides that:
“The territorial sea shall be twelve miles in breadth or have such other breadth as may be
prescribes”.
The Jamaican Parliament was empowered to pass such legislation in accordance with the
provisions of Section 3 of the First Schedule to The Jamaica Independence Act, 1962,
(U.K.)
Section 3 provides that : “The legislature of Jamaica shall have full power to make laws
Despite this provision, it appears that up to the time of the passage of The territorial Sea
Act, the prerogative of the Crown, (that is, the English Monarch), to prescribe the limits of
Jamaica’s Territorial Sea was still intact or at least the position as regards this was not
unequivocal was in light of Jamaica’s constitutional status as a monarchy and the position at
common law as regards the Crown’s prerogative to delimit maritime territorial bounderies.
bounderies of the territorial sea as regards the possible enforcement of a maritime claim.
Accordingly: it is only appropriate that such powers should vest indubitably and solely
Thus, Section 6 (1) of The Territorial Sea Act vests the relevant Minister with power,
173
inter alia, to defme the limits of the Territorial sea (per sub-paragraph (b) and to prescribe
“anything authorised or required by this Act to be prescribed” (per sub-paragraph (f)). Most
importantly, Section 7 of the Act stipulates: “This Act binds the Crown”.
Accordingly, Henriques 32 observes that: “In Jamaica the prerogative right of the
Crown to determine the maritime boundary of the state and the limits of the territorial sea has
been abrogated by statute. The Crown has lost the right to extend the sovereignty of the state
beyond its land territory by virtue of the Act. The prerogative power of the Crown has been
replaced by the statute. The extent of the Sovereignty of the State of Jamaica has been fixed by
the Territorial Sea Act, which can only be altered by an amending Act of Parliament”.
33
The net result is that Jamaica’s sovereignty is extended to the 12 miles breadth of the
Territorial Sea and the power to affect such breadth resides solely with the Jamaican Parliament.
Further, where there are Adjectival law or conflict of Laws stipulations which refer to “in
Jamaica” or “the jurisdiction”, or whose ramifications relate to the territorial extent of Jamaica
and its waters, then such stipulations, prima facis, bring into issue the territorial sea of Jamaica
Such considerations as will be shown shortly are particularly relevant to questions such
as those of the exercise of the court’s assumed or extra-territorial jurisdiction and Choice of
Henriques, R.N.A.: The Jurisdiction of the Courts in Territorial Waters, 3.L.J. July 1975, p. 46
Ibid.,p51
174
“Since the sovereignty of Jamaica is extended to the breadth of the territorial sea,
concomitantly, its laws, both common law and statute are similarly extended. It follows by
parity of reasoning that the Laws of Jamaica will be applicable to all persons found in the
Territorial sea”
From this it is clear that the restraints placed in respect of the exercise of civil jurisdiction
In this context Starke indicates that provisions such as those of Article 28 “... impose
limitations on the jurisdictional rights of the coastal state in the interests of minimizing
A significant feature of the Law of the Sea traditionally is its division of international
maritime space into zone which fit neatly into a dichotomy of being within or beyond national
36
jurisdiction.
O’Connel notes that “The division of the sea into various zones which in modern
parlance are zones of “national jurisdiction” or “beyond national jurisdiction” has meant that
there are varying scales of competence of coastal states and shipping states over things,
The territorial sea and internal waters are well established zones of national jurisdiction.
Thus, expect where there are particular derogations from the littoral state’s jurisdictional rights,
Ibid., p 50
Opcit, at p. 265
O’Connel, D.P.: The International Law of the Sea, Clarendon Press, 1984, vols 1&2
Ibis., p. 733 (Vol.2).
175
in accordance with international law, ships and persons entering such zones are normally
Internal Waters encompass ports, harbours, lakes and canals and generally the baselines
exercise of civil jurisdiction in these waters has been noted in respect of Ports.
Starke states:
“The general rule is that a merchant vessel enters a port of a foreign state subject to the
local jurisdiction. The derogations from this rule depend on the practice followed by each state.
There is, however, an important exception which belongs to the field of customary international
law, namely that a vessel in distress has a right to seek shelter in a foreign poet, and on account
of the circumstances of its entry is considered immune from local jurisdiction, subject perhaps
to the limitation that no deliberate breaches of local municipal law are committed while in port.
On the other hand, some authorities concede only a qualified immunity to such vessels”.
39
It cannot be said with any certainty what approach would be taken in Jamaica in such
However, largely on an apriori basis, it seems to the writer that it would be unlikely that
such a claimed immunity would easily move a court to say, order the release of a vessel that has
38 Vide: Article 8, Montigo Bay Convention; Churchill, R:R and Lowe, A.V.: The Law of the Sea,
Manchester University Press, 1st edn, 1983, at p. 45; Akehurst op cit., at p. 26<; Shaw, Malcom:
International Law, 1977, London, at pp 239-240
op cit, at p267
176
been arrested in such alleged circumstances.
This is, so because of the evidentiary questions involved and if such a claimed immunity
was to easily succeed then this would conceivably open the floodgates for such immunity
claims in the future. In time perhaps what would have started as an immunity based on noble
considerations would conceivably degenerate into a mere “defence” in the armoury of legal
councsel.
Although, admittedly there is a strong parallel between this situation and the hypothetical
situation discussed as regards a ship stationary but presumably not “lying” in the Territorial Sea
Other traditional maritime zoned include the High Seas which is outside national
jurisdiction.
Importantly, the Montego Bay Convention has introduced the concept of the Exclusive
Although the Convention is not yet in force, this concept is generally regarded as now
It is being contended by the writer that this new concept may ultimately have significant
See generally: Attard, David: The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, Claredon Press Oxford,
1987, chap. 8;
Lupinacci, Julio Cesar: The Legal States of the Exclusive Economic Zone in the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the
Sea and Schreiber, Alfonso Arias: The Exclusive Economic Zone: Its Legal Nature and the Problem of
Military Uses,
Chapters 6&7 respectively of: Vienna Francisco Ouuego: The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Latin American
Perspective,
Western Press U.S.A. 1984
177
jurisprudential ramifications as regards Jurisdiction and Choice of Law issues under Jamaican
Law.
This is so as, inter alia, it appears to disturb the traditional and more jurisprudentially
convenient dichotomy of maritime zones being clearly within or beyond national jurisdiction.
Yet, some of the rules which arise in the context of the Conflict of Laws seem to be, inter alia,
Article 55 provides the captain “specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone” as
follows:
“The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,
subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and
jurisdiction of the coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other states are governed by the
Article 56, captioned “Rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal state in the exclusive
178
economic zone” provides:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard
to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other
States and shall act in a maimer compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. ...
Article 58 deals with Rights and duties of other states in the E.E.Z.
Here, all states are granted certain freedoms of communication as pertains to the High
179
However, states are required to .. . ‘comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the
coastal state in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of
international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this part”
Article 86 in reference to Part 7 of the Convention which deals with the High Seas states
that:
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive zone, in the territorial sea, or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic
state. This article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all states on the
Accordingly, the E.E.Z. is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, constituted
by a part of the sea not included in the high seas and subject to a specific legal regime
embracing:
(2) other rights and duties contemplated in the convention as appertaining to the coastal
state;
(3) jurisdiction of the coastal state as regards specified matters such as protection and
180
r
From the foregoing, one is prompted to ask to whom really does the zone belong?
Related to this is the issue of to whom may be attributed the so-called residual rights, that is,
those rights which are not expressly conferred either on the coastal state nor on other states.
These issues are of relevance in the present context because the convention does not
specifically address the question of the exercise of civil jurisdiction in or regarding the
41
E.E.Z.
This seeming omission from the convention could simply be because the issue does not
Alternatively, despite any express reference to the exercise of civil jurisdiction pertaining
to the E.E.Z., inferences as regards such exercise may nevertheless be drawn upon perusal of
At this point, the provisions of Article 59 should be noted. Importantly, they attempt to
Article 59 provides:
“In cases where this convention does not attribute rights of jurisdiction to the coastal
state or to other states within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the
interests of the coastal state and any other state or states, the conflict should be resolved on the
41 Church hill and Lowe, op cit, at p. 129 for instance indicates that if the E.E.Z. is deemed To have a residual
territorial
sea character, then a presumption would arise: ‘that nay activity not falling within the clearly defined rights
of non-
coastal states would come under the jurisdiction of the coastal state”.
181
basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the
respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international
community as a whole’.
This was the closest the convention comes (and apparently could have come
) in
42
It is clear from its wording that Article 59 does not resolve the residual rights question.
Essentially, the Article merely proffers resort to equitable principles in resolving disputes
between states when in fact the matter of residual rights do come into issue.
Thus Article 59, in effect, leaves open for instance, the question as to whether the littoral
state has rights under international law to prescribe and enforce rules in the E.E.Z. as regards
say, ship arrest in a manner analogous to and in extrapolation of such right in The Territorial
Sea.
So, in spite of Article 59, there is still the basic question of whether the E.E.Z. is a zone
exercise its civil jurisdiction territorially over the zone, as it does over the Territorial Sea.
from the territorial sea and the high seas although containing elements of both.
Thus Lupinacci states in reference to the Law of the Sea Conference and the zone:
“In the view of the great majority of the delegates, participating in the conference, the
182
Exclusive Economic Zone is not a part either of the territorial sea or of the high seas; it is a zone
sui generis, with a statute of its own that does not fit into the classic moulds.
44
Schreiber argues 5 that the E.E.Z. is not only a zone sui generis but also a zone of
national jurisdiction.
1. the nature of the concepts used to characterise the zone, that is, “sovereign rights”,
and “rights of sovereignty” and importantly that of “jurisdiction as used in Article 56(1)(b);
2. the scope of the rights ascribed to the coastal state in the E.E.Z., which leaves to other
states only the freedom of international communications the exercise of which is itself limited;
3. related to (2), a balancing of the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state against the
freedoms and rights of other states in the E.E.Z., from both a qualitative and quantitative
viewpoint tilts the scale a great deal in favour of the coastal state;
4. the powers accorded to the coastal state to ensure compliance with its laws and
regulations in cases expressly provided for, including the visit, inspection and seizure of
5. the great majority of coastal countries consider the E.E.Z.a zone of national
6. the prevailing opinion today is that due to geographical, economic, social and security
considerations, the coastal state has a right superior to that of any other over resources of its
Ibid., p105
Ibid.
183
adjacent seas and to protect other interests of its population within a zone not exceeding 200
miles;
7. the uses of third states are marginal with respect to this zone, in which they do not
exercise any special competence but only jurisdiction over their own vessels; and
8. the continental shelf is a zone of national jurisdiction and as the seabed and subsoil
sector of the E.E.Z. is indistinguishable from the continental shelf up to a distance of 200 miles
from the relevant baselines and also since that sector of the E.E.Z. along with its superjacent
If indeed the zone is one of national jurisdiction, then this would imply that the coastal
state would have the blessing of international law to pass laws relating to the exercise of its civil
jurisdiction so as to fully affect foreigners or vessels in the zone, subject to any derogations
However, Attard, while acknowledging the sui generis character of the zone, warns of
the danger as well as questions the validity in modern times of dividing up world maritime
He asserts:
The division of the oceans today on the basis of sovereignty, however, is a solution as
dangerous and as obsolete as the maintenance of an unrestricted concept of the freedom of the
seas. Clearly, therefore, neither sovereignty nor freedom today provides an acceptable basis for
a viable regime to regulate uses of the sea beyond the territorial sea
46
184
Lupinacci observes that:
“the classic clean-out division between maritime spaces, subject either to the statute of
sovereignty or to the statute of freedom, has been left behind by the evolution of the Law of the
47
Sea”.
“...there is a distribution of residual rights in favor of the coastal state with respect,
essentially to economic and associated interests and in favor of all states with respect to the
interest of international communication. There remains the no-man’s-land, which would seem
to be constituted of other interests with no well defined legal protection and governed by the
provision of Article 59, whose application to each specific case may give rise at the time to
interpretation”.
serious difficulties of 48
The precise legal states of the E.E.Z. is clearly enmeshed in doubt. State practice or
further international rules might in time help to clarify the matter. Hence, in the context of this
chapter sweeping generalization as regards the effect of the new concept would seem
inadvisable.
Nevertheless, in so far as Article 56 (1)(b) specifically invests the coastal state with
jurisdiction in respect of a number of matters, it seems to the writer that littoral states are at least
competent to extend their civil jurisdiction to encompass such matters as they pertain to the
E.E.Z.
185
Perusal by the writer of various post-convention national enactments
49 on the E.E.Z.
did not reveal any specific reference to the exercise of state civil jurisdiction in the zone.
, Indonesia 51,
Typically, in the various enactments such as those of the U.S.S.R.
50
jurisdiction in the E.E.Z. over the matters mentioned under Article 56 (l)(b).
54
underway.
While, specific reference need not be made to the exercise of civil jurisdiction in such a
bill, it is the writer’s submission that the declaration of an E.E.Z. should be followed up by
alterations being made to particular Jamaican Conflict of Laws rules pertaining to maritime
claims.
Thus, the statutory requirement for the exercise of the court’s extra-territorial jurisdiction
It should stipulate that torts committed within the E.E.Z. and failing within the ambit of
those matters embraced by Article 56 (1) (b) should be deemed as committed within the
As reproduced in. The Law of the Sea: Notional Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
Exclusive fishery Zone, U.N.. New York, 1986; See also: Moore, Gerald: Coastal State requirements for
foreign fishing, FAO Legislative Study 21 Rev. 3. Rome, 1988
50 Decree of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Economic Zone of 28 February 1984
51
52 act No 15/1984 of 12 November 1984 on the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone.
Proclamation 5030, 10 March 1983 by the President of the United States of America.
See eg. daily Gleaner Report, January 13, 1989 at p.2 The Bill appears to be at its very formative and
“confidential” stage and thus attempts by the writer to procure a copy of what has been done so for was
unsuccessful.
186
Similar considerations should also apply in respect of the application of Choice of Law
Both conflict of Laws issues are in fact presently reside on the traditional dichotomy of
An oil spill in a state’s E.E.Z. clearly runs afoul that state’s interests in protecting and
Hence, Jamaica, when it enacts E.E.Z.legislation ought to ensure that there are no
compensation arising from such a spill, say twenty miles from shore.
It is obvious that Jamaica has nothing to loose by declaring such a zone. Although,
resources of relatively limited economic value, has never been particularly enthusiastic about the
However, it ought to see the matter of the Commission of maritime torts such as the
spilling of oil in its E.E.Z. as cogent reason to enact E.E.Z. legislation and concomitant
jurisdictional provisions to protect its interest in having its nationals obtain compensation from,
say, delinquent shipowners’ for damage and losses sustained of a result of such a spill.
See: Rattray, K:o:, Kirton; A and Robinson, P. The effect of the Existing Law of the Sea on the Caribbean
Region and the Gulf of Mexico, in Pacem in Maribus: Caribbean Study and Dialogue 256-257 (Borgese, E.
(Ed) 1974); Lewis, Vaughan A: The Interests of the Caribbean Countries and the Law of the Sea
Negotiations in Maritime Issues in the Caribbean, Thabvala, Farrokh (Ed), 1,3.; and Hyman, Hugh: The
Common Heritage of Mankind, LLB dissertation (unpiublished) U.W.I. Cave Hill, Barbados, pp 94-97.
187
As the law stands at present, if such an oil spill was to take place one hundred miles
from shore causing extensive damage to fisheries stocks up to a distance of thy, fifteen miles
from shore then the tort is deemed to have taken place outside of Jamaica’s jurisdiction.
It appears to the writer, that such an issue may also be seen in terms of whether or not
laws dimension. In any event, it would have to be made to the Jamaican private international
law rules.
This is so because assuming that there is a cause of action, then it is probable that such a
ship, its master, owner and crew would not be within the reaches of the courts normal territorial
jurisdiction.
“unfortunately for the potential plaintiff in an oil pollution case, the chances of the ship
which caused the damage, or a sister ship or its owner or master being within the jurisdiction at
some time after the writ has been issued are not very great”.
57
This therefore rules out the ship’s arrest as well as that of service within the jurisdiction.
The only alternative would thus be to attempt to effect service out of the jurisdiction.
Abecasis, David William: The Law and Practice relating to Oil Pollution from Ships, London, Butterworths,
1978.
Thid., p. 152.
188
Here, the most relevant basis for seeking to obtain the court’s necessary blessing for
service outside the jurisdiction, is likely to be That “the action is founded on a tort committed
But, with the law in its present state, such a spill would be deemed to have been
Thus it is being submitted that changes in the relevant procedural and private
international law rules should ultimately be effected so as to ensure the efficacy of the court’s
exercise of its civil jurisdiction in respect of the E.E.Z. and specifically the Article 56 (1)(b)
matters:
(1) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
This is because of the grave danger that would be posed to the island’s tourist industry,
economy and general well being if there was a large oil spill affecting in particular the island’s
beautiful beaches.
Vide: supra
To Date, Jamaican beaches have been largely free of oil pollution. A Study conducted between 1980-1983
has confirmed this: vide: Wade, Barry A., Provan, Maura and Gillet, Vincent Oil Pollution of Jamaican
Coastal Waters and Beaches: Results of the IOCARIBE/CARIPOL Monitoring Programme (Jamaica), 1980-
1983, Carib. J. Sci 23(1): 93-104 (1987)
189
Thus, Ratiray, in reference to the Caribbean, has alluded to the potential for oil spill
aid pollution... .thereby threatening the lifeline of the economies of many of the states,
In such circumstances, it would be absolutely vital that the island’s own laws do not
Since the adoption of the Montego Bay Convention, two international treaties have
provisions pertaining to the E.E.Z.. which lend support to the writer’s foregoing
incorporated
submissions.
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 as
amended by its 1984 Protocol and the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 as amended by its 1984
Protocol.
Article 2 of the 1969 Liability Convention (as amended by Article 3 of its 1984 Protocol)
provides that:
(i) in the territory, including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State, and
Ranray, K.O.: Law of the Sea and its implications for the Caribbean, Port News, 1983, p.6.
61 Ibid.
190
r
s the jurisdiction to
provision “... felt that recent developments in international law gave state
63
states of jurisdiction over areas beyond the territorial sea”.
64
compensation for oil pollution damage.
191
in the E.E.Z. or its equivalent, is actionable locally and/or the form of extending the court’s civil
jurisdiction to include specified torts, committed within the E.E.Z. affecting the preservation of
Whichever option is utilized, the effect would be to ensure that not only the court would
have jurisdiction over the matter, but that Jamaican law would be applied.
Another aspect of the Montigo Bay Convention that is of particular relevance to the
issues under discussion in this chapter, is its provisions in respect of the nationality of ships.
“Every state shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of
the state whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the state
Article 92 (1) provides that: “Ships sail under the flag of one state only and, save in
exceptional Cases.. .shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas”.
Article 94 deals with the duties of the flag state and provides.
“1. Every state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
192
(a) maintain a register of ships...
(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and its master,
officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning the
ship...”
The quoted provisions are similar to those contained in Articles 5 and 6 of the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 1958 which never came into force. However as Singh 65 notes
“since the preamble of the convention declares that its provisions are based on ‘established
principles of international law’, it may be regarded as stating the existing law on the
subject” 66
The effect of the Montego Bay Convention provisions and their Geneva predecessor,
and as reflected in state practice, have been to leave it up to the particular state to determine the
Braekhus, for instance notes that the genuine link demand .“is somewhat vague...and
..
193
The fact that in practice, shipowners’ often choose national flags for their ships with
impunity that, in accordance with the quoted provisions, they likewise make choices as regards
the national jurisdiction and law to which they wish to may be subject, as regards, for instance a
The choice of a flag is a choice of legal affiliation to a certain state, and, as for as that
This can lead to unsavory consequences in the application of Jamaica’s maritime conflict of
laws rules.
Basically, a Jamaican Court may be obliged by its Choice of Law rules to apply the law
of a Flag of Convenience Country in circumstances where there is virtually no link with that
The only link might well be the fact of paper registration of the vessel in the Registry of
This might typically operate against a Jamaican seafarer working on such a vessel.
It is not proposed to delve any further into the problems posed by the loophole provided
Suffice to say, however, that whenever Jamaica’s choice of Law rules require resort to
Ibid., p. 282
Thus Nye notes that although the Law of the Sea requires a “genuine link”, “...in practice simply entry into
a register may be enough Nye, Daniel A: Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, Lecture: The Norwegian
“:
194
r
the law of the flag then this may discreetly brings into play the relevant provisions of the
Subsequent attempts to give more substance to the “genuine link” requirement have on
the whole had the effect of giving legal blessing to open registries and flags of convenience.
The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1986 seem to
country. Its ship registration requirements are governed by Part 1 of the Merchant Shipping
Act,1894, (U.K.)
Vide: Hyman, Hugh: Legal Insight Column, Caribbean Shipping Journal, November 1987, pp. 31)32.
195
(3) OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION PROVISIONS
(a) An Overview
with issues of jurisdiction and choice of law. Unlike the just discussed Law of the Sea
provisions, the provisions to be now considered generally tend to address these issues more
This Convention provides that “national law” shall govern a number of specified matters
This national law means in effect that of the country of the ship’s flag in keeping with the
Article 94 (2) provisions of the Montego Bay Convention, discussed earlier. Indeed, the ILO
the provisions of the seamen’s Articles Convention has stated that the terms of maritime
employment contracts should be subject to the law of the state of registration. This generally
196
ensuring that the agreement shall not contain any stipulation by which the parties
This Article appears to be directed against the use of the Jurisdiction Clause 72 device to
circumvent the intent of the Convention to inter alia, ensure a minimum amount of protection is
However, it appears that the flag shopping shipowner is able to avoid any inconvenient
effect of this stipulation by choosing an appropriate flag of convenience, such as one that is not
Article 3 provides for the immunity of specified State-owned vessels from inter alia,
arrests or in rem proceedings, thus, in effect, precluding the exercise of another state court’s
197
Article 3, however goes on to provide as follows:
‘Nevertheless, claimants shall have the right to proceed before the appropriate Courts of
the State which owns or operates the ships in the following cases:
(ii) Claims in respect of salvage or in the nature of salvage and in respect of general
average;
(iii) Claims in respect of repairs, supplies or other contracts relating to the ship:
and the State shall not be entitled to rely upon any immunity as a defense...”
The same rules apply to State-owned cargoes carried on board the State-owned ships
The other non-immune State-owned ships, generally those operated for commercial
purposes, are as regards its liabilities and obligations, subject to the same rules relating to the
immunity along the lines reflected in the provisions referred to. It is not clear what precise
approach the Jamaican Courts will take, although one may surmise that they will probably
198
T embrace some sort of a restrictive approach to sovereign immunity. There appears to be no
However, the Solicitor General of Jamaica and former Rapporteur at the last law of the
but, as articulated, it prejudges the legitimacy of certain areas of State activities. It may
well be that the state should be placed in the same position of ordinary individuals in
respect of all activities. It is then that both the ends of justice and non-differentiation
(a) either before the Court where the defendant has his habitual residence or a place of
business;
(b) or before the Court of the place where arrest has been effected of the defendant ship
or of any other ship belonging to the defendant which can be lawfully arrested, or where
arrest could have been effected and bail or other security has been furnished;
199
(c) or before the court of the place of collision when the collision has occurred within
Collision cases by nature tend to be the most amenable to forum shopping. This is so
because of the potentially large number of legal contacts such incidents can have with different
legal systems, thus rendering courts of different states competent to exercise jurisdiction in the
matter.
For the forum shopping maritime claimant it appears Article 1(b) allows him the most
scope for ‘shopping” as he can hold strain after a collision incident and simply wait until the
The state court of such a place will have jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of
Article 1(b). However, it may elect not to exercise such jurisdiction on the basis of forum non
Importantly, provisions of this Convention have been given effect in Jamaican law,
although, as noted, Jamaica is not a party to this Convention. This is by virtue of the extension
of the provisions of Section 4 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956 (U:K:) to Jamaica,
The Section 4 provisions gave legislative effect in the U:K: to provisions of the
Convention. The U:K: had earlier become a party to this Convention but never at the time, or
200
Despite the existence of the section 4 provisions in its law which are ultimately based
Section 4 of the Administration ofJustice Act, 1956 U:K: as adapted and extended to
(1) No court in Jamaica shall entertain an action in personam to enforce a claim to which
this section applies until any proceedings previously brought by the plaintiff in any court
outside Jamaica against the same defendant in respect of the same incident or series of incidents
(3) The preceding provisions of this section shall apply to counter-claims (not being
counter-claims in proceedings arising out of the same incident or series of incidents) as they
apply to actions in personam, but as if the references to the plaintiff and the defendant were
respectively references to the plaintiff on the counter- claim and the defendant to the counter
claim.
(4) The preceding provisions of this section shall not apply to any action or counter
claim of the defendant thereto submits or has agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.
(5) Subject to the provision of sub-section (2) of this section, the Supreme Court of
Jamaica shall have jurisdiction to entertain an action in personam to enforce a claim to which the
section applies whenever any of the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection
(1) of this section are satisfied, and the rules of court relating to the service of process outside
201
the jurisdiction shall make such provisions as may appear.
(7) The claims to which this section applies are claims for damage, loss of life or
personal injury arising out of a collision between ships or out of the carrying out of or omission
to carry out a manoeuvre in the case of one or more of two or more ships or out of non
compliance, on the part of one or more of two or more ships, with the collision regulations.
(8) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that this section applies in relation to
the jurisdiction of any court not being Admiralty jurisdiction, as well as in relation to its
From this it is clear that the provisions of Article 1 of the Convention, with the exception
Overall Section 4 deals with “Jurisdiction in personam of courts in collision and other
cases” 76
Accordingly, Article 1 (b) dealing as it does with in rem jurisdiction is beyond its scope.
Moreover, English law as well as that of Jamaica in any event already allowed for the
Basically, section 4 (1) lays down the essential conditions for the exercise of the courts
‘ See: Cloumn2, Second Schedule, The Admiralty Jurisdiction (Jamaica) Order in Council, 1962
76 per marginal note, see also section 4(7); “other cases” presumably includes Allision cases.
202
encompasses the Territorial Sea of Jamaica. The sub-section also applies the principle of res
77
judicata,
Sub-sections 2-4 of Section 4 deals with the matter of lis alibi pendens.
They clearly require the Jamaican Supreme Court to stay proceedings where proceedings
between the two parties instituted in some foreign country in respect of the same matter are in
esse.
The court is required to so act except where a defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the
court.
Sub-sections 2-4 of section 4 largely relate to Article 1(2) and 3 of the Convention.
A claimant shall not be allowed to bring a further action against the same defendant on
the same facts in another jurisdiction, without discontinuing an action already instituted.
Article 3 provides:
(1) Counterclaims arising out of the same collision can be brought before the Court
having jurisdiction over the principal action in accordance with the provisions of Article 1.
(2) In the event of there being several claimants, any claimant may bring his action
before the Court previously seized of an action against the same party arising out or the same
collision.
(3) In the case of a collision or collisions in which two or more vessels are involved
‘n persection4(1)(c)
203
nothing in this Convention shall prevent any Court seized of an action by reason of the
provisions of this Convention, from exercising jurisdiction under its national laws in further
It therefore appears that the provisions of sub-sections 2-4 are in keeping with or at
Section 4 (5) contemplated the making of Rules of Court relating to the assumption of
In keeping with the overall provisions of Section 4, such Rules ought to stipulate that
the court may assume jurisdiction over a claim for damage, loss of life or personal injury arising
(a) the defendant has his habitual residence or a place of business in Jamaica; or
(b) the cause of action arose within the territorial waters, including any port, dock or
harbour in Jamaica;
(c) an action arising out of the same incident or series of incidents is proceeding in the
78
See clicey and Morris, Op. Cit., Rule 24 (18), p. 226; Order 75, Rule 4, Rules of the Supreme Court (U.K.).
204
As regards (b), when Jamaica enacts its E.E.Z. legislation, then this stipulation should be
extended to take account of the Articles 56 (1) (b) stipulations of the Montego Bay Convention,
discussed earlier.
Then, where for instance a collision takes place in the E.E.Z. resulting in pollution of the
marine environment, the court would be able to assume jurisdiction in respect of the relevant
claim.
With the present lacuna in the Jamaican law as regards the contemplated Rules of Court
in respect of Collision cases, it is probable that Section 686 of the Jamaica Civil Procedure
, would be brought into play in a given collision case requiring service out of the
79
Code
jurisdiction.
This the relevant English Rules, namely those contained in Order 75, Rule 4 of the
This Rule is similar in terms to the writers suggested stipulations for Jamaica’s Rules.
There appears to be no reported Jamaican case dealing with the Section 4 stipulations.
Despite, the apparent disuse it seems Jamaica ought to update its law in this area by
Also, it might wish to consider its position as regards the Convention itself.
Afterall, Jamaica actually has the essential stipulations of the Convention reflected in its
laws.
See Chapter 4
205
International Convention Relating to the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 1962
(Article 8)
Article 8 provides:
“The provisions of this Convention shall be applied as regards all persons interested
when all the vessels concerned in any action belong to States of the High Contracting Parties.
(1) As regards persons interested who belong to a Non-contracting State, the application
of the above provisions may be made by each of the contracting States conditional upon
reciprocity;
(2) Where all the persons interested belong to the same State as the court trying the case,
the provisions of the national law and not of the Convention are applicable”:
Here, it appears that Jamaica should easily satisfy the reciprocity criterion since its own
municipal laws essentially require it to act in accordance with the Convention provisions.
a whole with a view as deemed appropriate from such consideration of “regularizing” its
206
F
Artical 4 of this Convention provides that the rules relating to the constitution and
distribution of the limitation fund and all rules of procedure shall be governed by the national
(Article 7, 10)
Ship arrest was examined in the previous Chapter. Here it may be briefly noted in the
present context that the Convention sanctions the use of ship arrest as a basis for jurisdiction on
Also, it provides that the law of the country where the ship is arrested is to be the one to
It has already been shown that in the case of Jamaica, ship arrest is predicated upon the
court having in rem jurisdiction. The Converse is not true. Also, under Jamaican private
international law, procedural matters are in any event governed by the lex fori.
207
Article 10 gives a claimant against an operator of a ship equipped with a nuclear power
plant the option of instituting proceedings before the courts of the ship’s licensing state “or
before the courts of the Contracting State or States in whose territory nuclear damage has been
sustained”.
This Convention which is not yet in force has attracted very limited international support
and its relevance has waned very much since its adoption in 1962.
Both Articles 9 (of the Liability Convention) and 7 (of the Fund Convention) require that
where an incident has caused oil pollution damage in the territory (including the territorial sea),
the E.E.Z. (or its equivalent) of a contracting state (or states) or where preventitive measures
have been taken to avert or minimize such pollution damage, actions for compensation may only
208
This requirement also obtains in respect of indemnification claims as provided for 80
Each Contracting State is required to ensure that its courts possess the necessary
jurisdiction.
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region, 1983 and the Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combatting Oil Spills in
rules and procedures, which are in conformity with international law, in the field
Convention area”.
It seems to the writer that among the “appropriate rules” should be Jurisdictional and
Choice of Law rules dealing with the occurrence of oil spills in the various maritime zones
Here, due cognizance should be paid to the precedence set by these two international
The opportunity should be taken to harmonize in the region the relevant Rules at least as
209
these pertain to the critical matter of oil pollution of the marine environment.
In the past, attempts have been made to harmonize shipping legislation in the Caribbean.
This has been through the instrumentality of the Caribbean Community Secretariat.
It appears the basic issues under focus in this thesis are yet to entice any regional co
However, it is submitted that Article 14 could provide a launching pad for an effort
inclusive of such activity in respect of the critical matter of oil pollution of the marine
Luggage by Sea, Athens, 1974 (Article 17) as amended by its 1974 Protocol
Article 17 gives a claimant in an action against a carrier for damage suffered as a result of
the death of or personal injury to a passenger of the loss or damage to luggage, the option of
bringing his action in one of a number of different courts provided that the court chosen is
210
r
‘(a) the court of the place of permanent residence of principal place of business of the
defendant, or
(b) the court of the place of departure or that of the destination according to the contract
of carriage, or
(c) a court of the state of the domicile or permanent residence of the claimant, if the
(d) a court of the state where the contract of carriage was made, if the defendant has a
‘After the occurrence of the incident which has caused the damage, the parties may agree
that the claim for damages shall be submitted to judicial proceedings or to arbitration”.
Like its 1957 predecessor’s Article 4, Article 14 provides that the rules relating to the
constitution and distribution of the limitation fund and all rules of procedure are to be governed
211
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by sea, 1978
Article 21 provides:
plaintiff, at his option, may institute an action in a court which, institute an action in a court
which, according to the law of the state where the court is situated, is competent and within the
(b) the place where the contract was made provided that the
212
a Contraction State at which the carrying vessel or any other
accordance with applicable rules of the law of that state and international
the claimant must remove the action, at his choice, to one of the
in the action.
of the arrest.
States
213
4. (a) Where an action has been instituted in a court competent
under paragraph 1 or 2 of this article or where judgement has been delivered by such a
court, no new action may be started between the same parties on the same grounds unless
the judgement of the court before which the first action was instituted is nor enforceable in
of a new action;
accordance with paragraph 2(a) of this article, is not to be considered as the starting of a
new action.
paragraphs, an agreement made by the parties, after a claim under the contract of carriage
by sea has arisen, which designates the place where the claimant may institute an action,
is effective’
.
t
that:
“...3. The arbitration proceedings shall at the option of the claimant, be instituted at one
214
of the following places:
defendant; or
or
clause or agreement.
4. The arbitrator or arbitration tribunal shall apply the niles of this convention.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article are deemed to to be part of every
arbitration clause or agreement, and any term of such clause or agreement which is
6. Nothing in this Article affects the validity of an agreement relating to arbitration made
be the parties after the claim under the contract of carriage by sea has arisen”.
215
The provisions of the Hamburg Rules relating to Jurisdiction are of particular
importance. They have a special significance for Jamaica and its shippers who often
today find themselves with Bills of Lading with exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses.
’ and Hague-Visby
The Hamburg Rules were developed to replace the Hague
8
82
Rules.
Jamaica is a party to and applies the Hague Rules. These Rules are enacted into
Jamaican Law by way of incorporation into the Carriage of Goods Act, 1900. They are
The Hague Rules did not at all assess the question of jurisdiction. This matter
was therefore left to be dealt with by the national law of the various contracting states:
In time, various countries including Jamaica have been faced with the use of
Carriers usually attempt to avoid dealing with courts and jurisprudence that may
operate against their interests by inserting jurisdiction clauses in their Bills of Lading
specifying that a particular Countrys Courts should exclusively determine any dispute
Typically also, such clauses would contain a choice of applicable law stating that
In practice, such jurisdiction clauses in Bills of Lading usually take one of two
81
Inmati onal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading,
1924; See also chapter 6.
meHague Rules as amended by its 1968 Brussels Protocol; see also chapter 6.
82
216
forms.
“The contract evidenced by this bill of lading shall be governed by X law and
dispute determined in X (or at the option of the carrier, at the point of destination)
other country”
“Any dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall be decided in the country
where the carrier has his principal place of business, and the law of
As is noted by Judge Hand in The Tricolor (193 ) AMC 919: “The choice of a
court may be more important than many of the (other) express terms of the contract
Jurisdiction clauses have partly a prorogatory effect, in that they refer the parties
effect, in that by their wording or intention preclude suits in all other jurisdictions.
83
217
For the Jamaican shipper, faced with a Jurisdiction Clause, it is the purported
Here, the clause may require that disputes are only to be adjudicated in, say,
London. The inconvenience and costs involved will often make recourse to such
proceedings in London impractical for the shipper. Yet, essentially, the objective behind
the insertion of the clause in the Bill of Lading, by its draughtsman in such a case is likely
to be that of ensuring that disputes between the parties are adjudicated in London only.
Braekhus has indicated that generally courts have an easier time accepting the
prorogatory effect of these clauses than they have as regards their derogatory effect.
based on principles of public policy: the effect of a jurisdiction clause is to oust the
jurisdiction of the national courts; private individuals ought not to be able by contract to
limit the authority of the courts of a state in that way. Courts have been especially
unwilling to accept the clauses where the result is that one of the citizens of the state is
being denied the right to bring his case before the courts of his homeland”.
84
218
matter of jurisdiction clauses.
The provisions of Article 21 must, inter alia, must seen against this background.
clause. However, most importantly, it denies such a clause, any exclusive character.
Thus the Article is in this respect, essentially directed at the derogatory effect
Thus it does by enumerating a number of places with direct connection with the
carriage (as well as the contractually designated jurisdiction) at which an action may be
the courts of a particular country, this will not prevent the Plaintiff from having his claim
heard elsewhere.
Here, other courts whose state had some connection with the contract of
affreightment, such as say the port State of loading or discharge ate deemed to be
competent by the convention and may accordingly hear and determine the claim.
However, while Article 21(1) enumerates a number of places connected with the
contract of affreightment, Article 21(2) provides for the possible exercise of jurisdiction
by a state court whose State has no connection with the contract of carriage.
Here, the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is the arrest of the offending
However, the defendant may have the action to one of the places specified in
219
paragraph 1 upon furnishing security sufficient to ensure payment of any judgement that
Hence, adoption and enactment of Article 21(2) into Jamaican law would
The Convention recognizes that parties may agree to refer their disputes to
arbitration. 86
In so doing they are in fact selecting their jurisdiction in the sense that they are
places. Apart from the place of arrest, provided for in Article 2 1(2), those places are
However, after the claim has arisen the parties may by agreement designate the
220
It is to be noted that the places of jurisdiction are, except as just noted, exclusive
and apart from the places of arrest, are not contained to contracting states.
This has the effect of giving the claimant a wide variety of options.
It is clear that the aim of the jurisdictional provisions was to achieve a balance
As the law now stands internationally this balance tilts very much in favor of the
87
carrier.
However, the Convention does not at all deal with the second limb of the
This as noted above, embraces the question as to whether the court will exercise
the jurisdictions permitted under the Convention to refuse to hear a case on the grounds of
Article 21(4) essentially prohibits the bringing of more than one action between
the same parties on the same ground where the normal principles pertaining to us alibi
As regards the Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clauses it may be noted that
although they are being focused on in the present context in relation to the carriage of
goods by sea they also operate elsewhere in the Jamaican Maritime context.
S also: chapter 6.
87
221
Jamaican assured, often has his contract of insurance 88 with a foreign insurer. Also,
foreign shipowner.
However, in the present context, the thrust of the discussion is as regards the
As alluded to, the Hague Rules make no reference to “Jurisdiction Clauses” and
neither so their enabling Act in Jamaica: The Carriage of Goods Act, 1900.
There are no Jamaican Admiralty cases dealing with the issue of Jurisdiction
“The law of this country is committed to the principle of the unfettered freedom
of contract and where the parties to a contract have therein expressed an intention that a
particular legal system shall govern their rights and obligations that intention almost
invariably must prevail... .But the law of this country is also committed to another
222
principle which I may state thus: where a contract, the proper law of which is that of a
foreign jurisdiction is, by the law of this country, prima facie void as being contrary to the
public policy of this country, it must be shown to be essentially valid not only by its
proper law, but also by the law of this country if it is sought to be enforced here”.
91
The contract had provided that it was to “...be construed under and governed by
the restrictive covenant stipulation was contrary to public policy, it was treated as void ab
initio.
find a Choice of Law or Jurisdiction stipulation as void ab initio based on public policy
considerations.
commitment to the notion of the sanctity of contractee to the extent that where the parties
“
to a contract have expressed an intention that a particular legal system shall govern their
that might of ought to move a Jamaican Court to treat as void ab initio or otherwise,
Ibid.,p 471
91
223
circumvent a Jurisdiction or Choice of Law clause in the present context whether on the
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clauses, appear to find their strongest buttress in
the argument that persons should be held to their agreement: the principle of the sanctity
of contract.
However, this principle was itself founded on certain premises which have been
In the Bills of Lading, the Jamaican shipper is faced with a standard form fme
print document whose terms he has had no opportunity of negotiating and practically is
He is very much the weaker party in the relationship and has practically not
At times, he may fmd himself being subject to terms which he can have no real
This usually takes place by use of the device of clause incorporating charterparty
An adhesion contract is based on standard form, used to supply mass demands for goods and/or
93
services, drafted for an indefinite number of persons, rather than a single individual and whose use
entails the superior bargaining power of the stipulator vis-a-vis the individual customer/consumer
whoihad no bargining power, must either adhere to the contract ar refuse to contract altogther See eg.
Burgess, Andrew: Adhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms.., Faculty if Law, U.W.I., at p7 citing
Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and Freedom of Contract (1962) 36 Tul. L.R.48
224
terms. Such terms may include Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Stipulations.
In addition, it may well be that a jurisdiction and Choice of Law clause may, if
given effect in Jamaica, may lead to an avoidance of the Hague Rules stipulations to
This will happen where the designated jurisdiction and applicable law is that of a
In the case, The Morviken, 1983, Lloyd’s Rep.1., the House of Lords in
England, decided that a jurisdiction clause is null and void pursuant to Article 3(8) of the
Hague Rules when the court to which the dispute would be submitted would apply
provisions less favorable to the cargo owner than those of the Rules.
Article 3(8) provides, inter alia, that any clause in a contract of carriage which
lessens the liability, otherwise than as provided for the Rules are null and void and of no
effect.
Clearly therefore, Jurisdiction Clauses when they have this effect ought to be
to whether these clauses are amenable to some sort of general approach particular
American Courts, in the past, held consistently that jurisdiction clauses were not
225
valid perse as purporting to “oust the courts of their jurisdiction”
94
Braekhus has cited the practice of American Courts in the period preceding The
Hatter Act, 1893 (U.S.) as an example of the vindication of national mandatory law
the English shipping companies, who dominated the traffic between Europe
and the United States of America, employed broad exemption of liability clauses in their
bills of lading. These exemptions were respected by the English Courts, but to a large
degree declared to be against public policy and invalid by the American courts, thereby
protecting American cargo interests engaged in import and export, to and from the United
States of America. The English shipowners attempted to avoid the stringent liability
imposed by the United States law first by including a clause in bifis of lading that they be
subject to English law, and then via a clause providing that the suits arising due to a loss
of or damage to cargo only could be brought before English Courts. The American cargo
interests were forced to accept such bills of lading. Nevertheless, both the choice of law
94 Wiid & Salik Inc. v. Companie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F. 2d. 941, 942. (2d Cir. 1930)
See:
0p cit., p. 304
95
226
The protectionist attitude in the U.S.A. was subsequently more overtly maintained by
way of legislation through the Harter Act of 1893 and later the Carriage of Goods by
Here, it is noted that “mere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of
unreasonableness’.
they may relieve the carrier from liability he would normally have incurred under Belgian
Law.
clauses if they are satisfied that the foreign courts will apply the Hague Rules in the Same
thid.
97
See: Manbabady, Samir (ed): Comments on the Hamburg Rules, The Hamburg Rules on the
98
Carriage of goods by sea, 1978, p. 101 citing Kranger v Pennsylvania Rail Co., 2 Cir. 1949, 174F.
2d. 2556.
See: Bills of Lading, Report by the Secretariat of UNCTAD: TD/BC.4JILS/6/ Rev. 1; U.N., N.Y.,
99
1971, at p. 50; See also: Oland, A. Barry: Forum Non Coveniens in Canada: The Common Law
Position, The Federal Court of Canada, Suggested Reform, 1986 Meredith Memorial Lectures, Mcgill
University, Richard de Boo, Ontario, at pp. 323, 334.
227
Thus its Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides:
carriage of goods from any place outside Australia to any place in Australia shall be
illegal, null and void and of no effect. The basic English Common law position has
In the Eleftheria (1969= 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 237, Justice Brandon elaborated on the
position thus:
agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and the defenthnts apply for a stay, the
English Court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the jurisdiction, is not bound to
plaintiffs.
228
T (5) In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following
fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience
and, if so, whether it differs from English law in any material respects;
the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages, whether there would be
very great delay relative to English proceedings and whether remedies available in
having to sue in the foreign court because they would: (i) be deprived of security for that
claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time bar not
applicable in England; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to
It is to be noted that Justice Brandon’s first three principles place very strong
Thud.,
1 p. 242
229
They refer to the plaintiff bringing an action in breach of an agreement to refer
disputes to a foreign court and the strong onus on the plaintiff to defeat a jurisdiction
clause.
101 writing about the situation in Canada where the Eleftheria’s principles
Oland,
“...the sanctity of contract issue...is paraded before the courts in biblical terms
by P&I Council. This issue fails to recognize the realities of commercial life, that Bills of
owners and P&I Clubs. Except for the Hague Rules, the terms of a bill of lading are
jurisdiction clause...”
02
interpretation in Canada “...that effectively sends litigants away from the courts to other
jurisdictions” 103
least does not discourage him from using the court’s services” 104
It seems to the writer, that just such ab approach is highly advisable in the case
of Jamaica.
1bjd.,
102 p. 318
1bjd.,
103 p. 319
1bid.
104
230
If the Jamaican Admiralty Court and Jamaican maritime jurisprudence is to
develop fully, then an approach ought to be adopted which is strongly inclined towards
hearing a case whenever the aid of the court is sought, provided the court’s jurisdiction
has in matters where, say, a Jamaican shipper or consignee holds a Bill of Lading with a
foreign jurisdiction clause and wishes to make a claim against a foreign shipowner in
Jamaica.
Such an approach would not only in the normal case protect Jamaicas cargo
interests, but also generally serve to expand the judicial and legal services provided in
Jamaica in the maritime sphere iocally as well as in due course to persons from overseas
Here it is acknowledged that, inter alia, various charges are needed to improve
the efficacy of Jamaican Admiralty Law and practice before the suggested approach can
However, one thing is clear, a judicial approach that discourage use of the court
is one which can only result in such a prospect receding further and further away from
See g. Chapter 2.
105
231
with that country’s position as the leading centre in the world for adjudication of maritime
cases.
The particular position of the Jamaican cargo-owner vis-a-vis the adhesion type
inconvenience and extra expenses to the cargoowner in having his matter heard
The Hamburg Rules, Article 21 is clearly against the carrier dictating to the
shipper and national courts where the shipper must go to have his claim adjudicated.
They were developed after much discussion and compromise between the
shipowners, These Rules had their genesis in the era when almost all of the present
developing countries were colonies and had no opportunity to present their points of view
232
as they had a regards the Hamburg Rules.
As is to be expected, the result of this was that the Hague Rules largely reflected
the interests of the club of shipowning countries who enacted them in accordance with
that carriers who in reality unilaterally draw up the terms of the Bill of Lading, have
sought to take advantage of the opening in the Hague Rules by way of self serving
Jamaica,as a “shippers” country, ought to bear this in mind and have the reality
Indeed, Oland has strongly argued for the immediate enactment into Canadian
provisions is also highly advisable in Jamaicas case where it is saddled with the aging
Hague Rules and a common law approach to Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clauses
which, if not creatively applied, stand to exacerbate an inequitable situation and generally
233
operate contrary to Jarnaicas best interest in the present context.
Articles 21 and 22 may be given local legislative effect, with or without Jamaica
Indeed, there are already instances in Jamaican law where International Maritime
the
Convention provisions are given legislative effect without Jamaica being a party to
particular convention.
Thus such enactment as suggested need not await appraisal of the Rules in toto
Until such enactment (if any) due cognizance may also be paid to the
be
considerations embodied in The Eleftheria’s fifth principle. However these should
ing
done from the perspective indicated. The Australian approach in statutorily outlaw
tive or
interests” often provide the ratio d’étre whether overtly or covertly for legisla
national
judicial activity, it would be less than prudent not to have regard for one’s own
udence.
interests in attempting to shape an indigenous and relevant maritime jurispr
234
on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 1980
multimodal transport under the Convention, the Plaintiff at his option may institute an
action in a court which, according to the law of the state where the court is situated, it is
competent and within the jurisdiction of which is situated one of the following places:
provided that the defendant has there a place of business, branch of agency through which
of the said places. Agreements between the Parties after the claim has arisen as regards
235
the place of jurisdiction are valid.
C: CONCLUDING REMARKS
3 broad categories.
Here, the precise location of the place where say, a maritime tort was
committed, or a particular person or vessel vis-a-vis the various maritime zones is crucial
in determining whether a court had or may exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case.
Also such provisions in the case of maritime torts provide the public
The provisions in this first category are to be found in the provisions of the law
236
Secondily, there is the category in which the majority of provisions examined
fall.
This category deals with the question as to which country’s tribunals are
This question falls more directly in the realm of private international law. The
relevant provisions have more potential for direct and immediate impact on national law
once the relevant convention is ratified or acceded to and subsequently given the force of
obliged to make special provisions for the jurisdictional rules in its procedural and private
international law.
The net result would be that Jamaican courts would then have no jurisdiction to
entertain an action falling under such enabling enactments unless the particular
Examples of such Conventions are The Hamburg Rules, the Civil Liabity for Oil
particular Convention, of necessity, ultimately has direct consequences for the local
237
maritime procedural and private international law rules, where these are different from
those stipulated in the connection. In effect, the Convention Jurisdiction stipulations and
on a state to declare an EEZ and to concomitantly enact appropriate jurisdiction and choice
of law rules.
The relevant Law of the Sea provisions in the fmal analysis merely sets outer
limits as regards the possible exercise of civil jurisdiction by ascribing varying degrees of
falling into a third category embracing a variety of public and private international law
issues.
For the most part, they relate to the matter of Choice of Law, whether directly or
indirectly.
The effect of these provisions on national law are not as direct as those of the
second category.
thus, for instance, the ship nationality provisions of the Law of the Sea, are
Hence, the provisions affect the local law rather indirectly whenever the
238
question of the law of the flag state is brought into issue.
Overall, it had been shown that as regards the Conventions to which Jamaica is
a party, the provisions relating to the considered preliminary issues may ultimately have
This will be even more so the case when Jamaica fully exercises its rights under
In the case of the 1952 Collision Convention, where Jamaica has given
legislative effect to its provisions without becoming a party to the convention, the relevant
These are yet to be promulgated. There is thus a gap in the local law which has
its roots in the provisions of an international convention to which Jamaica is not even a
party.
within the second category their stipulations have not up to now had any direct
However, indirectly they may affect Jamaican Jurisprudence to the extent that
239
they offer guidelines as to international thinking on jurisdictional questions which may
jurisdictional stipulations and its ramifications for Jurisdiction clauses in Bills of Lading.
Here, much guidance can be obtained from these provisions for judicial and
legislative activity.
attention is the maritime procedural and private international law relating to marine
pollution.
Here, urgent changes are necessary in the law as an integral part of any national
In the fmal analysis, it is essential that the local jurisdictional and related rules as
they exist now, and develop in the future, within international legal parameters advance,
240
Chapter 6
241
Chapter 6
1. Introduction
2. Policy Considerations
242
1. General stipulations
2. Particular stipulations
i. General
ii. Claims against carrier by sea i respect to Passenger Death, Personal Injury,
i. General considerations
6. Concluding Comments
243
Chapter 7
1. Introduction
In practice it is of the most importance that a maritime claimant does not go to sleep on his
claim. He is required to commence and pursue his claim with reasonable dispatch. As Jackson
notes, “Delay is relevant to every stage of enforcement proceedings and can have the
Various devices and sanctions are available and used at different stages of the litigation
At the pre-litigation stage a claimant is in the first place required to commence court
proceedings within a stipulated time period. After he has started his action, he is required to
244
promptly proceed with his claim or be liable to have his action dismissed by the court for “want
of prosecution”.
‘Courts do not like to deprive a plaintiff of the right to his day in Court or
of having his action tried but, at the same time, delays cannot be permitted
to the prejudice of defendants who are entitled to have the issues disposed
In keeping with the focus of this thesis, this chapter is essentially concerned with time
from those relating to continuation of such proceedings. Here, time is of the essence not only
for the claimant but also for the claimant’s lawyer who may, if properly and timely briefed, be
exposed to liability for negligence where he fails to start proceedings within the time allowed.
“An Attorney will not always win his case. How could he? He is not
Diplock, U. (as he then was) in Allen v Sir Alfred McAlpine and Sons Ltd. et al (1968), 2QB 229 at
p. 254.
245
expected to. It will not be held against him unless it happens because he
determined by the Attorney is how much time remains before suit must be
filed.”
In Jamaica, following the English practice, the expression “Limitation of Action” is used in
reference to the situation where a Claimant is liable to lose or forfeit his right of action or
proceedings. For the claimant, the limitation period is accordingly “... the period during which
Jamaica. The principal Jamaican Statute of Limitation is The Limitations of Actions Act, 1881,
Pineus, Kaj International Maritime Law, Time-Barred Actions, 1984 at p.v. (Introduction).
Danielson, David and Smith, Craig: The presentation of the claimant’s cargo case, 1981.
Archbold v Scully (1861) 9 H.L. Case 360 per Lord Wensleydale at p. 383 cited also in Weld v Peire (1929)
1 Ch. 33 (C.A.).
Roughly analogous terms used in Continental European civil law jurisdictions are “prescription” and
“Verjahrung”.
Mozley and Whitely’s Law Dictionary 10th edition, E.R. Butterworths (E.R. Hardy Ivany (editor)) stated that
“A statute of limitation is one which provides that no court shall entertain proceedings for the enforcement of
246
(itself dated) which is general in its scope.
There is as such one other Statute of Limitation in Jamaica: The Public Authorities Protection
Act, 1942. This Act deals exclusively with actions instituted against Public Authorities.
Neither statute makes any specific reference to maritime claims although these claims
generally fall Within their purview. The exceptions are the few instances where there are in other
statutes particular provisions specifying limitation periods for certain maritime claims. In these
cases it is the particular stipulations which apply and take precedence over any general
stipulations which would otherwise apply. Thus as Jackson states ‘Any inquiry about time
limits must, therefore, stan with a search for a particular statute relevant to the claim.” If such a
search is not fruitful, then one looks to the more general and all embracing limitation statutory
provisions.
2. Policy Considerations
Various policy reasons supporting the need for statutes of limitation have been put forward
certam rights if such proceedings were set on foot after the lapse of a definite period of time, reckoned as a
rule from the date of the violation of the right”.
Ibid., p. 90.
247
by the courts. These include:
1. that long dormant claims have more cruelty than justice in them
(RB Policies at Lloyds v Butter 2 ALL E.R. 226 at 229, 230 per
Streatfield J.);
2. that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim
3. that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with
Actions succinctly sets out the raison detre of limitation periods as follows:
from beginning actions once that reasonable time has passed. Underlying
248
the policy is a recognition that it is not fair that an individual should be a
subject indefinitely to the threat of being sued over a particular matter. Nor
From the commercial perspective, as Gertner notes, “Limitation periods also inject a much
needed element of certainty or finality into commercial dealings and the commercial world,
From the standpoint of the Legislator setting the cut off point is a balancing exercise
involving the differing interests of the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Thus Stone notes that a
“sensible legislator” should in drawing the line, inter alia, “... give Plaintiffs a reasonable
opportunity of enforcing their rights”, taking into account “... disabilities to which the plaintiff
may be subject and to difficulties which he may have in discovering the facts from which the
claim arises”. Conversely, the legislator should endeavor not to “disappoint reasonable
Ibid.., at p. 9.
Gertner, Eric: Dismissal for want of prosecution: A Decade after Sir Alfred McAlpine and SOns Ltd.,
at p. 48.
Stone, P.A.: Time limitation in the English Conflict of Laws, 1985 L.M.C.L.Q., 497 at p. 501.
249
F
In general, the period of limitation begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Apart
from any special provision, a cause of action normally accrues when there is in existence a
person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when there are present all the facts
which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. The general rule in contract is
that the cause of action accrues when the breach takes place and in tort when the damage is
suffered.
Ibid..
See generally: Haisbury’s Laws (4th edition) Vol 28, para 601 et seq.
“The fact or combination of facts which give rise to a cause of action” (per Osbom’s Concise Law
Dictionary, 7th Edition, at p. 66.
Cooke v Gill (1873) LR 8CP 107 at 116 per Brett J; Read v Brown (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 128, C.A.
Pineus, Kaj (ed.), op. cit., at p. 71; Halisbury’s Laws. op. cit., para 622 et seq.
250
This is done in Jamaica by filing or having issued a written of originating
“If creditors enter into a binding agreement not to sue a debtor for a certain time,
the Plaintiff that he wishes him to delay proceedings without prejudice to the
In general, limitation periods may be extended in case of disability (e.g. where an infant
251
or person of unsound mind is involved). They may be postponed where there has been certain
252
d. The effect of time having run
The general rule, in Jamaica (following the traditional English view) is that the effect of a
time-bar is to take away the claimant’s remedies (by action or by set-off) It leaves the right to the
claim otherwise intact. Thus, claimant, may by means other than action or set-off on the time-
1. General Stipulations
In Jamaica, the general period of limitation is six years from the accrual of the cause of
action where it is founded on simple contract or on tort. For actions against Public Authorities,
the limitation period is one year. In cases of fatal accident, the relevant time period is three
years. Thus, where there are no special provisions relating to a particular maritime claim, these
253
time periods would, in general, apply to the claim.
2. Particular stipulations
Article HI, paragraph 6 of the SCHEDULE to the Jamaican Carriage of Goods Act,
“Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or
damage be given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge
before or at the time of the removal of the goods into custody of the person
damage be not apparent within three days, such removal shall be prima facie
evidence of the delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of
loading.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has at the
The International Convention for the unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading, 1924.
Note: This section of the thesis focuses on carriage of goods claims covered by the Hague Rules. For other
carriage of goods claims, other considerations will apply, vide:infra.
254
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability
in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered.
From this it follows that the consignee or person taking delivery on his behalf is normally
required to upon taking custody of the goods to indicate then, at the latest, that they are not in
the same order and condition described in the Bill of Loading, if that is the case. Except that
where the loss or damage is not apparent such written notice has to be given within three days.
The penalty for failing to give notice within the time stipulated is to provide the carrier with
prima facie evidence of delivery of the goods in the same order and condition as described in the
bill of loading.
Thus, it appears that essentially the legal implication is that a tardy consignee in such a case
would (by failing to give timely written notice) have the onus of proving loss of or damage to
255
paragraph of paragraph 6 dealing with notice, that it “... appears to have no legal effect.
Whether notice is given or not, the onus of proving loss or damage will lie upon the person
asserting it”.
However, with respect, it appears to the writer, that this assertion fails to distinguish “legal”
from “practical” consequences. Mankabady, for instance states that the sanction for not giving
timely notice in accordance with the provisions under discussion, “... is that the burden if proof
shifts from the carrier to the shipper.” This surely is a legal consequence and follows logically
from the evidential presumption against the consignee where he fails to give notice.
It is true that in practice it is likely that in the final analysis a claimant, despite any initial
presumption in his favour will ultimately have to discharge the burden of proving his claim.
Hence, it may be said that the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 6 is of limited practical
significance. Nevertheless, the view that it is of no legal effect seems unsupportable in strict
legal terms, since the mere shifting of the burden of proof however short lived that might be is
of definite legal consequence. Moreover, such shift need not be temporary nor does it appear
For instance, where a consignee can furnish a qualified receipt, this will automatically
18th edition.
Ibid.., at p. 428.
Mankabady, Samir: Comments on the Hamburg Rules, the Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by
Sea, Samir Mankabady, Editor, A.W. Sitho 88 Leyden/Boston 1978, at p. 93.
-
256
provide prima facie evidence against the carrier of the existence of loss or damage at the time of
delivery. This then places the onus of furnishing rebuttal evidence on the carrier. In a situation
where a prima facie case has been made out and there is difficulty on procuring rebuttal evidence
Conversely, the giving of a clean receipt to the carrier upon taking delivery of the goods or
otherwise failing to give timely written notice of loss or damage to the goods will, as Astle
notes, place upon the consignee “the onus of retuting the prima facie evidence of the clean
receipt...
Two final observations may be made regarding the Notice stipulations. Firstly, as is noted in
‘if by the time the goods have been removed into the custody of the person
entitled to delivery the ship has sailed and has no agent at the port of
with.”
Serutton suggests that possibly the agent employed for the ship will be held to continue to be
agent for the purpose of receiving notice. Thankfully, the problem does not seem to present
257
itself in practice as conceivably, difficult problems would arise concerning any ungratified
Moreover, in the first place, the person who was employed as agent for the ship may be held
to be within his rights not to accept any such notice after the ship has left and his agency
contract with the ca-trier has ended on the basis that he has no actual or implied authority to do
so.
The second observation concerns the words: “... before or at the time of the removal of the
does not receive the goods directly from the ship. Typically, cargo after discharge in Jamaica,
will at least pass through the hands of the reminal Operator and Customs Authorities before it
reaches the consignee. These “intermediaries” ought therefore to take care of timely quality in
An initial question to be determined is the meaning and scope of the term “suit” in this
Ibid.
Astle, Ibid..
258
Normally the term “suit” means civil court proceedings. The English Osborn’s concise Law
Dictionary states that suit is “any legal proceeding of a civil kind brought by one person against
another.” The American Black’s Law Dictionary in its definition unequivocally indicates that
proceeding by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right... “Kohl v U.S., 91 U.S. 367,375, 23 L. Ed. 449;
Weston v Charleston, 27 U.S. (2Pet.) 449, 464, 7 L. ED 481; Syracruse Plaster Co v Agostini
Black’s Dictionary goes on to point out that the term “is, however, seldom applied to a
criminal prosecution” and has, “generally been replaced by the term ‘action’...”
Section 2 of the Jamaican Civil Procedure Code which deals with the interpretation to be
given to various terms used in the code, tersely states that “suit” “shall include action”. This
“definition” by itself hardly takes us any further. However the code then states that “action”
“shall mean a civil proceeding commenced by writ, and shall not include a criminal proceeding
aLp. 315.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edit, 1979, at p. 1286.
Ibid.
The Consolidated Judicature (Civil Procedure Code) Law, Chapter 177, 1889.
259
..“
by the crown.
It therefore appear that at the very least, as a matter of legal semantics, the term “suit”
implies civil court proceedings. The question therefore arises as to whether “suit to be brought
within one year under Article 3(6) should be confmed to civil court proceedings
The issue of whether commencement of arbitration proceedings was “suit brought” within
the meaning of Article 3(6), came up for decision in the English case of The Merak.
In that case, cargo owned by the plaintiffs was discharged on 21st November 1961, in a
damaged condition. The bill of lading contained a clause requiring any dispute to be referred to
arbitration within 12 months of final discharge. The plaintiffs issued a writ on 15th November
1962, and the case came on trail on 28th July 1964, when the trail Judge stayed the action on
the ground that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration. By then, the time limit
under the arbitration clause had long since passed. The plaintiffs appealed and claimed that the
arbitration clause was void in that it conflicted with Article 3, paragraph 6 and 8, of the Hague
Rules, and that they were still entitled to bring an action within one year of final discharge as
The English Court of Appeal held that the action must be stayed. The arbitration clause was
(1965) p 223 (1965) I All E.R. 230, CA; It appears American Courts have taken an opposite view to that in
the Merak, vide: Murray D.E.: The Hamburg Rules: A comparative analysis. Lawyer of the Americas; at p.
80. Vide: Shipping Marine Insurance and the Law Background plots (34). Time Limitation Place of
— —
260
effective, and since the matter had not been referred to arbitration within 12 month, the plaintiffs
proceedings.
The ultimate consequences for the consignee were clearly severe. Prima facie, it seems to be
a case where the right thing was not done at the right time by the plaintiff. However, further
exploration of the facts reveals that the Arbitration Clause and its time stipulation was not
apparent on the face of the Bill of Lading. Rather, these stipulations were incorporated into the
It is respectfully submitted that whenever the bill of lading is issued under a charterparty
containing an arbitration clause a different approach ought to be taken by the courts. Here, the
consignee will typically be ignorant of the details of the charterparty provisions, and often
cannot without much inconvenience and costs to himself procure such information.
where for instance, a Bill of Lading clearly on the face of it requires disputes to be settled by
arbitration, them arbitration proceedings timely commenced should be sufficient to satisfy the
provisions of Article 3(6). However, if an arbitration clause stipulates a time limit shorter than
Vide infra.
261
This is do since this would clearly violate Article 3(8) of the schedule of the Jamaican
carriage of Goods Act (which enacts the same provision of the Hague Rules) and provides as
follows:
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with
goods arising from negligence, fault or failure in the duties and obligations
Firstly, time starts to run from the date of delivery of the goods. Secondly, it starts to run
from when the goods should have been delivered. Thus it is important to consider what
constitutes “delivery” and whether, for instance, it has the dame meaning as “discharge”.
The Supreme Court of Australia has held that “delivery” was made for the purpose of
In Automatic Tube Co Pty Ltd. and Email Ltd. Balfour Buzacott Division v Adelaide SS (Operations) Ltd.,
-
Adelaide SS Co Ltd. and Adelaide SS Co Pty Ltd., The Belirane (1967) i Lloyd’s Rep 531.
262
Article 3(6), either when the goods were landed on the wharf and freed from the ship’s tackle,
or at the latest, when they were placed in a warehouse and immediately became available to the
consignee.
In an American Case, it was held that the time-bar period started running after discharge
plus notice to the consignee plus a reasonable opportunity to receive the goods. In another
American case it was held that “delivery” was not synonymous with discharge and denoted a
two-party transaction in which the consignee would have an opportunity to observe defects.
There appears to be no Jamaican or other West Indian or English cases directly on point.
However, it appears, to the writer that mere discharge of the goods should not be sufficient to
start time running against the consignee. At least he needs to have been notified and given a
reasonable opportunity of receiving and inspecting the goods to at least ascertain apparent
Article 3(6) of the Schedule to the Jamaican Carriage of Goods Act in its enactment of the
corresponding provision of the Hague Rules omitted the second sub-paragraph of the latter’s
National Packaging Corp. v Nippon Yusen Kaiska (NYK Line) 1973 I Lloyd’s Rep 46.
American Hoesch Inc. and Riblet Products Inc. v SS Aubade and Maritime Commercial Corp. Inc. (1971) 2
Lloyds Rep 423.
263
provisiOnS.
“If the loss or damage is not apparent, the notice must be given within three
This extra wording which was perhaps put in the Hague Rules to aid its translation into
other languages was apparently omitted from the Jamaican Act by the draughtsmen to avoid
tautology.
This appears to be so as the requirements of the deleted sub-paragraph are contained in the
Nevertheless, it appears to the writer that its inclusion, although seemingly repetitions would
This submission is based on the fact that the first sub-paragraph is cumbrously drafted. It
requires rather careful reading to extract the meaning readily conveyed by the deleted sub
paragraph.
The Jamaican Carriage of Goods Act is actually divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with the
carriage of goods by land. Part 2 deals with the carriage of goods by sea and incorporates the
Hague Rules.
It seems to the writer that it would have been better to have had a separate Act dealing
264
exclusively with the carriage of goods by sea rather than have those provisions in effect,
attached to a largely unrelated and dated 1889 Act dealing with carriage of goods by land.
Part 2 of the Act is essentially a duplication of the 1924 United Kingdom Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, which enacted the Hague Rules into English Law. Part 2 was enacted by Act 10 of
1927.
The provisions of Article 3(6) of the Hague Rules have been amended by Article 1,
provides that:
“In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in
respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered.”
Like its Jamaican counterpart does now, it applied only to “outward” Bills of Lading.
265
“Subject to paragraph 6bis the carrier and the ship shall in any event be
discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods unless suit is
brought within one year of their delivery or of the date when they should
have been delivered. This period may however be extended if the parties so
The effect of this amendment, it appears, is to now apply the one year time limit to all claims
in respect of loss or damage, inclusive of claims such as those for wrongful delivery.
In addition the amendment makes it clear that the parties may by agreement extend the
limitation period after the cause of action has accrued. This, in any event, can normally be done
By virtue of Article, paragraph 3 of the Brussels Protocol, an additional paragraph b bis has
been added. It immediately follows the now amended paragraph 6 of Article 3 of the Hague
“An action for indemnity against a third person may be brought even after
the expiration of the year provided for in the preceding paragraph if brought
within the time allowed by the law of the Court seized of the case. However,
the time allowed shall not be less than three months commencing from the
266
day when the person bringing such action for indemnity has settled the claim
By virtue of this amendment, the carrier is not discharged from liability within the one year
time limit provided by Article 3(6), in the case of claims for indemnity by, for instance, another
carrier who had to pay a claim for loss or damage to cargo which occurred while the cargo was
in the custody of the carrier against whom the right of indemnity exists.
The carrier who has paid the claim has at least three months from the time of (1) the
settlement of the claim or (2) when proceedings were instituted against him, to Commence
These have effected very significant changes in both substance and form to the Hague Rules
Article 3(6) provisions. Under the Hamburg Rules, only its Article 20 is captioned “Limitation
of Actions”. However, the matter of limitation of actions and intimately related issues are dealt
with by 4 articles: 19—22, comprising part 5 of those rules under the caption: “Claims and
Astie, Ibid..
267
F
ActionS”.
The subject matter of Article 19 is “Notice of loss, damage or delay”. Accordingly, Article
19 deals with those matters within the purview of the first three and fifth sub-paragraphs of
Article 3, paragraph 6 of the Hague Rules. Here, significant amendments have been made.
However, it appears that, by far the most significant amendments have been made in respect
of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 3, paragraph 6 which requires “suite to be “... brought within one
year...”. These amendments have largely been instituted by the cumulative effect of Articles
20—22.
Articles 21 and 22, which deal with “Jurisdiction” and “Arbitration”, respectively, have no
counterparts in neither the Hague nor Hague-Visby Rules. They were introduced in the
Hamburg Rules to deal with particular deficiencies arising from certain lancunae in both the
loss or damage, is given in writing by the consignee to the carrier not later
than the working day after when the goods were handed over to the
268
the carrier of the goods as described in the document of transport or, if no
within 15 consecutive days after the day when the goods were handed
3 If the state of the goods at the time they were handed over to the
4 In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier and
the consignee must give all reasonable facilities to each other for
delivery unless a notice has been given in writing to the carrier within 60
consecutive days after the day when the goods were handed over to the
consignee.
269
6 If the goods have been delivered by an actual carrier, any notice given
under this article to him shall have the same effect as if it had been given
to the carrier, and any notice given to the carrier shall have effect as if
7 Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the general nature of the loss
not later than 90 consecutive days after the occurrence of such loss or
facie evidence that the carrier or actual carrier has sustained no loss or
damage due to the fault or neglect of the shipper, his servants or agents.
8 For the purpose of this Article, notice given to a person acting on the
carrier’s or the actual carrier’s behalf, including the master or the officer
deemed to have been given to the carrier, to the actual carrier or the
“any person by whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a
shipper” (per Article 1)
“any person to whom the performance of the carriage of the goods, or of part of the carriage has been
entrusted by the carrier; and includes any other person to whom such performance has been entrusted.’ (per
Article 1)
Article 4(2) provides that the carrier is deemed to be in charge (and accordingly responsible, per Article 4(1))
for the goods from the time he has taken them over until when he has delivered them.
270
shipper, respectively.”
1 Time starts to run against the consignee for giving notice from when the
2 In the case of apparent loss or damage to the goods, the consignee now
has until the working day after the goods were handed to him to give
3 Where the loss or damage is not apparent, the time allowed is now 25
goods eliminates the need to give written notice by the consignee, under
271
respect of such losses must now be given within 60 days of the goods
6 The consignee may give the relevant notice to either the actual carrier or
carrier” to give written notice to the shipper of any loss of damage due to
the fault of the shipper. Failure to give timely notice is prima facie
8 Notice for the actual carrier, carrier or shipper may respectively be given
272
2 The limitation period commences on the day on which the carrier has
delivered the goods or part thereof or, in cases where no goods have been
delivered, on the last day on which the goods should have been delivered.
3 The day on which the limitation period commences is not included in the
period.
4 The person against whom a claim is made may at any time during the
declaration or declarations.
after the expiration of the limitation period provided for in the preceding
paragraphs if instituted within the time allowed by the law of the State
where proceedings are instituted. However, the time allowed shall not be
less than 90 days commencing from the day when the person instituting
such action for the indemnity has settled the claim or has been served
273
a
1
This Article along with Articles 21 and 22 have virtually effected a transmutation of the
provisions with their requirements for “suite to be be “brought within one year” with time
revealed a number of deficiencies and have been subject to a variety of judical interpretations.
Often, it seemed that this provision in conjunction with others was weighted against cargo
interests.
This served to exacerbate the unease with which a number of developing countries viewed
the Hague Rules and its amendments. Most of these countries were colonies when the Hague
Rules were promulgated under the yoke of the dominant ship owning perspectives of a number
of developed countries.
The unease and agitation of the developing countries culminated in UNCTAD, in 1970
mandating UNCITRAL to review in detail the Hague Rules and their amendments. Among the
areas singled out for special attention were those pertaining to limitation periods and related
issues of jurisdiction.
The UNCTAD committee in its review of Article 3, paragraph 6 was particularly concerned
with sub-paragraph 4.
See generally: Bills of Lading, Report by the Secretariat TD/B/C.4/ISL/6/rev. 1 United Nations,
New York, 1971; Astle W.E.: The Hamburg Rules. Fairplay, 1981; Mankabady, Samir (Ed): The Hamburg
Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978.
As noted in Astle, W.E.: The Hamburg Rules, pp. 48—5 1, 137—138.
274
V
(a) what constitutes “delivery’ in order to start the one year period running? Here, the
view was taken that “delivery” would normally mean the moment when the consignee
receives the goods from the person competent to deliver them. Accordingly, it was
indicate that the moment from which time begins to run is from when the consignee
received the goods or on the 1st day when he should have received them. This
proposal is reflected in Article 20 (2) (as well as Article 19 (2) and (3).
(b) Does “brought within one year” mean brought anywhere within one year, or
In the English case, Compania Colombia de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co (1932)
2 Lloyds Rep 479, it was held that a suit was time-barred because it was not brought in England
within one year, although they were previously brought within one year in another country — the
United States.
The decision in this case was very much criticized. The UNCTAD Committee opined that “if
the object of the time limit is to make cargo owners give prompt notice of claims to carriers, this
Thid., p. 50.
275
The Committee felt that there should be amendments stating that it would be sufficient for
suit to be brought in any jurisdiction having reasonable close connection with the contract of
carriage, and as the country of shipment or destination, and that the cargo claimant would not be
Accordingly, Article 21 gives a claimant a wide choice of jurisdiction. Further, even where
the contract of carriage stipulates jurisdiction in a particular country or courts, the claimant is
As afready noted, the English case, The Mearak, held that “suit” includes arbitration. The
UNCTAD Committee was concerned that where ‘suit” is held to include arbitration, the
consequences could be very prejudicial to consignees when the Bill of Lading has been issued
Here, the charterparty is usually incorporated into the Bill of Lading by reference and the
consignee does not know of its contents. The result is that the consignee might start court
proceedings within one year. Belatedly, he discovers that his legal suit will not be entertained
because he did not in the first place arbitrate. His application for arbitration then fails because he
276
did not appoint an arbitrator within the one year period. The end result is that he is without a
remedy.
However, if tt
suit” is taken to exclude arbitration and the parties in fact submit to arbitration,
there is the question of whether this means that they have thereby waived the requirement that
In the final analysis the word “suit” was abandoned and Article 20 (1) expressly indicates
that either judicial and arbitral proceedings may be commenced to satisfy the time limitation
requirement.
Nevertheless, it appears, a claimant is still required to ensure that he starts the right
proceedings at the right time. This is so as the Rules expressly provides for the settlement of
referred to arbitration and a bill of lading issued pursuant to the charter-party does not contain a
special annotation providing that such provision shall be binding upon the holder of the bill of
lading, the carrier may not invoke such provision as against a holder having acquired the will of
Hence the problem of due notice to the bill of lading holder as to what proceedings to
277
commence should not normally arise.
Here, Astle notes that “Thee was also a conflict among the Common Law Countries as to the
effect of the words ‘in any event’.” Under English Law an unjustifiable deviation could
conceivably (via the fundamental breach doctrine) result in the six year common law limitation
In the United States the one year time limit continues to apply even in cases of unjustifiable
amendment. However, it appears that in the final analysis the Rules have not by express
Although, inductive reasoning would seem to suggest that under the Hamburg Rules, the
latter American view regarding the Hague Rules “in any event” stipulation is the one adopted.
To begin with, Mankabady notes in reference to the time limit under section 20 of the Hamburg
the departure from the voyage contracted to be made is a breach by the ship owner of his contract, a breach of
such a serious character that, however slight the deviation, the other party to the contract is entitled to treat it
as going to the root of the contract, and to declare himself as no longer bound by any of the contract
terms...”
Astle, Ibid..
278
Rules that “the time limit will still be applicable in case the loss damage of delay resulted from
an intentional or a reckless act. It is clear from Article 8 that the only sanction is that the carrier
This inference appears to be based on reasoning which may be analogised with that
Thus, it is noted that sanctions are stipulated for when the carrier or actual carrier does or
fails to do certain things. This is the case, for example, under Article 8, where the right to limit
No such stipulations are made with respect to the carrier losing the benefit of the limitation
period stipulations. Hence, one can infer that none was intended.
It therefore appears that, prima facie, the limitation period stipulations under the Hamburg
Rules will always apply regardless of what the carrier or actual carrier does or fails to do.
While extension by the parties is permitted in Jamaica and in most countries, it was not
allowed in certain Eastern European countries. Such extension accords with the provisions of
Article 5 of the Hague Rules which permits the carrier to surrender wholly or partly his rights
Op. cit., p. 96
Mankabady, op. cit., p. 97
279
and immunities or to increase any of his responsibilities and liabilities under the Rules.
Whatever existing doubts that persisted should be put to rest by paragraph 4 of Article 20
which expressly permits such extension by a declaration in writing to the claimant. As alluded
to, this does not affect the position in Jamaica where, in any event, such extension is permitted
Finally, as regards Article 20, it has quite importantly, increased the one year period of
limitation to two years. Also, this Hamburg Rules provision unlike its Hague Rules counterpart
is formulated as a time-bar rather than as a discharge from liability. It therefore seems open to be
construed as only barring the claimants remedy and not his right to claim. For recourse actions
for indemnity claims, the relevant limitation period is not less than 90 days instead of (not less
The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.) applies to Jamaica by virtue of its section 9(1)
“This Act shall extend throughout His Majesty’s Dominions and to any territories under
This accords with certain established practice. For instance, under the existing “Gold Clause Agreement”,
British ship owners agree to, in effect, allow up to two years for cargo interests to start action against them
provided specified timely notice is given of the claim.
Vide: supra
280
his protection.. .
Section 8 of the said Act is captioned ‘Limitation of Actions” and provides as follows:
“No action shall be maintable to enforce any claim or lien against a vessel or her owners
in respect of any damage or loss to another vessel, her cargo or freight, or any property on
board her, or damages for loss of life or personal injuries suffered by any person on board her,
caused by the fault of the former vessel, whether such vessel be wholly or partly in fault, or in
respect of any salvage services unless proceedings therein are commenced within two years
from the date when the damage or loss or injury was caused or the salvage services were
rendered, and an action shall not be maintainable under this Act to enforce any contribution on
respect of an overpaid proportion of any damage for loss of life or personal injuries unless
proceedings therein are commenced within one year from the date of payment:
Provided that any Court having jurisdiction to deal with an action to which
this section relates may, in accordance with the rules of court, extend any
such period, to such extent and on such conditions as it thinks fit, and shall
if satisfied that there has not during such period been any reasonable
country to which the plaintiffs ship belongs or in which the plaintiff resides
281
or have his principal place of business extend any such period to an extent
The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.) was enacted to give legislative effect to two
Brussels COnventions on Collision and Salvage to which the United Kingdom and with her
The two conventions are The International Convention for The Unification of Certain Rules
of Law with respect to Collision between vessels, 1910 and The Convention for the Unification
Section 8 of The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (U.K.), was enacted to cumulatively give
legislative effect to Article 7 of the Collision Convention and Article 10 of the Salvage
Convention. These Articles respectively prescribe a limitation period of two years for collision /
Both Articles permit State Parties to the Conventions to provide in their legislation for the
extension of the limitation periods where it has not been possible to arrest the defendant vessel
in the territorial waters of the state in which the plaintiff has his domicile or principal place of
business.
282
Article 7 also stipulates a one year period of limitation for enforcement of rights to obtain
contribution for excess damages paid to third parties in respect of death or personal injuries.
As under English law claims for salvage and for damage done by a ship in collision with
another ship or vessel are among the claims recognised as giving rise to maritime liens, section
8 of the Act specifies that the enforcement in each case of both the claim and the lien to which it
gives rise to will be barred after two years. This provision thus provides one of the exceptions
to the general rule that liens are only extinguished in accordance with the doctrine of laches.
“Temperley’s Merchant Shipping Acts, emphasises that section 8 by its wording, only
applies “... to claims in respect of damage or loss to cargo or property or loss of life or
It states further that “claims of this nature which lie against the vessel carrying the persons,
cargo or property in question are not affected by this period of limitation: cf. The Nice to de
Larrinaga (1966) P. 80; The Ainwick (1965) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (reversed ibid. 320 on another
point). Jackson notes that they “are subject only to the general pattern of time-bar rules.”
As an action in rem commences when the writ is issued, the lack of reasonable opportunity
to arrest does not prevent a prospective plaintiff fro ensuring that the time limit is complied with
Vide: Thomas, P.R.: Maritime Liens, 1980, para 504; Mankabady, S. The Law of collision at sea, 1987, p.
544.
Ibid., para
Temperly, R.: The Merchant Shipping Acts, Britgish Shipping Laws, Vol. II, London, 1976.
Ibid., para 844
Ibid.
Op.cit. p. 93; Vide: The Niceto de Larrinaga (1966) p. 80
283
in the first place.
However, having had the writ issued, he might not have an opportunity to serve it before the
writ expires.
“No original writ of summons shall be in force for more than twelve months from the
day of the date thereof, including the day of such date; but if any defendant therein
named shall not have been served therewith, the plaintiff may, before the expiration of
the twelve months, apply to the court or Judge for leave to renew the writ; and the Court
or Judge if satisfied that reasonable efforts have been made to serve such defendant, or
for other good reason, may order that the original or concurrent writ of summons be
renewed for six months from the date of such removal inclusive, and so from time to
Even if application is not made within the prescribed time, the court can extend the time for
renewing the writ, despite the general rule of practice that the court will not by the renewal of
the writ revive a statue-barred debt: Doyle v Kaufman (1878) 3Q.B.Q. 1, 340; Hewett v Barr
In the case of The Espanoleto, 36 T.L.R. 554; (1920) p. 223. the facts were that a collision
Vide: F.N. 40
284
having taken place in February 1917, a writ in rem was issued in December 1918. By that time
the defendant vessel had left the jurisdiction. Application for renewal of the writ was made in
March 1920. Then, the vessel was arrested upon her first return to a port within jurisdiction.
Upon a motion to set aside the writ and the renewal and the warrant of arrest, and to
discharge the undertaking to put in bail, Hill I. held that in as much as the period of limitation
provided by section 8 was not absolute, the court should consider the applicant on its merits and
inquire whether the circumstances were such that the court would have given leave to issue the
writ notwithstanding that the time had expired, on the ground that the plaintiff exercised due
diligence in prosecuting his claim. If leave to issue the writ would have been granted, a fortiori,
a renewal of a writ taken out within the prescribed time should be granted.
Section 8, refers to the court extending the time period in accordance with rules of court”.
Although no rules of court have yet been made under the section, the court may exercise its
The principles upon which the court will grant such extension under section 8 are the same
“In considering whether to grant a renewal or further renewal of a writ, the court will
Temperly, op.cit. para 845, Jackson, op.cit., p. 93; The Owenbawn (1973) I Lloyds Rep. 56
The Annual Practice 1965, Vols. I, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1965, p. 68
285
have regard to all the circumstances of the case.”
In the Owenbaum, (1973) 1 Lloyds Rep. 56, Brandon J. envisaged three situations in
(3) where there has been conduct leading the plaintiff to suppose that it would be all right
to defer service.
This list is not exhaustive. It appears that once the court is convinced that there is “good
reason” to renew the writ or likewise extend the two years limitation, it will normally do so.
However, mere negotiation between the parties do not constitute “good reason” to renew.
Thus, Lord Denning M.R. in Easy v Universal Anchorage Co Ltd (1974) 1 W.L.R. 899 at p.
902 states that: “Negotiations for a settlement do not afford any excuse for failing to serve a writ
Finally, as regards section 8, it should be noted that despite the reference to arrest in its
proviso, the discretion to extend time applies to actions in personal as well as to action in rem:
“The only principle is that a writ is not to be renewed except for good reason...” per Lord Denning. M.R. in
Easy v. Universal Anchorage Co. Ltd. (1974) 1 W.L.R. 899 at p. 902; Vide: Odgers’ Principles of Pleading
and Practice in Civil Actions in the High Court of Justice (22nd Edn.), London, Stevens & Sons, 1981.
286
New Salvage Convention
There is now a new Salvage Convention: The International Convention on Salvage, 1989.
1 Any action relating to payment under this Convention shall be time-barred if judicial
or arbitral proceedings have not been instituted within a period of two years. The
limitation period commences on the day on which the salvage operations are
terminated.
2 The person against whom a claim is made may at any time during the running of the
limitation period extend that period by a declaration to the claimant. This period may
3 An action for indemnity by a person liable may be instituted even after the expiration
of the limitation period provided for in the preceding paragraphs, if brought within the
time allowed by the law of the State where proceedings are instituted.”
Thus, the limitation period remains at two years, before it runs fro the day on which the
287
1
It is now expressly provided that the person against whom a claim is made can during the
limitation period allow more time to the claimant for commencing his action against him. This,
as already noted, would in any event be normally allowed under Jamaican Law.
stop time from running against the claimant. No reference was made to arbitration under the
1910 convention.
The new stipulation parallels the Hamburg Rules Article 20 (1) provisions and appears to be
Under the new provisions, a court would no longer, at least, by virtue of the Convention,
have any power to extend the time for bringing action except in respect of recourse actions for
indemnity.
For indemnity actions, no maximum period is stipulated. This is left to the law of the state
(c) Maritime Claims in Jamaica — without claim specific limitation periods (and International
Convention provisions)
Supra.
Discussed, supra
288
i General
In Jamaica, these are, in general, governed by the broadly applicable 6 year period of
limitation. On exception is in respect of maritime fatal accident claims, involving for example
ship passengers or crew. Here, as noted, the relevant period under The Fatal Accidents Act is
three years. Also, where the Government or other Public Authority is being sued the applicable
limitation period for commencing suit is one year (Public Authorities Protection Act, section 2).
ii Claims against carrier by sea in respect of Passengers Death, Personal Injury, Loss
of or Damage to Luggage.
Article 16 of the 1974 Athens Convention Relating to The Carriage of Passengers and Their
“1 Any action for damages arising out of the death or personal injury to a passenger or
for the loss of or damage to luggage shall be time-barred after a period of two years.
(a) in the case of personal injury, from the date of disembarkation of the passenger,
(b) in the case of death occurring during carriage, from the date when the
passenger after disembarkation, from the date of death, provided that this period
Supra
289
shall not exceed three year from the date of disembarkation;
(c) in the case of loss or damage to luggage, from the date of disembarkation or
from the date when disembarkation should have taken place which ever is later.
3 The law of the court seized of the case shall govern the grounds of suspension and
interruption of limitation periods, but in no case shall an action be brought after the
expiration of three years from the date of disembarkation of the passenger or from the
4 Notwithstanding paragraph 1,2 and 3 of this Article, the period of limitation may be
extended by a declaration of the carrier or by agreement of the parties after the cause
In determining when time begins to rum paragraph (b) makes a distinction between when
death occurs during carriage and when it occurs after carriage of the passenger. Under the
Jamaican Fatal Accident Act, the primary concern is the date of death.
The distinction seems well advised as whoever is bringing suit might mot be made aware of
the death of the deceased until after the time he should have disembarked.
290
Clearly, if the distinction is followed the result wifi be to increase the period of limitation that
would be available to the claimant for death occurring during the voyage.
The absolute ceiling of three years for fatal accident claims, except for the distinction noted,
generally accords with present Jamaican law. However as regards personal injury and damage
Article 17 of the convention which deals with “competent jurisdiction “permits a claimant to
choose from a variety of courts to bring his action. If he chooses a Jamaican Court, one benefit
he will clearly have vis-a-vis the controls of State Parities to the Convention is a longer time
within which to bring his action in respect of personal injury and loss or damage to luggage.
On the other hand, if it is a fatal accident claim arising from the death of the passenger
during the voyage he may well find himself with less time to commence proceedings in the
Jamaican court as against that permitted by the courts of the State parties to the Convention.
It appears anyway that a “limitation period” Forum Shipping claimant might be very much
constrained in exercising his Article 17 options by the relatively few number of State Parties to
291
Article 8 of the International Convention on Civil Liability For Oil Pollution Damage (1969)
provides that:
an action is brought thereunder within three years from the date when the
years from the date of the incident which caused the damage. Where this
incident consists of a series of occurrences, the six years’ period shall run
extinguished unless an action is brought thereunder or a notification has been made pursuant to
Article 7, paragraph 6 within three years from the date when the damage occurred. However, in
no case shall an action be brought after six years from the date of the incident which caused the
damage.
extinguished before the expiry of a period of six month as from the date on which the owner or
292
p
his guarantor acquired knowledge of the bringing of an action against him under the Liability
Convention.”
In considering these provisions, it is worth bearing in mind that the main aim of the
“Liability Convention” is to facilitate the recovery of compensation for oil pollution damage
cases where damage claims are not covered by the Liability Convention. Article 4 of this
convention provides for the obtaining of such compensation. Article 5 facilitates indemnification
of the owner and his guarantor in certain circumstances. Article 7 (6) requires notice to be given
to the Fund in respect of any proceedings for oil pollution damage brought in a contracting
For both Conventions, the basic limitation period is three year from the date when damage
occurred. Claimant in respect of latent or deterred oil pollution damage stand to benefit from the
longer but absolute 6 years ceiling for bringing claims. Although, this need not always be so as
in this case time runs from the incident and not the damage. Often, the full effects of oil
pollution damage take a long time to manifest themselves. The potential claimant may thus be
Vide: Gold, Edgar: Handbook on Marine Pollution, Gard, 1985, p. 114 115; Bates, John H.: United
-
Kingdom Pollution Law, 1985, chap. 4; Abecassis, D.W., Tarashow, R.L.: Oil Pollution from Ships, (2nd
Edn), 1985, Chap. 10.
Ibid.
293
prejudiced accordingly.
Jamaica is a party to neither the Liability nor the Fund Convention. The general six year
limitation period thus applies to oil pollution damage claims. However, Jamaica may wish to
benefit from certain Voluntary Compensation Schemes provided by the Oil Tndustry. For both
TAVOLOP and CRISTAL, a claimant is required to give notification within two years of the
incident.
These broadly include all other claims such as those for demurrage, freight under a
charterparty, loss or damage under a marine insurance policy and contribution to general
i. General consideration
Maritime liens, with limited exceptions, are not subject to any specific time for enforcement
294
-a
under Jamaican Law. However, they may be lost through lack of reasonable diligence in
enforcing them.
Thomas notes that “with regard to the operation of the doctrine of laches in the Admiralty
Court, it would appear that a claim will rarely founder on the ground of mere delay. “Thus in
the Chieftan (1863) B&L. 212, a lapse of 10 months before a master instituted a suit for wages
was held to be no bar. In The Europa (1863) B& L 80, a delay of over three years ion
prosecuting a damage lien arising out of collision did not bar enforcement.
The case of The Wing Magnus, 1891 p. 223 affords a remarkable example. In that English
case a delay of eleven days before instituting proceedings in rem was held insufficient to
extinguish the claim, although during that period the offending ship had made frequent visits to
The applicable principle appears to be that where there is undue delay in presenting a claim
the Court looks not only to the period of time which has elapsed, but to the total circumstances
as they touch upon the interests of justice or of the parties involved, the ultimate consideration
Relevant circumstances include the loss of witnesses or evidence and the rights of third
parties. Thus in the Europa, it is noted that “A maritime lien follows the ship into whosoever
295
hands she may pass, and may be enforced after a considerable lapse of time; but to effect the
rights of third persons, reasonable diligence in its enforcement must be used, otherwise the lien
may be lost.”
In the same case it is stated that “Reasonable diligence means not the doing of everything
possible but that which, having regard to all the circumstances, including consideration of
The doctrine of laches prevail except in cases where there are specified limitation periods as
in respect of salvage and collision damage liens. Thomas opines that where there exists a
statutory time limitation, there can be no successful challenge for delay within the specified
period, for the statutory period of time represents “... the period during which the law permits
If this is so then it seems to the writer that this rules out the possibility of a situation
occurring where a claim secured by a maritime lien survives the loss of that lien. However, such
a possibility, although considered “unlikely” has been put forward in Pineus: Time-Barred
Actions.
The example given is where a lien has been lost through lach of reasonable diligence ‘as
(1863)B &L89.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
296
may be the case if the vessel is allowed to change ownership to the plaintiffs knowledge
without the plaintiff attempting to exercise the lien, the plaintiff would still have his claim until
It is respectfully submitted that this latter view ought to be preferred to that of Thomas. The
fact is that maritime claims can and do exist without accompanying maritime liens.
A maritime lien is a privilege against particular maritime property. Its retention is subject to
certain rules. These rules are quite distinguishable from those relating to preservation of the
right of action on the claim by instituting proceedings within a specified limitation period.
While application of one set of rules may bring into consideration the other set, each set is
not inextricably bound up with the other. Thus, it seems to the writer, that if a court in applying
the rules relating to the extinction of maritime liens resulting from lapse of time to a particular
case, fmd that it is an appropriate case for extinction of the lien, then it may well determine that
the “other rules” are only part of the matrix of factors relevant to arriving at such a finding.
Hence, it is the writers respectful submission that it seems possible for an underlying
maritime lien to be extinguished within the limitation period leaving the claim it accompanied
otherwise intact.
vide; LEG 55/4/1, IMO, consideration of work in respect of Maritime Liens and Mortages and Related
Subjects; Also vide supra.
297
p
ii International Convention Provisions
Both existing conventions on Maritime Liens and Mortgages have failed to gain broad
international acceptance. Preparatory work on a new convention on the subject under the
Both of the existing Conventions contain provisions relating to the extinction of Maritime
Liens. Article 9 of the 1926 Convention has very detailed stipulations but like its much briefer,
1967 Counterpart, per Article 8, it prescribes a period of one year for the extinction of specified
Article 8 of the new draft Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages also generally
Section 74 of the Jamaica Shipping Bill, 1989 is based on and worded similar to that of
extinguished after a period of one year from the time when the claims
The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Maritime Liens and
Mortgages 1926. The International Convetion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime
Liens and Mortgages, 1967.
The Joint Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Maritime Liens and Mortgages ad Related Subjects had its
fifth session 11-20, December 1988 and are finalizing work on Draft Articles for a new Convention on
Maritime Liens and Mortgages, vide: LEG/MLM/19 (IMO Report).
Vide LEGIMLMJ19 (IMO Report).
298
secured thereby arose unless, prior to the expiry of such period, the ship has
been arrested and the arrest has led to a forced sale pursuant to the
provisions of the rules of court or any other law for the time being in force
2 The one year period referred to in subsection (1) shall not be subject to
interruption or suspension except that time shall not run during the period the
This provision was apparently put into the Jamaican Bill in anticipation of Jamaican
However at the present time there are a number of doubts and misgivings surrounding the
Chief among these is the concern about the period of one year was too short and that it
should be extended to two years. Alternatively, a compromise proposal between the latter and
the present draft proposal could be to allow maritime liens recorded at the end of one year to
These various positions have been canvassed at the Sessional Group meetings of the Joint
Inter Governmental Group of Experts on Maritime Liens on December 20, 1988. Jamaica was
299
not represented at this meeting.
The majority view is that “... the one-year period was sufficient since maritime liens were
hidden charges and should not remain valid for a period longer than one year”
However special problems may arise in respect of crew wages. Here the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions have proposed that special consideration be given to
extending the period of validity of maritime liens to two years, at least, in case of crew wages
since the crew members often stayed on board ship for a period longer that one year during
Similarly, the International Labour Organization, supporting the proposal has noted that in
the case of social insurance contributions, the problem was even more serious, as “. . .often the
crew members discovered much later that social insurance contributions had not been paid.”
It seems that the best solution could be to have a generally applicable period of one year but
with exceptions for crew claims in which case the period would be two years. Such a
compromise solution would be in Jamaica’s best interest where more and more seafarers are
being produced. While ignorance of the law is no excuse, seafarers are likely to be quite
Ibid., p 24.
Ibid.
Ibid., p 25.
300
Thus, bearing in mind this fact as it relates to Jamaica and the observations of the
ample opportunity to pursue their legal claims. Except for this qualification, the present majority
view should be supported. As regards the drafting of Section 74 itself, it seems the marginal
note: “limitation of Action “is inappropriate. The note should be “extinction of maritime liens by
lapse of time”. Such a note would not only be identical to the present caption of the relevant
Article 8 of the draft convention, but would more accurately indicate the intent and contents of
that Article as contained in Section 74. Moreover, as discussed above, the issue of extinction of
maritime liens by lapse of time although related is quite distinguishable from considerations
Maritime Arbitrations are founded on agreement between the parties as to how disputes
between them are to be resolved. Accordingly <jamaican law does not ipso facto prescribe any
specific time period for commencing arbitration proceedings. Any such requirement is provided
Thomas notes that it is not open to the court to “...dismiss a claim in arbitration or grant an
Thomas, D. Rhiclian: The legal remedies for dilatoriness in the pre-hearing arbitral procedure, 1983,
301
injunction to restrain an arbitral proceeding that had it been an action at law the court would have
He notes further that “...a respondent in an arbitration enjoys no right as against the claimant
The arbitrator himself has at common law no inherent power to dismiss a claim for want of
und Machine fabriko v. South India Shipping Corp, 1981 A.C. 909).
It thus appears that a very advisable stipulation in any Agreement to submit to Arbitration is
one specifying the time within which Arbitration proceedings are to be brought and the attendant
hence, Arbitration Agreements often specify that a particular step must be started within a
“Any claim must be made in writing and claimant’s Arbitrator appointed within twelve
months of final discharge and where this provision is not complied with, the claim shall be
L.M.C.Q. 315.
Ibid., at p 321.
Ibid.
302
deemed to be waived and absolutely barred.”
Such “time and bar’ arbitration agreements operate independently of statutory time limits.
Thomas notes that “In effect, by substituting an alternative period of time to that specified by
statute, such agreements operate as a contractual displacement of the otherwise operative time
limits.”
These “time and bar” clauses are valid and not deemed to be contrary to public policy.
(Atlantic v. Drefus, 1922, 2A.C. 250). However they can give rise to harshly inequitable
consequences for a potential claimant particularly where the time period stipulated is rather
short. A default extinguishes the claim (in respect of both right and remedy), leaving nothing
Maritime Arbitrations in Jamaica are governed by The Arbitration Act, 1900. This Act does
not contain any special provision empowering the court to take ameliorative action when faced
with an unconscionable but valid “time and bar” clause. It is probable that the court may well
consider itself unhappily fettered by the manacles of the position at common law. This
permissive common law approach is itself clearly buttressed by the sanctity of contract
principle.
Thomas, D. Rhidian: Commercial Arbitration: Power of court to extend time for commencing arbitration
proceedings, 1981, L.M.C.L.Q.529.
Ibid.
Term used by Thomas, Ibid. to indicate that default bars the claim absolutuley, as compared with a “time
stipulation simpliciter” which ‘leaves open the possibility of legal proceedings subject to the court’s
discretion to stay”: Ibid., p 530.
303
It therefore appears that appropriate amendment to the Jamaican Arbitration Act to remove
these shackles. Here, it is worth noting the provision of Section 27 of the United Kingdom’s
“Where the terms of an agreement to refer future disputes to arbitration provide that any
claims to which the agreement applies shall be barred unless notice to appoint an arbitrator is
taken within a time fixed by the agreement, and a dispute arises to which the agreement applies
the High Court, if it is of opinion that in the circumstances of the case undue hardship would
otherwise be caused, and notwithstanding that the time so fixed has expired, may, on such term
if any, as the justice of the case may require, but without prejudice to the provisions of any
enactment limiting the time for commencement of arbitration proceedings extend the time for
By this provision the English Court is given a discretionary jurisdiction to extend the time
for commencing an arbitration proceeding in circumstances where the applicant would otherwise
suffer undue hardship and injustice. A similar provision in Jamaican Arbitration legislation
would go a far way in correcting the pregnant potential for injustice and hardship provided by
304
Salmon L.J., in the case Liberian Shipping Corp. v. A. King & Sons, Ltd: the Pegasus
(1967) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 302,309, commented on the state of English law as regard “time and
bar” clauses, prior to the enactment of Section 27. These comments which point appositely to
“Prior to this enactment.. .the commercial community.. .and. .those who practiced and
.
administered commercial law.. .were shackled by. .this type of arbitration clause. It put it out of
.
the power of the Court to grant any relief to a claimant who had allowed perhaps a day or two to
run beyond the period. specified in the clause, even although the delay could have caused no
. .
conceivable harm to the other side.. .The other party, who had not been guilty of a deliberate
.
breach of contract, was relieved from liability to pay compensation for the heavy loss which he
had caused... .It was no doubt to remedy this hardship and injustice that the legislature
It seems all the more desirable to legislatively empower the courts to intervene when it is
remembered as noted in the United Kingdom’s 1927 Machinnon Report on the Law of
ARbitration that ...“ the vast majority of submissions to arbitration are contained in the printed
arbitration clause in printed form of contract, which cannot be carefully examined in the
transaction of business, and alteration of which it would be difficult for most people to
305
secure. .
to how the court’s discretion to extend time or not should be exercised. Such guidelines are
absent from the United Kingdom’s 1950 Act. However, English Case Law provide some
pointers.
In the Jocelyne, (1977) 2 Lloyds Rep. Ri at p. 129, Brandon, J. (as he then was)
sunimarised some of the relevant criteria to be applied in relation to Section 27 of the United
“In deciding whether to extend time or not the Court should look at all the relevant
circumstances of the particular case. In particular the following matters should be considered:
(c) whether the delay was due to the fault of the claimant or to circumstances outside his
control;
(d) if it was due to the fault of the claimant, the degree of such fault;
(f) whether the other party has been prejudiced by the delay, and if so, the degree of
306
a
such prejudice.’
Other criteria have been identified in other English cases. These include the following
considerations:
(g) the strength of the claim of the applicant. (Sanko Steamship Co., Ltd v. Tradax
(h) whether apart from Section 27, there is a criteria structured into the arbitration
process by which the time stipulation may be extended: (Ets Soules & Cie v.
(i) would the applicant suffer personal liability if and so far as the claim is not allowed to
(j) was the time stipulation part of an international code for promoting uniformity: (Nea
Agrex S.A. v. Baltic Shippin Co. Ltd. and Intershipping Charter Co. The Agios
(k) considerations emanating from and prevailing within the particular trade in which the
307
dispute arises: (Timmerman’s Coraan En Maalhandel En Maalderij B.V. v. Sachs
-
It is submitted that Jamaica should make the necessary amendments paying cognizance to
these guidelines.
While in general a Jamaican Court may feel powerless to deal effectively with a seemingly
too short time period stipulation in a time and bar arbitration clause, this ought not to be the case
where it is dealing with a case within the ambit of the Carriage of Goods Act, 1889 which
The problem may arise if the time limit in the charter-party arbitration clause is shorter than
the one year limit provided for in the Hague Rules where they govern the contract between the
parties.
Application of a shorter time limit would violate Article 3 (8) of the Hague Rules because it
would lessen the carrier’s liability. Hence such a time and bar clause ought properly to be
treated as void and repugnant to the Hague Rules provisions contained in the Carriage of Goods
Act.
308
Under Jamaican Law, following the traditional English position, statutory rules on limitation
of action are classified as procedural rather than substantive, on the ground that they only bar
Accordingly for purposes of Jamaican private international law, time limitation is governed
by the lex fori. No foreign time bat will therefore be recognized even if that is labelled as
arising from a contract governed by foreign la, a Jamaican Court following the English common
law position, is obliged to apply the Jamaican Statute of Limitation and not that of the proper
Thus, if the Jamaican Limitation period has expired, it may be obliged to dismiss the action,
even if the foreign period had not expired. Conversely the court would be obliged to permit the
action if brought within the Jamaican period but after expiry of the foreign period.
This approach stands in sharp contrast to that taken by continental European, which
characterize time bars as substantive. Further, the traditional English approach has now been
abrogated with the enactment in England of The Foreign Limitation Periods Act, 1984 (U.K.),
Vide: Stone, P.A.: Time Limitation in the English Conflict of Laws, 1980 L.M.C.L.Q., 497.
The internal law of the country where the court is situated.
Jackson, op. cit., p 101.
Stone, op. cit., p 497.
309
which came into force on October 1, 1985.
Thus in England, the basic rule now is that time limitation is treated as a substantive question
and thus governed by the law which governs other aspects of the parties substantive rights.
The result is that a claim will be dismissed in England, if it is time barred by the lex causae,
although not by English internal law, and will be upheld if it is timely under the lex causae, even
Stone notes that “the rule that procedure is governed by the lex fori has the legitimate
purpose of simplifying the conduct of the proceedings and enabling them to be conducted in a
manner with which the court is familiar and comfortable. It is not designed to enable the forum
He notes further that “... time limitation cannot justifiable be characterized as a matter of
procedure: the relevant limitation rule will often be decisive as to the outcome of the case; there
will seldom be any particular difficulty in applying a foreign limitation rule; and the question
Added to these very cogent reasons for departure from the traditional English position is the
Dicey and Morris observe that “The main justification for the conflict of laws is that it
310
implements of reasonable and legitimate expectations to a transaction or an occurrence.”
Thus where for instance, parties enter into a maritime contract for which the proper law is
that of country X which provides for a limitation period of say three years, then it is reasonable
to expect that if no action is commenced in accordance with the three year stipulation, that is the
However, if the matter ends up in a Jamaican Court where the applicable limitation period is,
say six years, then the Jamaican Court, following the traditional English position, would be
obliged to entertain the suit. It would then go on to apply the “substantive” law of country X to
the case.
reforming the law along the lines long taken in Continental European law and now belatedly
followed by England.
311
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Undoubtedly, a crucial preliminary consideration for any maritime claimant (and indeed for
all concerned, whether in negotiations or otherwise about a claim) is how much time the
Exploration of the relevant Jamaican Law reveals an absence of Jamaican or West Indian
cases or limitation of Maritime Actions. It is therefore likely that Jamaican Courts will resort to
However, these authorities are not without their problems. Indeed, some have been much
Here, it is worth bearing in mind that the perspectives of analysis adopted by UNCTAD are
likely to more favourable to “cargo interests” countries like Jamaica, than those which gave rise
to conventions such as the Hague Rules adopted when Jamaica was a British colony by a few
mainly ship owning countries who naturally sought to legislate in accordance with their rested
interests.
Overall, in the development of Jamaican jurisprudence and legislation in this area of the law,
312
due regard should thus be had to the deliberations of international organizations such as
UNCTAD and IMO on subjects such as the Carriage of Goods by Sea and Maritime Liens.
This should be done not only to gain a different and wider perspective than that of the
vital in the international maritime law sphere. These deliberations offer readily accessible,
international experts.
Similarly, cases from other common law jurisdictions reveal different approaches which
Also, the approaches of civil law counties in this area can be very instructive. For instance,
the treatment of Continental European law of limitation of actions as a “substantive” rather than
Here it has been shown that the United Kingdom itself has now albeit belatedly taken steps
to rid itself of what, in the writer’s humble view, was a blot on its jurisprudence.
Sadly, Jamaican law is left with this legacy. A new approach is therefore strongly urged.
A new Limitation of Actions Act is required to break new ground and consolidate certain
existing laws. There should be clear enumeration of maritime and other claims, specifying their
limitation periods as well as the overall applicable principles. Provision should be made in this
313
regards for Jamaican courts to deal with unconscionable time stipulations in Arbitration “time
The present incorporation of the draft Article on extinction of maritime lien by lapse of time
points to an attempt to keep Jamaica’s law abreast of the latest developments. While this is
commendable, steps should be taken to ensure, as far as possible, Jamaica’s participation in the
decision making process as regards the draft Article itself and others. Otherwise, Jamaica might
be “modernizing” but not in line with its best interests. For instance, as shown, our seafarers
may be unduly prejudiced by a blanket one year period for the extinction of maritime liens.
As Jamaica is only a party to the Hague Rules which it has enacted, its limitation of action
provisions in this area, suffer from a number of the deficiencies of these Rules. It is unable to
The Limitation of Actions and related provisions of the Hamburg Rules, which although not
yet in force, are very instructive as they arguably point in the direction in which the international
maritime community is moving. They provide a useful part jurisprudential policy framework for
judicial analysis and legislative activity. Further, to the extent that in some respects they purport
to only clarify certain ambiguous provisions of the Hague Rules they are to some extent
314
I
These Hamburg Rules Limitation of Actions and related provisions appear to offer a more
just and equitable balancing of the risks between cargo and carrier interests as compared to the
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules. Cargo Interests are provided with more reasonable time to
negotiate with carriers before commencing proceedings to protect their claim. This itself accords
As regards collision claims, it appears that Jamaica should consider establishing Rules of
Court as required by the existing convention, along the lines of its established principles for writ
renewal.
The Maritime Conventions Act (U.K.) 1911, does not appear in the Volumes of Laws of
Jamaica. This means that resort has to be had to English literature to locate the Act. Jamaica is a
party to the existing Collision and Salvage Conventions, in its own right. It should reenact these
conventions into Jamaican law so that the relevant legislation appears in our statute books.
In the case of salvage claims, the new Salvage Convention has done away with the need for
special Rules of Court as regards extension of time. This convention with its emphasis on
encouraging operations to stem oil pollution, should prima facie, be favourably viewed by
Jamaica.
their desirability. However even if there is a decision not to become a party to a convention, it is
315
apparent that guidance for judicial and legislative purposes can be obtained from an examination
of its limitation of action and related provisions. Moreover, uniformity as regards such
accordance with widely accepted international provisions would enhance not only the contents
No analysis has been attempted of provisions of conventions other than those impinging on
the subject of this chapter, hence no inferences are offered about these Conventions on a whole.
Nevertheless, it is clear that in the case of the Carriage of Goods by Sea, the limitation of
actions provisions of the Hague Rules especially as they have been interpreted by the English
Courts to be revised.
Here, one caveat worth emphasising is that time limitation provisions of maritime
conventions constitute a relatively small albeit very important component of these conventions.
It has been shown that analysis of these convention provisions additionally serve the useful
purpose of seeing where Jamaican law stands as regards certain internationally agreed time
316
1
limitation stipulations.
Further, even where there are no International Conventions as is the case with TOVALOP
and CRISTAL, it is important to know the time constraints within which a Jamaican maritime
claimant operates. It therefore seems safe to conclude, that in any event from the perspective of
317
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
A Variety of subject matters falling under the broad umbrella of preliminary legal issues
have been examined. In each of the preceding chapters dealing with the various preliminary
legal issues an attempt has been made in each case to indicate the main inferences to be drawn
from the analysis. It is not the writer’s intention to simply regurgitate them here.
Certain conclusions may be advanced from the study as a whole. The primary
conclusion is that preliminary legal issues pertaining to maritime claims enforcement in Jamaica
definitely have an international dimension worth considering when such issues are being dealt
with.
Examination of all of the major sub-areas spanned by the thesis support such an
inference.
This is manifestly the case as regards issues pertaining to ship arrest and the scope of the
Jamaican Admiralty Jurisdiction where essential local rules clearly have their roots in
The study supports the basic inference that muncipal maritime Jurisdiction and Choice of
319
Law issues ultimately operate within international legal parameters and its useful to see them in
this light, in the case of Time Limitation of Maritime Actions, where, prime facie, it seems less
probable that international rules may have an influence, the study shows that as regards a
number of particular Maritime claims the influence is direct and very significant.
The basic reason for this recurring international and local legal nexus, appears to be
the striving for international uniformity, certainty and justice in maritime matters generally.
Thus, more and more, international maritime rules are extending their frontiers into the
domain of what was traditionally perceived as the preserve of municipal law rules.
For instance, IMO has traditionally been preoccupied with safety and anti-marine
pollution substantive safety regulations. However, in recent years, it has been increasingly
concerned with civil liability and related jurisdictional issues as these pertain to, for example,
oil pollution.
UNCTA1) which has been traditionally preoccupied in the legal sphere with broad issues
of economic regulation of shipping, is now with IMO jointly focusing on issues of maritime
Also UNCTAD by way of its more recent conventions on the carriage of goods by sea
320
and multimodal transport has been paying special attention in these Conventions to preliminary
legal issues. This, the study shows reflects a growing trend in international maritime
stipulatuions. Indeed, this development has been prompted by the failure of many of the past
conventions to include peovisions on these preliminary legal issues and to make them
mandatory for the municipal law of Contracting State parties. Such a failure it has been shown
has at times to frustrated the objectives of the substantive Rules of the relevant Conventions.
The net result of this new trend is more direct consequences for state parties
t domestic
In the case of Jamaica, this is exemplified by the incorporation of provisions of the Draft
Articles for a new Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages in its new Shipping Bill.
Whenever both sets of previsions move beyond the draft stage into being respectively,
international and Jamaican law, then the nexus will entail clearer consequences for law practice
in Jamaica. The international dimension, to such issues will then be more readily discernible.
However, on the whole, the trend is yet to have full impact on Jamaican law.
More directly responsible for the link between the preliminary issues and international
This is what has been largely responsible for the appearance in Jamaica of international
321
The process of extended legislation has brought with it international convention
stipulations which have helped to keep Jamaican maritime procedural and private international
law rules in keeping with existing international stipulations. However, they have also brought
with them particular problems of statutory interpretation and various deficiencies. Where they
have required or contemplated further enactment, these have not been promnigated.
Overall, it is safe to conclude that the area of the law examined by this study has been
ignored by the legislators. The reasons for this include the apparent low priority accorded the
development of rules embracing these preliminary issues and a lack of expertise for both
Many areas of Jamaican law have been identified as needing changes or particular
hampered by the local maritime and private international law rules. Thus, a basic conclusion is
that significant changes are needed to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the relevant local
laws.
The manifest international dimension to these preliminary issues have highlighted the
need for Jamaica to strive to participate fully in the shaping of the narrower circumscribed
322
The study supports the inference that International Maritime Convention provisions
Attempts to ascertain what the law is on particular issues is at times made more difficult
by the very limited amount of Jamaican cases impinging on the subject area. Also compounding
this difficulty is the process of extended legislation, and various colonial legacies.
On the whole however, the legal position in Jamaica on the various issues can generally
Also, it may well be that the study, mainly, by its express incorporation of the
International dimension as well as its emphasis on the protection of national interests will
provide at least an additional lens with which to view the preliminary issues discussed.
The importance of the preliminary legal issues can hardly be doubted. Part of the future
challenge is to ensure that the relevant rules are updated and improved to make certain their
relevance to national interests as well as their overall efficacy and efficiency. A further and vital
323
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Relating to Bills
of Lading.
Certain Rules
Ships.
Employment at
Foundering of
15 Comvention fixing the Minimum Age for the Admission of Young Persons
to Employmeent as Trimmers or Stokers (Convention 15 of 1921)
1926)
Employment
Damage, 1969.
Establishment of an
Luggage by Sea
1
1974
1978
Goods, 1980
1986
Part A: General
Language: English
Climate: Tropical
Capital: Kingston
Organization
Membership: Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), Organization of
American States (O.A.S.), African, Caribbean and Pacific
Group (A.C.P.); The Common wealth: The United Nations
(U.N.).
(b) shelf area to 200 meters depth: 11,700 square nautical miles
(c) EEZ area to 200 nautical miles: 86,800 square nautical miles
(Attard indicates that this data is itself based on “information supplied by the U.S.
Geographer, see eg., Limits no.36 (4th Rev.). The EEZ figures are generally based on
He also notes in reference to the data that limitations may prevent states from
claiming a full 200 mile EEZ. Overall, it appears that the figure given in respect of the
EEZ indicated the area the zone would have if Jamaica was able to claim all areas
adjacent to it to a distance of 200 miles from the relevant baselines. However, as
Jamaica is a Carib-locked country, the figure stated for the EEZ is larger than it will be
2. Registered
of Ships)
3. Maritime
4. Maritime
5. Maritime Sector
APPENDIX 3
Economic Regulations
MARINE RESOURCES
MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS
MARThE INSURANCE
PRIZE GOODS
SEAFARERS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Morant and Pedro Cays Act, 1907
A:IMO CONVENTIONS
4. International Convention on Loadlines, 1966 (as amended in 1971, 1975 and 1979)
I
B: 1LO CONVENTIONS
9. Convention fixing the minimum age for the admission of young persons to
10. Convention fixing the minimum age for the admission of children to employment at
12. Convention concerning the compulsory medical examination of children and young
UN CONVENTIONS
15. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, 1958
16. Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958
C: CMI-BRUSSELS CONVENTIONS
19. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
20. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
21. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relation to
1. Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the