Restatement of The Doctrine of Piercing
Restatement of The Doctrine of Piercing
Restatement of The Doctrine of Piercing
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19
CESAR L. VILLANUEVA *
INTRODUCTION
The title of this paper may expectedly lead to the impression that
the main thrust would be to rehash existing decisions on the doctrine
of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Although that would be the
process, the aim of this paper is to place more emphasis on the
complementary relationship of the piercing doctrine to the main doc-
trine that a corporation has a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the stockholders or members who compose it.
Looking at the number of decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court where it has pierced the veil of corporate fiction, compared with
the handful of decisions by which it has refused to apply the piercing
doctrine and instead affirmed the main doctrine of separate juridical
personality, may give one the impression that when the issue is whether
or not to treat the corporation as a separate person, the main doctrine
has lost some of its vitality, and that.the piercing doctrine has grown
lush and vital.
It is always comforting to note, especially for businessmen to whom
the corporate entity has undoubtedly become the most popular medium
by which to pursue business transactions, that the viability and vitality
of a doctrine is to be tested not by the times it has been challenged
and overcome in court decisions, but by the usefulness and frequency
of its use in the market place. The enormity of the number of Supreme
Court decisions applying the piercing doctrine does not even begin
to show the thousands upon thousands of daily transactions nego-
tiated and completed without a hitch employing the corporate entity.
The author is a professorial lecturer in Corporation Law at the Ateneo College of Law, and
the Managing Partner of Villanueva Bernardo & Gabionza Law Offices, 702 Vicente Madrigal
Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. Editor-in-Chief, Ateneo Law journal (1980-81).
ACT No. 1459 passed by the then Philippine Commission, known as the CORPORATION LAW.
2 Section 2, AcT No. 1459, and Section 2, BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 25, CORPORATION CODE, Section
2 (1980).
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 25 (1980).
Sec. 287.
BALLANTINE,
6 SCRA 373 (1962).
Manila Gas Corp. v. Collector of Internal Revenue7 held that the tax
exemptions granted to a corporation do not pertain to its stockholders
due to the separate corporate personalities. "A corporation has a
personality distinct from that of its stockholders, enabling the taxing
power to reach the latter when they receive dividends from the
corporatipn. It must be considered as settled in this jurisdiction that
dividends of a domestic corporation which are paid and delivered in
cash to foreign corporations as stockholders are subject to the payment
of the income tax, the exemption clause to the charter [of the domestic
corporation] notwithstanding.""
Likewise, attempts by stockholders to intervene in suits against
their corporations have been struck down in Magsaysay-Labrador v.
Court of Appeals' on the basic premise that a party may intervene under
remedial provisions if he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
but that stockholders' right in corporate property is purely inchoate
and will not entitle them to intervene in a litigation involving corporate
property.
Magsaysay-Labrador held that a majority stockholder's interest in
corporate property, "if it exists at all, x x x is indirect, contingent,
remote, conjectural, [in]consequential and collateral. At the very least,
their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right in
the management of the corporation and to share in the profits thereof
and in the properties and assets thereof on dissolution, after payment
of the corporate debts and obligations.""o "While a share of stock
represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the property of the
corporation, it does not vest the owner thereof with any legal right
or title to any of the property, his interest in the corporate property
Id. at 375-376.
7 62 Phil. 895 (1936).
* Id. at 898
9 180 SCRA 266 (1989).
1o Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989).
" Magsaysay citing Ballantine 288-289; Pascual 0. Del Sanz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82, 86 (1911).
12 195 SCRA 740 (1991).
'n Id. at 744-745.
14 72 SCRA 347 (1976).
1 177 SCRA 789 (1989). The mere fact that an individual bound himself as surety for a corporations
obligations does not vest the SEC exclusive jurisdiction over said individuals or over the
latter's person or property in a rehabilitation and recievership proceedings pending with the
SEC over the Corporate entity (Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 788, 792
[1989]).
11 Id. at 792.
" 152 SCRA 487 (1987).
Is Id. at 486. See also Sulong Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, Inc. 72 SCRA 347, 354-355 (1976).
19 194 SCRA 544 (1991).
A. When Applicable
The main doctrine of separate juridical personality is to be
tempered by the supporting doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction. Since both theories were transported to Philippine jurisdiction
as part and parcel of the implantation of the American Corporation
2 Id. at p. 550, citing Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 482 (1989] and Cruz
v. Dalisay, 152 SCRA 482 [1989].
1 186 SCRA 841 (1990).
n 2 SCRA 632, 640 (1961).
3 See also Palay, Inc v. Clave, 124 SCRA 638 (1983); Pabalanv. National Labor Relations Commission,
184 SCRA 495 (1990).
u 189 SCRA 529, 543 (1990).
* Id. at 543. Also Diatagon Labor Federation v. Ople, 101 SCRA 534 (1980).
7A PNB v. Phil. Neg. Oil Co., 49 Phil. 857, 853, and 862 (1927).
Law, the source of the piercing doctrine is also common law. But the
magical words by which the piercing doctrine has come to be known 27
found their origins in the case of United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Transit Co.:28
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority,
it is that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a
general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears;
but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public con-
venience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will
29
regard the corporation as an association of persons.
The main value of the piercing doctrine to both corporate prac-
titioners and their clients has always been to show them how to avoid
both the application the courts of the doctrine to their particular
situation as well as the consequences of said application, which is
mainly to hold the associates in the venture personally liable for cor-
porate obligations. Therefore, the discussions below study the main
features of each of the three general classes of piercing, so that in actual
practice counsel and their clients would know how to properly struc-
ture their transactions to avoid incurring the ."ire" of judicial bodies.
B. Consequences of Piercing
7 So common-place has the incatation been that even our own Supreme Court when it says
the magic words does not even cite the case of United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit
Co., 142 Fed. 247 [1905]).
- 142 Fed. 247 (1905).
1 Id. at 255.
30 Umali v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 529 (1990).
3. 77 Phil. .496 (1946).
since the sale was invalid for being made to an agent of the seller.43
The Supreme Court ruled that corporate fiction will not be disregarded
because the corporate entity was used neither to perpetuate fraud nor
to circumvent the law, and the disregard of the technicality would
pave the way for the evasion of a legitimate and binding commitment,
especially since Tuason was fully aware of the position of Mr. Araneta
in the corporation at the time of the sale.
Since the piercing doctrine is meant to prevent th commission
of fraud, it cannot apply when it would allow persons or entities to
gain advantages."
In addition, the piercing doctrine offers a remedy of last resort
and will not be applied, even in case of fraud, if other remedies are
available to the parties. Thus, in Umali the Supreme Court refused
to apply the piercing doctrine since the petitioners were "merely seeking
the declaration of the nullity of the foreclosure sale, which relief may
be obtained without having to disregard the aforesaid corporate fiction
attaching to respondent corporations, [especially since] petitioners failed
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that private respondents
were purposely formed and operated, and thereafter transacted with
petitioners, with the sole intention of defrauding the latter."4
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Norton and Harrison4 where
the parent corporation owned all the outstanding stocks of the
subsidiary corporation; where parent corporation financed all the
operations of the subsidiary; where the parent treated the subsidiary's
employees as its own; where the officers of both corporations were
located in the same compound; where the Board of the subsidiary was
constituted in such a way as to enable the parent to actually direct
and manage the subsidiary's affairs, because the same officers
comprised the Boards for both corporations; and where the fiction of
a Under Article 1491 of the REPUBLIC ACT NO. 386, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPINES, a purchase by
an agent of the property of the principal is void.
* In Burnett Commisioner v. Clarke, 287 US 410, 53 S.Ct. 207, 77 L.Ed. 397, the United States
Supreme Court refused to allow a taxpayer to use the piercing doctrine to gain a tax advantage.
Clarke indorsed his notes for a corporation of which he was majority stockholder. He sustained
losses by virtue of such endorsement. Such losses cannot be deducted from his income tax
returns, because first, it did not result from any operation of any trade or business a corporation
and its stockholders are generally to be treated as separate entities, and second, only under
exceptional circumstances can the difference be diregarded.
's 189 SCRA 529, 543 (1990).
4 11 SCRA 714 (1954).
corporate entity was being used as a shield for tax evasion by making
it appear that the original sale was made by the parent corporation
to the subsidiary corporation in order to gain a tax advantage, the
courts will not hesitate to pierce the veil of corporate fiction and treat
as void the sales between the two corporations.
Since Norton and Harrison is a fraud case, one begins to wonder
why there was a need to show that the subsidiary corporation was
being used as an instrumentality or conduit of the parent corporation,
since even in the absence of such evidence, piercing to prevent fraud
(i.e., tax evasion) would have been warranted. Must fraud cases
necessarily be accompanied by alter-ego elements to make a fraud case
stick for\ application of the piercing doctrine?
It would seem not to be necessarily so, because fraud is a matter
of proof, and often it is a state of the mind being founded on malice.
It becomes necessary, therefore, that in order to establish the state of
mind of the stockholders to make them liable for corporate debts, or,
as in the case of Norton and Harrison,in order to consider two separate
entities as one and the same, there is an imperative need to detail the
circumstances which show that the corporate fiction is being used
consciously as a means to commit a fraud. In short, the alter-ego
circumstances are needed to prove the malicious intent of the parties.
In Namarco v. Associated Finance Co.4 1 it was held that where a
stockholder, who has absolute control over the business and affairs
of the corporation, entered into a contract with another corporation
through fraud and false representqtions, such stockholder shall be liable
jointly and severally with his co-defendant corporation even when the
contract sued upon was entered into on behalf of the corporation.
Namarco demonstrates an instance when a fraud case overlaps
with an alter ego case, as the Supreme Court held: "We feel perfectly
justified in 'piercing the veil of corporation fiction' and in holding
Sycip personally liable, jointly and severally with his co-defendant,
for the sums of money adjudged in favor of the applicant. It is settled
law in this and other jurisdictions that when the corporation is the
mere alter ego of a person, the corporate fiction may be disregarded;
the same being true when the corporation is controlled and its affairs
so conducted, as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, or
conduit of another."#
A. Liability of Officers
The general rule is laid down in Palay, Inc. v. Clave:0 unless "sufficient
proof exists on record" that an officer (in this case, a president and
controlling stockholder) has "used the corporation to defraud private
respondent" he cannot be made personally liable "just because he
appears to be the controlling stockholder."' "Mere ownership by a
single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for
disregarding the separate corporate personality."5 2
Pabalan v. National Labor Relations Commission" held that "[t]ffe
settled rule is that the corporation is vested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from the persons composing it, including its
officers, as well as from that of any other entity to which it may be
Therefore, A.C. Ransom held that "the responsible officer of the employer
corporation can be held personally, not to say even criminally, liable
for the non-payment of backwages; and that in the absence of definite
proof as to the identity of an officer or officers of the corporation
directly liable for failure to pay backwages, the responsible officer is
the president of the corporation jointly and severally with other presidents
of the same corporation.
In effect, A.C. Ransom would hold a corporate officer liable for
corporate obligations by the mere fact that he is the highest officer,
even when there is no proof that he acted in the particular matter for
the corporation.
In Del Rosario v. National Labor Relations Commission,6 the
Supreme Court, stating that the doctrine in A.C. Ransom was
inapplicable without further explanation, refused to allow a writ of
execution against the properties of officers and stockholders for a judgment
rendered against the corporation, which was later found to be without
assets, on the grouhd that "[bjut for the separate juridical personality
of a corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be clearly
and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed." In addition,
it was held that "[tlhe distinguishing marks of fraud were therefore
clearly apparent in A.C. Ransom. A new corporation was created,
owned by the same family, engaging in the same business, and
operating in the same compound." In short, Del Rosario re-affirmed
the original doctrine before the A.C. Ransom pronouncement that in
order for a corporate officer or stockholder to be held liable for corporate
debts, it must clearly be shown that he had participated in the
fraudulent act.
This principle was reinforced in Western Agro Industrial Corpora-
tion v. Court of Appeals6 2 which held that a corporate officer cannot be
made personally liable for a corporate debt simply because he hall
executed the contract for and in behalf of the corporation. It explained
that when a corporate officer acts in-behalf of a corporation, pursuant
to his authority, there results "a corporate act for which only the
corporation should be made liable for any obligations arising from
them."'6
behind the corporation, and not the corporate entity, that is liable for
the criminal prosecution. Without the fraud cases of piercing, the
corporate entity would become a shield behind which unscrupulous
businessmen may hide and perhaps even become dangerously aggres-
sive in undertaking shady deals, because there would be no risk of
personal liability for their fraudulent acts. To maintain separate
juridical personality under such circumstances would; therefore,
encourage fraudulent activities within society. Instead of making the
corporation an attractive medium, the dastardly deals closed through
exploited corporate entities could put corporations at the periphery
or, perhaps, even in the underworld of business dealings.
Thus, no less than the Supreme Court has stated that the use of
the corporate entity to gain an advantage (such as minimizing taxes
due) is not by itself a fraudulent scheme. The corporate entity is there
for both businessmen and lawyers to tinker with in order to gain every
advantage available under the law, and that alone is not a reprehen-
sible act.
In Ramirez Telephone Corp. v. Bank of America,74 Ramirez had unpaid
rents due Herbosa. The latter sought to garnish Ramirez's bank ac-
count, but no such personal account existed, and only an account in
the name of Ramirez Telephone Corp. could be found and was gar-
nished. The Supreme Court held that the corporate bank account can
be garniphed despite the fact that Ramirez himself leased Herbosa's
premises because of the following: (1) although Ramirez was the tenant,
the company, in truth, occupied the premises; (2) Ramirez paid the
rent with checks of the telephone company; and (3) 75% of the shares
of the company belonged to Ramirez and his wife.
In Madrigal Shipping v. Oglivie,5 the crew members of SS Bridge
brought an action against Madrigal Shipping Company for payment
of their salaries. It seemed, however, that Madrigal & Co. was the
registered owner of SS Bridge. The Supreme Court held that, granting
that it was not the Madrigal Shipping Co. that owned SS Bridge but
Madrigal & Co., a corporation with a juridical personality distinct from
the former, yet as the former was the subsidiary of the latter, and,
as found by the facts, a business conduit for the latter, the fiction of
corporate existence may be disregarded to make the former liable for
the claims.
In McConnel v. Court of Appeals, 76 a forcible entry case, the
corporation was ordered to pay damages, but such corporation was
later found to be without sufficient assets, so the defendant went after
the properties of the stockholders. The Supreme Court decided to
pierce and held the stockholders liable for the deficiency. Although
it held that mere ownership of all or nearly all of the stocks does not
make a corporation a business conduit of the stockholders, in that case,
the operation of the corporation was so merged with those of the
stockholders as to be practically indistinguishable. Furthermore, they
had the same office, the funds were held by the stockholders, and the
corporation had no visible assets.
One cannot be sure whether McConnel is clearly an alter ego case
or a fraud case of piercing, since the Supreme Court has cited and
fused the magical Milwaukee chants on piercing in fraud cases together
with the alter ego formula. No fraud seems to have been intimated
in the decision, since the conclusion was based more on the findings
of the lower court that "the evidence clearly shows that these persons
completely dominated and controlled the corporation and that functions of
the corporation were solely for their benefits."77
However, it is in McConnel where the Supreme Court took special
notice of the fact that "[tJhe corporation itself had no visible assets,
as correctly found by the trial court, except perhaps the toll house, the
wire fence around the lot and the signs thereof. It was for this reason that
the judgment against it could not be fully satisfied."7 Does the incor-
poration of an entity without reasonable assets to support the under-
taking or venture for which it is organized constitute a fraud against
the corporate creditors? From the decision in McConnel, it would not
seem so, since after noting the lack of visible assets of the corporation,
the Supreme Court held:
The facts thus found can not be varied by us, and conclusively show
that the corporation is a mere instrumentality of the individual
stockholders, hence, the latter must individually answer for the
corporate obligations. While the mere ownership of all or nearly
all of the capital stock of a corporation [does not make it] a mere
business conduit of the stockholder, that conclusion is amply justified
where it is shown, as the case before us, that the operations of the
corporation were so merged with those of the stockholders as to
be practically indistinguishable from them. To hold the latter liable
for the corporation's separate entity, but merely to apply the
established principle that such entity can not be invoked or used
for purposes that could not have been intended by the law that
created that separate personality."
Under-capitalizing a corporate entity, as distinguished from si-
phoning off corporate assets, is, therefore, a species of- alter ego cases,
especially so when it is never considered prudent business practice
for ventures to shoulder all the capital needed for the venture when
credit therefor is available. Thus, leveraging is an accepted and, indeed,
idealized business practice. More importantly, most corporate credi-
tors extend credit to the corporation after having studied the financial
statements of the corporation, and the allegation of under-capitaliza-
tion would have been apparent from such statements. Corporate creditors,
therefore, extend credit fully aware of the risk involved in case of
under-capitalization, and the element of fraud generally does not attain
by that fact alone.
A. Parent-Subsidiary Relationship
The alter ego doctrine has been applied unevenly in the area of
the parent-subsidiary relationship. We start with the premise laid down
in Lidell & Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue:a0
It is of course accepted that the mere fact that one or more cor-
porations are owned and controlled by a single stockholder is not
of itself sufficient ground for disregarding separate corporate entities.
Authorities support the rule that it is lawful to obtain a corporate
charter, even when a single substantial stockholder, to engage in
S specific activity, and. such activity may co-exist with other private
activities of the stockholder. If the corporation is a substantial one,
conducted lawfully and without fraud on another, its separate entity
is to be respected."
* Id. at 508-509.
* The subsidiary corporation bore the expenses of the parent company; used its own inventory
to cover orders from the parent company; answered for the drafts of the parent company;
had key officers residing in the United States; and employed simple booking entries for credits
due from the parent company.
as 186 SCRA 841 (1990).
- 101 SCRA 534 (1980).
87181 SCRA 669 (1990).
*I am always frightened by Supreme Court decisions that seeks to oversimplify things, as Justice
Cruz enunciated in his opening statement in Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation
(181 SCRA 669, 670): "The concept of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is a mystique to
many people, especially the layman, but it is not as esoteric as all that is this case will
demonstrate."
8 Id. at 673, citing Jabney v. Belmont Country Club Properties, Inc. 279 Pac. 829.
" Id. at 674
ego doctrine, the Supreme Court would use the sale by a parent company
of its shareholdings in a subsidiary to demonstrate complete control
over the subsidiary. The result of such a doctrine would be that in
cases of "equity transfers" as discussed below, contrary to the ruling
in Edward J. Nell Company v. Pacific Farms, Inc.," the applicable. rule
would be that the transferor is always liable for the corporate liabilities
of the corporation whose shares are transferred, in complete deroga-
tion of the main doctrine of separate juridical personality.
Logically, a stockholder always has complete and near-absolute
control over the share he holds in a corporation. But that does not
necessarily mean that he has complete control over the affairs and
transactions of the corporation. Perhaps the Supreme Court forgot its
own pronouncement that shares of stock in a corporation do not translate
into any interest in corporate properties, as it held in Stockholders of
F. Guanzon and Sons Inc. v. Register of Deeds of Manila,9 2 Magsaysay-
Labrador v. Court of Appeals,93 Saw v. Court of Appeals, 94 and Sulo ng
Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, Inc.95
Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., 26 SCRA 242 (1968). It rejected the genossenchaft theory
of Friedman that would recognize the corporate entity as the "reality of the group as a social
and legal entity independent of state recognition and concession."
" Ang Pue & Co. v. Sec. of Commerce and Industry, 5 SCRA 645 (1962). The formation of a corporate
entity or a pertnership is not a matter of right, but rather of a privilege.
" 22 SCRA 1158 (1968).
* 8 SCRA 96 (1963).
sideration; and that even the name of the corporation was the same
as the tradename of the partnership, and apparently their employ-
ees are also the hame. All these, the Commission said, coupled with
the fact that four out of the five members of the partnership do
not only own the controlling stock of the corporation, indicates in
a conclusive manner that there was merely a change in the juridical
personality of the entity operating the business, so that it may be
said that the substance of the juridical person owning and operating
the business remain the same if its legal personality has changed."oo
Although there was no fraud intended, San Teodoro held that the
possibility of fraud allowed the application of the piercing doctrine.
To the same effect is Laguna Trans. Co., Inc. v. Social Security System'
where the Supreme Court held that "[t]he corporation continued the
same transportation business of the unregistered partnership, using
the same lines and equipment. There was, in effect, only a change in
the form of the organization of the entity engaged in the business of
transportation of passengers."o2 It further held that "While it is true
that the corporation once formed is conferred a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the persons composing it, it is but a legal
fiction introduced for purposes of convenience and to subserve the
ends of justice. The concept cannot be extended to a point beyond its
reasons and policy and, when invoked in supportof an end subversive
of this policy, will be disregarded by the courts."o3
V. EQUITY CASES
capacities, but which did not include the corporation, the judgment
debt was sought to be enforced against the corporate assets. Although
Emilio Cano Enterprises is essentially an alter ego case, the Supreme
Court had occasion to apply the rationale for equity cases of piercing,
thus:
x x x Verily, the order against them [the corporate officers] is in
effect against the corporation. No benefit can be attained if this
case were to be remanded to the court a quo merely in response
to a technical substitution of parties for such would onlycause an
unwarranted delay that would work to Honorata's prejudice. This
is contrary to the spirit of the law which enjoins a speedy adju-
dication of labor cases disregarding as much as possible the tech-
nicalities of the procedure. We, therefore, find unmeritorious the
relief herein prayed for." 6
In A.D. Santos v. Vasquez,' a suit for workmen's compensation
was filed by taxi driver Vasquez against A.D. Santos, Inc. Vasquez
testified that Amador Santos was his employer. A.D. Santos, Inc.
contended that Amador is the only one liable. The Court, however,
held A.D. Santos, Inc. liable. Indeed, Amador was, at one time, the
sole owner and operator of the taxi business that employed Vasquez,
which was later transfefred to A.D. Santos, Inc. But such testimony
should not be allowed to confuse the facts relating to employer-employee
relationship, for when the veil of corporate fiction is used to "confuse
legitimate issues," the same should be pierced.
a Id. at 782.
But all three types of piercing have an underlying theme that often
does not catch one's attention. In all of the cases discussed, the effect
of piercing has always been to make the active or intervening stock-
holder or officer liable for corporate debts and obligations. Therefore,
what is clear, especially for publicly-listed companies, is that the main
doctrine of separate juridical personality, and all its ancillary attributes,
including limited liability, remains firm and formidable to mere passive
investors in a corporation.
mn Id. at 498-499.
This just proves a point often pointed out in my lectures that the
corporate entity is meant primarily to attract investors to place their
money in the hands of professional managers (a divorcing of own-
ership from control) and that most corporate doctrines were intended
for such a set-up. Close supervision of one's investment should be
more compatible with other forms of media such as partnership and
sole proprietorship, In fact, the Corporation Code has given a special
type of vehicle for investors who wish to actively manage their in-
vestments: the close corporations, which have been termed as incor-
porated partnership and for which intervening stockholders are made
personal ly liable for corporate debts and obligations."'