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IEC 61000-4-36
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Edition 1.0 2014-11
Part 4-36: Testing and measurement techniques – IEMI immunity test methods
INTERNATIONAL
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) –

STANDARD
for equipment and systems

BASIC EMC PUBLICATION
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IEC 61000-4-36:2014-11(en)
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Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

IEC 61000-4-36
®
Edition 1.0 2014-11
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
colour
inside
BASIC EMC PUBLICATION
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) –

Part 4-36: Testing and measurement techniques – IEMI immunity test methods
for equipment and systems
INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
PRICE CODE
XC
ICS 33.100.20 ISBN 978-2-8322-1904-1
Warning! Make sure that you obtained this publication from an authorized distributor.
® Registered trademark of the International Electrotechnical Commission

–2– IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
CONTENTS
FOREWORD ........................................................................................................................... 6
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 8
1 Scope .............................................................................................................................. 9
2 Normative references ...................................................................................................... 9
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations ............................................................................... 9
3.1 Terms and defintions .............................................................................................. 9
3.2 Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 12
4 General ......................................................................................................................... 13
5 IEMI environments and interaction ................................................................................. 13
5.1 General ................................................................................................................. 13
5.2 IEMI environments ................................................................................................ 14
5.2.1 Technical capability groups ........................................................................... 14
5.2.2 IEMI deployment scenarios ............................................................................ 14
5.2.3 Radiated IEMI environment summary ............................................................ 15
5.2.4 Published conducted IEMI environments........................................................ 15
5.3 Interaction with fixed installations ......................................................................... 16
5.3.1 General ......................................................................................................... 16
5.3.2 Protection level .............................................................................................. 17
6 Test methods ................................................................................................................. 17
6.1 Derivation of applicable test methods .................................................................... 17
6.2 Derivation of transfer functions ............................................................................. 18
6.3 Radiated tests using IEMI simulator ...................................................................... 19
6.4 Radiated tests using a reverberation chamber ...................................................... 19
6.5 Complex waveform injection (CWI) ....................................................................... 19
6.6 Damped sinusoidal injection (DSI) ........................................................................ 19

6.7 Electrostatic discharge (ESD) ............................................................................... 19
6.8 Electrically fast transient (EFT) ............................................................................. 19
6.9 Antenna port injection ........................................................................................... 20
7 Test parameters ............................................................................................................ 20
7.1 Derivation of immunity test parameters ................................................................. 20
7.2 Radiated test parameters ...................................................................................... 21
7.2.1 Generic hyperband test parameters (skilled capability group) ........................ 21
7.2.2 Generic mesoband test parameters (skilled capability group)......................... 21
7.2.3 Generic hypoband/narrowband test parameters (skilled capability
group) ............................................................................................................ 23
7.3 Generic conducted IEMI test parameters............................................................... 24
7.3.1 General ......................................................................................................... 24
7.3.2 Characteristics and performance of the fast damped oscillatory wave
generator ....................................................................................................... 25
7.4 Tailored test level derivation ................................................................................. 26
7.5 Relevance of EMC immunity data ......................................................................... 26
8 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 27
Annex A (informative) Failure mechanisms and performance criteria ................................... 29
A.1 General ................................................................................................................. 29
A.2 Failure mechanisms .............................................................................................. 29
A.2.1 General ......................................................................................................... 29
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 –3–
A.2.2 Noise ............................................................................................................. 30

A.2.3 Parameter offset and drifts ............................................................................ 30
A.2.4 System upset or breakdown ........................................................................... 31
A.2.5 Component destruction .................................................................................. 31
A.3 Effect of pulse width.............................................................................................. 32
A.4 Performance criteria ............................................................................................. 32
A.5 References ........................................................................................................... 33
Annex B (informative) Developments in IEMI source environments ...................................... 35
B.1 General ................................................................................................................. 35
B.2 IEMI environment .................................................................................................. 36
B.3 IEMI sources ......................................................................................................... 37
B.4 Published radiated IEMI environments .................................................................. 41
B.4.1 IEC 61000-2-13 ............................................................................................. 41
B.4.2 Mil-Std-464C ................................................................................................. 41
B.4.3 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) ......................................... 42
B.4.4 Practical determination of a tailored test level – An example.......................... 42
B.5 Summary .............................................................................................................. 43
B.6 References ........................................................................................................... 44
Annex C (informative) Interaction with buildings ................................................................... 46
C.1 Building attenuation .............................................................................................. 46
C.2 Coupling to cables ................................................................................................ 47
C.3 Low voltage cable attenuation ............................................................................... 48
C.4 References ........................................................................................................... 49
Annex D (informative) Relation between plane wave immunity testing and immunity
testing in a reverberation chamber ........................................................................................ 51
D.1 General ................................................................................................................. 51
D.2 Relation between measurements of shielding effectiveness in the two
environments ........................................................................................................ 52
D.3 Relation between immunity testing in the two environments .................................. 55

D.4 Additional aspects ................................................................................................. 57
D.5 References ........................................................................................................... 57
Annex E (informative) Complex waveform injection – Test method ....................................... 60
E.1 General ................................................................................................................. 60
E.2 Prediction ............................................................................................................. 60
E.2.1 General ......................................................................................................... 60
E.2.2 Example ........................................................................................................ 64
E.3 Construction ......................................................................................................... 66
E.4 Injection ................................................................................................................ 70
E.5 Summary .............................................................................................................. 72
E.6 References ........................................................................................................... 72
Annex F (informative) Significance of test methodology margins .......................................... 74
F.1 General ................................................................................................................. 74
F.2 Examples .............................................................................................................. 74
F.2.1 General ......................................................................................................... 74
F.2.2 Negative contributions ................................................................................... 75
F.2.3 Positive contributions..................................................................................... 77
F.2.4 Summary ....................................................................................................... 79
F.3 References ........................................................................................................... 79
Annex G (informative) Intentional EMI – The issue of jammers ............................................ 80
–4– IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
G.1 General ................................................................................................................. 80

G.2 Effects .................................................................................................................. 80
G.3 Published accounts of jamming ............................................................................. 81
G.4 Risk assessment ................................................................................................... 81
G.5 Mitigation .............................................................................................................. 81
G.6 References ........................................................................................................... 82
Figure 1 – Example of radiated and conducted IEMI interaction with a building .................... 16
Figure 2 – Assessment options ............................................................................................. 18
Figure 3 – Examples of ports ................................................................................................ 20
Figure 4 – Typical hyperband waveform ................................................................................ 21
Figure 5 – Typical mesoband waveform ................................................................................ 23
Figure 6 – Typical hypoband/narrowband waveform .............................................................. 24
Figure 7 – Waveform of the damped oscillatory wave (open circuit voltage) .......................... 25
Figure A.1 – IEMI induced offset of sensor output – Corruption of information ..................... 30
Figure A.2 – Collision of an induced disturbance with data bits [1] ........................................ 31
Figure A.3 – Examples of destruction on a chip [2] ............................................................... 31
Figure A.4 – Generic failure trend as a function of pulse width .............................................. 32
Figure B.1 – A comparison of HPEM and IEMI spectra [6] ..................................................... 35
Figure B.2 – Representation of typical IEMI radiation and coupling onto systems [3] ............ 37
Figure B.3 – Parameter space in power/frequency occupied by sophisticated IEMI (i.e.
DEW) sources [1] .................................................................................................................. 38
Figure B.4 – Peak power and energy from continuous and pulsed (durations shown)
microwave sources, narrowband and wideband .................................................................... 38
Figure B.5 – Peak powers of various types of pulsed HPM sources [1].................................. 39
Figure B.6 – Peak vs. average power for microwave sources with duty factors
indicated ............................................................................................................................... 39

Figure B.7 – Phase coherence leading to a compact HPM source with N 2 scaling of
output power ......................................................................................................................... 40
Figure B.8 – Briefcase mesoband UWB source sold by Diehl-Rheinmetall [3] ....................... 40
Figure B.9 – A do-it-yourself electromagnetic weapon made from an oven magnetron
[13] ...................................................................................................................................... 41
Figure B.10 – Plot of entire narrowband system weight as a function of output
microwave power for land-mobile and land-transportable systems ........................................ 43
Figure C.1 – Typical unprotected low-rise building plane wave E-field attenuation
collected from references ...................................................................................................... 46
Figure C.2 – Cable coupling – Resonance region .................................................................. 48
Figure C.3 – Mains cable attenuation profile ......................................................................... 49
Figure E.1 – LLSC reference field measurement set-up ........................................................ 61
Figure E.2 – LLSC induced current measurement set-up ...................................................... 62
Figure E.3 – Typical LLSC magnitude-only transfer function ................................................. 62
Figure E.4 – Prediction of induced current using minimum phase constraints ........................ 63
Figure E.5 – IEC 61000-2-9 early-time (E1) HEMP environment ........................................... 64
Figure E.6 – Overlay of transfer function and threat (frequency domain) ............................... 65
Figure E.7 – Predicted current .............................................................................................. 65
Figure E.8 – Example of de-convolution result ...................................................................... 67
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 –5–
Figure E.9 – Damped sinusoidal waveforms – Ten-component fit .......................................... 67

Figure E.10 – Approximated and predicted transient ............................................................. 68
Figure E.11 – Approximated and predicted transient (0 ns to 100 ns) .................................... 68
Figure E.12 – Approximation and prediction transient – Frequency domain comparison ........ 69
Figure E.13 – Variation in error for increasing number of damped sinusoids ......................... 70
Figure E.14 – Complex injection set-up ................................................................................. 71
Figure E.15 – Amplifier requirements for various current levels ............................................. 71
Figure E.16 – Comparison of predicted (green) and injected (red) current ............................. 72
Figure F.1 – Variation in induced currents as a result of configuration .................................. 75
Figure F.2 – Comparison of HPD and VPD induced currents ................................................. 76
Figure F.3 – System variability .............................................................................................. 76
Figure F.4 – Comparison of single- and multi-port injection ................................................... 77
Figure F.5 – Example transfer functions and worst-case envelope ........................................ 78
Figure F.6 – Comparison of individual and worst-case transfer function predictions .............. 78
Figure F.7 – Comparison between predicted and measured induced currents ....................... 79
Table 1 – Possible IEMI Deployment Scenarios .................................................................... 15

Table 2 – Summary of radiated IEMI source output (rE far ) by capability group ...................... 15
Table 3 – Example protection levels ...................................................................................... 17
Table 4 – Generic hyperband test parameters (skilled capability group) ................................ 21
Table 5 – Generic mesoband test parameters (skilled capability group) ................................ 22
Table 6 – Generic hypoband/narrowband test parameters (skilled capability group) ............. 23
Table 7 – Conducted IEMI test levels .................................................................................... 24
Table 8 – Open circuit specifications ..................................................................................... 25
Table 9 – Short Circuit Specifications ................................................................................... 26

Table A.1 – Recommended performance criteria ................................................................... 33
Table B.1 – IEMI environments from IEC 61000-2-13 ............................................................ 41
Table B.2 – Hypoband/narrowband HPM environment........................................................... 42
Table B.3 – Hyperband/wideband HPM environment ............................................................. 42
Table C.1 – Shielding effectiveness measurements for various power system buildings
and rooms............................................................................................................................. 47
Table E.1 – Time waveform norms ........................................................................................ 66
–6– IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

____________
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) –
Part 4-36: Testing and measurement techniques –

IEMI immunity test methods for equipment and systems
FOREWORD
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8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is
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9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of
patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
International Standard IEC 61000-4-36 has been prepared by subcommittee 77C: High-power
transient phenomena, of IEC technical committee 77: Electromagnetic compatibility.
It forms part 4-36 of IEC 61000. It has the status of a basic EMC publication in accordance
with IEC Guide 107.
The text of this standard is based on the following documents:
CDV Report on voting

77C/231/CDV 77C/236/RVC
Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on
voting indicated in the above table.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 –7–
This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
A list of all parts in the IEC 61000 series, published under the general title Electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC), can be found on the IEC website.
The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until
the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data
related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.
IMPORTANT – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates
that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct
understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a
colour printer.

–8– IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
INTRODUCTION
IEC 61000 is published in separate parts according to the following structure:
Part 1: General
General considerations (introduction, fundamental principles)
Definitions, terminology
Part 2: Environment
Description of the environment
Classification of the environment
Compatibility levels
Part 3: Limits
Emission limits
Immunity limits (in so far as they do not fall under the responsibility of the product
committees)
Part 4: Testing and measurement techniques
Measurement techniques
Testing techniques

Part 5: Installation and mitigation guidelines
Installation guidelines
Mitigation methods and devices
Part 6: Generic standards
Part 9: Miscellaneous
Each part is further subdivided into several parts, published either as International Standards
or as technical specifications or technical reports, some of which have already been published
as sections. Others will be published with the part number followed by a dash and a second
number identifying the subdivision (example: IEC 61000-6-1).
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 –9–
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) –
Part 4-36: Testing and measurement techniques –

IEMI immunity test methods for equipment and systems
1 Scope
This part of IEC 61000 provides methods to determine test levels for the assessment of the
immunity of equipment and systems to intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI)
sources. It introduces the general IEMI problem, IEMI source parameters, derivation of test
limits and summarises practical test methods.
2 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and
are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any
amendments) applies.
IEC 61000-4-4, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-4: Testing and measurement
techniques – Electrical fast transient/burst immunity test
techniques – Ring wave immunity test
techniques – Damped oscillatory wave immunity test
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

For the purposes of this document, the following terms, definitions and abbreviations apply.
3.1 Terms and defintions
3.1.1
attenuation
reduction in magnitude (as a result of absorption and/or scattering) of an electric or magnetic
field or a current or voltage, usually expressed in decibels
3.1.2
bandratio
br
ratio of the high and low frequencies between which there is 90 % of the energy
Note 1 to entry: If the spectrum has a large dc content, the lower limit is nominally defined as 1 Hz (see
IEC 61000-2-13 for further details).
3.1.3
bandratio decades
brd
bandratio expressed in decades as: brd = log10(br)
– 10 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
3.1.4
burst
time frame in which a series of pulses occurs with a given repetition rate
Note 1 to entry: When multiple bursts occur, the time between bursts is usually defined.
3.1.5
conducted HPEM environment
high-power electromagnetic currents and voltages that are either coupled or directly injected
to cables and wires with voltage levels that typically exceed 1 kV
3.1.6
continuous wave
CW
time waveform that has a fixed frequency and is continuous
3.1.7
electromagnetic compatibility
EMC
ability of an equipment or system to function satisfactorily in its electromagnetic environment
without introducing intolerable electromagnetic disturbances to anything in that environment
3.1.8
electromagnetic disturbance
any electromagnetic phenomenon which may degrade the performance of a device,
equipment or system
3.1.9
electromagnetic interference
EMI
degradation of the performance of a device, transmission channel or system caused by an
electromagnetic disturbance
Note 1 to entry: Disturbance and interference are respectively cause and effect.

3.1.10
(electromagnetic) shield
electrically continuous housing for a facility, area, or component used to attenuate incident
electric and magnetic fields by both absorption and reflection
3.1.11
(electromagnetic) susceptibility
inability of a device, equipment or system to perform without degradation in the presence of
an electromagnetic disturbance
Note 1 to entry: Susceptibility is a lack of immunity.
3.1.12
equipment under test
EUT
equipment being subjected to the test
3.1.13
high-altitude electromagnetic pulse
HEMP
electromagnetic pulse produced by a nuclear explosion outside the earth’s atmosphere
Note 1 to entry: Typically above an altitude of 30 km.

IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 11 –
3.1.14
high-power microwaves
HPM
narrowband signals, nominally with peak power in a pulse, in excess of 100 MW at the source
Note 1 to entry: This is a historical definition that depended on the strength of the source. The interest in this
document is mainly on the EM field incident on an electronic system.
3.1.15
hyperband signal
signal or waveform with a pbw (see 3.1.20) value between 163,4 % and 200 % or a
bandratio > 10
3.1.16
hypoband signal
narrowband signal or waveform with a pbw of < 1 % or a bandratio < 1,01
3.1.17
intentional electromagnetic interference
IEMI
intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy introducing noise or signals into
electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these systems for
terrorist or criminal purposes
[SOURCE: IEC 61000-2-13:2005, 3.16]
3.1.18
L band
radar frequency band between 1 GHz and 2 GHz
3.1.19
mesoband signal
signal or waveform with a pbw value between 1 % and 100 % or a bandratio between 1,01
and 3

3.1.20
percentage bandwidth
pbw
bandwidth of a waveform expressed as a percentage of the centre frequency of that waveform
Note 1 to entry: The pbw has a maximum value of 200 % when the centre frequency is the mean of the high and
low frequencies. The pbw does not apply to signals with a large dc content (e.g., HEMP) for which the bandratio
decades is used.
3.1.21
port-of-entry
PoE
physical location (point) on an electromagnetic barrier, where EM energy may enter or exit a
topological volume, unless an adequate PoE protective device is provided
Note 1 to entry: A PoE is not limited to a geometrical point.
Note 2 to entry: PoEs are classified as aperture PoEs or conductive PoEs according to the type of penetration.
They are also classified as architectural, mechanical, structural or electrical PoEs according to the functions they
serve.
3.1.22
pulse
transient waveform that usually rises to a peak value and then decays, or a similar waveform
that is an envelope of an oscillating waveform
– 12 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
3.1.23
pulse repetition frequency
prf
number of pulses per unit time, measured in Hz (per second)
3.1.24
radiated HPEM environment
high-power electromagnetic fields with peak electric field levels that typically exceed 100 V/m
3.1.25
rE far
electric field normalised at a distance of 1 m from the antenna as derived from an E-field
measurement at a given distance in the far-field
3.1.26
sub-hyperband signal
signal or a waveform with a pbw value between 100 % and 163,4 % or a bandratio between 3
and 10
3.1.27
transient
pertaining to or designating a phenomenon or a quantity which varies between two
consecutive steady states during a time interval which is short compared with the time-scale
of interest
Note 1 to entry: A transient can be a unidirectional impulse of either polarity or a damped oscillatory wave with
the first peak occurring in either polarity.
3.1.28
ultrawideband
UWB
signal that has a percent bandwidth greater than 25 %
3.2 Abbreviations

DS Damped sinusoid
EMI Electromagnetic interference
ESD Electrostatic discharge
HEMP High-altitude electromagnetic pulse
HIRF High-intensity radiated fields
HPD Horizontally polarized dipole
HPEM High-power electromagnetic
HPM High-power microwave
LEMP Lightning electromagnetic pulse
LLSF Low level swept field
LLSC Low level swept current
NEMP Nuclear electromagnetic pulse
SE Shielding effectiveness
UWB Ultra wideband

IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 13 –
VPD Vertically polarized dipole
4 General
The use of electromagnetic sources to generate intentional electromagnetic interference

(IEMI) is of increasing concern as the reliance of society on technology increases
significantly. Many technical papers have been published that show the effects of IEMI are
cause for concern; they are summarised in [1] 1. A summary of failure mechanisms at
equipment level is provided in Annex A.
The effects of IEMI on equipment can be similar to the effects caused by high-power
electromagnetic (HPEM) environments. HPEM environments include high-intensity radiated
fields (HIRF) generated by radio and radar systems, lightning electromagnetic pulse (LEMP)
and electrostatic discharge (ESD). Some of these HPEM environments have similar
characteristics to those sources used to cause IEMI but are unintentional EMI sources, i.e.
non-malicious. However, it is possible to use information regarding qualification of equipment
and systems to these environments to inform the likely response to IEMI.
The IEC defines IEMI within 3.1.17 as ‘intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic
energy introducing noise or signals into electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting,
confusing or damaging these systems for terrorist or criminal purposes’.
Within this definition it is possible to also include jammers, which are designed to overload
antenna receiver circuits (front doors) by operating at or close to the victim receiver frequency
of operation. Jammers typically require low power to operate due to the fact that receivers are
designed to operate at very low power levels (nW or less). More information on the issue of
jammers can be found in Annex G.
This document complements IEC 61000-4-25 [2], which deals with high-altitude
electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) immunity test methods for equipment and systems.
5 IEMI environments and interaction

5.1 General
There are many types of sources that can generate electromagnetic environments that can
potentially be used to cause intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). IEC 61000-2-13
[3] discusses the various environments that can be generated and categorises them in terms
of time characteristics, frequency range and bandratio. Further details and actual examples
are included within Annex B.
A key requirement of developing IEMI test methods and test levels is to achieve a good
understanding of the environment in which the victim equipment or system will be required to
operate. Within this document specific focus is provided for victim equipment that is integrated
within a site or other fixed installation and it is generally assumed that such equipment is
housed within a building.
IEMI phenomena are unlike other EMC standardised phenomena where assumptions can be
made about the general or average disturbance level arriving at victim equipment ports.
Important parameters related to the IEMI interaction with victim systems which will affect the
test level include:
a) IEMI source parameters

1) frequency range of the source,
___________
1 Numbers in square brackets refer to the Bibliography in Clause 8.
– 14 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
2) amplitude of the source vs. distance to the victim system,

3) pulse width, pulse repetition frequency, burst length of the source,
4) source mobility,
5) technical capability of the source user/designer.
b) The protection level of the fixed installation
1) the range or distance between the IEMI Source and the victim electronics,
2) the propagation channel loss including the properties of the intervening barriers
(attenuation and absorption).
Once these characteristics of the IEMI source and environment are well understood, then
appropriate test methods and test levels for ports on the victim equipment can be determined.
One approach would be to take all of the IEMI source parameters of interest and combine
them such that one set of test levels is derived. The disadvantage of this approach is that,
should effects be observed, it would be difficult to assign them to any single IEMI parameter
set. In addition the combination of widely varying waveform characteristics would likely result
in an extreme set of test levels.
Some IEMI sources generate waveforms/environments that are similar to other

electromagnetic (EM) environments, for example electrostatic discharge (ESD) or lightning
electromagnetic pulse (LEMP). Analytical methods can be used to determine the amount of
similarity between IEMI environments and other EM environments, in particular through the
use of waveform norms (see IEC 61000-4-33 [4]). Any deficiencies in the test evidence could
be made up through increasing the distance between the IEMI source and the electronic
systems of interest or by undertaking testing focussed on specific frequencies.
5.2 IEMI environments
5.2.1 Technical capability groups
IEMI sources vary in complexity. It is therefore important to understand the relationship

between this complexity and the technical capability of the perpetrator. This document defines
three levels:

a) Novice – Individuals or small groups with minimal technical or financial support.
b) Skilled – Moderately well-funded adversaries with training and expertise in relevant
technology.
c) Specialist – Well-funded adversaries with post-graduate level training and access to
substantial research capabilities, resources and funding.
When considering the IEMI sources of interest it is important to consider the deployment
scenario.
5.2.2 IEMI deployment scenarios
IEMI sources can be packaged and deployed in different ways, although this generally
depends on the technical capability of the designer and the available resources. A set of
potential scenarios for deployment of IEMI generators is given in Table 1.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 15 –
Table 1 – Possible IEMI Deployment Scenarios
Deployment Example use Victim interaction Technical

scenarios capability group
Man portable Carried to the victim and used while in Direct Novice
possession of the adversary. Could be
assembled in place. Radiated Skilled
Conducted
Hand delivered Carried to the victim and concealed, Direct Novice
perhaps remotely activated. Could be
assembled in place. Radiated Skilled
Conducted
Fixed installation Set-up in a space adjacent to the victim, i.e. Radiated Novice
an adjoining room or building.
Conducted Skilled
Specialist
Automotive / Mounted inside a pick-up truck or on the Radiated Skilled
marine delivered after deck of a marine vessel.
Conducted Specialist
Air delivered Installed inside an aircraft bay, carried as a Radiated Specialist
pod, or dropped (i.e., E-bomb).
5.2.3 Radiated IEMI environment summary
Table 2 provides a summary of threat source environments defined by capability group. The
term ‘rE far ’ describes the electric field normalised at a distance of 1 m from the antenna as
derived from an E-field measurement at a given distance in the far-field. It is equivalent to
equivalent isotropic radiated power (EIRP) which is derived from the power density at a given
distance in the far field.
Table 2 – Summary of radiated IEMI source output (rE far ) by capability group
Category IEMI source IEMI source name or technology type rE far (V) Near/far
type distance
(approx.)

Novice Hyperband ESD gun 5 000 1m
Hypoband Microwave oven magnetron 2 000 1m
Skilled Hyperband Commercially available solid state pulser 60 000 1m
(e.g. pockels cell driver)
Mesoband Commercially available pulser 120 000 2m
Hypoband Typical radar 450 000 5m
Specialist Hyperband Military demonstrator (e.g. jolt) 5 300 000 50 m
Mesoband Military mesoband demonstrator 500 000 5m
Hypoband Military hypoband demonstrator 30 000 000 50 m
5.2.4 Published conducted IEMI environments
Unlike the situation with radiated IEMI sources, examples of conducted IEMI sources are less
common. However, it has been shown that many conducted EMC tests exist within published
civilian EMC standards such as IEC 61000-4-18 [5], IEC 61000-4-4 [6] and IEC 61000-4-25
[7] and that the sources that generate these test waveforms can be uprated or applied to
equipment ports in a different way or otherwise used for malicious effect. There are also
various military standards that contain relevant conducted tests such as Mil-Std-461 [8] and
Defence Standard 59-411 [9].
– 16 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
5.3 Interaction with fixed installations
5.3.1 General
The magnitude of the IEMI environment impinging on a victim system is primarily dependent
upon two factors:
1) The range or distance between the IEMI source and the victim electronics.
2) The propagation channel loss, including the properties of intervening barriers (attenuation
and absorption).
It is important to note that radiated IEMI interacts not only with apertures and structures, but
also cables. The total EM disturbance presented to the victim electronics inside is therefore a
function of the direct radiated IEMI and the coupling of this IEMI to EM conductors such as
cables, pipe-work and ducting. When determining an appropriate test level for a particular
radiated IEMI environment of concern, an assessment of the transfer of the IEMI to the victim
electronics inside the building is required and this should include any attenuation afforded by
the building material, propagation loss and any other aspects that can affect the resulting
currents or voltages presented to the equipment.
Figure 1 shows a typical radiated and conducted IEMI scenario with a vehicle mounted IEMI
source illuminating a building and separately injecting into a power cable. The fields
generated by the radiating source penetrate through apertures and separately couple to
conductors (both outside and inside the building), generating induced currents and voltages
that can affect the victim electronic equipment. The current/voltage generated by the
conducted source is coupled to the conductor allowing it to propagate inside the building and
potentially affect electronic equipment.
IEC
Figure 1 – Example of radiated and conducted

IEMI interaction with a building
It should be noted that cable attenuation and attenuation afforded by lumped components
(such as transformers) should be considered when determining the currents and voltages
presented at the electronic equipment. It should also be noted that different coupling modes
(i.e. common mode or differential mode) may result in very different path losses during the
propagation.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 17 –
5.3.2 Protection level
Given the discussion above it can be implied that victim electronic equipment located inside a
fixed installation will have a ‘protection level’ which is a function of the physical distance
between the IEMI source and the victim electronics and the loss in the propagation channel. A
discussion on the radiated and conducted interaction of IEMI sources within buildings is
provided in Annex C.
Example protection levels are indicated in Table 3. These levels have been identified using
the information in Annex C. However, it is highly important that the actual protection level is
quantified through measurements, possibly as part of a site survey. Test methods which can
be used to assess the barrier attenuation/propagation loss are discussed in Clause 6.
Table 3 – Example protection levels
Example Assumed range to Path loss Assumed barrier Total EPL

protection level victim attenuation
(EPL) rating (m) (dB) (dB) (dB)
EPL0 2 6 0 6
EPL1 10 20 0 20
EPL2 12 22 4 26
EPL3 18 25 7 32
EPL4 30 28 11 39
EPL5 30 28 18 46
EPL6 35 31 29 60
NOTE Path loss equals the assumed range to victim in dB reference to 1 m.
The EPL should be considered when deriving the applicable IEMI immunity test parameters
discussed in Clause 7. In the absence of actual data the generic EPLs above can be used.
6 Test methods

6.1 Derivation of applicable test methods
A detailed discussion on test methods is included in IEC TS 61000-5-9 [10]. The test methods
summarised below encompass the evaluation of the ‘example protection level’ and the
immunity test level for potential victim equipment.
As IEMI falls into 2 main categories, namely radiated and conducted, the methods for testing
against IEMI fall broadly into the same categories.
Testing against radiated IEMI can be undertaken with the IEMI source of interest, a simulated
environment such as those shown in IEC TR 61000-4-35 [11], or by injecting the signal
expected to be induced into conductors by exposure to the IEMI radiated environment. The
latter relies on knowledge of the transfer function 2 of each conductor of concern (typically
these conductors are cable bundles that carry power and/or data that is vital to the continuing
function of the equipment or system).
Testing against conducted IEMI is typically undertaken with either the IEMI source directly or
with a conducted simulator. Although it is possible to use a radiated method to assess against
the effects of conducted IEMI, it is not commonplace.
___________
2 A measure of internally induced current or electromagnetic field as a result of an externally illuminating
electromagnetic environment.
– 18 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Once the preferred test methodology has been agreed, it is possible to determine the required
test levels.
Figure 2 shows the options available when undertaking assessment of the effects of IEMI on
equipment or systems.
IEC
Figure 2 – Assessment options
It is essential that testing is conducted in a representative configuration and that careful

consideration is given to those aspects of the test set-up that can have a significant impact on

test results, for example cable layout. If the requirement is for equipment to be immune to
IEMI when in a power-off configuration then testing with the equipment powered off is
applicable. For all other cases, testing with the equipment powered and functioning is
essential. Research has shown that transient effects can be significantly enhanced when the
equipment is being operated functionally, for example with computer equipment that is
constantly conducting hard drive operations or memory intensive functions.
A summary of test methods that can be used for the assessment of equipment or systems to
the effects of IEMI is provided below.
6.2 Derivation of transfer functions
Transfer functions are essential for any equipment or system that is to be tested against the
effects of a radiated IEMI source using conducted methods and can also be used to evaluate
the protection level of a victim installation.
Transfer functions can either be measured (using techniques such as those discussed in
IEC TS 61000-5-9 [10]) or generated analytically using some understanding of relevant
geometry.
Transfer functions provide the means of estimating induced currents or voltages on

conductors as a result of an EM field illuminating the conductor or from an EM source injected
onto external cabling. Transfer functions are generally measured over a broad frequency
range (~1 MHz to ~1 GHz) and enable predictions to be computed for any IEMI environment
with similar frequency content. Transfer functions can be extended to tens of GHz by
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 19 –
measuring internally induced EM fields and reflecting the change in dominance of the
interaction mechanism from cable coupling to aperture coupling.
For applicable test methods and test set-up see IEC TS 61000-5-9 [10].
6.3 Radiated tests using IEMI simulator
IEMI simulators are becoming increasingly available as the threat of IEMI is understood and
accepted to pose real risk to the continuing operation of electronic equipment.
IEC TR 61000-4-35 [11] contains details on IEMI simulators and their respective parameters.
The equipment under test (EUT) shall be set-up in a representative condition of its intended
use for the results to be indicative of the EUT response when fielded. The use of IEMI
simulators to assess the protection level of a fixed installation is not recommended since it
may present a significant interference risk.
For applicable test methods and test set-up see IEC TR 61000-4-35 [11].
6.4 Radiated tests using a reverberation chamber
IEC TR 61000-4-35 [11] also provides some examples of reverberation chambers.

Reverberation chambers can be used to produce the high field levels for equipment level
testing and are useful for testing of a material’s shielding effectiveness in accordance with
IEC 61000-4-21 [12].
Care should be taken to understand how the results of measurements made within a
reverberation chamber compare with the realistic case of IEMI interaction which is closer to a
plane wave phenomena. This difference is discussed in Annex D.
For applicable test methods and test set-up see IEC 61000-4-21 [12].
6.5 Complex waveform injection (CWI)
This method takes the predicted currents from transfer functions and injects them onto
conductors one-by-one whilst monitoring for effects. The injected waveforms are a function of

the resonances measured by the transfer function and the environment itself and are complex
in nature, i.e. they contain many frequencies. Further details on this method can be found in
Annex E.
6.6 Damped sinusoidal injection (DSI)
This method uses single frequency damped sinusoidal waveforms and is generally required to
be repeated across many frequencies to give an indication of how an EUT may respond to an
IEMI environment. For applicable test methods and test set-up see IEC 61000-4-12 [13] and
IEC 61000-4-18 [5].
6.7 Electrostatic discharge (ESD)
Testing to IEC 61000-4-2 [14] provides confidence of the continuing operation of the EUT as a
result of ESD. ESD is generally a fast transient with a rise-time of the order of hundreds of
picoseconds and pulse-width of tens of nanoseconds. This information may be used to inform
likely susceptibility to certain IEMI environments via the generation of radiated fields.
6.8 Electrically fast transient (EFT)
The EFT test has parameters that compare favourably with certain IEMI conducted
environments, and data from the test defined in IEC 61000-4-4 [6] may be used to indicate the
response of an EUT to IEMI.
– 20 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
6.9 Antenna port injection
This type of test provides valuable information on the response of transceiver systems to the
effect of IEMI including jammers which are discussed in Annex G. The IEMI environment of
interest shall either be used directly to inject signals into the antenna port or to determine
(through the use of transfer functions) those signals that would exist at the associated
electronics. Figure 3 shows a typical EUT with various ports including an antenna port.
IEC
Figure 3 – Examples of ports
In general, antenna ports are commonly subjected to an ESD test. Also covered under 6.7,
this is likely to provide useful information concerning the response of antenna ports to IEMI
environments.
For applicable test methods and test set-up see Mil-Std-461 test method CS116 [5].

7 Test parameters
7.1 Derivation of immunity test parameters
The key to deriving immunity test levels lies in understanding the IEMI source of interest, the
immunity requirement of the equipment or system that is to be assessed and the protection
level for a given scenario.
For example, if the equipment or system is to be located within a secure facility (assuming
20 dB of attenuation for physical barriers) and such that an IEMI source cannot be any closer
than 50 m (distance) away, this provides a useful bound on the test level. It may be prudent
to consider some margin to deal with issues such as measurement uncertainty or
measurement limitation to ensure that the test results carry a high level of confidence. This
gives a solid foundation for developing the required test level. Once this is understood, the
test levels can be derived using a radiated IEMI source or simulator or with the use of transfer
functions as discussed in 6.2.
Subclause 7.2 indicates generic test parameters based on the skilled category using the
environment levels derived in Table 2 and the example protection levels indicated in Table 3.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 21 –
7.2 Radiated test parameters
7.2.1 Generic hyperband test parameters (skilled capability group)
Subclause 7.2.1 defines the immunity test levels for hyperband IEMI environments (i.e. those
with a band ratio ≥ 10). This is summarised in Table 4.
Table 4 – Generic hyperband test parameters (skilled capability group)
EPL Amplitude Risetime Pulse width Pulse Pulse

repetition length/burst
frequency duration
(V/m) (ps) (ns) (Hz) (s)
EPL0 30 000
EPL1 6 000
EPL2 3 000
EPL3 1 500 100 to 500 0,2 to 5 1 to 1 000 1 to 10
EPL4 675
EPL5 300
EPL6 60
NOTE Any combination of waveform parameters in Table 4 will result in a different frequency spectrum of the
waveform applied during the test. In some cases, this will result in a test that is less severe when considering
the overall content or the associated maximum derivative of the applied waveform.
All combinations of the parameter ranges given in Table 4 are simultaneously achievable with
existing IEMI test sources. Once a test level is selected, some parameter variation is
recommended within the stated parameter ranges, if possible.
An example of a hyperband waveform is given in Figure 4.
IEC
Figure 4 – Typical hyperband waveform
7.2.2 Generic mesoband test parameters (skilled capability group)
These types of IEMI environment are characterised by a damped sinusoidal waveform. Table
5 contains the test levels and associated parameters. It should be noted that any combination
– 22 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
of waveform parameters in Table 5 will result in a different frequency spectrum of the

waveform applied during the test. In some cases, this will result in a test that is less strenuous
when considering the overall content or the associated maximum time derivative of the
applied waveform.
Table 5 – Generic mesoband test parameters (skilled capability group)
EPL Amplitude, E c Centre Damping PRF Pulse

frequency, f c factor, Q length/surst
duration
(V/m) (MHz) (Hz) (s)
EPL0 60 000
EPL1 12 000
EPL2 6000
EPL3 3 000 80 to 500 5 to 20 1 to 1 000 1 to 10
EPL4 1 350
EPL5 600
EPL6 120
The waveforms are well described by damped sine waves as shown in Equation (1) with the
characteristics E c , f c and Q found in Table 5. The normalizing constant k is defined so that the
maximum value of E c will be equal to E pp /2. Further information can be found in
IEC 61000-2-10.
−p fc t
( )
E c (t ) = k Epp / 2 e Q
(
sin 2 p f c t ) (1)
Immunity data from relevant test standards (for example IEC 61000-4-18, DO160 [15], Mil-
Std-461 [5]) may cover some of the requirements in Table 5 or assist in the identification of
frequencies that require further investigation.

It should be noted that not all combinations of the parameter ranges given in Table 5 are
simultaneously achievable with existing IEMI sources. Once a test level is selected, some
parameter variation is recommended within the stated parameter ranges if possible.
An example of a mesoband waveform is given in Figure 5.

IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 23 –
IEC
Figure 5 – Typical mesoband waveform
7.2.3 Generic hypoband/narrowband test parameters (skilled capability group)
Table 6 gives the test levels for narrowband IEMI which are characterised by low relative
bandwidth, centre frequencies of ≥ 1 GHz and an associated pulse repetition frequency (PRF)
of ≤ 100 Hz.
Table 6 – Generic hypoband/narrowband

test parameters (skilled capability group)

EPL Amplitude Pulse width PRF Pulse length/burst
duration
(V/m) (µs) (Hz) (s)
EPL0 225 500
EPL1 45 000
EPL2 22 550
EPL3 11 300 0,01 to 10 Single shot to 1 000 1 to 10
EPL4 5 050
EPL5 2 250
EPL6 450
NOTE Any combination of waveform parameters in Table 6 will result in a different frequency spectrum of the
waveform applied during the test. In some cases, this will result in a test that is less severe when considering
the overall content or the associated maximum derivative of the applied waveform.
All combinations of the parameter ranges given in Table 6 are simultaneously achievable with
existing IEMI test sources. Once a test level is selected, some parameter variation is
recommended within the stated parameter ranges, if possible.
An example of a hypoband/narrowband waveform is shown in Figure 6.

– 24 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
IEC
NOTE The y-axis is amplitude (scale intentionally removed).
Figure 6 – Typical hypoband/narrowband waveform
7.3 Generic conducted IEMI test parameters
7.3.1 General
This standard defines conducted IEMI test levels in Table 7. The user shall define specific
test levels relevant to a specific IEMI environment by following the process in Clause 6.
Table 7 – Conducted IEMI test levels

V oc I sc Waveform Basic standard
V A
100 2 Damped sinusoids a IEC 61000-4-18
1 000 20 Damped sinusoids a IEC 61000-4-18
4 000 80 5/50 ns IEC 61000-4-4
8 000 160 5/50 ns IEC 61000-4-4
16 000 320 5/50 ns IEC 61000-4-4
NOTE 1 Voltage and current levels shown in the table are for common mode values.
NOTE 2 For the two highest immunity test levels, it is sufficient to test with a single pulse.
a IEC 61000-4-18 defines the following test frequencies: 3 MHz, 10 MHz and 30 MHz. Depending on the
characteristics of the incident IEMI electric field, tests may be recommended for damped sinusoids with
frequencies of 100 MHz or 300 MHz using the waveshape defined in IEC 61000-4-18.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 25 –
7.3.2 Characteristics and performance of the fast damped oscillatory wave generator
Subclause 7.3.2 details the characteristics and performance requirements of the fast damped
oscillatory wave generator required to undertake the testing referred to in Table 7, footnote a.
The waveform of the fast damped oscillatory wave is given in Figure 7.
IEC
Figure 7 – Waveform of the damped oscillatory wave (open circuit voltage)
Open circuit specifications associated with Figure 7 are given in Table 8:
Table 8 – Open circuit specifications

Voltage rise time (T 1 in Figure 7) 5 ns ± 30 %
Voltage oscillation frequencies a 3 MHz, 10 MHz and 30 MHz ± 10 %
Repetition rate 5 000/s ± 10 %
Decaying (see Figure 7) Pk 5 shall be > 50 % of the Pk 1 value
and Pk 10 shall be < 50 % of the Pk 1 value
Burst duration 3 MHz: 50 ms ± 20 %
Burst period 300 ms ± 20 %
Output impedance 50 Ω ± 20 %
Open circuit voltage Pk 1 value, 100 V to 4 kV ± 10 % (see Figure 7)
Phase relationship with the power frequency No requirement
Polarity of the first half-period Positive and negative
a Oscillation frequency is defined as the reciprocal of the period between the first and third zero crossings
after the initial peak. This period is shown as T in Figure 7.
Short circuit specifications associated with Figure 7 are given in Table 9:

– 26 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Table 9 – Short Circuit Specifications
Current rise time (T 1 in Figure 7): 3 MHz: < 330 ns

10 MHz: < 100 ns
30 MHz: < 33 ns
Current oscillation frequencies a 3 MHz, 10 MHz and 30 MHz ± 30 %
Decaying (see Figure 7) Pk 5 shall be > 25 % of the Pk 1 value and Pk 10 shall be
< 25 % of the Pk 1 value
Short circuit current (Pk 1 value) 5 A to 80 A ± 20 %
a Oscillation frequency is defined as the reciprocal of the period between the first and third zero crossings
after the initial peak. This period is shown as T in Figure 1.
7.4 Tailored test level derivation
The test levels defined within 7.2 and 7.3 are provided to allow the reader to apply generic
IEMI test levels to equipment and systems where prior knowledge of a particular IEMI
environment is not available.
For situations where one or more specific IEMI environments are the subjects of the
assessment, tailored test levels shall be derived by considering the source-to-victim path
using the following steps:
a) understand the IEMI threat Environment of particular interest

b) measure the protection level by obtaining transfer function (coupling) data
1) develop analytically
2) measure
c) predict induced currents/voltages/fields/power at the location of the equipment/systems
d) envelope predictions
e) assess immunity of equipment/systems
1) inject predicted induced waveforms into equipment/systems

2) compare injected results with existing immunity data (if available)
7.5 Relevance of EMC immunity data
Immunity data from general EMC testing may be useful in determining whether testing to the
levels presented within this document is necessary to declare immunity to IEMI environments.
A rigorous mathematical approach utilising waveform norms should be used as the basis for
such assessments. Further information on the application of waveform norms can be found in
IEC 61000-4-33 [4].
Measurement uncertainties, whose quantitative calculations are possible, e.g., intensity of

projected electric field, discharge voltage of static electric test facilities, current induced in
cables, etc., shall be included in any test report. It may be necessary to consider the use of
additional test margins to take account of limitations in test methods; further details on this
subject can be found in Annex F. Additionally, any test reports shall include the statement that
test results are dependent on the test conditions and configuration of the tested equipment,
and the note that the test results are, therefore, only valid for the cases specifically under
identical test conditions, test methods and equipment configuration.
Information and determination of measurement uncertainty for EMC testing can be found in
CISPR TR 16-4-1 [16], CISPR 16-4-2 [17] , CISPR 16 4-3 [18] and CISPR16-4-4 [19] and are
equally applicable to the determination of measurement uncertainty for IEMI test results.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 27 –
8 Bibliography
[1] Threat of Electromagnetic Terrorism, Lessons learned from documented IEMI attacks,
F Sabath, EUROEM 2012, July 2012,
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/230815457_Plenary_Presentation_Threat_of_
electromagnetic_terrorism/file/d912f504d9d4f9fa50.pdf
[2] IEC 61000-4-25, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-25: Testing and
measurement techniques – HEMP immunity test methods for equipment and systems
[3] IEC 61000-2-13:2005, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 2-13: Environment -

High-power electromagnetic (HPEM) environments – Radiated and conducted
measurement techniques – Measurement methods for high-power transient parameters
[5] IEC 61000-4-18 , Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-18: Testing and
measurement techniques – Damped oscillatory wave immunity test
measurement techniques – Electrical fast transient/burst immunity test
measurement techniques – HEMP immunity test methods for equipment and systems
IEC 61000-4-25:2001/AMD1:2012
[8] MIL-STD-461F, ‘Department of Defense Interface Standard – Requirements for the

Control of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics of Subsystems and
Equipment’, 10 December 2007,
[9] Ministry of Defence, Defence Standard 59-411 Issue 1 ‘Electromagnetic Compatibility’

Publication Date 23 January 2007

[10] IEC TS 61000-5-9, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 5-9: Installation and
mitigation guidelines – System-level susceptibility assessments for HEMP and HPEM
[11] IEC TR 61000-4-35, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-35: Testing and
measurement techniques – HPEM simulator compendium
measurement techniques – Reverberation chamber test methods
[13] IEC 61000-4-12 , Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-12: Testing and
measurement techniques – Ring wave immunity test
measurement techniques – Electrostatic discharge immunity test
[15] DO160/ED14, ‘Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne

Equipment’, 2010
[16] CISPR TR 16-4-1, Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measuring
apparatus and methods – Part 4-1: Uncertainties, statistics and limit modelling –
Uncertainties in standardized EMC tests
– 28 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
[17] CISPR 16-4-2 , Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measuring apparatus
and methods – Part 4-2: Uncertainties, statistics and limit modelling – Measurement
instrumentation uncertainty
[18] CISPR TR 16-4-3 , Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measuring
Statistical considerations in the determination of EMC compliance of mass-produced
products
[19] CISPR TR 16-4-4, Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measuring
Statistics of complaints and a model for the calculation of limits for the protection of
radio services

IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 29 –
Annex A
(informative)
Failure mechanisms and performance criteria
A.1 General
Electronic components and subsystems are essential parts of modern systems like airplanes,
communication, IT infrastructure, traffic management or safety systems. Since these
electronic components have begun to control safety critical functions, concern is growing over
the vulnerability of electronic systems. Therefore the susceptibility of critical systems is of
vital interest since an upset or failure in these systems could cause major accidents or
economic disasters. As a consequence, the investigation of the susceptibility of electronic
systems as well as their protection and hardening against IEMI threats is of great interest [1] 3,
[2], [3], [4] and [5].
There have been several documented cases, where high-power electromagnetic (HPEM)
environments caused unwanted action or failure. In addition the last decade has witnessed
worldwide numerous IEMI susceptibility investigations. Published reports of such
investigations document a variety of observed effects such as:
– disturbed screens (flickering of screens, distorted displays, black screens),

– display of wrong data,
– corruption of signals and data (signal drifts, corruption of signals, lost data),
– false response of sensors and systems,
– unintentional response or action of systems (movement of actuator, change of course),
– decreased performance (reduction of computational performance, data transfer),
– hang up of software,
– reboot of digital devices (computer, controller, processor),
– destruction of components.

Due to the large range of observed effects, the systematic assessment (fail/pass) as well as
the development of sufficient protection measures require a classification of the effects and
the failure mechanisms, which summarize the essential information.
A.2 Failure mechanisms
A.2.1 General
If the observed effects are analysed with regard to the underlying failure mechanism, five
main categories can be extracted:
1) noise
2) parameter offset and drifts
3) corruption of information
4) system upset or breakdown
5) component destruction
___________
3 Numbers in square brackets refer to the references in Clause A.5.
– 30 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Any of these mechanisms can occur on a system as a result of an incident EM environment,

sometimes with disastrous consequences. Further details are given for each of the categories
below.
A.2.2 Noise
Electromagnetic disturbances can raise the noise level on signal and power lines, which
results in flashing of displays or reduced data rates.
In a particular case of jamming the IEMI source (jammer) operates at or close to the
frequency of operation and the induced noise level overloads the receiver circuits. Due to the
fact that receivers are designed to operate at very low signal levels, jamming typically
requires less radiated power.
A.2.3 Parameter offset and drifts
Parameters of analogue circuits are subject to changes (e.g. offset, drift) caused by induced
signals. According to the application, these parameter changes can result in distortions of
signals and/or false control signals and affect control circuits as well as the system status.
This is shown in Figure A.1:

IEC
[Source: Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC-Protection, WIS.]
Figure A.1 – IEMI induced offset of sensor output –

Corruption of information
Injected signals are capable of changing bits of a data stream and of corrupting transferred
information. In the worst case the receiving subsystem interprets the injected signal or the
corrupted data stream as valid information or instructions. Typical effects of this class are the
activation of a pop up menu, the opening and closing of programs, device failure messages,
wrong sensor readings, and movements of actuators. This is shown in Figure A.2:
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 31 –
(V)
4
Voltage
2
−2
−4
−500,0 n 0,0 500,0 n 1,0 µ 1,5 µ

Time (s)
IEC
Figure A.2 – Collision of an induced disturbance with data bits [1]
A.2.4 System upset or breakdown
A system upset or breakdown is the inability of a physically undamaged system to perform its
desired function. Upsets and breakdowns are caused by electromagnetic disturbances that
are capable of affecting the logic state of an electronic system (e.g. by triggering digital
devices, by changing counters or altering the state of logic circuits). After a reset (self,
external, or power reset), the system will return to its usual capabilities.
A.2.5 Component destruction
Insulating layers of printed circuit boards or components (e.g. integrated circuits) can be
sensitive to interfering disturbances. If the dielectric insulation is too thin, induced voltage
signals can cause an electrical breakdown. The resulting component destructions range from
flashover effects over melted lines to bond wire destruction (see Figure A.3).
a) b)

c) d)
IEC
Figure A.3 – Examples of destruction on a chip [2]
The identification of which destruction mechanism occurs requires additional detailed

examinations of the system (e.g. opening of ICs and detailed on-chip investigation). As the
destructive effects are of a permanent nature, usually the time consumption of such additional
examination is not a problem. In contrast, the temporary nature of interferences requires a
real-time measurement of signals and additional measurements, which enable observation,
storage and analysis of the internal stages of the system under investigation.
– 32 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
A.3 Effect of pulse width
Electronic equipment generally responds to either the peak power or the average power of the
incident IEMI environment. Much data has been collected to determine the relationship
between peak and average effects [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], and the trend from this data is
summarised in Figure A.4.
IEC
Figure A.4 – Generic failure trend as a function of pulse width
Figure A.4 shows how the peak power for failure for a typical circuit will decrease as the pulse
width increases, corresponding to the average power failure mode. At the transition point the
circuit no longer reacts to the increasing average power and appears to depend only on the
peak power corresponding to the peak power mode.

A comparison between the failure modes of typical older analogue equipment and newer
digital equipment is given in several of the references. Most modern equipment cannot be
defined as wholly analogue or wholly digital in nature, and the assumption that a single
mechanism is responsible for the equipment susceptibility is a simplification. However, it is
clear from the references that for many systems there is a dependency on pulse width and the
peak power required.
A.4 Performance criteria
Determination of a system under test either passing or failing a test requires classification of
the test results in terms of the loss of function or the degradation of performance of the
system under test, relative to a performance level defined by its manufacturer or specified in
the test plan.
Recommended performance criteria are shown in Table A.1.

IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 33 –
Table A.1 – Recommended performance criteria
Performance Description
Normal Normal performance within specified limits.
Tolerable interference Appearing disturbances can be tolerated or do not influence the main
function.
Performance degradation The appearing disturbance reduces the efficiency and capability of the
system.
Temporary loss of function Temporary loss of function or degradation of performance which ceases
after the disturbance ceases, and from which the equipment under test
recovers its normal performance, without operator intervention.
Persistent loss of function Temporary loss of function or degradation of performance, the correction
of which requires operator intervention.
Permanent loss of main function Loss of function or degradation of performance which is not recoverable,
owing to damage to hardware or software, or loss of data.
The manufacturer shall define the performance criteria of the system under test in accordance
with Table A.1.
A.5 References
[1] Nitsch, D.; Camp, M.; Sabath, F.; ter Haseborg, J.L.; Garbe, H.; "Susceptibility of some
electronic equipment to HPEM threats”, IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic
Compatibility, vol.46, no.3, pp. 380- 389, Aug. 2004
[2] Camp, M.; Garbe, H.; "Susceptibility of Personal Computer Systems to Fast Transient
Electromagnetic Pulses”, IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, vol.48,
no.4, pp.829-833, Nov. 2006
[3] Sabath, F.; “Classification of Electromagnetic Effects at System Level”, Ultra-

Wideband, Short Pulse electromagnetics 9, Springer Science+Business Media, pp.
325- 334, 2010, ISBN 978-0-387-77844-0

[4] IEC TR 61000-1-5, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 1-5: General – High
power electromagnetic (HPEM) effects on civil systems
[5] Hoad, R.; Carter, N.J.; Herke, D.; Watkins, S.P.; Trends in EM susceptibility of IT
equipment, IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, vol.46, no.3, pp. 390-
395, Aug. 2004
[6] Unified Electromagnetic Environmental Protection: A Design Guide, Part A:

Introduction and the Philosophy of Hardening’, by Dr NJ Carter, QinetiQ
[7] ‘A time-domain view of the choice of transient excitation waveforms for enhanced
response of electronic systems’, Interaction Note 560, by C. E. Baum September 2000
[8] ‘Measuring the upset of CMOS and TTL due to HPM-Signals’, by Norbert Esser and
Bernd Smailus, ABB AG Corporate Research Center
[9] ‘Pulse Length and Power Dependency of the failure threshold of a Low Noise
Amplifier’, by Rolf Jonsson, Magnus Hoijer, Swedish Defence Research Agency
[10] ‘HPM Effects on Electronic Components and the Importance of this knowledge in
Evaluation of System Susceptibility’, by Gunnar Goransson, FOA Defence Research
Establishment
Copyrighted material licensed to Electricity of Vietnam by Clarivate Analytics (US) LLC, subscriptions.techstreet.com, downloaded on 2020-03-17 09:30:44 +0000 by Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
‘Comparative Susceptibility Study of Pulse and Constant Illumination of Wires over

Ground Planes’, by KP Slattery, CKC Laboratories, Inc.
– 34 –
[11]
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 35 –
Annex B
(informative)
Developments in IEMI source environments
B.1 General
The use of electromagnetic sources [1] 4 to generate intentional electromagnetic interference

(IEMI) is becoming an increasing concern as the reliance of society on technology increases
significantly. Many technical papers have been published that show the effects of IEMI are
cause for concern [2], [3].
The effects of IEMI on equipment can be similar to the effects caused by high-power
electromagnetic (HPEM) environments. HPEM environments include high-intensity radiated
fields (HIRF) generated by radio and radar systems, lightning electromagnetic pulse (LEMP)
fields and electrostatic discharge (ESD). Some of these HPEM environments have similar
characteristics to those sources used to cause IEMI but are unintentional EMI sources, i.e.
they are not used for malicious use. However, it is possible to use information regarding
qualification of equipment and systems to these environments to inform the likely response to
IEMI.
Recently two new terms have arisen in the EMC field – EM terrorism [4] and intentional
electromagnetic interference (IEMI) [5]. Over the past 12 years the scientific community has
decided to accept the more generic term IEMI, which includes EM terrorism. In February 1999
at a workshop held at the Zurich EMC Symposium, a widely accepted definition for IEMI was
suggested: “Intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy introducing noise or
signals into electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these
systems for terrorist or criminal purposes”.
Figure B.1 qualitatively presents several of these electromagnetic environments, along with
the narrowband and wideband IEMI threats that are the subject of this document [6].
IEC
Figure B.1 – A comparison of HPEM and IEMI spectra [6]

___________
4 Numbers in square brackets refer to the references in Clause B.6.
– 36 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
In August 1999 the problem of IEMI was recognized by the International Radio Scientific
Union (URSI) during a special session that resulted in an URSI resolution. The URSI
“Resolution of Criminal Activities using Electromagnetic Tools” [7] was intended to make
people aware of the following:
• The existence of criminal activities using electromagnetic tools and associated

phenomena.
• The fact that criminal activities using electromagnetic tools can be undertaken covertly
and anonymously and that physical boundaries such as fences and walls can be
penetrated by electromagnetic fields.
• The potentially serious nature of the effects of criminal activities using electromagnetic
tools on the infrastructure and important functions in society such as transportation,
communication, security, and medicine.
• That the possible disruptions of the health and economic activities of nations could have
major consequences.
The URSI Council recommended to the scientific community in general, and the EMC
community in particular, to take account of this threat and to undertake the following actions:
– Perform additional research pertaining to criminal activities using electromagnetic tools

in order to establish appropriate levels of vulnerability.
– Investigate techniques for appropriate protection against criminal activities using
electromagnetic tools and to provide methods that can be used to protect the public
from the damage that can be done to the infrastructure by terrorists.
– Develop high-quality testing and assessment methods to evaluate system performance
in these special electromagnetic environments.
– Provide data regarding the formulation of standards of protection and support
standardization work.
It should be noted that the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) added the IEMI
threat to its previous standardization work dealing with HEMP in 1999.
B.2 IEMI environment

In order to understand the nature of IEMI threats it is necessary to understand the different
types of electromagnetic environments that can be produced and that can affect exposed
equipment. This document focuses mainly on radiated threats, although injected threats will
be summarised.
In terms of system vulnerabilities, the narrowband threat is usually one of very high-power
and high energy, since the electrical energy is delivered in a narrow frequency band. It is
fairly easy to deliver fields on the order of many kV/m at a single frequency. Of course each
system under test may have a vulnerable frequency that is different from others. Often the
malfunctions observed in testing equipment with narrowband waveforms are those of
permanent damage. Available test facilities using the narrowband or hypoband waveforms can
be found in an article by Sabath et al. in [8].
The wideband threat is somewhat different. Since a time domain pulse produces energy over
many frequencies at the same time, the energy density at any single frequency is
considerably less. Therefore damage is not as likely as in the narrowband case; however, it is
easier to find a system’s vulnerability since many frequencies are applied to the system
simultaneously. Sources that have been built in the past typically produce repetitive pulses
that can continue for many seconds, thereby increasing the probability of producing a system
upset. Test facilities producing these types of waveforms are described in an article by
Prather, et al. [9].
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 37 –
While the waveform characteristics are defined above, there are two primary ways that they
may be delivered to a system. One is through the application of radiated fields, and the other
is through injection along cables and wires. These two methods of delivery are consistent with
the general treatment of electromagnetic disturbances in the field of electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC) where nearly all environments and tests are defined in terms of radiated
or injected environments [10].
For radiated fields, it seems clear that frequencies above 100 MHz are of primary concern in
that they are able to penetrate unshielded or poorly protected buildings very well and yet
couple efficiently to the equipment inside of the building. In addition, they have the advantage
that antennas designed to radiate efficiently at these frequencies are small. Figure B.2
illustrates a qualitative view of how radiated fields may illuminate and couple to system
electronics through apertures (e.g., windows) and through building wiring [3].
IEC

Figure B.2 – Representation of typical IEMI
radiation and coupling onto systems [3]
For injected voltages and currents, there are some differences in terms of the frequency
range of interest. It is well established that if common-mode conducted signals are injected
into the power supply or telecom cables outside of a building, frequencies below 10 MHz (and
pulsewidths wider than 50 ns) propagate more efficiently than higher frequencies.
Experiments by Parfenov et al. have shown that these “lower” frequencies can disrupt the
operation of equipment inside a building [11].
B.3 IEMI sources
The nature of IEMI sources [1] varies from very sophisticated sources being developed in
research laboratories and industry to threats hastily assembled by novices. The sophisticated
sources, termed directed energy weapons (DEWs), occupy a parameter space that is
illustrated in Figure B.3 [1]. Note that the UWB (hyperband) sources tend to be at lower
frequencies and contain much less energy per pulse than the HPM (hypoband or narrowband)
sources (see Figure B.3). The sophisticated IEMI sources are increasingly higher power,
increasingly more compact, and can be operated repetitively. Recent advances at the Institute
of High Current Electronics, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences have taken
2
advantage of phase coherence to demonstrate a roughly N scaling in output power when N-
separate HPM sources are operated with phase coherence within 25 %. An example is shown
in Figure B.7 [12].
– 38 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
IEC
Figure B.3 – Parameter space in power/frequency

occupied by sophisticated IEMI (i.e. DEW) sources [1]

IEC
Figure B.4 – Peak power and energy from continuous and pulsed
(durations shown) microwave sources, narrowband and wideband
Further, for hypoband or narowband sources worldwide surveys of typical source power levels
have been conducted, see Figure B.4 [16]. Figure B.5 and Figure B.6 demonstrate the
achieved power levels.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 39 –
IEC
NOTE The values of the quality factor Pf 2 scaling (where P is the output power and f is the frequency) vary over
several orders of magnitude.
Figure B.5 – Peak powers of various types of pulsed HPM sources [1]
IEC
Figure B.6 – Peak vs. average power for microwave

sources with duty factors indicated
The duty factor for IEMI sources is the product of the pulse length and the pulse repetition
rate, and is of the order of 10 -6 (10 -5 at most).
A prominent example of a mesoband type of UWB source is the Diehl-Rheinmetall briefcase

sources, shown in Figure B.8 [3].
– 40 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
IEC
NOTE The system depicted is capable of radiating 6,0 GW at X-band [12].
Figure B.7 – Phase coherence leading to a compact HPM

source with N 2 scaling of output power

IEC
Figure B.8 – Briefcase mesoband UWB source sold by Diehl-Rheinmetall [3]
The narrowband and UWB HPM sources just described are examples of sophisticated sources
that took considerable resources to design and develop. On the other extreme are sources
that can be constructed by novices using microwave ovens and other readily available
components (such as from radar systems). An example is shown in Figure B.9. Although such
devices radiated considerably lower powers than the sophisticated devices, at close range
they can have effects on exposed electronic systems.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 41 –
IEC
Figure B.9 – A do-it-yourself electromagnetic

weapon made from an oven magnetron [13]
An example of a Russian industrial scale electromagnetic weapon is the RANETS-E, which

was advertised at an Asian air show during the last decade. RANETS-E has goals of
achieving operating parameters of 0,5 GW, 10 ns to 20 ns, 500 Hz in X-band, with 45 dB to 50
dB gain antenna [1].
B.4 Published radiated IEMI environments
B.4.1 IEC 61000-2-13
IEC 61000-2-13 presents several sources which could be considered as applicable to the
IEMI threat. These are summarised in Table B.1.

Table B.1 – IEMI environments from IEC 61000-2-13
Name Band Typical operating Electric field Source type

frequency
Phaser Hypoband or 1,1 GHz 2,3 kV/m at 3 m Magnetron
narrowband
Dispatcher Mesoband 500 MHz 100 kV/m at 1 m Marx generator
Disrupter Hyperband 200 MHz to 2 GHz 500 kV/m at 1 m Impulse radiating
(instantaneous antenna-based
bandwidth) system
B.4.2 Mil-Std-464C
Mil-Std-464C [16] contains a list of multiple HPM 5 threats with an overall compilation of these
threats.
Table B.2 and Table B.3 are taken from Mil-Std-464C. Table B.2 provides field strengths that
exist at one kilometre for the hypoband/narrowband threat high-power microwave (HPM)
environment. HPM is a military term used to describe a class of IEMI systems which can be
___________
5 The Mil-Std uses HPM to define a threat, which radiates high peak power electromagnetic pulses intended to
disrupt or damage electronic systems. This part of IEC 61000 uses the more accurate term, IEMI, as not all
IEMI sources operate in the microwave part of the radio frequency spectrum.
– 42 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
used in military scenarios. Table B.3 provides a spectral magnitude description for wideband
HPM at a distance of 100 meters.
Table B.2 – Hypoband/narrowband HPM environment
Frequency range (MHz) Electric field (kV/m at 1 km)

2 000 to 2 700 18,0
3 600 to 4 000 22,0
4 000 to 5 400 35,0
8 500 to 11 000 69,0
14 000 to 18 000 12,0
28 000 to 40 000 7,5
Table B.3 – Hyperband/wideband HPM environment
Frequency range (MHz) Broad-band electric field distribution

(mV/m/MHz at 100 m)
30 to 150 33 000
150 to 225 7 000
225 to 400 7 000
400 to 700 1 330
700 to 790 1 140
790 to 1 000 1 050
1 000 to 2 000 840
2 000 to 2 700 240
2 700 to 3 000 80
B.4.3 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has published a ‘High-power

electromagnetic immunity guide for telecommunication systems’ [17] that also contains
published levels of IEMI environments.
B.4.4 Practical determination of a tailored test level – An example
An electronic system is to be installed within a facility with a secure perimeter such that the
system is at least 100 m away from any insecure location (i.e. the IEMI source cannot get
closer than 100 m to the system of interest). The facility operator has been tasked to ensure
that a mesoband IEMI source radiating 60 MHz with an electric field of 10 kV/m at 10 m and
variable prf (< 1kHz) cannot disrupt the system.
There are 4 ways to approach this problem.
1) The maximum field that can be generated at the system is 1 kV/m (assuming far field
conditions such that the IEMI source magnitude is inversely proportional to an increase in
distance). An assessment is made of the impedance of all cables that are connected to
the system and the lowest value is used to determine the highest current that could be
induced. All cables are then tested to the maximum current amplitude with a 60 MHz
mesoband signal with 1 kHz prf and a similar decay factor of the IEMI source whilst being
monitored for effects.
2) Measurements of the transfer functions of all cables connected to the system of interest
are taken and used to predict the induced currents as a result of the 60 MHz mesoband
source. These predictions can then be either injected directly into the cables or a worst-
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 43 –
case envelope generated of the predicted norms (the latter methods will result in an over-
test for many cables).
3) Set-up the system of interest within a test facility and use an IEMI simulator (such as the
ones described within IEC TR 61000-4-35) to undertake controlled exposure. Care shall
be taken when considering building attenuation that might be present in the real case.
4) Obtain the IEMI source of interest and illuminate the facility with the system of interest
inside. The testing shall commence at a low level and build up to the normal operating
output to ensure that any effects observed will allow the termination of the testing before
damage is caused. It should be noted that this method is likely to affect other electronic
systems and EM spectrum users and that permission from telecommunication authorities
is likely to be required.
If the system shows no effects when tested, it is assessed as immune to the IEMI source of
interest.
B.5 Summary
IEMI sources are increasingly pervasive. They range from small do-it-yourself sources that
can be built from directions found on the Internet to highly sophisticated narrowband
(hypoband) sources that are only found in national laboratories and universities. Regarding
the latter, they can also be broken up into sources that fire a single shot at a time and those
that can fire repetitively in a burst. Figure B.10 presents the typical range of mass (in kg) and
power (in GW) of these two types of sources.
IEC
NOTE 1 The black line (lower line) is a trend line for single shot sources and the red line (upper line) is a trend
line for systems that are repetitively pulsed (tens to hundreds of hertz).
NOTE 2 This is representative data relevant for sample land-mobile or land-transportable systems and includes
the weight of the entire hypoband system, from prime power to antenna. This was generated by combining data
from Table 2.1 in [14] for the HPM sources, and models from HEIMDALL [15] for the weight of the hypoband
system components.
Figure B.10 – Plot of entire narrowband system weight as a function of output

microwave power for land-mobile and land-transportable systems
Whether or not the more massive sources can find their way to be used as part of the IEMI
environment remains to be seen. The lighter variants are certainly more likely to be used and
– 44 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
can be just as effective as the higher power, more massive devices, provided they are brought
closer in range to the victim.
B.6 References
nd
[1] J. Benford, J. Swegle, and E. Schamiloglu, High Power Microwaves, 2 Ed. (Taylor
and Francis, Boca Raton, FL, 2007).
[2] See, for example, IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Special Issue
on High-Power Electromagnetics (HPEM) and Intentional Electromagnetic Interference
(IEMI), vol. 47, no. 3 (2004).
[3] W. Radasky and E. Savage, Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) and Its
Impact on the U.S. Power Grid, Metatech Corporation Report Meta-R-323, January
2010.
[4] R.L. Gardner, “Electromagnetic Terrorism. A Real Danger,” Proceedings of the XIth
Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (Wroclaw, Poland, June 1998).
[5] W.A. Radasky, M.A. Messier and M.W. Wik, “Intentional Electromagnetic Interference
(EMI) – Test and Data Implications,” presented at Zurich EMC Symposium (Zurich,
Switzerland, February 2001).
[6] D.V. Giri and F.M. Tesche, “Classification of Intentional Electromagnetic Environments
(IEME),” IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 322-
328 (2004).
[7] International Radio Scientific Union (URSI) General Assembly (Toronto, Canada,
1999).
[8] F. Sabath, M. Bäckström, B. Nordstrom, D. Serafin, A. Kaiser, B. Kerr, and D. Nitsch,

“Survey of Four European High-Power Microwave Narrow-Band Test Facilities,” IEEE
Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 329-334 (2004).

[9] W.P. Prather, C.E. Baum, R.J. Torres, F. Sabath, and D. Nitsch, “Survey of Worldwide
High-Power Wideband Capabilities,” IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic
Compatibility, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 335-344 (2004).
[10] IEC TR 61000-2-5, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) – Part 2-5: Environment –

Description and classification of electromagnetic environments.
[11] Y. Parfenov, L. Zdoukhov, W. Radasky, and M. Ianoz, “Conducted IEMI Threats for
Commercial Buildings,” IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, vol. 46,
no. 3, pp. 404-411 (2004).
[12] V.V. Rostov, Institute of High Current Electronics (private communication, June 2011).
[13] http://hacknmod.com/hack/diy-electromagnetic-herf-gun-project/
[14] R.J. Barker and E. Schamiloglu, High Power Microwave Sources and Technologies
(IEEE Press/John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY, 2001)
[15] J.A. Swegle and J.N. Benford, “End-to-End Modeling with the Heimdall Code to Scope
High-Power Microwave Systems,” Proc. 2007 IEEE International Pulsed Power
Conference, PPPS-2007 (Albuquerque, NM, June 2007), pp. 1114-1118
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 45 –
[16] Mil-Std-464C, ‘Department of Defense Interface Standard – Electromagnetic

Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems’, 1 December 2010
[17] ITU-T K.81 (11/2009), High-power electromagnetic immunity guide for

telecommunication systems

– 46 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Annex C
(informative)
Interaction with buildings
C.1 Building attenuation
Buildings and structures provide a level of attenuation against IEMI environments (and other
EM environments). The degree of this attenuation, referred to as shielding effectiveness, is a
function of the material used in construction and the frequency range of the IEMI environment.
Figure C.1 shows data collected from published sources [1] to [7] 6.

IEC
NOTE A re-bar structure in general gives very little attenuation above 500 MHz [8].
Figure C.1 – Typical unprotected low-rise building

plane wave E-field attenuation collected from references
The trend lines in Figure C.1 are based upon measurements made on a typical office building
(building types 3, 3a and 3b relate to office buildings in suburban areas) and are supported by
the data from other sources made at varying distances into the building. The general trend is
that attenuation decreases linearly for frequencies from 10 kHz to 100 MHz and then
increases at a much-reduced rate to 10 GHz.
In [7] further data derived from measurements of rooms within buildings of varying
construction averaged over frequencies between 1 MHz and 3 GHz is provided. This is shown
in Table C.1.
___________
6 Numbers in square brackets refer to the references in Clause C.4.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 47 –
Table C.1 – Shielding effectiveness measurements for

various power system buildings and rooms
Description Shielding
(dB)
Wood building 2
Room under wood roof 4
Wood building, room 1 4
Concrete, no re-bar 5
Wood building, room 2 6
Concrete and re-bar, room 1 7
Metal building 26
Concrete and re-bar, well protected room 29
Figure C.1 and Table C.1 are included here to allow the reader to estimate the shielding
effectiveness afforded by buildings within which electronic systems that are required to be
immune to IEMI environments are located. Given the frequency of the IEMI environment of
interest, a reduction to test levels can be made using the shielding effectiveness data
provided. It should be noted that this type of reduction applies only to assessments of
radiated IEMI. Accurate values of shielding effectiveness can only be obtained through an
assessment of the specific building and installation scenario.
For narrowband (hypoband) environments, a single figure can be used with reasonable
accuracy when utilising shielding effectiveness measurements to reduce the magnitude of
radiated IEMI. For hyperband environments, the user should assess the significance of using
a single value or if multiple frequency-point values are required to improve fidelity in the
assessment process.

C.2 Coupling to cables
The extent to which IEMI is coupled to cables depends on the associated wavelength (and
therefore, frequency) of the energy and the length of the cable. Cable coupling is strongest
when the wavelength is equivalent, or proportional, to the cable length. This is shown
simplistically in Figure C.2 [9].
– 48 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Constant× ω Constant/ ω
IEC
Figure C.2 – Cable coupling – Resonance region
Figure C.2 shows coupling efficiency as a function of frequency where f is the frequency of
interest, f L is the lowest frequency in the incident IEMI environment, f h is the highest
frequency in the incident IEMI environment and L is the cable length; ω is angular frequency,
2pf. In this example, band 2 shows the ”resonance region”, the region in which the maximum
amount of energy is coupled to the cable from the incident IEMI environment. Coupling either
below or above this region tends to follow a reduction of approximately 20 dB per decade.
There are some minor adjustments to this trend for frequencies above the resonance region
where “end-fire” conditions (special angles of incidence and polarization) can create a less
rapid decrease in coupling.
C.3 Low voltage cable attenuation

The ability of a cable to conduct current efficiently is determined by a number of factors. One
of the main factors is the material that the cable core is made of and the quality of any braid
(shielding). A graph of attenuation per metre for a standard twin and earth low voltage cable
is shown in Figure C.3 [10].
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 49 –
IEC
Figure C.3 – Mains cable attenuation profile
At 150 kHz the common-mode attenuation for a standard twin and earth low voltage cable is
approximately 0,7 dB/m.
At frequencies around 200 MHz the common-mode attenuation of the cable approaches
2 dB/m. Given a 10 m cable length the attenuation would be 20 dB at this frequency, i.e. the
injected signal would be an order of magnitude lower by the time it reached the EUT. At
frequencies above 200 MHz the attenuation rises logarithmically.

C.4 References
[1] Smith, A., ‘Radio Frequency Principles and Applications: The Generation, Propagation,
and Reception of Signals and Noise’, Page(s): 43 – 68, Copyright Year: 1998, Wiley-
IEEE Press eBook Chapters
[2] W. C. Stone, ‘NIST Construction Automation Program Report No. 3, Electromagnetic

Signal Attenuation in Construction Materials’, Building and Fire Research Laboratory
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899, NIST United States Department of Commerce
Technology Administration National Institute of Standards and Technology, October
1997
[3] P. Pauli and D. Moldan, ‘Reduction and shielding of RF and Microwaves’,

Electromagnetic Environments and Health in Buildings Conference, May 2002, London,
UK
[4] D. Molkdar, ‘Review on radio propagation into and within buildings’, IEE
PROCEEDINGS-H, Vol. 138, No. 1, February 1991
[5] IEEE Std 473-1985, ‘IEEE Recommended Practice for an Electromagnetic Site Survey
(10 kHz to 10 GHz)’, Reaffirmed September 26, 1991
– 50 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
[6] R. Hoad, S. P. Watkins, A. Wraight, A. Lambourne, A. Leaver and B. Petit,

‘Measurement of the attenuation of buildings and structures and comparison with
published data’, AMEREM 2010, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA, July 2010
[7] E. B. Savage, J. L. Gilbert, W. A. Radasky and M. J. Madrid, “An Alternative EM

Shielding Effectiveness Measurement Method for Buildings”, 2010 Asia-Pacific
International Symposium on EMC, Beijing, China, April 12-16, pp. 138-141, 2010.
[8] Giri D V and Tesche F M, “Electromagnetic Attenuation through Various Types of

Buildings”, APEMC 2013, 20-23 May 2013, Melbourne, Australia
[9] High-Power Microwave Systems and Effects, D. V. Giri and C. D. Taylor, Taylor and
Francis International Publishers, Washington, D.C., 1994
[10] EUPEN EMC Cables data sheet,

http://www.eupen.com/weimages/download_catalog/emc.pdf

IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 51 –
Annex D
(informative)
Relation between plane wave immunity testing

and immunity testing in a reverberation chamber
D.1 General
The problem in relating the outcome of a susceptibility test in a reverberation chamber to free-
space conditions was identified and addressed early on [1] 7. In a reverberation chamber the
field can be regarded as illuminating the equipment under test (EUT) by plane waves coming
from many directions within one stirrer rotation [24]. By use of a rotating stirrer located inside
the chamber the boundary conditions are changed, thereby generating different field
conditions. The concept of statistical isotropy, sometimes used for reverberation chambers,
means that the ensemble average of the signal received by an antenna (or by a critical
component inside the EUT) will be independent of the directional properties of the antenna
[2] 8. In an isotropic environment the ensemble average of the receiving cross-section, σ p ,
is, for all antennas and irrespective of their directivity properties, given by [3], [4], [5]:
λ2 λ2
σp = ⋅ D ⋅η ⋅ p ⋅ q = ⋅η ⋅ q (D.1)
4p 8p
where λ is the wavelength, D is the directivity (sometimes denoted the directive gain), η is
the antenna radiation efficiency, p is the polarization-matching factor, and q is the impedance-
mismatch factor. It holds that D = 1 and p = 1 2 in an isotropic environment. Equation (D.1)
illustrates the loss of information regarding polarization and directional properties in a
reverberation chamber test.
The fact that the variations in directivity and polarization are averaged out in a reverberation
chamber – illustrated by Equation (D.1) – indicates that an immunity test carried out in a

reverberation chamber might be less severe than a test carried out in an anechoic chamber
(AC), at least if the anechoic-chamber test comprises the worst angle of incidence and
polarization. This also holds for measurements of shielding effectiveness (SE), i.e. a
measurement in a reverberation chamber may yield a higher, i.e. a more favourable, value of
the SE than a measurement in an anechoic chamber comprising the worst angle of incidence
and polarization. Of course, the opposite may also be true, i.e. that the immunity test in an
anechoic chamber might be less severe than a test in a reverberation chamber. This happens
if all the test cases carried out in the anechoic chamber correspond to small values of D ⋅ p ,
i.e. if the angle of incidence and/or the polarization corresponds to a weak coupling to the
EUT.
The exact relation between the stresses an EUT will face in the two environments depends on
the definition of the electric field used for immunity testing in a reverberation chamber (see
[6]). Usually, in a measurement of shielding effectiveness (see below), the most natural
choice is to use the scalar power density. This yields a value of SE measured in the
reverberation chamber that is equal to the average value, with respect to all aspect angles
and polarizations, of the shielding effectiveness measured in the anechoic chamber.
In an immunity test in a reverberation chamber the relation between the two environments
becomes more complicated. One reason is that the immunity test parameter is given by, with
___________
7 Numbers in square brackets refer to the references in Clause D.5.
8 It has been shown [18] that good isotropy also prevails at each position of the stirrer.
– 52 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
respect to all stirrer positions used in the test, the maximum field strength and not by an
average value of some more convenient parameter like the power received by the calibration
antenna. Another reason is that different definitions on the test field strength, the total and a
rectangular component of the electric field respectively, are used in different standards.
D.2 Relation between measurements of shielding effectiveness in the two

environments
In a measurement of the shielding effectiveness (SE) of an EUT, we regard the EUT with its
internal field sensor as an antenna. The receiving cross-section, σ p , of an antenna is given
by [7]:
λ2 λ2
σp = ⋅ G(q ,φ ) ⋅ p ⋅ q = ⋅ D(q ,φ ) ⋅ η ⋅ p ⋅ q (D.2)
4p 4p
where (see Equation (D.1) above) λ is the wavelength, G is the antenna gain and D(θ ,φ ) is
the directivity, and where θ and φ
denote the angle of incidence of the plane wave. The
parameter η denotes the antenna radiation efficiency, i.e. it represents the losses of the
antenna ( η = 1 for the lossless case), p is the polarization-matching factor, and q is the
impedance-mismatch factor. In the present case, since the “antenna” consists of a shielded
structure with a field sensor mounted inside, the “antenna” has a very low efficiency. In other
words, the losses, represented by the parameter η , are very high, i.e. η « 1.
In a reverberation chamber, the scalar power density, S sc , is defined by [8]:
2
ET
8π
S sc = = ⋅ Pr (D.3)
Z0 λ2

where E T is the total electric field strength, Z 0 is the free space wave impedance and Pr is
the power received by an (lossless and impedance-matched) antenna in a reverberation
chamber. The brackets indicate the average taken over all (statistically independent) stirrer
positions used in the test.
In a measurement of shielding effectiveness made in a reverberation chamber the average

power received by a sensor located inside the EUT, Pr, sensor,RC − test , is given by (see the
discussion below Equation (D.1) above):
λ2
Pr, sensor,RC − test = ⋅ η ⋅ q ⋅ S sc (D.4)
8π
In a corresponding measurement of SE in an anechoic chamber, i.e. using the same sensor at

the same location inside the EUT, we get:
λ2
Pr, sensor, AC − test = ⋅ D(q ,φ ) ⋅ p ⋅ η ⋅ q ⋅ S AC (D.5)
4p
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 53 –
where S AC = Einc 2 Z 0 is the power density of the incident plane wave, with the field
strength Einc .
If we equate the power densities in the two facilities, i.e. S sc = S AC , we get:
Pr, sensor, AC − test

= 2 D(θ ,ϕ ) ⋅ p (D.6)
Pr, sensor,RC − test
The received power can thus differ up to 2Dmax between the two environments, assuming that
the power density in the anechoic chamber is equal to the scalar power density in the
reverberation chamber. Dmax denotes the maximum directivity taken over all angles of
incidence.
Usually, shielding effectiveness is expressed as the ratio between field strength (electric or
magnetic) or of the power densities, outside and inside the EUT. In a reverberation chamber
test this can be achieved by defining an equivalent scalar power density inside the EUT in
analogy with the definition in Equation (D.3) above (see [9]). The term equivalent indicates
that the field conditions inside the EUT do not necessarily fulfil the requirements for the field
statistics in a reverberation chamber. The introduction of an equivalent scalar power density
results in a shielding effectiveness equal to:
Pr
SERC = (D.7)
Pr,sensor,RC−test
Equation (D.7) represents a simple and fruitful way to define shielding effectiveness in a
reverberation chamber (see [25]). By using the power received by the sensor (compensated
for antenna efficiency and impedance mismatch) one does not explicitly have to derive a
value of an internal field strength, which might turn out to be very difficult for narrow and
complex environments. Also, it seems reasonable that the power received by a sensor is
representative for the power that would be picked up by an internal cable or wire. It shall also

be noted that any antenna used for the calibration of the field external to the EUT gives the
same value of Pr (assuming that compensation has been made for differences in impedance
mismatch and antenna efficiency). Thus, a measurement of SE will not depend on the type of
antenna that is used for the calibration of the chamber.
For a measurement in an anechoic chamber the definition of SE is not applicable since a

measurement of the power received in the calibration antenna depends on the gain of the
antenna. Therefore, it is evidently a more natural choice to use the power density (or the
electric or magnetic field strength) to characterize the field external to the EUT. If we use
Equation (D.3) to define an equivalent scalar power density inside the EUT we get:
S AC S AC ⋅ λ
SE AC = = (D.8)
S sc, eq Pr, sensor, AC − test ⋅ 8π
Combining Equations (D.3), (D.7) and (D.8) and assuming S sc = S AC , we get for the relation
between SEs measured in the two chambers the following:
SERC Pr, sensor, AC − test

= = 2 D(θ ,φ ) ⋅ p (D.9)
SE AC Pr, sensor,RC − test
– 54 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
i.e. the same relation as given by Equation (D.6).
An alternative way, in both these environments, to avoid the difficulties associated with the
concept of shielding effectiveness, for example the problem to determine field strengths or
use an equivalent scalar power density in complex and narrow compartments, is to use the
receiving cross-section of the sensor mounted inside the EUT, i.e.:
Pr, sensor,RC − test

s p,RC = (D.10)
S sc
Pr, sensor, AC − test

s p, AC = (D.11)
S AC
Again, compensation shall be made for the non-ideal properties of the sensor. An advantage
of using the receiving cross-section instead of the shielding effectiveness is that the results of
a measurement in a direct way can be related to the susceptibility of components inside the
EUT that are, in one sense or the other, considered to be critical, see [10].
The relation between the cross-section measured in the reverberation chamber and that
measured in the anechoic chamber is the same as the one given in Equations (D.6) and (D.9)
above. This means that the average of the receiving cross-section taken over all angles of
incidence and the polarizations for a measurement in an anechoic chamber is equal to the
cross-section measured in a reverberation chamber. This has been supported by
measurement on several real and complex objects (see [11] and references in Clause D.5).
These measurements have also shown a maximum directivity of the order of 10 dB to 15 dB.
Useful estimates of the maximum directivity, based on the spherical wave theory and
assuming that the spherical mode coefficients are independent random variables, can be
found in [12], [21].
The dominant factor in the uncertainty related to a shielding effectiveness measurement is the
number of stirrer positions used. The confidence interval in dB is given by [13]:

1+ k
d [dB] = 10 ⋅ log10
zn
(D.12)
1− k zn
where k determines the confidence level ( k = 1,96 for 95 %), z is the number of dimensions of
the field data (1 or 3), and n is the number of independent stirrer positions. Assuming that the
power picked up by the field probe and by the cables follows a chi-squared distribution with
two degrees of freedom, it holds that z = 1 (see the discussion below on the choice between
using the total electric field or a rectangular component of the electric field).
If Equation (D.12) is solved for n , we get:
2
 d 
 2 10 
k  10 +1
n= (D.13)
z  d 
 10 10 − 1 
 
For example, if d = 2 dB and the desired confidence level is 95% ( k = 1,96 ) we get that
n = 75 . Thus 75 stirrer positions yield a confidence interval equal to 2 dB, i.e. an uncertainty
of roughly ±1 dB (the confidence interval is not entirely symmetric). For n = 100 we get an
uncertainty of roughly ±0,9 dB.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 55 –
D.3 Relation between immunity testing in the two environments
In immunity testing in a reverberation chamber the electric field test level is expressed in
terms of the maximum electric field, with respect to the (assumed statistical independent)
stirrer position used in the test. Depending on the exact definition of the test level, the relation
between a test in a reverberation and an anechoic chamber becomes more complicated than
what was shown above for the average-based measurements of shielding effectiveness. This
becomes clear when studying the expressions in [6] for the maximum of the total field,
E T,Max and the maximum of a rectangular component of the field, ER,Max . Since the relation
between those two parameters depends on the number of stirrer positions there is no simple
way to derive the value of one of these from the value of the other.
A “generalization” of the scalar power density (see Equation (D.3) above), i.e.
2
S sc,Max = 8π λ ⋅ Pr,Max would give the same relation between the two environments as for the
measurements of the shielding effectiveness and receiving cross-section shown above.
However this would lead to a kind of ad-hoc definition of the maximum scalar power density
2
leading to the relation S sc = 3 ⋅ ER,Max (see [14]).
For different reasons the choice of the electric field test level in a reverberation chamber has
been to use either the maximum of the total field, E T,Max , or the maximum of a rectangular
component of the field, ER,Max . Different choices have been made in different standards. In
the DO-160F [15] standard for civil aircraft the former has been chosen while the latter has
been chosen for the IEC 61000-4-21 [16] standard and for MIL-Std-461 [17]. An argument for
choosing ER,Max is that the power absorbed by an antenna in a reverberation chamber
follows the same statistical function (a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom)
2
as the magnitude of the square of a rectangular component of the electric field, i.e. ER,Max ,
and that the same holds for the power delivered to the load, for example an electronic
component, connected to a wire or a cable inside an EUT. This is of course not surprising
since the wires and cables picking up the energy are expected to behave as antennas [18],
[19]. The total electric field, on the other hand, may be of interest for example in direct

heating of the bulk of a component (see the discussion in [6]).
As was indicated above the relations between the maximum responses in the two
environments become somewhat complicated when E T,Max or ER,Max are chosen as the test
field strength. In both cases the relations, which in the case of determination of the shielding
effectiveness equal 2 ⋅ DMax , will now depend on the number of stirrer positions. The relations,
which can be found in [20], show that the expected ratio between the maximum responses in
the anechoic and reverberation chambers, respectively, varies for different choices of the
number of stirrer positions, N :
If E T,Max is used to define the test field strength it follows that:
Pr, AC,Max
= 2 ⋅ DMax , for N = 1
Pr,RC,MAx
Pr, AC,Max
= 1,3 ⋅ DMax , for N = 20, and
Pr,RC,Max
Pr, AC,Max
= 1,1 ⋅ DMax , for N = 200
Pr,RC,Max
– 56 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
If ER,Max is used to define the test field strength (see the discussion in connection to
Equation (D.8) in [14]), it follows that:
Pr,AC,Max 2
≈ ⋅ DMax , for all choices of N .
Pr,RC,Max 3
Obviously, the strong dependency of N when choosing E T,Max as the test field strength may
pose problems since the relation between the two environments becomes quite intricate, while
this difficulty essentially does not hold for ER,Max .
As noted above estimates of the maximum directivity, DMax , based on the spherical wave
theory can be found in [12], [21].
The relations above point out the risk for under-testing in a reverberation chamber, compared
to a test in an anechoic chamber. However, apart from in-band radiated-susceptibility testing
of antenna systems, it should be noted that the maximum stress level in the anechoic
chamber is in practice never attained. The reason is that it would either require knowledge
beforehand of the worst angle of incidence and polarization, or that a huge number of aspect
angles and polarizations have to be used in the test [11]. In [23] a comparison was made,
using measurements of coupling from an external field to an internal probe depicting a critical
component, between a typical anechoic-chamber test – using four aspect angles and two
polarizations – and a reverberation-chamber test using 12 stirrer positions. The result was
expressed in terms of an error bias for each test chamber, defined as the ratio of the
measured maximum response to the true maximum plane-wave response. It was shown that if
the field strength in the anechoic chamber was equated to the maximum of a rectangular
component in the reverberation chamber, the expected error biases became similar in the two
chambers. Thus, in this case, the under-testing in each of the two chambers, with respect to
the ideal worst-case plane wave test, was the same.
If a worst case test really is required, for example for safety-critical equipment, it might be
better to make the test in a reverberation chamber including a margin corresponding to the
relation given above, than to spend the extensive time needed to find the worst angle of

incidence and polarization in an anechoic chamber. Alternatively, one can make use of the
fact that the statistical distribution for the power received by a critical component inside an
EUT is the same when varying the angle of incidence and polarization in an anechoic
chamber as when the stirrer is rotated in a reverberation chamber, see [26]. By equating the
average stress in the two environments and by making an appropriate choice of the number of
independent stirrer positions, the maximum stress induced in the reverberation chamber test
will be the same as the maximum stress that possibly can be achieved in an anechoic
chamber test.
In the aforementioned standards, E T,Max and ER,Max are determined by use of a calibration
procedure (see [15], [16], [17]). The field strengths can also be estimated from a
measurement of the average (see [15]), or maximum (see [16], [17]) power measured by a
receive antenna.
The uncertainty of an immunity test is not described by the same statistics as the one for an
average measurement of for example shielding effectiveness. The test field strength is
defined by the maximum field, with respect to a given number of independent stirrer positions,
measured by a reference antenna. The measured value is assumed to be the maximum field
seen by the EUT (however probably not at the same stirrer position). An investigation made
on the uncertainty in immunity testing, based on the power received by the reference antenna,
is presented in [18]. Figure 8 in [18] shows that the uncertainty in the maximum power
stressing of the EUT, with respect to the maximum power measured by the reference antenna,
Pr,Max , at a confidence level of 95 % is approximately ± 3 dB for N = 100 (as for the average
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 57 –
case above, the probability density function is not symmetric). The result can also be stated
(see [18]) that one, for N = 100 , has to subtract a security margin of 2,3 dB from the power
measured by the reference antenna to assure that the stress on the EUT, within 95 %
confidence, is equal to or larger than what is given by the reference value.
D.4 Additional aspects
The following additional aspects should be considered:
• If the EUT is to be located in an electromagnetic environment similar to that of a

reverberation chamber, for example a large avionics bay, the problem of relating free field
conditions to those in a reverberation chamber does have to be considered.
• The discussion above relates to the stress picked up by a critical component inside the
EUT. Things become more complicated if there are several critical components and if the
interference of a system is determined by a simultaneous malfunction of several critical
components. The latter may be the case if the EUT employs for example triple modular
redundancy (TMR) to reduce the risk of failure for critical functions.
• The term statistical isotropy is often used to point out that true isotropic conditions are
only achieved in a statistical sense, for example if one in an average measurement uses a
large, or infinite number of independent stirrer positions or independent spatial positions.
In practice, however, it seems that, from a practical viewpoint, a sufficient isotropy is
achieved also at one and the same stirrer position. This would imply that the assumption
of isotropic conditions is in practice valid not only for average type measurements, for
example for a measurements of shielding effectiveness, but also at radiated susceptibility
testing (see [18]).
• If the EUT is subjected to pulse modulated waveforms, which is usually the case in
susceptibility testing at microwave frequencies, it is necessary that the time constant of
the chamber is shorter than the pulse length of the modulated waveform. To achieve that,
the Q value of the chamber may have to be decreased, which means that the test field
strength will be reduced for a given level of input power. A criterion used in several
standards is that the chamber time constant shall not be greater than 0,4 times the pulse
length.
• As shown above the test field strength depends on the number of independent stirrer

positions. In practice this statistical independence is evaluated by checking that the stirrer
positions are uncorrelated (see [16] and the discussion in [22]).
D.5 References
[1] J. L. Bean and R. A. Hall, “Electromagnetic Susceptibility Measurements Using a

Mode-stirred Chamber,” in Proceedings of 1978 IEEE International symposium on
Electromagnetic Compatibility, Atlanta, USA, pp. 143-150.
[2] Corona, “Electromagnetic Reverberating Enclosures: Behaviour and Applications,” Alta

Frequenza, XLIX, 2, pp. 154-158.
[3] D. A. Hill, “Plane Wave Integral Representation for Fields in Reverberation Chambers,”
IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC-40, 3, pp. 209-216.
[4] D. A. Hill, “Electromagnetic Theory of Reverberation Chambers,” NIST Technical Note

1506, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Boulder, Colorado 80303-3328,
USA.
[5] L. K. Warne and K. S. H. Lee [2001], “Some Remarks on Antenna Response in a

Reverberation Chamber,” IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC-
43, 2, pp. 239-240.
– 58 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
[6] J. M. Ladbury and G. H. Koepke, “Reverberation Chamber Relationships: Corrections

and Improvements or Three Wrongs Can (almost) Make a Right,” in Proceedings of the
1999 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Seattle, USA,
pp. 1-6.
[7] Antenna Handbook, Vol. 2 Antenna Theory, Ed. by Y T Lo and S W Lee, Van Nostrand
Reinhold, New York, 1993, pp.6-6 to 6-8.
[8] D. A. Hill, “Plane Wave Integral Representation for Fields in Reverberation Chambers,”
IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 40, No. 3, August 1998, pp.
209-216.
[9] M Bäckström, J Lorén, O Lundén, L Jansson, "Directional Properties of Microwave

Coupling for Apertures and Shielded Equipment Measured in Mode-Stirred and
Anechoic Chambers", 97 Mode-Stirred Chamber, and OATS Users Meeting &
Measurement Uncertainty Tutorial, April 28 – May 2, 1997, Vail, Colorado, USA
[10] Bäckström M. and Lövstrand K. G., ” Susceptibility of Electronic Systems to High-

Power Microwaves: Summary of Test Experiences”, IEEE Transactions on
Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 46, No. 3, August 2004, pp. 396 – 403.
[11] M. Bäckström, J. Lorén, G. Eriksson, and H-J Åsander, “Microwave Coupling into a
Generic Object. Properties of Measured angular Receiving Pattern and its Significance
for Testing”, in Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE International Symposium on
Electromagnetic Compatibility, Montreal, Canada.
[12] Wilson P. F., Hill D. A., Holloway C. L., “On Determining the Maximum Emission From
Electrically Large Sources”, IEEE Transactions on EMC, Vol. 44, No. 1, February
2002.
[13] Kostas J. and Boverie B:, “Statistical model for a Mode-Stirred Chamber”, IEEE
Transactions on EMC, Vol. 33, No. 4, November 1991.
[14] O. Lundén and M. Bäckström, “Pulsed Power 3 GHz feasibility study for a XYm3 Mode

Stirred Reverberation Chamber”, 2007 IEEE International Symposium on EMC, Hawaii,
USA, July 8-13 2007.
[15] RTCA/DO-160F, Section 20, “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for
Airborne Equipment. Radio Frequency Susceptibility (Radiated and Conducted)”,
RTCA, Inc., 1828 L Street, NW Suite 805, Washington, DC 20036, USA, December 6,
2007. http://www.rtca.org/onlinecart/.
[16] IEC 61000-4-21, “Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). Part 4-21: Testing and
measurement techniques – Reverberation chamber test methods”, International
Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva, Switzerland. www.iec.ch.
[17] MIL-STD-461F, “Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference

Characteristic of Subsystems and Equipment”, Department of Defense Interface
Standard (USA), 10 December 2007. http://www.pdfqueen.com/mil-std-331-mil-
std461f.
[18] M. Höijer, “Maximum Power Available to Stress Onto the Critical Component in the
Equipment Under test When Performing a Radiated Susceptibility Test in the
Reverberation Chamber”, IEEE Transactions on EMC, Vol. 48, No. 2, May 2006.
[19] D. A. Hill, M. T. Ma, A. R. Ondrejka, B. F. Riddle, M. L. Crawford, and R. T. Johnk,

“Aperture Excitation of Electrically Large, Lossy Cavities,” IEEE Transactions on
Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC-36, 3, pp. 169-178.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 59 –
[20] M. Bäckström, J. Lorén, “Microwave Coupling into a Generic Object. Properties of

Angular Receiving Pattern and its Significance for Testing in Anechoic and
Reverberation Chambers”, FOI Scientific Report, FOI-R—0392—SE, February 2002.
Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI, Sensor Technology, P.O. Box 1165, SE-581
11 Linköping, Sweden.
[21] H. G. Krauthäuser, “Statistical Analysis of the Correlation of Emission Limits for

Established and Alternative Test Sites”, IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic
Compatibility,
[22] N. Wellander, O. Lundén, and M. Bäckström, “The maximum value distribution in a

reverberation chamber,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. EMC, Montreal, Canada, Aug. 13–17,
2001, pp. 751–756.
[23] G. J. Freyer, M. Bäckström, “Impact of Equipment Response Characteristics on

Anechoic and Reverberation Chamber Test Results”, in Proceedings of EMC Europe
2002 International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility”, Sorrento, Italy,
September 9 –13, 2002.
[24] Rosengren, K., Kildal, P-S, ”Study of Distributions of Modes and Plane Waves in
Reverberation Chambers for the Characterization of Antennas in a Multipath
Environment”, Microwave and Optical Technology Letters, Vol. 30, No. 6, September
20, 2001.
[25] C.L. Holloway, et al., ”Use of Reverberation Chambers to Determine the Shielding
Effectiveness of Physically Small, Electrically Large Enclosures and Cavities”, IEEE
Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 50, No. 4, November 2008, pp.
770-782.
[26] M. Höijer, “Including Directivity in Reverberation Chamber Radiated Susceptibility

Testing”, IEEE Transaction on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 53, No. 2, May
2011, pp. 283-287.

– 60 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Annex E
(informative)
Complex waveform injection – Test method
E.1 General
High-power electromagnetic (HPEM) environments, including high-altitude electromagnetic

pulse (HEMP) environments, interact with systems causing currents to be induced. The
frequency content and magnitude of this current is primarily a function of the geometry of the
system and the impedance of the system conductors. Traditional methods assess the impact
of these induced currents at equipment level with testing, using methods such as DCS05 and
DCS08 defined in Defence Standard 59-411 [1] or the Mil-Std-461 [2] equivalent (CS116).
These test methods use the injection of single frequency damped sinusoidal waveforms at
various frequencies ‘in-band’ to the threat environment. Alternatively, assessment is
conducted at the system level using simulators to approximate the threat environment. The
latter option is expensive with considerable time and funds being spent on planning,
conducting and supporting a large-scale system test.
Equipment level testing is intended to reduce the risk of system level issues but at the present
time does not consider the synergistic nature of the induced current caused by the
illuminating threat environment. The synergistic nature of the induced current in this context
refers to the fact that the actual induced currents from actual transient environments will be
complex, consisting of many different frequencies. The determination of equipment level limits
is based on historical information and one particular issue is that of the upper frequency limit.
In the UK defence standard this upper limit is 50 MHz whereas the US military standard uses
100 MHz. Newer systems are adopting shielded cabling to assist in mitigating the risk when
exposed to HPEM environments. These shielded cables are typically de-coupled at bay or
compartment interfaces and can result in significant coupled content at frequencies greater
than the present upper limit. The traditional methods rely on the defined test amplitudes,
frequencies and bounds on the energy (damping factor, Q), which do not consider the
synergistic nature of the transient excitation.
Given the constraints with respect to high-power transient simulators discussed above,

alternative options are being sought that rely on the injection of waveforms that approximate
the induced transient.
Annex E discusses a novel method for the prediction, construction and injection of complex
transients that occur as a result of the exposure of a system or equipment to HPEM and
HEMP environments.
E.2 Prediction
E.2.1 General
Cable bundle transfer functions can be measured using the low level swept current (LLSC)
technique. This technique was developed in the 1980s by those seeking to remove the need
for high-power illumination of aircraft during the process of providing aircraft clearance
evidence against high-intensity radiated field (HIRF) environments [3]. LLSC involves
illuminating a system with a uniform low power, swept frequency, electromagnetic field. The
system under test is illuminated from four orientations in turn and completed for two
polarizations of the transmit antenna. The technique is generally conducted between 500 kHz
and 400 MHz and measurements are split into three bands to maximise transmit antenna
efficiency and to ensure sufficient resolution in the final transfer function. The technique can
be used up to 1 GHz but the validity of the transfer function at these higher frequencies is
dependent on the length of the cable bundle being measured, and the position of the current
probe on the bundle affects the final result. For frequencies above 200 MHz (to allow an
overlap between the cable and aperture coupling regimes) the transfer function of the platform
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 61 –
shielding is measured with the low level swept field (LLSF) technique as it has been observed
that aperture coupling is the main driver for equipment susceptibilities at these frequencies.
Transfer functions obtained using the LLSC method are the focus of Annex E.
The first stage of LLSC is to measure the incident (reference) field. The second stage is to
measure the induced current in the cable bundle of interest whilst the reference field is
illuminating the system. The final stage involves the processing of the measurements such
that a transfer function is generated. The LLSC technique results in 24 data files for each
cable bundle (three bands, two polarizations, and four orientations) all of which have been
normalized to the measured reference field.
Initially, the data is frequency tied to repackage the dataset into 8 files (two polarizations and
four orientations). In some cases, the processing stops here, resulting in polarization and
orientation dependent transfer functions for each cable bundle measured. However, for the
case of frequency domain HIRF testing, a generic transfer function is calculated which is the
highest measured coupling for any frequency; these transfer functions are polarization and
orientation independent. Generic transfer functions introduce an inherent safety-margin into
the resulting equipment susceptibility assessment. This susceptibility assessment, known as
bulk current injection (BCI) is not addressed in Annex E. Polarization dependent but
orientation independent transfer functions can also be obtained if required.
The resulting transfer function is expressed in terms of current per incident field (dBµA/(V/m)).
A typical LLSC reference field measurement set-up is shown in Figure E.1 and an induced
current set-up is shown in Figure E.2.
IEC
Figure E.1 – LLSC reference field measurement set-up

– 62 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
IEC
Figure E.2 – LLSC induced current measurement set-up
Each antenna is connected to the instrumentation (spectrum analyser, tracking source and
amplifier) in turn such that the EUT can be illuminated from four consecutive orientations.
The induced current is monitored by the spectrum analyser via a fibre optic link (FOL) to
ensure electrical isolation.
A typical LLSC transfer function is shown in Figure E.3.

Typical transfer function
80
(dB(µA)/V/m)
70
60
50
Normalised induced current
40
30
20
10
0
1 × 10 5 1 × 10 6 1 × 10 7 1 × 10 8 1 × 10 9
Frequency (Hz)
IEC
Figure E.3 – Typical LLSC magnitude-only transfer function
The measured transfer function can be used to predict an induced current as a result of an
incident HPEM environment. In the case of frequency domain HPEM environments, the
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 63 –
transfer function can simply be extrapolated to the frequency domain environment as it is

expressed in terms of induced current normalised to the incident electric field across the
relevant frequency range. However, for time domain HPEM environments, the prediction is
complicated by the lack of phase information and convolution is required instead of simple
extrapolation. Phase is not measured during the LLSC technique due to difficulties concerning
the accuracy of phase measurements at frequencies above the dominant frequency, the effect
of current probe location on the cable bundle being measured and the time burden required to
carry out phase measurements. The lack of phase information is mitigated by the use of the
minimum phase algorithm (MPA). This algorithm generates phase for the measured transfer
function by imposing minimum phase constraints with a Hilbert Transform (Equation (E.1)):
ln H ( jω )
∞
ω
φ ( jω 0 ) = ∫ dω (E.1)
2π ω 02 − ω 2
−∞
where |H(jω)| is the magnitude component and φ(jω) is the phase component of the same
transfer function.
The constraints are that the resulting prediction is stable, causal and has a stable inverse
[4] 9. Although the minimum phase response will not be the true response of the system [5], it
provides an order of magnitude response based on the total energy content of the incident
wave being concentrated towards t = 0. However, specific information such as the peak
value, its location and maximum rise time may not be adequately predicted.
Figure E.4 gives a flow chart of the prediction process.
IEC
Figure E.4 – Prediction of induced current using minimum phase constraints
The first stage of the prediction process is to generate the phase to be associated with the
measured magnitude-only LLSC transfer function resulting in a complex transfer function,
f c (ω) + Φ c . In parallel to this, the HPEM environment or threat, f t (t), is converted into a
complex function via the Fourier Transform (FT), f t (ω) + Φ t . At this stage a complex function
(magnitude and phase) exists for both the measured transfer function and the incident threat.
___________
9 Numbers in square brackets refer to the references in Clause E.6.
– 64 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
An Inverse Fourier Transform (IFT) is performed on the convolution output resulting in the
cable bundle response, f ct (t).
The process can be repeated with all measured transfer functions and can be used with any
HPEM environment including ultra wideband (UWB), high-power microwave (HPM), damped
sinusoid (DS) and electromagnetic pulse waveforms such as nuclear EMP (NEMP), HEMP or
lightning EMP (LEMP), as long as the main frequency content of the threat environment falls
within the frequency range of the transfer function data.
E.2.2 Example
The magnitude-only transfer function shown in Figure E.3 has, after deriving the phase by use
of the minimum phase algorithm, been convolved with the IEC 61000-2-9 [6] early-time EMP
waveform shown in Figure E.5. The transfer function and the frequency domain EMP
waveform are overlaid in the frequency domain in Figure E.6. Finally, the predicted current is
shown in Figure E.7.
Exo-atmospheric EMP from IEC 61000-2-9

60 000
50 000
40 000
(V/m)
30 000
E-Field
20 000
10 000

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Time (ns)
IEC
Figure E.5 – IEC 61000-2-9 early-time (E1) HEMP environment

IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 65 –
SELECT MAX FREQUENCY. Threat (red) and transfer functions (green)

10 −2
10 −3
10 −4
10 −5
10 5 10 6 10 7 10 8 10 9
Frequency (Hz)
IEC
Figure E.6 – Overlay of transfer function and threat (frequency domain)
Predicted induced current

2
1,5
1
(A)
0,5

Amplitude
−0,5
−1
−1,5
−2
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1 000
Time (ns)
IEC
Figure E.7 – Predicted current
As part of the prediction process, the waveform norms of interest are calculated. The norms
used, their mathematical definition and their physical description are given in Table E.1.
– 66 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Table E.1 – Time waveform norms
Name Type Definition Effect

Peak Amplitude f (t ) max Circuit upset
Peak derivative Variation Component arcing; circuit upset

df (t )
dt max
Peak impulse Content t Dielectric puncture
∫ f (t )dt
0 max
Rectified impulse Content ∞ Equipment damage
∫ f (t ) dt
0
Root action integral Content ∞ Component burnout

2
∫ f (t ) dt
0
The waveform norms are used to uniquely characterise a transient and are used during the
assessment of an injected waveform during the final analysis stage of this method.
E.3 Construction
In order to understand the contributions from each of the frequencies in the complex transient
it is necessary to de-convolve it into its constituent damped sinusoid components such that
the frequency, amplitude, relative phase and decay factors can be obtained. The de-
composition algorithm used for this process is based upon a variation of the MPA that results
in non-minimum phase predictions [7]. The Stieglitz-McBride algorithm [8] is used to fit poles
and zeros to the complex transient. A partial fraction expansion is then used to extract the
relevant parameters. The algorithm used to conduct the de-convolution allows the user to

select the number of damped sinusoids to resolve (order of fit).
Typically, complex transients can be well approximated with the use of 4 to 6 damped
sinusoidal components. The level of agreement between the approximation and the predicted
transient is determined through an initial visual inspection followed by a mathematical
analysis, which calculates the standard deviation error and the maximum error as a
percentage of the peak.
Figure E.8 shows the result of de-convolving a complex transient into 10 damped sinusoids.
The graph in the top-left corner shows each of the damped sinusoidal components with their
respective parameters given in the table in the top-right. The graph at the bottom-left of
Figure E.8 gives an overlay of the approximation and the complex transient, and the graph in
the bottom-right shows the pole-zero plot of the approximation.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 67 –
IEC
Figure E.8 – Example of de-convolution result
Figure E.9 shows the 10 individual damped sinusoidal components and Figure E.10 shows an
overlay of the approximated and predicted transient.
Damped sinusoidal waveforms – 10-component fit

25
20

15
10
Component 1
Component 2
5
(A)
Component 3
Component 4
0
Amplitude
Component 5
Component 6
−5 Component 7
Component 8
−10 Component 9
Component 10
−15
−20
−25
0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200 1 400 1 600 1 800 2 000
Time (ns)
IEC
Figure E.9 – Damped sinusoidal waveforms – Ten-component fit

– 68 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Approximated and predicted transient

15
10
5
(A)
10 component fit
Amplitude
0
Prediction
−5
−10
−15
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1 000
Time (ns)
IEC
Figure E.10 – Approximated and predicted transient
Figure E.11 shows the same overlay but expanded over the 0 ns to 100 ns range to more
closely illustrate the degree of correlation between the approximation and the prediction.
Approximated and predicted transient (0 ns to 100 ns)

15
10

5
(A)
10 component fit
Amplitude
0 Prediction
−5
−10
−15
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time (ns)
IEC
Figure E.11 – Approximated and predicted transient (0 ns to 100 ns)
Figure E.12 shows the comparison in the frequency domain.

IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 69 –
Frequency domain comparison

1 000
100
(nA/Hz)
10
10 component fit
Prediction
Magnitude
0,1
0,01
1 10 100 1 000
Frequency (MHz)
IEC
Figure E.12 – Approximation and prediction transient – Frequency domain comparison
As can be seen, the approximation is an excellent representation of the predicted transient.
Each individual damped sinusoid is expressed as a function of amplitude (A), time (t),
frequency (f) and phase ( φ ) as shown in Equation (E.2).
Ae ( −αt ) cos( 2πφt ) +φ (E.2)
πf

where Q= .
α
The waveform approximation is the sum of each component with the phase parameter
representing the relative phase between each component as shown in Equation (E.3).
A1e( −α1t ) cos( 2πf 1t ) +f1 + A2 e ( −α 2 t ) cos( 2πf 2 t ) +f2 + ... + An e( −α n t ) cos( 2πf n t ) +fn (E.3)
The summation of each component and therefore the approximation is thus given
mathematically by Equation (E.4).
∑A e
n
n
( −α n t ) cos( 2πf n t ) + f n
(E.4)
Figure E.13 shows the relationship between increasing the number of damped sinusoids and
the associated error of fit between the approximation and the prediction.
– 70 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Variation in error for increasing number of damped sinusoids

90 8
80 7
70
6
60
5
(%)
(%)
50
Max error
4
Max error
SD error
SD error
40
3
30
2
20
10 1
0 0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Number of damped sinusoids
IEC
Figure E.13 – Variation in error for increasing number of damped sinusoids
As the number of damped sinusoidal components is increased, the error decreases. After
approximately 6 components are fitted, the reduction in error decreases significantly with the
addition of each further component. As the number of damped sinusoids is increased the
energy content of each additional component is decreasing, resulting in diminishing marginal
improvements in the accuracy of the approximation.
E.4 Injection
In order to assess the response of equipment to the predicted transient, it is necessary to

construct and inject the complex transient. Once the parameters of the approximating
waveform are derived using the method explained in Clause E.3, an equation of the form of
Equation (E.4) is programmed into a waveform synthesiser (arbitrary waveform generator).
The output from the waveform synthesiser is passed through an amplifier and injected into a
cable bundle using a suitable injection probe. A broadband matching transformer can be used
between the amplifier output and the injection probe to improve the impedance match and
maximise the injected current. This process is shown schematically in Figure E.14.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 71 –
IEC
Figure E.14 – Complex injection set-up
Figure E.15 shows the results of simple calculations to estimate the amplifier power
requirements needed to drive various current levels into a conductor for different impedances,
assuming a broadband matching transformer is used to match the injection probe input
impedance to the amplifier output impedance.
Peak-to-peak injected current

10 000
100 W
(A)
1 000
500 W
Peak-to-peak current
100 1 kW
10 1,2 kW
2,5 kW
1
10 kW

0,1
1 10 100 1 000 100 kW
Cable impedance (Ω) 1 MW

IEC
Figure E.15 – Amplifier requirements for various current levels
To achieve useful current levels (10 A to 100 A) a pulsed amplifier in excess of 10 kW is

required. For example, Figure E.15 shows that the injection of current levels in the range 10
A to 100 A into a cable of 100 Ω loop impedance typically requires a 10 kW amplifier.
Considerably more power would be required for situations where there is a poor match
between the amplifier and its load.
One final analysis is required to assess the agreement between the predicted and injected
transient as applied to a real system. An example is given in Figure E.16.
– 72 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
(dB(A)/Hz)
Frequency domain
0
-20
-40
Normalised amplitude
-60
-80
-100
-120
-140
10 4 10 5 10 6 10 7 10 8 10 9 10 10
TRFF – BA01
6
4
Amplitude
2
0
−2
−4
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 2
Time (µs)
IEC
Figure E.16 – Comparison of predicted (green) and injected (red) current
As can be seen from Figure E.16, the complex injected waveform as measured on the real
platform differs slightly from the prediction. The most dominant factor affecting this variation is
that the complex injected transient is injected on top of any power or data signal that the
cable is already carrying. Thus, the monitor current probe will record the superposition of the
injected signal and the normal operational signal.
E.5 Summary
Access and cost issues limit the availability of full threat transient simulators, and

standardised damped sinusoidal waveforms are somewhat limited in their ability to reproduce
realistic waveforms. The derivation and prediction of complex damped sinusoidal transients
can be achieved and calculated where the system transfer function data is available.
A credible alternative method to the traditional approach of assessing the response of

equipment to induced current as a result of an HPEM or HEMP environment has been
presented and discussed. The new method exploits the synergistic nature of complex
transients by virtue of the fact that they excite several frequencies simultaneously.
The norms of each prediction can be compared against the norms of each injected waveform
to determine the level of HPEM or HEMP clearance that can be assigned.
E.6 References
[1] Defence Standard 59-411, Electromagnetic Compatibility, Incorporating Amendment 1,

31 January 2008
[2] MIL-STD-461F, Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference

Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment, 10 December 2007
[3] N. J. Carter, “The Revision of EMC Specifications for Military Aircraft Equipment,” PhD
Thesis, 1985, University of Surrey, England
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 73 –
[4] A. V. Oppenheim and R. W. Schafer, “Discrete Time Signal Processing”, 1989

Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA.
[5] F. M. Tesche, “On the Use of the Hilbert Transform for Processing Measured CW
Data”, IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 34, No. 3, August
1992
[6] Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 2: Environment – Section 9: Description of

HEMP environment – Radiated disturbance. Basic EMC publication, IEC 61000-2-9 Ed
1.0
[7] A. Wraight, “Improvements in Electromagnetic Assessment Methodologies: Bounding

the Errors in Prediction”, PhD Thesis, January 2007, Cranfield University
[8] K. Stieglitz and L. E. McBride, “A Technique for the Identification of Linear Systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. 10, No. 4, October 1965, pp. 461-464

– 74 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Annex F
(informative)
Significance of test methodology margins
F.1 General
Understanding how a system responds to High-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) or

high-power electromagnetic environments (HPEM) typically requires testing of some variety.
The test methods used will depend on a number of factors including the different operating
configurations and functions of the system and the IEMI environment of interest. All test
methods have an inherent uncertainty or error associated with them that can be readily
determined by understanding the uncertainty associated with each item of test equipment,
either through calibration or by referring to the manufacturer’s data, and by combining them
[1] 10. An example of a contributor to measurement uncertainty is the uncertainty in converting
the measured voltage from a current probe to induced current. Typically, individual
contributions to overall measurement uncertainty are between 1 dB and 3 dB.
Test methodology margins are another important element for understanding the overall
uncertainty associated with testing and arise from limitations in test methods. Any type of test
is inevitably a balance of time and cost against the need for evidence. Testing takes time out
of any development programme and is often an unwelcome expense, therefore minimising test
time is generally an overarching requirement.
Examples of contributions to the test methodology margin include [2]:
• Testing a single test object and applying the results to the entire production – modern
quality assurance processes employed on production lines provide a high degree of
confidence that all articles are built to the same design standard. However, this does not
take into account any degradation of EM protection that may occur as a result of use or
over time.
• Configuration/mode of system during test – due to the need to keep testing to a minimum
because of the associated expense, it is common to test a number, but not all, of

representative configurations. Specifically, when testing using radiated fields, general
constraints include a limited number of illumination angles, polarizations and field
distributions with respect to the ”real” environment (hence IEMI ”simulators”).
• Equipment set-up – limitations such as access to cable bundles to connect
probes/sensors, or limited ability to excite all ports simultaneously can generate significant
uncertainty in the overall result.
Annex F includes examples of contributions to the test methodology margins based upon the
limitations above.
F.2 Examples
F.2.1 General
Contributions to the test methodology margin can be either negative or positive, and Clause
F.2 provides some example datasets for both types [2].
___________
10 Numbers in square brackets refer to the references in Clause F.3.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 75 –
F.2.2 Negative contributions
F.2.2.1 Configuration
EMP testing was conducted on two aircrafts with different stores configurations, firstly
”baseline” with no stores or tanks fitted and secondly ”heavy” with a variety of stores and
tanks fitted. Induced currents were measured across 112 test points for both horizontal and
vertical polarizations. All measurements of induced current were normalised to the measured
incident field to provide a direct comparison. Figure F.1 shows the induced current plotted
against each configuration; the data has a range of -16,6 dB to 20,73 dB, a mean of 4,99 dB
and a standard deviation of 6,38 dB.
Comparison of baseline and heavy configurations

10
(A)
Induced current ʻheavyʼ
0,1
0,01
0,01 0,1 1 10
Induced current ʻbaselineʼ (A)
IEC

Figure F.1 – Variation in induced currents as a result of configuration
F.2.2.2 Polarization
Aircraft tests were conducted in two EMP simulators, a horizontally polarized dipole (HPD)
and a vertically polarized dipole (VPD), allowing data to be obtained for both across 208 test
points. In this case, the configuration was the same for all measurements. Figure F.2 shows
the induced current plotted against each polarization; the data has a range of -4,4 dB to
20,96 dB, a mean of 6,46 dB and a standard deviation of 4,1 dB.
– 76 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Comparison of VPD and HPD induced currents

100
10
(A)
VPD induced current
0,1
0,01
0,01 0,1 1 10 100
HPD induced current (A)
IEC
Figure F.2 – Comparison of HPD and VPD induced currents
F.2.2.3 Equipment variability
Transfer functions were measured for 12 test points across 8 aircrafts of a similar type. The
variation in predicted peak current is shown in Figure F.3 with a mean difference of 18,7 dB
and a standard deviation of 6 dB. This is a limited dataset and includes other areas of
uncertainty such as the use of worst-case transfer functions and differences in configuration,
but it is included to demonstrate the variation that can arise across systems that are nominally
‘similar’.
Induced current for the same test point across different aircraft
10

(A)
1
Induced current
0,1
0,01
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Test point
IEC
Figure F.3 – System variability
F.2.2.4 Synergistic effects
The majority of systems contain numerous cable bundles and testing them all simultaneously
is not possible. It is feasible to identify those cable bundles that are associated with a
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 77 –
particular function or sub-system but even then significant numbers of cable bundles are likely
to require testing at the same time. In reality, the IEMI environment will illuminate the system
of interest at the same time such that synergistic excitation of all ports occurs. If single port
injection (excitation) is used as a test method, a test methodology margin can be assigned to
the result to allow for differences between single- and multi-port excitation. Figure F.4 shows
a comparison of the susceptibility threshold for single- and multi-port injection of a piece of
electronics equipment with multiple cable bundles. Each measured frequency point has a
susceptibility range of between -1,5 dB 11 and 6,5 dB; the mean is 3,7 dB with a standard
deviation of 2,4 dB.
110
105
(dBµA)
100
Induced current
95
90
85
80
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Frequency (MHz)
Multi Single
IEC
Figure F.4 – Comparison of single- and multi-port injection

F.2.3 Positive contributions
F.2.3.1 Worst-case (enveloped) transfer functions
Transfer functions are typically measured at 4 illumination positions (orientations) and 2

polarizations, meaning that each cable bundle has 8 transfer functions associated with it.
Worst-case transfer functions are computed by taking the maximum coupling at each
frequency, effectively providing an envelope of all of the transfer functions associated with
one cable bundle. Using a single transfer function as opposed to 8 reduces testing time by a
factor of 8 however, there is an uncertainty associated with this method that should be
considered.
Figure F.5 shows transfer functions from a typical cable bundle and the associated worst-case
envelope (referred to as a ‘generic’).
___________
11 The negative value indicates that less current was required for the single injection case although this only
occurred over a narrow frequency range.
– 78 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Typical transfer functions

80
(dB(µA) per V/m)
70 Generic − all
Generic − horz
60 Generic − vert
Right horz
50
Left horz
Normalisedinduced current
Nose horz
40
Tail horz
30 Right vert
Left vert
20
Nose vert
Tail vert
10
0
1 10 100 1 000
Frequency (MHz) IEC
Figure F.5 – Example transfer functions and worst-case envelope
Data similar to that shown in Figure F.5 has been convolved with a damped sinusoidal IEMI
environment and the resulting predicted currents from each polarization and orientation have
been compared with their associated worst-case prediction (Figure F.6). A total of 496
transfer functions were used and the data has a mean of -9,24 dB and a standard deviation of
4,77 dB.
30 120 %
25 100 %

20 80 %
Frequency
15 60 %
10 40 %
5 20 %
0 0%
−30 −25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0
Bin
IEC
Figure F.6 – Comparison of individual and worst-case transfer function predictions
F.2.3.2 Phase reconstruction methods
Magnitude-only transfer functions require some phase reconstruction method to allow them to
be used for the prediction of induced currents as a result of illumination by an IEMI
environment [3]. A common method used here is that of the ‘minimum phase algorithm’ which
uses a Hilbert Transform to generate phase and results in the energy of the resulting
prediction being concentrated towards t = 0; in many cases this results in an overestimation of
the predicted current [4].
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 79 –
Figure F.7 shows a comparison of predicted induced currents using the minimum phase
algorithm and measurements made using an HPD EMP simulator. The data has a mean of
~7 dB and a standard deviation of ~2,5 dB. This means that, on average, the minimum phase
algorithm results in predicted currents that are, on average, ~7 dB higher than expected in
reality [5].
Difference between measurements and minimum phase predictions - HPD

25
(%)
20
Percentage occurrence
15
10 kV/m
30 kV/m
50 kV/m
10
Minimum phase to measurement (dB)

IEC
Figure F.7 – Comparison between predicted and measured induced currents
F.2.4 Summary
The total uncertainty associated with measurements is complex as there are many
opportunities for ‘uncertainty’ in the process. Some data relevant to the determination of the
test methodology margin to account for limitations in test methods has been given within
Annex F, however, it is important to note that a system-specific assessment should be made
to understand the uncertainty associated with the specific measurement methods applied.

A good understanding of the individual contributions is essential and all identified
uncertainties and margins should be combined through analytical treatment, numerical
analyses or empirical measurements.
F.3 References
[1] The Expression of Uncertainty in EMC Testing, United Kingdom Accreditation Service,
LAB34 Edition 1, August 2002
[2] A. Wraight et al, The Method Uncertainty – Is the Compromise Acceptable? AMEREM,
July 2010
[3] A. Wraight et al, Phase Processing Techniques for the Prediction of Induced Current,
IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, August 2008
[4] F. M. Tesche, On the Use of the Hilbert Transform for Processing Measured CW Data,
IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 34, No. 3, August 1992
[5] A. Wraight, Improving Electromagnetic Assessment Methodologies: Bounding the

Errors in Prediction, University of Cranfield, PhD thesis, January 2007
– 80 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
Annex G
(informative)
Intentional EMI – The issue of jammers
G.1 General
Problems with intentional jamming of global positioning systems (GPS)/global navigation

satellite systems (GNSS) ground-based receivers, mobile phone base stations and handsets,
automobile locking systems, and wireless WIFI/WLAN receivers which may be used for
cameras, alarm systems and other applications are now being widely reported [1], [2] 12.
To a certain extent the problem can be traced back to the fact that it is very easy to find and
buy cheap and easy to use jammers from the Internet. For a price of around 100 Euros one
can buy a man-portable battery-operated or automobile 12-volt powered jammer typically
having a range of some tens of meters. [3]
These kinds of narrowband deliberate jamming sources, tailored to be used against a certain
kind of system like WiFi or GPS, operate at low power levels, of the order of 1 Watt. Some of
the available devices are alleged to cover several bands at once. More powerful and
advanced jamming devices can also be acquired or built.
A powerful HPEM narrowband source will enable the perpetrator to operate at a much larger
distance, and can also be used in situations where the purpose is to, at a close distance,
cause permanent damage to the receiver.
The technologies and modalities described above seem to fit within the broad definition of
IEMI.
G.2 Effects
Studies of permanent damage show that pulse energies typically of the order of μJ,

corresponding to a field strength of the order of 1 kV/m or less, are sufficient to destroy a
receiver [4], [5], [6]. For an experimental SiGe LNA (low noise amplifier) device, damage level
as low as 20 nJ has been reported [6]. Alternatively, a wideband HPEM source, i.e. a
radiation source that transmits pulses having a wide spectral content, can be of interest. The
advantage of wideband jamming is that no information is needed beforehand about the
operating frequency of the victims, and it also means that different types of radio equipment
can be interfered with simultaneously.
Due to their extremely high sensitivity GNSS/GPS receivers are particularly vulnerable to
jamming. The extreme sensitivity of GPS receivers is due to the fact that satellite signals,
because of the limited supply of energy, are very weak. As a rule of thumb, an interference
signal that exceeds the normal signal level of the receiver by 20 dB to 30 dB is sufficient to
block the communication of a GPS receiver. This means that a very modest output power of a
jammer can be enough to block the communication, even from a fairly long distance.
In [8] it is claimed that the Russian GPS jammer Aviaconversija MAKS 1999 has a radius of
action for interference of 45 km. This jammer has an output power of 8 W, is powered by a
12 V battery and has a weight of about 3 kg. From those data one can estimate that a field
strength of the order of only a few tenths of 1 mV/m is sufficient to block a GPS receiver. This
result is consistent with other findings (see [5], [7], [9]). As a comparison, levels of in-band
interference of WLAN have been reported to be around 1 V/m [5].
___________
12 Numbers in square brackets refer to the references in Clause G.6.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 81 –
G.3 Published accounts of jamming
In June 2102, it was reported [10] that jamming of GPS signals by North Korea may have
contributed to the fatal crash of a UAV in South Korea. The small helicopter crashed into its
own ground control vehicle which led to the death of an engineer and injured the two remote
pilots. The jamming reportedly started on April 28 2012 and disrupted passenger flights into
Seoul’s two main airports.
In recent years, numerous cases of inadvertent interference with GPS have been reported [9],
[13]. Reportedly [11] the introduction of a new telecommunications system, consisting of
40 000 high-power transmitters, was stopped in the United States because it was shown to
interfere with the GPS system.
In [12] results from a study of the vulnerability of telecommunication networks to intentional

EMI are presented. The study deals mainly with attacks leading to permanent damage on
receivers (and to some extent interference on electronics through back-door coupling) but it is
noted that it is easy to jam communication links.
G.4 Risk assessment
The introduction of a wireless system for critical functions in railway applications, e.g. in the
European ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System), has brought the question of
its resilience against electromagnetic interference, intentional as well as unintentional, into
focus (see [14], [15]). In ERTMS the light signals along the tracks are essentially replaced by
radio communication (GSM-R) to the driver. In [14] it is concluded that a one-megawatt
source might cause permanent damage to the GSM-R receiver at a distance of up to 200
meters and, of course, induce interference at a much larger distance. The threat from IEMI
against modern railway systems is the topic of an EU project, SECRET, started in mid-2012
[16]. EMI issues in railway systems, e.g. regarding GSM-R, are also addressed in another EU
project, TREND [17].
In recent years, several cases of interference with wireless commercial electronics such as
mobile phones, GPS receivers, car locks and anti-theft alarms in shops have been reported.
In the case of car locks, an interfering signal can be used to block the communication

between the car key and the car, thus preventing the owner, unaware about the jamming,
from locking the car. Jamming of shop alarms seems to be quite common. In this case the
purpose is evidently to leave the shop with stolen goods without being noticed. There are
many videos online that show the use of jammers (search e.g. "phone jammer").
G.5 Mitigation
There are methods which may mitigate the risk for interference. Of course the obvious
solution is not to rely on RF reception for functionally critical and in particular safety critical
systems and to employ alternative solutions. However, for the types of low cost narrow-band
jammers that can be found on for example the Internet mitigations can include modulation
techniques such as spread spectrum modulation, i.e. techniques that distribute the energy in
frequency or time (see [18]). Another of these modulation techniques is frequency hopping, in
which the transmitted signals carrier frequency switches in a random fashion between many
frequency channels. As an example, Bluetooth® 13 uses frequency hopping to make it more
robust against interfering signals. Another technique is called direct sequence, in which case
the initial power of the signal is spread out across a larger bandwidth. An interesting
technique is the so-called UWB radio, or impulse radio, where extremely short wide-band
pulses are used to transmit the information. In order not to interfere with other radio
___________
13 Bluetooth® is the trade name of a product supplied by Bluetooth SIG. This information is given for the
convenience of users of this standard and does not constitute an endorsement by IEC of the product named.
Equivalent products may be used if they can be shown to lead to the same results.
– 82 – IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014
communication the output power of a UWB radio is very low, which makes it useful only for
short distances, some tens of meters or so.
Another technique to neutralize interference is to use adaptive antennas, i.e. phased-array

antennas that can suppress a hostile signal from a given direction. Protection against
permanent damage may be attained by use of transient protection devices [4], [7].
Jamming detection [19] can also be employed to identify whether jamming is actually taking
place and perhaps ascertain if the disturbance is unintentional or malicious.
It should be noted that jamming, and methods to prevent it, is a part of the extensive military
electronic warfare technology area.
G.6 References
[1] GAARDIAN and SENTINEL project overview:

http://www.chronos.co.uk/index.php/en/com-rsform-updates/gaardian?id=5
[2] Doherty, J. ‘Alternate position Navigation and Timing Initiative – The need for robust
navigation’. Presented at NAV2010, London, UK
[3] Mitch, R. H., et al, ‘Signal Characteristics of Civil GPS Jammers’, The Institute of
Navigation (ION), GNSS conference, 19 – 23 September 2011, Portland, Oregon, USA
[4] Nilsson, T., Jonsson, R., “Investigation of HPM Front-door Protection Devices and
Component Susceptibility”, FOI Technical Report, FOI-R--1771--SE, November 2005,
Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI, Sensor Technology, P.O. Box 1165, SE-581
11 Linköping, Sweden.
[5] Nilsson, T., Lundén, O., Bäckström, M., “HPM Susceptibility Measurements on GPS
and WLAN Systems”, Proceedings of EMC Europe Workshop, Electromagnetic
Compatibility of Wireless Systems, Rome, Italy, 19-21 September 2005.

[6] T. Nilsson, R. Malmqvist and M. Bäckström, “Investigation of HPM Susceptibility Levels
on Low Noise Amplifiers”, Proceedings of EMC Europe 2006, Barcelona, Spain,
September 4-8, 2006.
[7] D. Månsson, R. Thottappillil, T. Nilsson T., O. Lundén and M. Bäckström,

“Susceptibility of civilian GPS receivers to electromagnetic radiation”, IEEE Trans. on
EMC, Vol. 50, No. 2, May 2008, p.434-437.
[8] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Positioning_System
[9] P. Stenumgaard, L. Pääjärvi, K. Fors, “Radiated Emission from Personal Computers –

a Safety Risk for GPS Receivers?”, Proceedings of EMC Europe Workshop 2007,
Paris, France, June 14 – 15, 2007.
[10] http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/2012/05/gps-loss-kicked-off-fatal-
dron.html and http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-
06-01/uav-crash-korea-linked-gps-jamming
[11] Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 11, 2011
[12] Wilson P., Haakinson E., Dalke R., ”Vulnerability of Wireline and Cellular
Telecommunications Networks to High Power Radio Frequency Fields”, NTIA Report
01‐382, U.S. Department of Commerce, November 2000.
IEC 61000-4-36:2014 © IEC 2014 – 83 –
[13] S. F. Williams, “Radar’d Out. GPS Vulnerable to High-Power Microwaves”, GPS World,
April 2006.
[14] Månsson D., Thottappillil R., Bäckström M. and Lundén O. “Vulnerability of European
Rail Traffic Management System to Radiated Intentional EMI”, IEEE Trans. on EMC,
Vol. 50, No. 1, February 2008
[15] S. Mili, V. Deniau, D. Sodoyer, M. Heddebaut, “Modeling of a GSM-R receiving chain

exposed to transient IEMIs”, EUROEM 2012 – European Electromagnetics, 2-6 July
2012, Toulouse, France.
[16] http://www.secret-project.eu/
[17] http://www.trend-eu.org/
[18] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spread_spectrum
[19] Proctor A. G., Curry C.W.T, Tong J., Watson R., Greaves N., Cruddace P., ‘Protecting
the UK Infrastructure: A System to Detect GNSS Jamming and Interference’,
NAV2010, London, UK
_____________

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Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) –

for equipment and systems

IEC Central Office Tel.: +41 22 919 02 11

About the IEC

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Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

BASIC EMC PUBLICATION

Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) –

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

® Registered trademark of the International Electrotechnical Commission

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

A.2.2 Noise ............................................................................................................. 30

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

G.1 General ................................................................................................................. 80

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

Figure E.9 – Damped sinusoidal waveforms – Ten-component fit .......................................... 67

Table 1 – Possible IEMI Deployment Scenarios .................................................................... 15

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) –

Part 4-36: Testing and measurement techniques –

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

The text of this standard is based on the following documents:

CDV Report on voting

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

IEC 61000 is published in separate parts according to the following structure:

General considerations (introduction, fundamental principles)

Description of the environment

Classification of the environment

Part 4: Testing and measurement techniques

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

Mitigation methods and devices

Part 6: Generic standards

ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) –

Part 4-36: Testing and measurement techniques –

3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

3.1 Terms and defintions

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

Note 1 to entry: Susceptibility is a lack of immunity.

Note 1 to entry: Typically above an altitude of 30 km.

[SOURCE: IEC 61000-2-13:2005, 3.16]

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

Note 1 to entry: A PoE is not limited to a geometrical point.

Công ty CP Tư vấn Xây dựng Điện 1.

EMI Electromagnetic interference

ESD Electrostatic discharge

HEMP High-altitude electromagnetic pulse

HIRF High-intensity radiated fields

HPD Horizontally polarized dipole

HPEM High-power electromagnetic

HPM High-power microwave

LEMP Lightning electromagnetic pulse

LLSF Low level swept field

LLSC Low level swept current

NEMP Nuclear electromagnetic pulse