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    296 - Miailhe vs. CA

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    Beatrice Aban
    The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's action had prescribed and that prescription was not interrupted by extrajudicial demands. Specifically: 1) The petitioner's action for annulment of contract should have been filed by February 24, 1990, as the threat and intimidation ceased on that date in 1986. However, the petitioner did not file until March 23, 1990, making the action prescribed. 2) Article 1155 allowing interruption of prescription by extrajudicial demand does not apply here since the respondent had no obligation to reconvey the property without an annulment, as the allegedly voidable contract was still binding. 3) As such, the petitioner's extrajudicial demands did not interrupt prescription

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    296 - Miailhe vs. CA

    Uploaded by

    Beatrice Aban
    242 views2 pages
    The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's action had prescribed and that prescription was not interrupted by extrajudicial demands. Specifically: 1) The petitioner's action for annulment of contract should have been filed by February 24, 1990, as the threat and intimidation ceased on that date in 1986. However, the petitioner did not file until March 23, 1990, making the action prescribed. 2) Article 1155 allowing interruption of prescription by extrajudicial demand does not apply here since the respondent had no obligation to reconvey the property without an annulment, as the allegedly voidable contract was still binding. 3) As such, the petitioner's extrajudicial demands did not interrupt prescription

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    296- Miailhe vs. CA

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    The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's action had prescribed and that prescription was not interrupted by extrajudicial demands. Specifically: 1) The petitioner's action for annulment of contract should have been filed by February 24, 1990, as the threat and intimidation ceased on that date in 1986. However, the petitioner did not file until March 23, 1990, making the action prescribed. 2) Article 1155 allowing interruption of prescription by extrajudicial demand does not apply here since the respondent had no obligation to reconvey the property without an annulment, as the allegedly voidable contract was still binding. 3) As such, the petitioner's extrajudicial demands did not interrupt prescription

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    242 views2 pages

    296 - Miailhe vs. CA

    Uploaded by

    Beatrice Aban
    The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's action had prescribed and that prescription was not interrupted by extrajudicial demands. Specifically: 1) The petitioner's action for annulment of contract should have been filed by February 24, 1990, as the threat and intimidation ceased on that date in 1986. However, the petitioner did not file until March 23, 1990, making the action prescribed. 2) Article 1155 allowing interruption of prescription by extrajudicial demand does not apply here since the respondent had no obligation to reconvey the property without an annulment, as the allegedly voidable contract was still binding. 3) As such, the petitioner's extrajudicial demands did not interrupt prescription

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    #296 Miailhe vs.

    CA
    G.R. No. 108991 | Panganiban, J. | March 20, 2001
    Voidable Contracts

    DOCTRINE: Actions for the annulment of contracts prescribe in four years. If the ground for annulment is
    vitiation of consent by intimidation, the four-year period starts from the time such defect ceases. The
    running of this prescriptive period cannot be interrupted by an extrajudicial demand made by the party
    whose consent was vitiated. If the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period are apparent
    from the records, the complaint should be dismissed.

    FACTS:
    William Miailhe, Victoria Desbarats-Miailhe, Monique Miailhe-Sichere, and Elaine Miailhe-
    Lencquesaing were the former registered owners of three parcels of land located at J.P. Laurel St., San
    Miguel, Manila with a one (1) storey building erected thereon, formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of
    Title No. 80645 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. On August 1, 1976, during the height of the martial law
    regime of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through its armed
    forces, forcibly and unlawfully took possession of the plaintiffs’ properties and continued its lawful and
    forcible occupation of the said premises from August 1, 1976 to August 19, 1977 without paying rentals,
    despite plaintiffs' demands therefor. The Office of the President subsequently directed the Development
    Bank to acquire for the government the subject properties from plaintiff. On August 19, 1977, through
    threats and intimidation employed by defendants, plaintiffs, under duress, were coerced into selling the
    subject properties to defendant DBP for the grossly low price of P2,376,805.00 or about P400.00 per
    square meter. That defendant DBP, in turn, sold the subject properties to [Respondent] Republic of the
    Philippines, through the Office of the President, in 1982. On February 24, 1986, after the late President
    Marcos left the country because of the EDSA revolution, plaintiffs made repeated extrajudicial demands
    upon defendants for the return and reconveyance of subject properties to them to no avail. Respondent
    Republic filed its answer denying the allegations in the complaint as according to them, there was no
    forcible took-over and that the payment for the lands were fair and reasonable. Respondent thereafter filed
    before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action had prescribed pursuant to
    the provisions of the Civil Code. Defendant DBP likewise filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of the
    Affirmative Defense raising the same ground of prescription as contained in the Motion to Dismiss. The
    RTC denied the preliminary hearing and deferred until trial the Motion To Dismiss. The CA, on the
    other hand, ruled that petitioner’s action had already prescribed. Moreover, the CA also ruled that Article
    1155 of the Civil Code, according to which a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors would interrupt
    prescription, referred only to a creditor-debtor relationship, which is not the case here. Hence, the present
    petition.

    ISSUE:
    (1) Whether or not the petitioner’s action had already prescribed. -YES
    (2) Whether or not the petitioner’s extra-judicial demands interrupted prescription. -NO

    HELD:
    (1)The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The reckoning period for prescription would be that
    pertaining to an action for the annulment of contract; that is, four years from the time the defect in the
    consent ceases. Furthermore, Section 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which was in effect at the time,
    expressly allowed the trial court to "defer the hearing and determination of the motion to dismiss until the
    trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable." In Gicano v. Gegato, this Court
    held that a complaint may be dismissed when the facts showing the lapse of the prescriptive period
    are apparent from the records. In its words, “trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss
    an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it
    to be indeed time-barred; x x x and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer
    which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; x x x What is essential only, to repeat, is that
    the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and
    satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or
    otherwise established by the evidence." It should be known that

    In the present case, the trial court deferred until trial the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss,
    because it found that the Complaint did not show on its face that the action had already prescribed. It
    deemed it better to allow the parties to present their evidence in a full-blown trial. The Supreme Court
    disagreed with the trial court and asserted that the CA correctly set aside the Order of the trial court for the
    records in this case indubitably showed the lapse of the prescriptive period, thus warranting the immediate
    dismissal of the Complaint. A perusal of the Complaint shows that the threat and intimidation ceased after
    then President Marcos left the country on February 24, 1986. Since an action for the annulment of
    contracts must be filed within four years from the time the cause of vitiation ceases, the suit before the trial
    court should have been filed anytime on or before February 24, 1990. In this case, petitioner did so only on
    March 23, 1990. Clearly, his action had prescribed by then. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss should not have
    been deferred until trial since from the facts of the case, there has been an indubitable evidence to show
    that it had prescribed.

    (2)The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. ART. 1155 of the Civil Code states that “The
    prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is extrajudicial
    demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.” In the
    instant case, the plaintiff’s reliance on this provision was mistaken because for this provision to apply, there
    must be an existing obligation. Respondent has no obligation to reconvey the subject lots because of the
    existing Contract of Sale. Although allegedly voidable, it is binding unless annulled by a proper action in
    court. Not being a determinate conduct (to give, to do, or not to do) that can be extrajudically demanded, it
    cannot be considered as an obligation either. Since Article 1390 of the Civil Code states that voidable
    "contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court," it is clear that the defendants
    were not obligated to accede to any extrajudicial demand to annul the Contract of Sale. In the absence of
    an existing obligation, petitioner cannot be considered a creditor and Article 1155 of the Civil Code cannot
    be applied to his action. Thus, any extrajudicial demand he made did not, or will not, interrupt the
    prescription of his action for the annulment of the Contract of Sale.

    WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
    Costs against petitioner.
    SO ORDERED.

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