436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 148597. October 24, 2003.

GRACE F. MUNSAYAC­DE VILLA, LILY F.

MUNSAYACSUNGA and ROY MUNSAYAC,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; Judge
ANTONIO C. REYES, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61; NORA F.
MUNSAYAC­VISPERAS (Represented by Her Heirs);
and GELACIO F. MUNSAYAC, JR., respondents.

Actions; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; In a petition

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court—as distinguished from an
ordinary appeal of a criminal case in which the whole case is
opened for review—the appeal is limited to the error assigned
by petitioner; No affirmative relief can be given to one who did
not contest the lower court’s decision.—In a petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court—as distinguished from an
ordinary appeal of a criminal case in which the whole case is
opened for review—the appeal is limited to the errors
assigned by petitioner. Since respondents did not contest the
Decision of the CA, no affirmative relief can be sought by or
given to them. Thus, not all the issues raised before the
appellate court need to be considered by this Court. The sole
issue in the present Petition is the question of inhibition of
respondent judge.
Same; Courts; Judges; Inhibition of Judges; Once case has
been decided with finality, a petition for inhibition of the judge
is rendered moot and academic.—After the CA terminated
Special Proceedings No. 704­R, we see no more reason why
the inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The
Petition therefor has already become moot and academic in
view of the termination of the main case. How can he be
inhibited from a

_______________
 * THIRD DIVISION.

437

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003 437

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

case that has already been decided with finality? It should be

clear that the CA Decision terminating Special Proceedings
No. 704­R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
executed by all the parties was the “final, complete and
absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims as
heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta
Munsayac.” As such, any and all incidents relating to the
special proceedings should also be deemed to have been
terminated.
Same; Same; Probate Proceedings; Jurisdiction; The
determination of whether a property should be included in the
inventory is within the jurisdiction of a probate court.—
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return
of any property previously deposited with the court should be
effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether
the amounts and the property deposited should be released.
Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to
the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates
the long­standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate
court exercises limited jurisdiction. However, the
determination of whether a property should be included in the
inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such
determination is only provisional—not conclusive—in
character and subject to the final decision in a separate action
that may be instituted by the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A probate court may not decide
a question of title of ownership, but it may do so if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to its
assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are
not impaired.—In a train of decisions, this Court has
consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle:
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all
heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or
the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the
rights of third parties are not impaired. These principles,
however, have no more application in this case, since the main
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased couple have already been decided and terminated.
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end.
Same; Same; Judgments; It is already an accepted rule of
procedure for the Supreme Court to strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation.—In view of the above
ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to
immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order
the release of any property deposited in custodia legis. It is
already an accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive
to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving
no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. To
achieve that end and to expedite the case in the interest of
substantial justice, a directive to the trial judge to lift the
freeze

438

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

order and release the property deposited with the court

becomes indispensable.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Ismael M. Estella for petitioners.
          Tenefrancia, Agranzamendez, Liceralde &
Associates for private respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Once a case has been decided with finality, a petition

for the inhibition of the judge therefrom becomes moot
and academic.

The Ca se
1
 1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the2
Rules of Court, assailing the March3
2,
2001 Decision and the June 21, 2001 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA­G.R. SP No. 60914. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition for

certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED only insofar as
nullifying and setting aside the order of arrest contained in
Respondent Judge Antonio C. Reyes’ Orders dated June 22,
2000 and August 28, 2000 in Special Proceedings 704­R,
entitled ‘In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late
Gelacio Munsa ya c, Sr. and the Late Vicenta Munsa ya c.’
4
“No pronouncement as to costs.”

The assailed Resolution denied

5
both petitioners’ Partial
Motion for Reconsideration6 and private respondents’
Motion for Reconsideration.

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 10­33.

2 Annex “A” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 34­40. Penned by Justice
Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. (Division chairman) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (member).
3 Annex “B” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 42­44.
4 CA Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 39.
5 CA Rollo, pp. 298­309.
6 Id., pp. 402­411.

439

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003 439

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

The Fa cts

The facts of the case were summarized by the CA in this

wise:

“A recapitulation of facts shows that the present controversy

before [u]s stems from Special Proceeding Case No. 704­R,
entitled ‘In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late
Gelacio Munsa ya c, Sr. and the Late Vicenta Munsa ya c’ and
pending before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City. The said special proceeding case was filed on
November 17, 1998 by Grace F. Munsaya­De Villa (‘DE
VILLA’), Lily F. Munsayac­Sunga (‘Sunga’) and Roy Peter F.
Munsayac (‘ROY’)—three (3) of the five (5) children of the
late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC—for
letters of administration nominating DE VILLA as
administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents. DE
VILLA’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other
children of the late Munsayac Spouse, namely, Gelacio F.
Munsayac, Jr. (‘MUNSAYAC, JR.’) and the late Nora F.
Munsayac­Visperas (‘VISPERAS’), who nominated
MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late Munsayac
Couple’s intestate estate.
“MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed
administrator pursuant to respondent Judge’s Order dated
MARCH 22, 2000, replacing Lawyer Ceasar G. Oracion as
special administrator of the said intestate estate, pursuant to
the Order dated April 27, 1998.
“Despite the approved 60­day suspension of the
proceedings to enable the parties to discuss an amicable
settlement, the protracted exchange of pleadings between the
opposing siblings in Special Proceeding Case No. 704­R was of
no help in the immediate settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Munsayac Couple.
“Even the efforts of the petitioners to inhibit respondent
Judge further complicated the intestate proceedings. Thus,
there was the Request for Inhibition dated September 28,
1999, which was filed by DE VILLA and SUNGA. Barely a
week after the aforesaid Request for Inhibition was filed and
before respondent Judge could act on it, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which was
received by this Court on October 4, 1999, docketed as CA­
G.R. SP NO. 55193 which has for its petitioners and
respondents the same respective parties involved in the
present petition before [u]s, and questions, among others,
respondent Judge’s Order in open court dated September 29,
1999 directing/ordering DE VILLA to produce by 2:00 p.m. in
the afternoon of the same date certain bank time deposit
certificates/documents; and the order of arrest of DE VILLA
by about 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the same date, for
failure to produce the said bank certificates/documents.
Pending the resolution of CA­G.R. SP NO. 55193, petitioners
filed an administrative case dated July 11, 2000 before the
Supreme Court, docketed as OCA IPI NO. 00­989­RTJ, which
not only prayed for respondent Judge’s suspension but also
his
 440

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

permanent removal from office on grounds of grave

misconduct and serious inefficiency.
“Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated April 24, 2000 which
was filed by the administrator of the intestate estate,
respondent Judge issued the Order dated May 4, 2000, which
underscored the order to surrender, under pain of contempt,
(a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the
names of the late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made
with the United Coconut Planter’s Bank, Baguio City
(‘UCPB’) under Investment Confirmation No. 0666 worth
P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not disclosed by the
petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the
surrender of all the pieces of jewelry given by the late
VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the ‘freeze
order’ with the China Banking Corporation.
“The Court a quo substantially reiterated the import of the
Order dated May 4, 2000, by issuing the Order dated May 24,
2000 and, on the account of petitioners’ failure to faithfully
comply therewith, issued the Order dated June 22, 2000,
which contained the following decretal portion—

WHEREFORE, for their failure to comply with the Order of this

Court dated May 24, 2000, the petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily
Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are hereby ordered ARRESTED in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 71, of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, until their compliance to immediately surrender in
custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the amount
of P13,506,343.33 plus the legal interest of 12% per annum
compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully complied with or a
total amount of P23,802,788.00 more or less, as of May, 2000.
‘The petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy
Munsayac are likewise ORDERED to surrender in custodia legis to
this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of
P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest of 12% per
annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully complied
with or a total amount of P32,267,868.00, more or less, as of May
2000, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order.
‘SO ORDERED.’

and the Order dated August 28, 2000, the pertinent portion
of which reads—
‘The order for the petitioners to surrender the amounts stated in this
Court’s order dated June 22, 2000 shall stand and the order for the
petitioners’ arrest shall not be lifted until their full and faithful
compliance with the order to place the said money in the legal
custody of either the special administrator or this Court. The motion

441

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003 441

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

for reconsideration on the matter of petitioners’ standing order of

arrest is therefore DENIED.
‘SO ORDERED.’

were issued by respondent Judge and are now both subject

7
of this present petition x x x.”

Ruling of the Court of Appea ls

In nullifying the arrest order issued by Judge Reyes,

the CA ruled that he had summarily ordered the arrest
of petitioners without any written charge filed against
them or any hearing conducted thereon. According to
the appellate court, “there is nothing in Rule 71 which
explicitly allows that the requirements of filing a
written charge and hearing 8
in indirect contempt cases
may be dispensed with.” It thus set aside the Order of
Arrest issued by respondent judge.
Ruling on the request for inhibition filed by
petitioners, the CA, however, held that there was no
convincing proof that the demeanor of the trial judge
had put him under suspicion, especially in the light of
their clear
9
display of contumacious behavior toward the
court. It further held that their request for inhibition
was unacceptable, because
10
they had come to the court
with “unclean hands.” 11
Hence, this Petition.

The Issue
12
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit this sole
issue for our consideration:
_______________

7 CA Decision, pp. 2­4; Rollo, pp. 35­37. Citations omitted.

8 CA Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 39.
9 CA Resolution dated June 21, 2001, p. 2; Rollo, p. 43.
10 Id., pp. 3 & 44.
11 The case was deemed submitted for decision on July 10, 2002,
upon this Court’s receipt of petitioners’ “Supplemental to
Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration,” which was signed by Atty.
Ismael M. Estella. Earlier or on March 20, 2002, this Court received
petitioners’ Memorandum signed by the same counsel. Private
respondents’ Memorandum, signed by Attys. Reynaldo U.
Agranzamendez and Miguel B. Liceralde was filed with this Court on
April 15, 2002.
12 Rollo, pp. 107­127.

442

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

“With due respect, the Respondent Court of Appeals erred as

a matter of law in not ordering the inhibition of the
respondent presiding judge WHO, as shown in all his
actuations and orders, [has] demonstrated vindictiveness,
arbitrariness, prejudice and bias against petitioners and
partiality in favor of private respondents thereby denying
petitioners’ fundamental right to be entitled to an impartial
13
tribunal.”

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition for inhibition has no merit, but the trial

judge must lift the freeze order and cause the return of
property or money still in custodia legis.

Sole Issue:
Inhibition

Before delving into the issue of inhibition, we note that

the CA Decision nullified and set aside the Order of
Arrest issued by Judge Reyes against petitioners.
Consequently, the propriety of the Order was no longer
raised in this Petition. Neither was it raised by
respondents.
In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court—as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of a criminal
case in which the whole case is opened for review—the 14
appeal is limited to the errors assigned by petitioner.
Since respondents did not contest the Decision of the
CA, no15
affirmative relief can be sought by or given to
them. Thus, not all the issues raised before the
appellate court need to be considered by this Court. The
sole issue in the present Petition is the question of
inhibition of respondent judge.
We emphasize at the outset that the main case from
which this Petition arose has already been decided by
the CA. The Decision is

_______________

13 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 12; Rollo, p. 118. Original in

uppercase.
14 Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 632; 280 SCRA 400,
October 9, 1997.
15 Rayandayan v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 27; 314 SCRA 255,
September 14, 1999; China Banking Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 329 Phil. 608; 260 SCRA 782, August 22, 1996.

443

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003 443

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals
16
now final and executory. Already terminated in that
main case was Special Proceedings No. 704­R, which
had given rise to a number of incidents and petitions
including the herein matter. In CA­G.R. SP No. 64025,
the CA found that Judge Reyes had gravely abused his
discretion17 when he disallowed the Extrajudicial
Partition executed by the heirs of the Munsayac
spouses. Thus, the appellate court disposed as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil

action is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders
dated March 1, 2001 and March 21, 2001 are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new one ENTERED
approving the Extrajudicial Partition between the Heirs of the
Spouses Gelacio J. Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta F. Munsayac,
and terminating Special Proceedings No. 704­R pending
before respondent Court[.] The parties are hereby ENJOINED
18
to abide by the same.”

Petitioners, however, argue that since there are still

matters pending before the trial judge, such as the
withdrawal/release of money deposited in custodia legis
and the lifting of a freeze19
order on certain jewelry, his
inhibition is still needed.
We disagree. After the CA terminated Special
Proceedings No. 704­R, we see no more reason why the
inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The
Petition therefor has already become moot and
academic in view of the termination of the main case.
How can he be inhibited from a case that has already
been decided with finality? 20
It should be clear that the CA Decision terminating
Special Proceedings No. 704­R found that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the parties was
the “final, complete and absolute settlement of their
respective shares and claims as heirs of

_______________

16 See Entry of Judgment dated June 17, 2002 in CA­G.R. SP No.

64025; Annex “A” of petitioners’ “Supplemental to
Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration”; Rollo, p. 160.
17 Records, Vol. III, pp. 834­837.
18 CA Decision dated November 29, 2001, p. 12; Rollo, p. 99.
19 Petitioners’ “Supplemental to Manifestation/Motion for
Reconsideration,” p. 2; id., p. 158.
20 Dated November 29, 2001; Records, Vol. III, pp. 883­895; penned
by Justice Ramon A. Barcelona (Division chairman) and concurred in
by Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Perlita J. Tria Tirona
(members).

444

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

deceased spouses
21
Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta
Munsayac.” As such, any and all incidents relating to
the special proceedings should also be deemed to have
been terminated.
 When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding
the bank manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio 22
City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners
23
and
to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, he did so
as the presiding judge in the probate court that was
hearing Special Proceedings No. 704­R. Now that the
case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither
he nor his court has any more right to hold the
properties that were the subject of his Orders in the
special proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and
the return of any property previously deposited with the
court should be effected. The judge had no more
discretion to decide whether the amounts and the
property deposited should be released. Likewise, any
standing order on any property in relation to the special
proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the
long­standing principle that a tribunal acting24
as a
probate court exercises limited jurisdiction. However,
the determination of whether a property should be
included in the inventory is within its probate
jurisdiction. Such determination is only provisional—
not conclusive—in character and subject to the final
decision in 25a separate action that may be instituted by
the parties.
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions
on an advance made or allegedly made by the deceased
to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
that has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings; and
that the final order of the court thereon

_______________

21 CA Decision dated November 29, 2001, pp. 4­5; id., pp. 886­887.
22 Order dated March 24, 1999, Records, Vol. I, p. 142.
23 Order dated May 4, 2000, Records, Vol. II, pp. 1037­1045; Order
dated May 24, 2000, id., pp. 1103­1104.
24 Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes v. Reyes, 345 SCRA 541, November 22,
2000; Lim v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 60; 323 SCRA 102, January
24, 2000.
25 Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes v. Reyes, supra; Sanchez v. Court of
Appeals, 345 Phil. 155; 279 SCRA 647, September 29, 1997; Valera v.
Inserto, 149 SCRA 533, May 7, 1987.

445
 VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003 445
Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

shall be binding
26
on the person raising the questions and
on the heirs.
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently
enunciated this settled, corollary principle: generally, a
probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are
all heirs; or the question is one of collation or
advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption
of jurisdiction
27
and the rights of third parties are not
impaired. These principles, however, have no more
application in this case, since the main proceedings for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
couple have already been decided and terminated.
28
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end.
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the
ownership of the properties deposited with or ordered
frozen by the lower court during the progress of the
special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so
now. Whether those properties should have been
adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses
is beside the point at this time. The former have
already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition
representing the final, complete and absolute
settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is
left to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order
and the release of any property originally deposited by
petitioners in custodia legis.
In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to
direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze order
still pending and to order the release of any property
deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted
rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving29 no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. To
achieve that end and to expedite the case in the interest
of substantial justice, a

_______________

26 Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 418 Phil. 669; 366 SCRA 385,

October 2, 2001.
27 Ibid.; Coca v. Borwmeo, 81 SCRA 278, January 31, 1978.
 28 Province of Camarines Norte v. Province of Quezon, 419 Phil.
372; 367 SCRA 91, October 11, 2001; Flores v. Court of Appeals, 328
Phil. 992; 259 SCRA 618, July 29, 1996.
29 San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 598; 365 SCRA 279,
September 13, 2001; Ching v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 28; 331
SCRA 16, April 27, 2000; De los Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil.
522; 313 SCRA 632, September 3, 1999.

446

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Munsayac­De Villa vs. Court of Appeals

directive to the trial judge to lift the freeze order and

release the property
30
deposited with the court becomes
indispensable.
WHEREFORE, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge
Antonio C. Reyes is hereby DENIED for being moot and
academic. However, he is DIRECTED to immediately
lift any order he made on properties relative to Special
Proceedings No. 704­R. He is further ORDERED to
cause the return of any amount or property originally
deposited by petitioners in custodia legis. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
          Puno (Chairman), Sandoval­Gutierrez, Corona
and Carpio­Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition for prohibition against respondent judge
denied, but he is ordered to lift any order relative to
Special Proceedings No. 704­R and to return any
amount or property deposited in custodia legis.

Notes.—As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from

serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or
other fiduciary, unless the estate or trust belongs to, or
the ward is a member of his immediate family and only
if his service as executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with the proper
performance of his judicial duties. (Carual vs. Brusola,
317 SCRA 54 [1999])
A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion
for his inhibition that questions or puts to doubt,
however insignificant, his supposed predilection to a
case pending before him. (Cortes vs. Bangalan, 322
SCRA 249 [2000])
 ——o0o——

_______________

30 De los Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra; Golangco v. Court of

Appeals, 347 Phil. 771; 283 SCRA 493, December 22, 1997; Heirs of
Gabriel­Almoradi v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 15, January 4, 1994.

447

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