Dogfight Over Europe
Dogfight Over Europe
Dogfight Over Europe
Ryanair
MGMT 420
Marvin Lieberman
UCLA Anderson School of Management
1
Competitors
• One-hour air flight
– 500,000 passengers a year
– Average price: £150-160
• Nine-hour ferry trip
– 750,000 passengers a year
– Average price: £60
Operating Expenses
Staff 35.7 35.7 24.2 15.8 15.8
Depreciation 8.6 8.6 8.6 5.6 5.6
Fuel & Oil 31.8 31.8 31.8 20.7 20.7
Engineering/aircraft 9.8 9.8 9.8 6.4 6.4
Selling 18 9 9 6.1 6.1 4 6.1 10.1
Aircraft Leases 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.2
Landing Fees 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Handling & Catering 16.6 8.3 8.3 5.7 5.7 3.7 5.7 9.4
Ground equipment 19.5 19.5 19.5 12.7 12.7
Operating Expenses
Staff 35.7 35.7 24.2 15.8 15.8
Depreciation 8.6 8.6 8.6 5.6 5.6
Fuel & Oil 31.8 31.8 31.8 20.7 20.7
Engineering/aircraft 9.8 9.8 9.8 6.4 6.4
Selling 18 9 9 6.1 6.1 4 6.1 10.1
Aircraft Leases 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.2
Landing Fees 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Handling & Catering 16.6 8.3 8.3 5.7 5.7 3.7 5.7 9.4
Ground equipment 19.5 19.5 19.5 12.7 12.7
Operating Expenses
Staff 35.7 35.7 24.2 15.8 15.8
Depreciation 8.6 8.6 8.6 5.6 5.6
Fuel & Oil 31.8 31.8 31.8 20.7 20.7
Engineering/aircraft 9.8 9.8 9.8 6.4 6.4
Selling 18 9 9 6.1 6.1 4 6.1 10.1
Aircraft Leases 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.2
Landing Fees 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Handling & Catering 16.6 8.3 8.3 5.7 5.7 3.7 5.7 9.4
Ground equipment 19.5 19.5 19.5 12.7 12.7
Operating Expenses
Staff 35.7 35.7 24.2 15.8 15.8
Depreciation 8.6 8.6 8.6 5.6 5.6
Fuel & Oil 31.8 31.8 31.8 20.7 20.7
Engineering/aircraft 9.8 9.8 9.8 6.4 6.4
Selling 18 9 9 6.1 6.1 4 6.1 10.1
Aircraft Leases 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.2
Landing Fees 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Handling & Catering 16.6 8.3 8.3 5.7 5.7 3.7 5.7 9.4
Ground equipment 19.5 19.5 19.5 12.7 12.7
8
BA/AL’s likely response
• What options do they have?
1. Accommodate – do nothing
64,240 * £20 = (£1.2 in profits) (at most!)
2. Full scale match – price at £98
• 500,000 * £60 = £30m in profits lost
• But their capacity utilization would go to 100%
269,000 * (£98 - £28) = £18.5m in profits gained
• (£30m) + £18.5m = (£11.5m in profits)
9
BA/AL’s likely response
• What options do they have?
1. Accommodate – do nothing
64,240 * £20 = (£1.2 in profits) (at most!)
2. Full scale match – price at £98
(£30m) + £18.5m = (£11.5m in profits)
3. Targeted match – drop its highest fare only
• Assume there are 100,000 such customers (which
is more than Ryanair’s capacity)
(£209m-£98m)*100,000 = (£11.1m in profits)
10
BA/AL’s Decision tree
RA
(£1.2m ) makes
Accommodate
£650m
Partially
BA/AL Match RA
(£11.1m ) makes
Enter £??
Ryanair RA
Fully match (£11.5m ) makes
£0 (we
hope?)
Don’t RA
£0 makes
Enter
£0
11
Wal-Mart Decision Tree
Enter (-5,-2)
Potential
Entrant
Build large
store
Stay out (10,0)
Walmart
Enter (2,2)
Potential
Entrant
Build
small
store
Stay out (15,0)
12
What Happened?
13
Key Questions
1. What went wrong? What specific
decisions of Ryanair’s were faulty?
14
Game 1
15
Game 2
16
How Are These Different?
• “There’s no way I could [play
steal]… I mean everyone
who knows me would be
disgusted if I stole”
• “I can look you straight in the
eye and promise, I swear to
you, I am going to split”
• “Let me tell you what my
word means. My father once
said to me, ‘A man who
doesn’t keep his word is not a
man. Not worth a dollar.’ 17
And This?
• “Ibrahim, I am
an honest
person. I am
going to play
the steal ball.”
18
Game 2: Game Theoretic
Analysis Nick
Split Steal
Split 7 , 7 0.01 , 14
0 , 14
Ibrahim
Steal 14 , 0 0 , 0
• If Ibrahim really believes that Nick will play steal, then he can’t
win any money…..
• …. Unless he chooses split, and Nick is honest
• Does Ibrahim have to believe Nick is honest and will split the
money with him?
• …. No! He only has to believe Nick is really going to play steal!
• …. And that there is even a TINY chance Nick will share!
• Why would Nick lie about playing steal?
• Nick’s statement is credible, i.e. Ibrahim believes it
When analyzing competitor response,
it’s important to….
1. Think through the competitor’s
strategy and incentives
2. Think through the competitor’s
beliefs about my strategy and
incentives
Nash Equilibrium:
• Naïve view: “Both parties doing
what’s best for them”
• “Both parties doing what’s best for
them based on their beliefs about
the other” 20
The Most Important Lesson of
Game Theory
• “People make choices in their own best
interests”
22
JetBlue’s Launch Strategy
• Why was JetBlue’s launch such a huge success?
• NOT because of the leather seats, DirecTV and
free snacks
• YES because the giants accommodated entry!
• It initially focused on leisure routes in New York
(e.g. JFK-Buffalo, Syracuse, Rochester) – not a
huge source of profits for the giants
• It entered into a 3-year exclusive lease
agreement with a small aircraft provider
– Sent the signal that it planned to stay small
• JetBlue built profits, brand and political
23
connections that allowed greater expansion
Netflix’s Strategy
• Netflix’s “niche” philosophy
– Cheap price / lower quality content (e.g. no current season)
– Goldilocks-esque “not too big, not too small”
24
* Both quotes are from Netflix CEO Reed Hastings
Judo Strategy
• A credible commitment to stay small (at least for a
while) limits the incentive of the incumbent to retaliate.
• Retaliation in this case hurts the incumbent much
more than the entrant.
• In general, hard to make this kind of commitment in
the airline industry.
- Jet Blue found a way.
- How many flights per day does Spirit fly between city pairs?
25
WalMart’s Strategy
• Sunk cost commitments protect local monopolies
from entry by competitors.
• Investment in local store (initial advertising, setup
costs, employment contracts) are sunk costs.
• Sunk costs are a type of fixed cost. (Once made, they
cannot be reversed.)
• Note that rent is a fixed cost, but not a sunk cost.
Maybe WalMart should own its stores in some locations
to raise its sunk costs.
• Can an airline commit to a city-pair market in this way?
26
Game Theory Summary
• Easy to get trapped in bad outcomes
• Need to think not only about the other party’s
strategy, but their beliefs about your strategy
• “Cheap talk” doesn’t influence beliefs because
underlying incentives haven’t changed
• Need to find credible ways to signal your
strategy
27
“Honestly we didn’t know whether or not
Aer Lingus would match our price. We
thought they wouldn’t if they were rational,
but we didn’t spend a lot of time worrying
about it because it was out of our control”
– Tony Ryan
28
Saving Tony Ryan
1. How could Ryanair “control” whether
Aer Lingus’s entered into a price war?
RA
(£1.2m ) makes
Accommodate
£650m
Partially
BA/AL Match
(£11.1m )
Enter
Don’t RA
£0 makes
Enter
£0
31
AL’s beliefs about effect of its
decision on Ryanair
Partially
Match
AL (£11.1m ), and Ryanair
will continue to attack us
32
What Does Ryanair Want
AL to Believe?
1. “We are going to crush you”
– Dangerous given the high FC in the industry!
2. “We are going to stay small”
– Need to find a credible way to signal this; e.g.
JetBlue’s clever lease scheme
3. “We are going to target the ferry market,
not your core customer groups”
– Design a product that is not attractive to
business travelers
33
The Danger of Flexibility
• “Strategy is about maintaining as much flexibility
as possible”
37
Ryanair’s Route Structure
38
Ryanair’s Current Cost per
Marginal Passenger
• £2
• Oops, that’s wrong – sorry
• -£2
• (£2)
• It makes marginal revenue per passenger
(e.g. ad revenue) greater than its MC!!
39
Course Structure
1. Competitive Analysis is
Advantage largely static
Industry Analysis
Analysis is
Dynamic
2. Strategic 3. Organizational
Interactions Strategy 40
Ryanair Wrap
• Static analysis of competitive advantage is hugely useful, but can
only get the strategist so far
• Thinking strategically requires thinking through interactions between
you and competitors (and others!); game theory is a fundamental
tool for this analysis
• Your competitor’s beliefs about your likely actions are just as
important as your beliefs about her actions
• Leads to a huge number of novel strategies based on affecting
other’s beliefs
• One canonical example: tying a hand behind your back as a way to
make a credible commitment
• Judo strategies - based on credible commitment to stay small
• Preemptive strategies - based on credible sunk cost commitments
41