11

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE FOR THEORIES OF READING

Marion D. Jenkinson

I am perhaps being bold, not to say foolish, to undertake tq

speak to the topic of this paper. My reasons for consenting to do
so spring from my own need to explore why, after seventy-five
years of research and investigation, there has not emerged a
coherent construct within which we can examine reading. Two
aphorisms point up my dilemma. "Experience keeps a dear school
but fools will learn in no other". (Benjamin Franklin) Yet, on the
other hand, as an old Welsh proverb states, "Experience is the
fool's best teacher; the wise do not need it".
This paper, then, will attempt first to suggest why this failure
has occurred, and then will indicate some points of departure
which may be productive for the gradual evolution of theories.
More questions will be posed than answers given, but it was
Einstein who reminded us that the asking of the right questions
may lead to greater knowledge than the discovery of scientific
facts. Yet again, I must counteract this with another adage "The
greater fool may ask more than the wisest man can answer".
The following topics will be discussed briefly in the remainder
of this paper: the reasons for the failure to evolve theories, model
making in reading, some questions concerning the assimilation of
meaning, and triad of sources for a reading model.

*Dr. Jenkinson is on the faculty of education of the University of Alberta

at Edmonton.
12

Reasons for Failure to Evolve Theories

The first reason is not peculiar to the reading field, but has great
pertinence for it. I have been concerned recently with educational
epistemology. (Jenkinson 1967) My own concern has been
supported in the United States by Cooper (1967). What are the
sources of our knowledge in education? It seems to me that the
traditional six ways of knowing, identified by philosophers-appeal
to authority, intuition, formal logic, empiricism, pragmatism, and
scepticism—should all be applied to our endeavours to know more
about what is happening in education. Of course, some of these
methods are superior to others for certain purposes, and their
effectiveness will depend upon the nature of the thing to be
known. My quarrel is that because the empirical method has
proved so effective in scientific enquiry, we in education have
allowed this to influence us too exclusively. Educational evidence
which is not labelled "research", or does not present evidence in
what is often a pseudo-scientific manner, is usually suspect.
More recently the term "development" or "experiment" has
become the magic lamp, by rubbing which we hope to solve our
educational problems. On the surface this new dogma appears to
espouse pragmatism, the method of evaluating things on the basis
of their palpable effects. Yet the variety of conclusions, and the
conflicting and partial nature of the evidence from the myriad of
reading programs and innovations of the past decade, not only
leads to scepticism but also calls for prudence in application of
any of the findings. We are still far from codifying the experiential
proof of these efforts since we are still at such a primitive stage of
collecting significant data. It has been demonstrated frequently
that the teacher is the one single important variable contributing
to reading success. Yet we are only just beginning to realize that
we must examine, in depth, the teacher's behaviour and, parti-
cularly language performance, in terms both of linguistic mastery
and the ways in which language is used to elicit learning.
Another common error which has crept into our educational
thought arises from a mistaken notion even of scientific truth. As
Wiseman (1966) has suggested:
Development in the history of science which has led to a
clearer and more widespread realization that the distinguish-
ing marks of a scientific hypothesis, as compared, for
example, with an affirmation, or belief, is the fact that it
 13

must be intrinsically susceptible to disproof, rather than that

it can be proved to be true. The most that can ever be said
about the truth of a hypothesis, even in the more highly
developed of the physical sciences, is that all the results
obtained so far are in line with what we would have
predicted from it.

In reading, we frequently fall into the trap of attempting to

"prove or produce" evidence that one method or set of materials
is superior to another. Sometimes the burden of truth should lie
rather with the established mode. The efficacy of innovation
might well be subject to disproof rather than proof.
When one examines the epistemológy of reading, it appears that
superficially we cover the range of sources suggested above. Yet, I
would argue that we need to acquire a true appreciation for a
balance of all six methods and developthe skills of knowing when
to select the most appropriate one or combination of them for the
specific reading area we are examining.
This is not just another plea for an eclectic approach to reading.
We should rather recognize those specific and peculiar contribu-
tions that differing sources of knowledge, as well as different
disciplines, can make. Too often the "eclectic approach" has
served to camouflage rather than elucidate our concepts.

Model Making in Reading

Model making in many aspects of education, including reading,

is playing a new role. Hopefully, this desire to create models will
not decline in to a mere mystique, but will enable us through their
construction to show interrelationships between concepts and to
suggest areas of ignorance. The Maccias (1966) have suggested that
educational theorizing might profit much through the use of
models, though it is acknowledged that model making in educa-
tion, as in all the social sciences, is of a special kind and perhaps of
greater complexity than that encountered in the sciences. How-
ever, as Eastwood (1966) suggests, though there are many ways of
using the term model, a systematic enquiry model, the end
product of which is explanation rather than a solution of various
problems, is most appropriate for people in education to consider.
Eastwood further suggests that this may be conceived as a system
of four dimensions — the referential, the theoretical, the experi-
14

mental and the validational. Such systems should provide a general

model which encompasses the framework for the derivation of
specific models from which testable hypotheses can be deduced.
One of the most common misunderstandings is that the word
model is seen as synonymous for theory. It is not appropriate to
discourse at length on the distinctions and variety of definitions of
the two words. There is a consensus, however, that the two terms
are not identical. George (1966) compares a model to a skeleton,
whereas the relevant theory can be compared to the complete
organism.
My reference to this current work of enquiry into models and
theories is really to suggest that in reading we must become more
sophisticated in our model making. Several models have been used
in reading. The earliest ones were by Gray (1960) with later
additions by Robinson (1966). Holmes (1965) used factor analysis
to produce his substrata-factor theory of reading, while Smith
(1963) has adapted Guilford's model or the intellect to the reading
process, and more recently McCullough (1968), Kingston (1961),
and Cleland (1965) have suggested other models.
All these models, it is true, attempt to clarify and explicate the
relationships between one facet of reading and another. Un-
fortunately, however, until comparatively recently, they have
attempted to cover too many facets in reading. The intellectual,
hynamic activity of the reading process has been confused by
linking this with the techniques and skills which need to be
acquired in the "learning to read" process. In addition, the
learning and teaching activity are rarely examined independently.
As I have suggested elsewhere, it would seem that future models
should not attempt, at least in the beginning, to be all inclusive.
(Jenkinson, 1968). We need a series of models of various aspects
of reading which may ultimately be capable of being integrated.
But a model which deals with the reading process as such, which
includes the cognitive interactions, the impact of language and
linguistic considerations in the affective as well as in the cognitive
domain, and will then attempt to relate these reading operations
to other aspects of thinking, is perhaps the most urgently needed.
Part of this process may be the differentiation of the reading-
thinking action from every other human activity, including
ordinary thinking. I feel that this may be a productive point of
departure.
A quite separate model is needed to show the interrelationship
 15

between the skills, techniques, materials and media involved in the

decoding process. This will then lead to the way in which the child
gradually assimilates the understanding of the word which is
decoded. Yet the assimilation of understanding at this period will
not be identical with the very different aptitudes of the mature
reader. It would seem that the acquisition of encoding and
decoding in children as they progress through school is entirely
dependent on their developing perceptual activities and the
acquisition of the appropriate, systematic, cognitive abilities. The
extent to which the developing abilities influence the amount that
the child can assimilate from his reading is still largely a mystery.
We do know, however, that as he matures he can apparently
understand increasingly complex; material. It would seem to me
that we shall make greater progress if we do not attempt to
account, at least in the same model, for both the developing reader
and the mature reader.
One of the problems that continues to plague us is that we lack
accurate definitions in reading. It has become imperative that we
somehow attempt to agree on some terms within the field. Several
of the contributors to the N.S.S.E. volume Innovation and Change
in Reading Instruction (Robinson, 1968) commented on the
problems attendant on trying to simplify ideas from research and
experimentation because of the lack of agreement on definitions.
Spache (1968) also suggested that the confusion has been further
confounded because many of the disciplines which have contri-
buted to our knowledge of the field of reading have their own
distinctive terminology for the basic components of reading. The
varied uses of terms to describe conditions or concepts which are
often quite similar not only interfere with our exchange of
information but retard our ultimate progress toward greater
knowledge.
Many sciences have experienced this problem,but the time has
come, as it did in the other sciences, when a general acceptance of
some definitions is essential. It is true that the way to good
definitions is paved with difficulties. As Dewey has reminded us,
the twin demons of vagueness and ambiguity frequently impinge
upon salient definitions. It is ironical, too, that language itself is a
major deterrent in accurate defining. Dewey (1933) wrote with
cogency on this point.
A constant source of misunderstanding and mistake is
indefiniteness of meaning. Because of vagueness of meaning,
16

we misunderstand things ourselves. Because of ambiguity,

we distort and pervert. Conscious distortion of meaning may
be enjoyed as nonsense; erroneous meanings may be
followed up and got rid of. Vague meanings are too
indefinite to allow for analysis and too bulky to support
other beliefs. Vagueness prevents testing and responsibility
and disguises the unconscious mixing together of half
understood concepts. It is aboriginal, logical sin, the source
from which most bad intellectual consequences flow. To
totally eliminate indefiniteness is impossible. To reduce it in
extent and force requires sincerity and vigour.
The nature of definitions has plagued us from the time of the
Greeks, but recently philosophers such as Robinson (1965) have
come to some general conclusions about the attributes of
functional definitions, and of these we must become aware. Our
definitions at one and the same time must be inclusive but never
so restrictive that they cannot function. Definitions in reading as
in all other sciences must be relative. They must be capable of
changing in both basic concepts and in content, as new ideas
appear. Thus, it would seem that the only definitions we can use
would be tentative or stipulative definitions, for should rigid
definitions be used, these would belie the dynamic character of
language and further restrict investigation. Wittgenstein has aptly
stated that definitions should not be permitted to give us mental
cramp and rigidly limit exploration. Reading as an act and a
process may in the end be the most difficult of all to define.
Perhaps reading, like mystery, can only be described and evoked.
Moreover, we are often faced in the field of reading with the
sceptics who often exist among the practitioners who deny the use
or validity of theories. Perhaps the conept that "it is all right in
theory but it won't do in practice" is merely a way of rejecting
something which is difficult to understand. Black (1946) has
indicated that Schopenhauer (1932) said all that needs to be said
about this type of sophistry.
The assertion is based upon an impossiblity: what is right in
theory must work in practice. And if it does not there is a
mistake in the theory; something has been overlooked and
not allowed for and consequently what is wrong in practice
is wrong in theory too.

And now having examined several problems which seem to have

 17

been major deterrents to the formulation and evolution of useful

theories about reading some questions will be posed concerning
the assimilation of meaning, since this is basic to the mature
reading process. Then some of the sources of knowledge from
which we might seek further enlightenment will be examined
briefly.

Some Questions Concerning the Assimilation of Meaning

It is a truism that part of our problem in developing a theory
has been the complexity of the process involved. Reading must
engage the total organism. The recent distinction made by Wiener
and Cromber (1967) between acquisition and assimilation of
meaning I think is one we have needed to examine for some time.
However, there are innumberable questions to which we still
need answers. I can only pose a very few of these at the present
time.
(1) Is reading comprehension synonymous with thinking? The
converse obviously is not true, but if reading is considered to
be a type of thinking which is triggered by the printed rather
than by the spoken word, what are the controlling variables of
the thinking thus aroused?

(2) How does this thinking differ from all other types of
thinking? It obviously must be controlled to an extent by the
thought indigenous to the writer, but though the reader's
thought is controlled by the content, he frequently has to
interpolate and extrapolate in order to get the full impact of
the author's meaning.

(3) What are the differences between spoken and written

language? This could apply to the ways in which the thoughts
are engendered but is also very important in our understand-
ing of the problems that will face the reader but which may or
may not be apparent if the ideas are expressed orally.

(4) What are the respective functions of the lexical and structural
elements within written material? Again, beginning has been
made on this but we need more information.
18

(5) What are the variables residing within the reader which enable
him to become receptive to the message of the author? What
is the influence of past experience, of prejudice, of bias, of
attitudes, of personality variables? What is the effect of
general and immediate motivation, of interests, of attitudes of
rigidity, or personality structure, of the cognitive style of the
reader and his ability to initially submerge his concepts for
those of the author? And these constitute but a few of the
variables inherent in the reader.

(6) What problems arise because of the level of abstraction of the

material that is being presented? This is apposite for the
mature reader as well as the child learning to read. Moreover,
undoubtedly the reader will be more or less successful
according to his familiarity with the content of the matter he
is reading and the type of "language game"* which is being
undertaken by the author.

(7) How do the separate and disparate experiences of individuals

lead to a common acceptance of general meaning but which
also permit differences of interpretation? What is going to be
the future of literacy as compared with "oracy"? [cf.,
McLuhan (1964)]

(8) Perhaps we need to examine the axiology of reading, the

values gained from reading, particularly in the light of current
contentions that "oracy" rather than literacy has become the
pervasive means of the immediate conveying of meaning. It
appears that written material, however, will continue to play
an active part in conveying and relating meaning from one
area to another and from one generation to another. Since
reading permits more effective thinking, the written word will
continue to be the most efficacious influence in knowledge
extension and exhange in every sphere, [cf., McLuhan (1964),
p. 168]

The answers to these questions will be complex, but by

examining some recent development in "basic" fields we may
obtain productive insights.

*cf., Wittgenstein, (1958).

 19

A Triad of Sources for a Reading Theory

Although psychology and linguistics were once studied as part

of the philosophy of mind, the three subjects are now pursued
separately. Chomsky (1966) has himself suggested that this
resulting speculation without rational attempts at synthesis has
been detrimental to our knowledge of language and its function-
ing. A very cursory examination follows of each of ,these three
areas of philosophy, psychology and linguistics as they might
contribute to some of the questions posed above.

Philosophy

Philosophers have been concerned for the past thirty years with
the problems involved in how meaning is obtained through
language. If any current journal of philosophy, either British or
American, is selected it will be noticed that much of its content is
concerned with language and the strategies involved in language
functioning.
Wittgenstein, some thirty years ago, by his insistence that most
philosophical questions turned upon the meaning of the language
in which the questions were posed, inaugurated this movement for
clarity. He emphasized the problems which words impose upon
thought and also the problems which thought imposes upon words
and the ideas these words attempt to convey. He insisted that
meaning was the "meaning of the word in use" and that all
communcation was dependent upon both parties being aware of
the "language game" in which they were engaged. Language of
science will necessitate an entirely different set of rules and
strategies than the language of poetry. It is a different language
game.*
Austin (1962) distinguished between statements and the "per-
formative" "utterances" and finally replaced this with a more
inclusive general theory of "illocutionary" forms which have
"perlocutionary" effects. In attempting to analyze the impact of
language he termed a "performative" utterance, one in which we
purpose to be doing something in saying something: e.g. "I judge
this to be the best dog in the show" or "I promise ", or "I
appoint you ". These sentences are neither true nor false, but in

*cf., Wittgenstein, (1958).

20

the event that there is failure to do what is purported, the

utterance becomes null and void. An "illocutionary" utterance is
one which contains some sort of action. It contains the per-
formance of an act in saying something as opposed to the
performance of an act of saying something. Illocutionary acts are
those of informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc. "Per-
locutionary" effects are those which are brought about when
words such as "convince", "persuade", "deter", etc. produce the
desired results, e.g. "I persuaded him to stop teasing the cat".
These differing yet interlinked utterances producing acts are
differing senses or dimensions of the "use or a sentence", or of
"the use of language". There are, of course, many more differing
types of utterances than the three illustrated. However, discussion
of the purpose of utterance has obvious impact upon assimilation
of meaning.
The noted American philospher Quine (1960) has been explor-
ing the relationship of the notion of meaning and the linguistic
mechanisms of objective references, as expounded in his book
Word and Object. He insists that the meaning of a sentence is not
an external entity, but is embodied in the words used. The
problems of translation, explanation, and explication in terms of
language are explored. He examined the anomalies, ambiguities
and conflicts implicit in the referential implications of language. In
his most recent series of lectures — the Dewey lectures 1968 -
Quine (1968) is exploring "ontological relativity" as it pertains to
language. Quine recognized the complexity of the problems facing
us in language learning:
The semantic part of learning a word is more complex than
the phonetic part, therefore, even in simple cases, we have
to see what is stimulating the other speaker. In the case of
words not directly ascribing observable traits to things, the
learning process is increasingly complex and obscure; and
obsurity is the breeding place of mentalistic semantics. What
the naturalist insists on is that, even in the complex and
obscure parts of language learning, the learner has no data to
work with but the overt behaviour of other speakers, (p.
186)

He includes, however, the problem of extension reference and the

attendant difficulties upon our knowledge of these references.
Langer, on the other hand, found the ordinary language of
 21

words so complex for explaining exact meaning that she continued

the work of Whitehead and emphasized the value of symbolic
forms to convey logical ideas. In her most recent work (Langer,
1967) she is beginning to throw some light on cognitive
functioning and its relation to language. Her new attack on the
problem of mind and its functioning involves biology, bio-
chemistry and psychology as well as philosophy. She attempts to
contribute to a concept of mind adequate and'acceptable to both
the sciences and the humanities.

"The enormous power of language, whereby we are

enabled to form abstract concepts, concatenate them in
propositions, apply these to the world of perception and
action, making it into a world of "facts", and then
manipulate its facts by a process of reasoning, springs from
the simpleness of discursive projection", (p. 102)

These are but a few of the many philosophers who have turned
their attention to the elucidation and illumination of the way
ideas are conveyed through language and these studies and many
others are of obvious relevance to our study of reading and its
comprehension.
Another philosopher, (Findlay, 1968), has heartened me con-
siderably. He writes:

Modern philosophy is distinguished by the emergence of a

new question: how to give meaning to the expressions used
in ordinary and philosophical discourse. Earlier philosophers
simply inquired into the truth of this or that assertion,
without troubling to raise the prior question as to what
precisely such an assertion meant, or whether it really meant
anything at all. When the question of, sense has been raised,
it led to yet another inquiry: in what way or ways a sense
had been given to some assertion, or in what way or ways a
sense could be given to it. The question led to yet another
question... in what way or ways the sense of an expression
could be taught or imparted, so that many men could use
the expression in an identical way, and give it the same
sense. This obviously is a truly fundamental question. For it
is plain that most expressions acquire sense for use through a
process of teaching, (p. 72)
22

At least this indicates that the vital knowledge of language

functioning is capable of being learned and, therefore, presumably
of being taught.

Linguistics and Psycho-linguistics

Again, I can only suggest it is presumptuous of me to attempt in

a short period of time to indicate what further contributions
might be obtained from the linguists and particularly now because
of their closer relation to psycho-linguists.
Part of our problem has been in the past that there have been so
many differing schools of thought about language structure and
functions that it has been almost impossible for anyone outside
the field to make any appropriate synthesis of its findings. Perhaps
it was unfortunate, too, that in the fifties the interest of most
linguists in reading was concentrated almost exclusively upon the
grapheme-phoneme relationship. It is only more recently that
several of the branches of linguistics and psycho-linguistics have
begun to explore the effect of structure and lexical meaning on
the understanding of language.
Some descriptive linguists, interested primarily in analyzing
non-Western languages in order to provide viable writing systems
for them, produced grammars and alphabets adequate for their
purposes. Applied English linguists relate some of these descriptive
methods to the English language and writing system. Abercrombie
(1965) has begun to sharpen our awareness of the great differences
between actual everyday speech, on the one hand, and the "texts"
of spoken English analyzed by linguists and English deliberately
organized for visual presentation (prose), on the other. And
although Abercrombie's book is quite revealing, it does not
indicate the more subtle differences the reader must perceive to
obtain a meaning closely approximating what he might obtain
from the primary source of speech.
Lefevre (1964) was one of the first to point out the
implications for reading of the complex interplay of spoken and
written English language patterns - above the level of phonemes
and graphemes. He emphasized that in reading instruction we must
recognize and teach the essential grammaticaland syntactical clues
in printed English, particularly those that suggest intonation:
stress, tune, and junctures or terminals. Insensitivity to some of
these signals, I suspect, may underlie problems of differing
 23

interpretations that are accorded to much written material. As

Lefevre (1968) said in a recently published paper, intonation and
sentence patterns are critically important subsystems of the
English structural system and are essential to meaning in both
speech and writing; moreover, in addition to their lexical
meanings, the syntactical functions of words, signaled by gram-
matical inflections and derivational affixes, must be perceived as
important clues to meaning in reading printing English just as they
are in hearing English spoken.
At this point, apparently some linguists are beginning to explore
analyses of structures at higher levels than that of the single
sentence. This discourse analysis, it seems to me, will have an
important impact on our understanding of meaning as will be the
tagmemicists' analysis. Both these suggest the possibilities of
useful new insights into larger structures of the exposition of all
types of prose. The work in this field has primarily been directed
towards writing but it seems that it should have pertinence to
reading, too.
Undoubtedly the work of Chomsky and the transformational
grammarians in revealing that sentences, and thus discourse as a
whole, had both a surface and a deep meaning, has had much to
offer in expanding our knowledge of how meaning is conveyed.
The embeddedness of meaning in deep structures is apparently
learned comparatively easily by a child, but although he may use
the structures adequately in performance, he may face a very
difficult task when he receives these from others. Goodman
(1964), in his insistence on the types of miscues which can lead to
major errors in understanding, has indicated one of the most
productive ways of furthering our understanding, since it is often
by examination of errors made rather than by competence
revealed, that our knowledge in any field is enhanced. The
distinction which linguists have made between linguistic per-
formance and linguistic competence, as Wardhaugh (1968) has
suggested, may be a very important one for our assessing the
ability of students to obtain meaning from what they need. This
competence at the spoken level may vary quite considerably from
the linguistic performance in reading. It may be that the reader
will only catch the superficial interpretation and will fail to take
into account the more deeply embedded structural elements which
occur in the printed word. The printed word tends to be more
complex and thus contains more latent embeddedness. Inci-
24

dentally, the discrepancy between linguistic competence and

performance is very evident in children as some recent research by
Lyons and Wales (1966) in Britain has shown.
Again, in a sense, I have only dabbled in this vast field of
linguistics. My plea is, however, that we continue to use the
emerging findings of the linguists and incorporate these into our
theories and ultimately into our teaching or reading as efficiently
and effectively as possible.

Psychology

It is perhaps most difficult to summarize the contributions of

psychology to our knowledge of the reading process because they
are so diverse. A great many of the findings of behavioral analysis,
of child development, including child cognition, of general
learning theory, of theories of perception, and of problem solving
have been applied to the teaching of reading, but few have
examined these findings in the light of the mature reader obtaining
meaning. In addition, there are so few studies which have focused
in depth upon any one area which extend our knowledge of the
reading process per se.
The work on cognition is so far the most fruitful field.
Undoubtedly Guilford's (1959) model of the intellect has stimu-
lated many workers to explain the relationships between the
parameters suggested. When this model, however, was applied to
reading there were obvious gaps, inconsistencies, and invalidities.
Ausubel's (1967) concept of the pervasiveness of receptive
learning as opposed to the less frequent opportunities for
discovery learning is also pertinent. The reading process is
obviously one of the main vehicles for such receptive learning. The
need to know, the "epistemic curiosity" described by Berlyne
(1965) has also obvious implications, since books are still a prime
source of knowledge. Skinner's concept of verbal behaviour is also
pertinent. Perhaps we are in more need of workers such as Carroll,
who synthesized both in 1959 and 1964 the relationships between
psychology and language, than we are of direct researchers.
The concept of the impact of a distinctive cognitive style on all
aspects of personality variables, including those of attitudes,
flexibility and ability to tolerafe ambivalence, is receiving
attention from a variety of psychologists, but as yet there is little
to be applied to reading.
 25

The psychology of motivation, including that of interest, is

moving forward too, but again the results are scattered and still
appear to apply to experimental rather to real life situations. We
need to know more than the superficial interest of what and why
people read, but also how they read. The attempt by Gray and
Rogers (1956) remains the only thorough study which tries to
assess the differing levels of adult reading competence linked with
their interests.
There have been a few attempts, mostly by people within the
field of reading, to analyze the reading process, but again few of
these have dealt with mature readers. The majority of these studies
have examined errors made in comprehension in an effort to
determine what caused differing interpretive responses. Strang
(1965) has given an admirable summary of these to 1965.
Thus, from a psychological point of view, the reading process is
dependent upon a reader's prerequisites for learning, his language
competence (including reading) and his attitudes and goals. Yet,
all these may be vitiated by chemical or neurological factors, of
which our knowledge is still minimal.

Conclusion

I have merely explored some of the fringes of those areas of

knowledge which seem to impinge upon the eternal conundrum of
the meaning of meaning in reading. To develop an appropriate
theory, it is evident that we need to bring together related
disciplines in co-ordinated research efforts. The most productive
insights frequently emerge from the interplay and friction between
the differences of disparate disciplines, from the interfaces where
the knowledge of one area borders on another. Regretfully, too,
frequently one discipline disparages another, and ' I can only
deplore that too often people in the reading field have reacted
negatively to some of the attempts of other disciplines to explain
the reading process. But other scholars must also share some of the
blame. I think all partners in this future voyage of discovery into
the nature of the reading process must move forward in humility,
each recognizing the limitations of his own discipline honestly, but
also ensuring that the wide avenues of educational epistemology
are continually kept open.
In this discussion I have probably revealed my own ignorance
more than enlightened yours and undoubtedly as Gray once wrote
26

of the Eton College boys:

Thought would destroy their paradise
No more: where ignorance is bliss
Tis folly to be wise.
No doubt it has been foolish wisdom to dally in this, the various
sources of knowledge which might illumine the reading process.
Yet again, I am reminded of an appropriate section of Lewis
Carroll's Alice through the Looking Glass, a section favoured by
philosophers.

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather

scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean,
neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words
mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
the master, that's all."

This passage is usually used to emphasize the intractibility of

language. In reading, the meanings of words, lexical, syntactical
and structural, determine to a large extent what the reader can
comprehend of the writer's ideas. Unless this is so, then the other
Humpty Dumpty fable must ensue, and "We shall never put him
together again."
 27

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