RULE 110-127

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CASE SYLLABUS
Sec.1.INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION

G.R. No. 139930. June 26, criminal Procedure; Prescription; Behest Loans;

2012.* In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the
Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the
REPUBLIC OF THE discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. the government, as aggrieved party, could not have
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, known that those loans existed when they were
JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, made.—In the prosecution of cases of behest loans,
MARIA CLARA LOBREGAT, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the
JOSE ELEAZAR, JR., JOSE discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that
CONCEPCION, ROLANDO P. the government, as aggrieved party, could not have
DELA CUESTA, EMMANUEL known that those loans existed when they were
M. ALMEDA, made. Both parties to such loans supposedly
HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, conspired to perpetrate fraud against the
NARCISO M. PINEDA, IÑ AKI government. They could only have been discovered
R. MENDEZONA, DANILO S. after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people
URSUA, TEODORO D. ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to
REGALA, VICTOR P. that date, no person would have dared question the
LAZATIN, ELEAZAR B. legality or propriety of the loans.
REYES, EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA, Same; Same; Prescription of actions is a valued
DOUGLAS LU YM, rule in all civilized states from the beginning of
SIGFREDO VELOSO and organized society.—Prescription of actions is a
JAIME GANDIAGA, valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning
respondents Republic vs. of organized society. It is a rule of fairness since,
Cojuangco, Jr., 674 SCRA without it, the plaintiff can postpone the filing of his
492, G.R. No. 139930 June action to the point of depriving the defendant,
26, 2012 through the passage of time, of access to defense
witnesses who would have died or left to live
elsewhere, or to documents that would have been
discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover,
the memories of witnesses are eroded by time.
There is an absolute need in the interest of fairness
to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long
to file in court.

G.R. No. 169588. October Criminal Law; Prescription of Offenses; In

7, 2013.* resolving the issue of prescription of the offense
JADEWELL PARKING charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
SYSTEMS CORPORATION period of prescription for the offense charged; (2)
represented by its manager the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and authorized and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
representative Norma Tan, interrupted.―In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, 470
petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE SCRA 754 (2005), this Court defined the
NELSON F. LIDUA, SR., parameters of prescription: [I]n resolving the issue
Presiding Judge of The of prescription of the offense charged, the following
 Municipal Trial Court should be considered: (1) the period of prescription
Branch 3, Baguio City, for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
EDWIN ANG, “JOHN DOES” prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard to
and “PETER DOES”, the period of prescription, it is now without
respondents. Jadewell question that it is two months for the offense
Parking System charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
Corporation vs. Lidua, Sr.,
706 SCRA 724, G.R. No. Same; Same; The commencement of the
169588 October 7, 2013 prescription period of offenses is governed by
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.―The
commencement of the prescription period is also
governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code reads: Art. 91. Computation of prescription of
offenses.—The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him. The offense was
committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by
the attendants of the petitioner on the same day.
These actions effectively commenced the running of
the prescription period.

Local Government Units; Component Cities; An

independent component city has a charter that
proscribes its voters from voting for provincial
elective officials.―Cities in the Philippines that were
created by law can either be highly urbanized cities
or component cities. An independent component
city has a charter that proscribes its voters from
voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that
all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities.
In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,
31 Phil. 524 (1915), this Court recognized the
validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No.
1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of
Baguio City.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure;

Prescription of Offenses; Summary Procedure;
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is
involved in an ordinance.―As provided in the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the
filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period
where the crime charged is involved in an
 ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when
he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia
v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of a
municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also
featured similar facts and issues with the present
case. In that case, the offense was committed on
May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May
30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990.

Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no distinction

between the filing of the Information contemplated
in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules
of Summary Procedure.―There is no distinction
between the filing of the Information contemplated
in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules
of Summary Procedure. When the representatives
of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription
period was running. It continued to run until the
filing of the Information. They had two months to
file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the
preliminary investigation, the original charge of
Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the
violation of the ordinance did not alter the period
within which to file the Information. Respondents
were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had
two months from the discovery and commission of
the offense

G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. Criminal Law; Libel; Prescription; In determining
October 19, 2004.* when the one-year prescriptive period should be
ROBERTO BRILLANTE, reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of
petitioner, vs. COURT OF the same code which sets forth the rule on the
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE computation of prescriptive periods of offenses.—
OF THE PHILIPPINES, With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth
respondents. Brillante vs. paragraph of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code
Court of Appeals, 440 SCRA provides that the “crime of libel or other similar
541, G.R. Nos. 118757 & offenses shall prescribe in one year.” In determining
121571 October 19, 2004 when the one- year prescriptive period should be
reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of
the same code which sets forth the rule on the
computation of prescriptive periods of offenses.

Same; Same; Same; The filing of the complaint for

purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts
 the period of prescription of criminal responsibility.
—The meaning of the phrase “shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaint or information” in
Article 91 has been settled in the landmark case of
People v. Olarte, where the Court settled divergent
views as to the effect of filing a complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary
investigation on the prescriptive period of the
offense. The Court therein held that the filing of the
complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation
interrupts the period of prescription of criminal
responsibility.

Same; Same; Same; The filing of the complaint

with the fiscal’s office also suspends the running of
the prescriptive period of a crime.—The Court in
Francisco v. Court of Appeals clarified that the filing
of the complaint with the fiscal’s office also
suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
crime:

G.R. No. 152662. June 13, Criminal Law; Prescription of Offenses; Since BP

2012.* Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
PEOPLE OF THE imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. not more than one year or by a fine for its violation,
MA. THERESA it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in
PANGILINAN, respondent. accordance with the aforecited law.—Since BP Blg.
People vs. Pangilinan, 672 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
SCRA 105, G.R. No. 152662 imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
June 13, 2012 not more than one year or by a fine for its violation,
it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The running of
the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the
guilty person.

Same; Same; There is no more distinction between

cases under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription.—There
is no more distinction between cases under the RPC
and those covered by special laws with respect to
the interruption of the period of prescription. The
ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., 211 SCRA 277 (1992),
is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v.
Dicdican, 260 SCRA 207 (1996), Ingco, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997), , cases
involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et
 al., 567 SCRA 354 (2008), the Court even ruled that
investigations conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code
effectively interrupts the prescription period
because it is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases.

G.R. No. 167571.  Same; Prescription; Act No. 3326, appropriately

November 25, 2008.* entitled an Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the
petitioner, vs. law applicable to offenses under special laws which
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, do not provide their wn prescriptive periods.—
RAMON C. TONGSON and There is no question that Act No. 3326,
RODRIGO G. CAWILI, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish
respondents. Panaguiton, Jr. Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
vs. Department of Justice, Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
571 SCRA 549, G.R. No. Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to
167571 November 25, 2008 offenses under special laws which do not provide
their own prescriptive periods.

Same; Same; Act No. 3326 applies to offenses

under B.P. Blg. 22.—We agree that Act. No. 3326
applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense
under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under
Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in
four (4) years from the commission of the offense
or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold
the position that only the filing of a case in court
can toll the running of the prescriptive
period.Same; Same; The prescriptive period is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused.—In
Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997) and
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 546 SCRA 303
(2008), which involved violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which
are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution
of proceedings for preliminary investigation against
the accused. In the more recent case of Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al., 567 SCRA 354 (2008), the Court
ruled that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
 Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to
the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ
in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the
prescriptive period.

Same; Same; Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-

affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on
24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and
thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P.
Blg. 22.—We rule and so hold that the offense has
not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his
complaint–affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive 551VOL. 571,
NOVEMBER 25, 2008551Panaguiton, Jr. vs.
Department of Justiceperiod for the offenses they
had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover,
since there is a definite finding of probable cause,
with the debunking of the claim of prescription
there is no longer any impediment to the filing of
the information against petitioner.

G.R. No. 166510.  April 29, Prescription; Criminal Complaints; Anti-Graft

2009.* and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Criminal
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the prescriptive
PEOPLE OF THE period is tolled only when the Office of the
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise
BENJAMIN “KOKOY” initiates its investigation.—The rule is that for
ROMUALDEZ, and criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
SANDIGANBAYAN, prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of
respondent. People vs. the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise
Romualdez, 587 SCRA 123, initiates its investigation. As such preliminary
G.R. No. 166510 April 29, investigation was commenced more than fifteen
2009 (15) years after the imputed acts were committed,
the offense had already prescribed as of such time.

Same; Same; The amendment of a criminal

complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the
original complaint.—The flaw was so fatal that the
information could not have been cured or
resurrected by mere amendment, as a new
preliminary investigation had to be undertaken,
and evidence had again to be adduced before a new
information could be filed. The rule may well be
that the amendment of a criminal complaint
retroacts to the time of the filing of the original
complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the
 original information is void ab initio, thus incurable
by amendment.
SEC.2. THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

No. L-58595. October 10, Criminal Procedure; While a mere sworn

1983.* narration of how a private crime was committed is
not sufficient basis for filing information, a similar
PEOPLE OF THE sworn narration which also explicitly states that
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. offended party is formally charging the offenders.—
HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, The ruling in Santos is not applicable to the case at
in his capacity as Presiding bar. In that case, the “salaysay” executed by
Judge, CFI of Iloilo, Br. V, complainant Bansuelo was not considered the
CECILE SANTIBAÑ EZ and complaint contemplated by Article 344 of the
AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, Revised Penal Code because it was a more narration
respondents. People vs. of how the crime of rape was committed against
Ilarde, 125 SCRA 11, No. L- her. However, in the affidavit-complaint submitted
58595 October 10, 1983 by Efraim Santibañ ez, the latter not only narrated
the facts and circumstances constituting the crime
of adultery, but he also explicitly and categorically
charged private respondents with the said offense.

G.R. No. 173637. April 21, Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice;

2009.* Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; The
certification against forum shopping is required to
DANTE T. TAN, petitioner, be executed by the plaintiff; The petition before the
vs. PEOPLE OF THE Court of Appeals originated from Criminal Case No.
PHILIPPINES, respondents. 119830 where the plaintiff or the party instituting
Tan vs. People, 586 SCRA the case was the People of the Philippines; Acting
139, G.R. No. 173637 April Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Merceditas
21, 2009 N. Gutierrez being the head of the DOJ had the
authority to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping for Criminal Case No. 119830 which was
filed on behalf of the People of the Philippines.—
The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the
authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas
Gutierrez to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping of the petition for certiorari before said
court. It must be stressed that the certification
against forum shopping is required to be executed
by the plaintiff. Although the complaint-affidavit
was signed by the Prosecution and Enforcement
Department of the SEC, the petition before the
Court of Appeals originated from Criminal Case No.
119830, where the plaintiff or the party instituting
the case was the People of the Philippines. Section
2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for
doubt and establishes that criminal cases are
prosecuted in the name of the People of the
Philippines, the offended party in criminal cases.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 3, paragraph_ 2) of
 the Revised Administrative Code, the DOJ is the
executive arm of the government mandated to
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders and administer the probation and
correction system. It is the DOJ, through its
prosecutors, which is authorized to prosecute
criminal cases on behalf of the People of the
Philippines. Prosecutors control and direct the
prosecution of criminal offenses, including the
conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to
review by the Secretary of Justice. Since it is the DOJ
which is the government agency tasked to
prosecute criminal cases before the trial court, the
DOJ is best suited to attest whether a similar or
related case has been filed or is pending in another
court of tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas
N. Gutierrez, being the head of the DOJ, therefore,
had the authority to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping for Criminal Case No. 119830,
which was filed on behalf of the People of the
Philippines.

FALSE TESTIMONY; REPEAL OF ACT No. 1697;

LAW NOW APPLICABLE.—By the mere
[No. 11676. October 17, interpretation of this court in various decisions, Act
1916.] No. 1697 was deemed to have repealed certain
THE UNITED STATES, articles of the Penal Code relative to false
plaintiff and appellee, vs. testimony, notwithstanding that the said Act did not
ANDRES PABLO, defendant expressly repeal them; and as the final article and
and appellant. United States section of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657),
vs. Pablo., 35 Phil. 94, No. paragraph 2, has totally repealed the said Act No.
11676 October 17, 1916 1697, without stating that the articles of the Penal
Code relating to false testimony comprised within
the term of perjury were likewise repealed; and if it
is undeniable that the community must necessarily
punish perjury or false testimony, and if it is
impossible to conceive that crimes of, this kind may
go immune and be freely committed without any
punishment at all, because the liberty to pervert the
truth, in sworn testimony for the very reason that it
might save a guilty party from punishment, might
also determine the conviction and punishment of an
innocent party, the conclusion is inevitable that
there must be some previous and preexisting law
which punishes perjury or false testimony—a
punishment required by good morals and by the
law, even in a society of mediocre culture, in order
to avoid incalculable harm and resultant
disturbances which might affect public order.
 2. ID. ; ID.; ID.—For the reasons above stated and
in view of the provisions of Law 2, Title 2, Book 3, of
the Novísima Recopilació n, the needs of society
demand that articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code
be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the said
Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act on
perjury, did not explicitly declare that the said
articles of the Penal Code were likewise repealed.
United States vs. Pablo., 35 Phil. 94, No. 11676
October 17, 1916
SEC.3. COMPLAINT DEFINED

No. L-24689. December 26, Same; Same; Prosecution of offenses; Sufficiency

1969. of complaint or information; Defect of the
THE PEOPLE OF THE complaint's being subscribed to before the
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- municipal mayor instead of before the municipal
appellee, vs. HERMOGENES judge is one of form.—Under the Rules, a complaint
CAYOSA, defendant- is substantially sufficient if it states the name of the
appellant. People vs. defendant, the designation of the offense by statute,
Cayosa, 30 SCRA 806, No. L- the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the
24689 December 26, 1969 name of the offended party, the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place
where it was committed. The defect that the
complaint was subscribed to before the municipal
mayor instead of before the municipal judge is
clearly one of form that is curable by amendment.
For even the absence of an oath in the complaint
does not necessarily render it invalid unless the
complaint charged a private offense under Articles
344 and 360 of the Revised Penal Code. People vs.
Cayosa, 30 SCRA 806, No. L-24689 December 26,
1969

G.R. No. 130408. June 16, Criminal Procedure; Complaints; Judicial Notice;
2000.* Evidence; Formal Offer of Evidence; A complaint
presented by a private person when not sworn to
PEOPLE OF THE by him, is not necessarily void—the want of an oath
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- is a mere defect of form which does not affect the
appellee, vs. DOMINADOR substantial rights of the defendant on the merits;
HISTORILLO, accused- The failure of the prosecution to formally offer in
appellant People vs. evidence the sworn complaint of the offended party
Historillo, 333 SCRA 615, or the failure to adhere to the rules is not fatal and
G.R. No. 130408 June 16, does not oust the court of its jurisdiction to hear
2000 and decide the case—if the complaint is forwarded
to the Court as part of the record of the preliminary
investigation of the case, the court can take judicial
notice of the same without the necessity of its
formal introduction as evidence of the prosecution.
—A complaint presented by a private person when
not sworn to by him, is not necessarily void. The
want of an oath is a mere defect of form which does
not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on
 the merits. Such being the case, it is not permissible
to set aside a judgment for such a defect. Also, the
failure of the prosecution to formally offer in
evidence the sworn complaint of the offended party
or the failure to adhere to the rules is not fatal and
does not oust the court of its jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. If the complaint is forwarded
to the Court as part of the record of the preliminary
investigation of the case, the court can take judicial
notice of the same without the necessity of its
formal introduction as evidence of the prosecution.
People vs. Historillo, 333 SCRA 615, G.R. No.
130408 June 16, 2000

G.R. Nos. 140576-99. same; Same; Parties; Offended Party; The

December 13, 2004.* interest of the party must be personal; and not one
based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., right of some third and unrelated party.—Under
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be
Division), ALBANO & a private individual whose person, right, house,
ASSOCIATES and the liberty or property was actually or directly injured
ASSOCIATION OF by the same punishable act or omission of the
GENERALS & FLAG accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged
OFFICERS, INC., or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such
respondents. Ramiscal, Jr. party must be one who has a legal right; a
vs. Sandiganbayan, 446 substantial interest in the subject matter of the
SCRA 166, G.R. Nos. action as will entitle him to recourse under the
140576-99 December 13, substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is
2004 sufficient or that he has the legal right to the
demand and the accused will be protected by the
satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must
not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or
inconsequential. The interest of the party must be
personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated
party. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 446 SCRA
166, G.R. Nos. 140576-99 December 13, 2004

Same; Same; Same; Same; A party cannot be

G.R. No. 119063. January allowed to disown statements he made under oath
27, 1997.* and in open court when it serves his purpose—this
is a contemptible practice which can only mislead
JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner, the courts and thereby contribute to injustice.—The
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of
PEOPLE OF THE the private respondent’s motion to quash are
PHILIPPINES and ADELA inconclusive. The petitioner cannot be allowed to
TEODORA P. SANTOS, disown statements he made under oath and in open
respondents. Garcia vs. court when it serves his purpose. This is a
Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA contemptible practice which can only mislead the
678, G.R. No. 119063 courts and thereby contribute to injustice. Besides,
January 27, 1997 he never denied having given the pertinent
 testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it
was not clear whether the prior marriage which
Eugenia Balingit disclosed to him was that entered
into by the private respondent with Reynaldo
Quiroca. It is immaterial to whom the private
respondent was first married; what is relevant in
this case is that the petitioner was informed of a
prior marriage contracted by the private
respondent. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA
678, G.R. No. 119063 January 27, 1997

No. L-27018. August 30, Criminal procedure; Complaint; Peace officer

1972. designated as acting chief of police with authority
to file complaint.—Section 2 of Rule 110 of the
AMORSOLO R. MANZANO, Rules of Court defines a complaint as a “sworn
petitioner-appellant, vs. written statement charging a person with an
JUDGE PATROCINIO S. offense subscribed by the offended party, any peace
VILLA,the MUNICIPAL officer or other employee of the government or
JUDGE OF VICTORIA, governmental institution in charge of the
TARLAC and the CHIEF OF enforcement or execution of the law violated.” The
POLICE OF police sergeant who filed the complaints was a
VICTORIA,TARLAC, member of the municipal police force of Victoria,
respondents-appellees. Tarlac, and therefore a peace officer with authority
Manzano vs. Villa, 46 SCRA to file the complaints in question. The fact that at
711, No. L-27018 August the time he did so he was acting as chief of police
30, 1972 without formal appointment but merely by
designation of the Mayor did not divest him of that
authority. In either capacity, he remained a peace
officer. Manzano vs. Villa, 46 SCRA 711, No. L-
27018 August 30, 1972

[No. 49046. November 22, 1.Criminal Procedure; Mandamus Does not Lie

1943]Marcelo Dimaunahan, to Compel Chief of Police to Subscribe and
petitioner-appellant, vs. Swear to a Criminal Complaint.— Before the
Hon. Diego Aranas and A. M. accused were arraigned on the original complaint
Vergara, respondents- for less serious physical injuries, the private
appellees. Dimaunahan vs. prosecutor tended a second amended complaint
Aranas and Vergara, 74 charging the accused with serious physical injuries,
Phil., 455, No. 49046 but the chief of police refused to sign it and the
November 22, 1943 justice of the peace denied the oral petition of the
private prosecutor to order the chief of police to
sign it. Held: That mandamus does not lie against
either the chief of police or the justice of the peace.
To subscribe and swear to a criminal complaint is
not a ministerial but a discretionary act of a peace
officer. To coerce him by mandamus to perform
such an act would make him a mere robot and
nullify the oath.
 2.Id.; Procedure Where Offended Party Desires
to Amend His Complaint.—All criminal actions
must be commenced either by complaint or
information. (Section 1, Rule 106.) "Complaint is a
sworn written statement charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the offended party, any
peace officer or other employee of the Government
or governmental institution in charge of the
enforcement or execution of the law violated."
(Section 2, id.) Thus, under the law the offended
party himself may subscribe and swear to the
complaint in question. The correct procedure for
him to follow was to ask for the dismissal of the
original complaint for less serious physical injuries
and to file another complaint for serious physical
injuries, subscribed and sworn to by himself. The
justice of the peace would have to accept it and give
it due course by holding the preliminary
investigation required by Rule 108. Should the
justice of the peace refuse to issue the warrant of
arrest after the preliminary investigation, and
should the offended party be dissatisfied with the
action of the justice of the peace, he could appeal to
the provincial fiscal. This goes to show that
appellant has not been excluded from the use and
enjoyment of a right; he simply did not know how
to exercise his right. Dimaunahan vs. Aranas and
Vergara, 74 Phil., 455, No. 49046 November 22,
1943
SEC.4. INFORMATION DEFINED
G.R. No. 124453. March 15, Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Witnesses; A
2000.* THE PEOPLE OF young girl’s revelation that she has been raped,
THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
appellee, vs. JOSEPH examination and willingness to undergo public trial
PAMBID y CORNELIO, where she could be compelled to give details of the
accused-appellant. People assault on her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as
vs. Pambid, 328 SCRA 158, mere concoction.—Maricon had no motive to falsely
G.R. No. 124453 March 15, claim that she had been raped by accused-appellant
2000 if this was not true. We have ruled that a young
girl’s revelation that she has been raped, coupled
with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial
where she could be compelled to give details of the
assault on her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as
mere concoction. If her story had only been
contrived, she would not have been so composed
and consistent throughout her entire testimony in
the face of intense and lengthy interrogation.
Maricon’s testimony is likewise corroborated by
medical findings of hymenal lacerations. The
evidence on record thus supports the trial court’s
finding that accused-appellant is guilty of raping
 Maricon.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The testimony of rape

victims who are young and immature deserves full
credence, specially if they are without any motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellant.—As we
have held time and again, the testimony of rape
victims who are young and immature deserves full
credence, specially if they are without any motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellant. In this
case, accused-appellant offered no evidence to
show that Maricon was impelled by any ulterior
motive to fabricate a story of defloration against
him. The fact that Maricon failed to immediately
inform any member of her family about the two
rape incidents was understandable considering the
threats made by accused-appellant.

Same; Same; Same; In rape cases, the time of

commission of the crime is not a “material
ingredient of the offense.”—It is true that the
supposed dates of the two rape incidents were not
alleged in the information. But, as held in People v.
Dimapilis, under Rule 110, §§6 and 11 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, an information is sufficient
as long as it states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constituting the
same, since in rape cases, the time of commission of
the crime is not “a material ingredient of the
offense.” It is thus sufficient if it is alleged that the
crime took place “as near to the actual date at which
the offense(s) are committed as the information or
complaint will permit.” We also ruled that in rape
cases, victims of rape hardly retain in their
memories the dates, number of times and manner
they were violated. In the same vein, to be material,
discrepancies in the testimony of the victim should
refer to significant facts which are determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused, not to mere
details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime, such as the exact time of its commission in
cases of rape, and are not grounds for acquittal.
People vs. Pambid, 328 SCRA 158, G.R. No. 124453
March 15, 2000

G.R. No. 121671. August 14, Same; Same; Same; Same; The accused cannot be
1998.* convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is
alleged or necessarily included in the information
PEOPLE OF THE filed against him.—“The hornbook doctrine in our
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted
appellee, vs. WILLY of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
MANALILI y BOLISAY and complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a
 DANILO REYES y right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
MAMNILA, accused- accusation against him. To convict him of an offense
appellants. People vs. other than that charged in the complaint or
Manalili, 294 SCRA 220, information would be violative of this constitutional
G.R. No. 121671 August 14, right.” Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a
1998 crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against
him. People vs. Manalili, 294 SCRA 220, G.R. No.
121671 August 14, 1998

Criminal Procedure; Informations; Pleadings and

Practice; It is hornbook doctrine that what
determines the real nature and cause of the
accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the information or complaint and not
the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law.—The foregoing, we repeat, was
embodied in the Information for a crime which the
trial court designated as “qualified illegal
possession of firearms used in multiple murder.” It
is hornbook doctrine, however, that “what
determines the real nature and cause of the
accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the information or complaint and not
the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law.” From its recital of facts, said
Information charged appellants with the offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and murder. Thus, the
scope of this review encompasses the offenses
actually charged in the Information, which the
prosecution sought to prove. People vs. Manalili,
294 SCRA 220, G.R. No. 121671 August 14, 1998

G.R. Nos.143618-41. July Criminal Procedure; Informations; An invalid

30, 2002.* BENJAMIN information, is no information at all and cannot be
“Kokoy” ROMUALDEZ, the basis for criminal proceedings; The information
petitioner, vs. THE may be quashed where the officer who filed it had
HONORABLE no authority to do so.—In the case at bar, the flaw
SANDIGANBAYAN (First in the information is not a mere remediable defect
Division) and THE PEOPLE of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the
OF THE PHILIPPINES wording of the certification in the information was
represented by SPECIAL found inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where
PROCECUTION OFFICER II the required certification was absent. Here, the
EVELYN TAGOBA LUCERO, informations were filed by an unauthorized party.
respondents. Romualdez vs. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting
Sandiganbayan, 385 SCRA another preliminary investigation. An invalid
436, G.R. Nos.143618-41 information, is no information at all and cannot be
July 30, 2002 the basis for criminal proceedings. In fact, where an
 information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, it is subject to quashal. More
particularly, the information may be quashed
where the officer who filed it had no authority to do
so.

Same; Same; Criminal due process requires that

the accused must be proceeded against under
the orderly processes of law.—Criminal due
process requires that the accused must be
proceeded against under the orderly processes of
law. In all criminal cases, the judge should follow
the step-by-step procedure required by the Rules.
The reason for this is to assure that the State makes
no mistake in taking the life or liberty except that of
the guilty.

Same; Same; The infirmity in the information

caused by lack of authority of the officer signing it
cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence or even by
express consent.—We ruled that the infirmity in the
information caused by lack of authority of the
officer signing it cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence or even by express consent. A new
information must be filed by the proper office.
Same; Same; Petitioner’s right was violated when
the preliminary investigation of the charges against
him were conducted by an officer without
jurisdiction over the said cases.—The
Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of
discretion when it abruptly terminated the
reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor
Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in
G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary
investigation was based on our ruling that the right
to a preliminary investigation is a substantive,
rather than a procedural right. Petitioner’s right
was violated when the preliminary investigation of
the charges against him were conducted by an
officer without jurisdiction over the said cases. It
bears stressing that our directive should be strictly
complied with in order to achieve its objective of
affording petitioner his right to due process.
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 385 SCRA 436, G.R.
Nos.143618-41 July 30, 2002

A.M. No. RTJ-04- Criminal Procedure; Informations; The

1837.March 23, 2004.* information need not be under oath, the reason
therefore being principally that the prosecuting
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 03- officer filing it is charged with the special duty in
regard thereto and is acting under special
 1722-RTJ) VISITACION L. responsibility of his oath of office.—There is no
ESTODILLO, ET AL., requirement that the information be sworn to.
complainants, vs. JUDGE Otherwise, the rules would have so provided as it
TEOFILO D. BALUMA, does in a complaint which is defined as a “sworn
respondent Estodillo vs. written statement charging a person with an
Baluma, 426 SCRA 83, A.M. offense, subscribed by the offended party, any
No. RTJ-04-1837 March 23, peace officer, or other public officer charged with
2004 the enforcement of the law violated.” In a case, we
ruled that the information need not be under oath,
the reason therefore being principally that the
prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the
special duty in regard thereto and is acting under
the special responsibility of his oath of office.
Clearly, respondent had confused an information
from a complaint Estodillo vs. Baluma, 426 SCRA
83, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837 March 23, 2004
SEC.5. WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTION

G.R. No. 163797. April 24, Criminal Procedure; Public Prosecutors; The
2007.* rationale for the rule that all criminal actions shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of a
WILSON CHUA, RENITA public prosecutor is that since a criminal offense is
CHUA, THE SECRETARY OF an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it
JUSTICE and THE CITY necessarily follows that a representative of the
PROSECUTOR OF LUCENA State shall direct and control the prosecution
CITY, petitioners, vs. thereof.—Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of
RODRIGO PADILLO and Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly provides
MARIETTA PADILLO, that “All criminal actions either commenced by a
respondents. Chua vs. complaint or information shall be prosecuted under
Padillo, 522 SCRA 60, G.R. the direction and control of a public prosecutor.”
No. 163797 April 24, 2007 The rationale for this rule is that since a criminal
offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State,
it necessarily follows that a representative of the
State shall direct and control the prosecution
thereof. In Suarez v. Platon, 80 Phil. 556 (1940), this
Court described the prosecuting officer as: [T]he
representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.

Same; Same; The public prosecutor, in the exercise

of his functions, has the power and discretion to: (a)
determine whether a prima facie case exists, (b)
decide which of the conflicting testimonies should
be believed free from the interference or control of
the offended party, and (c) subject only to the right
against self-incrimination, determine which
witnesses to present in court; While the public
prosecutor is bound by his oath of office to
prosecute who, according to complainant’s
evidence, are shown to be guilty of a crime, he is
likewise dutybound to protect innocent persons
from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution.—
Having been vested by law with the control of the
prosecution of criminal cases, the public
prosecutor, in the exercise of his functions, has the
power and discretion to: (a) determine whether a
prima facie case exists; (b) decide which of the
conflicting testimonies should be believed free from
the interference or control of the offended party;
and (c) subject only to the right against
selfincrimination, determine which witnesses to
present in court. Given his discretionary powers, a
public prosecutor cannot be compelled to file an
Information where he is not convinced that the
evidence before him would warrant the filing of an
action in court. For while he is bound by his oath of
office to prosecute persons who, according to
complainant’s evidence, are shown to be guilty of a
crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect
innocent persons from groundless, false, or
malicious prosecution.

Same; Same; The Secretary of Justice may affirm,

nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of said
prosecutor, and, in turn, the Court of Appeals may
review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.—We must
stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s
exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute.
First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
is subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who,
under the Administrative Code of 1987, as
amended, exercises control and supervision over
the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of
Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the
ruling of said prosecutor.” In special cases, the
public prosecutor’s decision may even be reversed
or modified by the Office of the President. Second,
the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, on the ground that he committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Not

even the Supreme Court can order the
 prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case—the only
possible exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the prosecutor.—Grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. We have carefully examined the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated January
3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no
probable cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita
Chua for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents. As found by the Court of Appeals, the
Secretary of Justice either overlooked or patently
ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissa’s
practice of depositing checks, with altered names of
payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and
Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa
are husband and wife makes it difficult to believe
that one has no idea of the transactions entered into
by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto
Alcantara dated November 26, 1998 confirming
that Wilson had knowledge of Marissa’s illegal
activities. Indeed, as we ruled in Sanchez v.
Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 (1983), not even the
Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find
sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie
case. The only possible exception to this rule is
where there is an unmistakable showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, as
in this case. Chua vs. Padillo, 522 SCRA 60, G.R. No.
163797 April 24, 2007

Criminal Law; It is on the account that violations of

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944. criminal laws are an affront to the People of the
December 13, 2005.* Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person
directly prejudiced that the presence of a public
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05- prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is
2189-RTJ.) STATE necessary.—Violation of criminal laws is an affront
PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not
PINOTE, petitioner, vs. merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being
JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, merely the complaining witness. It is on this
respondent Pinote vs. Ayco, account that the presence of a public prosecutor in
477 SCRA 409, A.M. No. the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect
RTJ-05-1944 December 13, vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest
2005 to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of
the people.

Courts; Judges; Criminal Procedure; Due

Process; Absence of Prosecutor; The act of a
 judge in allowing the presentation of the defense
witness in the absence of the complainant public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for
the purpose is a clear transgression of the Rules
which could not be rectified by subsequently giving
the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the
witness.—Respondent’s act of allowing the
presentation of the defense witnesses in the
absence of complainant public prosecutor or
aprivate prosecutor designated for the purpose is
thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could
not be rectified by subsequently giving the
prosecution a chance to cross-examine the
witnesses. Respondent’s intention to uphold the
right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the
case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify
a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to
due process, so is the State. Pinote vs. Ayco, 477
SCRA 409, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944 December 13,
2005

Nos. L-41213-14. October 5, Criminal procedure; Prosecution of offenses;

1976.* Prosecution officer, as representative of State, with
JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR control and direction of and responsibility for
TAN, LIBRADO SODE, prosecution.—Since a criminal offense is an outrage
TEOFANIS BONJOC, to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that
OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and the representatives of the State should direct and
MARIANO BARTIDO, control the prosecution. The prosecuting officer “‘is
petitioners, vs. JUDGE the representative not of an ordinary party to a
PEDRO GALLARDO, in his controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
capacity as Presiding Judge to govern impartially is as compelling as its
of Circuit Criminal Court, obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
13th Judicial District, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
Tacloban City, and PEOPLE shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
OF THE PHILIPPINES, such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
respondents. Tan, Jr. vs. servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306, Nos. guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
L-41213-14 October 5, prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he
1976 should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.’”

Same; Same; Prime duty of prosecuting officer to

see to it that the innocent may not suffer and the
guilty may not escape unpunished.—There is an
absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay
“before the court the pertinent facts at their
disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and
 loopholes in their evidence, to the end that court’s
mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the
innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape
unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution’s
prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the
state.” It is for the purpose of realizing these
objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed
under the direction, control, and responsibility of
the prosecuting officer. Tan, Jr. vs. Gallardo, 73
SCRA 306, Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976

Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigations;

G.R. No. 96229. March 25, Separation of Powers; Prosecutors; Judges;
1997.* Preliminary investigation is an executive, not a
judicial, function.—It must be stressed that
PEOPLE OF THE preliminary investigation is an executive, not a
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. judicial, function. As the officer authorized to direct
HON. GLORIOSA S. and control the prosecution of all criminal actions, a
NAVARRO, as Presiding prosecutor is primarily responsible for ascertaining
Judge, Regional Trial Court, whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
Branch 20, Naga City, well-founded belief that an offense has been
respondent. People vs. committed and that the accused is probably guilty
Navarro, 270 SCRA 393, thereof. An RTC judge, on the other hand, has no
G.R. No. 96229 March 25, authority to conduct a preliminary investigation.
1997
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That an RTC
judge has no authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation necessarily means that he cannot
directly order an assistant prosecutor, particularly
over the objections of the latter’s superiors, to
conduct a preliminary investigation.—In setting
aside the order of Prosecutor Cajot which granted
the withdrawal of the complaint, and subsequently
ordering Prosecutor Llaguno to conduct the
required preliminary investigation, respondent
judge clearly encroached on an executive function.
That an RTC judge has no authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation necessarily means that he
cannot directly order an assistant prosecutor,
particularly over the objections of the latter’s
superiors, to conduct a preliminary investigation.
To allow him to do so is to authorize him to meddle
in the executive and administrative functions of the
provincial or city prosecutor. There is a hierarchy of
officials in the prosecutory arm of the executive
branch headed by the Secretary of Justice and his
team of prosecutors. Mere suspicion or belief that
the said officials will not adequately perform their
official duties is no reason for the judge’s
interference in or disregard of such hierarchy.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; A
Regional Trial Court does not acquire jurisdiction
over criminal complaints filed directly before it by
persons who are neither prosecutors nor
authorized by the Provincial or City Prosecutors to
file directly with said court.—It is true that after a
case has already been filed in court and the court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over it, fiscals as a rule
are divested of the power to dismiss a criminal
action without the consent of the court. In the case
at bench, however, the RTC had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint filed directly before
it by Sgt. Sanchez who was not a prosecutor.
Neither was he authorized by the Provincial
Prosecutor to file such case directly with the
respondent court. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
If the trial court cannot designate the prosecutor
who will conduct a reinvestigation, there is more
cogent reason why it should not be allowed to do so
in the original preliminary investigation.—We are
not persuaded by respondent judge’s contention
that Abugotal applies only to reinvestigations, and
not to preliminary investigations. This distinction is
insubstantial and even tenuous. Both the
preliminary investigation and reinvestigation are
conducted in the same manner and for the same
objective, that is, to determine whether there exists
“sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief
that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.” If the trial court cannot designate the
prosecutor who will conduct a reinvestigation,
there is more cogent reason why it should not be
allowed to do so in original preliminary
investigations, particularly where—as in this case
—the said trial court has not even validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case because of the lack of
authority of the police officer who filed the case.
People vs. Navarro, 270 SCRA 393, G.R. No. 96229
March 25, 1997

G.R. No. 190487. April 13, Criminal Procedure; Prosecutors; All criminal

2011.* actions commenced by complaint or information
are prosecuted under the direction and control of
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, public prosecutors.—It is well-settled that
petitioner, vs. PETER prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive
SHERMAN, MICHAEL department of the government whose principal
WHELAN, TEODORO B. power and responsibility is to insure that laws are
LINGAN, ATTY. OFELIA B. faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the
CAJIGAL and the COURT OF right to prosecute violators. All criminal actions
TAX APPEALS, respondents. c/ommenced by complaint or information are
Bureau of Customs vs. prosecuted under the direction and control of
Sherman, 648 SCRA 809, public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special
G.R. No. 190487 April 13, laws, the exigencies of public service sometimes
2011 require the designation of special prosecutors from
different government agencies to assist the public
prosecutor. The designation does not, however,
detract from the public prosecutor having control
and supervision over the case. Bureau of Customs
vs. Sherman, 648 SCRA 809, G.R. No. 190487 April
13, 2011

Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Public

G.R. No. 116237. May 15, Prosecutors; The absence of a prosecutor
1996.* PEOPLE OF THE cannot be raised by an accused to invalidate the
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- testimony of a state witness if said accused
appellee, vs. FE ARCILLA y cannot prove personal prejudice.—The presence
CORNEJO, accused- of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases
appellant. People vs. Arcilla, is necessary to protect vital state interests at stake
256 SCRA 757, G.R. No. in the prosecution of crimes, foremost of which is
116237 May 15, 1996 its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock
of peace of the people. As the representative of the
State, the public prosecutor has the right and the
duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the
People in the trial of an accused. It ought to be self-
evident that the right belongs to the public
prosecutor and not to the accused. The absence of a
prosecutor cannot therefore be raised by an
accused to invalidate the testimony of a state
witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice as in
the case at bar. People vs. Arcilla, 256 SCRA 757,
G.R. No. 116237 May 15, 1996

1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; REFUSAL TO PERFORM

[No. L-8252. January 31, OFFICIAL DUTY WITHOUT JUST CAUSE; DUTY
1958] OF THE FISCAL TO PROSECUTE OR NOT, CRIMES.
—The refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when after
JOSE C. ZULUETA, plaintiff an investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to
and appellant, vs. NICANOR establish a prima facie case is not a refusal, without
NICOLAS in his capacity as just cause, to perform an official duty. The fiscal has
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, for sure the legal duty to prosecute crimes where
defendant and appellee. there is enough evidence to justify such action. But
Zulueta, vs. Nicolas, 102 it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after an
Phil. 944, No. L-8252 investigation he has become convinced that the
January 31, 1958 evidence available is not enough to establish a
prima facie case,

2. ID. ; ID. : ID. ; AUTHORITY OF FISCAL TO

DETERMINE WHETHER A "PRIMA FACIE" CASE
EXISTS.—The fiscal is not bound to accept the
opinion of the complainant in a criminal case as to
whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested
 with authority and discretion to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of the
corresponding information, and having control of
the prosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot
be subjected to dictation from the offended party.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR RESULTING

INJURIES.—As a general rule, a public prosecutor,
being- a quasi-judicial officer empowered to
exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally
liable for resulting injuries when acting within the
scope of his authority, and in the line of his official
duty (42 Am. Jur., sec. 21, p. 256) Zulueta, vs.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944, No. L-8252 January 31, 1958

G.R. No. 83809. June 22, Evidence; Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act;
1989.* The unconvincing and bare denial of accused
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
PEOPLE OF THE prosecution witnesses.—The main defense of the
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- accused is denial. The appellant’s bare denial
appellee, vs. SAID SARIOL Y cannot, however, prevail over his positive
MUHAMADING, accused- identification by prosecution witnesses as actually
appellant. People vs. Sariol, engaged in the sale of the contraband item. As held
174 SCRA 237, G.R. No. in several rulings of this Court, the unconvincing
83809 June 22, 1989 and bare denial of the accused that he had not
committed the crime is not sufficient to overcome
the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses
(See People v. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137 [1985] and
People v. Tuscano, 137 SCRA 203 [1985]). Such
denials constitute self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declarations of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.

Same; Presumption of Regular Performance of

Official Duty; Law enforcers are presumed to have
regularly performed their official duty, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.—The Narcom
agents who conducted the buy-bust operation did
not know the accused-appellant. Their
apprehension of the accused came about only as a
result of the information given them by the
confidential informer. There is not the slightest
showing of an evil or bad motive on their part. We
see no valid obstacle to the application of the ruling
in People v. Capulong, (160 SCRA 533 [1988]) that
credence is accorded to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it
is presumed that they have regularly performed
their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the
 contrary. The appellant has not shown that the
prosecution witnesses were motivated by any
improper motive other than that of accomplishing
their mission.

Criminal Procedure; Presentation of Witnesses;

Discretion belongs to the city or provincial fiscal
as to how the prosecution should present its
case.—The accused-appellant likewise questions
the non-presentation of the confidential informer.
The matter of presentation of its witnesses by the
prosecution is not for the accused or, except in a
limited sense, for the trial court to control.
Discretion belongs to the city or provincial fiscal as
to how the prosecution should present its case. He
has the right to choose whom he should present as
witnesses. (People v. Campana, 124 SCRA 271
[1983]). Moreover, if the defense believes that there
are other witnesses who could have exculpated the
accused, it should have called for them even by
compulsory process. (People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA
263 [1987]) People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237, G.R.
No. 83809 June 22, 1989

G.R. No. 188897. June 6,

2011.*PEOPLE OF THE Same; Same; Same; It is well-entrenched in this
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. jurisdiction that when the offended parties are
IRENO BONAAGUA y young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are
BERCE, appellant People vs. inclined to lend credence to their version of what
Bonaagua, 650 SCRA 620, transpired, considering not only their relative
G.R. No. 188897 June 6, vulnerability, but also the shame and
2011 embarrassment to which they would be exposed if
the matter about which they testified were not true.
—It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that
when the offended parties are young and immature
girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability, but
also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed if the matter about which they
testified were not true. A young girl would not
usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow
the examination of her private parts; and undergo
all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention
the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not
in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect
and preserve her honor, and motivated by the
desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts
committed against her. Moreover, the Court has
 repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the
victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to
sustain a conviction. People vs. Bonaagua, 650 SCRA
620, G.R. No. 188897 June 6, 2011

No. L-38308. December 26, Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Adultery is a

1984.* private offense. Requisites for filing thereof.—
Adultery, being a private offense, it cannot be
MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
and MANUEL MORENO, offended spouse who cannot institute the criminal
petitioners, vs. HON. prosecution without including both the guilty
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he
Presiding Judge, Branch III, shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Court of First Instance,
Negros Oriental, PABLO E. Same; Same; Both the second complaint filed at the
CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of Fiscal’s Office and the Court sufficiently state a valid
Dumaguete, and JULIAN L. cause of action for adultery in the case at bar.—
TEVES, respondents. Donio- Petitioner’s submission—that there is no sufficient
Teves vs. Vamenta, Jr., 133 and valid complaint—instituted in the instant case
SCRA 616, No. L-38308 so as to confer jurisdiction over the offense and
December 26, 1984 persons of the accused (herein petitioners), hardly
convince Us. The second complaint dated January
16, 1973 filed with the Fiscal’s Office and that filed
with the respondent Court on March 26, 1973, are
both sufficient and valid complaints. Both state the
name of the defendants; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed, which is an absolute
compliance with what Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court prescribe. Both complaints were also
thumbmarked by and under oath of the
complainant. The allegations of the complaints fully
apprised petitioners of the facts and acts subject
matter thereof and enables them to fully
comprehend to which acts of theirs it refers. Both
sufficiently identify the acts constituting the
offense, sufficient enough to enable the Court to
pronounce a valid judgment thereon in case of
conviction.

Same; Same; In private crimes it is better practice

for the Fiscal to limit himself to the filing of the
complaint rather than an information.—As it is,
doubt could not have set in and confusion would
not have arisen had the Fiscal limited himself
merely to the filing of the complaint (thumbmarked
and under oath of the complainant) instead of an
information with the complaint annexed thereto.
 Donio-Teves vs. Vamenta, Jr., 133 SCRA 616, No. L-
38308 December 26, 1984

G.R. No. 119835. January Remedial Law; Complaints; The victim’s

28, 1998.* ‘sinumpaang salaysay’ which was prepared in the
vernacular, and the ‘complaint’ in English satisfy
THE PEOPLE OF THE the legal definition of a ‘complaint’ as a ‘sworn
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- statement’ charging a person with an offense,
appellee, vs. JOSEPH subscribed by the offended party.—The term
BARRIENTOS, accused- “complaint filed by the offended party” found in
appellant. People vs. Rule 110, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, said the
Barrientos, 285 SCRA 221, Court in People vs. Sangil, should be—“x x x given a
G.R. No. 119835 January 28, liberal or loose interpretation meaning a ‘charge,
1998 allegation, grievance, accusation or denunciation’
(p. 158, West’s Legal Thesaurus Dictionary)—
rather than a strict legal construction, for more
often than not the offended party who files it is
unschooled in the law. The purpose of the
complaint in Section 5, Rule 110, is merely to
initiate or commence the prosecution of the
accused. The victim’s ‘sinumpaang salaysay’ which
was prepared in the vernacular, and the ‘complaint’
in English, which must have been prepared for her
by someone else, complement each other, when
read together, and satisfy the legal definition of a
‘complaint’ as ‘a sworn statement charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the offended party x
x x’ (Sec. 3, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure). The Court is not inclined to disregard
her salaysay (complaint) for mere lack of an oath
for that would amount to suppressing her
anguished cry for redress.”

Same; Same; The overriding consideration in

determining compliance with the requirement is
the intent and determination of the aggrieved party
to seek judicial redress.—Verily, the situation is not
beyond the context and the ambit of the ruling in
People vs. Sangil. The legal requirement imposed in
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, as has been
so aptly observed in People vs. Ilarde, is “out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial.” The
overriding consideration in determining
compliance with the requirement is the intent and
determination of the aggrieved party to seek
judicial redress. Here, the sworn statement of the
victim hardly can cast doubt on her evident resolve
to bring the accused to justice.
 Same; Same; The issue on the validity and
sufficiency of the complaint has been belatedly put
up by appellant.—In any event, the issue on the
validity and sufficiency of the complaint has been
belatedly put up by appellant. The matter could
have been raised in a motion to quash the
information pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Rules of Court which step he has failed to do. The
rule, according to the Court’s holding in People vs.
Garcia, is that—“x x x at any time before entering
his plea, the accused may move to quash the
information on the ground that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form. The failure of
the accused to assert any ground for a motion to
quash before he pleads to the information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash, except
the grounds of no offense charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of
the offense or penalty, and jeopardy. People vs.
Barrientos, 285 SCRA 221, G.R. No. 119835 January
28, 1998

Criminal Procedure; Rape; Complaint;

G.R. No. 91158. May 8, Jurisdictional requirement that a prosecution
1992.* PEOPLE OF THE for rape should be commenced by a complaint
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- of the aggrieved party, by her parents,
appellee, vs. FELIPE grandparents or guardian, pursuant to Sec. 5,
SANGIL y VELISARIO, Par. 3 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
respondent. People vs. Procedure, was satisfied in this case.—The
Sangil, 208 SCRA 696, G.R. jurisdictional requirement that a prosecution for
No. 91158 May 8, 1992 rape should be commenced by a complaint of the
aggrieved party, by her parents, grandparents or
guardian, pursuant to Sec. 5 Par. 3 of Rule 110 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, was satisfied
in this case.

Same; Same; Same; Court not inclined to disregard

her salaysay (complaint) for mere lack of an oath
for that would amount to suppressing her
anguished cry for redress.—The phrase “complaint
filed by the offended party” as used in Section 5,
Rule 110 should be given a liberal or loose
interpretation meaning a “charge, allegation,
grievance, accusation or denunciation” (p. 158,
West’s Legal Thesaurus Dictionary)—rather than a
strict legal construction, for more often than not the
offended party who files it is unschooled in the law.
The purpose of the complaint in Section 5, Rule 110,
is merely to initiate or commence the prosecution
of the accused. The victim’s “sinumpaang salaysay”
 which was prepared in the vernacular, and the
“complaint” in English, which must have been
prepared for her by someone else, complement
each other, when read together, and satisfy the legal
definition of a “complaint” as “a sworn statement
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by
the offended party x x x” (Sec. 3, Rule 110, 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure). The Court is not
inclined to disregard her salaysay (complaint) for
mere lack of an oath for that would amount to
suppressing her anguished cry for redress.

Same; Same; Evidence; Trial judge’s conviction

that the accused had raped his daughters is a
finding that merits the highest respect of this
Court.—The trial judge’s conviction (“there is no
doubt in the mind of the court”) “that the accused
had raped his daughters” is a finding that merits the
highest respect of this Court for he had unmatched
opportunity, denied to this Court, to hear the
witnesses testify, assess their credibility, and
observe their demeanor under questioning (People
vs. Francisco, 182 SCRA 305; People vs. Besa, 183
SCRA 533). We have no hesitancy in sustaining the
conviction of the accused. Same; Same; Penalty; Life
imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion
perpetua for the latter carries the accessory
penalties prescribed in Article 41 of the Revised
Penal Code which life imprisonment does not.—
However, the correct penalty for the crime of rape
is reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment. Trial
courts should be careful in using the proper
designation of the penalties prescribed by the
statutes to avoid misunderstanding as to the scope
and consequences of the penalties (People vs.
Ansing, 190 SCRA 374; People vs. Dekingco, 189
SCRA 512; People vs. Manalansan, 189 SCRA 619).
The Revised Penal Code has its own table of
penalties, which some special laws do not follow
strictly. Life imprisonment is not synonymous with
reclusion perpetua for the latter carries the
accessory penalties prescribed in Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, which life imprisonment does
not. People vs. Sangil, 208 SCRA 696, G.R. No. 91158
May 8, 1992

G.R. No. 124391. July 5, Criminal Law; Rape; Statutes; Anti-Rape Law of
2000.* 1997 (Republic Act 8353); Ex Post Facto Laws;
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8353 rape is a crime
PEOPLE OF THE against persons which may be prosecuted de oficio,
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- but where the alleged crime was committed in
appellee, vs. ELMER 1994, which was prior to the effectivity of R.A.
 YPARRAGUIRE y SEPE, 8353, the old law should apply and the same should
accused-appellant. People be treated as a private offense.—After his
vs. Yparraguire, 335 SCRA indictment and trial, accused-appellant appeals
69, G.R. No. 124391 July 5, from his conviction for the crime of rape of a mental
2000 retardate. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8353, the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape is a crime against
person which may be prosecuted de oficio.
However, considering that the alleged rape was
committed in 1994, which was prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 8353, we apply the old law and
treat rape as a private crime. People vs.
Yparraguire, 335 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 124391 July 5,
2000

G.R. No. 80116. June 30, Criminal Law; Actions; Rule that the crime of
1989.* adultery as well as four other crimes against
chastity cannot be prosecuted except upon a
IMELDA MANALAYSAY sworn written complaint filed by the offended
PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. spouse, a jurisdictional requirement.—Under
HON. CORONA IBAY- Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
SOMERA, in her capacity as adultery, as well as four other crimes against
Presiding Judge of the chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
Regional Trial Court of written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. has long since been established, with unwavering
LUIS C. VICTOR, in his consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
capacity as the City Fiscal of jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
Manila; and ERICH requirement. While in point of strict law the
EKKEHARD GEILING, jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in
respondents. Pilapil vs. it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate
653, G.R. No. 80116 June since it is that complaint which starts the
30, 1989 prosecutory proceeding and without which the
court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Same; Same; Same; In prosecutions for adultery

and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and
nobody else.—Now, the law specifically provides
that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
the person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or
guardian of the offended party. The so-called
exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of
the first four offenses above mentioned do not
apply to adultery and concubinage.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Complainant must have
the status, capacity or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal action.—
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at
the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact,
lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of
the filing of the complaint or petition. Pilapil vs.
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, G.R. No. 80116 June
30, 1989

l.Criminal Law and Procedure; Concubinage;

[No. 48183. November 10, Bigamy; Double Jeopardy.—As to appellant's plea
1941]The People of the of double jeopardy, it needs only be observed that
Philippines, plaintiff- the offense of bigamy for which he was convicted
appellee vs. Rodolfo A. and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in
Schneckenburger et al., the court below are two distinct offenses in law and
defendants-appellants. in fact as well as in the mode of their prosecution.
People vs. Schneckenburger The celebration of the second marriage, with the
et al., 73 Phil., 413, No. first still existing, characterizes the crime of
48183 November 10, 1941 bigamy; on the other hand, in the present case,
mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman
who is not wife characterizes the crime of
concubinage. The first is an offense against civil
status which may be prosecuted at the instance of
the state; the second, an offense against chastity
and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the
offended party. And no rule is more settled in law
than that, on the matter of double jeopardy, the test
is not whether the defendant has already been tried
for the same act, but whether he has been put in
jeopardy for the same offense.

2.Id.; Id.; Prior Consent; Pardon.—The document

executed by and between the accused and the
complainant in which they agreed to be "en
completa libertad de acció n en cualquier acto y en
todos conceptos", while illegal for the purpose for
which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a
valid consent to the act of concubinage within the
meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each
party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the
other.

3.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—It was said before (People vs.

Guinucod), 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which
bars the offended party from instituting a criminal
 prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness is that which has been given
expressly or impliedly after the crime has been
committed. This is a narrow view in no way
warranted by the language, as well as the manifest
policy, of the law.

4.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—The second paragraph of article

344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "The
offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders." As
the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the
offense after its commission, "consent" must have
been intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to
refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logi-
cal difference can indeed be perceived between
prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances
as the offended party has chosen to compromise
with his/her dishonor; he/she becomes unworthy
to come to court and invoke its aid in the
vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband
who delivers his wife to another man for adultery,
is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon
acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its
commission, he says or does nothing. Held: That
prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent
to bar the offended party from prosecuting the
offense. People vs. Schneckenburger et al., 73 Phil.,
413, No. 48183 November 10, 1941

G.R. No. 96602. November Criminal Law; Adultery; Constitutional Law;

19, 1991.* Right against self-incrimination.—The Court, in
the said Resolution of 24 April 1991, had likewise
EDUARDO ARROYO, JR., ruled on the claim that Mrs. Neri’s constitutional
petitioner, vs. COURT OF right against self-incrimination had been
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE disregarded when her admission to her husband in
OF THE PHILIPPINES, the privacy of their conjugal home that she had
respondents.G.R. No. indeed lain with petitioner Arroyo was taken into
96715. November 19, account by the trial court. x x x As to the
1991.* RUBY VERA-NERI, constitutional issue, we held in Gamboa v. Cruz,
petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE (162 SCRA 642 [1988]) that: ‘The right to counsel
OF THE PHILIPPINES and attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when
THE HONORABLE COURT the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
OF APPEALS respondents. elicit information and/or confessions or admissions
Arroyo, Jr. vs. Court of from respondent-accused.’ (Italics supplied) In the
Appeals, 203 SCRA 750, G.R. present case, Dr. Neri was not a peace officer nor an
No. 96602, G.R. No. 96715 investigating officer conducting a custodial
November 19, 1991 interrogation, hence, petitioner cannot now claim
 that Mrs. Neri’s admission should have been
rejected.

Same; Same; Doctrine of pari delicto not

applicable.—We turn to the contention that pari
delicto “is a valid defense to a prosecution for
adultery and concubinage and that in such a case ‘it
would be only a hypocritical pretense for such
spouse to appear in court as the of fended spouse’.”
In the first place, the case cited does not support
petitioner Neri’s position. In the Guinucud case, the
Court found that the complaining husband, by
entering into an agreement with his wife that each
of them were to live separately and could marry
other persons and by filing complaint only about a
year after discovering his wife’s infidelity, had
“consented to, and acquiesced in the adulterous
relations existing between the accused, and he is,
therefore, not authorized by law to institute the
criminal proceedings.” In fine, the Guinucud case
refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to
consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal
proceedings.

[No. 36270. August 31, Criminal Law; Adultery; Revised Penal Code,

1932] The People of the Article 344 Construed; Pardon by Offended
Philippine Islands, plaintiff Party.—The second paragraph of article 344 of the
and appellee, vs. Revised Penal Code, reading: "The offended party
Consolacion Infante et al., cannot institute criminal prosecution without
defendants. Consolacion including both the guilty parties, if they are both
Infante, appellant. People alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
vs. Infante, 57 Phil., 138, No. pardoned the offenders," means that the pardon
36270 August 31, 1932 afforded the offenders must come before the
institution of the criminal prosecution, and means
further that both the offenders must be pardoned
by the offended party if the said pardon is to be
effective. In the case at bar, as these circumstances
do not concur, the motion for dismissal predicated
on an affidavit of the husband pardoning his guilty
spouse for her infidelity is denied. People vs.
Infante, 57 Phil., 138, No. 36270 August 31, 1932

G.R. No. 196842. October Criminal Law; Concubinage; Condonation; Old

9, 2013.*ALFREDO jurisprudence has held that the cynosure in the
ROMULO A. BUSUEGO, question of whether the wife condoned the
petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF concubinage lies in the wife’s “line of conduct under
THE OMBUDSMAN the assumption that [she] really believed her
(MINDANAO) [and] ROSA S. husband guilty of concubinage.”—Old
BUSUEGO, respondents. jurisprudence has held that the cynosure in the
Busuego vs. Office of the question of whether the wife condoned the
Ombudsman (Mindanao), concubinage lies in the wife’s “line of conduct under
707 SCRA 298, G.R. No. the assumption that [she] really believed [her
196842 October 9, 2013 husband] guilty of [concubinage]:” Condonation is
the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation or, as stated in I
Bouver’s Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the
‘conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband
or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter
has committed.’

Same; Same; Same; Their continued cohabitation

as husband and wife construed from Rosa’s annual
visits to Davao City is not acquiescence to Alfredo’s
relations with his concubines.—Indeed, Rosa’s
admission was that she believed her husband had
stopped womanizing, not that she had knowledge of
Alfredo’s specific acts of concubinage with Sia and
de Leon, specifically keeping them in the conjugal
dwelling. This admission set against the specific
acts of concubinage listed in Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code does not amount to
condonation. Their continued cohabitation as
husband and wife construed from Rosa’s annual
visits to Davao City is not acquiescence to Alfredo’s
relations with his concubines. On that score, we
have succinctly held: We can find nothing in the
record which can be construed as pardon or
condonation. It is true that the offended party has
to a considerable extent been patient with her
husband’s shortcomings, but that seems to have
been due to his promises of improvement; nowhere
does it appear that she has consented to her
husband’s immorality or that she has acquiesced in
his relations with his concubine.

Same; Recantation; The Supreme Court has

generally looked with disfavor upon retraction of
testimonies previously given in court. Affidavits of
recantation are unreliable and deserve scant
consideration.—We have generally looked with
disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously
given in court. Affidavits of recantation are
unreliable and deserve scant consideration. The
asserted motivesthe repudiation are commonly
held suspect, and the veracity of the statements
made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently
and deservedly subject to serious doubt.Same;
Concubinage; Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code
lists three (3) specific acts of concubinage by a
husband: (1) keeping a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling; (2) sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife;
 and (3) cohabiting with [a woman who is not his
wife] in any other place.—Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code lists three (3) specific acts of
concubinage by a husband: (1) keeping a mistress
in the conjugal dwelling; (2) sexual intercourse,
under scandalous circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife; and (3) cohabiting with [a
woman who is not his wife] in any other place. The
Ombudsman found a prima facie case against
Alfredo and Sia based on the testimony of Robert,
Melissa S. Diambangan and Liza S. Diambangan that
Alfredo had kept Sia in the conjugal dwelling where
Sia even stayed at the conjugal room. We
completely agree with the Ombudsman’s
disquisition: Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman
(Mindanao), 707 SCRA 298, G.R. No. 196842
October 9, 2013

[No. L-10033. December 28, 1. HUSBAND AND WlFE; INFIDELITIES

1956] BENJAMIN AMOUNTING TO ADULTERY; CONDONATION
BUGAYONG, plaintiff and DEPRIVES OFFENDED SPOUSE OF ACTION FOR
appellant, vs. LEONILA LEGAL SEPARATION.—Granting that the
GINEZ, defendant and infidelities amounting to adultery were committed
appellee. Bugayong vs. by the wife, the act of the husband in persuading
Ginez, 100 Phil. 616, No. L- her to come along with him, and the fact that she
10033 December 28, 1956 went with-him and together they slept as husband
and wife, deprives him, as the alleged offended
spouse, of any action for legal separation against
the offending wife, because his said conduct comes
within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil
Code.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTENT OF COHABITATION TO

CONSTITUTE CONDONATION.—The only general
rule in American jurisprudence is that any
cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
commission of the offense, and with the knowledge
or belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of
condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted
by evidence (60 L.J. Prob. 73). Bugayong vs. Ginez,
100 Phil. 616, No. L-10033 December 28, 1956

[No. 13946. February 5, SEDUCTION; COMPLAINT OF THE AGGRIEVED

1920.] THE UNITED PARTY HERSELF; JURISDICTION.—Since from the
STATES, plaintiff and moment Act No. 1773 went into effect the crime of
appellee, vs. TOMAS seduction is considered as a public crime and must
BAUTISTA, defendant and be prosecuted as are all other crimes defined by the
appellant. United States vs. Penal Code, by the Acts of the Philippine
Bautista., 40 Phil. 735, No. Commission, and by those of the Philippine
13946 February 5, 1920 Legislature, the complaint of the aggrieved party for
 the said crime of seduction filed in the form
prescribed in section 4 of General Orders No. 58 is
sufficient, valid and lawful and the court or judge
has thereby acquired authority and jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and the subject-
matter of the criminal action, although the
aggrieved party is under age and said complaint
was presented personally by her without the aid or
intervention of her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, unless she is incapable or incompetent to
do- so upon other lawful motives, restrictive of her
juridical personality and civil capacity to appear at
the hearing. United States vs. Bautista., 40 Phil. 735,
No. 13946 February 5, 1920

[No. L-8558. September 28, CRIMINAL LAW; ABDUCTION; WHO MAY FILE
1955] THE COMPLAINT; ARTICLE 344, REVISED PENAL
CODE CONSTRUED.—The law (Article 344 of the
LEODEGARIO BENGA- Revised Penal Code) does not state or does not
ORAS, petitioner, vs. JOSE intend to state that the right of the offended party
EVANGELISTA, Judge of the to file the complaint against the offender, in cases of
Court of First Instance, First seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness,
Branch. Capiz and THE is here exclusively in the sense that when she does
PEOPLE OF THE not file the same, her parents, grandparents, or
PHILIPPINES, respondents. guardian cannot file it. What it means to say and
Benga-Oras vs. Evangelista, what it in fact says is, that when the offended party
etc., 97 Phil. 612, No. L- is a minor and she does not file the complaint, this
8558 September 28, 1955 may be done by her parents, grandparents or
guardian, in the order named (Tolentino vs. De la
Costa, 66 Phil, 100). Benga-Oras vs. Evangelista,
etc., 97 Phil. 612, No. L-8558 September 28, 1955

G.R. No. 86162. September Criminal Procedure; Where a minor failed to file
17, 1993.* PEOPLE OF THE a complaint for rape, her father may do so.—
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- There is no doubt that 18-year old Rosario is still a
appellee, vs. VIRGILIO minor, not having reached twenty-one (21) when
TAMAYO, ARTURO GARCIA the crime was committed on her [March 14, 1981].
alias “Zoro”, RODRIGO The records also fail to disclose that she filed a
IMBUIDO alias “Isong”, complaint on the outrage done to her.
accused. VIRGILIO Consequently, when she failed to file her complaint,
TAMAYO, accused- the filing by her father was justified under the
appellant. People vs. Rules. Thus, when appellant filed a motion to
Tamayo, 226 SCRA 527, G.R. dismiss in the court below for lack of jurisdiction, it
No. 86162 September 17, was not error for the trial court to deny the same.
1993 Criminal Law; In rape accused may be convicted on
sole testimony of victim.—Rape is a most
abominable crime wherein the offender should be
severely punished, especially in our country where
religion, tradition and culture demand high respect
for Filipino women. Since the crime of rape is not
normally committed in the presence of witnesses,
the court merely relies on the credibility of the
 victim’s testimony as weighed against the
credibility of the accused. It is settled that in rape
cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the complaining witness provided
such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
otherwise consistent with human nature and the
course of things. People vs. Tamayo, 226 SCRA 527,
G.R. No. 86162 September 17, 1993

No. L-47437. September 29, Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Complaint for
1983.* rape filed by mother of demented girl valid even
if her father is still living.—Under the
PEOPLE OF THE circumstances, the complaint filed by the mother
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- was a sufficient compliance with article 344 and
appellee, vs. GAMELO section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jurisdiction on
MARIANO y OBUSAN, the court to try the case [People vs. Pastores, L-
accused-appellant. People 29800, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 498, 508; People
vs. Mariano, 124 SCRA 802, vs. Bangalao, 94 Phil. 354; U.S. vs. Gariboso, 25 Phil.
No. L-47437 September 29, 171]. The father’s passivity should not preclude the
1983 mother from securing redress for the outrage
committed against her daughter. People vs.
Mariano, 124 SCRA 802, No. L-47437 September 29,
1983

[No. L-10853. May 18, CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; COURT; JURISDICTION;

1959] COMPLAINT FILED BY A PERSON WHO CLAIMS
AS GUARDIAN.—Article 344 of the Revised Penal
THE PEOPLE OF THE Code provides that the offenses of rape can only be
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and prosecuted upon complaint filed by the offended
appellee, vs. SALVADOR 'party, her parents, grandparents or guardian, and
PONELAS Y INAJE and that unless this requirement is complied with the
JAVIER ENORIO Y prosecution may fail on the ground of lack of
HERNANDEZ, defendants jurisdiction. However, if a person, of his own accord
and appellants. People vs. and free will, and as guardian of the victim, files an
Ponelas and Enorio, 105 action for rape, the complaint is sufficient to confer
Phil. 712, No. L-10853 May jurisdiction on the court People vs. Ponelas and
18, 1959 Enorio, 105 Phil. 712, No. L-10853 May 18, 1959

G.R. Nos. 139346-50. July Criminal Law; Acts of Lasciviousness; Elements

11, 2002.* PEOPLE OF THE of the Crime of Acts of Lasciviousness.—The
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are:
appellee, vs. JOSE ABADIES (1) that the offender commits any act of
y CLAVERIA, accused- lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by
appellant. People vs. using force or intimidation, or (b) when the
Abadies, 384 SCRA 442, G.R. offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
Nos. 139346-50 July 11, unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is
2002 under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended
party is another person of either sex.

Same; Same; Denial; For accused-appellant’s

denial to prevail, it must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability and there is
 none.—Accused-appellant’s simple denial of the
crime charged is inherently weak. It is negative
evidence which cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of credible witnesses. For accused-
appellant’s denial to prevail, it must be buttressed
by strong evidence of non-culpability and there is
none.

Same; Same; Same; Compromises; Settled is the

rule that in criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by
law to be settled through mutual concessions,
an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.—There is no iota of doubt that accused-
appellant was asking forgiveness for having
committed the acts with which he now stands
charged. Settled is the rule that in criminal cases,
except those involving quasi-offenses or those
allowed by law to be settled through mutual
concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for
forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong
and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise. Under the
circumstances, accused-appellant’s plea of
forgiveness should be received as an implied
admission of guilt People vs. Abadies, 384 SCRA
442, G.R. Nos. 139346-50 July 11, 2002

No. L-80838. November 29, Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; Petitioner’s
1988.* stance that the complaint for qualified
seduction is barred by waiver and/or estoppel
ELEUTERIO C. PEREZ, is unmeritorious.—Finally, petitioner avers that
petitioner, vs. COURT OF the complaint for Qualified Seduction is barred by
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Yolanda
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Mendoza, the latter having opted to consider the
respondents. Perez vs. case as Consented Abduction. He also alleges that
Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA her delay of more than nine (9) years before filing
236, No. L-80838 the second case against him is tantamount to
November 29, 1988 pardon by the offended party. Petitioner’s stance is
unmeritorious. The complainant’s filing of a
subsequent case against him belies his allegation
that she has waived or is estopped from filing the
second charge against petitioner. Neither could she
be demeed to have pardoned him, for the rules
require that in cases of seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended
party, to be effective, must be expressly given [Rule
110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court. Rule 110, Sec. 5 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] Moreover
 the length of time it took her to file the second case
is of no moment considering that she filed it within
the ten (10)-year prescriptive period provided by
Article 90 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code for
crimes punishable by a correctional penalty such as
Qualified Seduction. Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 168
SCRA 236, No. L-80838 November 29, 1988
SEC.6. SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

G.R. No. 168168. September Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Rape;
14, 2005.* The revelation of an innocent child whose
chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as
PEOPLE OF THE her willingness to undergo the trouble and the
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent
EDGARDO DIMAANO, testament to the truth of her complaint.—It is
appellant. People vs. likewise well-established that the testimony of a
Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647, rape victim is generally given full weight and credit,
G.R. No. 168168 September more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an
14, 2005 innocent child whose chastity has been abused
deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo
the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an
eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In
so testifying, she could only have been impelled to
tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill
motive.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Delay in

reporting the rape incidents, especially in the
face of threats of physical violence, cannot be
taken against the victim, more so when the
lecherous attacker is her own father.—Contrary
to appellant’s assertion, complainant’s credibility
was not diminished by her failure to report the
sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives
despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting
the rape incidents, especially in the face of threats
of physical violence, cannot be taken against the
victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her
own father. Strong apprehensions brought about by
fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended
party to doubt or even distrust what should
otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the
culprit to justice. The Court has thus considered
justified the filing of complaints for rape months,
even years, after the commission of the offense.
People vs. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647, G.R. No. 168168
September 14, 2005
G.R. No. 111399. September Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed;
27, 1996.* Criminal Law; The right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
ODON PECHO, petitioner, accusation against him, an ancient bulwark of
vs. PEOPLE OF THE the liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill of
PHILIPPINES and the Rights which the people of Great Britain
SANDIGANBAYAN, demanded and received from the Prince and
respondents Pecho vs. Princess of Orange in 1688.—On the assumption
People, 262 SCRA 518, G.R. that the prosecution’s evidence had satisfied the
No. 111399 September 27, quantum of proof for conviction for the complex
1996 crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents, there is
absolutely no merit in the petitioner’s claim that he
could not be convicted of the said crime without
offending his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Such right, an
ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its
origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of Great
Britain demanded and received from the Prince and
Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688. It was
adopted by the Constitution of the United States
and was extended by Act No. 235, or the Philippine
Bill of 1902. It was later carried into the Jones Law
and, ultimately, enshrined in the Constitutions of
1935, 1973, and 1987.

Same; Same; Same; Objectives of the Right to be

Informed.—The right to be informed has the
following objectives: First. To furnish the accused
with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense; second, to
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause; and third, to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one
should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542). In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of
law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff or defendant), and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary
to constitute the crime charged.

Same; Same; Same; What determines the real

nature and cause of accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
 information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor
the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, they being conclusions of
law.—What determines the real nature and cause
of accusation against an accused is the actual recital
of facts stated in the information or complaint and
not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law. An incorrect caption is not a
fatal mistake. It follows then that an accused may be
convicted of a crime which, although not the one
charged, is necessarily included in the latter. Pecho
vs. People, 262 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 111399
September 27, 1996

[No. 1376. January 21, CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; COMPLAINT OR

1904.] INFORMATION; CERTAINTY.—An information for
estafa which charges the defendant with
THE UNITED STATES, appropriating "the sum of $1,000, gold currency of
complainant and appellee, the United States," is sufficient, and it is not
vs. J. VALENTINE necessary to describe the funds with any greater
KARELSEN, defendant and certainty. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE.—
appellant. United States vs. Where the information charges the embezzlement
Karelsen, 3 Phil., 223, No. of a certain sum of money in gold currency of the
1376 January 21, 1904 United States it is not bad for not alleging the
equivalent value in pesetas, and the courts will take
judicial notice of the equivalent in the latter coin for
the purpose of fixing the penalty. United States vs.
Karelsen, 3 Phil., 223, No. 1376 January 21, 1904
G.R. Nos. 128823-24.
December 27, 2002.* Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed;
PEOPLE OF THE Accused-appellant was denied the
PHILIPPINES, accused- constitutional right to be informed of the nature
appellee, vs. PEDRO and cause of the accusation against him; An
FLORES, JR. y FLORES indictment must fully state the elements of the
ALIAS “PESIONG”, accused- specific offense alleged to have been committed.
appellant. People vs. Flores, —It is at once apparent, from a reading of the
Jr., 394 SCRA 325, G.R. Nos. above-quoted complaints, that accused-appellant
128823-24 December 27, was denied the constitutional right to be informed
2002 of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. This right has the following objectives: 1. To
furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make the
defense; 2. To avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against further prosecution
for the same cause; 3. To inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. The right cannot be waived for
reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that
 the complaint or information filed against the
accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such,
an indictment must fully state the elements of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed.
For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense,
even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the complaint or
information.

Same; Same; What characterizes the charge is the

actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information; The complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary
to constitute the crime charged.—Neither can
accused-appellant be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness or of any offense for that matter
under our penal laws. It is settled that what
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of facts
in the complaint or information. For every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent which must be
set forth in the complaint or information with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
other words, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary
to constitute the crime charged, the accused being
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense. People vs. Flores,
Jr., 394 SCRA 325, G.R. Nos. 128823-24 December
27, 2002

G.R. Nos. 123156-59. Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Information;

August 29, 2000.* Convicting appellant of a crime not alleged while he
is concentrating his defense against the offense
PEOPLE OF THE alleged would be unfair and underhanded.—
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- Clearly, conviction of appellant for statutory rape
appellee, vs. RENATO (absent any allegation in the information that the
PUZON y JUQUIANA, complainants were below 12 years of age at the
accused-appellant. People time of the rape), and not for rape through force or
vs. Puzon, 339 SCRA 164, intimidation, which was the method alleged—
G.R. Nos. 123156-59 August would violate the right of the appellant to be
29, 2000 informed of the nature of the accusation against
him; which right is granted by the Constitution to
every accused to the end that he could prepare an
adequate defense for the offenses charged against
him. Convicting appellant of a crime not alleged
while he is concentrating his defense against the
offense alleged would be unfair and underhanded.
People vs. Puzon, 339 SCRA 164, G.R. Nos. 123156-
59 August 29, 2000