IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No.

ESTATE OF DE’VON BAILEY, by and through its personal representatives Delisha Searcy and
Greg Bailey,
R.B., a minor, by and through their legal guardian Laquana Gardner.

Plaintiffs,
v.

CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO, a municipality;

SERGEANT ALAN VAN’T LAND, in his individual and official capacity; and
OFFICER BLAKE EVENSON, in his individual and official capacity,

Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

______________________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

He was running down the street

When they shot him in his tracks
About the only thing agreed upon
Is he ain't coming back
There won't be any trial
So the air it won't be cleared
There's just two sides calling names
Out of anger out of fear
If you say it wasn't racial
When they shot him in his tracks
Well I guess that means that you ain't black
It means that you ain't black1

1. On August 3, 2019, Colorado Springs Police Department Sergeant Alan Van’t

Land and Officer Blake Evenson shot Mr. De’Von Bailey in the back as he ran away from them,

killing him.

1
Patterson Hood, “What It Means,” Drive-By Truckers, American Band, 2016. The song and its lyrics can be found
here: https://youtu.be/mY0qOCUy27Q. 

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 2. The officers contacted Mr. Bailey after receiving a false report that Mr. Bailey

had been involved in an armed robbery. They killed him before the Colorado Springs Police

Department conducted even the most basic of investigations into the robbery claim—and when

the department did investigate, it discovered that no robbery had occurred at all.

3. Mr. Bailey did not threaten any police officer or citizen in any way prior to

Sergeant Van’t Land and Officer Evenson’s decision to shoot him. He simply ran away, fast.

4. Nearly thirty-five years before Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson killed Mr.

Bailey, the United States Supreme Court made clear:

The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the
circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony
suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to
the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend
him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate
when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little
late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect.

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

5. The officers killed De’Von Bailey at the age of 19. His community lost yet

another young black man to police violence. His parents were forced to bury their son just as he

bloomed into adulthood. His child, born only months after his death, will never meet their father.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States and is

brought pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is also brought under Colorado state law, including

the wrongful death act, C.R.S. § 13-21-201 et seq. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction supporting Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees and costs

is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

7. Venue is proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All

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the events alleged herein occurred within the State of Colorado.

8. Timely Notice of Claim under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act was

given by Plaintiffs to Defendants regarding Defendant Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s willful and

wanton wrongful killing of De’Von Bailey, in violation of Colorado’s wrongful death statute.

PARTIES

9. At all times pertinent to the subject matter of this litigation, the decedent De’Von

Bailey was a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of and domiciled in the State

of Colorado. Delisha Searcy and Greg Bailey are his parents and serve as the co-personal

representatives of the Estate of De’Von Bailey.

10. Plaintiff R.B. is a minor child of Mr. Bailey. R.B. brings this action by and

through their legal guardian and mother, Laquana Gardner. R.B. is a citizen and resident of

Colorado.

11. Defendant City of Colorado Springs, Colorado, is a municipality organized under

the laws of the State of Colorado and is a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

Colorado Springs Police Department (“CSPD”) is a law enforcement agency that is part of the

City of Colorado Springs. Defendant City of Colorado Springs is responsible for the oversight,

supervision, discipline, and training of CSPD officers including Defendants Alan Van’t Land and

Blake Evenson.

12. At all relevant times, Defendant Alan Van’t Land was a citizen of the United

States and a resident of and domiciled in Colorado. At all times pertinent, Defendant Van’t Land

was acting within the scope of his official duties and employment and under color of state law in

his capacity as a law enforcement officer and Sergeant employed by the Colorado Springs Police

Department.

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 13. At all relevant times, Defendant Blake Evenson was a citizen of the United States

and a resident of and domiciled in Colorado. At all times pertinent, Defendant Evenson was

acting within the scope of his official duties and employment and under color of state law in his

capacity as a law enforcement officer employed by the Colorado Springs Police Department.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Anthony Love falsely reported an assault and armed robbery to CSPD.

14. De’Von Bailey spent the afternoon of August 3, 2019 hanging out with his

girlfriend, Laquana Gardner, his cousin and close friend, Lawrence Stoker, and a gaggle of other

teenaged friends and relatives. It was a relaxed late-summer gathering in Colorado Springs, in

the neighborhood where Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker had grown up. Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker

discussed their excitement about how each of them would soon become a father—both Mr.

Bailey’s and Mr. Stoker’s girlfriends were expecting.

15. At some point during the afternoon, 19-year-old Anthony Love, who had known

Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker from when they had attended the same school years earlier,

approached Mr. Bailey, Mr. Stoker, Ms. Gardner, and a couple of other friends who were

standing and talking in the parking lot outside the Rosewood Apartments, where Mr. Bailey

lived.

16. Mr. Love initially approached the group in a heavily intoxicated state, and he

continued to drink alcohol and smoke marijuana while he spoke with them.

17. At some point in the conversation, Mr. Love began to make inappropriate

comments towards Ms. Gardner, which she repeatedly rebuffed. Though Ms. Gardner asked Mr.

Love to back away from her and to leave her alone, Mr. Love refused to stop.

18. Seeing that Mr. Love was not going to respect Ms. Gardner’s requests to leave her

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alone, Mr. Stoker also asked Mr. Love to step away. After a brief argument, Mr. Love angrily

threw a punch at him. Mr. Stoker defended himself, and a brief fight broke out where Mr. Stoker

hit Mr. Love in the right eye, they both fell down and rolled around for a very short period of

time before the fight was broken up.

19. Mr. Bailey was the one who broke up the “fight”. Mr. Bailey took no violent

action of any kind, simply pulling the combatants apart.

20. Furious, embarrassed, humiliated, and still heavily intoxicated, Mr. Love

eventually left the gathering, shouting violent threats at Mr. Stoker and Mr. Bailey. He went to

the nearby home of Anthony Rivera, another attendee of the gathering whom he had visited

earlier, to pick up his backpack. He was quickly asked to leave that residence as well, due to his

excessive drunkenness and belligerence.

21. Seeking revenge against Mr. Stoker and Mr. Bailey, Mr. Love called 9-1-1 from a

nearby elder care facility and falsely reported that he had been the victim of an armed robbery

with a gun in broad daylight.

22. Mr. Love falsely claimed in the 9-1-1 call that Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker had

approached him on the street, beaten him, menaced him with a gun, and stolen his wallet.

Though more than an hour had passed since Mr. Love had initiated and lost his fight with Mr.

Stoker, he told the 9-1-1 operator that the robbery had only just occurred.

23. Such false reporting through the 9-1-1 system is known as “swatting.” Mr. Love

is known in his community for settling personal grudges by contacting police and making false

reports of crimes, thereby causing police officers to contact those people under the false

impression that they are involved in criminal activity. Mr. Love’s August 3, 2019 9-1-1 call was

an apparent effort to cause law enforcement to contact Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker under the false

5
impression that they had just committed a violent crime, and that one or both of them was armed.

At the Stoker trial discussed below, it came to light Mr. Love has claimed to be a victim of at

least 5 prior aggravated robberies.

24. Mr. Stoker was nevertheless prosecuted but was acquitted of all charges in the

alleged assault, having in fact acted in self-defense after Mr. Love threw a punch at him. Mr.

Stoker was never so much as charged with a robbery (as reported by Mr. Love in his swatting

call), because Mr. Love’s lie fell apart under the slightest police investigation after Mr. Stoker

was arrested. The jury was out for approximately 10 minutes before acquitting him, and jurors

later apologized to Mr. Stoker for having to go through with this charade.

25. Mr. Bailey, however, would never have the opportunity to have his name cleared

of Mr. Love’s outrageous lie; tragically, Defendant Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD)

officers shot and killed Mr. Bailey before conducting any substantive investigation into Mr.

Love’s false report.

Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson shot Mr. Bailey in the back, killing him and
violating his clearly established constitutional rights.

26. Sometime after the fight between Mr. Stoker and Mr. Love, Mr. Bailey and Mr.

Stoker were walking on Preuss Road in the same quiet, residential area of Colorado Springs

when Defendant Van’t Land stopped his police SUV in the middle of the street and approached

them. A few seconds later, Defendant Evenson and CSPD Officer Richard Gonzalez parked their

own cruisers nearby.

27. Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker were both black men.

28. Defendant Van’t Land exited his vehicle first, and Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker

calmly walked toward him when he gestured for them to do so, wholly compliant with his

commands. Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker stood a few feet apart, about ten feet from Defendant

6
Van’t Land; Mr. Bailey stood to Mr. Stoker’s right.

29. Defendant Van’t Land asked for the two men’s names, and Mr. Stoker asked

Defendant Van’t Land about the reason for the stop.

30. As Mr. Stoker spoke with Defendant Van’t Land, Defendant Van’t Land asked

Mr. Bailey to keep his hands out of his pockets. Mr. Bailey immediately complied, apologizing

to Defendant Van’t Land and moving his arms and stretching them out perpendicular to his torso

to demonstrate that he would not touch his pockets any further. He did not reach for his pockets

again at any point through the rest of the interaction with the CSPD officers.

31. Defendant Van’t Land again asked Mr. Bailey his name; he responded,

“De’Von.” Defendant Van’t Land asked what name Mr. Bailey went by, and Mr. Bailey said that

he just went by De’Von.

32. By this time, Officer Richard Gonzalez and Defendant Evenson had taken up

positions a few feet away, to the right of Defendant Van’t Land and to the left of Mr. Stoker.

33. Defendant Van’t Land ordered Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker to put their hands in the

air. Both Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker immediately complied.

34. Defendant Evenson later told investigators that Mr. Bailey and Mr. Stoker were

cooperative with Defendant Van’t Land and that the situation appeared to be calm; other

witnesses described the interaction as a calm, civil conversation. Nonetheless, Defendant Van’t

Land threateningly rested his hand on his gun as he continued to converse with Mr. Bailey and

Mr. Stoker.

35. The officers then began to close in on Mr. Stoker and Mr. Bailey. Officer

Gonzalez approached Mr. Stoker from the side, and Defendant Evenson approached Mr. Bailey

from behind.

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 36. As Defendant Evenson approached Mr. Bailey, Mr. Bailey turned and sprinted up

the street, directly away from the officers and Mr. Stoker.

37. Mr. Bailey was running away as fast as possible to escape from the officers.

38. Defendant Van’t Land immediately drew his weapon to shoot Mr. Bailey.

Likewise, Defendant Evenson drew his weapon to shoot Mr. Bailey.

39. Defendant Van’t Land shouted three times in rapid succession: “Hands up, hands

up, hands up!” He gave no other commands, and no warnings that he was going to shoot his

gun at the back of the fleeing De’Von Bailey.

40. Defendant Van’t Land began issuing his first “hands up” command approximately

one second after Mr. Bailey began running. Defendant Van’t Land issued all three “hands up”

commands within the space of approximately two seconds.

41. Defendant Van’t Land did not wait to see if Mr. Bailey would obey his commands

to put his hands up; he had already decided to shoot Mr. Bailey in the back. Before he had even

finished saying the word “up” for the final time, Defendant Van’t Land fired his gun at Mr.

Bailey.

42. Neither Defendant Van’t Land nor Defendant Evenson ever, at any point, warned

Mr. Bailey that they would use deadly force if Mr. Bailey continued to run.

43. Immediately after Van’t Land began shooting at the fleeing Bailey, Defendant

Evenson began firing his gun at Mr. Bailey’s back, as well.

44. Defendant Van’t Land and Defendant Evenson fired their guns a total of eight

times over the course of less than two seconds. Defendant Van’t Land fired six times, while

Defendant Evenson accounted for the remaining two shots.

45. Three bullets struck Mr. Bailey in the back as he was desperately trying to run

8
away, and one additional bullet grazed his elbow. He collapsed in the street, bleeding profusely

from his wounds.

46. Apparently, the other four shots the officers fired were wild, and missed Bailey

entirely.

47. As Defendant Van’t Land and Defendant Evenson approached the fallen Mr.

Bailey, they again ordered him to put his hands up. Given the last opportunity to comply with the

command, Mr. Bailey summoned the energy to put his right hand in the air, even as he lay dying

with three CSPD bullets lodged in his back. This signal of compliance would be Mr. Bailey’s

final conscious act.

48. At that point, the officers searched Mr. Bailey and handcuffed him, and found a

gun deep within the pockets of his shorts. The gun was so deep within his shorts that the officers

were required to cut Mr. Bailey’s shorts to remove the gun because it was so difficult to retrieve

out of his shorts pocket.

49. At no time did Mr. Bailey display (or even touch) the gun when in the presence of

the officers.

50. An ambulance arrived on scene minutes later and rushed Mr. Bailey to Memorial

Central Hospital in Colorado Springs, but he could not be saved. He was pronounced dead

shortly after arriving at the hospital.

51. Multiple witnesses to the shooting of Mr. Bailey reported that Defendants Van’t

Land and Evenson made little effort to pursue Mr. Bailey at all, and stopped running after they

saw that Mr. Bailey was getting away, to take up shooting stances after taking only a few steps in

pursuit.

52. Defendant police officers determined that the only way to prevent Mr. Bailey

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from getting away was to shoot him in the back. So they did.

53. Multiple witnesses to the shooting confirm that Mr. Bailey never looked back

towards the officers as he ran, and never made any threatening gesture or motion that suggested

he was going to turn towards them. It was clear that Mr. Bailey was simply running away, to

escape from the police.

54. At no point before Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson searched Mr. Bailey did

they see that Mr. Bailey possessed a gun. Before they shot Mr. Bailey multiple times in the back,

Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson never saw that Mr. Bailey had a gun, Mr. Bailey made no

statements indicating he had a gun, and Mr. Bailey never displayed the gun.

55. Defendants’ unconstitutional killing of Mr. Bailey has deprived his parents of a

son, his girlfriend of a partner, and his child of a father.

Defendant Colorado Springs is municipally liable for the Individual Defendants’

actions and has a custom and practice of using excessive force.

56. It has long been the custom and actual practice of CSPD to engage in, encourage,

and condone the use of excessive force by CSPD officers, particularly against African

Americans.

57. Colorado Springs did not terminate or discipline either Defendant Van’t Land or

Evenson (“the Individual Defendants”) or even counsel them for their actions. Further, CSPD

provided no additional training to either Individual Defendant, or other CSPD officers, related to

the killing of Mr. Bailey.

58. Colorado Springs’ and the CSPD’s official position on the events regarding the

shooting death of De’Von Bailey is that the officers’ conduct was appropriate, consistent with

and engaged in pursuant to all approved police policies, practices and training of the City of

Colorado Springs and the CSPD.

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 59. This ratification of the conduct that caused Mr. Bailey’s death is not alleged as

proof that this ratification itself “caused” his death. Rather, it evidences that the conduct was

engaged in pursuant to policy, custom, and practice of the Colorado Springs; had it been outside

of policy, disciplinary or remedial action would have been taken.

60. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson acted intentionally, knowingly, willfully,

wantonly, maliciously and/or recklessly in disregard to Mr. Bailey’s federally protected rights,

and acted under the preexisting and ongoing deliberately indifferent custom, policy, practice,

training, and supervision of Defendant Colorado Springs acting under color of state law.

61. The custom and practice of excessive force is evidenced by a considerable

number of other events, as detailed in at least the following examples:

Corey Barnes

62. On May 15, 2018, CSPD officers illegally detained, handcuffed, and searched by

Corey Barnes after unjustifiably and inexplicably misidentifying him as a passenger in a stolen

vehicle for whom CSPD had been searching. CSPD repeatedly made clear through radio

communications that officers were looking for an African American male who was around 15-

years-old, had a long light brown afro haircut, was wearing a zippered hoodie and blue jeans, and

had run into a specific apartment in a specific building of a building complex. CSPD officers

stopped and handcuffed Mr. Barnes in a parking lot even though Mr. Barnes had very short hair,

not a long afro; he was almost double the age of the suspect (he was 29, not 15); and he was

wearing a t-shirt and shorts, rather than a zippered hoodie and jeans. In fact, another officer on

the scene immediately told the three officers involved in detaining Mr. Barnes was not the

suspect, yet they continued to detain Mr. Barnes without justification. The officers then illegally

searched Mr. Barnes’ pockets and wallet without his consent. Then, when another officer radioed

11
that Mr. Barnes came out of a different building than the suspect had entered, and when the

officers were told for a second time, by dispatch, that Mr. Barnes was not the suspect, they still

did not immediately release him. Instead, an officer twice asked Mr. Barnes if he knew the

suspect, to which Mr. Barnes did not respond. One of the officers instructed the other officers to

take a picture of Mr. Barnes’s ID so that she could “add him to the call screen,” which they did

by removing his ID, again, from his wallet. Only then did they remove the handcuffs.

Throughout the entire interaction, Mr. Barnes did not physically resist the officers, nor make any

threatening statements or movements. The CSPD officers lacked probable cause, reasonable

suspicion, or any other legal basis to believe that Mr. Barnes had engaged in any criminal

activity or posed any threat to them or anyone else. Instead, the detention, handcuffing, and

search of Mr. Barnes was illegally motivated wholly or in part by racial bias.

63. Mr. Barnes filed a complaint with CSPD Internal Affairs (“IA”) department,

which determined that the vast majority of the officers’ conduct—the detention and search—was

consistent with CSPD policy, with the only exception being the retrieval of Mr. Barnes’ wallet

from his pocket. The finding that this action violated policy resulted in unspecified “appropriate

administrative action.” The ratification and endorsement of the majority of the officers’ actions

were part and parcel of, and consistent with, the Colorado Springs’ customs, practices, and

policies of engaging in and tolerating racially-biased policing and failing to discipline CSPD

officers for misconduct. A lawsuit based on the officers’ unlawful conduct against Mr. Barnes

was filed in May 2020 and remains pending.

Jeffrey Melvin

64. On April 26, 2018, CSPD officers responded to a noise violation at an apartment

complex in Colorado Springs. After the officers had determined that no crime had been

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committed, there was no ongoing crime, and those present did not have outstanding warrants,

they encountered Jeffrey Melvin, Jr., a young black man arriving at the apartment. The officers

had no reason to believe that Mr. Melvin had been or was about to be engaged in any criminal

activity. The two officers nevertheless attempted to arrest Mr. Melvin. While attempting to

unlawfully arrest Mr. Melvin—without probable cause to believe that he had committed any

crime—these officers used overwhelming force against him. The officers aggressively

manhandled Mr. Melvin, threw him to the ground, and repeatedly tased him. Mr. Melvin briefly

escaped the officers’ wholly unconstitutional assault, only to collapse from the extreme trauma

the officers had inflicted on him. He was rushed to the hospital, where he was immediately

declared a full trauma. Mr. Melvin never regained consciousness and died from his injuries days

later, at the age of 27. This excessive force is the subject of the federal civil rights action

captioned Estate of Jeffrey Melvin, Jr. v. Colorado Springs, et al., Case no. 20-cv-00991-CMA-

KMT (D.Colo. 2020).

Ryan and Joey Brown

65. On March 25, 2015, brothers Ryan and Joey Brown were pulled over by CSPD

officers. The brothers were young black men who were driving to their home, which was in a

predominantly white neighborhood. CSPD officers had no grounds on which to pull them over,

and officers would not tell the Brown brothers why they had been pulled over. Instead, the

officers held them at taser- and gunpoint. Though the brothers had done nothing wrong, the

officers ordered them out of their car at gunpoint, frisked them, threw Ryan to the ground and

threw his phone away to stop him from recording the interaction. The officers wrongfully

arrested both brothers, and CSPD responded to the brothers’ complaint about their mistreatment

13
by determining that the officers conduct was within official policy and justified. Colorado

Springs paid $212,000 and made substantial policy changes to settle the Brown brothers’ claims.

Grant Bloomquist

66. In 2013, CSPD officers arrested Grant Bloomquist without probable cause after

he verbally protested two CSPD officers’ beating of another man outside of a nightclub. Mr.

Bloomquist was outside Cowboys Night Club in Colorado Springs and saw officers brutally

beating an African American man, so he stepped to about 7 feet away and said, “get the fuck off

him.” At that point, he was blindsided and struck by an officer, who hit him in the face. Multiple

CSPD officers struck Mr. Bloomquist repeatedly in the groin area with knee strikes and pinned

him against a police vehicle. The officers then threw him in the police car and arrested him.

Colorado Springs settled a lawsuit based on CSPD officers’ conduct against Mr. Bloomquist in

2016.

John Sturgis

67. On January 26, 2012, CSPD officers arrested John Sturgis, an African American

man, without probable cause and subjected him to excessive force while investigating Mr.

Sturgis as a homicide suspect. Mr. Sturgis was not the perpetrator of any crime. A witness had

allegedly told CSPD officers he had seen a man at a gas station—Mr. Sturgis—who he claimed

resembled a homicide suspect. Mr. Sturgis in fact was twice the age of the suspect (40 vs 20),

was bald when the suspect had hair, and exhibited many other physical dissimilarities with the

suspect. Despite these obvious differences, officers followed Mr. Sturgis and arrested him. Mr.

Sturgis surrendered peacefully and asked the officers not to handcuff him behind his back

because he had recently had surgery on his shoulder; he even offered to show the officers MRI

images of his injured shoulder that were sitting on the front seat of his car as proof. The officers

14
ignored Mr. Sturgis’s pleas, and excessively forcefully handcuffed him behind the back despite

his pleas not to do so, causing Mr. Sturgis to significantly reinjure his shoulder and require

further surgery. Several officers falsified their reports about the incident to invent probable cause

to arrest Mr. Sturgis. Colorado Springs determined that the officers’ conduct was within policy,

but paid $300,000 to settle Mr. Strugis’s claims.

Douglas Sellier

68. On June 2, 2009, CSPD officers, including Defendant Van’t Land, came to

Douglas Sellier’s home to retrieve Mr. Sellier’s grandson. When Mr. Sellier insisted that the man

to whom the officers were bringing the child was a sex offender, the officers told Mr. Sellier he

was under arrest. Defendant Van’t Land and another officer grabbed Mr. Sellier. He lost

consciousness and came to while pinned on the ground by Defendant Van’t Land and another

officer. While Mr. Sellier was pinned to the ground, Defendant Van’t Land punched him three

times in the shoulder and another officer deployed his taser on Mr. Sellier twice. Mr. Sellier filed

suit, arguing that Van’t Land and the other officers had used excessive force against him. After a

federal judge denied the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Colorado Springs settled

Mr. Sellier’s clams for $50,000. Colorado Springs argued that the police officers conduct was

within police department policy and appropriate. Colorado Springs never disciplined or

counseled Defendant Van’t Land for his unlawful conduct toward Mr. Sellier, nor did CSPD

institute additional training requirements for Defendant Van’t Land based on the incident.

69. Several of these representative cases resulted in Colorado Springs paying

substantial monetary sums to settle police misconduct claims, yet the facts surrounding Mr.

Bailey’s case make clear that the Colorado Springs Police Department has yet to adequately train

15
and supervise its officers regarding the appropriate and legal use of force or otherwise ensure

that the clear ongoing custom and practice of police misconduct as occurred here ceases.

70. Defendant Colorado Springs knew, based on its long history and widespread

practice of its officers using excessive force and taking racially biased actions against African

Americans and its condoning of those actions, that its officers would likely be influenced by

racial bias when contacting African Americans, and that such bias could cause the CSPD officers

to use excessive and unnecessary force against African Americans like Mr. Bailey.

71. Knowing this, Defendant Colorado Springs could have and should have pursued

reasonable methods for training and supervising CSPD officers, including the individual

Defendants, in recognizing and guarding against implicit or explicit racial bias in interacting with

African Americans and not using excessive force against African Americans, but it failed to do

so.

72. Defendant Colorado Springs has a policy that trains and tolerates its officers who

use deadly force based upon the officer’s belief that the officer has probable cause to believe that

the subject of an officer’s shooting previously used a gun in the commission of a felony, even

under circumstances where the officer or a third party is not at the time of the officer shooting in

imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury.

73. In fact, Defendant Van’t Land, in 2012, previously shot and killed another

individual while on duty on December 4, 2012, Robert Kresky. CSPD determined that Defendant

Van’t Land had acted within CSPD policy and training in killing Mr. Kresky; however, CSPD

did not perform an independent investigation into whether any internal policies had been

violated, but rather solely relied on the DA’s investigation and exoneration (from criminal

charges) decision, reasoning that if Defendant Van’t Land had not violated criminal laws, he

16
must not have violated any CSPD policies either. CSPD’s appears to apply this procedure for all

officer-involved shootings: instead of performing its own internal and independent investigation

after the DA’s investigation concludes, CSPD merely relies on the DA’s decisions.

74. Because Defendant Colorado Springs created and tolerated a custom of deliberate

indifference and failed to adequately train and supervise CSPD officers in the constitutional use

of deadly force, individuals, especially African Americans like Mr. Bailey, have repeatedly been

subjected to violations of their constitutional rights.

75. Defendant Colorado Springs fostered “a policy of inaction” in the face of

knowledge that CSPD officers were frequently violating specific constitutional rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which is the functional

equivalent of a decision by Colorado Springs itself to violate the Constitution.

76. Defendant Colorado Springs’s “policy of inaction” and policies, customs, or

practices in failing to properly train and supervise its employees were a moving force and

proximate cause of Individual Defendants’ violation of Mr. Bailey’s constitutional rights.

77. CSPD has persistently failed to investigate and counsel or discipline CSPD

officers for their similar uses of excessive force against African Americans. Colorado Springs’s

failure to find wrongdoing and failure to counsel or discipline officers in this case, the cases

described above, and others reflects a custom, policy, or practice of encouraging, tolerating and

ratifying blatantly illegal conduct. These encouragements, toleration of, and ratifications show

that CSPD officers carry out such police misconduct under the policies of and regimen of

training provided by Colorado Springs, and that such conduct is customary within CSPD.

78. Indeed, CSPD’s Use of Force analyses from 2014-2017 show racially biased uses

of force. Colorado Springs’ population is approximately 6.5% African American. Even so, in

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2014 and 2015, approximately 20% of the people against whom CSPD used force were African

American. In 2016 and 2017, that figure jumped to 26% and 25%, respectively.

79. In 2017, CSPD officers used force against 21% of the total number of African

American males who were arrested. In the same year, CSPD officers used force against only

12% of the total number of White males who were arrested.

80. Similarly, statistical data shows that CSPD has a history of racially disparate

traffic stops and arrests, and a history of consistently treating African American individuals

worse than white individuals. For instance, in October 2016, CSPD data showed that CSPD

stopped African American males while driving by 97% more often than would be expected based

on their proportion in the population in Colorado Springs as of the 2010 census. When looking at

driving age population in Colorado Springs, CSPD stopped African American males 120% more

often than would be expected. Caucasian males, on the other hand, were consistently stopped by

CSPD at rates consistent with the relative size of their population in the City,

81. Additional data shows that CSPD officers disproportionately arrest African

Americans. African Americans comprise only 6.2% of the city’s population. Nevertheless, in

2017, they made up 17.6% of the persons CSPD arrested for what the agency’s annual report

refers to as “arrests at the highest charge.” In 2018, 18.1% of individuals that the CSPD arrested

for “arrest at the highest charge” were African American.

82. These figures make clear that CSPD officers are disproportionately more likely to

use force against African American men, like Mr. Bailey, than against similarly situated white

suspects.

83. Despite being on notice from prior lawsuits, press, settlements, and statistical data

that continued tolerance of racially-biased policing and violations of constitutional rights was

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substantially certain to result in a constitutional injury like that suffered here, Colorado Springs

has consciously chosen not to remedy its deficient customs and to instead ignore the risk of harm

caused by the customs.

84. CSPD’s approval and defense of the use of racially-biased policing and excessive

force by CSPD employees sends a clear and unequivocal message to those employees—such

approval and failure to appropriate respond actually trains CSPD law enforcement officers—that

such use of excessive force is acceptable, consistent with policy, and is approved practice,

causing the use of such excessive force to be likely or even inevitable in the future.

85. Colorado Springs is responsible for training its officers to ensure they perform

their duties consistent with the law and to discipline their improper conduct, so officers can learn

from their experiences and be deterred from engaging in future misconduct that violates the

constitutional rights of people with whom the police interact. Colorado Springs’s failure to do so

has communicated to, and trained, CSPD officers, including Defendants Van’t Land and

Evenson, that excessive force against African Americans is authorized and tacitly (or explicitly)

encouraged. The failure to counsel or discipline misconduct constitutes training which causes

future similar unconstitutional conduct.

86. Colorado Springs’ past ratification and toleration of similar unconstitutional

conduct thus caused and was the moving force behind the Individual Defendants’ use of

excessive force against Mr. Bailey, and Colorado Springs’ failure to discipline the Individual

Defendants for this illegal use of force will lead to more unconstitutional conduct.

87. Defendant Colorado Springs’ acts or omissions caused Mr. Bailey damages

because he suffered physical and mental pain, humiliation, fear, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of

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life, loss of liberty, privacy, and sense of security and individual dignity, and death, among other

injuries, damages, and losses.

88. Defendant Colorado Springs’ actions, as described, deprived Mr. Bailey of the

rights, privileges, liberties, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of

America and caused him other damages.

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

42 U.S.C. § 1983
Fourth Amendment Violation--Excessive Force
(The Estate of De’Von Bailey Against All Defendants)

89. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

90. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson acted under color of state law, and within

the course and scope of their employment, in their capacities as officers of the Colorado Springs

Police Department at all times relevant to the allegations in this Complaint.

91. Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

92. Under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the

Fourteenth Amendment, Decedent De’Von Bailey had a constitutionally protected right to be

secure in his person against unreasonable seizures through the use of excessive force. It is

clearly established that excessive force violates the Constitution. Specifically, it has been clearly

established since 1985 that it is unconstitutional to use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon when

the officer does not have probable cause to believe the suspect posed a significant threat to a

police officer or any other person if not immediately apprehended.

93. Under the application of the specific facts and totality of circumstances as

described herein, Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson violated the clearly established

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constitutional rights of Mr. Bailey.

94. Any reasonable law enforcement officer knew or should have known of this

clearly established right at the time of Mr. Bailey’s death.

95. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson did not have a legally valid basis to seize

Mr. Bailey in the manner and with the level of force used under the circumstances present.

96. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson seized Mr. Bailey by means of objectively

unreasonable and excessive deadly force when they shot him to death without having even a

reasonable belief Mr. Bailey posed a significant threat to any officer or any other person if not

immediately apprehended.

97. Defendants had no basis to believe that they or any other person was at imminent

risk of death or serious bodily injury such as to justify deploying deadly force rather than other

measures to apprehend Mr. Bailey as a suspect to an earlier crime.

98. The decision to employ deadly force by shooting Mr. Bailey in the back multiple

times and killing him, when other less-than-lethal force was readily available, was excessive

under the circumstances.

99. Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s actions, as described herein, were

objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. Any

reasonable officer in their position would have known that it was unreasonable to use deadly

force under the totality of the circumstances and that to do so would violate Mr. Bailey’s clearly

established constitutional rights.

100. Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s actions, as described herein, were

motivated by malice and/or involved reckless or callous indifference to Mr. Bailey’s federally

protected rights, and they engaged in these actions and omissions intentionally, willfully, and/or

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wantonly, demonstrating deliberate indifference to, and a reckless disregard for, Mr. Bailey’s

constitutionally protected rights.

101. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson acted as they did pursuant to and because of

the customs, policies, training, and/or practices of Defendant Colorado Springs.

102. The Individual Defendants’ actions were the direct result of Defendant Colorado

Springs’s (1) promulgation, creation, implementation, or enforcement of policies, customs, or

practices that failed to provide that CSPD officers, including the Individual Defendants, could

use deadly force against fleeing felons only when constitutional requirements for such force was

met and/or (2) deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives

available to these Defendants of not adequately training or supervising CSPD officers including

the Individual Defendants regarding the constitutional use of deadly force, given that the need

for such training and supervision was so obvious, and the inadequacy of training and/or

supervision was so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights such as those described

herein.

103. Defendant Colorado Springs knew to a moral certainty that CSPD officers would

be required to arrest fleeing felons in the execution of their official law enforcement duties. The

City armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, in light

of the duties and responsibilities of CSPD officers who are inevitably called on to arrest fleeing

suspected felons, the need to train CSPD officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of

deadly force was so obvious that Defendant Colorado Springs’s failure to do so constituted

deliberate indifference to Mr. Bailey’s constitutional rights.

104. Defendant Colorado Springs adheres to a policy and practice of permitting the use

of deadly force on a felony suspect where there is probable cause to believe the suspect had

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earlier committed a crime with a gun, even when there is no immediate risk of death or serious

bodily injury later when the officer uses deadly force. Adherence to such a policy makes

permissible under official city policy the unconstitutional use of deadly force.

105. Defendant Colorado Springs knew or should have known that its acts or

omissions were substantially certain to cause CSPD officers including the Individual Defendants

to violate individuals’ constitutional rights to be free from excessive deadly force, and they

consciously or deliberately chose to disregard this risk of harm in adhering to their policy,

custody, or practice of failing to provide that CSPD officers use deadly force against fleeing

felons only within constitutional limits, and/or in deliberately choosing not to provide adequate

training to CSPD officers in this area.

106. Therefore, Defendant Colorado Springs set in motion a series of events that it

knew would cause an individual in a similar situation as Mr. Bailey to be deprived of the

constitutional right to be free from excessive force at the hands of law enforcement. But for the

above acts or omissions of Defendant Colorado Springs, Mr. Bailey would not have been

subjected to a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and such a deprivation was a proximate

cause and a natural and foreseeable consequence of these acts and omissions.

107. As a direct and proximate cause and consequence of Defendants’ unconstitutional

acts and omissions, described above, Plaintiff Estate suffered injuries, damages, and losses.

108. The herein described acts or omissions of Defendants are the moving force and

the legal, direct, and proximate cause of Plaintiff Estate’s injuries and losses, including but not

limited to Mr. Bailey’s death, the physical and mental pain and anguish Mr. Bailey suffered

before and during his shooting death, the loss of Mr. Bailey’s relationships with his family,

girlfriend, and child, life, and other compensatory and special damages including but not limited

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to permanent lost earnings and earnings capacity of Mr. Bailey.

109. The intentional actions or inactions of Defendants as described herein

intentionally deprived Mr. Bailey of due process and of rights, privileges, liberties, and

immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of America.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Fourteenth Amendment
Denial of Equal Protection – Racially Biased Policing
(Against All Defendants)

110. Plaintiffs incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth herein.

111. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson were acting under color of state law in their

actions and inactions at all times relevant to this action.

112. At the time of the complained of events, Mr. Bailey had the clearly established

constitutional right to be free from racial discrimination in law enforcement by police officers

and to enjoy the equal protection of the laws.

113. Mr. Bailey’s race was a motivating factor in the Defendants Van’t Land’s and

Evenson’s decision to use excessive deadly force against him under the circumstances.

Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson acted with the purpose of depriving Mr. Bailey of the equal

protection and benefits of the law, and equal privileges and immunities under the law, in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

114. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson’s reactions to the circumstances confronting

them as described herein were adversely influenced by assumptions and stereotypes arising out

of Mr. Bailey’s and Mr. Stoker’s race. These assumptions and stereotypes caused, wholly or in

part, the immediate escalation of the situation to the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing

suspect, a decision that more probably than not would not have been made with a non-African

American suspect.

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 115. Defendants racially profiled Mr. Bailey and assumed at least partly because of his

race that he presented an enhanced threat to their safety. Their conduct in their interactions with

Mr. Bailey, including their decision to shoot him in the back while he was fleeing, were infected

by and motivated by implicit or explicit bias leading them to believe that he was more dangerous

than he would have been had he been a white suspect under the same circumstances.

116. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson treated Mr. Bailey less favorably—and with

much more unreasonable force—than his similarly situated White counterparts, wholly or in part

because of his race.

117. Race is a suspect class, and differential treatment holly or in part based upon a

person’s race is presumptively unconstitutional. There was no compelling state interest

justifying the use of deadly force on Mr. Bailey when such force more probably than not would

not have been employed on a similarly situated white suspect.

118. There was not even a rational basis for Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s

discriminatory actions, let alone a purpose narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental

interest.

119. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson used excessive force against Mr. Bailey

without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that Mr. Bailey posed a threat of harm

to any other person that would legally justify the deadly force used.

120. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson intentionally, willfully, unreasonably and

wantonly seized Mr. Bailey by using excessive force against him, wholly or in part because of

his race.

121. Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s actions were objectively unreasonable

considering the facts and circumstances confronting them.

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 122. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson engaged in these actions intentionally,

willfully, maliciously, and wantonly, showing deliberate indifference to and reckless disregard of

Mr. Bailey’s federally protected constitutional rights.

123. Defendant Colorado Springs failed to properly train, supervise, and/or discipline

its employees regarding the constitutional requirement not to engage in racially biased policing,

resulting in the Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s unlawful racially biased use of

excessive force.

124. Colorado Springs’s inadequate training, supervision, and/or discipline resulted

from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various

alternatives available to Defendant Colorado Springs.

125. Considering the duties and responsibilities of personnel of Defendant Colorado

Springs—who must police and interact with African Americans regularly— and the frequency

with which such law enforcement personnel will confront African Americans while discharging

their duties as law enforcement officers as described herein, the need for specialized training,

supervision and discipline regarding such decisions is so obvious, and the inadequacy of training

and/or supervision is so likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights, such as those

described herein, that Defendant Colorado Springs is liable for its failure to properly train,

supervise, and/or discipline its subordinate employees and agents.

126. Such failure to properly train, supervise, and/or discipline was a moving force

behind and proximate cause of Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s racially biased treatment

of Mr. Bailey, and makes up an unconstitutional policy, procedure, custom, and/or practice.

127. CSPD exonerated Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson for their racially biased

conduct under Colorado Springs’s municipal customs, policies and/or actual practices described

26
herein. Such decision to exonerate racially discriminatory conduct was made deliberately and

pursuant to Colorado Springs’s longstanding customs and practices. The decision clearly

evidences that Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson acted pursuant to the customs, practices, and

policies of Defendant Colorado Springs.

128. Defendant Colorado Springs’s failure to train and/or supervise, as well as the

failure to take appropriate disciplinary or remedial action on past instances of similar

unconstitutional conduct, as described herein, was a legal and proximate cause of the Mr.

Bailey’s death.

129. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Mr. Bailey’s lost his life

and his family has been and continues to be damaged by Defendants Van’t Land’s and

Evenson’s unreasonable use of excessive force.

130. Mr. Bailey endured physical and mental pain, humiliation, fear, anxiety, loss of

enjoyment of life, loss of liberty, privacy, loss of consortium with his family and friends, and

sense of security and individual dignity, and tragically the loss of his life at the age of 19.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Battery Causing Wrongful Death
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-201 et seq.
(Plaintiff R.B., through her mother and legal guardian Laquana Gardner, Against
Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson)

131. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

132. Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-10-105(1) and 24-10-118(2)(a), public

employees like Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson are not immune under the Colorado

Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) for acts or omissions that are willful and wanton.

133. Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-109, Plaintiffs provided Defendant Colorado

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Springs with timely notice of claim on January 28, 2020.

134. Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson intentionally shot Mr. Bailey in the back

with the intent to inflict harmful contact on Mr. Bailey, and which such contact caused injury to

Mr. Bailey, namely his death.

135. As described in detail in above, Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s shooting

of Mr. Bailey did not constitute the use of reasonable force because the shooting was in excess of

the amount of force that an officer in their position would have reasonably believed necessary to

arrest Mr. Bailey or prevent his escape.

136. Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s intentional infliction of physical harm

upon Mr. Bailey, causing his death, was without legal authorization, privilege, or consent.

137. In shooting Mr. Bailey, Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson consciously

disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of danger of death or serious bodily injury to Mr.

Bailey.

138. Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s willful and wanton conduct caused Mr.

Bailey’s death and the Plaintiffs’ damages.

139. Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s conduct was attended by circumstances

of malice, or willful and wanton conduct, which they must have realized was dangerous, or that

was done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to the consequences to Mr. Bailey or his

family, his safety and life and their lives.

140. Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s conduct also constituted a felonious

killing under C.R.S. §§ 13-21-203 and 15-11-803, in that his conduct caused the death of Mr.

Bailey and that Defendants Van’t Land and Evenson (1) consciously disregarded (2) a

substantial and (3) unjustifiable risk that they knew would (4) cause the death of another,

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namely, Mr. Bailey.

141. Plaintiff R.B., as the child of Mr. Bailey, suffered and continues to suffer

economic and non-economic damages due to Defendants Van’t Land’s and Evenson’s conduct,

including but not limited to extreme emotional stress, grief, loss of companionship, impairment

of quality of life, inconvenience, pain and suffering, funeral expenses, and financial losses due to

the financial benefits they may have reasonably expected to receive from their father had he

lived, and all other damages as allowed under the Colorado Wrongful Death Act.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their

favor and against each of the Defendants, and grant them all relief as allowed by law and equity,

including, but not limited to:

(a) Declaratory and injunctive relief, as appropriate;

(b) Economic losses on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at

trial;

(c) Compensatory and consequential damages, including, but not limited to, damages

for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and

suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial;

(d) Punitive damages on all claims allowed by law and in an amount to be determined

at trial;

(e) Attorneys’ fees and the costs associated with this action, including expert witness

fees, on all claims allowed by law;

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 (f) Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate;

(g) Any further relief that this court deems just and proper, and any other relief as

allowed by law.

PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL TO A JURY ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.

In some town in [Minnesota]

But it could be anywhere
It could be right here on [Preuss] Street
In fact it's happened here
And it happened where you're sitting
Wherever that might be
And it happened last weekend
And it will happen again next week2

Dated this 4th day of June 2020.

KILLMER, LANE & NEWMAN, LLP

s/ Darold W. Killmer
___________________________
Darold W. Killmer
Mari Newman
Liana Orshan
Reid Allison
1543 Champa Street, Suite 400
Denver, Colorado 80202
Phone: (303) 571-1000
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]

Daniel Kay
318 Pikes Peak Ave.
Colorado Springs, CO 80903
Phone: (719) 635-3611
[email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

2
Patterson Hood, “What It Means,” Drive-By Truckers, American Band, 2016 (modified lyric changing “Missouri”
to “Minnesota” and “Ruth Street” to “Preuss Street,” emphasizing the point of the lyric). See also footnote 1, supra. 

30