Type : OS Fiche 3-Annexe 3

Sujet d’étude : Taking Advantage of Linux Capabilities. Durée : 20 min.

Auteur : Michael Bacarella.

Résumé: Linux Capabilities.

Concentrating on user privileges to appease the security paranoid.

A common topic of discussion nowadays is security, and for good reason. Security is becoming more
important as the world becomes further networked. Like all good systems, Linux is evolving in order
to address increasingly important security concerns.

One aspect of security is user privileges. UNIX-style user privileges come in two varieties, user and
root. Regular users are absolutely powerless; they cannot modify any processes or files but their own.
Access to hardware and most network specifications also are denied. Root, on the other hand, can do
anything from modifying all processes and files to having unrestricted network and hardware access.
In some cases root can even physically damage hardware.

Sometimes a middle ground is desired. A utility needs special privileges to perform its function, but
unquestionable god-like root access is overkill. The ping utility is setuid root simply so it can send and
receive ICMP messages. The danger lies in the fact that ping can be exploited before it has dropped its
root privileges, giving the attacker root access to your server.

Fortunately, such a middle ground now exists, and it's called POSIX capabilities. Capabilities divide
system access into logical groups that may be individually granted to, or removed from, different
processes. Capabilities allow system administrators to fine-tune what a process is allowed to do, which
may help them significantly reduce security risks to their system. The best part is that your system
already supports it. If you're lucky, no patching should be necessary.

A list of all the capabilities that your system is, well, capable of, is available in
/usr/include/linux/capability.h, starting with CAP_CHOWN. They're pretty self-explanatory and well
commented. Capability checks are sprinkled throughout the kernel source, and grepping for them can
make for some fun midnight reading.

Each capability is nothing more than a bit in a bitmap. With 32 bits in a capability set, and 28 sets
currently defined, there are currently discussions as to how to expand this number. Some purists
believe that additional capabilities would be too confusing, while others argue that there should be
many more, even a capability for each system call. Time and Linus will ultimately decide how this
exciting feature develops.

The Proc Interface

As of kernel 2.4.17, the file /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound contains a single 32-bit integer that defines the
current global capability set. The global capability set determines what every process on the system is
allowed to do. If a capability is stripped from the system, it is impossible for any process, even root
processes, to regain them.

For example, many crackers' rootkits (a set of tools that cover up their activities and install backdoors
into the system) will load kernel modules that hide illicit processes and files from the system
administrator. To counter this, the administrator could simply remove the CAP_SYS_MODULE
capability from the system as the last step in the system startup process. This step would prevent any
kernel modules from being loaded or unloaded. Once a capability has been removed, it cannot be re-
added. The system must be restarted (which means you might have to use the power button if you've
removed the CAP_SYS_BOOT capability) to regain the full-capability set.

Okay, I lied. There are two ways to add back a capability:

init can re-add capabilities, in theory; there's no actual implementation to my knowledge. This is to
facilitate capability-aware systems in the event that init needs to change runlevels.

If a process is capable of CAP_SYS_RAWIO, it can modify kernel memory through /dev/mem.

Among other things, it can modify kernel memory to grant itself whatever access it desires. Remove
CAP_SYS_RAWIO, but be careful: by removing CAP_SYS_RAWIO, programs such as X most
likely will fail to run.

Editing cap-bound by hand is kind of tedious. Fortunately for you, there's a utility called lcap that
provides a friendlier interface to cap-bound. Here's how one would remove CAP_SYS_CHOWN:

lcap CAP_SYS_CHOWN
Once done, it becomes impossible to change a file's owner:
chown nobody test.txt
chown: changing ownership of `test.txt':
Operation not permitted

Here's how you would remove all capabilities except CAP_SYS_BOOT, CAP_SYS_KILL and
CAP_SYS_NICE:
lcap -z CAP_SYS_BOOT CAP_SYS_KILL CAP_SYS_NICE

One thing to note: modifying cap-bound restricts the capabilities of future processes only. Okay, not
exactly future processes but any process that calls exec(2) (see the function compute_creds in the
kernel source file fs/exec.c). Currently running processes keep the capabilities with which they started.

Modifying the capabilities of an existing process leads us into the next section, and here's the catch I
spoke about above. Running lcap with no arguments lists what your system is capable of. If you see
that CAP_SETPCAP is disabled, you need to make a change to your kernel. It's simple enough to
describe here. In the kernel source tree, edit include/linux/capability.h. You're changing the lines:

#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP))
#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(0)

so that they read:

#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0)

#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(~0)
and then recompile.

There's actually a reason that CAP_SETPCAP is disabled by default: it's deemed a security risk to
leave it enabled on a production system (a patch exists for this condition but has yet to be applied as of
this writing). To be on the safe side, make sure to remove this capability when you're done playing.

The System Call Interface

As of this writing, the syscalls capset and capget manipulate capabilities for a process. There are no
guarantees that this interface won't change. Portable applications are encouraged to use libcap
(www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4) instead.

The prototype for capset is

int capset(cap_user_header_t header,
const cap_user_data_t data);

HEADER is a fancy way to say which pid you're operating on:

typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
__u32 version;
int pid;
} *cap_user_header_t;

If pid is -1, you will modify the capabilities of all currently running processes. Less than -1 and you
modify the process group equal to pid times -1. The semantics are similar to those of kill(2).

The DATA argument allows you to choose which capability sets you plan to modify. There are three:
typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
__u32 effective;
__u32 permitted;
__u32 inheritable;
} *cap_user_data_t;

The permitted set contains all of the capabilities that a process is ultimately capable of realizing.
The effective set is the capabilities a process has elected to utilize from its permitted set. It's as if you
had a huge arsenal of poetry (permitted set) but chose only to arm yourself with Allen Ginsberg for the
task at hand (effective set).

The inheritable set defines which capabilities may be passed on to any programs that replace the
current process image via exec(2). Please note that fork(2) does nothing special with capabilities. The
child simply receives an exact copy of all three capabilities sets.

Only capabilities in the permitted set can be added to the effective or inheritable set. Capabilities
cannot be added to the permitted set of a process unless CAP_SETPCAP is set.

The Filesystem Interface

Sadly, capabilities still lack filesystem support, limiting their usefulness to a degree. Someday, the
mainstream kernels will allow you to enable capabilities in a program's inode, obviating the setuid bit
in many system utilities.

Once fully supported, permitting the ping utility to open raw sockets could be as simple as:
chattr +CAP_NET_RAW /bin/ping

Unfortunately, more pressing kernel issues have delayed work in this area.

If you're so inclined, you can use libcap to hack your favorite services so that they are capability-aware
and drop the privileges they no longer need at startup. Several patches exist for xntpd that do just this;
some even provide their modified version as an RPM. Try a Google search if you're interested in a
capability-aware version of some root-level process you find yourself often shaking a fist at.
setpcap can be used to modify the capability set of an existing process. For example, if the PID of a
regular user's shell is 4235, here's how you can give that user's shell the ability to send signals to any
process:
setpcaps 'cap_kill=ep' 4235

An example use of this would be to allow a friend who is using your machine to debug a CGI script to
kill any Apache processes that get stuck in infinite loops. You'd run it against their login shell once
and forget about them.

Here's an example that utilizes execcap and sucap to run ping as the user “nobody”, with only the
CAP_NET_RAW capability. Our target of choice for ping iswww.yahoo.com:
execcap 'cap_net_raw=ep' /sbin/sucap nobody
nobody /bin/ping www.yahoo.com

This sample isn't terribly useful because you need to be root to execute it, but it does illustrate what is
possible. Despite some of these shortcomings, system administrators still can take measures to
increase the security of their system. A system without CAP_SYS_BOOT, CAP_SYS_RAWIO and
CAP_SYS_MODULE is extremely difficult for an intruder to modify. They cannot hack kernel
memory, install new modules or restart the system so that it runs a backdoored kernel.
If your system logs are append-only and your core system utilities immutable (see chattr(3) for
details), removing the CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE capability will make it virtually impossible for
intruders to erase their tracks or install compromised utilities. Traffic sniffers like tcpdump become
unusable once CAP_NET_RAW is removed. Remove CAP_SYS_PTRACE and you've turned off
program debugging. Such a hostile environment is a script kiddy's worst nightmare, and there is no
choice but to disconnect and wait for the intrusion to be discovered.
Conclusion

Capabilities can provide sophisticated, fine-grained access control over all aspects of a Linux system.
At last, security paranoids will have some tools they so desperately need in their endless fight against
“them”.

Resources
Michael Bacarella ([email protected]) is president of Netgraft Corporation, a firm specializing in
web system development and information security analysis. He shares an apartment in New York with
his wonderful fiancée and a most fearsome green iguana (the iguana's name is Kang.
CAPABILITIES(7) Linux Programmer's Manual CAPABILITIES(7)

NAME         top

capabilities - overview of Linux capabilities

DESCRIPTION         top

For the purpose of performing permission checks, traditional UNIX

 implementations distinguish two categories of processes: privileged
processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred to as superuser or
root), and unprivileged processes (whose effective UID is nonzero).
Privileged processes bypass all kernel permission checks, while
unprivileged processes are subject to full permission checking based
on the process's credentials (usually: effective UID, effective GID,
and supplementary group list).

Starting with kernel 2.2, Linux divides the privileges traditionally

associated with superuser into distinct units, known as capabilities,
which can be independently enabled and disabled. Capabilities are a
per-thread attribute.

Capabilities list
The following list shows the capabilities implemented on Linux, and
the operations or behaviors that each capability permits:

CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL (since Linux 2.6.11)

Enable and disable kernel auditing; change auditing filter
rules; retrieve auditing status and filtering rules.

CAP_AUDIT_READ (since Linux 3.16)

Allow reading the audit log via a multicast netlink socket.

CAP_AUDIT_WRITE (since Linux 2.6.11)

Write records to kernel auditing log.

CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND (since Linux 3.5)

Employ features that can block system suspend (epoll(7)
EPOLLWAKEUP, /proc/sys/wake_lock).

CAP_CHOWN
Make arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs (see chown(2)).

CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
Bypass file read, write, and execute permission checks. (DAC
is an abbreviation of "discretionary access control".)

CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
* Bypass file read permission checks and directory read and
execute permission checks;
* Invoke open_by_handle_at(2).

CAP_FOWNER
* Bypass permission checks on operations that normally require
the filesystem UID of the process to match the UID of the
file (e.g., chmod(2), utime(2)), excluding those operations
covered by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH;
* set extended file attributes (see chattr(1)) on arbitrary
files;
* set Access Control Lists (ACLs) on arbitrary files;
* ignore directory sticky bit on file deletion;
* specify O_NOATIME for arbitrary files in open(2) and
fcntl(2).

CAP_FSETID
Don't clear set-user-ID and set-group-ID permission bits when
a file is modified; set the set-group-ID bit for a file whose
GID does not match the filesystem or any of the supplementary
GIDs of the calling process.

CAP_IPC_LOCK
Lock memory (mlock(2), mlockall(2), mmap(2), shmctl(2)).

CAP_IPC_OWNER
Bypass permission checks for operations on System V IPC
objects.
CAP_KILL
Bypass permission checks for sending signals (see kill(2)).
This includes use of the ioctl(2) KDSIGACCEPT operation.

CAP_LEASE (since Linux 2.4)

Establish leases on arbitrary files (see fcntl(2)).

CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
Set the FS_APPEND_FL and FS_IMMUTABLE_FL inode flags (see
chattr(1)).

CAP_MAC_ADMIN (since Linux 2.6.25)

Override Mandatory Access Control (MAC). Implemented for the
Smack Linux Security Module (LSM).

CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE (since Linux 2.6.25)

Allow MAC configuration or state changes. Implemented for the
Smack LSM.

CAP_MKNOD (since Linux 2.4)

Create special files using mknod(2).

CAP_NET_ADMIN
Perform various network-related operations:
* interface configuration;
* administration of IP firewall, masquerading, and accounting;
* modify routing tables;
* bind to any address for transparent proxying;
* set type-of-service (TOS)
* clear driver statistics;
* set promiscuous mode;
* enabling multicasting;
* use setsockopt(2) to set the following socket options:
SO_DEBUG, SO_MARK, SO_PRIORITY (for a priority outside the
range 0 to 6), SO_RCVBUFFORCE, and SO_SNDBUFFORCE.

CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
Bind a socket to Internet domain privileged ports (port
numbers less than 1024).

CAP_NET_BROADCAST
(Unused) Make socket broadcasts, and listen to multicasts.

CAP_NET_RAW
* use RAW and PACKET sockets;
* bind to any address for transparent proxying.

CAP_SETGID
Make arbitrary manipulations of process GIDs and supplementary
GID list; forge GID when passing socket credentials via UNIX
domain sockets; write a group ID mapping in a user namespace
(see user_namespaces(7)).

CAP_SETFCAP (since Linux 2.6.24)

Set file capabilities.

CAP_SETPCAP
If file capabilities are not supported: grant or remove any
capability in the caller's permitted capability set to or from
any other process. (This property of CAP_SETPCAP is not
available when the kernel is configured to support file
capabilities, since CAP_SETPCAP has entirely different
semantics for such kernels.)

If file capabilities are supported: add any capability from

the calling thread's bounding set to its inheritable set; drop
capabilities from the bounding set (via prctl(2)
PR_CAPBSET_DROP); make changes to the securebits flags.
CAP_SETUID
Make arbitrary manipulations of process UIDs (setuid(2),
setreuid(2), setresuid(2), setfsuid(2)); forge UID when
passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets; write a
user ID mapping in a user namespace (see user_namespaces(7)).

CAP_SYS_ADMIN
* Perform a range of system administration operations
including: quotactl(2), mount(2), umount(2), swapon(2),
setdomainname(2);
* perform privileged syslog(2) operations (since Linux 2.6.37,
CAP_SYSLOG should be used to permit such operations);
* perform VM86_REQUEST_IRQ vm86(2) command;
* perform IPC_SET and IPC_RMID operations on arbitrary System
V IPC objects;
* override RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit;
* perform operations on trusted and security Extended
Attributes (see attr(5));
* use lookup_dcookie(2);
* use ioprio_set(2) to assign IOPRIO_CLASS_RT and (before
Linux 2.6.25) IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE I/O scheduling classes;
* forge PID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain
sockets;
* exceed /proc/sys/fs/file-max, the system-wide limit on the
number of open files, in system calls that open files (e.g.,
accept(2), execve(2), open(2), pipe(2));
* employ CLONE_* flags that create new namespaces with
clone(2) and unshare(2) (but, since Linux 3.8, creating user
namespaces does not require any capability);
* call perf_event_open(2);
* access privileged perf event information;
* call setns(2) (requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the target
namespace);
* call fanotify_init(2);
* perform KEYCTL_CHOWN and KEYCTL_SETPERM keyctl(2)
operations;
* perform madvise(2) MADV_HWPOISON operation;
* employ the TIOCSTI ioctl(2) to insert characters into the
input queue of a terminal other than the caller's
controlling terminal;
* employ the obsolete nfsservctl(2) system call;
* employ the obsolete bdflush(2) system call;
* perform various privileged block-device ioctl(2) operations;
* perform various privileged filesystem ioctl(2) operations;
* perform administrative operations on many device drivers.

CAP_SYS_BOOT
Use reboot(2) and kexec_load(2).

CAP_SYS_CHROOT
Use chroot(2).

CAP_SYS_MODULE
Load and unload kernel modules (see init_module(2) and
delete_module(2)); in kernels before 2.6.25: drop capabilities
from the system-wide capability bounding set.

CAP_SYS_NICE
* Raise process nice value (nice(2), setpriority(2)) and
change the nice value for arbitrary processes;
* set real-time scheduling policies for calling process, and
set scheduling policies and priorities for arbitrary
processes (sched_setscheduler(2), sched_setparam(2),
shed_setattr(2));
* set CPU affinity for arbitrary processes
(sched_setaffinity(2));
* set I/O scheduling class and priority for arbitrary
 processes (ioprio_set(2));
* apply migrate_pages(2) to arbitrary processes and allow
processes to be migrated to arbitrary nodes;
* apply move_pages(2) to arbitrary processes;
* use the MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL flag with mbind(2) and
move_pages(2).

CAP_SYS_PACCT
Use acct(2).

CAP_SYS_PTRACE
* Trace arbitrary processes using ptrace(2);
* apply get_robust_list(2) to arbitrary processes;
* transfer data to or from the memory of arbitrary processes
using process_vm_readv(2) and process_vm_writev(2).
* inspect processes using kcmp(2).

CAP_SYS_RAWIO
* Perform I/O port operations (iopl(2) and ioperm(2));
* access /proc/kcore;
* employ the FIBMAP ioctl(2) operation;
* open devices for accessing x86 model-specific registers
(MSRs, see msr(4))
* update /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr;
* create memory mappings at addresses below the value
specified by /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr;
* map files in /proc/bus/pci;
* open /dev/mem and /dev/kmem;
* perform various SCSI device commands;
* perform certain operations on hpsa(4) and cciss(4) devices;
* perform a range of device-specific operations on other
devices.

CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
* Use reserved space on ext2 filesystems;
* make ioctl(2) calls controlling ext3 journaling;
* override disk quota limits;
* increase resource limits (see setrlimit(2));
* override RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit;
* override maximum number of consoles on console allocation;
* override maximum number of keymaps;
* allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock;
* raise msg_qbytes limit for a System V message queue above
the limit in /proc/sys/kernel/msgmnb (see msgop(2) and
msgctl(2));
* override the /proc/sys/fs/pipe-size-max limit when setting
the capacity of a pipe using the F_SETPIPE_SZ fcntl(2)
command.
* use F_SETPIPE_SZ to increase the capacity of a pipe above
the limit specified by /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size;
* override /proc/sys/fs/mqueue/queues_max limit when creating
POSIX message queues (see mq_overview(7));
* employ prctl(2) PR_SET_MM operation;
* set /proc/PID/oom_score_adj to a value lower than the value
last set by a process with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.

CAP_SYS_TIME
Set system clock (settimeofday(2), stime(2), adjtimex(2)); set
real-time (hardware) clock.

CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
Use vhangup(2); employ various privileged ioctl(2) operations
on virtual terminals.

CAP_SYSLOG (since Linux 2.6.37)

* Perform privileged syslog(2) operations. See syslog(2) for
information on which operations require privilege.
* View kernel addresses exposed via /proc and other
 interfaces when /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict has the
value 1. (See the discussion of the kptr_restrict in
proc(5).)

CAP_WAKE_ALARM (since Linux 3.0)

Trigger something that will wake up the system (set
CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM and CLOCK_BOOTTIME_ALARM timers).

Past and current implementation

A full implementation of capabilities requires that:

1. For all privileged operations, the kernel must check whether the
thread has the required capability in its effective set.

2. The kernel must provide system calls allowing a thread's

capability sets to be changed and retrieved.

3. The filesystem must support attaching capabilities to an

executable file, so that a process gains those capabilities when
the file is executed.

Before kernel 2.6.24, only the first two of these requirements are
met; since kernel 2.6.24, all three requirements are met.

Thread capability sets

Each thread has three capability sets containing zero or more of the
above capabilities:

Permitted:
This is a limiting superset for the effective capabilities
that the thread may assume. It is also a limiting superset
for the capabilities that may be added to the inheritable set
by a thread that does not have the CAP_SETPCAP capability in
its effective set.

If a thread drops a capability from its permitted set, it can

never reacquire that capability (unless it execve(2)s either a
set-user-ID-root program, or a program whose associated file
capabilities grant that capability).

Inheritable:
This is a set of capabilities preserved across an execve(2).
It provides a mechanism for a process to assign capabilities
to the permitted set of the new program during an execve(2).

Effective:
This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to perform
permission checks for the thread.

A child created via fork(2) inherits copies of its parent's

capability sets. See below for a discussion of the treatment of
capabilities during execve(2).

Using capset(2), a thread may manipulate its own capability sets (see
below).

Since Linux 3.2, the file /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap exposes the

numerical value of the highest capability supported by the running
kernel; this can be used to determine the highest bit that may be set
in a capability set.

File capabilities
Since kernel 2.6.24, the kernel supports associating capability sets
with an executable file using setcap(8). The file capability sets
are stored in an extended attribute (see setxattr(2)) named
security.capability. Writing to this extended attribute requires the
CAP_SETFCAP capability. The file capability sets, in conjunction
with the capability sets of the thread, determine the capabilities of
 a thread after an execve(2).

The three file capability sets are:

Permitted (formerly known as forced):

These capabilities are automatically permitted to the thread,
regardless of the thread's inheritable capabilities.

Inheritable (formerly known as allowed):

This set is ANDed with the thread's inheritable set to
determine which inheritable capabilities are enabled in the
permitted set of the thread after the execve(2).

Effective:
This is not a set, but rather just a single bit. If this bit
is set, then during an execve(2) all of the new permitted
capabilities for the thread are also raised in the effective
set. If this bit is not set, then after an execve(2), none of
the new permitted capabilities is in the new effective set.

Enabling the file effective capability bit implies that any

file permitted or inheritable capability that causes a thread
to acquire the corresponding permitted capability during an
execve(2) (see the transformation rules described below) will
also acquire that capability in its effective set. Therefore,
when assigning capabilities to a file (setcap(8),
cap_set_file(3), cap_set_fd(3)), if we specify the effective
flag as being enabled for any capability, then the effective
flag must also be specified as enabled for all other
capabilities for which the corresponding permitted or
inheritable flags is enabled.

Transformation of capabilities during execve()

During an execve(2), the kernel calculates the new capabilities of
the process using the following algorithm:

P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |

(F(permitted) & cap_bset)

P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : 0

P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable) [i.e., unchanged]

where:

P denotes the value of a thread capability set before the

execve(2)

P' denotes the value of a capability set after the

execve(2)

F denotes a file capability set

cap_bset is the value of the capability bounding set (described

below).

Capabilities and execution of programs by root

In order to provide an all-powerful root using capability sets,
during an execve(2):

1. If a set-user-ID-root program is being executed, or the real user

ID of the process is 0 (root) then the file inheritable and
permitted sets are defined to be all ones (i.e., all capabilities
enabled).

2. If a set-user-ID-root program is being executed, then the file

effective bit is defined to be one (enabled).
 The upshot of the above rules, combined with the capabilities
transformations described above, is that when a process execve(2)s a
set-user-ID-root program, or when a process with an effective UID of
0 execve(2)s a program, it gains all capabilities in its permitted
and effective capability sets, except those masked out by the
capability bounding set. This provides semantics that are the same
as those provided by traditional UNIX systems.

Capability bounding set

The capability bounding set is a security mechanism that can be used
to limit the capabilities that can be gained during an execve(2).
The bounding set is used in the following ways:

* During an execve(2), the capability bounding set is ANDed with the

file permitted capability set, and the result of this operation is
assigned to the thread's permitted capability set. The capability
bounding set thus places a limit on the permitted capabilities that
may be granted by an executable file.

* (Since Linux 2.6.25) The capability bounding set acts as a limiting

superset for the capabilities that a thread can add to its
inheritable set using capset(2). This means that if a capability
is not in the bounding set, then a thread can't add this capability
to its inheritable set, even if it was in its permitted
capabilities, and thereby cannot have this capability preserved in
its permitted set when it execve(2)s a file that has the capability
in its inheritable set.

Note that the bounding set masks the file permitted capabilities, but
not the inherited capabilities. If a thread maintains a capability
in its inherited set that is not in its bounding set, then it can
still gain that capability in its permitted set by executing a file
that has the capability in its inherited set.

Depending on the kernel version, the capability bounding set is

either a system-wide attribute, or a per-process attribute.

Capability bounding set prior to Linux 2.6.25

In kernels before 2.6.25, the capability bounding set is a system-

wide attribute that affects all threads on the system. The bounding
set is accessible via the file /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound.
(Confusingly, this bit mask parameter is expressed as a signed
decimal number in /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound.)

Only the init process may set capabilities in the capability bounding
set; other than that, the superuser (more precisely: programs with
the CAP_SYS_MODULE capability) may only clear capabilities from this
set.

On a standard system the capability bounding set always masks out the
CAP_SETPCAP capability. To remove this restriction (dangerous!),
modify the definition of CAP_INIT_EFF_SET in
include/linux/capability.h and rebuild the kernel.

The system-wide capability bounding set feature was added to Linux

starting with kernel version 2.2.11.

Capability bounding set from Linux 2.6.25 onward

From Linux 2.6.25, the capability bounding set is a per-thread

attribute. (There is no longer a system-wide capability bounding
set.)

The bounding set is inherited at fork(2) from the thread's parent,

and is preserved across an execve(2).

A thread may remove capabilities from its capability bounding set

 using the prctl(2) PR_CAPBSET_DROP operation, provided it has the
CAP_SETPCAP capability. Once a capability has been dropped from the
bounding set, it cannot be restored to that set. A thread can
determine if a capability is in its bounding set using the prctl(2)
PR_CAPBSET_READ operation.

Removing capabilities from the bounding set is supported only if file

capabilities are compiled into the kernel. In kernels before Linux
2.6.33, file capabilities were an optional feature configurable via
the CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES option. Since Linux 2.6.33,
the configuration option has been removed and file capabilities are
always part of the kernel. When file capabilities are compiled into
the kernel, the init process (the ancestor of all processes) begins
with a full bounding set. If file capabilities are not compiled into
the kernel, then init begins with a full bounding set minus
CAP_SETPCAP, because this capability has a different meaning when
there are no file capabilities.

Removing a capability from the bounding set does not remove it from
the thread's inherited set. However it does prevent the capability
from being added back into the thread's inherited set in the future.

Effect of user ID changes on capabilities

To preserve the traditional semantics for transitions between 0 and
nonzero user IDs, the kernel makes the following changes to a
thread's capability sets on changes to the thread's real, effective,
saved set, and filesystem user IDs (using setuid(2), setresuid(2), or
similar):

1. If one or more of the real, effective or saved set user IDs was
previously 0, and as a result of the UID changes all of these IDs
have a nonzero value, then all capabilities are cleared from the
permitted and effective capability sets.

2. If the effective user ID is changed from 0 to nonzero, then all

capabilities are cleared from the effective set.

3. If the effective user ID is changed from nonzero to 0, then the

permitted set is copied to the effective set.

4. If the filesystem user ID is changed from 0 to nonzero (see

setfsuid(2)), then the following capabilities are cleared from the
effective set: CAP_CHOWN, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
CAP_FOWNER, CAP_FSETID, CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE (since Linux 2.6.30),
CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, and CAP_MKNOD (since Linux 2.6.30). If the
filesystem UID is changed from nonzero to 0, then any of these
capabilities that are enabled in the permitted set are enabled in
the effective set.

If a thread that has a 0 value for one or more of its user IDs wants
to prevent its permitted capability set being cleared when it resets
all of its user IDs to nonzero values, it can do so using the
prctl(2) PR_SET_KEEPCAPS operation.

Programmatically adjusting capability sets

A thread can retrieve and change its capability sets using the
capget(2) and capset(2) system calls. However, the use of
cap_get_proc(3) and cap_set_proc(3), both provided in the libcap
package, is preferred for this purpose. The following rules govern
changes to the thread capability sets:

1. If the caller does not have the CAP_SETPCAP capability, the new
inheritable set must be a subset of the combination of the
existing inheritable and permitted sets.

2. (Since Linux 2.6.25) The new inheritable set must be a subset of

the combination of the existing inheritable set and the capability
bounding set.
 3. The new permitted set must be a subset of the existing permitted
set (i.e., it is not possible to acquire permitted capabilities
that the thread does not currently have).

4. The new effective set must be a subset of the new permitted set.

The securebits flags: establishing a capabilities-only environment

Starting with kernel 2.6.26, and with a kernel in which file
capabilities are enabled, Linux implements a set of per-thread
securebits flags that can be used to disable special handling of
capabilities for UID 0 (root). These flags are as follows:

SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS
Setting this flag allows a thread that has one or more 0 UIDs
to retain its capabilities when it switches all of its UIDs to
a nonzero value. If this flag is not set, then such a UID
switch causes the thread to lose all capabilities. This flag
is always cleared on an execve(2). (This flag provides the
same functionality as the older prctl(2) PR_SET_KEEPCAPS
operation.)

SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
Setting this flag stops the kernel from adjusting capability
sets when the threads's effective and filesystem UIDs are
switched between zero and nonzero values. (See the subsection
Effect of User ID Changes on Capabilities.)

SECBIT_NOROOT
If this bit is set, then the kernel does not grant
capabilities when a set-user-ID-root program is executed, or
when a process with an effective or real UID of 0 calls
execve(2). (See the subsection Capabilities and execution of
programs by root.)

Each of the above "base" flags has a companion "locked" flag.

Setting any of the "locked" flags is irreversible, and has the effect
of preventing further changes to the corresponding "base" flag. The
locked flags are: SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED,
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED, and SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED.

The securebits flags can be modified and retrieved using the prctl(2)
PR_SET_SECUREBITS and PR_GET_SECUREBITS operations. The CAP_SETPCAP
capability is required to modify the flags.

The securebits flags are inherited by child processes. During an

execve(2), all of the flags are preserved, except SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS
which is always cleared.

An application can use the following call to lock itself, and all of
its descendants, into an environment where the only way of gaining
capabilities is by executing a program with associated file
capabilities:

prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED |
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED |
SECBIT_NOROOT |
SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED);

Interaction with user namespaces

For a discussion of the interaction of capabilities and user
namespaces, see user_namespaces(7).

CONFORMING TO         top
 No standards govern capabilities, but the Linux capability
implementation is based on the withdrawn POSIX.1e draft standard; see
⟨http://wt.tuxomania.net/publications/posix.1e/⟩.

NOTES         top

Since kernel 2.5.27, capabilities are an optional kernel component,

and can be enabled/disabled via the CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
kernel configuration option.

The /proc/PID/task/TID/status file can be used to view the capability

sets of a thread. The /proc/PID/status file shows the capability
sets of a process's main thread. Before Linux 3.8, nonexistent
capabilities were shown as being enabled (1) in these sets. Since
Linux 3.8, all nonexistent capabilities (above CAP_LAST_CAP) are
shown as disabled (0).

The libcap package provides a suite of routines for setting and

getting capabilities that is more comfortable and less likely to
change than the interface provided by capset(2) and capget(2). This
package also provides the setcap(8) and getcap(8) programs. It can
be found at
⟨http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs⟩.

Before kernel 2.6.24, and since kernel 2.6.24 if file capabilities

are not enabled, a thread with the CAP_SETPCAP capability can manipu‐
late the capabilities of threads other than itself. However, this is
only theoretically possible, since no thread ever has CAP_SETPCAP in
either of these cases:

* In the pre-2.6.25 implementation the system-wide capability bound‐

ing set, /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound, always masks out this capabil‐
ity, and this can not be changed without modifying the kernel
source and rebuilding.

* If file capabilities are disabled in the current implementation,

then init starts out with this capability removed from its per-
process bounding set, and that bounding set is inherited by all
other processes created on the system.

SEE ALSO         top

capsh(1), setpriv(2), prctl(2), setfsuid(2), cap_clear(3),

cap_copy_ext(3), cap_from_text(3), cap_get_file(3), cap_get_proc(3),
cap_init(3), capgetp(3), capsetp(3), libcap(3), credentials(7),
user_namespaces(7), pthreads(7), getcap(8), setcap(8)

include/linux/capability.h in the Linux kernel source tree

COLOPHON         top

This page is part of release 3.79 of the Linux man-pages project. A

description of the project, information about reporting bugs, and the
latest version of this page, can be found at
http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.

Linux 2015-02-01 CAPABILITIES(7)