Emotional Intelligence in Organizations

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Annu. Rev. Organ. Psychol. Organ. Behav. 2014. Keywords

1:459–88
emotion, intelligence, ability, performance, leadership
First published online as a Review in Advance on
January 15, 2014
Abstract
The Annual Review of Organizational Psychology
and Organizational Behavior is online at Emotional intelligence (EI) is a set of abilities that pertain to emotions
orgpsych.annualreviews.org and emotional information. EI has attracted considerable attention
This article’s doi: among organizational scholars, and research has clarified the defini-
10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-031413-091233 tion of EI and illuminated its role in organizations. Here, I define EI
Copyright © 2014 by Annual Reviews. and describe the abilities that constitute it. I evaluate two approaches
All rights reserved to measuring EI: the performance-based and self-report approaches.
I review the findings about how EI is associated with work criteria,
organizing the findings according to three overarching models: the
validity generalization, situation-specific, and moderator models. The
support for the latter two models suggests that the organizational con-
text and employee dispositions should be considered in order to fully
explain how EI relates to criteria. I identify controversies in this area,
describe how findings address some controversies, and propose fu-
ture research to address those that remain. I conclude by listing best
practices for future research on the role of EI in organizations.
459
INTRODUCTION
Steve Jobs’s biographer, Walter Isaacson, attributed some of Jobs’s success in leading Apple to
develop many of the most popular and creative technology products on the market to his abilities
to identify, analyze, and control emotions. Jobs “could size people up, understand their inner
thoughts, cajole them, intimidate them, target their deepest vulnerabilities, and delight them at
will. He knew, intuitively, how to create products that pleased, interfaces that were friendly, and
marketing messages that were enticing” (Isaacson 2011). This quote suggests that it was not
intelligence in the traditional sense that differentiated Jobs from other leaders in his industry.
Instead, Jobs understood better than his competitors how people felt when using different
products, and he leveraged this understanding to design computers and phones that appealed
more to customers.
Research on emotional intelligence (EI) investigates whether a set of abilities about emotions
and emotional information—such as the abilities that Jobs seemingly deployed—enhances our
prediction and understanding of the outcomes of organization members, such as their job per-
formance and their effectiveness as leaders. Research on EI in organizations started after the
publication of seminal theoretical articles by Salovey & Mayer (1990, Mayer & Salovey 1997) and
popular books by Goleman (1995, 1998). There are an increasing number of studies that illu-
minate the role of EI. In this article, I review these studies and provide a road map for future
research on EI in organizations. Specifically, I review definitions of EI, approaches to measuring
EI, and findings about how EI is associated with work criteria. I describe controversies in this area
and identify future research that would advance our understanding of the role of EI in organi-
zations. I conclude by listing best practices for research on EI that emerge from this review.
DEFINITION OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

In the article in which they introduced EI to the academic literature, Salovey & Mayer (1990,
p. 189) defined EI as “the subset of social intelligence that involves the ability to monitor one’s own
and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide
one’s thinking and actions.” They later revised and extended their definition, proposing that EI
consists of “the ability to perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions so as to assist
thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions
so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth” (Mayer & Salovey 1997, p. 5). A more recent
review defined EI as “the ability to carry out accurate reasoning about emotions and the ability to
use emotions and emotional knowledge to enhance thought” (Mayer et al. 2008, p. 507). These
definitions all construe EI as a set of abilities concerned with emotions and emotional information.
To further understand the meaning of EI, it is critical to define its constituent components—
intelligence and emotion—and explain how these concepts are integrated to form the construct
of EI (Côté 2010, Matthews et al. 2002, Mayer & Salovey 1997; also see Pedhazur & Schmelkin
1991). Defining the constituent components is important because “few EI researchers are willing
to be specific about what they want to measure” (Conte 2005, p. 437).
Definition of Intelligence
Intelligence is typically defined as ability or capacity. Wechsler (1958, p. 7) defined intelligence
as “the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally and
to deal effectively with his [or her] environment.” A report by a task force of the American
Psychological Association indicated that intelligence is the “ability to understand complex ideas,
460 Côté
to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of
reasoning, [and] to overcome obstacles by taking thought” (Neisser et al. 1996, p. 77). Orga-
nizational psychologists have defined intelligence similarly. Schmidt & Hunter (2000, p. 3) defined
it as the “ability to grasp and reason correctly with abstractions (concepts) and solve problems.”
Locke (2005, p. 425) wrote that “the concept of intelligence refers to one’s ability to form and
grasp concepts, especially higher-level or more abstract concepts.”
In turn, abilities consist of “the possible variations over individuals in the liminal [threshold]
levels of task difficulty. . .at which, on any given occasion in which all conditions appear to be
favorable, individuals perform successfully on a defined class of tasks” (Carroll 1993, p. 8). Thus,
abilities refer to variations in how well individuals can accomplish a set of tasks in a particular
domain, in conditions that are favorable for accomplishing these tasks. Consistent with this
notion, Sackett et al. (1988) noted that researchers commonly use the terms typical and maximum
performance to refer to personality and ability measures, respectively. These authors defined
maximum performance as the performance that individuals exhibit when they have accepted
instructions to maximize effort for a period of time and are aware that they are being evaluated
(Sackett et al. 1988). Thus, intelligence factors (e.g., verbal intelligence, perceptual intelligence)
and the abilities that they subsume reflect variations in the performance that individuals exhibit
when they exert their highest effort to solve problems in specific domains, under evaluative
conditions.
Definition of Emotion
Emotions are brief, organized sets of responses (including physiological changes, expressive
behaviors, action tendencies, and subjective experiences) that optimize how individuals address
the challenges and exploit the opportunities that arise in the events that they encounter (Lazarus
1991, Levenson 1994). Distinct emotions, such as anger, embarrassment, and happiness, represent
qualitatively different sets of responses that evolved to address unique challenges and exploit
unique opportunities. For instance, anger helps to address the challenge of being treated unfairly
by motivating individuals to redress unfairness (Lazarus 1991). Embarrassment helps to address
the challenge of having violated a social norm by motivating individuals to communicate to
conspecifics an awareness of having violated a norm (for example, by blushing; Keltner &
Buswell 1997).
Integrating Intelligence and Emotion

Combining the definitions of its constituent components, EI is a set of abilities that pertain to
the organized sets of responses to events that constitute emotions (Mayer & Salovey 1997,
Salovey & Mayer 1990). Each of the abilities that constitute EI represents variation in how well
individuals can solve a set of problems that involve emotions. As such, EI differs from other
intelligence factors, such as verbal intelligence and perceptual intelligence, which focus on cog-
nitive processes (Côté & Miners 2006, Mayer et al. 2008).
One implication of integrating intelligence and emotion is that it must be possible to determine
“at least some ‘right’ answers as to feelings” (Mayer & Salovey 1997, p. 9) and then rely on these
correct answers to distinguish individuals with higher EI from those with lower EI (Matthews et al.
2004). Although correct answers may vary depending on the cultural context, it must be possible
to determine correct answers within a given cultural context (Matthews et al. 2004, Mayer &
Salovey 1997, Morgan et al. 2010). In the literature on intelligence, individuals are correct if they
know a piece of information that others ignore (Carroll 1993). Such variation in knowledge has
www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 461

been termed crystallized intelligence (Cattell 1943). Similarly, emotionally intelligent individuals
are correct to the extent that they know information about emotions that others ignore (Matthews
et al. 2004). For example, emotionally intelligent leaders may know that followers could get angry
if they are treated unfairly, whereas leaders with lower EI may ignore this information.
The literature on intelligence also proposes that individuals are correct if they can determine
the appropriate solution to a problem and determine that solution quickly, whereas others pro-
duce inappropriate solutions or take a relatively long time to produce a solution (Carroll 1993).
Researchers have referred to such variations in correct and fast problem solving as fluid intelli-
gence (Cattell 1943). Similarly, emotionally intelligent individuals are correct to the extent that
they produce appropriate solutions to problems about emotions and produce those solutions
quickly (Matthews et al. 2004). For example, emotionally intelligent service agents may accurately
identify the emotions that customers express subtly, whereas those with lower EI may misread
these subtle displays of emotions or take a relatively long time to identify these displays.
The Jingle Fallacy and Trait Models of Emotional Intelligence

The jingle fallacy is “the belief that, because different things are called by the same name, they are
the same thing” (Pedhazur & Schmelkin 1991, p. 74). This fallacy is prevalent in research on EI
because some conceptualizations of EI lump together constructs that meet the definitions of its
constituent components—intelligence and emotion—with other constructs that do not meet the
definition of the components (Roberts et al. 2008).
In particular, trait models of EI define it as “a constellation of emotion-related self-perceptions
and dispositions located at the lower levels of personality hierarchies” (Petrides et al. 2007, p. 26),
including assertiveness, happiness, self-esteem, and self-perceived ability to manage stress (see Tett
et al. 2005 for a review of these approaches). Mixed models of EI, such as the model presented by
Goleman (1995, 1998), combine self-perceptions and dispositions with emotional abilities.
Several dimensions of trait/mixed models are outside of the realm of intelligence because they
refer to typical behavior rather than maximum performance (Côté 2010, Elfenbein & Eisenkraft
2010, Zuckerman et al. 1976).
Consider self-esteem, a trait included in several trait/mixed models that represents the ten-
dency to perceive oneself to be a worthy and valuable individual (Crocker & Park 2004). Self-
esteem does not reflect maximum performance on problems in a given domain. When individuals
perceive that they are worthy and valuable, they have not necessarily accepted instructions to
maximize effort. Thus, definitionally, self-esteem is outside of the realm of intelligence. Self-esteem,
along with all dimensions of trait models and many dimensions of mixed models, should be
excluded from models of EI. Researchers commit the jingle fallacy when they assign the label EI to
trait/mixed models (Roberts et al. 2008). Instead, it is more accurate to refer to these models as lists
of healthy individual differences. To avoid committing the jingle fallacy, researchers should in-
stead select ability models of EI.
DIMENSIONS OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

In this section, I describe the main branches of EI and the abilities that each branch subsumes
that have received the most attention. Mayer & Salovey (1997) developed the most prevalent
model of EI—a hierarchical four-branch model that includes perceiving/expressing, using, un-
derstanding, and regulating emotions—based on a review of the literature. The branches are
ordered from more basic psychological processes that emerge earlier in development to more
complex processes that emerge later (Joseph & Newman 2010, Mayer & Salovey 1997). This
462 Côté
model has served as the basis for the most research, and it accommodates other typologies of
emotional abilities, such as the facets of emotion knowledge described by Izard and colleagues
(Fine et al. 2003, Morgan et al. 2010). In Table 1, I list the branches of EI, the abilities that each
branch subsumes, sample measures of these abilities, and sample findings about each branch.
The Perceiving and Expressing Emotions Branch

This branch concerns how accurately and how fast individuals can express emotions and identify,
detect, and decipher aspects of emotional experiences and emotional displays. I describe four
specific abilities contained in this branch.
The ability to identify the emotions that others feel. This ability refers to how accurately indi-
viduals can identify which emotion(s) others feel (e.g., whether others feel anger, sadness, etc.),
typically by processing nonverbal information such as facial expressions and vocal tones (Buck
et al. 1980, Elfenbein & Eisenkraft 2010, Jenness 1932). It has also been called empathic accuracy
(Côté et al. 2011b), emotion recognition ability (Rubin et al. 2005), and nonverbal receiving ability
(Buck et al. 1980). This ability can help individuals garner important information about others’
attitudes, goals, and intentions, which are communicated through emotional expressions (Van
Kleef 2009). For example, this ability can help employees perceive the emotions of their managers,
which may reveal information about managers’ unstated beliefs about the employees’ performance
and, in turn, help employees adjust their behavior.
A facet of this ability that may be particularly important in organizations is emotional aperture,
which refers to how accurately individuals can identify the distribution of emotions that are felt by
a group of people (Sanchez-Burks & Huy 2009). For instance, when making an important an-
nouncement, some leaders may be able to ascertain the proportion of followers who react
positively to the announcement, whereas other leaders may be less able to identify the distribution
of reactions to the announcement.
The ability to detect the authenticity of others’ emotional expressions. This ability refers to how
accurately individuals can distinguish emotional expressions that are authentic from expressions
that are fake (Groth et al. 2009, Mayer & Salovey 1997). It can help individuals determine if they
can rely on others’ expressions to infer their attitudes, goals, and intentions or if they should make
such inferences cautiously. For instance, service agents can use this ability to distinguish authentic
displays of happiness (Duchenne smiles) from fake displays and, in turn, determine if customers are
satisfied with the service that they are providing (Groth et al. 2009).
The ability to appraise one’s own emotions. This ability concerns how accurately individuals can
decipher the emotions that they themselves are feeling (Salovey & Mayer 1990). When individuals
have emotional reactions to events, some are more likely to realize that they are experiencing
emotions and to identify which emotions they are feeling. For instance, some employees may
realize when they are becoming angry at a decision made by the boss, whereas others may not
realize that they are having this reaction. One facet of this ability is introceptive awareness, defined
as the ability to identify physiological changes that are tied to emotions (e.g., heartbeats; Feldman
Barrett et al. 2004).
The ability to express one’s own emotions clearly to others. This ability concerns how clearly
individuals can display their own emotions (Buck et al. 1980, Salovey & Mayer 1990, Zuckerman
et al. 1976). It has also been called nonverbal sending accuracy (Buck et al. 1980). Individuals

Table 1 Branches of emotional intelligence
Branch of emotional
intelligence Abilities contained in this branch Sample measures Sample findings
The perceiving The ability to identify the emotions that The Multimodal Emotion Recognition Extraverted leaders with higher levels of
and expressing others feel (also called emotion Test (MERT; Bänziger et al. 2009) empathic accuracy receive higher ratings
464
emotions branch recognition ability, empathic The empathic accuracy paradigm of transformational leadership from their
accuracy, and nonverbal receiving (Levenson & Ruef 1992) subordinates, relative to extraverted
accuracy) The faces task of the MSCEIT leaders with lower empathic accuracy
Côté
(Mayer et al. 2002) (Rubin et al. 2005).
The ability to detect the authenticity Correspondence between targets’ Customers who are better able to detect
of others’ emotional expressions emotion regulation strategies and the authenticity of the emotions expressed
employees’ detection of these by service agents rate the service provided
strategies (Groth et al. 2009) by agents who fake emotions lower than
customers with lower levels of this ability
do (Groth et al. 2009).
The ability to appraise one’s own The heartbeat detection task Individuals with higher ability to detect their
emotions (Feldman Barrett et al. 2004) heartbeats report feeling more high- and
low-activation emotions than individuals
with lower levels of this ability do
(Feldman Barrett et al. 2004).
The ability to express one’s own The posed sending paradigm Individuals with a higher ability to express
emotions clearly to others (also called (Zuckerman et al. 1976) their own emotions clearly to others have
nonverbal sending accuracy) more empathic accuracy than individuals
(Elfenbein & Eisenkraft 2010).
The using emotions Knowledge of the systematic effects The facilitation task of the MSCEIT The association between positive affect and
branch of emotions on cognitive processes (Mayer at al. 2002) creative behavior is more pronounced
among employees with higher levels of the
using emotions branch of EI than among
those with lower levels of this branch
(Parke & Seo 2013).
The ability to harness emotions to guide The sensations task of the MSCEIT Same as above.
cognitive activities and solve (Mayer at al. 2002)
problems
(Continued )
Table 1 (Continued )
Branch of emotional
intelligence Abilities contained in this branch Sample measures Sample findings
The understanding The ability to comprehend emotion Part 4 of the Emotion Matching Task Children with higher ability to comprehend
emotions branch language (for children; Morgan et al. 2010) emotion language have less negative social
interactions than children with lower levels
of this ability do (Morgan et al. 2010).
The ability to analyze the cause and The Situational Test of Emotional Incidental anxiety reduces risk taking on
effect relations between events Understanding (STEU; MacCann & unrelated judgments less among individuals
and emotions Roberts 2008) with higher ability to analyze the cause and
The changes task of the MSCEIT effect relations between events and emotions,
(Mayer at al. 2002) relative to those with lower levels of this
ability (Yip & Côté 2013).
The ability to understand how basic The blends task of the MSCEIT Students with higher ability to understand
emotions combine to form complex (Mayer at al. 2002) how basic emotions combine to form complex
emotions emotions have higher GPAs than students
(Rode et al. 2008).
www.annualreviews.org

The regulating The ability to set emotion The preference for useful emotions Individuals who prefer useful emotions in
emotions branch regulation goals paradigm (Ford & Tamir 2012, a video game involving confrontation
Tamir et al. 2008) perform better in the game, compared
with their lower-ability counterparts
(Tamir et al. 2008).
The ability to select emotion regulation The Situational Test of Emotion Individuals with higher emotion
strategies (also called emotion Management (STEM; MacCann & regulation knowledge exhibit
regulation knowledge) Roberts 2008) a stronger connection between
The emotion management and moral identity and prosocial behavior
emotional relationships tasks of the than individuals with less emotion
MSCEIT (Mayer et al. 2002) regulation knowledge do (Côté et al. 2011a,
study 1).
Emotional Intelligence in Organizations

The ability to implement emotion The instructed emotion regulation Individuals with higher ability to modify
regulation strategies paradigm (Bonanno et al. 2004) emotional expressive behavior on demand
465
report higher life satisfaction and higher
income than individuals with lower levels
of this ability do (Côté et al. 2010a).
express emotions clearly when observers can identify the emotion(s) that expressers wish to display
to them. Emotionally intelligent leaders who are satisfied with work and who wish to express
positive emotions to followers may show these emotions clearly, whereas leaders with lower EI
may express the same emotions less clearly, so that followers perceive other emotions instead.
The Using Emotions Branch

This branch concerns how well individuals capitalize on the systematic effects of emotions on
cognitive activities such as creativity and risk taking (Salovey & Mayer 1990). I describe two
abilities that may constitute this branch.
Knowledge of the systematic effects of emotions on cognitive processes. This ability concerns how
much individuals know about how emotions systematically guide cognitive activities (Fine et al.
2003, Morgan et al. 2010, Salovey & Mayer 1990). For instance, there is a robust association
between feeling anxiety and avoiding risk, because anxiety signals that the current environment is
uncertain and avoiding risk is preferable under conditions of uncertainty (Johnson & Tversky
1983). Emotionally intelligent traders might know that they will be risk averse when they are
anxious, whereas traders with lower EI may not be aware of this effect (Yip & Côté 2013).
The ability to harness emotions to guide cognitive activities and solve problems. This ability
concerns how effectively individuals can “generate emotions ‘on demand’” (Mayer & Salovey 1997,
p. 12) to tailor their cognitive activities to the situation. For example, individuals may “imagine
negative outcomes as a method of motivating performance” (Salovey & Mayer 1990, p. 200).
Potential conceptual overlap between the using emotions branch and other branches. Defini-
tionally, these abilities overlap with abilities to regulate emotion. Knowledge of how emotions
influence cognitive processes is involved in setting appropriate emotion regulation goals, an ability
from the regulating emotions branch described below. Further, harnessing emotions to facilitate
cognitive activities involves creating emotions that are appropriate for the situation, another
ability described below (Joseph & Newman 2010). This conceptual overlap is supported by factor-
analytic research that shows that the using emotions branch loads on one or more of the other
branches of EI (Palmer et al. 2005, Roberts et al. 2006). Because of its lack of theoretical and
empirical distinctiveness, this branch is sometimes excluded from investigations of EI (e.g., Joseph &
Newman 2010, Matthews et al. 2006a).
The Understanding Emotions Branch

This branch concerns how accurately individuals reason about various aspects of emotions, such
as when they attach labels to emotions and identify connections between events and emotional
reactions. I describe three abilities within this branch.
The ability to comprehend emotion language. This ability refers to how accurately individ-
uals recognize relations between words and emotions and attach verbal labels to their and
others’ emotions (Fine et al. 2003, Mayer & Salovey 1997). Some individuals possess a rich
vocabulary about emotions that allows them to attach correct words to emotional reactions.
For instance, when individuals with a high degree of this ability perceive that they are embarrassed,
they are more likely to describe their feeling using that term, whereas their counterparts may use
other terms.
466 Côté
The ability to analyze the cause and effect relations between events and emotions. This ability
reflects how accurately individuals can identify which past events elicited current emotions and
how accurately they can predict future emotions based on current events (Fine et al. 2003,
MacCann & Roberts 2008, Morgan et al. 2010, Yip & Côté 2013). Mayer & Salovey (1997,
p. 11) described this ability as the “ability to interpret the meanings that emotions convey re-
garding relationships, such as that sadness often accompanies a loss.” For instance, leaders with
a high degree of this ability may correctly predict that unfair procedures will arouse anger in
employees, whereas other leaders may ignore the emotional consequences of unfair procedures.
The ability to understand how basic emotions combine to form complex emotions. This ability
concerns how well individuals can identify the complex emotional experiences that result from
combinations of more basic emotions. Mayer & Salovey (1997, p. 13) described how individuals
learn “to recognize the existence of complex, contradictory emotions” and to acknowledge such
combinations of emotions. Equipped with this ability, individuals can recognize that feeling
happiness and sadness while reliving a previous event will combine into a complex emotion,
nostalgia (Sedikides et al. 2008), whereas others are less likely to understand that happiness and
sadness form a more complex emotional experience.
The Regulating Emotions Branch

This branch concerns how well individuals can increase, maintain, or decrease the magnitude
or duration of their or others’ emotions (Gross 2013). I focus on three abilities that constitute
this branch.
The ability to set emotion regulation goals. This ability refers to how well individuals determine
if their current emotions are optimal in the current circumstances, and set goals for modifying
their emotions if necessary (Mayer & Salovey 1997). Individuals set goals for changing their
emotions if they are not optimal, and some individuals set more appropriate goals for the cir-
cumstances than others (Côté et al. 2006, Sheppes et al. 2013). For instance, emotionally intelligent
individuals are more likely to know that anger is useful, and happiness is not useful, when
confronting another person (Ford & Tamir 2012). A sports coach with a high level of this ability
may set a goal of increasing the level of energy in the team, a goal that is appropriate because higher
energy can improve team performance. A coach with a lower level of this ability may instead set
a goal of eliciting another emotion that is less conducive to high team performance.
The ability to select emotion regulation strategies. This ability concerns the extent to which
individuals select regulation strategies that are likely to create desired emotions. It has also been
called emotion regulation knowledge (Côté et al. 2011a). Evidence suggests that emotion regu-
lation strategies are more effective in certain situations and less effective in others (Sheppes et al.
2013). Some individuals are better at matching emotion regulation strategies to the situations
that they encounter, flexibly employing these strategies depending on the situation (Feldman
Barrett & Gross 2001). For instance, a sports coach with a higher degree of this ability can
determine which of a number of strategies (e.g., a fiery speech by the coach, letting the team captain
address the team) will best create high energy in the team, whereas a coach with a lower degree of
this ability may select strategies that are ineffective in creating energy.
The ability to implement emotion regulation strategies. This ability concerns how effectively
individuals deploy regulation strategies to produce the desired effect on emotions (Côté et al.

2010a, Sheppes et al. 2013). Individuals may choose appropriate regulation strategies, but they
may not necessarily implement these strategies effectively (Côté et al. 2006). A sports coach who
correctly identifies that a fiery speech is the best strategy to create energy may deliver that speech
well if the coach has a high level of this ability to implement emotion regulation strategies but
deliver it poorly if the coach has a low level of this ability.
MEASUREMENT OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

In this section, I evaluate the validity of the two most prevalent approaches to measuring EI:
performance-based and self-report measurements. I do not review the peer-report approach be-
cause few studies have used it. In evaluating validity, I adopt the notion that “a test is valid for
measuring an attribute if and only if (a) the attribute exists and (b) variations in the attribute
causally produce variations in the outcomes of the measurement procedure” (Borsboom et al.
2004, p. 1061).
Performance-Based Measurement of Emotional Intelligence

This approach consists of determining how well respondents perform tasks and solve problems
about emotions. Performance-based measurement is common in intelligence research because
it features the conditions for maximum performance that are inherent to intelligence con-
structs. That is, when completing performance-based measures, respondents accept instruc-
tions to maximize effort for a period of time and are aware that they are being evaluated
(Sackett et al. 1988).
Performance-based measures have been developed to assess several of the emotional abilities
described above, as shown in Table 1. The most popular performance-based measure is the Mayer-
Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al. 2002). The MSCEIT measures
all four branches and also provides a total EI score. There are two scoring systems for the MSCEIT,
one based on expert researchers on emotions and another based on the aggregated responses of
a large sample drawn from the general population (see Mayer et al. 2001 for the rationale for the
consensus-scoring system). Advantages of the MSCEIT include its coverage of all four branches
from Mayer & Salovey’s (1997) model and evidence for its validity and reliability from past studies
(e.g., Côté & Miners 2006, Farh et al. 2012). The MSCEIT has limitations, however. Researchers
have noted that the experts may not have been carefully selected, because the selection criterion
consisted solely of membership in a professional society on research on emotions, the International
Society for Research on Emotion (ISRE). Researchers have also criticized the theoretical rationale
for relying on general consensus to determine the correct answers to the problems (Conte 2005,
Matthews et al. 2002). In addition, the MSCEIT is difficult to access because it is copyrighted, and
researchers must make arrangements with a psychological assessment company to use it.
Several other measures are available that overcome the limitations of the MSCEIT. In par-
ticular, several measures of empathic accuracy (from the perceiving and expressing emotions
branch) present respondents with video recordings, photographs, and/or audio recordings in
which targets are expressing various emotions (e.g., Bänziger et al. 2009, Levenson & Ruef
1992; see Bänziger et al. 2012 for a review of these measures). The expressions in many of these
measures were checked against findings on how emotions are communicated in the face, voice,
and body. The number of expressions that respondents identify correctly reflects their levels of
empathic accuracy.
The Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU; MacCann & Roberts 2008) assesses
the ability to analyze the cause and effect relations between events and emotions (from the
468 Côté
understanding emotions branch). For each of a series of scenarios, respondents choose, among five
emotions that are presented, the emotion that is most likely to be generated by the scenario.
Individuals who select the emotions that are most likely to be generated, according to research on
how appraisals of events are connected to emotions, are inferred to have higher levels of this ability.
In addition, researchers have assessed the ability to implement emotion regulation strategies by
instructing respondents to employ specific strategies and then measuring objectively how well they
deploy these strategies. In one version of this paradigm, respondents are instructed to control their
emotional expressions either by showing as much emotion as possible so that observers really
know what they feel or by hiding as much emotion as possible so that observers cannot tell what
they feel (Bonanno et al. 2004, Côté et al. 2010a). Effectiveness at implementing the strategies is
assessed objectively by coding facial muscle movements.
Self-Report Measurement of Emotional Intelligence

In this approach, respondents indicate their agreement with self-descriptive statements about their
abilities such as “I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them” (Schutte et al. 1998,
p. 172) and “I am quite capable of controlling my own emotions” (Law et al. 2004, p. 496).
The self-report approach is based on the assumptions that individuals can accurately estimate
their maximum performance on problems about emotions and are willing to report it on ques-
tionnaires. There is evidence, however, that the self-serving bias manifests particularly strongly
when people estimate their abilities, because people are motivated to develop favorable percep-
tions of their intelligence (Dunning et al. 2004). In one investigation, nearly 80% of people
reported that they were among the 50% most emotionally intelligent people in the population, an
impossible figure that reveals that people generally overestimate their EI (Brackett et al. 2006). In
addition, findings suggest that individuals with lower EI overestimate their EI because they lack the
expertise necessary to evaluate how accurately they solve problems about emotions in the first
place, an instance of a phenomenon called the Dunning-Kruger effect (Sheldon et al. 2013).
Further, evidence suggests that individuals may fake their responses on self-report ques-
tionnaires even if they know their actual levels of EI (Donovan et al. 2003). For example, job
applicants rate their own EI higher than job incumbents, suggesting that individuals fake their
responses to questions about their abilities when they have an incentive to do so (Lievens et al.
2011). By contrast, participants could not increase their scores on performance-based measures of
EI under any instructions (Day & Carroll 2008), as one cannot pretend to know the correct
solutions to problems that one ignores.
These findings cast doubt on the assumptions that individuals are able and willing to report
their maximum performance on problems about emotions, assumptions that are critical to the
validity of the self-report approach. The limitations of this approach are supported by meta-
analytic evidence that self-report measures of EI are more strongly correlated with measures of
personality traits, which also capture self-perceptions, than with performance-based measures of
EI (Joseph & Newman 2010). In sum, researchers wishing to capture actual EI should avoid the
self-report measurement approach (Mayer et al. 2008).
CORRELATES OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

I now review the findings concerning three overarching models of how EI is associated with
work criteria (Lievens & Chan 2010). The first overarching model is a validity generalization
model that proposes bivariate associations between EI and criteria that are consistent across orga-
nizational contexts and employee dispositions. The second overarching model is a situation-specific

Table 2 Overarching models of associations between emotional intelligence (EI) and work criteria
470
Validity
generalization model Situation-specific model Moderator model
Côté
Description EI confers to organization members The magnitude and sign of The magnitude and sign of associations
of the model a variety of benefits that enhance associations between EI and between contextual and dispositional factors
work criteria across contexts and work criteria vary depending on and work criteria vary depending on EI.
employee dispositions. contextual and dispositional factors.
Visual illustration
Contextual Emotional
of the model factors Intelligence
Emotional Work Emotional Work Contextual

intelligence criteria intelligence criteria factors
Work
criteria
Dispositional
Dispositional factors
factors
Sample findings Empathic accuracy is associated Emotional intelligence is associated Emotional labor is associated with reduced
related to the model with job performance (Elfenbein with job performance among work engagement among service employees
et al. 2007). managers with higher managerial with lower empathic accuracy, but not among
work demands, but not among employees with higher empathic accuracy
Emotional intelligence is associated managers with lower demands (Bechtoldt et al. 2011).
with leadership emergence (Côté (Farh et al. 2012).
et al. 2010b). Moral identity is associated with prosocial
Empathic accuracy is associated with behavior among individuals with higher
transformational leadership among emotion regulation knowledge, but not
extraverted leaders, but not among among individuals with lower emotion
introverted leaders (Rubin et al. 2005). regulation knowledge (Côté et al. 2011a).
model that contends that the associations between EI and criteria depend on aspects of the or-
ganizational context or employee dispositions. The third overarching model is a moderator model
that posits that EI enhances some effects and attenuates other effects of contextual and dispo-
sitional factors on work criteria. In Table 2, I describe each model, provide visual illustrations,
and list sample studies that correspond to each model.
The Validity Generalization Model of Emotional Intelligence and Work Criteria

Validity generalization occurs when the association between a predictor and a criterion
(i.e., validity) is constant across jobs and employment settings (Schmidt & Hunter 1977). The
validity generalization model proposes that EI confers a variety of benefits to organization
members that generally translate into more favorable work criteria. This model predicts that EI
will exhibit bivariate associations with criteria across organizational contexts and employee
dispositions. It also predicts that EI will exhibit incremental validity over competing predictors,
particularly other individual differences, because the benefits of EI are unique.
The majority of the studies on EI have examined this model, and three meta-analyses of
the association between EI and performance, covering 8–10 studies each (total N ¼ 700–1,368),
have been conducted. Two meta-analyses of EI and job performance revealed correlations of
.16 (Joseph & Newman 2010) and .21 (O’Boyle et al. 2011) (the correlations were slightly
higher when corrections were applied). Another meta-analysis that covered studies of per-
formance in employment and academic settings and other unspecific facets of performance
found a correlation of .17 (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran 2004). EI exhibited little incremental
validity over cognitive intelligence and personality in all three meta-analyses. Another meta-
analysis of 18 studies (total N ¼ 1232) of the association between empathic accuracy and job
performance found a correlation of .20 (Elfenbein et al. 2007). Incremental validity was not
examined.
Turning to leadership criteria, a meta-analysis of the association between EI and trans-
formational leadership found (a) a correlation of .24 in 10 studies (total N ¼ 1,066) where focal
participants assessed their own transformational leadership and (b) a correlation of .05 in 4 studies
(total N ¼ 441) where subordinates assessed transformational leadership (Harms & Credé 2010).
Incremental validity was not examined. Two studies found correlations of .25 and .20 between EI
and leadership emergence, as well as incremental validity over cognitive intelligence, the Big Five
traits of personality, and self-monitoring (Côté et al. 2010b).
A few studies examined the role of EI in negotiations. In one study of a hypothetical integrative
negotiation between a seller and a buyer, the empathic accuracy of participants assigned to the role
of the seller was associated with the value created in the dyad and marginally associated with the
value claimed by the seller, when the levels of neuroticism of both negotiators were controlled for
(Elfenbein et al. 2007). Other analyses revealed that the average overall EI of the negotiators within
each dyad predicted the value created in the dyad (holding several traits of personality and de-
mographic characteristics constant), but negotiators with the highest overall EI score in each dyad
claimed less value than their opponents (Foo et al. 2004). In another investigation, participants
were more satisfied with the negotiation if their counterparts had higher levels of understanding
emotions, when the value claimed and positive affectivity were held constant, but EI was not
related to the value claimed by participants (Mueller & Curhan 2006).
Some studies examined whether EI is associated with judgments and decisions. In one study,
participants higher on the understanding emotions branch of EI were less likely to fall prey to the
ease of recall bias, an instance of the availability heuristic whereby individuals believe that events
that are more easily recalled occur more frequently than events that are difficult to recall (r ¼ .15;

Buontempo & Brockner 2008). This association was mediated by the self-reported tendency to
introspectively focus on one’s own thoughts and feelings.
Other studies examined whether emotionally intelligent individuals make better affective
forecasts—that is, predictions about how they will feel if certain events occur in the future—
because they know how events cause emotional reactions (Mayer & Salovey 1997). In a series of
studies, emotionally intelligent participants, compared with those with lower EI, made predictions
that were closer to the emotions that they actually felt when these events occurred, when de-
mographic factors (Dunn et al. 2007) and cognitive intelligence (Hoerger et al. 2012) were
controlled for. The associations ranged from small to large in size.
In sum, the findings reveal that EI exhibits small correlations with several work criteria, but not
with transformational leadership. EI exhibits incremental validity for some criteria, including
leadership emergence, value created and value claimed in negotiations, and affective forecasting,
but not for job performance. Conclusions that EI explains unique variance in these criteria are
tentative, however, because most studies controlled for only a subset of the competing individual
difference predictors.
The Situation-Specific Model of Emotional Intelligence and Work Criteria

Situational specificity is an alternative to validity generalization whereby the association between
a predictor and a criterion varies depending on the job or employment setting (Schmidt & Hunter
1977). Applied to EI, the situation-specific model predicts that EI explains unique variance in
criteria when the organizational context or employee dispositions facilitate its deployment
(Lievens & Chan 2010, Wong & Law 2002). This model also predicts that EI exhibits smaller or no
associations with criteria in the absence of opportunities to deploy it. In addition, there may be
conditions in which deploying EI is harmful to individuals and/or organizations (Dasborough &
Ashkanasy 2002, Salovey & Mayer 1990). Although the situation-specific model has received less
attention than the validity generalization model, some researchers have argued that it may more
adequately describe the effects of EI. For instance, Murphy (2006b, p. 351) wrote that “it is almost
certain that EI is more important in some settings than in others.” This suggestion is consistent with
the notion that “a measure may have incremental validity in some assessment applications but not
others” (Hunsley & Meyer 2003, p. 446).
Job characteristics as moderators of associations between emotional intelligence and criteria.

Research has examined whether EI predicts criteria more strongly in emotionally demanding
jobs (Wong & Law 2002). In the aforementioned meta-analysis by Joseph & Newman (2010),
the association between EI and job performance was stronger in jobs with higher emotional
labor demands (i.e., jobs that require employees to exert efforts to meet rules for which emotions
to display; r ¼ .22 across four studies with total N ¼ 220) than in jobs with lower emotional labor
demands (r ¼ .00 across three studies with total N ¼ 226). In addition, in higher emotional labor
demand jobs, EI exhibited incremental validity (DR2 ¼ .02) over cognitive intelligence and the
Big Five traits of personality. Similarly, in a more recent study, EI was positively associated with
supervisor-rated job performance in jobs with higher managerial work demands (i.e., jobs that
require managing diverse aspects of work such as different types of employees and business
functions), but not in jobs with lower managerial work demands (Farh et al. 2012). Cognitive
intelligence, the Big Five traits of personality, and several demographic variables and job
characteristics were controlled for. A similar set of findings revealed that medical students higher
on the regulating emotions branch performed better in courses on communication and in-
terpersonal sensitivity with patients (when the Big Five traits of personality and cognitive
472 Côté
intelligence were controlled for), but not in courses that covered technical material such as
anatomy (Libbrecht et al. 2014).
Dispositions as moderators of associations between emotional intelligence and criteria.

Employees with certain dispositions may have more opportunities to deploy EI and, in turn, ex-
hibit stronger associations between EI and criteria than other employees with different dis-
positions. In a sample of leaders in a global biotechnology company, empathic accuracy was
positively associated with the subordinate-rated transformational leadership of extraverted
leaders, but not introverted leaders, presumably because extraverts engage in more social inter-
actions that provide opportunities to deploy this ability (Rubin et al. 2005). The number of
subordinates and several personality traits (positive and negative affectivity and agreeableness)
were controlled for. In two related studies, empathic accuracy exhibited stronger positive asso-
ciations with the task coordination behavior and leadership emergence of extraverted students,
but not introverted students, in study groups (Walter et al. 2012). Cognitive intelligence, the other
Big Five traits of personality, and gender were controlled for.
EI may also exhibit stronger associations with job performance when high performance is not
already achieved via other abilities or dispositions. Côté & Miners (2006) developed a compen-
satory model that proposes that EI exhibits a weaker association with job performance among
employees with higher cognitive intelligence, because these employees are already performing at
a high level (Schmidt & Hunter 1998). Consistent with this model, in one study, EI was more
strongly associated with task performance and organizational citizenship behavior directed at
the organization among employees with lower cognitive intelligence, relative to employees with
higher cognitive intelligence. The Big Five traits of personality, leader–member exchange, and
several demographic variables were controlled for. In a related study in a telephone service center
(Doucet & Oldham 2006), empathic accuracy was more strongly associated with job performance
among employees with lower agreeableness and lower cognitive intelligence (when age and ed-
ucation were controlled for), possibly because employees who possessed one or both of these
characteristics already attained high performance via these other means.
Another hypothesis predicts that EI is more strongly associated with criteria among individuals
who are motivated than among those who lack motivation to deploy their abilities. Consistent
with this notion, Rode et al. (2007) found that EI was associated with the performance of students
with higher levels of conscientiousness (a proxy for motivation), but not the performance of
students with lower levels of this trait, holding cognitive intelligence, the other Big Five traits
of personality, and some demographic variables constant.
The sensitivity of the information as a moderator of associations between emotional intelligence

and criteria. Ickes & Simpson (1997) proposed that higher empathic accuracy is not always
associated with more favorable outcomes. Interpersonal encounters are fraught with “danger
zones” where the private feelings of others are potentially threatening. Although it is informative to
identify others’ emotions in these “danger zones,” the informational value is countervailed by
dissatisfaction with the relationship. Supporting this notion, higher empathic accuracy was as-
sociated with lower perceived closeness between spouses after discussions of threatening issues
(such as the attractiveness of other potential partners), but not after nonthreatening discussions
(Simpson et al. 2003).
Similar patterns of associations between EI and criteria could occur in “danger zones” in
organizations. This possibility is supported by the finding from Joseph & Newman’s (2010) meta-
analysis that the 95% confidence interval for the correlation between EI and job performance in
jobs with lower emotional labor demands ranged from .12 to .14. Where could “danger zones”

be found in organizations? Antonakis (2003) theorized that it may be better for leaders to be
immune to their subordinates’ emotions, because perceiving these emotions may distract leaders
and prevent them from performing their core duties. “Danger zones” could also be found in teams
that are prone to conflict. For example, in one study, work team members who could identify fear
that their teammates expressed through their voices, which their teammates presumably did not
intend to communicate, received lower peer ratings of work effectiveness from their teammates,
when several demographic variables were controlled for (Elfenbein & Ambady 2002).
In sum, the findings pertaining to the situation-specific model suggest that EI is associated with
job performance over competing predictors in jobs that are emotionally demanding, but not in
jobs that pose lesser emotional demands. This conclusion is more tentative for other criteria,
because fewer studies have been conducted and the available studies included few control varia-
bles. At least one facet of EI, empathic accuracy, may relate negatively to favorable outcomes when
it is deployed in “danger zones,” where discovering the private feelings of others is threatening.
The Moderator Model of Emotional Intelligence and Work Criteria

In this third overarching model, the levels of EI of organization members shape how they express
their dispositions and how they react to organizational contexts. This model predicts that EI serves
as a moderator variable that enhances or attenuates the effects of various contextual or disposi-
tional factors on work criteria. This model also predicts that the moderating effect of EI is unique
and will occur over competing moderators. For instance, Kilduff et al. (2010) proposed that EI
facilitates the effects of self-serving goals that are prevalent in competitive organizational
contexts on employees’ advancement in organizations. In addition, researchers have proposed
that stressors such as job insecurity may cause less unfavorable reactions among employees with
higher EI (Jordan et al. 2002, Salovey et al. 1999). The moderator model also accommodates the
possibility that some organizational and dispositional factors have more harmful effects among
employees with higher EI than among those with lower EI.
Emotional intelligence as a moderator of associations between goals and goal-related behavior. One
series of studies examined whether emotion regulation knowledge facilitates the achievement of
both prosocial and self-serving goals (Côté et al. 2011a). Emotion regulation knowledge may
facilitate the achievement of any goal by helping individuals generate the particular emotions that
are conducive to achieving the goal. Consistent with this notion, the associations between a
prosocial orientation and prosocial behavior in a social dilemma game (when demographic
variables were controlled for; study 1) and between Machiavellianism and deviant behavior in an
organization (when demographic variables and cognitive intelligence were controlled for; study 2)
were stronger among individuals with higher emotion regulation knowledge than among those
with less of that knowledge.
Emotional intelligence as a moderator of associations between challenging work situations and

work criteria. Some studies examined whether EI acts as a buffer between composites of job
stressors and stress reactions. In one study, the association between stressful life events (such as job
loss) and depressive symptoms was weaker among individuals with higher ability to implement
a cognitive reappraisal strategy to regulate emotions than among their lower-ability counterparts
(Troy et al. 2010). In related studies, the associations between stressors and depressive symptoms
(study 1) and somatic symptoms (study 2) were weaker among individuals with higher empathic
accuracy, relative to those with lower empathic accuracy (Robinson et al. 2012). In a laboratory
experiment with student participants, however, EI did not moderate the effects of three types of
474 Côté
task stressors (i.e., vigilance, workload, and evaluation) on immediate stress reactions (Matthews
et al. 2006a).
Other studies examined whether specific stressors are less strongly related to unfavorable
outcomes among employees with higher EI. One investigation tested whether empathic accuracy
attenuates negative associations between emotional labor (i.e., efforts to express organizationally
desired emotions during customer service interactions; Hochschild 1983) and work engagement
(Bechtoldt et al. 2011). Consistent with this reasoning, nurses and police officers with higher
empathic accuracy exhibited weaker negative associations between two forms of emotional labor
(deep and surface acting) and work engagement measured four weeks later, relative to their
counterparts with lower empathic accuracy, presumably because knowing how customers felt
helped them perform emotional labor more effectively.
Another investigation examined whether the association between developmental job experi-
ences and turnover intentions was weaker among new managers with higher EI, who may better
identify that they are experiencing emotional reactions caused by these experiences and, in turn,
more easily ameliorate these reactions (Dong et al. 2013). Consistent with this notion, negative
emotional reactions to developmental job experiences were associated with higher turnover
intentions among managers with lower EI, but not among managers with higher EI, when several
demographic variables and personality traits (i.e., positive and negative affectivity, the extent of
variability in emotions over time) were controlled for. A related study found that the negative
association between job complexity (i.e., the degree to which a job is difficult and mentally de-
manding) and positive affect was weaker among employees with higher emotion regulation
knowledge than among those with lower emotion regulation knowledge (Parke & Seo 2013).
Grant (2013) theorized that employees should voice concerns with more sensitivity if they can
select appropriate strategies to regulate emotions in these challenging interpersonal encounters. As
expected, in one study, the association between voice and supervisor-rated job performance was
more positive among employees higher in emotion regulation knowledge, relative to those with
lower emotion regulation knowledge, with the trait of extraversion held constant (Grant 2013).
EI may also help individuals to detect whether others’ emotions are authentic and, in turn, to
respond appropriately during interpersonal encounters. In one study, customers with higher
ability to detect inauthenticity gave lower service evaluations to service agents who faked emotions
(and higher service evaluations to service agents who showed authentic emotions), compared with
their lower-ability counterparts (Groth et al. 2009). Positive and negative affectivity and type of
service (moderate- versus high-contact) were held constant.
Finally, EI may help individuals avoid allowing incidental emotions that are unrelated to the
decisions that they are making influence these decisions. In two studies, the effect of incidental
anxiety (versus neutral emotion) on risk taking was weaker in participants with higher (rather than
lower) ability to analyze the cause and effect relations between events and emotions, when cog-
nitive intelligence was controlled for (Yip & Côté 2013). This ability presumably helped indi-
viduals to identify that their incidental anxiety was unrelated to the decisions at hand and, in turn,
to reduce the effects of anxiety on these decisions. An earlier study, however, did not find that EI
moderated the association between a mood induction (positive versus negative versus neutral) and
the unrelated judgments of a hypothetical target person (Ciarrochi et al. 2000).
In sum, the findings provide some support for a moderator model that proposes that EI
enhances or attenuates the effects of contextual and dispositional variables on criteria. The findings
suggest that EI enhances associations between goals and goal-directed behavior and attenuates
associations between stressors and unfavorable reactions. It is premature to definitively conclude
that these moderating effects are unique to EI, however, because most of the studies failed to control
for other individual differences, particularly cognitive intelligence.

Summary of the Evidence About the Associations Between Emotional Intelligence
and Work Criteria
The preceding review reveals some support for each overarching account of how EI is associated
with work criteria. The evidence for the situation-specific and moderator accounts, however,
suggests that contextual and dispositional variables may need to be considered to fully understand
how EI relates to criteria. It may not be meaningful—and it could even be misleading—to interpret
bivariate correlations between EI and criteria without at the same time considering the organi-
zational context and employee dispositions (Lievens & Chan 2010).
One may wrongly conclude that EI is irrelevant on the basis of small bivariate correlations with
criteria for two reasons. First, substantive positive associations between EI and criteria in con-
ditions that facilitate its deployment and substantive negative associations in “danger zones” may
cancel each other out (cf. Tett & Burnett 2003). For instance, in an aforementioned investigation,
the bivariate correlation between EI and job performance was not significant (Farh et al. 2012). It
would be wrong to conclude that EI was irrelevant, however, because the association between EI
and job performance was significant when managerial work demands were high.
Second, EI may determine the range and boundary conditions of substantive associations
between organizational and dispositional factors and criteria, even if it does not exhibit bivariate
correlations with the criteria (Lievens & Chan 2010). For example, in another aforementioned
investigation, the bivariate correlation between emotion regulation knowledge and deviant be-
havior at work was not significant. Again, it would be wrong to conclude that EI is irrelevant,
because emotion regulation knowledge determined the boundary condition for the association
between Machiavellianism and deviant behavior; this association was observed only among
employees with higher emotion regulation knowledge (Côté et al. 2011a).
CONTROVERSIES IN RESEARCH ON EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this section, I identify the most important controversies in this area of research (see also Cherniss
2010), note how current theory and evidence address some of the controversies, and identify issues
and questions to address the remaining controversies. I summarize this material in Table 3.
Controversy Concerning (Dis)agreement About the Meaning of Emotional

Intelligence
Several researchers have drawn attention to the confusion about what EI represents. The
meaning of EI becomes clear, however, when its constituent components are defined precisely.
EI is a set of abilities that represent how well individuals perform tasks and solve problems about
emotions, which are organized, functional responses to the events that individuals encounter.
Equipped with this definition, researchers can identify whether a construct falls inside or outside
of the realm of EI.
Researchers can advance our understanding of the meaning of EI by describing additional
branches as well as abilities within these branches. The four-branch model of EI is not a definitive
model, because it was based on a review of the literature available at the time (Mayer & Salovey
1997). The structure of EI can be refined as new discoveries about emotions are made. For instance,
based on recent findings about the social effects of emotions (Van Kleef 2009), Côté & Hideg
(2011) proposed a new dimension of EI, the ability to influence others via emotional displays.
Another research opportunity consists of modifying existing branches/abilities. For instance,
above, I reviewed evidence that the using emotions branch overlaps conceptually with other
476 Côté
Table 3 Controversies in emotional intelligence research and future research directions
How current theory and evidence help resolve Future research needed to further resolve
Controversy and sample statements the controversy the controversy
There is no consensus about the meaning of EI. Defining the constituent components of Identify other emotional abilities to complete
“Definitions of EI are constantly changing” EI—emotion and intelligence—provides a the list of facets of EI.
(Locke 2005, p. 426). precise definition of EI that clarifies which Clarify/modify the definitions of existing
“One reason for controversy over EI is that there is no constructs are inside and outside of the branches (e.g., the using emotions branch).
clear consensus about what EI really means” realm of EI.
(Murphy & Sideman 2006, p. 39).
“There exist no explicit criteria for deciding which
qualities belong to EI and which do not”
(Matthews et al. 2006b, p. 7).
There is overlap between EI and extant constructs. Defining the constituent components of EI clarifies Identify the position of EI within existing
“Evidence that EI is a viable construct independent how it differs conceptually from other intelligence models of individual differences and
of IQ or personality factors is sparse” factors and personality traits. intelligence.
(Antonakis 2003, p. 355). The meta-analytic correlations between EI and
“The relationship between emotional intelligence other individual differences (Joseph & Newman
and other concepts, including general intelligence, 2010) are small according to Cohen’s (1988)
social skills, and personality, is not adequately standards, supporting its distinctiveness.
www.annualreviews.org

understood” (Murphy 2006b, p. 346).
The measures of EI lack validity. Self-reports of intelligence measure a fundamentally Develop measures of some emotional
“The low relationships between different EI different construct than actual intelligence that is abilities that are currently lacking (e.g.,
measures raise serious questions about whether concerned with self-perceptions, and thus do not the ability to set emotion regulation goals).
they are all actually measuring the same construct” correlate highly with performance-based measures Develop comprehensive measures of all
(Conte 2005, p. 437). of intelligence. branches of EI that overcome the limitations
“The concept of overall EI (averaged across the There is theoretical and empirical support for the of the MSCEIT.
three construct-method pairings) is of limited validity of several performance-based measures
conceptual value due to inconsistent and low of EI.
correlations among some types of EI measures”
(Joseph & Newman 2010, p. 65).

(Continued )
477
Table 3 (Continued )
How current theory and evidence help resolve Future research needed to further resolve
Controversy and sample statements the controversy the controversy
The effect sizes for EI are small. The effect sizes for associations between EI and Develop broad theory about how EI relates
“The most widely publicized claims about the criteria vary depending on the organizational to work criteria in combination with
relationship between emotional intelligence and context and employee dispositions. contextual and dispositional factors.
478
success. . .in the workplace. . .are not supported Meta-analytic effect sizes for EI in conditions that Develop theory about when higher EI is
and, in some important cases, are almost certainly are conducive to its deployment are comparable associated with unfavorable outcomes.
Côté
untrue” (Murphy 2006b, p. 346). to effect sizes for other individual differences.
“There is not a single study reported that indicates EI enhances the effects of some and attenuates the
that EI has nontrivial incremental validity for a effects of other contextual and dispositional factors
socially important outcome variable after on criteria, effects that may or may not produce
controlling for intelligence and personality” bivariate correlations between EI and criteria.
(Brody 2004, p. 237).
“Contrary to the ‘big idea’ motivating much
emotional intelligence research, these findings
indicate that emotional intelligence actually does
little to explain how well people successfully
navigate their lives” (Ybarra et al. 2013, p. 4).
There is little evidence that EI can be “trained.” There is some suggestive yet indirect evidence that Design and test interventions to enhance EI.
“Because many applications of the EI concept people can increase their emotional abilities Develop theory about when interventions
involve attempts to develop EI. . ., further (but also evidence that this potential may are more and less likely to have the
investigation of the stability, and alternatively, be limited). desired impact.
the ‘trainability’ of EI, is needed” (Conte 2005, Develop theory about how to overcome
p. 438). potential barriers to enhancing EI.
There are variations across cultures in the role of EI and the Evidence that ethnic differences in EI test scores Develop theory about how the associations
nature of emotionally intelligent behavior. are partly explained by cultural values of between EI and work criteria vary
“Another difficulty with consensus scoring, prevalent in interdependence and independence (Moon 2011) depending on cultural factors.
performance-based measures of EI, is that people are living in suggests that the nature of emotionally intelligent Identify how the correct answers to
increasingly multicultural societies with a variety of social behavior varies by culture. emotional problems vary by culture,
norms, so normative values to be applied vary from setting to and incorporate the results in scoring
setting” (Matthews et al. 2004, p. 186). systems for measures of EI.
branches. Researchers could revise the description of the using emotions branch to address this
overlap.
Controversy Concerning How Emotional Intelligence Relates to Extant Constructs

Some researchers have questioned whether EI is a new construct that differs from other individual
differences. For instance, as reported in a paper titled “Emotional Intelligence: Not Much More
Than g and Personality,” Schulte et al. (2004) found that cognitive intelligence, the Big Five traits
of personality, and gender accounted for 41% of the variance in EI scores, inviting questions
about what new information EI reveals about individuals.
The most definitive results about how EI relates to other constructs are meta-analytic results,
because single studies are prone to sampling bias. The meta-analytic correlations between EI
(defined as abilities and assessed with performance-based measures) and other individual differ-
ences are equal to or lower than .25 (Joseph & Newman 2010), which is small according to
Cohen’s (1988) standards. The correlations in Schulte et al.’s (2004) study are at the higher end of
the range of correlations found in the meta-analysis. In addition, the meta-analytic correlations
between EI and other individual differences are similar to the correlations among these individual
differences (Joseph & Newman 2010). This suggests that EI does not lack unique content.
Researchers can advance our understanding of the relation between EI and extant constructs
by investigating the position of EI within broad models of individual differences, and models
of intelligence in particular (Mayer et al. 2008). Researchers have proposed that EI represents the
specialization of general intelligence in the domain of emotions, and cognitive intelligence rep-
resents the specialization of general intelligence in the domain of cognition (cf. Côté & Miners
2006). Supporting this logic, in one factor-analytic study, EI emerged as a different factor from the
crystallized and fluid facets of cognitive intelligence (MacCann 2010). Future research can extend
this initial evidence to better situate EI in models of individual differences, particularly in models of
intelligence.
Controversy About the Validity of Measures of Emotional Intelligence

Researchers have described limitations of several currently available measures of EI (Conte 2005,
Matthews et al. 2002). This controversy can be addressed in part by concluding, on the basis of the
evidence, that the self-report measurement approach is not valid to measure EI (or any intelligence
factor). By contrast, measures that capture maximum performance on sets of problems—whether
maximum performance consists of maximum knowledge, level, or speed—provide valid indi-
cators of EI. When adopting the performance-based approach, researchers should describe the
processes by which variations in the constructs cause variations in the measures (Borsboom et al.
2004, Côté 2010) and why higher scores on the measures represent higher levels of ability. To do
so, researchers should indicate how the correct responses to the problems have been determined
and whether potential cultural variation in the correct answers has been considered.
Researchers can advance the field by creating measures of some abilities that are lacking. For
example, researchers could create measures of the ability to set appropriate emotion regulation
goals by extending existing paradigms for capturing preferences for emotions in particular sit-
uations (e.g., Ford & Tamir 2012). There is also a need for more comprehensive measures that
cover the entire domain of EI, given the limitations of the MSCEIT (Mayer et al. 2002) listed above.
Controversy About the Effect Sizes for Emotional Intelligence

Another controversy concerns whether and how well EI predicts work criteria. As described
above, EI may or may not show bivariate associations with criteria, depending on how EI interacts

with contextual and dispositional factors. Interpreting bivariate correlations between EI and
criteria may produce misleading conclusions about the importance of EI. What about the effect
sizes in conditions that facilitate the deployment of EI? One way of evaluating the importance of EI
involves comparing the meta-analytic effect sizes of EI with the effect sizes of cognitive intelligence
and traits of personality (Joseph & Newman 2010). In jobs with higher emotional labor demands,
EI (r ¼ .24) is more strongly associated with job performance than each of the Big Five traits of
personality is (rs ranging from .09 for agreeableness and extraversion to .20 for conscientiousness)
and is surpassed only by cognitive intelligence (r ¼ .37). Thus, in conditions that are favorable to its
deployment, EI explains a proportion of variance that is comparable to the variance explained by
other individual differences common in organizational psychology.
There are several ways in which researchers can advance knowledge of associations between
EI and work criteria. Although evidence supports interactive models whereby EI interacts with
contextual and dispositional factors, the existing studies have been piecemeal, focusing on various
dispositions and contextual factors. The field would benefit from broad theories of how EI
interacts with these factors that could integrate the current findings. In developing new theories,
researchers should specify whether theories concern overall EI or only certain branches or abilities
(Elfenbein 2007). In addition, researchers should explore the conditions in which EI may be
harmful (Côté et al. 2011a, Dasborough & Ashkanasy 2002, Kilduff et al. 2010). For instance,
identifying when it may hurt leaders to perceive their subordinates’ emotions (Antonakis 2003)
is an intriguing research question.
Controversy Concerning Whether Emotional Intelligence Can Be Taught

There is considerable interest in developing EI. Companies are interested in how their managers
may employ EI to become better leaders and how their human resource departments may use EI
to better select and train employees (Schmit 2006). Many employees are interested in discovering
and enhancing their “EQ.” Several researchers, however, have noted that the evidence that EI can
be enhanced is scant (Landy 2005, Matthews et al. 2002, Schmit 2006), and some have questioned
whether it is possible to develop EI (Hogan & Stokes 2006). This skepticism is fueled by findings
that other intelligence factors are highly heritable (heritability coefficients between .4 and .8;
Nisbett et al. 2012) and the corresponding belief, prevalent in Western cultures, that intelligence is
immutable (Heine et al. 2001).
The definition of EI, however, is agnostic as to whether it can be enhanced. Above, I indicated
that intelligence is typically defined as a set of abilities, and abilities reflect variations in how well
individuals can solve sets of problems in a given domain. There are no aspects of these definitions
that commit intelligence to be either teachable or fixed. Further, the evidence that intelligence is
immutable is challenged by (a) arguments that studies overestimate the heritability of intelligence
by undersampling lower-class individuals whose IQs more strongly depend on environmental
factors (Stoolmiller 1999), (b) comments that heritability coefficients are difficult to interpret
because they depend on the variance in genetic and environmental factors in the specific
populations studied (Nisbett et al. 2012), (c) evidence that schooling is a potent environmental
factor that influences intelligence (Ceci 1991), (d) evidence of large gains in intelligence across
generations that cannot be explained by genetic forces (Flynn 1987), and (e) the belief, prevalent
in Eastern cultures, that intelligence can be increased with effort (Heine et al. 2001). It thus
remains an open question whether intelligence factors, including EI, can be enhanced (Nisbett
et al. 2012).
There is some evidence that adults can be trained in EI. There are robust findings from de-
velopmental psychology that children acquire more or less EI depending on the behavior of their
480 Côté
parents (Saarni 1999), suggesting that training interventions for adults could be modeled on
parental behavior that facilitates the acquisition of EI in children. Some studies show that training
can improve the ability to identify various aspects of social encounters in which the protagonists
express emotions, such as relative status or kinship between the protagonists, but these studies are
not strictly focused on emotions and several lack a control group (see Rosenthal et al. 1979 for
a review). Early research showed that individuals improved their empathic accuracy after
studying the anatomy of facial expression in textbooks, but it also lacked a control group
(Guilford 1929). Exposure to displays of emotions of members of different cultures increases the
ability to recognize such displays in the short term, but the longer-term impact of such exposure
is unknown (Elfenbein 2006). In addition, there is evidence that interventions increase self- and
peer-reported EI, but it remains unclear whether any improvement can be captured with
performance-based measures of EI (Kotsou et al. 2011).

Other evidence casts doubt that EI can be increased. Associations between empathic accuracy
and biological processes, including testosterone (Ronay & Carney 2013), oxytocin (Bartz et al.
2010), and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (Côté et al. 2011b), suggest limits to the degree to which
EI may be modified in adults. In addition, in a series of studies, after receiving their scores on
a measure of EI, individuals with lower EI disparaged the accuracy of this feedback and the
relevance of EI for their careers and were paradoxically less interested in improving their EI than
were those with higher EI (Sheldon et al. 2013). These potential barriers should be considered
when designing interventions for enhancing EI.
Researchers can advance knowledge by developing and testing the effectiveness of inter-
ventions for increasing EI and, in turn, for modifying the outcomes of organization members, such
as their job performance and their effectiveness as leaders. It is possible that interventions to de-
velop EI are more effective among some organization members than others. Therefore, moder-
ators of the effects of training interventions should be examined. Researchers could also
investigate how to overcome potential barriers to the effectiveness of interventions, such as the
potential rejection of training by those who need it most.
Controversy Concerning Cross-Cultural Variations in Emotional Intelligence

Researchers have noted that research on EI does not sufficiently incorporate culture (Matthews
et al. 2004, Moon 2011, Wong et al. 2004). Several questions about cross-cultural similarities and
variations in EI await investigation. It is unknown whether the patterns of associations between EI
and work criteria that have been found in research in Western cultures hold in other parts of the
world. For example, EI may contribute more to work success in collective cultures, because these
cultures emphasize social interactions to a greater extent and research has linked EI to high-quality
social interactions (Brackett et al. 2006, Lopes et al. 2005). In addition, EI may modify the effects of
separate contextual and dispositional factors on work criteria in different cultures. In Eastern
cultures, EI may accentuate or reduce the effects of collective experiences, such as changes in work
units, more than individual experiences.
Researchers should also consider culture when developing measures. The correct answers to
problems about emotions, such as identifying which emotion is caused by a certain event or which
emotion is displayed by targets, may vary by culture (Elfenbein et al. 2007, Morgan et al. 2010). In
one study, ethnic differences in scores on the MSCEIT, a measure of EI that was developed in North
America, were partly explained by cultural values of independence and interdependence (Moon
2011). Specifically, non-Westerners received lower scores on the measure, in part, because they
held more interdependent values than Westerners, and the correct answers to the problems were
likely rooted in independent values. Researchers can advance the field by examining whether there

is cultural variation in the correct answers to different measures of EI. Further, researchers could
develop separate versions of scoring systems to facilitate the use of existing measures of EI in
different cultures.
CONCLUSION AND BEST PRACTICES FOR RESEARCH ON EMOTIONAL

INTELLIGENCE
EI is a set of abilities that can potentially help individuals navigate challenging organizational
contexts and interpersonal encounters. There is progress in understanding the role of EI in
organizations owing to more precise definitions, better measures, and more refined models of EI
that consider contextual and dispositional factors. Even so, there remain important gaps in our
knowledge and controversies about the role of EI in organizations. The theoretical and mea-
surement approaches described in this article suggest best practices for research on EI in organi-
zations, which I list below.
The first set of best practices concerns theory development. Researchers should consider the
various potential ways in which EI may relate to work criteria beyond bivariate correlations,
including potential associations with criteria in combination with contextual and dispositional
factors as well as potential associations with unfavorable outcomes. In doing so, researchers
should determine whether theory they develop pertains to the broad construct of EI, a specific
branch of EI (e.g., the regulating emotions branch), or a specific emotional ability (e.g., the ability
to implement emotion regulation strategies). In addition, it is important to avoid confounding
theoretical arguments with considerations of measurement, by first articulating arguments for
how and why EI is associated with criteria and stating the hypotheses that emerge from the theory.
Only when this step is complete should researchers choose a measure of EI as part of their
methodological choices (Pedhazur & Schmelkin 1991).
The second set of best practices concerns methods. In particular, in justifying their choice of
measures, researchers would benefit from articulating the processes by which variations in the
constructs cause variations in the measures (Borsboom et al. 2004). Authors rarely justify why
scores on measures of EI capture the respondents’ levels of this construct. Descriptions of how
scores on the measures are generated and how the scores should be interpreted are often missing or
unclear. In some instances, I have not been able to determine whether a high score on a measure
reflected a high level of EI or a low level of EI. This state of affairs can be remedied if authors clearly
articulate why a high (or low) score on a measure captures EI (see MacCann & Roberts 2008 for
an example of a description of how the items in a measure capture emotional ability).
By following these best practices, researchers can accelerate progress in understanding how
abilities that pertain to emotions, such as the abilities to identify and control emotions, may help us
explain and predict the outcomes of organization members.
Best Practices for Developing Theory About Emotional Intelligence

1. Select an ability model of EI that is consistent with the definitions of its constituent
components—intelligence and emotion—and reject trait/mixed models.
2. Consider the three overarching models of how EI may relate to work criteria: the validity
generalization, situation-specific, and moderator models. If EI may relate to criteria in
combination with contextual and/or dispositional factors, one of the latter two over-
arching models is more appropriate.
482 Côté
3. Consider whether there are conditions in which higher EI may relate to unfavorable
outcomes. Also, in developing theory about how EI moderates the effects of organiza-
tional and dispositional factors, consider whether these factors may have more negative
consequences among emotionally intelligent employees.
4. Specify whether theory about EI and work criteria pertains to the broad construct of EI,
a specific branch of EI, or a specific emotional ability that constitutes one of the branches.
5. Separate theory development from choices of measurement. Decide how to measure EI
only after the theory is fully developed and the hypotheses that emerge from the theory
are stated.
Best Practices for Measuring Emotional Intelligence

1. Select performance-based measures of EI, and reject self-report measures.

2. Describe the process by which variations in EI cause variations in the selected measures.
In doing so, justify how the correct answers to the problems in the measures were
determined.
3. Consider potential cultural variations in the correct answers to problems in measures of EI.
4. Measure the following control variables, which could correlate with both EI and the
criteria, to verify that they do not cause spurious associations: cognitive intelligence, the
Big Five traits of personality, and demographic factors. Also measure other control
variables that are relevant to the specific context and criterion of interest in the study.
5. If the theory focuses on a specific facet of EI, include measures of other facets to verify
that they do not exhibit the same associations and, thus, that the findings are specific to
the theorized facet of EI. This is not always feasible, however, given the challenges (e.g.,
time and attention of participants) involved in measuring multiple facets of EI.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might
be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank Julie McCarthy and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on a previous
version of this article and Editor Frederick Morgeson and the Editorial Committee for helpful sug-
gestions for content to include in the article. This work was supported by a research grant from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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488 Côté
Annual Review of
Organizational
Psychology and
Organizational Behavior
Volume 1, 2014 Contents

What Was, What Is, and What May Be in OP/OB

Lyman W. Porter and Benjamin Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Psychological Safety: The History, Renaissance, and Future of an
Interpersonal Construct
Amy C. Edmondson and Zhike Lei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Personality and Cognitive Ability as Predictors of Effective
Performance at Work
Neal Schmitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Perspectives on Power in Organizations
Cameron Anderson and Sebastien Brion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Work–Family Boundary Dynamics
Tammy D. Allen, Eunae Cho, and Laurenz L. Meier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Coworkers Behaving Badly: The Impact of Coworker Deviant
Behavior upon Individual Employees
Sandra L. Robinson, Wei Wang, and Christian Kiewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
The Fascinating Psychological Microfoundations of Strategy and
Competitive Advantage
Robert E. Ployhart and Donald Hale, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Employee Voice and Silence
Elizabeth W. Morrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
The Story of Why We Stay: A Review of Job Embeddedness
Thomas William Lee, Tyler C. Burch, and Terence R. Mitchell . . . . . . . . 199
Where Global and Virtual Meet: The Value of Examining the
Intersection of These Elements in Twenty-First-Century Teams
Cristina B. Gibson, Laura Huang, Bradley L. Kirkman,
and Debra L. Shapiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
viii
Learning in the Twenty-First-Century Workplace
Raymond A. Noe, Alena D.M. Clarke, and Howard J. Klein . . . . . . . . . . 245
Compassion at Work
Jane E. Dutton, Kristina M. Workman, and Ashley E. Hardin . . . . . . . . . 277
Talent Management: Conceptual Approaches and Practical Challenges
Peter Cappelli and JR Keller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Research on Workplace Creativity: A Review and Redirection
Jing Zhou and Inga J. Hoever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
The Contemporary Career: A Work–Home Perspective

Jeffrey H. Greenhaus and Ellen Ernst Kossek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Burnout and Work Engagement: The JD–R Approach
Arnold B. Bakker, Evangelia Demerouti, and Ana Isabel Sanz-Vergel . . . 389

The Psychology of Entrepreneurship
Michael Frese and Michael M. Gielnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
Delineating and Reviewing the Role of Newcomer Capital in
Organizational Socialization
Talya N. Bauer and Berrin Erdogan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Stéphane Côté . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
Intercultural Competence
Kwok Leung, Soon Ang, and Mei Ling Tan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
Pay Dispersion
Jason D. Shaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
Constructively Managing Conflicts in Organizations
Dean Tjosvold, Alfred S.H. Wong, and Nancy Yi Feng Chen . . . . . . . . . . 545
An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: Improving
Research Quality Before Data Collection
Herman Aguinis and Robert J. Vandenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and

Organizational Behavior articles may be found at http://www.annualreviews.org/
errata/orgpsych.
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ANNUAL

REVIEWS Further Emotional Intelligence in

• Other articles in this volume

Annu. Rev. Organ. Psychol. Organ. Behav. 2014. Keywords

DEFINITION OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Integrating Intelligence and Emotion

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 461

The Jingle Fallacy and Trait Models of Emotional Intelligence

DIMENSIONS OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The Perceiving and Expressing Emotions Branch

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 463

Table 1 Branches of emotional intelligence

Emotional Intelligence in Organizations

The Using Emotions Branch

The Understanding Emotions Branch

The Regulating Emotions Branch

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 467

MEASUREMENT OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Performance-Based Measurement of Emotional Intelligence

Self-Report Measurement of Emotional Intelligence

CORRELATES OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 469

Emotional Work Emotional Work Contextual

The Validity Generalization Model of Emotional Intelligence and Work Criteria

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 471

The Situation-Specific Model of Emotional Intelligence and Work Criteria

Job characteristics as moderators of associations between emotional intelligence and criteria.

Dispositions as moderators of associations between emotional intelligence and criteria.

The sensitivity of the information as a moderator of associations between emotional intelligence

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 473

The Moderator Model of Emotional Intelligence and Work Criteria

Emotional intelligence as a moderator of associations between challenging work situations and

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 475

CONTROVERSIES IN RESEARCH ON EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND

Controversy Concerning (Dis)agreement About the Meaning of Emotional

Table 3 Controversies in emotional intelligence research and future research directions

Emotional Intelligence in Organizations

Controversy Concerning How Emotional Intelligence Relates to Extant Constructs

Controversy About the Validity of Measures of Emotional Intelligence

Controversy About the Effect Sizes for Emotional Intelligence

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 479

Controversy Concerning Whether Emotional Intelligence Can Be Taught

performance-based measures of EI (Kotsou et al. 2011).

Controversy Concerning Cross-Cultural Variations in Emotional Intelligence

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 481

CONCLUSION AND BEST PRACTICES FOR RESEARCH ON EMOTIONAL

Best Practices for Developing Theory About Emotional Intelligence

Best Practices for Measuring Emotional Intelligence

1. Select performance-based measures of EI, and reject self-report measures.

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 483

effect of private self-focused attention. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 38:159–72

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 485

intelligence and job performance: a meta-analysis. J. Organ. Behav. 32:788–818

www.annualreviews.org Emotional Intelligence in Organizations 487

Volume 1, 2014 Contents

What Was, What Is, and What May Be in OP/OB

Lyman W. Porter and Benjamin Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Contemporary Career: A Work–Home Perspective

Arnold B. Bakker, Evangelia Demerouti, and Ana Isabel Sanz-Vergel . . . 389

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and