Villanueva vs. Branoco G.R. No. 172804 Facts
Villanueva vs. Branoco G.R. No. 172804 Facts
Villanueva vs. Branoco G.R. No. 172804 Facts
172804
Facts:
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva, here represented by his heirs, sued respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco to
recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July
1971 from Casimiro Vere, who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970. In their Answer,
respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to
whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965.
The RTC considered the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to
Vere in 1970. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer. In this
regard, trial court declared petitioner as the owner of the Property. On the other hand, the CA ruled in favor of respondent,
finding that the Deed as donation inter vivos. Hence, accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and
respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for
Rodrigo’s lack of title.
Issue:
Whether the donation made by Rodrigo to Rodriguez was a donation mortis causa which she subsequently cancelled, or a
donation inter vivos.
Ruling:
The determination of whether the donation made was a donation mortis causa which was revoked, or a donation inter
vivos likewise determines the ownership over the subject property. If the former, petitioner prevails, having obtained title
from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier donation mortis causa to
Rodriguez. If the latter, respondents hold superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez.
In the instant case, it is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation
inter vivos.
First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but
will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate,
waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s
acceptance of the disposition which was on 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in
presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to
retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the
Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property. Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that
"the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only
refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title. Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s
love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates
the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."
Accordingly, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another”. Thus,
Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere and the lawful owners of the property are respondents.
Lastly, contrary to petitioner’s allegation, they cannot be deemed owners of the property who have acquired the same
through prescription and good faith possession. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and
possessed the Property "in the concept of an owner" since 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation and seven
years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing
title to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other
recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the
Property for 30 years. Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement