Psychiatric Self-Defense: A New Kind of "Living Will" Would Protect People From Involuntary Psychiatric Intervention
Psychiatric Self-Defense: A New Kind of "Living Will" Would Protect People From Involuntary Psychiatric Intervention
Psychiatric Self-Defense: A New Kind of "Living Will" Would Protect People From Involuntary Psychiatric Intervention
A new kind of "living will" would protect people from involuntary psychiatric intervention
Thomas Szasz from the May 1983 issue - view article in the Digital Edition
In the last two decades there has been a widening public recognition that much of psychiatric practice rests on or involves coercion and
violence. As this recognition grew, there emerged a concern, not least among former psychiatric patients, with "patient's rights," especially the
right to reject psychiatric treatment.
Since politics, however, is the art of saying one thing and doing another, the mental health establishment—which is nothing if it isn't political—
lost no time in coopting the patients' rights issue. Whereas formerly the code phrase in the mental health reform business was mental illness,
now it became the rights of mental patients. The phrase the right to treatment has become a formidable new weapon in the psychiatrists'
perennial struggle to oppress and control the "mental patient."
Today, coercive psychiatrists themselves freely admit that in the past mental patients were deprived of liberty by being involuntarily
"warehoused." But that is no longer true, they say. Now mental patients are guaranteed their "right to treatment," especially with so-called
antipsychotic drugs.
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The enormous importance of the right-to-treatment rhetoric is illustrated by Kenneth Donaldson's famous appeal to the Supreme Court in
1975. The appeal was brought on Donaldson's behalf by a group of mental health reform lawyers on the ground that Donaldson's rights had
been violated when he was deprived of treatment during incarceration in a mental institution. The appeal was supported by every major
mental health group in the country, including such traditional enemies of the involuntary mental patient as the American Psychiatric
Association and the American Orthopsychiatric Association.
It is important to emphasize and recognize that the mental health establishment's sudden concern with patients' rights has thus left completely
untouched the age-old problem of what to do with the "mental patient" who refuses treatment. The stubborn fact is that ever since the birth of
psychiatry, people have been deprived of the right to reject the ministrations of mad doctors. For 200 years or more, people were deprived of
this right on the grounds that they were "insane" or "psychotic" and hence were incompetent to manage their lives. For the past 15 years or so
—since the advent of the patients' rights rhetoric—people have been deprived of this right on the ground that their "true interests" require that
they receive "life-saving psychiatric treatment." Although some of the legal protections provided to mental patients might have worked to their
temporary advantage, I believe that, on balance, the added legal attention lavished on the so-called rights of mental patients has served only
to authenticate further the legitimacy of depriving them of the only right that counts—the right to reject treatment, the right to reject being cast
in the role of mental patient; in short, the right to reject psychiatric authority.
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Recently, a report on "patients' rights" in Psychiatric News, the American Psychiatric Association's official newspaper, explained that
psychiatrists no longer think "in terms of physical restrictions on freedom but of the shackles of [psychiatric] illness itself and the patient's right
to freedom from this mental restraint." The report cited the views of two "experts" on patients' rights according to whom involuntary mental
hospitalization and "treatment" actually increase the involuntary mental patients' freedom:
We would submit that commitment can be justified on the grounds of enhancing the individual's future freedom. If society insisted that
freedom be the only purpose of commitment, commitment to achieve a real lack of unnecessary constraints from mental illness and to
increase a patient's options could be justified.…Such an approach…would place psychiatry fully behind the principle that psychiatric
institutions be utilized for increasing the freedom of the mentally ill.
This rhetoric of "psychiatric slavery in the name of mentally healthy freedom" explains a seeming paradox: the professional advocates of the
rights of mental patients are the most determined adversaries of former mental patients' groups that are lobbying for mental patients' right to
reject treatment.
Sadly, but not surprisingly, psychiatric reformers have sought and continue to seek to improve the mental health system by doing even more
for the patient, for society, or for both. Thus, they have tried to protect the patient from himself or from those who might exploit or mistreat him;
they have tried to protect society from the "dangerous" patient and his "illness"; and, most recently, they have tried to restore the "sick patient"
to "mental health." Each of these efforts is paternalistic in principle and coercive in practice.
The individualist approach to the core problem of psychiatry—namely, coercion in the name of mental health-is radically different. Viewing
psychiatric coercion as essentially similar to religious coercion, the individualist solution to it is also similar. That solution, exemplified by the
Founding Fathers' position on clerical power, was to protect the free practice of religion but to abolish coercion in the name of God. The
individualist solution to clinical coercion is the same: to protect the free practice of psychiatry but to abolish coercion in the name of mental
health.
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Simple? Of course. Why, then, are so few people interested in it? The answer to that question is not so simple. I shall point here only to one of
the reasons for it.
When the United States went through its birth pangs, violence in the name of God was an accepted political and legal principle throughout
Europe and indeed the whole world. What justified this practice? We know the answer only too well: an alliance between church and state that
made the use of force in the service of God as legitimate as the use of force in the service of Caesar. The soldier protected the
commonwealth from external enemies. The inquisitor protected it from internal enemies, especially heretics.
The problem of religious coercion, like the problem of psychiatric coercion, could be approached in two ways. One way would be to look to the
state to protect the victims of clerical power. This would generate a rhetoric about the rights of heretics and demands for guaranteeing the
heretic's right to proper (that is, orthodox) worship. The other approach would be to recognize that the source of clerical power lies in an
alliance between church and state. This realization would generate (as it did in the United States) a rhetoric about the separation of church
and state and demands for making worship the private affair of the worshipper.
We can easily see how the first course only aggravates the problem. By guaranteeing the absurdity of the heretic's right to embrace the true
faith, it further authenticates the legitimacy of religious coercion. Similarly, coercion, being the result of an alliance between psychiatry and the
state, can be ended only by a separation of psychiatry and the state. Any other course, particularly the state's "guaranteeing" the absurd right
of mental patients to receive treatment can lead only to reauthenticating the legitimacy of psychiatric coercion. The history of mental health
reform in the United States during the past 15 years illustrates and supports the validity of this interpretation.
Psychiatrists, however, contend that insane persons—out of touch with reality, misinterpreting therapy as torture—cannot competently
consent to or reject psychiatric interventions. And many people, perhaps the majority of the population, believe that this is true. So some
special legal mechanism is necessary for realistically implementing a separation of psychiatry and the state. Such a mechanism is prefigured
in procedures that people in Western societies have developed for coping with other situations in which a moral agent's capacity to act
competently is diminished or destroyed. There are two typical situations of this sort: death and incapacitating terminal illness. And there are
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two legal instruments that have been developed to cope with them: wills (last wills and testaments) and so-called living wills. I propose that we
create a third type of will—the "psychiatric will."
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Conservation In Deed
William Tucker | 05.01.1983
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Arthur Laffer | 05.01.1983
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