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1.040 Project Management

Spring 2009

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Project Organization II

Spring 2009
Based on Lectures Given by Dr. Nathaniel
Osgood in 2005

Fred Moavenzadeh
Civil and Environmental Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Project Organization
I. Project Delivery Systems (most common)
¾ Design / Build
ƒ Others
ƒ Summary
II. Payment Schemes
ƒ General points
ƒ Lumpsum
ƒ Cost plus fixed fee/% price
ƒ Unit price
ƒ Guaranteed maximum price
III. Award Methods
ƒ General points
ƒ Negotiation
ƒ Bidding
 Part I
„ Project Delivery
 Design-Build
Owner

D/B Entity
Construction Design
Function Function

Sub Sub Sub

contractor contractor contractor

Contractual Relationship
Communicational Relationship
Internal Relationship
 How To: Design / Build
„ Owner
„ Develops early design (to communicate needs)
„ Hires a design/build firm that will complete both
design and construction
„ This firm can be a design/build firm but also
a joint-venture firm for this specific project
„ DB company may hire subcontractors
„ Work solicited via RFP (honorarium, phased)
„ Can be good for complex projects – but need
phased design to shield parties from risk
 Back to the Future…
„ Dominant method early in US history
„ Recent drivers
„ Time pressure (desire to fast track)
„ Shortcomings of tightly defined architect role
„ Constructability issues

„ Limited A/E oversight of construction

„ Downsizing of US corporations (outsourcing design)

„ Desire for single source of responsibility
 Advantages DB
„ Allows Fast Tracking
„ May be good for some complex projects
„ Close coordination within team
„ Institutional knowledge build up
„ Single source of accountability
„ Owner need not mediate or be exposed to
designer/contractor conflicts
„ Easier incorporation of changes caused by
field conditions
 Disadvantages DB
„ Lack of fiduciary relationship with designer
„ Risk of DB sacrificing design quality to protect profit
„ Owner must assume responsibility for quality assurance
„ Pricing not possible at the beginning
„ Demands sophisticated owner (construction,
quality, oversight of submittals, negotiation,…)
„ Must stay on top of design so don’t get surprise
„ Can be bad for many complicated projects
„ Very important for owner to be closely involved to
specify important and complex aspects of design
„ Package: Can’t pick or get rid of individual team
members (e.g. individual subcontractors)
 Design-Build Disadvantages II
„ Need to make sure design goals stay foremost
„ Often contractor’s interests within DB dominate
„ Fewer checks and balances
„ Problems may be hidden until late (no A/E watch)
„ May take direction that owner does not really want
„ Design-build firm can give high quote for changes
„ Responsible for everything!
„ If fast tracked, changes can lead to
„ Rework
„ Iteration
„ Delays
 Public Use Challenges
„ Regulatory hurdles
„ Federal use allowed
„ Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 allowed
„ Many states still do not allow
„ Special permission may be granted for formal request

„ Major opposition from

„ Architectural lobby
„ Unions
 Bridge Designer/Engineer
„ Serves as bridge between
„ Owner
„ Design-build team

„ Performs preliminary design before DB team hired

„ E.g. up to 30% design
„ Monitors development of design and construction
„ Fiduciary with owner
 DB Selection Considerations
„ Timing tension for when to recruit DB firm
„ Earlier recruitment:
„ Hard to judge – like beauty contest
„ Later recruit: Less benefit from DB
„ E.g. Lower ability to fast-track
„ Limit creativity (closer to GC)
„ Often have segmented pricing (cost-plus design, fixed
price or GMP construction)
„ More comprehensive selection process typical
„ Design/Price/Schedule/Team
„ Design competitions undertaken
 Example Design-Build: I15
„ Originally slated as DBB, but made DB to fast-track
„ Hard deadline due to 2002 SLC Olympic Games
„ $1.3B joint venture (Kiewit lead company)
„ US DOT as owner agency
„ Bidded project (with rights to use unsuccessful)
„ Unsuccessful bidders became subcontractors
„ Reputation foremost
„ 200 Subcontractors
„ Few reviews
„ Finished 5 months ahead of schedule
 Modified CM Design/Build:
Design Subcontracted
(CM Serves as Design/Builder and Subcontractors Design)

Owner

CM
Design/Builder Architect/Engineer

Sub-Contractor Sub-Contractor Sub-Contractor

Sub-Contractor

[Howell et al., 1998]

 CM Oversight Design/Build
(CM Provides Agency Oversight on Owner’s Behalf)

Owner

CM

Design/Build Contractor

Sub-Contractor Sub-Contractor Sub-Contractor

Sub-Contractor

[Howell et al., 1998]

 Other Delivery Methods
„ Turnkey (Like DB but Contractor Financed)
„ Very common in residential housing
„ Gives owner time to raise money during construct.

„ Design-Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
„ Long-term financing (vs. DBO)
„ Can compete on size, transfer time, etc.
„ Have different guarantees needed to entice

„ Multiple Primes
„ Phase construct.,hand-pick team,sophisticated owner
„ Owner/Agent (owner does part of design)
Type of Relationships Among
Participants

Owner- Owner- A/E- Owner- CM- CM-

A/E Contr. Contr. CM A/E Contr.
DBB K K C _ _ _
PCM K K _ K C C
CMR K _ _ C K
K
D/B K* I _ _ _

K: Contractual Relationship
C: Communication Relationship
I: Internal Relationship
*: Contractual Relationship between
the Owner and the D/B Team

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

 Advantages of the 3 Most
Common Delivery Methods

Construction
Management
Design Build
Traditional
Approach
Type of contracts
Advantages
Legal and contractual precedent X
Cost determined before contract commitment X
Fast-tracked construction allowed X X
Minimum owner involvement X X
Cost benefit from competition X X
Negotiation with quality contractor for unique expertise X X
Allow adjustment to new conditions without changing agreement X X
Single firm control of design/construct process X

Adapted from Gould and Joyce, 2002

Disadvantages of the 3 Most
Common Delivery Methods

Construction
Management
Design Build
Traditional
Approach
Type of contracts
Disadvantages
Design does not benefit from construction expertise X
Design construction time is the longest X
Adversarial relationship owner/designer vs contractor X ~x
Contract agreement affected by changes X ~x
Few checks and balances X
Cost control occurs late in project X
Contract amount may be complicated by continual contractor negotiations X ~x
Contract agreement affected by unforeseen conditions X ~x

Modified from Gould and Joyce, 2002

 Issues with Bids
„ Low bidders can be unreliable
„ Prequalify aggressively!
„ To allow for fast-tracking may bid early (30%)
„ Don’t try to force delivery from low bid
„ Growing Frequency: innovative bidding method
„ Pressure for lowest bid can create
„ Cutting corners
„ Low-quality personnel

„ Bad feelings
 Part II
„ Payment Schedule
 Payment Schemes
„ Extremes

Payment method: Reimbursable Fixed Price

Product Type: Service Commodity

Award method Solicit based on Reputation Bidding

and agree via Negotiation
 Key Idea Here: Risk Sharing
„ Different parties have ability to manage or
tolerate different types of risk
„ Owner (or big contractor) often better: Geotechnical
risk, weather risk
„ Contractor better: Risk of slow teams, equipment
quality, procurement, quality of supervision
„ Divide risks within an agreement to
„ Save money on contract price
„ Provide incentive to contractors to finish early, in
budget, good quality
 Fundamental Ideas
„ Contractors are often highly risk averse
„ Recall risk premiums: Contractor willing to “pay” owner
(charge less for contract) if owner takes on risk – if have to
„ For risks that contractor can’t control, may be willing to
pay a risk premium to owner to take over
„ Contractor here will lower costs if owner assumes certain risk
(essentially, paying the owner a risk premium)
„ For risks that contractors can control, cheaper for a
contractor to manage risk than to pay a risk premium
 Fundamental Ideas II
„ Structure contract so that
„ Risks contractor can better handle are imposed on
contractor (i.e. contractor will lose $ if don’t control)
„ To be competitive, will have to manage these

„ Risks owner can better handle are kept by owner

„ “’Risk can be better handled by A vs. B” here
means that the risk premium that would be
charged by the A for taking on this risk is
smaller than would be charged by B
 Fundamental Balance
„ Impose high enough risk incentive to get contractor do
job efficiently – within the specifications of the contract
„ E.g. Incentive to finish on time, incentive to stay within
budget
„ E.g. better team assignment, equipment provision, mgmt
„ Impose low enough risk to have reasonably low bid
„ Impose according to contractor ability to tolerate
 Derivative Results of Risks I:
Accountability/Monitoring
„ Consider parties A and B in an agreement
„ A is contractor; B is owner
„ The greater the risk on party A
„ The more incentive on party A to manage this risk
„ The less incentive on party B to manage this risk
„ More incentive on A to monitor the relevant factors
so B can’t claim the risk is responsible for a problem
„ More incentive on B to make sure that A’s means of
risk management falls within the agreement
„ E.g. that not
“cutting corners” or otherwise cheating to
shield from risk
 Derivative Results of Risks II:
Impact on Construction Timing
„ Both parties must agree on cost to move forward
„ In general, more risk on one party, less that party is
willing to move forward
„ More risk on contractor, the longer will delay construct.
„ Given uncertainty, contractor will charge more up front
„ Owner doesn’t want to pay a huge amount up front
„ As uncertainty is lessened in design, prices converge
„ Owner can expedite – by paying higher price (risk
premium) to contractor or by shouldering risk
„ Remember; delay can have major costs – but so can
wrangling over change orders!
 Note on Change Orders
„ Changes contract (cost/schedule/scope/etc.)
„ Can lead to costs beyond contract specification
„ Anticipated costs incorporated in “contingency”
„ Often 1-3% on top of agreed upon price
„ Often only paid for additional direct costs
„ Big problem if disruption in work
„ Source of very large risk
 Contractual Risk
Allocation
RISK SHARING METER
Modified from Kerzner, 2000

100 % Lump-Sum (Fixed Price) 0%

Fixed-Price w/ Economic Price Adjustments

CONTRACTOR’S RISK

Fixed-Price Incentive

OWNER’S RISK
Cost-Plus Incentive

Cost-Plus Award Fee

Cost-Plus Fixed Fee

Cost-Sharing

0%
RISK Allocation Cost-Plus Percentage 100 %
Cost Versus Price for Lump Sum
(Price is fixed at $10,300)

}c

} b{
Final Price

$10,300
a

$10,000

$10,500
$9,500

Final Cost

a = If final cost is $9,500, contractor profit is $800 (8.42%)

b = If final cost is $10,000, (as expected), contractor profit is $300 (3%)
c = If final cost is $10,000, contractor loss is $200 (-1.9%)

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Macomber, 1989
Lump Sum (“Fixed Price”)
„ Contractor required to achieve the project at
the negotiated contract value
„ All risk of cost, schedule fall on contractor
„ The owner knows the actual cost of the
project before it begins
„ Minimizes risk for the owner if the project is
well estimated, contractual documents
accurate and project clearly defined
„ High incentive for contractor to finish
„ Early (so can move on to other jobs)
„ Low cost (so can make a profit)
 Lump Sum
„ Required for many public projects
„ Good for some well-defined projects
„ Good price competition in commodity metric
„ Bad for ill-defined projects
„ Adversarial relationship over responsibility and
payment for of changes
„ High contractor risk means typically start late
„ Very different from typical meaning of “Fixed fee”!
 Ways to Save Money:
Effect on Owners
„ Helps: Efficiency within construction
„ Best teams
„ Appropriate equipment
„ Careful management
„ Quality workmanship (to avoid risk of rework)

„ Hurts: Cutting corners, distortion, charge orders

„ Substitution of materials
„ Distortion of quantities used
„ Distortion of progress
Cost Versus Price for Cost Plus
(Price = cost plus 5%)

$11,025

$10,500 } c

$9,975
} b
Final Price

}a

$10,000

$10,500
$9,500

Final Cost

a = If final cost is $9,500, contractor profit is $475 (5%)

b = If final cost is $10,000, contractor profit is $500 (5%)
c = If final cost is $10,500, contractor loss is $525 (5%)

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Macomber, 1989
 Cost Plus Fixed %
„ Owner is paying the actual cost plus a fixed
percentage
„ Contractor agrees to do his best efforts to
achieve the work
„ Contractor shoulders very little risk
„ Typically select contractors based on reputation
and comfort (service rather than commodity)
Cost Plus + Fixed %: Advantages
„ Maximum flexibility to the Owner
„ No fighting over change orders – contractor gets
paid for any extra work required
„ Permits to collaborate at the early stages of
the project
„ Minimal negotiation time
„ Minimal fear of commitment by contractor
„ Only have to pay for what actually costs
„ If manage closely, can save money vs. fixed-price
Cost Plus + Fixed %: Disadvantages
„ Owner shoulders all risk
„ Little incentive to reduce costs and overtime salaries
can even increase costs
„ Cost unknown until contract completes
„ Owner needs to oversee construction closely
„ Speed up slow crews
„ Identify management problems
„ Contractors have incentive to grow scope, price
„ Terrible with turnkey delivery type!
 Applicability
„ Requires sophisticated owner to manage
„ Uses if the pricing could not be performed in
any other way and if it is urgent
„ Emergencies (civil, military)
„ Ill-defined, risky scope
„ e.g. historic building renovation with unknown cond.
„ Unknown technologies
„ Either scope or construction method unknown
„ Confidential projects (limit public knowledge)
Cost Plus Fixed Fee (“Fixed Fee”)

„ Cost may vary but the fee remains firm

„ The fee is independent of the duration of the
project
„ Like Cost + fixed % except some shared risk
„ Less time risk: High incentive to finish early
„ Less risk of contractor growing size of project
 Unit Price Contract
„ Agreement on the price charged per unit
between the contractor and the owner
„ Interesting example of risk sharing
„ Owner: risk for uncertainty in quantity
„ Contractor: risk for unit price (efficiency, procur)
„ Contractor overhead must be integrated in
the units price
„ Necessity of an owner presence on site to
measure the actual quantities
„ Typically renegotiate if quantity 20% off
„ Quantity influences price b/c economies of scale
 Unit Price Contract
„ Highly dependent on the accuracy of the
estimation of the quantities given by the
Owner/Designer
„ Risk of unbalanced bidding
„ If contractor believes actual quantity will differ, case
increase and/or decrease the unit price
„ Contractor can make profit because payment is based
on actual quantities but he can also lose money in the
same way
„ A contractor can be excluded if its bid is very
unbalanced
„ The total cost for the owner can be greater than
planned
 Example: Pile Driving
„ Too risky to just charge fixed price
„ Geotechnical uncertainties make length of piles
uncertain
„ Piles can be highly expensive

„ Risk allocation
„ Price risk more under contractor control (efficiency,
crew and equipment selection): to contractor
„ Length out of contractor control: to owner

„ Owner must precisely monitor length used

Cost Versus Price for GMP
Guaranted-Maximum-Price Contract

(Price = cost of work plus fixed fee of $500

with a maximum price of $10,500)

$10,500 }c

$10,000 } b

}a
Final Price

$10,000

$10,500
$9,500

Final Cost

a = If final cost is $9,500, contractor profit is $500 (5.26%)

b = If final cost is $10,000, contractor profit is $500 (5%)
c = If final cost is $10,500, contractor loss is $0 (0%)

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Macomber, 1989
Guaranteed Maximum Price or GMP
„ Variation of the Cost Plus a Fee but GMP
can be a cap on direct costs
„ After a certain point, the “floor” or “ceiling”,
the contractor assumes any additional costs
„ Often start in cost plus fixed fee and then
impose GMP at e.g. 90% design
„ Best: GM Shared Savings: Below Guaranteed
Maximum, savings shared (60-40% or sliding)
„ Very good for turnkey, well-defined scope
 GMP: Advantages
„ Permits easier financing
„ Can fast-track
„ Owner keeps savings below GMP
„ Often can get started quickly on construction
„ Particularly if contractor already involved w/design
„ Contract may be higher than for fixed price b/c
design often not complete when contract set
 GMP: Disadvantages
„ Contractors may still spend lots
„ Owner must monitor contractor spending
„ Can be fights over what is direct vs. indirect cost
„ i.e. what must fall below GMP
„ Bad if unclear scope after GMP agreed to (must
renegotiate)
„ Just as for CPFF, quality may be sacrificed
whereas without GMP, cost and/or schedule
would have increased
Relative Costs of Construction Contracts
„ E= contractor's original estimate of the direct job cost at the time of contract
award
„ M = amount of markup by the contractor in the contract
„ B = estimated construction price at the time of signing contract
„ A = contractor's actual cost for the original scope of work in the contract
„ U = underestimate of the cost of work in the original estimate (with negative
value of U denoting an overestimate)
„ C = additional cost of work due to change orders
„ P = actual payment to contractor by the owner
„ F = contractor's gross profit
„ R = basic percentage markup above the original estimate for fixed fee contract
„ Ri = premium percentage markup for contract type i such that the total
percentage markup is (R + Ri), e.g. (R + R1) for a lump sum contract, (R + R2)
for a unit price contract, and (R + R3) for a guaranteed maximum cost contract
„ N = a factor in the target estimate for sharing the savings in cost as agreed upon
by the owner and the contractor, with 0 N 1. Chris Hendrickson, 2000
Original Estimated Contract Prices

Type of Contract Markup Contract Price

B = (1 + R +
Lump sum M = (R +R1)E R1)E
B = (1 + R +
Unit price M = (R + R2)E R2)E
Cost plus fixed % M = RA = RE B = (1 + R)E
Cost plus fixed fee M = RE B = (1 + R)E
B = (1 + R +
Guaranteed max cost M = (R + R3)E R3)E

Adapted from Chris Hendrickson, 2000

 Owner’s Actual Payment with
Different Contract Provisions

Type of Contract Change Order Payment Owner's Payment

Lump sum C(1 + R + R1) P = B + C(1 + R + R1)
Unit price C(1 + R + R2) P = (1 + R + R2)A + C
Cost plus fixed % C(1 + R) P = (1 + R)(A + C)
Cost plus fixed fee C P = RE + A + C
Guaranteed max cost 0 P=B

Adapted from Chris Hendrickson, 2000

 Contractor’s Gross Profit with
Different Contract Provisions

Type of Contract Profit from Change Order Contractor's Gross Profit

Lump sum C(R + R1) F = E - A + (R + R1)(E + C)
Unit price C(R + R2 F = (R + R2)(A + C)
Cost plus fixed % CR F = R (A + C)
Cost plus fixed fee 0 F = RE
Guaranteed max cost -C F = (1 + R + R3)E - A - C

Adapted from Chris Hendrickson, 2000

 Principles of Incentive
Contracts
Additional profits are possible by lowering cost
Customer and contractor share cost savings

•OWNER PAYS 80 % OF OVERRUN

•CONTRACTOR PAY 20 % OF OVERRUN
EXAMPLE •PROFIT IS $1500 LESS
CONTRACTOR’S 20 %
TARGET COST: $20,000
TARGET FEE: $1500
SHARING RATIO: 80/20 % •OWNER KEEPS 80 % OF OVERRUN
•CONTRACTOR KEEPS 20 % OF OVERRUN
•PROFIT IS $1500 PLUS
CONTRACTOR’S 20 %

Note: limitations may be imposed on price or profit

Kerzner, 2000
 Conclusion
„ When market is not very good, clients insists
on fixed price bids whereas when the project
offers are numerous, it is more difficult to
obtain those conditions
„ The contract type choice must depend on:
„ The accuracy of the estimation
„ The ultimate cost know since the beginning or at
least the maximum
„ The desired risk
„ If quick completion of work is wanted
 Part III
„ Award Methods
„ Contract Selection
 Award Methods: Contractor
Selection
„ Extremes

Payment method: Reimbursable Fixed Price

Product Type: Service Commodity

Award method Solicit based on Reputation Bidding

and agree via Negotiation
 Bidding
„ Variants
„ Low bid
„ Multi-parameter bidding
„ Low bid plus arithmetic combination of other factors

„ Low bid divided by ranking of other factors

„ Fixed price low bid is win-lose

„ Typically associated with lump-sum contract
„ Prequalification critical
 Bidding Tradeoffs
„ Time provided to bidders to review documents
„ Too long: Construction delayed
„ Too short:
„ Bids low-quality because too little time to review contract
docs (incorporate high risk premium or unrealistically
low)
„ Few bidders willing to participate

„ Bid count
„ Too many bidders: Scare away best contractors
„ Too few bidders: Bid not competitive
 Bidding Tradeoffs
„ Advantages
„ Can get good price
„ Transparency

„ Disadvantages
„ Can set up win-lose situation
„ Competitive pressures can eliminate profit from bid
„ Try to make up with change orders, cutting corners
„ Can lead to combative relationships

„ Insufficient consideration of design before pricing

 Bidding Metrics
„ Most common: Price alone
„ Bidding “cap”: Bid on how far can go with set amount
of money
„ Multi-parameter bidding (increasingly popular)
„ Consider non-price items (time, quality, qualification)
„ A+B Additive measures
„ Price+($/day)*days (common for retail), Price+qualification+design
rank, price+design rank,…
„ A/B (e.g. B scoring along some metric: Design, etc.)
 Issues with Bids
„ Low bidders can be unreliable
„ Prequalify aggressively!
„ To allow for fast-tracking may bid early (30%)
„ Don’t try to force delivery from low bid
„ Growing Frequency: innovative bidding method
„ Pressure for lowest bid can create
„ Cutting corners
„ Low-quality personnel
„ Bad feelings
 Bidding Process
„ A/E oversight typical
„ Publicity (specifies qualification requirements)
„ Provide bid documents
„ Typically include fair cost estimate, sample contract
„ Answer RFIs
„ Pre-bid conference
„ Explain scope, working conditions, answer
questions, documented in writing)
 Public vs. Private Bidding
„ Public Bidding
„ Must be publicly advertised (posting in newspapers,
public building, etc.)
„ Qualification occurs after submission of bids

„ Typically 60 day period in which can submit bids

„ Private Bidding
„ May be by invitation only
„ Qualification occurs before submission of bids
Dealing with Way-Out Low Bids
„ Forcing collection from unrealistically low bids
is dangerous
„ Construction highly contentious, poor morale
„ Risk of extreme corner cutting

„ Default is possible
„ Disruption

„ Insurance companies fulfilling performance bonds very

difficult to work with
 Subcontracting Bids
„ GCs push subs for lowest possible price before
GC bids
„ GC not obligated to use sub who gave bid
„ Can lead to serious predatory behavior
„ Bid shopping (before and after GC wins bid)
„ Bid peddling (unsolicited calls from subs to GCs
after GC wins bid)
„ Some owners/states require listing of chosen
subs at bid time or assign based on sub-bidding
 Qualifications
„ Common items for qualifications
„ Bonds/Insurance (bid, performance, payment)
„ Safety record
„ Reputation
„ Financial strength
„ Total/Spare capacity
„ Licensing
„ Background in type of work
„ Experience in local area/labor market
„ Management system (QA, planning, estimation, control)
„ Interest, adaptability shown
 Negotiation
„ Typically selected based on reputation, qualifications
„ Typically used for two cases
„ Very simple
„ Use trusted, familiar party
„ Very complex/big
„ Get contractor involved in design, start work early
„ Requires relatively savvy owner
„ Evaluate proposals, monitor performance
„ Important even for DBB for post-bid changes
 Negotiation Considerations
„ Can get win-win because of differences in
„ Risk preferences
„ Relative preferences for different attributes

„ Goal is to find a pareto optimal agreement

„ Key skill in negotiation: Ability to find win-win
options
 Negotiation Tips
„ Try to maintain clear sense of reservation price
„ Price or conditions under which will accept offer
„ Want to adopt some objective basis for position
„ Without this impersonal criteria, other party can take
disagreements personally as arbitrarily demands
„ Discuss multiple issues at once
„ Permits trading off issues flexibly
„ Formal exposure good–but experience gives
edge
 Negotiation Tips 2: Major Sins of
Negotiation (Thomson, 2001)
„ Leaving money on the table: Failing to identify
and use win-win opportunities
„ Settling for too little: Unnecessarily large
concessions
„ Walking away from the table: Rejecting terms
that are favorable, often due to pride
„ Settling for terms worse than existing alternative:
Pressure to reach some deal leads to opportunity
less attractive than opportunity cost