BONHOEFFER

OUTSTANDING CHRISTIAN THINKERS

Series Editor: Brian Davies OP, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham

University, New York.

The Cappadocians Hans Urs von Balthasar

Anthony Meredith SJ John O'Donnell SJ

Augustine Teresa of Avila

Mary T. Clark RSCJ Archbishop Rowan Williams

Catherine of Siena Bultmann

Giuliana Cavallini OP David Fergusson

Kierkegaard Karl Barth

Julia Watkin John Webster

Lonergan Aquinas
Frederick Rowe SJ Brian Davies OP

Reinhold Niebuhr Paul Tillich

Kenneth Durkin John Heywood Thomas

The Venerable Bede Karl Rahner

Benedicta Ward SLG William V. Dych SJ

The Apostolic Fathers Anselm

Simon Tugwell OP G. R. Evans

Denys the Areopagite Newman

Andrew Louth Avery Cardinal Dulles SJ

Calvin Bonhoeffer
T. H. L. Parker Stephen Plant
BONHOEFFER
Stephen Plant

Continuum
LONDON . NEW YORK
 Continuum
The Tower Building 15 East 26 Street
11 York Road New York
London SE1 7NX NY 10010

www. con tinuumbooks. com

© Stephen Plant 2004

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any
information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission from the publishers.

First published 2004

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 0 8264 5088 1 (hardback)

ISBN 0 8264 5089 X (paperback)

Typeset by Fakenham Photosetting Ltd, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN

Printed and bound by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
 Contents

Editorial Foreword vii

Preface ix

1 Introduction: 'a silence on the cross' 1

2 A life in dark times 11
3 Bonhoeffer's theological inheritance 38
4 Self, community and revelation: building blocks of ethics 55
5 The Fall: the origin of Christian ethics 77
6 Following Christ 92
7 The ethics of responsible action 111
8 Ethics and the 'world come of age' 127
9 'Are we still of any use?' 139

Abbreviations and Bibliography 151

Index 156

v
This page intentionally left blank
 Editorial Foreword

St Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) once described himself as

someone with faith seeking understanding. In words addressed to
God he says 'I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which
my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I
may believe, but believe in order to understand.'
This is what Christians have always inevitably said, either
explicitly or implicitly. Christianity rests on faith, but it also has
content. It teaches and proclaims a distinctive and challenging view
of reality. It naturally encourages reflection. It is something to think
about; something about which one might even have second thoughts.
But what have the greatest Christian thinkers said? And is it
worth saying? Does it engage with modern problems? Does it
provide us with a vision to live by? Does it make sense? Can it be
preached? Is it believable?
The Outstanding Christian Thinkers series is offered to readers
with questions like these in mind. It aims to provide clear, authori-
tative and critical accounts of outstanding Christian writers from New
Testament times to the present. It ranges across the full spectrum of
Christian thought to include Catholic and Protestant thinkers,
thinkers from East and West, thinkers ancient, medieval and modern.
The series draws on the best scholarship currently available, so it
will interest all with a professional concern for the history of
Christian ideas. But contributors also write for general readers who
have little or no previous knowledge of the subjects to be dealt with.
Its volumes should therefore prove helpful at a popular as well as an
academic level. For the most part they are devoted to a single thinker,
but occasionally the subject is a movement or school of thought.

Brian Davies OP

vn
 For
Catherine James (nee Holland)
1963-2001
 Preface

Dietrich Bonhoeffer is one of the best-known theologians of the

twentieth century but not often the best understood. Few
theologians, of any century, are burdened by his celebrity status. His
life-story has been told in half a dozen biographies, in documen-
taries, films, comic strips and operas; there is even a Bonhoeffer
rock musical. Since his death, Bonhoeffer's writings have been
press-ganged into authorizing astonishingly varied theological and
ethical positions. A full bibliography of books and articles about
Bonhoeffer sprawls across hundreds of pages. Why add more?
The publication of a complete scholarly edition of Bonhoeffer's
books, sermons, papers and letters in German, and the steady trans-
lation of the German original into the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works,
has made the raw materials for the study of Bonhoeffer more
accessible than ever before. Tools and materials that were formerly
unavailable to all but the most determined researcher are now
collected in a standard edition, cross-referenced and footnoted, and
are being translated into consistent English texts. A revised English
edition of Eberhard Bethge's magisterial Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A
Biography was published in 2000. But these new resources alone
cannot account for the recent resurgence of interest in Bonhoeffer in
churches and amongst students. Christians confront difficult
questions at the beginning of the third Millennium and we are
discovering that some of the avenues opened up by twentieth-
century theology lead to dead ends. Not all of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's
theology is equally helpful but enough of it points forward to make
him a good companion and guide on the Christian journey. He was
and is an outstanding Christian thinker.
This book tries to do three things. Firstly and most importantly, it
aims to introduce Bonhoeffer and his theology. Because this book is

IX
 BONHOEFFER

an introduction I have used endnotes only where omitting them

commits plagiarism, or where they help make connections a reader
might want to follow up. The book avoids lengthy engagement with
secondary literature about Bonhoeffer's life and theology in order to
pay full attention to Bonhoeffer's own writings. In a longer book I
would have made more use of Bonhoeffer's less well known
theological writings, as well as of his correspondence and papers,
but in what follows I have focused primarily on Bonhoeffer's key
writings. I have tried to keep things simple: Bonhoeffer was right to
comment that 'simplicity is an intellectual achievement, one of the
greatest' (LPP 385). Yet complex subjects are also ill served by
over-simplification and I have not avoided Bonhoeffer's more
difficult ideas. I have tried not to make assumptions about how much
you, as reader, know about Bonhoeffer's life or theology, or about
history and theology in general. But I do make one significant
assumption: that theology does not exist for its own sake, but to
serve God's Church. In the introduction to a late volume of his
Church Dogmatics, Karl Barth (whose name features prominently in
what follows) noted that many of his contemporaries who had
laboured for forty years in pastoral ministry were now retiring. 'For
three decades' Barth wrote 'I have no longer been taking any direct
share in this work. But what I have done in the meantime has been
intended for its benefit.' It is ridiculous to compare the purposes of
this book to those of Barth's Dogmatics, but his wistful dedication
does remind us that theology must keep its eyes fixed on the needs
of the Church and the world. Theology, as Bonhoeffer puts it, 'arises
from those on bended knees'. It is for this reason that I have, from
time to time, made connections between Bonhoeffer's theology and
issues confronting Christians today.
A second aim in this book, further than introducing Bonhoeffer's
life and thought, is to set Bonhoeffer in his social, historical and
intellectual context. Bonhoeffer's writing only makes sense if read
against the events through which he lived because as much as for
any theologian, his life and theology are inextricably intertwined.
English-speaking readers typically know little of the history of
Germany in the twentieth century into which I set Bonhoeffer's
biography in Chapter 2. Similarly, most of those educated outside
Germany do not understand the extent of Bonhoeffer's indebtedness
to certain key figures in German philosophy and theology. Some
English-speaking readers have consequently misunderstood what
Bonhoeffer means, or have attributed ideas to him that actually
originate with his sources. In Chapter 3, I therefore try to give an

x
 PREFACE

idea of how several key thinkers mark his thought. Only then will I
begin to explore Bonhoeffer's theology, before evaluating
Bonhoeffer's theological ethics in the concluding chapter.
A third aim in this book is to suggest a means by which the
consistencies in Bonhoeffer's theology can be brought into the open.
Aside from his early academic career, Bonhoeffer's theology
emerged in emergency situations, often under pressures of time, as
well as of urgency and danger. His writings come to us in frustrat-
ingly fragmentary forms; lectures pieced together from student
notes, barely decipherable manuscripts on poor quality paper;
fragments imperfectly arranged into books and letters smuggled
from prison. Honestly, all this adds to the 'romance' of reading
Bonhoeffer, but it has made it more difficult to discern anything
resembling a coherent 'Bonhoefferian' theology. Does this perhaps
explain why Bonhoeffer scholarship has relied unduly on the short
essay, rather than the monograph: scrappy responses to a scrappy
thinker? I think not; I believe that it is not only possible to uncover
coherent patterns and trajectories in Bonhoeffer, but that it is
important so to do. It is because I do not think that this is obvious
that I have also set myself the task of making a case for it in what
follows. And the coherence and consistency I hope to illuminate lies
in considering Bonhoeffer as a theologian with a particular interest
in ethics. Naturally, not everything he wrote can be viewed from an
ethical perspective, but I suggest that his theology is a consistent,
and by and large credible attempt to describe how people should live
together and conduct themselves in the light of the Gospel of Jesus.
My argument is not the hermeneutical key, a new 'aha' thesis that
trumps all previous interpretations of Bonhoeffer; neither is this the
first book to explore Bonhoeffer's ethics. Yet this book does, I hope,
offer something new in tracking ethical questions and concerns from
Bonhoeffer's earliest to his last writings. The Outstanding Christian
Thinkers series, to which this volume contributes, does not permit a
book to have a title other than the name of its subject; but were this
book to have a title, because the theme of ethics is so prominent, it
would probably be 'A silence on the cross: the theological ethics of
Dietrich Bonhoeffer'.
Most books incur debts, and this one certainly does. I am grateful
to Brian Davies OP for inviting me to write this book, and to the
staff of Continuum for their patience as its deadlines came and went.
The World Church Office of the Methodist Church in Britain funds
the half of my post dedicated to research which makes writing
possible. My thanks also go to the members of my support group at

XI
 BONHOEFFER

Wesley House, to colleagues and students in the Cambridge

Theological Federation and in Cambridge University; to Keith
Clements, John de Gruchy, Matt Finch, David Ford, Clifford Green,
Dan Hardy, David Horrell, John Kennedy, Joel Lawrence, Iain
Murton, Nicholas Sagovsky and Simon Sutcliffe, in whose company
theology becomes joyful. My wife Kirsty Smith, our son Caleb and
the child we expect before this book is published, keep book-writing
and study in their proper place and it would take another book to
record all of my debts to them.

xn
 1
Introduction: 'a silence on
the cross'

FRIDAY'S CHILD
(IN MEMORY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER,
MARTYRED AT FLOSSENBURG, APRIL 9TH, 1945)
W.H. Auden

He told us we were free to choose

But, children as we were, we thought —
'Paternal Love will only use
Force in the last resort

On those too bumptious to repent' —

Accustomed to religious dread,
It never crossed our minds He meant
Exactly what He said.

Perhaps He frowns, perhaps He grieves,

But it seems idle to discuss
If anger or compassion leaves
The bigger bangs to us.

What reverence is rightly paid

To a Divinity so odd

1
 BONHOEFFER

He lets the Adam whom He made

Perform the Acts of God?

It might be jolly if we felt

Awe at this Universal Man
(When kings were local, people knelt);
Some try to, but who can?

The self-obsessed observing Mind

We meet when we observe at all
Is not alarming or unkind
But utterly banal.

Though instruments at Its command

Make wish and counterwish come true,
It clearly cannot understand
What It can clearly do.

Since the analogies are rot

Our senses based belief upon,
We have no means of learning what
Is really going on,

And must put up with having learned

All proofs or disproofs that we tender
Of His existence are returned
Unopened to the sender.

Now, did He really break the seal

And rise again? We dare not say;
But conscious unbelievers feel
Quite sure of Judgement Day.

Meanwhile, a silence on the cross,

As dead as we will ever be,
Speaks of some total gain or loss,
And you and I are free

To guess from the insulted face

Just what Appearances He saves
By suffering in a public place
A death reserved for slaves.
? 1958

2
 INTRODUCTION: 'A SILENCE ON THE CROSS'

By the early 1960s Stephen Spender thought that there was no one
from whom the poet W.H. Auden got anything new 'except perhaps
a theologian'.1 The late fifties and early sixties were an unhappy
time in Auden's life and Friday's Child, dedicated to Bonhoeffer's
memory, is one of the few fine poems he wrote during this period.
At University Auden had abandoned Christianity, experimenting
with what he would later call the 'Christian heresies' of Blake,
Freud, Lawrence and Marx. But from 1939 he slipped gradually and
inconspicuously back into the Church. At first, under the influence
of S0ren Kierkegaard's theology, he considered Christian faith in
existentialist terms as a 'leap of faith'. But this jarred with his
experience, which was of a slow, intellectual taking hold of God in
which the act of faith remains an act of choice which no one can do
for another. Auden read a good deal of theology - not only
Augustine and Newman, staples of the Anglo-Catholic diet, but
Schleiermacher, Bultmann, Barm and, it seems, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer. 'I like to think', he told a friend 'that if I hadn't been a
poet, I might have become an Anglican Bishop - politically liberal,
I hope; theologically and liturgically conservative, I know'. W. H.
Auden was born a year after Bonhoeffer, on 21 February 1907 but
they had little in common. Both men fuelled their considerable intel-
lectual faculties with tobacco, both admired Kierkegaard and Barth;
but it is hard to imagine two more disparate individuals. In theory
they could have met: Auden arrived in New York in January 1939,
Bonhoeffer followed six months later. But they moved in very
different circles and while Bonhoeffer promptly decided to return to
Germany to share the fate of his nation, no amount of moral pressure
could persuade Auden he had a responsibility to go home and
contribute to his country's war effort, however trivially.
Auden discovered Bonhoeffer's theology relatively early, at any
rate before Bishop J. A. T. Robinson's controversial book Honest To
God popularized Bonhoeffer for the 1960s' generation of radical
theologians. Friday's Child was published at Christmas, 1958. The
poem is not necessarily a rendering of Auden's faith, nor a
commentary on Bonhoeffer's theology; still less is it a eulogy over
the dead theologian's unmarked grave. Its significance for our
purposes is that Friday's Child organizes poetically a theological
dilemma that is key to Bonhoeffer's thought. It is a dilemma that
begins with the freedom to choose and ends with the silence of the
cross. Poets, Auden thought, interpret theology in a rather unique
way because in poetry myth and dogma are fused together. Without
directly expositing Bonhoeffer's theological ethics Friday's Child

3
 BONHOEFFER

dissolves them instinctively in the Christian images of Judgement

Day, cross and resurrection. The phrase 'Friday's child' is from a
nursery rhyme, and Auden's poem retains its childlike cadencies.
Christ is Friday's child, characterized in the rhyme as 'loving and
giving'; what He gives is freedom to choose belief or unbelief,
obedience or disobedience. Whether it is God's anger or His
compassion that provides the explanation, God leaves 'the bigger
bangs' — the bigger choices — 'to us'. Just this donation of free
responsibility is, Auden suggests, the remarkable feature of the
Christian Deity, who 'lets the Adam whom He made/Perform the
Acts of God'. Auden understood that the Holocaust shattered older
forms of religious belief that had in any case been eroding since the
Enlightenment. Patterns of reverence, common 'when kings were
local', have gone for good. The foundations on which we based our
knowledge of God now seem shaky, such that 'We have no means
of learning what/is really going on'. Faith and theology can no
longer be a matter of apologetics, of proving or disproving the
existence of God; such questions are simply 'returned/Unopened to
the sender'. We live today, as Bonhoeffer put it in his prison letters,
in a world 'as if God were not given'. And yet, confronted with the
possibility of resurrection, even 'conscious unbelievers' can feel
Judgement Day bearing upon them. In the last two stanzas of the
poem Auden reaches the cross; here God is embodied, not in the
frantic fruitlessness of metaphysical theology, but in a silence that
speaks. On the cross we hear the 'total gain or loss' of Christ, which
leaves us guessing:

Just what Appearances He saves

By suffering in a public place
A death reserved for slaves.

Christian ethics is lived out in this silence. Auden's Friday's Child

intimates a performance of human life in the space God creates
between freedom of choice and a silence on the cross. This freedom
has nothing in common with the anarchic chaos of sexual revolution
or mind-blowing drugs; neither does it resemble the often superficial
and artificial freedoms of contemporary life. It is a freedom fastened
to the utter self-giving of God in Christ Jesus. Put simply: God's
silence on the cross signs our freedom as human beings to be respon-
sible for our own choices, to create our own ethical life; this is made
possible by the incarnation of God in the world. Jesus' death stills
the clamour of ethics in 'a silence on the cross'; not the empty prattle

4
 INTRODUCTION: 'A SILENCE ON THE CROSS'

of a godless world but the engaged, arcane silence of God in a world

come of age.
I am suggesting that theological ethics are a central concern of
Bonhoeffer's theology, but just what are theological ethics! We can
all recognize a moral problem. On some moral issues almost
everyone will agree. If I ask 'is lying right or wrong?' or 'if I
disagree with a politician should I kill him?' or 'if I want a son and
a pre-natal scan shows my foetus to be female, is it right to abort the
pregnancy and try again?' most people will give the same answers.
Yet moral questions are not always so clear-cut. If I ask 'is lying
wrong when, by telling a lie I can prevent someone from being
hurt?' or 'if a tyrant is killing thousands of people is it right to kill
him?', or 'if a scan shows that my foetus has Down syndrome should
I abort the pregnancy and try again?' then we can expect greater
diversity in people's responses. Whatever conclusions we draw we
recognize these sorts of questions as 'moral' or 'ethical'. But doing
the right or wrong thing when faced with certain choices is only part
of what morality or ethics are about. Our actions, taken collectively,
have a lot to do with who we are, with our moral identity. This is
why we often distinguish between good and bad people. Most
people can agree that Hitler and Pol Pot were bad people and that
Saint Francis and Gandhi were good people. Again, sometimes
matters are less clear-cut: some people in Russia still admire Stalin,
while others think that Mother Theresa would have done more good
in Calcutta by distributing condoms than by caring for the dying.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer too is morally controversial: to some a martyr
and saint, to others a traitor and murderer. Thinking carefully about
being good or bad is as much a part of morality and ethics as
thinking about whether particular actions or choices are right or
wrong.
'Ethicos' is a Greek word closely related to 'ethos'. In classical
Greek philosophy, 'ethicos' referred to issues of character, and also
to custom, usage, manners or habit. Its first recorded use in English2
is 1581 when it was used to mean 'relating to morals'. In English,
the word 'ethos' is, in some respects, rather closer to the Greek
original and is used in the sense of the prevailing tone or sentiment
of a people, community or group, and the characteristic spirit of a
system or institution. Relatively recently in English usage 'ethics'
has come to refer to the science of moral philosophy or the moral
system of a particular group or school of thought. 'Moralis' is the
Latin equivalent of 'ethicos". It derives from the plural form of
'mos/moris\ meaning nature, custom, practice or mood, as well as

5
 BONHOEFFER

character and behaviour. The English word 'mores' retains a sense

close to the Latin original. In English, 'moral' came to refer to the
distinction between right and wrong in relation to specific actions.
The German language also borrowed both 'ethik* and 'moral', but
also has the words 'sittlich' and *sittlichkeif which, though usually
translated 'moral' and 'morality', retain a more explicit connection
to customs and mores than the English word 'moral' generally does.
Moral philosophers or ethicists have tended to conceive their
discipline in three ways. Firstly, ethics may be a descriptive enquiry,
either historical or scientific that seeks to account for moral actions,
for example, anthropologically, psychologically, or sociologically.
Secondly, ethics can refer to the attempt to develop normative
patterns or rules for living. This might mean debating with one's
self, or with others what to do or think in a specific situation. Finally,
there is a much more selfconsciously 'philosophical' or 'academic'
activity that reflects on patterns of moral activity in ways that are
analytical or critical. This asks general logical, semantic or episte-
mological (i.e. how we know anything ethically) questions such as
'what do we mean by the word "wrong" when we say "lying is
wrong"'? or 'what kind of arguments would count logically as
moral arguments if someone were to argue a moral case?', or 'what
does it mean to be responsible?' Because this third kind of ethics
takes place at a theoretical remove from the first two kinds, it is
sometimes called 'meta-ethics'. Some ethical arguments will
confine themselves to one of these three types; others will switch
from one type to another. A convenient possibility is that we might
use the term 'morality' to refer to the second of these types and
'ethics' to refer to the third, so that 'ethics' would mean the practice
of reflecting on morality. Such a distinction is however, hard to
maintain in practice, not only because the distinction is not normal
in day-to-day conversation, but because it implies an over-sharp
distinction between ethical theory and moral practice.
During the twentieth century, however, the ways people behave
and the ways they reflect on moral issues, changed in most parts of
the world to a greater or lesser extent. Whether in reaction to total-
izing political ideologies such as Nazism, Fascism or Communism,
or in the wake of the social disruption of two world wars, or under
the influence of new philosophies such as existentialism or
'postmodernism', or with a decline in religious practice in some
places, or in the light of scientific research into the extent human
behaviour is determined by a genetic 'programme', or as seems
likely, as a result of some combination of these and related factors,

6
 INTRODUCTION: 'A SILENCE ON THE CROSS'

the neatness of the description of ethics outlined in the previous

paragraph has come into question. Those who think a lot about
moral issues have become more aware of how morally chaotic and
confused the world has become. Some have tried to recover for the
present a high point in the history of ethics represented, for
example by Aristotle, Augustine or Aquinas; others have reflected
on what it might mean to accept that people are shaped morally by
very particular communities, such as families, churches and
nations, instead of holding out for a 'universal ethics'; others have
relished the confusion; others have simply accepted that moral
behaviour is genetically determined and have essentially turned
ethics into anthropology. Bonhoeffer's ethics are situated in the
middle of many of these changes and if they are still to be of any
use must contribute to moral reflection and practices in these new
contexts.
Like everyone else, Christians make choices about what is right
and wrong, and distinguish between good and bad people. And like
moral philosophers, Christian theologians approach ethics in several
ways. But whether or not Christian moral theology is the same as
secular moral philosophy, and whether Christian theological ethics
is identical with secular ethics is hotly disputed. On the one hand,
some theologians argue that since Christians are human beings
shaped by the same moral forces as everyone else, claiming that
there is a separate Christian ethics amounts to no more than an ugly
assertion of moral superiority. Richard Holloway's Godless
Morality: Keeping Religion out of Ethics* makes just this case.
Holloway argues that Christian ethics as a separate discipline should
be done away with because claiming that Christian ways of
behaving are sanctioned by God's commands merely asserts that
Christian moral reasoning is divine while everyone else's is human.
Since history teaches that many of the moral claims made by
Christians have come subsequently to seem immoral, Holloway
suggests that Christians would do well to show a little more humility
and be a little less morally certain. Theologians like Stanley
Hauerwas and Pope John Paul II articulate a very different view:
they maintain that Christian ethics are quite distinct from the ethics
that everyone else lives by. Typically, they believe, Christians
maintain moral views that are at odds with those of the majority of
non-Christians. Even when Christians come to the same moral
conclusions as non-believers they do so for very different reasons.
This is because secular ethics begins by asking 'what is the right
thing to do?' while Christians begin by asking 'what does God want

7
 BONHOEFFER

of me?' What this debate reveals is that in contemporary theology

there is considerable uncertainty not only about what 'theological
ethics' are - but about whether such a thing is possible at all.
Bonhoeffer understood the importance of these questions as well
as anyone. The question 'is "Christian ethics" possible?' occupied
Bonhoeffer's attention throughout his working life. In 1929, while
serving as assistant minister to the German-speaking church in
Barcelona, Bonhoeffer gave a lecture on 'Fundamental questions of
a Christian ethic'. In 1931, at his first meeting with Karl Barm, they
argued about the nature of ethics. During the summer semester of
1932 he led a seminar in Berlin University on the question 'Is there
a Christian ethic?' In his doctoral dissertation on the Church, and in
his books on discipleship and community life he explored the life of
Christian communities, and the ways in which that life is distinct
from other forms of human community. But it was during the war
that Bonhoeffer paid greatest attention to ethics, preparing a book on
the subject that was never completed. Reviewing his life from his
prison cell in November 1943 Bonhoeffer wrote to Eberhard Bethge
that though his ideas were incomplete 'I've reproached myself for
not having finished my Ethics (parts of it have probably been confis-
cated), and it was some consolation to me that I had told you the
essentials' (LPP 129). A month later he added 'I sometimes feel as
if my life were more or less over, and as if all I had to do now were
to finish my Ethics' (LPP 163). In a fragment for this unfinished
book Bonhoeffer summed up his lifelong exploration of this key
question:

A Christian ethic will have to begin by asking whether and to

what extent it is possible at all to treat the 'ethical' and the
'Christian' as a theme, for that is not by any means so self-evident
as one might assume from the confidence with which this
repeatedly has been and is being done. (£"231)

It is one thing to demonstrate that Bonhoeffer consistently

questioned the nature of ethics; it is quite a different matter to
demonstrate that he found an answer. Not everyone recognizes in
Bonhoeffer, as Auden apparently did, an outstanding Christian
thinker capable of doing more than simply asking the right
questions. In May 1967 Karl Barth wrote to thank Eberhard Bethge
for sending a copy of Bethge's recently published biography of
Bonhoeffer.4 In his 'expectorations' on the book Barth queried the
value of Bonhoeffer's theology:

8
 INTRODUCTION: 'A SILENCE ON THE CROSS'

Wholly obscure to me, even after reading your book, is the matter
on which discussion has raged from several angles since it was
provoked by Letters and Papers from Prison: the renewal of
theology in both the narrower and the broader sense as he
envisioned it ... [T]o this day I do not know what Bonhoeffer
himself meant and planned with it all, and very softly I venture to
doubt whether theological systematics (I include his Ethics) was
his real strength.

It was not that Barth casually disregarded what Bonhoeffer had

written: his Church Dogmatics is salted with laudatory remarks
about Bonhoeffer's early writings, which he had clearly read atten-
tively. Barth's concern was that Bonhoeffer's was an 'agitated
intellectual pilgrimage' curtailed by martyrdom before it had taken
proper form. Today, some serious theologians with no desire to
belittle Bonhoeffer's integrity are equally agnostic about whether or
not his written legacy can be viewed as a coherent totality, whether
there is a 'Bonhoefferian' theological ethics at all. Outside the claus-
trophobic circle of Bonhoeffer's most devoted admirers some
theologians remain baffled that Bonhoeffer's ethics continue to be
read when others' ethics are comparatively neglected.5
It is certainly the case that too much of Bonhoeffer's popularity
rests on the mistaken view that the compelling story of his anti-Nazi
resistance, ending on the gallows, serves to justify the quality of his
theology. True, with Bonhoeffer biography and theology are inter-
leaved; but many who have died bravely have thought unclearly. If
Bonhoeffer is to speak to this new century as to the last then his
theology must be capable of standing on its own feet. What we need
to reveal is the way in which Bonhoeffer's theological ethics
constitute a coherent whole; only on that basis can we assess their
contribution to today's moral problems. By 'coherent' I do not mean
a self-enclosed, complete system that contains all truth; Christian
theology is not the kind of discipline that can be systematized, at any
rate tidily or wisely. Revealing the coherence in Bonhoeffer's
theological ethics will mean laying them out so that they make sense
cumulatively; so that their beginning, middle and end hang together.
I want to argue the case that a trajectory can be traced from
Bonhoeffer's earliest to his final writings which describe an ethics of
responsibility, lived out in obedience to the God who acts most
powerfully in 'the silence of the cross'. That is, Bonhoeffer's
theological ethics describe the way in which God makes it possible
for human beings to act responsibly and obediently, without

9
 BONHOEFFER

depriving them of their adulthood and human dignity. The extent to

which Bonhoeffer's thinking is still useful today is something that
only becomes clear as we read him and we will return explicitly to
this question in the last chapter.
In the chapters that follow we will explore just what Dietrich
Bonhoeffer meant by Christian ethics, or by what I have termed
'theological ethics'. For now I simply table the suggestion that this
question underpins a good deal of his theological writing and his
life, and it is to that life we can now turn.

Notes
1 For this and subsequent references to Auden, see Auden, Richard Davenport-
Hines, Minerva, 1995.
2 Dictionary references are from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
3 Godless Morality: Keeping Religion out of Ethics, Richard Holloway, Canongate,
1999.
4 Karl Earth Letters 1961-1968, T&T Clark, 1981, pp. 250-3.
5 Commenting on Barth's 1920s' lectures on ethics John Webster remarks that
'They deserve, for instance, to be more widely studied than Bonhoeffer's much
more celebrated Ethics\ Barth's Moral Theology, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1998,
p. 61.

10
 2
A life in dark times

'TO THOSE BORN LATER'

Truly, I live in dark times!

You who will emerge from the flood

In which we have gone under
Remember
When you speak of our failings
The dark time too
Which you have escaped.
For we went, changing countries oftener than our shoes
Through the wars of the classes, despairing
When there was injustice only, and no rebellion.

And yet we know:

Hatred, even of meanness
Contorts the features.
Anger, even against injustice
Makes the voice hoarse. Oh, we
Who wanted to prepare the ground for friendliness
Could not ourselves be friendly.

But you, when the time comes at last

And man is a helper to man

11
 BONHOEFFER

Think of us
With forbearance.1
Bertolt Brecht

Snapshot: July 1939

War was coming and everyone knew it. By the summer of 1939
preparations for defending the citizens of London were well under
way. In September 1938 the Government had issued gas masks to
every citizen in Britain. As the autumn wore on into the uncertain
new year of 1939, bomb shelters were dug in the public parks, and
in back gardens an Armada of Anderson shelters was fitted out and
stocked up. In April 1939 a million extra burial forms were issued to
London's local authorities in anticipation of bomb casualties; water
pipes were enlarged so the fire services could douse the flames.2 Few
Britons faced the prospect of a new war with the same jingoism with
which they had greeted the onset of the Great War twenty-five years
earlier. Then, they had lost their men by the million but the sound of
the guns had only rarely been audible in London. In the new war
Britain's cities would be on the front line. In July 1939 the flotsam
and jetsam of Europe's storms lapped against the steps of the British
Museum where the poet Louis MacNeice perceived:

Between the enormous fluted Ionic columns

There seeps from heavily jowled or hawk-like foreign faces
The guttural sorrow of the refugees.3

At the same moment in Germany, the diarist Viktor Klemperer was

fussing and fretting himself ready for the coming cataclysm. Of
Jewish origin and a Great War veteran, Klemperer had more reason
than most to hope war could be avoided. His diary reflects the
tension in the city of Dresden and in Germany in which the atmos-
phere of expectancy was polluted by the still more sinister odour of
fear. Klemperer's grocer expects Poland to be swallowed up by
Germany as bloodlessly as Czechoslovakia; a friend thinks war will
come by August; and a tram driver reports that a man with a Party
badge suggested he change the English names of his children to
German ones.4
Also in July 1939, in the London boarding house garden of a
refugee family, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was photographed relaxing in a
deck chair. The family of Gerhard Leibholz had arrived in London
nine months earlier. Gerhard's wife Sabine was Bonhoeffer's twin

12
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

and he felt as close to her as to anyone. In 1933 Bonhoeffer had

obeyed his superior's instruction and refused Gerhard's request to
conduct the funeral of his Jewish father (Bonhoeffer regretted his
decision so bitterly that he later wrote a poignant apology to his
brother-in-law5). Bonhoeffer had helped the family get out of
Germany. In advance of their arrival in London he had written to
influential British friends commending Gerhard's legal and political
expertise. Now, travelling from New York to Germany, Bonhoeffer
broke his journey to find out how the Leibholzes were settling in.
His passport was due to expire in March 1940 and it was unlikely he
would be granted another. Besides, the dogs of war were already
growling and travel between Germany and Britain would soon be
impossible. It is hardly surprising that a camera appeared and several
pictures were taken.
In the photographs Bonhoeffer appears surprisingly at ease. A
few days before he had taken the most difficult and significant
decision of his life: to renounce personal security by returning from
America to Germany in advance of war in order to participate in the
anti-Nazi resistance. He was an intelligent man and his family and
friends were well placed: he had the information to calculate the risk
his return involved. The pictures show him listening earnestly, or
smiling and talking. He is urbane and confident. Even in the summer
sun he wears a tailored suit and matching tie. When these photo-
graphs were taken Bonhoeffer was 33 but looked middle-aged.
The letters Bonhoeffer sent to friends and family during his brief
visit to London betray no sense of the turning point he had just
passed.6 He makes practical arrangements with his parents. In good
English he writes to George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, explaining
that the post of 'refugee Pastor' which he had been offered ought to
go to one of his 'non-Aryan brethren who are much more entitled to
such a post'. He asks Bell if anything can be done to support
Gerhard Leibholz's application for a modest Church grant. At the
end of the ten days Bonhoeffer left London as planned. He never
saw his sister again.

Memory and history

'[A]fter great distance of time', wrote Thomas Hobbes, 'our imagin-

ation of the Past is weak ... so that Imagination and Memory, are but
one thing.' There are too many ways in which memory and imagin-
ation get muddled for history to be a confident discipline, and this is
nowhere truer than in the recent history of Germany. Hindsight

13
 BONHOEFFER

embroiders facts and fogs truth: only by these means could one Nazi
commander whose unit shot 15,000 people say at his trial that he
was always 'inwardly opposed' to what he was doing.7 History looks
from the present into the past, but life is lived from the present
towards the future. History can never report events just as they
happened; we cannot, for example, look backwards into German
history and forget the horror that resulted from Hitler's coming to
power, or tell the life of Bonhoeffer and forget he was murdered.
This incapacity to see things from the 'hindsightless' perspective of
those who lived through the events we recall can lead us to attribute
meaning to things that were not there at the time - poignantly noting
for example that Bonhoeffer's meeting with his sister in 1939 was
his last when neither of them could know it would be so. History-
telling can also have a tendency to flatten out the complex
ambiguities of events as they are lived to fit them into the historian's
packaging; grey shades can be erased and a monochrome landscape
remain peopled only by villains or saints. It is only with the benefit
of an airbrushed memory that anything in twentieth-century German
history looks this clear. The German people failed; the conspiracy
against Hitler failed; the churches failed: Bonhoeffer shared in their
failure. It is urgent that this awful history is remembered, but it will
be better if our remembrance is graced by forbearance towards those
who could not know the outcomes of their actions and inactions.
Most biographical accounts of Bonhoeffer collapse Germany's
history, and that of the conspiracy and the church, into the story of
Bonhoeffer's life. It is understandable that this should be the case.
Yet while Bonhoeffer is naturally the central character in his own
life-story, he was not central to these far broader contexts.
Recounting the histories of Germany, the conspiracy and the church
struggle from Bonhoeffer's perspective can illuminate them, but it
can sometimes result in inflating his role. Within this chapter,
therefore, I will try to embed Bonhoeffer's life within these broader
contexts.

Germany: Empire, Republic and Reich

Dietrich Bonhoeffer's life spanned three eras in German history and

two grim wars. The world into which he was born was very different
from the one in which he died. On 4 February 1906 when Dietrich
and his twin were delivered, Europe was a continent in which
society was highly ordered, in which people knew their place, in
which members of the upper classes found it instinctively difficult to

14
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

be 'familiar' with the lower classes. Europe was at the end of an era
of hierarchy: on the eve of the First World War there were just three
Republics in Europe; by 1918 there would be thirteen. Few
European societies were more formal than Germany under the
Emperor Wilhelm II. Germany before the war was a patchwork quilt
of former states each with its own culture, institutions and polity,
gathered loosely into the Empire. But beneath this brittle exterior
unity, tectonic plates of social and political life were shifting.
Germany was undergoing a population explosion far in excess of
neighbouring countries. In 1871 the German population was 41
million; in 1914 it was 67.7 million (to which the Bonhoeffer
family's eight children made a handsome contribution). In the same
period Germany experienced rapid industrial expansion; output
increased fivefold while Britain's merely doubled. Cities and towns
grew rapidly to accommodate these changes,8 disrupting the
comparatively stable social relations of the past and storing up
industrial conflict and urban poverty for the future.
In 1906 Dietrich's father, Karl Bonhoeffer, was Professor of
Psychiatry in Breslau (now Wroclaw in Poland). In 1912 he moved
to the prestigious Chair of Psychiatry and Neurology at Berlin
University, where he consolidated his international reputation as a
bulwark against new ideas in psychiatry flowing from Sigmund
Freud and Carl Gustav Jung. This position, and the foreign currency
that came from his publications, would insulate the Bonhoeffer
family from some of the turmoil that was to come. Dietrich's mother
Paula (nee von Hase) came from a landowning family. Her father
served for two years as the Emperor Wilhelm IPs court preacher and
became a Professor of Theology. In spite of this ecclesiastical
heritage, like most Berliners, the Bonhoeffer family sat light to
church membership. On the face of it Berlin, the Bonhoeffer family
home and the German capital, was still a largely Protestant city.
Even in 1933 over 70 per cent of the total population of 4.2 million
designated themselves members of the provincial Evangelical (i.e.
Protestant) Church.9 Yet a large majority of them had lost any
functioning connection with church life; estimates suggest that only
250,000-300,000 regularly participated in a worshipping congre-
gation. When the Bonhoeffers required the services of the Church a
relative came to the house to do the job. The family said evening
prayers, sent their children to confirmation classes, and read the
Bible; but a spirit of rational empiricism and liberalism most
strongly characterized family life. Chatter and sentimentality were
discouraged. Dietrich's brothers prepared for careers in science and

15
 BONHOEFFER

law; his sisters married similarly solid professionals. So when

Dietrich as a boy announced his decision to become a theologian his
brothers discouraged him by pointing out how boring and petty
church life was. Dietrich replied that he would reform it. Much later,
in prison, Dietrich attempted to write a play in which one of his
characters was strikingly like himself and to whom a remark is
addressed that sums up the significance of the values and traditions
that shaped him:

People like you have a foundation, you have ground under your
feet, you have a place in the world. There are things you take for
granted, that you stand up for, and for which you are willing to
put your head on the line, because you know your roots go so
deep that they'll sprout new growth again. (DBW 7, 68)

This same seriousness was maintained when war was declared in

1914: when one of Bonhoeffer's sisters ran into the house shouting
delightedly 'There's a war', she had her face slapped for being
frivolous about events of such deadly seriousness.
In 1917 Bonhoeffer's two eldest brothers were called up; the next
oldest followed a year later. In 1918 Dietrich's brother Walter was
fatally wounded; the impact of his death on Bonhoeffer's family,
most visibly his mother, was profound. Dietrich inherited his
brother's Bible and used it for the rest of his life. In 1930/31 he
wrote that 'I myself was in these years a schoolboy and I can assure
you that not only had I in those days to learn what hunger means. I
should wish that you would have to eat this food for only one day
that we had for three or four years and I think you would get a
glimpse of the privations which Germany had to endure [text
amended]'.10 Greater still was the war's impact on those returning
from the front. One of those returning, Corporal Adolf Hitler,
believed that the soldiers at the front had not lost the war at all. The
war he believed, had been lost at home, where profiteering, poor
morale and discipline, and above all the malign influence of Jews
and Marxists had led to surrender when victory was still within
reach. He was far from the only demobilized soldier to subscribe to
this 'stab in the back' theory. Others simply felt destroyed spiritually
and physically by what they had experienced: in Erich Maria
Remarque's novel All Quiet on the Western Front, the protagonist,
wounded and grieving the loss of friends, reflects on the future: 'I
am young, I am twenty years old; yet I know nothing of life but
despair, death, fear, and fatuous superficiality cast over an abyss of

16
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

sorrow ... Our knowledge of life is limited to death. What will

happen afterwards? And what shall come out of us?'
The period following the end of hostilities was marked in
Germany by chaos, violence and bitterness. The Emperor fled and a
Republic was declared. Dishevelled units of the collapsing army
returned to Germany still carrying their rifles. Some formed bodies
intent on armed insurrection; others formed 'Freikorps', armed
volunteers loosely under the control of the army, to suppress them.
A Soviet Republic was declared in Bavaria and viciously crushed.
When Weimar was chosen as the town in which to inaugurate the
new Republican constitution in 1919 it was not in tribute to the high
culture of Goethe and Herder that had once flourished there, but
because it was small enough to defend with two battalions of
infantry. The Weimar constitution contained within it the seeds of its
own destruction. Agreed in haste, it aimed to please everyone.
Power on the one hand was too widely dispersed as Weimar
Germany's electoral system necessitated weak government by
coalition. On the other hand the President had too much power; he
was both Commander in Chief of the Army and authorized to
dissolve parliament. It is striking that the Nazis never needed to
abolish the Weimar Constitution. But the bitterness of this time
stemmed above all from Germany's reaction to the terms of the
Versailles Treaty that ended the war. Germany ceded large areas of
land to the victorious allies in the East and in the West. Germany
was to pay crippling reparations to the victors over 42 years. A 'war
guilt' clause fastened the blame for the war on Germany and Austria.
Even in 1930/31 Bonhoeffer could describe this as 'the wound
which still is open and bleeds in Germany'.11 In March 1920
'Freikorps' units marched on Berlin and the army refused
government orders to meet them. A General Strike restored order but
an impression remained of the new democratic political system's
incapacity to rule effectively. Political chaos gave way to economic
chaos. As the revenue from tax was insufficient to pay the police, the
army and the reparations bill, the government resorted to printing
money and inflation galloped. In October 1923 Dietrich Bonhoeffer
wrote to his parents telling them that each meal now cost 1 billion
marks. By November 1923 the exchange rate was 4000 billion
marks for one US dollar and the cash economy was replaced by an
economy based on barter in which two eggs bought a theatre ticket
and a pair of boots cost a pound of butter.

17
 BONHOEFFER

The student prince

In 1923 Dietrich began his theological studies, first in Tubingen and
then in Berlin. The discipline of theology was undergoing a crisis of
its own arising from war and political bedlam. In 1919, a Swiss
Pastor, Karl Barth, published a commentary on Paul's letter to the
Romans and in the same year he gave a lecture at Tambach in
Germany on 'The Christian's Place in Society'. These two events
marked the beginning of a new theological movement that would
dominate western theology in the twentieth century. Barth
demanded a revolution turning the attention of theology from human
beings towards God in Christ. Barth had been shocked by the way
that leading German academic theologians had supported the war.
He was convinced that the Bible was not, as it was commonly
regarded within the prevailing traditions of cultural Protestantism
and liberal scholarship, merely a religious history or a book of
Churchly doctrine, but a witness to the Bible writers' encounter with
a living God. The theology faculty in Berlin was a bastion of just the
kind of 'liberal' theology that Barth was challenging. Friedrich
Schleiermacher, regarded as a father of Protestant liberal theology,
had founded the theology faculty in Berlin; Adolf von Harnack, in
his seventies in 1923 and a historian in the liberal school with an
international reputation, still gave occasional classes in which
Dietrich was a favourite student.
Barth's theology of crisis was not the only revolutionary
theological movement current in Germany. Karl Holl, another of
Bonhoeffer's teachers, was spearheading a revival of study into the
theology of the Reformer Martin Luther. The Evangelical Church in
Berlin was a united church containing both Lutheran and Reformed
theological traditions, but Dietrich, as we shall see in the next
chapter, was far more influenced by Luther than by Calvin, or
indeed any other theologian. Dietrich also learned social theory and
sociology from Ernst Troeltsch and dogmatic theology from
Reinhold Seeberg, with whom he came into conflict when, after
1925, Bonhoeffer's essays began to incorporate Barth's influence.
The conflict Bonhoeffer faced in the Berlin faculty is illustrated in a
winsome letter to him from von Harnack complaining of the
'contempt for scientific theology and the menace posed by unscien-
tific theology', in Barthianism. In 1924 Bonhoeffer spent a term in
Rome and was deeply impressed both by this first encounter with
classical antiquity and with the Roman Catholic Church, in which
he sensed a seriousness and universalism far removed from the

18
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

caricatures of the Roman church served up in Protestant Berlin. A

year later, aged nineteen, Bonhoeffer began work on his doctoral
dissertation alongside his other studies. His Roman experiences
influenced his choice of topic, a study of the Church. He achieved
the licentiate degree, the Berlin equivalent of a Doctorate, in 1927
with his dissertation Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of
the Sociology of the Church. The same year he began training for
ordination within his regional church.
In the late 1920s and early 1930s Weimar Germany was, in
George Orwell's phrase, 'a society in decay'. Politics still had a
tendency to spill violently onto the streets. In the cafes, clubs and
beer-cellars of Berlin a jazzy counter-culture developed that
troubled instinctively conservative middle-class Protestant families
like the Bonhoeffers. This was the Berlin described in Christopher
Isherwood's book Goodbye to Berlin on which the musical Cabaret
was based. Isherwood's characters populate a city where wealth and
poverty live cheek by jowl in smoky nightclubs thriving on drink
and prostitution. We should remember that the word 'kitsch' is
German. Many Germans felt that the Weimar Republic was
presiding over an unprecedented period of moral decline emblema-
tized by growing numbers of women smoking in public, wearing
their hair short and doubtless using contraceptives!
The party passed Bonhoeffer by. All indicators pointed towards
an academic career for him, but Bonhoeffer felt at least as strongly
drawn to the ministry of preaching and pastoral care. At the
beginning of 1928 he took a post as assistant Minister of the German
congregation in Barcelona. He took to congregational life and to
Spain; he even relished bullfighting. But, though invited to remain,
he returned to Berlin early in 1929. Partly to pursue his genuine
theological interests, and partly to evade attendance at his regional
church's preacher's seminary, he began work on his Habilitation,
the post-doctoral degree that would qualify him as a university
lecturer. Alongside his research and writing he took a job as a
voluntary assistant lecturer in the Berlin faculty. He submitted his
second dissertation, Act and Being, in 1930. Both this and
Sanctorum Communio were subsequently published, though with a
signal lack of success.

New York
In September Bonhoeffer travelled to the United States to take up a
scholarship at Union Seminary in New York. At least as much as his

19
 BONHOEFFER

previous years of study, life at Union shaped Bonhoeffer's outlook

on life. In some of his papers and lectures, even taking into account
that he is writing in a newly acquired language, Bonhoeffer seems
over-earnest. America really was an alien land that took some
getting used to: he apparently failed his driving test because he
refused to pay the normal bribe to the examiner. The theological
foundations and perspectives of American student peers were
typically very different to his own rigorous Berlin education; he
winced as fellow students laughed when Luther was quoted in
lectures. But in the Frenchman, Jean Lasserre, Bonhoeffer first
encountered a Christian pacifism that would constitute a prominent
theme in his writings for the following decade. With Lasserre
Bonhoeffer watched the film version of Remarque's All Quiet on the
Western Front; the German and the Frenchman were united in
disgust for the manner in which the American audience trivialized
what was for them both a gut-wrenching story. Bonhoeffer preferred
the 'Negro' churches of Harlem to the alternatives because he
thought that the gospel was authentically preached in them; he
participated in youth work in a Harlem church there with a fellow
Union student, Frank Fisher. He was struck by the ways in which
'the social gospel' was taught and preached in the United States,
particularly by his teacher at Union, Reinhold Niebuhr. But though
he applauded the attempt to relate the gospel to social and political
life - still very rare in Germany - hisfinaljudgement on American
Christianity was that it amounted to 'Protestantism without
Reformation'.

Work

Bonhoeffer's return to Germany in 1931 marked the beginning of

his life as a teacher and a pastor. In the summer of 1931 he attended
an Ecumenical conference in Cambridge. At first, his involvement in
the nascent ecumenical movement was relatively insignificant, but it
came to occupy a central part in his life with the onset of the church
struggle. He was ordained in November - an event to which at the
time he attached little significance - and assigned to a student
chaplaincy at the technical college in Charlottenburg; it was not a
ministry that proved fruitful. He was at the time, as Eberhard Bethge
put it, a systematic theologian 'searching for the preacher' (DB 182).
Bethge believes that Bonhoeffer underwent a transformation at this
stage from being a theologian to being a Christian.12 In a letter of
1936 Bonhoeffer described how, at this stage, 'something happened,

20
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

something that has changed and transformed my life to the present

day. For the first time I discovered the Bible ... I had often preached,
I had seen a great deal of the church, spoken and preached about it
- but I had not yet become a Christian' (DB 205).
Germany in 1932 was a country in economic and political chaos.
The German economy had been hit badly by the sudden withdrawal
of international capital following the Wall Street crash in October
1929. Between 1929 and 1932 industrial production in Germany fell
by 42 per cent.13 The German banks collapsed in 1931. As a
symptom of economic uncertainty unemployment, at 1.3 million in
1929, rose to over 6 million by the beginning of 1933, and even this
figure, one in three of the working population, is likely to be an
underestimate of families affected.14 The payment of unemployment
benefits by those in work to those out of work could not be
sustained, and failure to find a solution led in March 1930 to the
abandonment of parliamentary government and to the direct
appointment of a cabinet by the President. To some extent the chaos
suited the old military, political and business elites as it fitted with
their aim of bringing an end to Germany's payment of war repara-
tions. But the inability of the centre parties and of the Social
Democrats to address unemployment led to popular disillusionment
with parliamentary democracy and a willingness to try extreme
solutions. The Communist Party was the main political beneficiary,
but the situation also made the Nazis more plausible. In the 1928
elections the NSDAP (the Nazi Party) achieved just 2.6 per cent of
the vote, but in September 1930 they become the second largest
party in the Reichstag with 107 deputies. In July 1932 the NSDAP
gained 230 seats, though this was eroded in elections in November
of the same year. Significantly as context for Bonhoeffer's lectures,
the middle classes were just as disillusioned with politics as young
working men and women: support for the NSDAP among university
students was disproportionately high, and this was particularly true
of theology students.15 Indeed, at the root of Nazi success was its
claim that while other parties represented interest groups - the
Communists and Social Democrats for the workers; the Centre Party
for Catholics; the Liberals for businessmen - their party was a party
for all Germans. The failure to govern by Germany's traditional
elites and the momentum of Nazi electoral successes persuaded
President Hindenburg to appoint Hitler Chancellor on 30 January
1933. Thereafter, Hitler moved swiftly to consolidate his power.
Using the Reichstag fire as a pretext - Bonhoeffer's father would
later write the psychological report on the man accused of starting it

21
 BONHOEFFER

- Hitler declared a state of emergency, and on 23 March, after

considerable intimidation, he passed the Enabling Laws allowing
him to govern without recourse to parliamentary approval. A year
later the first concentration camp opened at Dachau, providing the
state with the option of detaining opponents without full process of
the law. On 30 June, 'the night of the long knives', Hitler acted to
remove any potential opposition within the Party and the country.
When President Hindenberg died in the summer of 1934 it was an
easy matter for Hitler to abolish the post and require the armed
forces to swear allegiance to him instead. It had taken Hitler a couple
of years to step from the political fringe to a position of unassailable
and apparently permanent power.
These political events were taking place literally outside the door
of Bonhoeffer's lecture theatre and exposed fundamental questions
of political life: in a setting where democracy appeared to have
failed where was political authority to derive from? What is the
proper nature of power and what the nature of authority? Events also
exposed theological questions concerning the role of the Church in
politics. As a privatdozent (an authorized lecturer not on the Faculty
payroll) Bonhoeffer had a free hand in choosing what he taught. His
choices had to be registered, but he was not constrained overmuch
by the oversight of his Faculty. In the summer of 1932 he lectured
on 'The nature of the church' and led a seminar on the topic 'Is there
a Christian ethic?' During the winter Bonhoeffer lectured on 'Recent
Theology', and led a seminar on 'Dogmatics: Problems of a
theological anthropology'. He also gave a series of lectures on
Genesis 1-3. Bonhoeffer was pressed by students to publish the text
of his lectures and did so under the title Creation and Fall. It is the
only series of lectures Bonhoeffer gave in his two years as a lecturer
in Berlin to survive in Bonhoeffer's own words; his other lectures,
including his lectures in the summer semester of 1933 on
Christology, survive only in notes taken by students.
Bonhoeffer's lectures on Creation and Fall effected a new
theological engagement with politics. On 1 February 1933, two days
after the Berlin crowds had enthusiastically acclaimed Hitler's
appointment as Reich Chancellor, Bonhoeffer gave a radio
broadcast on 'The Younger Generation's Altered View of the
Concept of the Fuhrer\ a topic he had planned before Hitler
assumed power. The politically controversial nature of the address
may be the reason it was cut off before Bonhoeffer had finished
speaking. It was not the loss of democracy that troubled Bonhoeffer
in the collapse of the Weimar constitution, but the loss of the law,

22
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

the loss of the limits that constrain office holders in the exercise of
their authority. Bonhoeffer's anxiety was that the Fiihrer - leader -
was becoming a verfuhrer - a misleader - for the younger gener-
ation. Bonhoeffer also recognized that anti-Semitism was central to
Nazi ideology, and this too disturbed him. In Germany, clergy were
regarded in a sense as civil servants. When the Nazis introduced
legislation to ban Jews, and those of Jewish origin, from holding an
appointment as a civil servant they also attempted to impose this
'Aryan Paragraph' on the Church. For Bonhoeffer, erecting a racial
criterion for participation in the Church created a 'status confes-
sionisS that is it confronted the Church with a theological heresy so
significant that Christians could not accept it without denying their
confession that Jesus Christ is Lord. A Church that accepted such a
policy removed itself from God's blessing.16 His views set him on a
collision course with the Nazi state.

The Church struggle

At this stage in Bonhoeffer's life the 'Church struggle' as it has
become known, began increasingly to absorb his energies. The
struggle within the German Protestant churches, and between the
churches and the Nazi State, was involved, complex, and is too
infrequently explained to English speakers new to Bonhoeffer's life.
When Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor in 1933 there were 28
regional Evangelical (i.e. Protestant) Churches in Germany that
before German unification had each been national Churches. Some
were purely Lutheran in church tradition, others Reformed; some,
like Bonhoeffer's regional Church in Prussia, united Lutheran and
Reformed traditions. In some regions, particularly in southern
Germany, Catholics were in the majority, in others, particularly in
the north, Protestants were in a majority. Adolf Hitler lacked
patience with German Protestantism and understood it even less. But
Hitler, by birth an Austrian Catholic, understood from Fascists in
Italy, to whom he initially looked up, the importance of 'neutering'
Catholic opposition. This was particularly significant in Germany
where the lay Catholic Centre Party provided a significant political
and electoral obstacle to Nazi ambitions. In the 1920 programme of
the Nazi party, declared unalterable by Hitler in 1926, Article 24 had
guaranteed 'freedom for all religious confessions in the state' and
gone even further in stating that the 'Party as such stands for a
positive Christianity, without binding itself denominationally to a
particular confession'. This note of'positive Christianity' contrasted

23
 BONHOEFFER

with the overt hostility of the Communists and the ambivalence of

the Social Democrats towards Christian religion.
In 1933 the Nazis negotiated a Reich Concordat with the Vatican
over the heads of the German Catholic Bishops, who had previously
banned Catholics from Nazi Party membership. The Catholic Centre
Party was disbanded as a condition of the agreement. The Vatican
Secretary of State, Eugenio Pacelli, who became Pope Pius XII in
1939, led the Vatican negotiations. By 1933 the Nazi policy of
'gleichschaltung' - coordination - was in full swing: all organiz-
ations from sports clubs to boy scout troops were coming under the
National Socialist movement either voluntarily or by force.
Predictably Hitler wanted the regional Protestant Churches also to
fall in line, and unification of the regional Churches under one Reich
Bishop was the obvious way to begin this process. The Free
Churches (i.e. Protestant churches who were not historically national
churches), who made up a relatively minor proportion of Christians
in Germany, maintained their nominal independence by agreeing to
all the state's demands. But opinion within the regional Churches
was mixed. At one end of the spectrum of opinion were those like
Bonhoeffer who opposed state interference in church life as a matter
of theological principle (not all of these were anti-Nazi); at the
opposite end of the spectrum others felt that the national reform the
Nazis were leading presaged a necessary reform of the Church and
therefore supported Nazi plans. The struggle focused on elections
for the office of Reich Bishop and Church Parties were formed as
vehicles for these poles of opinion.
The pro-Nazi Church Party called themselves the Deutsche
Christen — German Christians (sometimes abbreviated as DC). A
1933 manifesto for Church elections embodies their self-perception:

The German Christians are Jesus Christ's S.A. [i.e.

Sturmabteilung - Brownshirts] ... They march with this
watchword: Germany, through Christ, a people of God ... Even
as the National-Socialistic movement for freedom is the plant-
cell of a new nation and marches towards the goal 'There must
become one German nation', so the German Christians are
called to be the plant-cell of the new German Evangelical
Church, and they march towards the goal There must become
one church'.17

The regional Churches were very largely led by men in their

sixties and seventies, while German Christian candidates for high

24
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

ecclesiastical office were often much younger, contributing to the

impression that the German Christians were vigorous and revol-
utionary. The 'opposition' was slower to materialize. A Young
Reformers Movement, which Bonhoeffer signed up to, had
emerged early on but petered out. In September 1933 a Pastors'
Emergency League was formed led by the Dahlem Pastor Martin
Niemoller. Niemoller had been a U-boat commander in the first
war, was highly decorated, and had at first supported the Nazis: his
decision now to lead the church opposition contributed to its credi-
bility. Bonhoeffer was very junior by comparison, but was
nonetheless one of the nucleus of Berlin clergy around whom the
Emergency league coalesced. They were united in opposition but
split by competing ideas and motivation.
Two candidates emerged from the two church groups for the post
of Reich Bishop. Ludwig Miiller was a military chaplain who had
inveigled himself into an appointment as Hitler's personal represen-
tative in Protestant Church affairs. The Fiihrer's nod was as good as
a wink for the German Christians and Miiller, who had few personal
qualities otherwise to recommend him, soon became their candidate.
To oppose him the Emergency League persuaded Friedrich von
Bodelschwingh, director of a community for the disabled in Bethel,
and a man of irreproachable personal integrity. Representatives of
regional churches and church bodies in a complex Electoral College
cast votes and somewhat to everyone's surprise Bodelschwingh was
overwhelmingly elected. This marked the high point of Protestant
opposition to Hitler, whose wishes had been ignored. But the
appearance of united opposition to Hitler's plans for the Protestant
churches proved illusory. The German Christians disputed
Bodelschwingh's election on technical grounds and within days his
authority was being undermined. Bodelschwingh had no stomach
for a fight characterized by shameful German Christian animus
towards him and he resigned. In the elections that followed Miiller
was elected Reich Bishop.
It is easy to get the impression from all this, and from
Bonhoeffer's letters and papers from this period, that the 'German
Church Struggle' involved all Protestant Christians in a bitter, time-
consuming controversy. To be sure, by January 1934 the Pastors'
Emergency League had 7000 members nationally, a significant
proportion of the total number of ordained Protestant clergy. The
Church historian Manfred Gailus gives a detailed picture of the
extent of the Church opposition in Bonhoeffer's regional Church in
Berlin:

25
 BONHOEFFER

[O]f 565 pastors with a congregation in Berlin during the Nazi

period, a church-political orientation could be determined for
509. Of these, 44 per cent belonged to the DC camp either
throughout or for part of the period. A good 36 per cent belonged
to the opposite BK [i.e. Confessing Church] camp.18

The remainder oscillated between the two sides or deliberately kept

out of 'church polities'. Yet while a high proportion of clergy were
involved, a relatively small proportion of church members for whom
an affiliation can be discerned took any part. At the height of the
conflict, from 1936 to 1939, Confessing Church groups in Berlin's
147 parishes probably involved around 36,000 people (compared
with 50,000 members aligned to the German Christians). At least
three quarters of Confessing Church members in Berlin were women,
though the twenty member Berlin leadership body had no women
members. The whole church struggle was waged, at least in Berlin,
by minorities amongst the church's members. Based on the church
elections in the summer of 1933, the affiliation of 131 of Berlin's 147
parishes can be ascribed: 34 parishes were basically Nazified; 21
were prepared to conform to the German Christian plans; 68 were
split between the two poles of the conflict and at most eight parishes
were 'resistant', i.e. clearly aligned with the church opposition.19
Shortly after the apparent success of the German Christians in the
election of Ludwig Miiller they scored a damaging own goal. A
keynote address on 13 November 1933 at a German Christian rally
held in the Berlin Sports Palace called for the Old Testament to be
scrapped, for the 'scapegoat and inferiority theology of the rabbi
Paul' to be excised from the Church, and allegiance declared to
Jesus Christ as a heroic Aryan type. Widespread resignations from
the movement followed. In spite of this setback, German Christians
in many regional churches held key appointments or were in
majorities on decision-making bodies. To focus opposition into a
'Confessing Church' Bonhoeffer was asked, with a colleague, to
draft a confession of faith, a statement that might summarize and
express the heart of theological opposition. But when Bonhoeffer
presented the document to the representatives who had
commissioned it they insisted on redrafting the more 'controversial'
sections on the Old Testament and the Jews with the result that, from
Bonhoeffer's perspective, the statement was eviscerated. He refused
to sign, and his disillusionment was a contributory factor behind his
decision to take up the Parish minister's job in London in October
1933. A year later Karl Barth had greater success with drafting a

26
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

statement for a Confessing Church Synod held at Barmen. The

Barmen Declaration finally gave the disparate Confessing groups a
theological foundation with Christ as its cornerstone. It was
followed by a second synod at Dahlem, which drew out some of the
practical and legal consequences. In the nascent international
ecumenical movement Bonhoeffer, a 'youth delegate', consistently
urged Church leaders to recognize the Confessing Church in
Germany as the only Protestant Church. He was to be disappointed:
the ecumenical movement attempted to appear impartial and invited
representatives of both 'churches' to meetings, as though the
Confessing Church were a new breakaway denomination. To
Bonhoeffer this badly missed the theological point, which was that
the Confessing Church had not 'left' the German national Church; it
was the national Church, and the German Christians had set
themselves outside the Church and beyond the salvation of Christ.
Though during Bonhoeffer's two years as a lecturer in Berlin he
had become increasingly involved both in the ecumenical movement
and in opposition to state interference in church life, he had not lost
his thirst for international travel or his sense of calling to a ministry
of preaching and pastoral care. He became interested in the non-
violent political action advocated by Gandhi and through George
Bell, Bishop of Chichester, whom Bonhoeffer had met in the context
of the ecumenical movement, he explored the possibility of living at
Gandhi's Ashram - an unfulfilled ambition he did not give up until
1935. In October 1933 he took a job as Pastor to two German-
speaking congregations in London, living in Forest Gate in south
London. Bonhoeffer thrived on local church life but the Confessing
Church needed him at home and he returned in April 1935.

Seminary Director
Preacher's seminaries were a recent innovation in Germany. Pastors
undertook theological studies in a university setting and, in the past,
were ordained with little training in preaching and pastoral care. The
seminary Bonhoeffer was appointed to direct was one of five estab-
lished in 1934 and 1935 by his regional Church, the Old Prussian
Council of Brethren, now severely disrupted by the Church struggle.
Bonhoeffer held this post until his death, though he was later techni-
cally 'on leave'. The seminary was an uncertain venture: students
relied on gifts to pay their expenses and there was no certainty that
'graduates' could be placed in pastorates. The seminary met first in
Zingst and later in Finkenwalde near Stettin (now Szczecin in

27
 BONHOEFFER

Poland). Bonhoeffer's attempts to integrate academic theology with

Christian community living and practical preparation for ministry
seemed strange, at first, to students used to academic study alone. A
good sense of life in the seminary can be gleaned from the two books
Bonhoeffer wrote at Finkenwalde: Discipleship (1937) and Life
Together (1939), both discussed in Chapter 6. Bonhoeffer's lectures
on 'discipleship' were also delivered at the Faculty in Berlin; they
were the last lectures Bonhoeffer gave there before his licence to
teach in the university was withdrawn in August 1936.
Alongside the seminary Bonhoeffer established a 'House of
Brethren', in which half a dozen course 'graduates' lived who each
held local church posts. The House of Brethren was intended to
model a community of proclamation and communal living and to
offer a retreat centre for working pastors in the Confessing Church.
But very soon a noose began to tighten around the life of the
seminary and the House of Brethren. Five groups of students
undertook their course at the seminary before the Gestapo closed the
seminary in September 1937. The House of Brethren was disbanded
a short while after. In place of the seminary Bonhoeffer established
a number of 'collective pastorates' in which ministerial candidates
could be placed in 'apprenticeships' with sympathetic pastors, but
still be guided by him in their training. Bonhoeffer diligently
maintained links with former students and their families; many had
run into difficulties with the Police. This was a frustrating time for
Bonhoeffer, who no longer had a settled base from which to work.
In January 1938 he was questioned by the Gestapo following a
church meeting in Berlin, put on a train out of the city, and
prohibited from returning. Bonhoeffer found ways around the ban
but he had to be cautious.
In 1938 the dark shadow of Nazi ambitions spread over Germany
and over Europe. In March German troops marched into Austria,
whose Government instructed the Austrian Army to offer no
resistance. Austrians greeted the Anschluss with widespread enthu-
siasm.20 Throughout the year Hitler skilfully manipulated the
European powers. Possibly blinded to the true nature of Nazi objec-
tives, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain agreed
Hitler's aims at a conference in Munich, claiming the agreement
guaranteed 'peace in our time'. Under this agreement Germany
annexed the Sudetenland across its south-eastern border ostensibly
to protect the interests of the German speakers there; by the
following year Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia had become
German protectorates. Within Germany there was an increase in

28
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

anti-Semitic actions climaxing on 9 November 1938 with

4
Kristallnacht\ the night of broken glass when Nazi activists and
German sympathizers burned Synagogues, looted Jewish-owned
shops and businesses, and enacted violence on Jews. In his Bible
Bonhoeffer wrote the date of Kristallnacht beside Psalm 74:8: 'they
burned all the meeting places of God in the land'. Bonhoeffer was
one of a very few within the Confessing Church who considered
solidarity with the Jews, and not just Jews who had converted to
Christianity, a matter on which the Church must stake its life. The
Church in Germany had proved incapable of effective resistance to
the Nazis; he would have to look elsewhere now for a means by
which to act. A split had become apparent in the Confessing Church
between regional Lutheran churches, that were more or less free of
German Christians and of state interference, and Confessing
Christians in divided regional Churches such as Prussia. The split
contributed, in the wake of a solidification of Nazi social control, to
the Confessing Church's growing tendency to turn in on itself, as if
it was enough to preserve its own institutional interests while
leaving the state a free hand in all other matters, such as persecution
of the Jews. This tendency was even more pronounced following the
controversial trial of Martin Niemoller in March 1938. When he was
effectively acquitted of alleged subversive activities, Hitler inter-
vened to intern Niemoller as a personal prisoner of the Fiihrer. He
remained in a concentration camp until the end of war.

Double agent
Thus disillusioned, in 1938 Bonhoeffer made first contact with a hub
of anti-Nazi sentiment in the Abwehr, the German military intelli-
gence agency, where his brother-in-law, Hans von Dohnanyi was a
senior legal advisor. He sensed that if he stayed in Germany he
would feel it necessary to be drawn into the conspiracy against
Hitler: it was a far from natural course of action for a pastor and a
theologian who had advanced Christian pacifism. He made a will. In
March and April 1939 Bonhoeffer travelled to England to nurture
his ecumenical contacts; he took the opportunity to put out feelers
towards America. In May, as he had been dreading, his call-up for
military service reached him. Made aware of his dilemmas
American friends contrived an invitation for him to travel to the
United States. A number of possible options were set in motion
including lecturing, or a job as pastor to German refugees. Again
travelling via England he reached New York in June. But his

29
 BONHOEFFER

uneasiness with this route to the future had deepened. On 22 June

Bonhoeffer wrote in his diary: 'To be here during a catastrophe is
simply unthinkable, unless things are so ordained. But to be guilty
of it myself, and to have to reproach myself that I left unnecessarily,
is certainly devastating.' On 28 June he added: 'I cannot imagine
that it is God's will for me to remain here without anything
particular to do in case of war. I must travel at the first possible
opportunity' (DB 656). He came to a decision: in July he wrote to
his sponsor Reinhold Niebuhr:

I have made a mistake in coming to America. I must live through

this difficult period in our national history with the Christian
people of Germany. I will have no right to participate in the
reconstruction of Christian life in Germany after the war if I do
not share in the trials of this time with my people ... Christians in
Germany will face the terrible alternative of either willing the
defeat of their nation in order that Christian civilization may
survive, or willing the victory of their nation and thereby
destroying our civilization. I know which of these alternatives I
must choose; but I cannot make that choice in security. (DB 655)

No amount of urging from Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Lehmann

could change his mind. Lehmann accompanied him on board the
ship to Britain still trying to keep Bonhoeffer back. He left New
York on 7 July; on the 27th he was home in Berlin. The German
invasion of Poland began on 1 September and Europe was again at
war.
The initial progress of the German army was astonishing. Poland
fell in under three weeks and was partitioned with the collusion of
the Soviet Union. By May 1940 Norway, Holland and Belgium were
under German occupation. Germany had spent most of the First
World War bogged down in Belgian and French mud; the surrender
of France in the summer of 1940 seemed to right all the wrongs of
the conflict a generation earlier. When news of the French surrender
was announced over the radio Bonhoeffer and Eberhard Bethge
were in a cafe in Memel. The crowd was jubilant and to Bethge's
surprise Bonhoeffer joined them in giving the Hitler salute: 'we shall
have to run risks for very different things now, but not for that
salute' he explained. History was being made; people were dying
and Bonhoeffer was giving Bible studies to German villagers: he
needed to act and doors were closing all around. In 1940 the Gestapo
closed down the Collective Pastorates and Bonhoeffer was out of a

30
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

job. In March 1941 he was forbidden to publish because of his

'subversive activities'. In order to avoid conscription and to situate
himself within the anti-Nazi conspiracy, Bonhoeffer became a
civilian member of the German Military Intelligence, who justified
his role on the basis that his international ecumenical contacts
yielded useful information. It was a strange moment to join the
conspiracy. Before the war many German generals had treated
Hitler's predictions of rapid success with scepticism: with Corporal
Hitler proved right so spectacularly the possibility of a military coup
for the moment passed. Removing Hitler would be a long game.
Upon the outbreak of war a kind of rapprochement took place
between the churches and the Nazi state, as many who had
previously doubted the regime patriotically put themselves behind
the war effort. For their part, the Nazis were content to bide their
time in relation to Christianity. Josef Goebbels, Hitler's 'Minister of
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda' recorded in a diary entry in
1939 the true nature of Nazi policy towards the churches in wartime:

The best way to deal with the churches is to claim to be a positive

Christian ... the technique must be to hold back for the present
and coolly strangle any attempts at impudence or interference in
the affairs of the state ... He [Hitler] views Christianity as a
symptom of decay. Rightly so. It is a branch of the Jewish race.

The policy, in other words, was to permit a certain freedom to the

churches during wartime with the intention of crushing them when
victory was complete. Yet the war also revealed the criminal
character of the Nazis more clearly, and this resulted in the one
confrontation of church and state that had genuinely successful
results. This was when, after war began, a euthanasia programme
was initiated to kill off people considered an unnecessary drain on
the nation's resources in war: these included the mentally disabled,
the severely mentally ill, those with extreme dementia or epilepsy,
as well as some with physical disability. The method was to order a
transfer of a patient or group of patients to another unnamed insti-
tution. Soon after a note would inform relatives that the patient had
died. Church-based institutions carried out a good deal of care and
treatment for people in these 'categories', and it was apparent, even
to the most credulous, that a large number of people were being
murdered. Opposition to the programme had evidence that was
difficult to reftite; confronted in this way the state called off the
programme at the end of 1941, shortly before the Wannsee

31
 BONHOEFFER

Conference, which initiated the 'Final Solution' of the Jewish

'problem'.
Bonhoeffer's life as an agent of the Military Intelligence left him
plenty of time to think, and the period from mid-1940 to his arrest in
1943 was theologically among the most fruitful of his life.
Bonhoeffer turned his attention once more to ethics, which enabled
him to integrate theology with the events in which he was engaged;
the results, fragmentary and brilliant, are discussed in Chapter 7. His
strengthening theological hold on daily life corresponded with a
momentous personal development when in January 1943
Bonhoeffer became engaged, secretly at first because she was only
eighteen years old, to Maria von Wedemeyer. Maria's grandmother
was one of Bonhoeffer's most ardent supporters during his
Directorship of the seminary and the pastorates; her father and
brother were army officers killed in the war. It was an unusual
alliance; intense, life-giving and strained by the war and the
conspiracy, his involvement in which Bonhoeffer did not fully
disclose.21 On behalf of Military Intelligence Bonhoeffer travelled
three times to Switzerland, twice to Sweden, and once to Norway
during 1941 and 1942. But in spite of all the care and caution taken
by the conspirators within Military Intelligence, tracks had been left.
In 1942 the Gestapo began investigating Abwehr activities. Von
Dohnanyi received a warning that his telephone and post were under
surveillance; a routine request for a visa for Dietrich went
unanswered. On 5 April 1943 Bonhoeffer, who was working on his
ethics at his parents' house in Berlin, telephoned his sister Christine
von Dohnanyi and a stranger answered. Dietrich knew at once that
the man was a Gestapo officer. He cleared his desk and went next
door to his sister Ursula's and ate a good meal. Shortly after his
father came to tell him that 'there are two men wanting to speak to
you upstairs in your room'.

Imprisonment

Tegel was a military interrogation prison and though a civilian,

Bonhoeffer was held there as a member of the Abwehr. Bonhoeffer's
first days there were grim. Mentally he had prepared himself for this
moment, but his isolation and the conditions penetrated his soul. He
was unaccustomed to incivility and brutality. At this early stage his
investigators did not suspect his involvement in a plot to assassinate
the Fiihrer. When he was finally charged, it was with 'subversion of
the armed forces' because he had 'evaded' conscription and helped

32
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

at least one other to do so. The Abwehr was also under investigation
for its role in an operation, in which Bonhoeffer was personally
involved, smuggling Jews to Switzerland. Bonhoeffer's relative
Lieutenant General Paul von Hase - who would later pay with his
life for his own involvement in the resistance - was military
governor of Berlin and visited him in the prison with several bottles
of wine and pointedly talked and laughed with his nephew. After the
visit Bonhoeffer was treated with more respect. As the months of
Bonhoeffer's imprisonment wore on he adapted to the routine. His
family brought him food, clothes, books and tobacco. He exercised,
read extensively and tried his hand at writing poetry, a play and a
novel. A sympathetic guard smuggled letters in and out of his cell;
by this avenue we have the correspondence published after the war
as Bonhoeffer's Letters and Papers from Prison. In prison
Bonhoeffer was as much in danger from allied bombing as from the
investigation; he lost patience with others' fear - and he lost a friend
to a direct hit.
In July 1944 an assassination attempt was made on Hitler's life.
Bonhoeffer knew it was coming and his smuggled letters reflect both
his patience and impatience to know the outcome. In October 1944
evidence came to light linking him with the attempted assassination.
He was transferred to the Gestapo prison in Prinz Albrecht Strasse
and his links with family and friends were abruptly ended. In
February 1945 Bonhoeffer was moved again, this time to the
Buchenwald concentration camp, then to Regensburg and
Schonberg. He developed relationships with those who shared his
confinement and journeys. One, British officer Payne Best, later
recalled that Bonhoeffer never complained but was, rather, 'quite
calm and normal; seemingly perfectly at his ease ... his soul really
shone in the dark desperation of our prison'. With a Soviet prisoner,
Kokorin - a nephew of Molotov - Bonhoeffer learned Russian in
exchange for lessons in the rudiments of Christian theology. On the
Sunday after Easter a group of fellow prisoners asked Bonhoeffer to
conduct a service for them. At first he was reluctant in deference to
the Catholics and Atheists among the group, but when Kokorin
approved, he agreed. He explained the texts for the day 'With his
wounds we are healed' (Isaiah 53:5) and 'Blessed be the God and
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ! By his great mercy we have been
born anew to a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ
from the dead' (1 Peter 1:3). When news spread to other groups that
he had led worship, they wanted him to repeat it for them, but there
was no time. A call came for 'Prisoner Bonhoeffer'. He knew what

33
 BONHOEFFER

it meant and wrote his name and address in a book he had with him
as evidence of his final movements for his family. He asked Payne
Best to pass a message to George Bell: 'this is the end - for me the
beginning of life'.
Bonhoeffer was transferred to Flossenbiirg concentration camp.
A personal order from Hitler had condemned him a few days earlier
and had now caught up with him. During the night Bonhoeffer and
others from the Abwehr including Admiral Canaris and Brigadier
General Oster were summarily tried. At dawn they were ordered to
undress. The SS camp doctor - present to certify death - later
reported that before he complied Bonhoeffer knelt and prayed. At
the gallows he again prayed before composedly climbing the steps.
The bodies and possessions of those executed were burned. His
brother-in-law Hans von Dohnanyi was killed the same day at
Sachsenhausen; on 23 April his brother Klaus and brother-in-law
Riidiger Schleicher were executed. On 30 April Adolf Hitler did
what the conspirators had failed to do and ended his own life.

The conspiracy to assassinate Hitler

In writing of the German opposition to Adolf Hitler, as Alan Bullock
has rightly noted, there is a danger 'of giving altogether too sharp a
picture of what was essentially a number of small, loosely connected
groups, fluctuating in membership, with no common organization
and no common purpose other than their hostility to the existing
regime'.22 The circumstances of conspiracy made it difficult for
individuals and groups to coordinate their actions and contributed to
the insular and individualistic character of the resistance. But even
taking into account evident differences of political opinion among
the conspirators it is fair to say, as Mary Fulbrook does, that 'most
of them were essentially anti-democratic in outlook. They wanted an
authoritarian government run by elites, and not a return to the sort of
constitution embodied in the Weimar Republic; they disliked the
idea of mass participation in government, and had little conception
of the need for popular legitimation of a new government.'23
Bonhoeffer's own role was relatively minor compared to that of
Hans von Dohnanyi, his brother-in-law. Yet he knew a great many
details of the conspiracy, more than enough fatally to incriminate
himself and many others. The demands of coordinating his evidence
to the investigating magistrate with that of his colleagues in order to
conceal the conspiracy while adequately defending himself against
the lesser charges on which he was initially arrested were immense.

34
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

Before his arrest the Abwehr protected him from conscription. With
his Abwehr passport he was able to travel to neutral and occupied
countries, and through his ecumenical contacts encourage churchly
resistance to Nazi policy. On one of these trips, Bonhoeffer travelled
with Helmut Count von Moltke, the central figure in the 'Kreisau
Circle', an 'adjacent' resistance group to that in the Abwehr. Von
Moltke's motivation, like Bonhoeffer's, arose from deep Christian
convictions, but von Moltke did not approve of assassination as a
means to their common objectives. In May 1942 Bonhoeffer and his
clerical colleague Hans Schonfeld, met Bishop George Bell in
Stockholm and through him passed a message to the British Foreign
Secretary, Anthony Eden, sounding him out on the Allied response
to a potential coup. Eden replied to Bell's report on the meeting that
he was 'satisfied that it was not in the national interest to provide an
answer of any kind'. When Bell pressed the matter again Eden made
a marginal note on his draft reply that 'I see no reason whatsoever to
encourage this pestilent priest'.24 It is difficult to see how the Allies
could have reacted any differently and there is a jarring naivety in
Bonhoeffer's hope that they might. But the circle of which Dietrich
Bonhoeffer was a member came closest of all the resistance groups
to succeeding. The bomb placed by von Stauffenberg beneath a table
in the 'Wolf's Lair' at Rastenberg devastated the room; its force
blew Hitler's clothes from him, but left him relatively unharmed.
Even then, the coup might have won through, but matters slipped out
of the conspirators' hands, and the Nazis were in full control by the
following day.
Joachim Fest raises the question of what, had it succeeded, the
bomb plot would have achieved, and draws the 'sobering'
conclusion that 'nothing would have changed. The Allies would not
have altered their aims, abandoning their demand for unconditional
surrender, nor would they have modified the decision made later at
Yalta to occupy and divide Germany'.25 Yet, as Fest also notes, the
stakes proved tragically high as a ceasefire in July 1944 had the
potential to save a great many German lives — to say nothing of
others' lives: from the outbreak of war up to July 1944 2.8 million
German soldiers and civilians died, while from July 1944 until the
end of the war in Europe 4.8 million were killed.26 The day after the
assassination attempt had failed Bonhoeffer's brother Klaus, Emmi
his wife and her brother Justus Delbriick were clearing bomb
wreckage from a friend's house when Emmi asked the men what
lesson they drew from the failure of the plot. Delbriick's reply, as
Fest observes, captures the pathos and paradox of the resistance: 'I

35
 BONHOEFFER

think it was good that it happened, and good too, perhaps, that it did
not succeed'.27 Bonhoeffer's own assessment of the failure of the
conspiracy and of the Church was harsher. But towards women and
men of such courage, ultimately Brecht's request should surely be
granted:

Remember
When you speak of our failings ...

Think of us
With forbearance.

Notes
1 'To Those Born Later', Bertolt Brecht, tr. John Willet et.al, in Voices of
Conscience: Poetry from Oppression, eds H. Cronyn, R. McKane and S. Watts,
Iron Press, 1995, pp. 23-4.
2 A History of London, Stephen Inwood, Macmillan, London, 1998, pp. 774-80.
3 'The British Museum Reading Room', in Louis MacNeice: Collected Poems,
Faber&Faber, 1979.
4 / Shall Bear Witness: The diaries of Viktor Klemperer 1933-41, Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1998.
5 DBWG\3,pp. 34-5.
6 DBWG 15, pp. 243-53.
7 History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s,
Timothy Garton Ash, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1999.
8 A Concise History of Germany, Mary Fulbrook, Cambridge University Press,
updated edition, 1995, p. 138.
9 See 'Overwhelmed by their own fascination with "the ideas of 1933": Berlin's
Protestant Social Milieu in the Third Reich', Manfred Gailus, German History,
Volume 20, No. 4, 2002, pages 462-93.
10 DWG 10, pp. 383-4.
11 DBWG 10, p. 385.
12 My view is that Bonhoeffer's life was marked by both continuity and change, and
that Bethge's influential proposal that there were two major breaks in his life (from
theologian to Christian, and later from Church to world) helpfully emphasizes
developments in Bonhoeffer's approach, but can unhelpfully obscure continuities
in his thought.
13 Hitler: 1889-1936: Hubris, Ian Kershaw, Penguin, 1998.
14 A Concise History of Germany, Mary Fulbrook, Cambridge University Press,
updated edition, 1995, Chapter 6.

36
 A LIFE IN DARK TIMES

15 Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography , Eberhard Bethge, Fortress, 2000, pp. 207-8.

16 Bonhoeffer's views on the 'Jewish Question' were much influenced by Martin
Luther and retain features that, in light of the Holocaust, justly disturb some
commentators. There is a body of literature debating Bonhoeffer and the Jews. It
is useful to note that Bonhoeffer's experience of Judaism did not include any
encounter in depth with Judaism as a living religion, but was mediated chiefly
through the New Testament and Christian theology and history.
17 Quotation from 'The Social Message of the German Christians', in The Church
Controversy in Germany, by Anders Nygren, Billing & Sons, 1934.
18 Gailus, art. cit, p. 483.
19 Gailus, art. cit., p. 474.
20 When in the early 1960s The Sound of Music was being filmed in the Austrian city
of Salzburg the city council refused a request from the producers to put up Nazi
banners in the city's main square saying that 'the people of Salzburg never
supported the Nazis'. The producers got their way by threatening to use contem-
porary newsreel footage showing the enthusiastic welcome given by Salzburgers
to the Nazi Anschluss of 1938.
21 See their correspondence in Love Letters from Cell 92, Harper Collins, London,
1994.
22 Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Alan Bullock, Pelican, 1962, p. 735.
23 Mary Fulbrook, op. cit., p. 202.
24 Plotting Hitler's Death, Joachim Fest, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1996,
p. 208.
25 Ibid., p. 342.
26 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
27 Ibid., p. 343.

37
 3

Bonhoeffer's theological
inheritance

The wish to be independent in everything is a false pride. Even

what we owe to others belongs to ourselves and is part of our own
lives, and any attempt to calculate what we have 'earned' for
ourselves and what we owe to other people is certainly not
Christian, and is, moreover, a futile undertaking. It's through
what he himself is, plus what he receives, that a man becomes a
complete entity.1

Bonhoeffer was thinking of the role of personal friendships in

shaping him, but his comment is equally true of writers who had
influenced him intellectually. Bonhoeffer was unique, yet he was
also a product; of a family, as we have seen, of an educational
system, and of key intellectual 'ancestors' whose work he tapped for
the minerals with which to nourish his own ideas. Yet his roots in the
loam of theological and philosophical traditions are not always
visible. After Bonhoeffer qualified as a university lecturer he
departed from many of the conventions of academic theology. He
did not often use the technique of writing theology by discussing the
work of other theologians. His did not use footnotes extensively. To
Bonhoeffer, writing in difficult circumstances, against the clock or
expecting imminent arrest, such practices may have seemed less
crucial than they do to most scholars. Certainly Bonhoeffer read

38
 BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGICAL INHERITANCE

widely, as for example his extant notes for the Ethics show,2 but the
theology of others interested him less for its own sake than for the
contribution it might make to thinking through the problems he
faced. The importance of theological sources cannot simply be
calculated by totting up how often he quotes them. Neither can we
estimate the significance of a source simply by proving Bonhoeffer
agreed with it. At least as important as the sources with which
Bonhoeffer fundamentally agreed are those with which he funda-
mentally disagreed; the following discussions illustrate both source
varieties.
When he died there were over 50 books on ethics in Bonhoeffer's
possession as well as sections on ethics in broader theological texts
or in collected works. To make this chapter manageable therefore
each section discusses one 'book' written by four intellectual
'ancestors' with which Bonhoeffer was familiar: a translation of the
Bible and three books. These discussions function like trenches, dug
by an archaeologist across a far larger site in the hope of uncovering
something of importance in a limited time. Whole books have been
written on Bonhoeffer's relationship to just one of these sources (for
example on Bonhoeffer and Luther). But while the choice of four
ancestors - not three or five - is arbitrary; the choice of these
particular four is not. Certainly, there were others who influenced
Bonhoeffer's theological development - for example, Heidegger,
Hegel and Dilthey and Barth - and I am not suggesting that the
sources discussed here are the only important ones, merely that they
are among the most important and that they serve to illustrate the
ways in which awareness of sources can unlock the meaning of
Bonhoeffer's writings.

Luther's Bible
The Reformer Martin Luther (1483-1546) had a greater impact on
Bonhoeffer's theology than any other individual. Yet sorting out
Luther's direct influence from that of the general milieu of
Lutheranism that permeated German theology and culture and in
which Bonhoeffer lived can be tricky. Bonhoeffer's teacher Karl
Holl had contributed, with others,3 to a renewed interest in Luther as
a theologian and had included in his teaching a strong emphasis on
Luther's ethics.
Yet a crucial point at which Luther exerts influence on
Bonhoeffer has remained virtually unexplored: Bonhoeffer's
reliance on the Luther translation of the Bible. Biblical translation

39
 BONHOEFFER

involves theological decisions that interpret, often unconsciously,

the meaning of a text. Consequently, Bonhoeffer's reliance on the
Luther Bible involved the adoption at source of theological
interpretations carried within Luther's translation. Bonhoeffer
thought it was significant that he based his exegesis upon a German
translation of the Bible: 'Anyone really concerned with the salvation
of his soul', he said in 1935, 'has found that Luther's German
version of Holy Scripture still best fulfils the demand for the presen-
tation of the Gospel in a German way. Here is Christianity which is
both present and German ...' (NRS, 305). For English speakers in
the twenty-first century, with a great choice of Bible translations, it
is hard to grasp the fact that the 'familiar Luther text' had no
competitor as a vehicle of encounter with the Word of God.
What particular qualities are embodied in Luther's translation of
the Bible? In an essay on 'Luther's German Bible' Heinz Bluhm
highlights several features which begin to answer this question.4
Bluhm attempts to encapsulate something of the 'singularly
elusive quality' of Luther's rendering of the text in the vernacular.
Luther's Bible was the first serious attempt in German to translate
directly from the original languages. Luther worked from
Erasmus's Greek New Testament of 1519. In 1517 however, while
translating seven penitential Psalms, Luther's Hebrew was still
insufficient for him to base his new rendering on the original
language. But Luther's aim was not only to produce an accurate
translation, but also a readable one. In his 'Open Letter on
Translating' (1530) he wrote in defence against Papal attacks on
his departure from the Vulgate that 'I wanted to speak German, not
Latin or Greek'. His aim resulted in the 1531 rendering in which
'the Hebrew Psalter has virtually become a German Hymnal,
actually reading in many places like original German sacred
poetry'.5 Bonhoeffer drew two conclusions from using Luther's
Bible. He noted that 'translation itself is always fatal to any
doctrine of verbal inspiration, as it is only the original text which
is inspired' (NRS, 317). More than this, the 'Germanness' of
Luther's Bible enabled him to respond to the German Christians,
who were seeking to reconstruct a set of 'German Scriptures', that
it 'still best fulfils the demand for the presentation of the Gospel in
a German way. Here is Christianity which is "both present and
German'" (DBWG 14, 403).
In theological terms far the most important feature of Luther's
translation was not the beauty of his language, but his 'rediscovery'
of the theology of Paul. His reading of Paul permeated Luther's

40
 BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGICAL INHERITANCE

translation of the Bible. Luther's own interpretation of Paul was so

decisive for him that it even functioned to an extent as a means
through which an integrative unity could be imposed on the diverse
theologies of New Testament writers. Luther's decision to re-order
the books as they occur in the New Testament provides an illus-
tration of this: by placing the letter to the Hebrews and the letter of
James after the Johannine epistles in his translation Luther hoped to
draw attention away from their strongly un-Pauline theology. More
significant was Luther's idiosyncratic wording of crucial passages.
The most notable of these is his insertion of the word 'alone' in
Romans 3:28, which in Luther became 'justification is by faith
alone'.6
Luther's translation of the Bible also embodied a further
theological insight not discussed by Bluhm but crucial in the context
of Bonhoeffer's theology in the Nazi context. Martin Luther insisted
that the person of Christ was as much revealed in the Old Testament
as in the New, and that the Old Testament was therefore equally the
Church's Scripture. In his Introduction to the Old Testament (1545)
Luther wrote that 'The ground and proof of the New Testament are
surely not to be despised, and therefore the Old Testament is to be
highly regarded'. This view underlay his commitment, paradoxical
alongside his sharp distinction between Law and Gospel, to the unity
of the Bible as God's Word. In his Preface to the Psalter Luther
argued that 'The Psalter ought to be a dear and beloved book, if only
because it promises Christ's death and resurrection so clearly, and so
typifies his kingdom and the condition and nature of all Christendom
that it might well be called a little Bible.' Luther's views of the
relationship between the Old and the New Testament raise some
difficult questions, for example about the way Christians have
'colonized' Jewish Scripture, or about reading into Scriptural texts
Christian theological perspectives the original authors cannot have
intended; similar questions are raised by Bonhoeffer's use of Old
Testament texts (as we shall see, for example, in Chapter 5). For
now, however, all I want to remark is the extent to which Dietrich
Bonhoeffer adopted Luther's understanding of Scripture - its unity,
its centrality for theology and the nature of its authority rooted in
Christ - as his own. Very often Martin Luther is the most frequently
cited source in what Bonhoeffer wrote. But even where Luther's
influence is not made explicit, it is there, not least in Bonhoeffer's
reliance on the Luther Bible. Three of the five books he published
during his lifetime appropriate biblical texts for contemporary
theological situations. He wrote extended essays on the Ten

41
 BONHOEFFER

Commandments; on the books of Ezra and Nehemiah; on the

Psalms; on the biblical account of temptation and the Lord's Prayer.
He wrote over 100 sermons and addresses on biblical texts and in
Prison wrote that he read the Bible 'above all' (LPP 26). Bonhoeffer
is unusual among twentieth-century German systematic theologians
in using the Bible so much, and even more unusual in using the Old
Testament as much as the New. Bonhoeffer's theological ethics are
a commentary on the Luther Bible.

Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of

Morals1 (hereafter Morals]
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the first major philosopher to
write in the German language and the first of the modern era to earn
a living as a professional academic. Perhaps because he was coining
a new German philosophical vocabulary his writing style is notori-
ously opaque: 'there is no art in being intelligible', Kant wrote, 'if
one renounces all thoroughness of insight' (Morals, p. 37). Kant
stood at the confluence of two streams of Enlightenment thought. In
one, Isaac Newton's (1642-1727) physics proposed a system of
laws applying to space and time. In another, empirical philosophers
such as David Hume (1711-76) argued that the only sure ground for
knowledge was what our senses experience. Formerly, the study of
the natural sciences, religion and philosophy had largely proceeded
hand in hand; increasingly many sensed a conflict between scientific
and religious forms of knowing. From Kant's perspective, religion
and philosophy were in serious trouble. Science was based on exper-
iment and observation or on Newtonian laws of the universe; in
contrast, philosophy and religion seemed to make statements that
were unfalsifiable and unproveable. Religion supposed that every
person possessed a free will. Science supposes that laws govern
events in the physical world: things don't 'just happen', they happen
because they have a cause, and science could show what those
causes were. Religion, including ethics, needed 'free will' to make
sense; but if science was right that causal explanations can be found
for all human behaviour then ethics wastes itself in discussing
choices that people actually do not have. More importantly still, in
such a world what role was left for God? These were the problems
that Kant set out to tackle.
Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,
published in 1785, fitted morality into a far grander philosophical
system. It is called metaphysic of morals because it is a 'pure' form

42
 BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGICAL INHERITANCE

of philosophical analysis rather than applied to concrete moral

problems or derived from observation of human behaviour, for
example within anthropology (Morals, 38). Kant argued that the
world is made up of what he calls 'phenomena' (the way things
appear to a perceiving subject) and 'noumena' (the way things
actually are in themselves). Kant agreed with earlier philosophers
that we only know the world as it is presented to us via the medium
of our senses, and concluded that the belief that the mind can really
know things (phenomena) in themselves is an illusion. Yet Kant did
not despair of our ability to know things or make judgements. Kant
distinguished two types of 'judgement' - 'synthetic' and 'analytic'.
A judgement is analytic if it makes sense all on its own, for example
'a father is male' or 'a square has four sides'. All other judgements
- for example 'all men are arrogant', or judgements about empirical
matters such as 'copper conducts electricity' - are synthetic: the
truth of a 'synthetic' statement, that is, is not self-evident but rests
on a 'proof not contained in the statement/judgement itself. Kant
continued that judgements are also either a priori (true by nature of
the terms used and the rules governing their use, and thus knowable
in advance of their application) or a posteriori (true according to
how things are observed in the world and knowable only after an
event as knowledge contingent upon experience). He concluded that
the judgements we make are of three types. They can be analytic and
a priori\ synthetic and a priori, or synthetic and a posteriori. For
Kant, knowledge of morals is of the second type, synthetic (i.e. it is
not self-evident) and a priori (i.e. made up of laws knowable in
advance). He therefore describes moral reason as 'practical reason'
because it derives its principles from a mind's own rational nature,
not from examples drawn from the experience of the senses (Morals,
35), and not from (pure) theoretical reasoning (Morals, 11-12). By
describing morals as a priori Kant means that all moral statements
must be timeless, unchanging, and the same for all human beings
whatever culture they belong to and whatever circumstances they
are in.
But if morals are not based on experience, on what are they based?
Kant asserts that' [n]othing can possibly be conceived in the world, or
even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except
a Good Will' (Morals, 17). The 'Good Will' is the supreme good and
condition of every other good. Obeying one's own good will,
therefore, rather than pursuing personal happiness, is the goal of
morality; in other words doing good and being happy do not necess-
arily coincide and one's personal inclinations can be a poor guide to

43
 BONHOEFFER

moral action. The important thing is not to do what one wants to do,
but to do what one should. Kant describes this as duty: 'love, as an
affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake
may' (Morals, 24). But from where does duty derive its content (i.e.
how may duty be a duty to do something specific, rather than
remaining abstract only)? Kant answers: 'from the maxim by which
it is determined'. A maxim, he continued, is a subjective principle of
the will (Morals, 24). Kant did try to bridge the gap between the
subjective will and the universal principles of morality. It is crucial
that any maxim I act on should be one I want everyone to act on. Take
promises: if I make a promise I later regret, I might wish to break my
promise because that is what suits me. But, asks Kant, what would
happen if everyone behaved like that? Promises would become
completely worthless, and society would crumble. If I want others to
keep their promises to me, I must keep my promises to them and the
rule I set myself, therefore, should be one I wish everyone to follow,
that is, it ought to be a universal law. This means a moral imperative
is a categorical imperative. Imperatives can be hypothetical, e.g. 'if
you eat lots of fruit, you will be more healthy'. But hypothetical
imperatives only tell us to do something good as a means to
something else. Kant argues that a moral imperative must be
categorical: 'It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended
result, and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental dispo-
sition, let the consequence be what it may (Morals, 44).' Of this type
there is only one: 'Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the
same time will that it should become a universal law' (Morals, 49).
The universal, moral law is thus clearly independent of any particular
social order for Kant. Monogamy may be practised in one culture,
polygamy in another, but if Kant is correct only one or the other can
be morally right. The categorical imperative also implies freedom: its
'you ought' implies the possibility of disobedience. This freedom
entails two important consequences: firstly, it is important that other
people are treated by us not as means, but as moral ends in
themselves: 'a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can
be used merely as a means, but must in all his actions be always
considered to be an end in himself (Morals, 58). This freedom
implies, secondly, that each reasoning and moral subject is
autonomous, and this is exactly Kant's conclusion, which he correctly
perceived to be an original discovery in ethics:

Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the

principle of morality, we need not wonder why they all fail. It was

44
 BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGICAL INHERITANCE

seen that man was bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed
that the laws to which he is subject are only those of his own
giving, though at the same time they are universal, and that he is
bound to act in conformity with his own will... (Morals, 61)

Kant's philosophy was revolutionary. The poet and essayist

Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) mischievously expanded Kant's own
flattering comparison of the effects of his philosophy with
Copernicus's revolutionary theories: 'Formerly reason, like the sun,
went round the world of appearances and tried to cast light on it; but
Kant makes reason, the sun, stand still, and the world of appearances
turns around it and is illuminated as it enters the realm of this sun.'8
The centre of Kant's 'moral universe' Heine hints, is not God but the
reasoning individual. If all we know are appearances we cannot
know God in himself any more than we can know anything in itself.
By demolishing all arguments for the existence of God, Heine
writes, Kant 'has stormed heaven ... the Supreme Lord of the world,
unproved, is weltering in his blood'.9 Yet after this tragic loss of the
possibility of knowing God comes farce as Kant goes on to argue
that while God cannot be proved by pure reason, He can be still be
believed in by means of practical reason. Heine's caricature is satire,
but like most satire there is truth in it. Kant 'allows' God's existence,
and with God Kant permits ethics; but we are left with a suspicion
that restoration has been achieved by philosophical sleight of hand.
Kant was still a dominant force in philosophy and ethics when
Bonhoeffer was a student. As well as reading Kant's own books,
many of the ethical textbooks from which Bonhoeffer read took
Kant as the central authority.10 Yet Bonhoeffer was from his earliest
student period keen to challenge Kant's dominance in Protestant
ethics, and for two key reasons. Firstly, Bonhoeffer believed, Kant
had been mistaken in placing the reasoning mind of the individual at
the centre of the study of ethics. For Bonhoeffer human beings meet
the world not only as individuals but as members of communities of
people: of nations, of classes, of families and of churches. If Kant's
ethics neglected the communal nature of human life, they also
largely neglected the Christian God. 'God', to be sure, was present
in Kant's philosophy and ethics, but Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit
were not. This made it all the more extraordinary that Kant's thought
had become the default basis for Protestant theological ethics.
Bonhoeffer therefore took Kant seriously, as we shall see in the next
chapter, but used his philosophy as an anvil against which to
hammer out a more distinctively Christian ethics. He achieved this

45
 BONHOEFFER

in part using two very diverse sources: the writings of S0ren

Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling

No theologian teases his readers more than S0ren Kierkegaard
(1813-55), though his playfulness both endears and frustrates. One
of the 'games' Kierkegaard plays with us is his use of pseudon-
ymous authorship for many of his books. For example, Fear and
Trembling (FT) was published (in 1843) under the pen name
'Johannes de silentio\ Using pen-names was not, for Kierkegaard,
an attempt to preserve anonymity: it was a literary device rather like
the creation of a narrator in a novel that enabled him to step into the
shoes of a fictional character and explore thoroughly and consist-
ently what that character might think. It cannot, therefore, be
assumed that Johannes' thinking in Fear and Trembling represents
what Kierkegaard thought, or indeed that it does not, since fictional
narrators do sometimes resemble their authors. But the strategy
enabled Kierkegaard to create viewpoints he did not necessarily hold
himself, but which he felt were necessary in order to make progress
in a wider debate. A second 'game' Kierkegaard plays is to use
unconventional means of communicating philosophy and theology,
in particular through telling or retelling stories. Such is the case in
Fear and Trembling, in which the biblical story of Abraham and
Isaac is told and retold from several perspectives that open up
alternate ways of understanding what was taking place.
Bonhoeffer discussed Fear and Trembling at the beginning of his
career in Sanctorum Communio and at the end of his career was still
commending it to his fiancee.11 In a paper given at Union Seminary
Bonhoeffer includes Kierkegaard in a list of genuine Christian
thinkers with Paul, Augustine, Luther and Barth.12 Most signifi-
cantly Kierkegaard's ideas were important to Bonhoeffer in framing
the terms of his book Discipleship, in which, as we shall see in
Chapter 6, the contrast between cheap and costly grace, derived
from Kierkegaard, is central. Yet Bonhoeffer rarely discusses
Kierkegaard's writings at any length and the precise role and signifi-
cance of Kierkegaard for Bonhoeffer is therefore moot. In particular,
commentators are not agreed whether Bonhoeffer had grasped
Kierkegaard's thought thoroughly or superficially.13 My purpose in
this section is to draw out of Fear and Trembling an issue that I
believe is fundamental not only to that phase of his life when
Bonhoeffer wrote Discipleship, but to his theological ethics as a

46
 BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGICAL INHERITANCE

whole: this is the concept of a 'teleological suspension of the

ethical'.
A starting point for the discussion that Kierkegaard stages in Fear
and Trembling is Kant's view that all human beings owe a
categorical obedience to moral duty. Kant believed that it was
absurd to imagine that God might command something that was
unethical. From Kierkegaard's point of view what this would mean,
if true, is that duty to God is no more than duty to ethics and that
human beings owe nothing to God except the duty embodied in
morality. But what, Kierkegaard asks, if sometimes God directly
commands an individual to do something that breaks the moral law?
Just this situation arises in the story of God's command to Abraham
to sacrifice his son Isaac in Genesis 22. Kierkegaard imagines
several possible explanations for this extraordinary story. When he
raised his knife to kill his son did Abraham pretend to be a vicious
idolater so that Isaac would be spared the thought that the true God
had ordered his death? Did he go through events on the mountain
and thereafter lose all joy because he could not forget what God put
him through? Did he sin by thinking God was prepared to order him
to sacrifice Isaac? Did Isaac lose faith?
For Kierkegaard, this is not a remote classroom dilemma. He
believed that the church to which he belonged in Denmark had
cheapened faith by transforming the Gospel into an empty cliche-
ridden and this-worldly piety. Imagine a churchgoer, Kierkegaard
writes, who hears Abraham praised in a Sunday sermon and prepares
to imitate him. When the preacher hears of his plans he shouts
'loathsome man, dregs of society, what the devil so possessed you
that you wanted to murder your own son?' when all the man is
preparing to do is what the preacher had urged in his sermon. God
demands everything; but in contemporary church life, paraphrasing
W. H. Auden, it never crosses our minds he means exactly what he
says. Yet there is more to Fear and Trembling than a call to commit
oneself more fully to God. Genesis 22 teaches that there is a
'monstrous paradox' in Abraham's life that philosophy is quite
unable to account for. At face value, what we see in Abraham is
'infinite resignation' to the will of God. Yet if that is all that is to be
found in Abraham, he is no more than a tragic hero. Probe deeper,
Kierkegaard suggests, and Abraham goes a crucial step beyond
resignation: not only did he resign himself to God's command to kill
his son, he trusted that somehow God's promise would still be
fulfilled. Infinite resignation 'is the last stage before faith' but is not
itself faith. Faith, Kierkegaard says, goes beyond resignation to

47
 BONHOEFFER

believe 'on the strength of the absurd, on the strength of the fact that
for God all things are possible'. What Kierkegaard presents here is
a fundamental critique of philosophy from the basis of faith. Either
Kant is right and Abraham was a man who murderously disobeyed
his ethical duty, or Abraham truly is an exemplar of faith. It is also
a critique of theology that wants to sell faith 'at a bargain price' - to
denude faith of its absolute and absurd demands.
This account of faith raises three closely related ethical problems.
The first is: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical, that is
can moral laws ever be suspended for the sake of a goal or end
beyond ethical duty? 'The ethical', Kierkegaard explains, summa-
rizing Kantian ethics:

as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to

everyone, which can be put from another point of view by saying
it applies at every moment. It rests immanently in itself, has
nothing outside itself that is its telos [end, purpose] but is itself
the telos for everything outside, and when that is taken up into it,
has no further to go.14

If this really were the end of the matter then one could clearly not
surrender one's duty to ethics. Yet faith, Kierkegaard suggests 'is just
this paradox, that the single individual is higher than the universal',
not only in spite of the fact that this is absurd, but 'on the strength of
the absurd' (FT 84-5). Abraham does not obey a higher ethical duty
in preparing to sacrifice Isaac: in 'his action he overstepped the
ethical altogether, and had a higher telos outside it, in relation to
which he suspended it' (FT 88). This raises the second ethical
dilemma: Is there an absolute duty to God? Kantian ethics suggests
that duty to ethics is duty to God. But for Kierkegaard our duty to our
neighbour is not at all the same thing as our duty to God. This does
not mean that a person with faith ceases to have an obligation to love
her neighbour, but means that sometimes love of God may cause us
to act towards our neighbour in ways that contradict our ethical duty
-just as Abraham was prepared to contradict his paternal obligations
to Isaac in obedience to God. A third ethical dilemma again follows:
Was it ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his purpose from
Sarah and from Isaac? Ethically, the answer is clearly 'no'. But if he
was to obey God then Abraham had to remain silent: he cannot speak
and still obey. Abraham's silence breaks the rules of ethics and obeys
the command of God. (Is this the reason Kierkegaard employs the
pen-name Johannes de silentiol)

48
 BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGICAL INHERITANCE

It is tempting to make a connection at this point between

Abraham's obedient silence and Christ's silence on the cross. Yet
Bonhoeffer's theology will not permit such a connection, and the
reason why reveals both where Bonhoeffer draws on Kierkegaard,
and where he departs from him. Kierkegaard's proposal for a 'teleo-
logical suspension of the ethical' drives a wedge between Christian
obedience and philosophical ethics. It distinguishes, as Kant did not,
obedience to moral law and obedience to God. Abraham, whom
Kierkegaard characterizes as a 'knight of faith', discovered that in
certain rare circumstances God demands we act in ways that are
unethical. Bonhoeffer in his belief that Christian 'ethics' is a critique
of all other ethics took up this insight. We shall meet this idea later
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Yet Bonhoeffer disagreed with Kierkegaard
in a second, equally important respect. Kierkegaard's Fear and
Trembling proposes that the individual is higher than the
community. The consequence of this is that in the duty to love one's
neighbour it is not God we meet, but merely the neighbour, since our
duty to God can cause us to 'suspend' our ethical obligation to our
neighbour. For Bonhoeffer, the choice between God and neighbour
was false because God meets us in our neighbour. It was true, for
Bonhoeffer, that Kierkegaard had correctly turned away from Kant
in presenting a critique of philosophical ethics from the biblical
point of view: but Kierkegaard had wrongly followed Kant in
making the individual central to ethics. For Bonhoeffer, as we shall
see in the next chapter, individuals meet God in community, not in
isolated individualism.
Towards the end of his life Karl Barm, reflecting on the strong
influence of Kierkegaard on his early writings, said he considered
Kierkegaard 'to be a teacher into whose school every theologian
must go once. Woe to him who has missed it! So long as he does not
remain in or return to it.' On this at least, Bonhoeffer followed
Barm's lead.

Nietzche's Beyond Good and Evil

Dietrich Bonhoeffer may seem to be an unlikely successor to
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Nietzsche's reputation is of a man
at odds with Christianity; a prophet of meaninglessness and chaos,
whose literary creations declared the death of God. Yet in one
striking respect Bonhoeffer's theological ethics rest on Nietzsche's
foundations: both of them attempt to re-conceive human life Beyond
Good and Evil.15 Nietzsche imagined 'a music whose rarest magic

49
 BONHOEFFER

would consist in this, that it no longer knew anything of good and

evil'.16 For his part Bonhoeffer asserted, in a deliberate theological
appropriation of Nietzsche's atheistic idea, that 'The knowledge of
good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical reflection. The first
task of Christian ethics is to invalidate this knowledge' (E 3).
Bonhoeffer owned several volumes of Nietzsche and a collected
works.17 Within his Ethics he cites several of Nietzsche's works as
well as using phrases such as 'Ecce Homo' and 'twilight of the gods'
that draw on a common European heritage but are nonetheless
reminiscent of Nietzsche. Though elsewhere he makes a number of
passing and positive references to Nietzsche, Bonhoeffer's only
extensive discussion of him outside the Ethics occurs in an address
given in Barcelona where, more than ten years before he repeated
these themes in the Ethics, Bonhoeffer argued for an ethic 'beyond
good and evil' linked with Nietzsche's name.
Beyond Good and Evil, published in 1886, was Nietzsche's sixth
and last book of aphorisms. He regarded it as a critique of modernity
and, according to its subtitle, as a 'Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future'. Nietzsche thought that to understand ethical terms such as
good and evil it was important to understand their origins.
Originally, he thought, what was 'good' was the same as what was
'noble', while 'bad' was associated with the 'simple' people, who
Nietzsche disparagingly calls 'the herd'. Faced with the 'master
morality' which suppressed them, the 'herd' struck back by creating
a morality of its own in which the highest values of the master
morality — strength and nobility — became the greatest evils in the
morality of the weak. In this way Nietzsche suggests that there is
malign intent in a morality of good and evil: 'Moral judgement and
condemnation is the favourite form of revenge of the spiritually
limited on those who are less so' (Beyond:2l9, 130). Between these
two moralities the contrast looks like this: 'The noble type of man
feels himself to be the determiner of values, he does not need to be
approved of, he judges "what harms me is harmful in itself, he
knows himself to be that which in general first accords honour to
things, he creates values' (Beyond:26Q, 176). On the other hand,
there is the 'slave morality':

The slave is suspicious of the virtues of the powerful: he is

sceptical and mistrustful, keenly mistrustful, of everything 'good'
that is honoured among them - he would like to convince himself
that happiness itself is not genuine among them. On the other
hand, those qualities which serve to make easier the existence of

50
 BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGICAL INHERITANCE

suffering will be brought into prominence and flooded with light:

here it is that pity, the kind and helping hand, the warm heart,
patience, industriousness, humility and friendliness come into
honour - for here these are the most useful qualities and virtually
the only means of enduring the burden of existence. (Beyond:26Q,
178)

And here, Nietzsche draws the crucial conclusion that:

Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility. Here is the

source of the famous antithesis 'good' and 'evil' — power and
danger were felt to exist in evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety
and strength which could not admit of contempt. (Beyond:26Q,
178)

It is, in Nietzsche's distinctive phrasing, a morality of ressentiment.

It should already be clear that Nietzsche's imperative to go
'beyond good and evil' does not make for nihilism of the more
banal kind. Aware he might be misinterpreted he spells out that 'as
for the dangerous formula "beyond good and evil" with which we
at any rate guard against being taken for what we are not: we are
something different from "libres-penseurs", "liberi pensatorF,
"Freidenker" [i.e. free-thinkers], or whatever else all these worthy
advocates of "modern ideas" like to call themselves' (Beyond:44,
54). His proposal, Nietzsche insists, is constructive not destructive,
and though described as an attempt to live beyond the old morality
(Beyond:262, 182) it is not an attempt to live without morals. This
is because 'that which is done out of love always takes place
beyond good and evil' (Beyond:l53, 85). Nietzsche does not
advocate the destruction of morality but the 'transvaluation of all
values', the freedom for the elite moral agent to become the creator
of his own morality (and being a notorious misogynist he did mean
'his' and not 'her' morality. For Nietzsche good and evil are not
opposites - the erroneous belief of a slave morality - but are two
sides of the same coin. He recognized that the distinction between
good and evil does not represent the natural or ideal state of
humankind. His solution was to deny the concept of sin. For
Nietzsche, crudely put Eve and Adam had got it right; the fruit of
the knowledge of good and evil did belong to them, and his
proposal for ethics involved opening Eden to them once again in
order that they might truly become like gods, free from the super-
ficial sensation of guilt.

51
 BONHOEFFER

Bonhoeffer's focus on Nietzsche's ethics rather than on his

philosophy is unusual in a theologian. For Bonhoeffer, Nietzsche is
not to be thought of as an enemy of Christianity, but rather as
something of a prophet. Of course for Bonhoeffer the solution to the
problem of good and evil is not to assert that human beings are gods,
but to turn to God become Man in Christ Jesus. In this context
Bonhoeffer concludes that:

It is not, as Nietzsche supposed, because it arises from these dark

motives that judgement is wrongful; judgement is evil because it
is itself apostasy, and that is the reason why it brings forth evil in
the human heart... 'Judging' is not a special vice or wickedness
of the disunited man; it is his essence, manifesting itself in his
speech, his action and his sentiment. (E 17)

Though Nietzsche provides the insight and the language prompting

Bonhoeffer's ethic 'beyond good and evil', ultimately Nietzsche is
as much the subject of Bonhoeffer's critique of secular ethics as
Kant. To maintain an anthropocentric ethic in any form, according
to Bonhoeffer, is to maintain an ethic after the Fall. Because we are
creatures, not creators as Nietzsche supposed, we cannot be
ubermenschen, 'supermen', but are always simply ordinary human
beings limited by time and space. This remains true even though the
moral limitations of humanity are radically redescribed by God's
commitment to creation in becoming Man in Jesus. This is certainly
an irresolvable disagreement between Nietzsche and Bonhoeffer.
Yet when, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche comments 'When I wage war
against Christianity I am entitled to do this because I have never
experienced misfortunes and frustrations from that quarter — the
most serious Christians have always been well disposed towards
me';18 it may well be, as Jorg Rades commented, that Nietzsche had
theologians like Bonhoeffer in mind.

Provisional conclusion

Karl Earth suggested tentatively that Bonhoeffer was 'an impulsive,

visionary thinker who was suddenly seized by an idea to which he
gave lively form, and then after a time he called a halt (one never
knew whether it was final or temporary) with some provisional last
point or other'.19 Visionary, yes; but perhaps not as impulsive as
Barth thought. The value of tracking some of the roots of
Bonhoeffer's thinking is partly to make better sense of what he

52
 BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGICAL INHERITANCE

himself came to think. But it can also help us to appreciate that what
may appear to be intellectual kite flying exercises are, on closer
inspection, securely earthed in Bonhoeffer's knowledge of intel-
lectual traditions. The discussions in this chapter will begin to pay
dividends when we explore Bonhoeffer's own writings in the next
and succeeding chapters.

Notes

1 LPP, p. 150. Jorg Rades, a graduate student in Scotland, died in April 1989. In the
months before he died, with many drugs in his system and writing in a second
language, Rades wrote several essays exploring the influence of several key
thinkers on Bonhoeffer. They remain among the best essays of their kind. This
chapter is indebted to him.
2 Zettelnotizen fur eine 'Ethik', ed. Use Todt, Chr Kaiser Vlg, Munich, 1993,
publishes Bonhoeffer's notes towards his book on Ethics. They show that even
where a reference to a source is not given in the text of his drafts essays, he has
paid full and proper attention to them.
3 See Martin Luther: German Saviour, James M. Stayer, McGill-Queen's
University Press, Montreal, 2000, for a study of Luther interpretation in Weimar
Germany.
4 'Luther's German Bible', chapter VIII of Seven-Headed Luther, ed. P. N. Brooks,
Clarendon, 1983.
5 Bluhm, op. cit., p. 183.
6 Luther's interpretation of Paul has been challenged by much recent scholarship,
which suggests that the sharp contrast between Law and Gospel was Luther's
theological construct and is not borne out by careful study of Paul in his historical
and sociological setting.
7 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Prometheus, New York,
1998.
8 'On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany', in Selected Prose,
Heinrich Heine, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1993, p. 273.
9 Ibid., p. 276.
10 To cite one example, in 1926 Nicolai Hartmann, Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Berlin, published his three volume Ethics. A copy of it, annotated by
Bonhoeffer, exists. It would not be too gross an exaggeration to describe it as a
commentary on Kant's ethics.
11 Love Letters from Cell 92, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Maria von Wedemeyer,
HarperCollins, 1994, p. 154.
12 DBWIQ, p. 432.
13 See the debate between David Hopper, Paul Matheny and Daniel Hardy in the
International Bonhoeffer Society Newsletter, issues number 44 (May 1990) and 45
(October 1990).

53
 BONHOEFFER

14 Fear and Trembling, S. Kierkegaard, Penguin, 1985, p. 83.

15 Cited by Julia Watkin in Kierkegaard, Geoffrey Chapman, London, 1997, p. 100.
Bonhoeffer shared with Nietzsche a desire to break free of the hegemony of
Kantian ethics, and in particular used Nietzsche to shore up his conviction that
there are no universal moral rules. This, in spite of Nietzsche's assertion that 'the
Protestant pastor is the grandfather of German Philosophy', and that 'Kant's
success is merely a theologian's success'.
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, London, Penguin, 1973, Part 8, no.
255, p. 169 (hereafter Beyond 8:255, 169).
17 Details in the Nachlass, p. 220.
18 On the Genealogy of Morals/Ecce Homo, F. Nietzsche, Vintage, 1989, p. 233.
19 Letter from Karl Barth to P. W. Herrenbriick, 21 December 1952, in World Come
of Age, ed. R. Gregor Smith, Collins, 1967, pp. 89-90.

54
 4

Self, community and

revelation: building blocks of
ethics

Bonhoeffer's decision to write his doctoral dissertation on the

Church seems far less strange now than it did in 1925. Today, the
role the Church plays in shaping Christian life is a central concern
of the discipline and practice of ethics. But in 1925 Protestant
theology and ethics was focused far more on the individual. Above
all this approach was embodied in Adolf von Harnack who, his great
age notwithstanding, was a towering authority of liberal Protestant
theology, the pope 'of the Protestant professorial curia'.1 Von
Harnack's method was based on the conviction that true theology
must distinguish between the essentials and the inessentials of
Christianity, between its kernel and its husk. This meant stripping
away what he considered to be the outer layers of theological specu-
lation using 'scientific' historical tools. Historical theology, von
Harnack believed, could establish what Jesus said and did and what
became of his original message in the early history of the Church.
Proper historical study of Christian theology, von Harnack believed,
meant that anyone, albeit with professional scholarly guidance,
could arrive at an authentic form of Christianity free of the extra-
neous additions of both Jewish theology and Greek philosophy. In
practice, this amounted to distinguishing a 'genuine' gospel of Jesus
from that of later Church dogma. Jesus' gospel of the kingdom of

55
 BONHOEFFER

God, von Harnack thought, was not directed to the church, or indeed
to any other form of community, but to the individual:

The kingdom of God comes by coming to the individual, by

entering into his soul and laying hold of it. True, the kingdom of
God is the rule of God; but it is the rule of the holy God in the
hearts of individuals; it is God himself in his power. From this
point of view everything that was dramatic in the external and
historical sense has vanished; and gone, too, are all external hopes
for the future. Take whatever parable you will, the parable of the
sower, of the pearl of great price, of the treasure buried in the field
- the word of God, God himself, is the kingdom. It is not a
question of angels and devils, thrones and principalities, but of
God and the soul, the soul and its God.2

Von Harnack's approach seemed to many the highest possible

expression of Protestant theology with its emphasis on the direct
encounter of God and the individual, free of the authority of the
Church.
Bonhoeffer studied Christian Doctrine with von Harnack in 1924
and from 1924 to 1926 participated in two more seminars with him.
Yet even in his teens, Bonhoeffer was reaching beyond Berlin and
the historical approach to theology that dominated there towards the
light of dialectical theology. The term 'dialectical theology' was
beginning to be attached to a loose knit circle of theologians,
including Karl Barm, Emil Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten and Rudolf
Bultmann, concerned with holding together a scholarly, rational and
'scientific' study - of the Bible, church history and religious
psychology - with a lively Christian faith. The discipline of
theology, they maintained, must move 'dialectically' between these
poles holding the apparently contradictory demands of rational
reflection and faith in paradoxical tension. Bonhoeffer aspired to a
theological method that would enable him to integrate the methods
of the Berlin faculty and those of dialectical theology. This method-
ological break with his own faculty was reflected in his choice of
subject matter for his two university dissertations. Von Harnack and
his followers viewed the Church as a barrier to the authentic
encounter of the individual and the gospel rather than as its vehicle.
Where the Church attracted their attention at all it was treated
merely as historical data. Bonhoeffer wanted to examine the Church
using scholarly tools, such as sociology and social philosophy, but
also to regard the Church from the perspective of faith as the body

56
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

of Christ - a premise that lay outside the disciplines of history and

sociology.
Bonhoeffer's doctoral dissertation was written in 1927 and
published in 1930 under the title Sanctorum Communio (the holy
community); his second dissertation, Act and Being, written to
qualify him as a university lecturer, was completed in 1930 and
published a year later. Both dissertations are situated in conflicts and
debates from which theology has long since moved on. This might
suggest that they have little if any contemporary interest - and very
probably if Bonhoeffer had not come after his death to be widely
regarded as an outstanding Christian thinker his academic disserta-
tions would be no better remembered than the scores of other
dissertations published in Berlin at the time, which is to say hardly
at all. For contemporary students of theology, reading these books is
therefore often justified simply because they form the basis of
Bonhoeffer's later work, and this is certainly the case: part of my
argument in this book is that a trajectory can be traced in
Bonhoeffer's ethics that begins with these two dissertations and ends
with Bonhoeffer's prison letters. But in this chapter I want to open
up two contemporary ethical debates to which these early books
contribute irrespective of their value in illuminating later develop-
ments in Bonhoeffer's theology.
Making links between Bonhoeffer's dissertations and contem-
porary moral problems is far from straightforward. The highly
technical language and style of both dissertations sometimes makes
them difficult to follow. They discuss philosophical and theological
sources that are very demanding and some of which are now
unfamiliar to all but the most expert scholars. It is easy to see why
the dissertations take the form they do: one commentator on
Sanctorum Communio points out that even Bonhoeffer-enthusiasts
cannot avoid the 'sad truth (all too evident in this instance) that
academic dissertations are not written to enlighten the public but to
impress a faculty committee'.3 Certainly, in writing his two
academic dissertations, the young Bonhoeffer was not aiming
primarily at clarity and elegance of expression; a contemporary
reader of Sanctorum Communio told Bonhoeffer's uncle 'your
nephew still has to learn German'.4 Seventeen years after he
presented Sanctorum Communio to his Faculty examiners
Bonhoeffer himself had come to feel abashed at the form his
theology then took and wrote to his young fiancee '[YJou're twenty
years old! I am thoroughly ashamed to recall how ignorant I was at
that age, and how replete your own life already is, by comparison,

57
 BONHOEFFER

with experiences and tasks of the utmost importance. I still believed

then that life consisted of ideas and books, and wrote my first book
[i.e. Sanctorum Communio], and was, I'm afraid to say, inordinately
proud of it.'5 Bonhoeffer was young when he wrote Sanctorum
Communio and Act and Being: and even if he exhibits a level of
maturity within them far in excess of his years (and he does), at this
stage of his development he can be forgiven for leaving some
threads untied and some elements not fully resolved. Yet such diffi-
culties can too easily become excuses for ignoring these remarkable
and precocious early writings.
The two debates outlined below are both important; classical
Greek philosophy energetically considered how individuals and
society fit together, and how being good fits in with doing good
things. The relation of the individual to society has been arguably
the central debate in English-speaking political ethics during the last
twenty years. My interest in these particular debates - rather than in
other equally important discussions in contemporary ethics - arises
from the central role these same debates play in Bonhoeffer's early
theology to which this chapter attends. I am not looking in current
ethics for theories or models with which to interpret or to critique
Bonhoeffer's theology, though that might be both possible and
useful. I want to ask what issues are raised within these debates and
to see how Bonhoeffer's early theology might help us to think
through them.

Self and community6

At the height of her power the British Prime Minister Margaret

Thatcher gave an interview to a women's magazine on the
philosophy that lay behind her political programme. The magazine
led its report of the interview with the Prime Minister's statement
that there was 'no such thing as society'. Her critics, who took it as
evidence that the Conservative Party led by Mrs Thatcher was
wilfully intent on social disintegration, rampant self-interest and
individualism, promptly seized upon this catchy phrase. Whatever
view one takes of the merits of Thatcher's political philosophy, we
may better understand her meaning if the phrase is restored to its
context in the interview. There is no such thing as society, she said,
but there:

are individual men and women, and there are families. And no
government can do anything except through people, and people

58
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

must look to themselves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves
and then to look after our neighbour.7

Society, she believed, is not best thought of as an abstract thing-in-

itself, but as a living structure of individuals, families, neighbours
and voluntary associations (among which, presumably, she included
churches). This political philosophy, at least in theory, should lead
to a downsizing of the role of the state in people's lives. It is a view
that von Harnack would have recognized and affirmed: states, he
thought, are not redeemed by Jesus' gospel, individuals are.
Margaret Thatcher did not originate this view of the relation
between individuals and society; it is a fundamental tenet of a wider
tradition of postwar liberal political theory. Following the Second
World War political philosophical debate had stagnated. In 1972 the
philosopher John Rawls kick-started a new phase of political
thinking with his book A Theory of Justice? which wittingly or
unwittingly provided the basis for the 'new right' political
programmes of both Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Rawls
asserted that 'the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it',
that is in both moral and political life the individual moral agent
exists prior to any social identity she may also have. It is primarily
as an individual that she makes moral choices and has moral rights,
such as the right to own property. Even if she aligns herself with a
moral community, such as a church, her primary moral identity does
not originate in the shared values of that community, since her
ability to choose to belong precedes her actual belonging.
Those who believe that moral identity is primarily centred in
community articulate a diametrically opposing view. Prominent
among advocates of 'communitarianism' is the philosopher Alasdair
Maclntyre. Maclntyre insists that morality is acquired by being part
of a community in which moral traditions are embodied and passed
on. People are formed morally by the stories told by particular
communities, stories that are lived out in moral practice. So much is
this the case that when community is fragmented - as is the case in
much contemporary life - morality in any meaningful sense ceases
to exist. In short morality is community tradition, and without
community there can be no morality. By and large recent theological
ethics has been in profound sympathy with the communitarian views
held by Maclntyre - who indeed resources part of his argument by
reference to the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Christian theology, in
which retelling the 'stories' of the Bible plays a central role, has
found it natural to maintain that narrating stories in the context of the

59
 BONHOEFFER

Church can shape a person's moral life. In particular this resonance

with communitarianism has found a focus in 'narrative theology', a
vogue term describing theology that reflects on and out from the role
of story in the Church. Significantly for our purposes, Stanley
Hauerwas, a prominent advocate of attending to the role of narrative
in the Church, utilizes the 'narrative character of Christian convic-
tions' in developing a vigorous theological ethics:

The nature of Christian ethics is determined by the fact that

Christian convictions take the form of a story, or perhaps better,
a set of stories that constitutes a tradition, which in turn creates
and forms a community. Christian ethics does not begin by
emphasizing rules or principles, but by calling our attention to a
narrative that tells of God's dealing with creation ... it is crucial
for us ... to see that it is not accidentally a narrative.9

Maclntyre and Hauerwas offer an attractive vision of community

life, but their subordination of the moral individual to the moral
community raises awkward questions (which they respond to far
better than my brief summary of their arguments might suggest).
Both agree that since morality is deeply embedded in particular
moral communities, there can be no such thing as a universal
morality, as Kant supposed. But how then, are we to distinguish
between 'good' moral communities and 'bad' ones? Obviously,
where the moral codes of two communities conflict, they cannot
both be right. The Nazis believed firmly in a national 'community',
the German Volk: on what basis may I assert that its views and
practices were morally repugnant? Hauerwas would say that I can
know this because I belong to another community, the Church,
which embodies a radically different ethic rooted in God's love. But
is this not better characterized as an irresolvable conflict of two rival
moralities? Maclntyre also recognizes the nature of the problem and
responds by arguing that in a healthy society in which different,
incommensurable (moral) systems are in apparently irresolvable
conflict a debate may arise in which one system turns out to be
superior in more adequately accounting for difficulties with its own
and other traditions.10 Another dimension to the problem surfaces
when we consider that in practice most people belong not to one but
to several moral communities. I am a member of a Church, but I am
also a member of a family, a member of a university, a member of a
political party and a member of a nation. What happens when the
moralities of these communities conflict not simply with each other,

60
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

but within me? Does Hauerwas' way of putting things suggest that I
belong solely to the Church, and that this community should
properly be not only my Church, but also, in a sense, my family,
university, political 'community' and nation?
The debate about the relationship between self and community
has remained a vigorous one in both political philosophy and in
theological ethics. In our turn towards Bonhoeffer's early writings
this contemporary debate can help furnish us with questions to
which we are still looking for answers nearly eighty years on:

• What is a community?
• Which comes first (in ethics) - the individual or the community?
• Is the Christian community (i.e. the Church) different from other
kinds of human community?
• Is there a way of resolving conflicts between the Church and other
moral communities?

Doing good and being good

How I tell a good person from a bad one is not a new conundrum in
ethics. Plato debates the question 'how do we recognize a just
person?' in his Republic and in The Nichomachean Ethics', Aristotle,
Plato's recalcitrant pupil, takes up the same problem. The question
has been a component of ethics ever since. One aspect of this
discussion concerns the relationship between deeds and character: is
a person good because he performs good acts or because he is good
in himself? Aristotle's answer was that character was crucial. He
argued that 'we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts'.11 That is, goodness does
not come naturally but by consciously forming habits of good
behaviour, which Aristotle terms virtues.
For the greater part of Christian history, under the influence of
classical philosophy, Christians also maintained that character is at
the heart of ethics. In the thirteenth century the theologian Thomas
Aquinas transposed Aristotle's philosophy into Christian theology,
thereby reiterating the importance of virtue and character in
Christian ethics. But in the sixteenth century this emphasis on
character was disrupted in the Protestant theology of Martin Luther
and John Calvin. Luther was suspicious of the idea that people,
under their own steam, could develop good character; human beings
were naturally too sinful to be good. Luther believed that by consid-
ering the laws given by God in the Bible it becomes painfully clear

61
 BONHOEFFER

that humanity is rotten to the core. Yet God does not leave humanity
in this Fallen state; for by the law God turns human lives towards the
need for His grace and forgiveness. Luther conceded a second use of
law in restraining human sinful actions through the exercise of legal
discipline by secular ruling authorities. John Calvin agreed with all
this, but went a step further. He argued that beyond the first two uses
of the law outlined by Luther, God's law is able to teach, encourage
and inspire the believer to do good. God's commandments, Calvin
says, were not cancelled by God's gift of forgiveness in Jesus Christ,
but interpreted anew by his life and work.
The Reformation thus set two theological cats into the pigeon loft
of virtue ethics. Luther called into question human ability to be good
without divine grace. Calvin pressed the question of if and how God
commands the believer to act according to His law. But if what
matters is obedience to God's commandments, then is the signifi-
cance of one's personal virtue and character not relativized? As a
consequence of Luther's and Calvin's related but distinct theologies
there exists in Protestant ethics a sometimes-unresolved tension
between an emphasis on human sinfulness (and the doctrine of
salvation by faith alone) and the requirements of direct obedience to
God's law. In modern times Protestant theologians have tended to
follow Luther and Calvin in their rejection of ethics based on virtue
and character. However, recently there has been a remarkable
recovery of virtue ethics. Philosophers such as Alasdair Maclntyre,
Iris Murdoch and Martha Nussbaum, and theologians such as
Stanley Hauerwas, have argued that the parlous state of contem-
porary moral discourse and practice can be revivified by a return to
virtue-based ethics, in which what we mean by 'good' in phrases
like 'good community' or 'good person' refer to prized qualities of
life or prized features of moral character. Contemporary theological
ethics manifests this tension in the contrast between ethics in which
obedience to (God-given) rules, laws or commandments is central;
and ethics conceived as an ongoing process of character formation
in which one is shaped by practices such as worship, prayer, Bible
reading and community life. It is a contrast between moral agency
conceived as right choices and good character; between obedience
and virtue; between act and being.
This current debate raises further questions that we can usefully
hold in mind when reading Bonhoeffer's early writings:

• How, in Christian ethics, should the relationship between good

acts and being good be conceived?

62
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

• What should I do? ('What must I do to inherit eternal life?'

MarklO:17).
• Who should I be? (What kind of person should I be?)

Sanctorum Communio
The structure of the Church as a community, Bonhoeffer begins, can
only be understood when theology employs the tools of social
philosophy and sociology. When these tools are used, it becomes
clear that 'all the basic Christian concepts ... "[PJerson", "primal
state", "sin", and "revelation" can be fully comprehended only in
relation to sociality' (DBW 1 21), not only the social relations of
human beings with each other, but the sociality of human beings with
God. Social philosophy deals with the social relations presupposed
by empirical community, that is community as it is experienced and
observed, rather than in theory alone. Sociology is the study of the
structures of human social formations in order to understand how
people and groups behave. Yet to realize the insights of social
philosophy for a theology of the Church means adopting a presuppo-
sition which social philosophy and sociology do not themselves
adopt, namely that the real structure of the Church can only be
grasped by those to whom its inner reality is revealed by Christ. This
is because 'the nature of the church can only be understood from
within, cum iraet studio [with passionate zeal], never by nonpartici-
pants' (DBW 1 33). What Bonhoeffer seeks, in other words, is not to
examine personhood and personal relations, or community as such,
but to unlock a Christian concept of personhood and community.
In dialogue with social philosophy Bonhoeffer arrives at a
Christian understanding of personhood expressed in strikingly
ethical terms. For Bonhoeffer, each individual discovers what it
means to be a human person when she accepts that those she meets
constitute barriers or limits to herself, i.e. when the T realizes that
her own needs and desires are not all that matter, since the 'you'
encountered has needs and desires of their own. A proper sense of
human identity is 'created in the moment of being moved - in the
situation of responsibility, passionate ethical struggle, confrontation
by an overwhelming claim; thus the real person grows out of the
concrete situation' (DBW 1 49). Primarily this takes place when we
come face to face with God as the ultimate Other, whose divine
person transcends my limited human person. But, by analogy, each
person we encounter demands a similar realization that our
personhood is bounded by social and ethical relationships. The

63
 BONHOEFFER

social and ethical character of the individual means that properly

speaking we do not exist as human beings in isolation, but only in
accepting our responsibility to the other in our face to face encounter
with him. Bonhoeffer describes this as a meeting of the concrete T
with the concrete 'You'. Ethics begins with the realization that I can
never be you; that the social barrier between us is at the same time
an ethical barrier. This barrier is not best conceived as a chasm, but
rather as a point of resistance between the will of the T and the will
of the 'You'. The self is self-encapsulated, turned in on itself; in
short the self is selfish! It is not the otherness of the other, however,
that results in its isolation - the otherness of the other is her God-
given individuality. Rather, it is sin which isolates each individual
and prevents community. Bonhoeffer recognizes that in speaking of
an 'uncrossable' boundary between I and You, he risks implying
that, however responsible I may feel for You, I am in the last resort
isolated from You by the barrier between us. It is at this point that
Bonhoeffer makes a claim that becomes fundamental to the
argument of the whole book. Though one human being cannot of her
own accord cross this barrier, yet

God or the Holy Spirit joins the concrete You; only through
God's active working does the other become a You to me from
whom my I arises. In other words, every human You is an image
of the divine You. (DBW1 54-5, Bonhoeffer's italics)

Genuine ethical responsibility becomes possible, Bonhoeffer claims,

when God assumes the place of the 'You' in the I-You encounter,
making it possible for the I to recognize the needs of the other.
The theological origins of Bonhoeffer's argument lie in the
biblical story of Adam's original state of unbroken community with
God. When Adam sinned at the Fall, his relationship with God was
fundamentally altered, but so also was his social relationship with
Eve. The concepts of person and community must be interpreted
theologically in the light of this biblical account of original
unbroken community, of the Fall, and of restored unity - or
salvation - in Christ. But how, Bonhoeffer asks, are 'person' and
'community' related in this context? A Christian understanding of
person supposes that a person has a spirit. The spirit in a person is
the self-consciousness and self-determination that holds a person
together as a unified whole, and is expressed in acts of thought, will
and feeling. Such acts are only evident in social exchanges, and can
become explicit in language. In short, human spirit in its entirety is

64
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

woven into the interaction of the I and the You; 'this is the essence
of spirit, to be oneself through being in the other' (DBW1 73). This
community of persons is broken at the Fall and can only be restored
in Christ. But which matters most in this: the individual or the
community? 'In theological terms,' asks Bonhoeffer, 'does God
intend by community something that absorbs the individual human
being into itself, or does God intend only the individual? Or are
community and individual both intended in their distinctive signifi-
cance?' (DBW 1 76). Bonhoeffer refuses to treat this question as an
either/or decision: community or individual. Instead, he suggests
that a community, just as much as an individual, is held together as
a unified whole by a (human) spirit around which it coheres: 'We
maintain that community can be interpreted as a collective person
with the same structure as the individual person' (DBW 1 77). This
collective personality or spirit of the community is not ordered
hierarchically in relation to the individual spirits that make it up, as
if individual spirit was subordinate to the collective spirit. Rather,
the distinct personality of the community, which to be sure
transcends its individual component parts, only exists because of the
individual spirits that make it up. God, Bonhoeffer believes, does not
see us as isolated individuals but as a human community in which,
nevertheless, individuality is not dissolved in a homogeneous
collective whole. Borrowing from Hegel's philosophy, Bonhoeffer
terms this community spirit 'objective spirit' — to be set alongside
the 'subjective spirit' of the individual. When two or more
individuals form a community, this 'objective spirit' comes into
being as a 'new' personality that brings to community its historical
and communal identity and continuity in space and time. The sense
in which a community with an 'objective spirit' has a 'body' is
complex. Obviously, a community does not have a 'single' body in
the same sense as an individual does: a community is not an
organism. Yet there is a sense in which communities, such as a
family or a nation are tangible realities. (Thomas Hobbes's 1651
political treatise Leviathan pictured a great 'collective' being, made
up of countless individual faces that made up the body of the nation
with the King as its head.) The sense in which the Church is spoken
of as 'the body of Christ' is unique, certainly, but in this sense it is
not completely different to other forms of human community. Not
all groups of people that have 'objective spirit', however, are
communities. Bonhoeffer distinguishes between a society and a
community. A society, he suggests, is oriented towards a goal or
purpose (which is not necessarily a bad thing); while a community

65
 BONHOEFFER

is oriented towards its self-preservation. Because of such differ-

ences, only a community has a personality in the way Bonhoeffer
means it.
The interweaving of the individual and the communal illuminates
Bonhoeffer's account of sin, in which the culpability of the
individual and of all humanity is closely connected. Original sin can
hardly be thought of in terms of genetic inheritance or biology, as if
children and those with mental disability are 'sinful' in the same
way as fully developed adults. Bonhoeffer's formulation of the
relationship between an individual sinful act and the collective sin of
all humanity is to state that: 'When, in the sinful act, the individual
spirit rises up against God ... the deed committed is at the same time
the deed of the human race (no longer in the biological sense) in the
individual person' (DBW 1 115). Bonhoeffer's claim is that as a
single individual can sin, a community can sin. A community is
ethically responsible, like a person, and expresses itself ethically
when an individual, such as a spokesperson, office holder, leader, or
member acts on behalf of the whole community. In this way a
community such as a married couple, a nation, or the human race,
can sin. This helps to explain why, in the Bible, the call of God's
prophets is invariably to the people of God rather than to the
individual. In this sense, communities can be extremely varied: at
the smallest end of the scale a marriage is a community, at the
largest end the human race is a community.
Only now that the ground has been prepared does Bonhoeffer
turn, more than a third of the way into his book, to the Sanctorum
Communio, the holy community of the Church. Paul wrote to the
Corinthians that 'as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in
Christ' (1 Corinthians 15:22). In the Church-community being-in-
Adam is replaced by being-in-Christ. But this only means that the
Church is free of sin in an eschatological sense, that is, as God's
promise and the Church's hope. Christians sin. For this reason the
'real' Church should not be confused either with the visible religious
community called church, or with the Kingdom of God. The 'real'
Church is a reality of revelation visible only with the eyes of faith.
This belief, i.e. in the Church, distinguishes Christianity from other
religions, Bonhoeffer asserts, in which community is not an
essential. He adds, in a somewhat idiosyncratic exegesis, that the
New Testament teaches that each individual congregation embodies
the totality of the Church — indeed, where an individual Christian is
present, the whole Church may be said to be present. This
community exists through Christ's action, in which the brokenness

66
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

of Adam is superseded by Him as the new Adam, who is both the

cornerstone of the Church, and is at all times really present in it,
since the church is Christ's body and has Him as its collective
personality. Bonhoeffer expresses this 'real presence' in a term that
effectively sums up the whole of the book's argument: 'Christ
existing as church community' (DBW1 141).
The existence of Christ in the Church community is invisible in
the sense that the perfected body of Christ is promised at the end of
time, but is visible in worship and in Christians' working-for-each-
other. Bonhoeffer accepts that the ethical imperative to love one's
neighbour is not confined to Christian theology. However, 'the
reality of love is nevertheless present only in Christ and in his
church-community' (DBW 1 167). He explains this demanding
statement on the basis that 'Christian love is not a human possi-
bility" (DBW I 167-8), it is not a matter of sympathy or
humanitarianism, or compassion, or, in a different meaning of love,
eroticism. Christian love is possible only through faith in Christ. As
a Christian, I love You my neighbour, not because it benefits me or
gives me pleasure, but because I experience in You God's claim
upon me. This does not mean that I love God in You, rather than
loving You in yourself and for Your own sake; rather, only God's
Spirit enables me to overcome the ethical barrier between us in
order that I can come to love You as you really are. My love for You
is an expression of my intention to embrace God's will and purposes
for you, and to do so without limits. Where such love is realized,
that is in God, can community truly come into being. This
community is a way of being with each other in a community
appointed by God; and it is a way of acting together in which
members of the community act with and for each other. This mode
of 'action-for' Bonhoeffer calls the principle of 'vicarious represen-
tative action' or deputy ship [in German Stellvertretung, literally
'standing in place of], an idea to which Bonhoeffer would return in
his Ethics.
In spite of Bonhoeffer's frequent insistence that he describes the
Church in concrete rather than in abstract ways, his description has
seemed to some to be 'idealized' in the sense that it bears little
resemblance to the experience most of us have of the church as a
flawed community of flawed individuals. The sociologist Peter
Berger has noted that in Sanctorum Communio '[T]he empirical is
retained as an element of definition. But one looks in vain through
the pages of Sanctorum Communio for any utilization of empirical
data concerning the relationship of religion and society. In other

67
 BONHOEFFER

words, despite Bonhoeffer's definitions, his dialogue is actually one

between social philosophy and dogmatic theology, both operating
on levels of abstraction safely removed from the harshness of
empirical data.'12 This is fair up to a point, as Bonhoeffer does not
refer to sociological studies of the church as it is observed. Yet he is
well aware of the imperfections in practice of members within the
church community: 'there are some who are strong and others who
are weak, some who are honourable and others who are dishon-
ourable, some who are, from an ethical and religious perspective
exemplary and others who are inferior', to say nothing of the many
social differences that exist within the church (DBW 1 206). The
unity of the church then, clearly does not mean that everyone is
equally good (or equally bad); but is there any means of distin-
guishing 'true' believers from nominal believers? Bonhoeffer
answers that while the Kingdom of God is made up of all those who
are predestined by God as members of the church community, the
church that is visible to us in the world is comprised, through infant
baptism, of those who are potentially members of the Kingdom of
God. It is in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper that those who are
serious about submitting to the rule of God gather together. The
church-community of spirit has its source in Christ's gift of Himself
in bread and wine, which symbolically expresses the gathering of
individuals into community.

Four questions answered

What is a community? For Bonhoeffer, a community can be thought
of as a collective person with an 'objective spirit' that comes into
being when two or more individuals come together to form a 'new'
collective self capable of thought, intention, feeling and action. Most
groups of individuals commonly called 'communities' are in reality
merely societies formed around a goal or task, and are therefore
impermanent. Social philosophy and sociology, Bonhoeffer claims,
help to identify and describe 'community', but are unable to
recognize the Church-community, which is only visible with the
eyes of Christian faith and which is, theologically speaking, unique
in relation to all other forms of community. A community can be as
small as a community of two (e.g. a marriage) or large as all human
beings (in the community of the human race).
In answer to the question 'which comes first: the individual or the
community?' Bonhoeffer asserts that '[I]n God's eyes, community
and individual exist in the same moment and rest in one another'

68
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

(DBW 1 80). The choice 'individual or community' is, for

Bonhoeffer, a false one; it is, rather a case of both individual and
community. The community does not take priority over the
individual and the individual does not take priority over the
community.
But how is the church-community different from other forms of
community? For Bonhoeffer, the church-community shares
common features with other forms of human community. Most
significantly the church-community, though it lives in anticipation
of holy perfection, remains in the present a sinful community that
shares in Adam's (fallen) humanity. Yet the church alone is 'Christ
existing as church-community'.13 Community is essential to
Christianity, Bonhoeffer maintains, as it is not essential to other
religions.14 This does not mean that true community only takes place
in the observable community of the local congregation, since the
Kingdom of God is not identical with the church. But only in God
can the barrier that exists between I and You be transcended; only in
God is community truly possible.
This raises the question of how, in communities other than the
Church, the ethical barrier between individuals may be crossed to
allow them to become 'collective personalities'. Presumably, the
same God who makes it possible to overcome the ethical barrier
between individuals — and therefore makes community possible — is
also able to overcome barriers between communities and to enable a
community of communities. The description of the 'other' (the
'You') as different to the T - which Bonhoeffer derived from his
reading of social philosophy - might provide a model for the
social-ethical relations of collective personalities (i.e. of different
moral communities) as much as it does the relations of individuals.

Act and Being

Imagine a friend, someone you know well: how do you know what
he is like? How do you know who he is? Perhaps you think you
know him because of how he treats you (e.g. because he is kind) or
because he tells you about his history or his opinions. Perhaps you
think you know him because of something he has done (e.g. you
might think he is thoughtful because he gave you an appropriate
birthday gift). Fine: but do any of these things lead you to think you
really know him completely? Put positively, is the element of
mystery in human relationships one of the things that makes them
worth investing ourselves in?

69
 BONHOEFFER

In all human relationships, there is an element of risk, an element

of trust, and a dimension that lies open to the future. In some
respects knowing God is similar to knowing a friend; for example,
we can never say we 'know' God, if what we mean by that is that
we have apprehended everything God is. Our relationship with God,
like our relationship with a friend can never be complete because if
it is healthy we are constantly learning new things. But knowing
God also has characteristics that are unique. While we have a lot in
common with a friend (we are both human beings) God is not the
same as us (for example God is uncreated and we are created). If we
truly know anything about God, we know that God is greater than
the capacity of our imagination (or if you prefer, our mind) to grasp
God. But does this mean that we cannot really know anything about
God at all? Immanuel Kant expressed this problem with particular
clarity and force. He was interested primarily in the possibility of
philosophical knowledge that transcends the bounds of experience,
but what he said of philosophy had profound implications for
human knowledge of God too. Kant thought that human knowledge
was limited to the way things 'appear' to the mind, to what he called
phenomena. Things in themselves, what he called noumena are, he
said, thinkable (imaginable) but not actually knowable. Knowing
God was, for Kant, a special case of this teaching. Kant believed
that one cannot say 'I know God exists' and mean by it that we
know God as God is in himself. Yet he did not think this necessarily
meant that saying 'I know God exists' is a lie. Take out a penny
from your pocket; now 'set alongside it' an imaginary penny. The
'real' penny and the imaginary penny are very different: you can
touch one and not the other, for example. But one can still say some
things about the imaginary penny that are as 'true' about it as they
are of the real penny: for example there is only one real penny and
there is only one imaginary penny. Similarly, we can say some
things that are 'true' about God, even if our minds cannot really
know God as God is in Godself. Kant called his theory 'transcen-
dental idealism'. Bonhoeffer thought that Kant's 'transcendental
idealism' was largely responsible for the crisis in philosophy and
theology that in Act and Being he wanted to resolve.
Philosophically, the problem is epistemological (i.e. it has to do
with theories that explain questions like 'how do I know
something?' and 'how does a subject know an object?').
Theologically this is the problem of revelation (i.e. 'in what sense is
God disclosed to humanity, and how is this possible?' 'in what
sense are theological concepts based on revelation trueT).

70
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

Bonhoeffer characterized this problem as 'an attempt to come to

an agreement about the problem of act and being' (DBW 2, 25). Is
God known in the act of faith, a moment in which God gives
Godself ? Or does God somehow exist in his revelation, so that in it
we know God's being? Bonhoeffer believed that Barm's view
(remember he was writing in the late 1920s) was closer to the
former, that is to an act-based understanding of revelation that
emphasized the freedom of God from his revelation in order to
preserve God's ultimate aseity, God's infinite qualitative difference
from humankind. Though Bonhoeffer respected the basic orientation
of Barth's theology he suspected it retained elements of Kant's
erroneous view, as he saw it, that God cannot really be apprehended
by the human mind. At the same time Martin Heidegger was
pioneering a philosophical revolution that challenged Kant's
approach by reopening a question, long ignored by philosophy,
about the nature of being (the technical term is ontology). In
Heidegger's brilliant, if incomplete, analysis of being - in German
'Dasein' ('being there') - he argued that the essence of human
Dasein, lies in an individual's capacity to reflect on his own
existence. Human Dasein, that is, does not have a fixed nature; 'its
essence lies in its always having its being to be, and having it as its
own', so that our 'being' depends on our understanding of it.
Bonhoeffer wanted to see how the Barthian theological revolution
(with its emphasis on God's freedom in revelation) and the
Heideggerian philosophical revolution (with its fresh approach to
ontology) could be brought together. 'In other words', he wrote, the
question is how 'the meaning of "the being of God in revelation"
must be interpreted, theologically, including how it is known, how
faith as act, and revelation as being, are related to one another and,
correspondingly, how human beings stand in light of revelation'
(DBW 2 28). This 'theoretical' question of how act and being cohere
has cash value in the relation between an individual's act of faith -
von Harnack's overriding concern and that of liberal Protestantism
- and the being of the Church-community15 of Christ, which
Bonhoeffer had described in Sanctorum Communio.
In the first part of Act and Being Bonhoeffer deepened his
examination of the alternatives established by Kant's transcendental
idealism and Heidegger's ontology. Kant's transcendental idealism,
Bonhoeffer asserted, had been taken to an extreme by later idealist
thinkers. While Kant thought that the objects of knowledge, i.e. the
world, are in reference to me, later idealists believed more extremely
that the world actually 'comes about' through my apprehension of it.

71
 BONHOEFFER

Thus, it is more accurate to say there are, in philosophy, not two but
three alternative understandings of how the transcendent is appre-
hended by the mind: 'Transcendental philosophy regards thinking to
be "in reference to" transcendence; idealism takes transcendent
being into thinking; and, finally, ontology leaves being fully
independent of thinking and accords being priority over thinking'
(DBW 2 60). Bonhoeffer wanted, without altogether dismissing
them, to move beyond all three approaches because '[T]hinking is as
little able as good works to deliver the cor corvum in se [the heart
turned in upon itself- Luther's phrase] from itself (DBW2 80). The
problem was how to do this; his solution was to return to the ideas
developed in his doctoral dissertation by looking at how the Church
interprets revelation as both act and being.
In Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer had argued that the Church
can only be properly understood from within; now he transposed
that insight into epistemology by asserting that 'only those who have
been placed into the truth can understand themselves in truth' (DBW
2 81); that is only those who approach knowledge from within
(God's) revelation will understand the extent to which human
beings, on their own, are incapable of true knowledge. Revelation is
not something that the human mind abstracts from its investigation
of the world: it is God's gift. Bonhoeffer understood, therefore, what
Barm intended by maintaining that God is not bound to anything, not
even to the historical record of his revelation in the Bible. If we think
revelation is contained in the Bible, there is a danger that we
transform God's free Word into something static that is at the
disposal of every individual who takes the Bible into her hand. But
Bonhoeffer could not accept Barm's insistence that revelation is an
event, an act of God who gives - or withholds - Godself freely. This
was where 'transcendentalism is lurking' in Barm's theology.16 For
Bonhoeffer, this was simply not the best way to put things. In reply,
he proposed that:

In revelation it is not so much a question of the freedom of God

- eternally remaining within the divine self, aseity - on the other
side of revelation, as it is of God's coming out of God's own self
in revelation. It is a matter of God's given Word, the covenant in
which God is bound by God's own action ... God is free not from
human beings but for them. Christ is the word of God's freedom.
God is present, that is, not in eternal nonobjectivity but - to put it
quite provisionally for now - 'haveable', graspable in the Word
within the church. (DBW2 90-1)

72
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

To expand this 'provisional' explanation and to balance Earth's —

and Kant's - one-sided account of act, Bonhoeffer looked at revelation
from the perspective of being. In what sense, he asked, does God exist
in revelation - that is, how exactly is God 'haveable' in God's Word?
Already within theology Bonhoeffer discerned three possible expla-
nations of the being of God in revelation; but in none of them did he
find what he was looking for. One explanation speaks of God existing
within theological doctrine. The problem with this, however, is that
even if the doctrine concerned is 'true', for example the teaching that
God is gracious, there is every danger that God becomes tied down in
doctrine within a human system of belief. If God really did exist in
doctrine, faith would no longer be God's free gift, but a human possi-
bility - an act of the mind and the will which grasps God by
understanding a doctrine and by then choosing to assent to it. A second
view of 'revelation as being' is to understand it as a religious
experience. This view teaches that 'God is found in my experience,
understandable and subject to classification within the human system
of experiences' (DBW2 104) as if God were required to reveal Godself
according to the quality of my spiritual life. Bonhoeffer suspected that
here too there was a sleight of hand, for one may have religious
experience without a genuinely life-transforming encounter with
God's existence. Finally, revelation may be conceived as embodied in
an institution. Bonhoeffer gives two examples: Protestants who
maintain that the Bible is verbally inspired by God; and Roman
Catholics who believe the Church to be a divinely instituted embod-
iment of revelation. In these institutional forms of revelation God is
again bound up and at the disposal of human beings, as if when one
affirms the verbal inspiration of Scripture or joins the (true) Church,
God must be revealed to one in the words of Scripture, or in the
authority of the Church's teaching office. In these three caricatures
Bonhoeffer effects potentially devastating critiques of contemporary
religion. God's creatures, Bonhoeffer insists, cannot take hold of and
smother God's existence. God is free, and God's existence will remain
remote unless 'God takes hold of human beings and turns them
around' (DBW2 106). This revelation takes place not in the Church
considered as an institution, but in the Church where it is 'understood
to be constituted by the present proclamation of Christ's death and
resurrection - within, on the part of, and for the community of faith'
(DBW 2 110). In the community of the Church God gives Godself to
human individuals by setting their being in relation to Christ's. Where
human being is in relation to Christ knowing too takes place in faith.
Theological truth, Bonhoeffer argues, is only 'haveable' in the Church.

73
 BONHOEFFER

The full implications of Bonhoeffer's conclusion for philo-

sophical and theological epistemology were profound. In the final
part of his thesis Bonhoeffer began to unpack his attempt to unify
act and being in relation to Paul's teaching that human being is 'in
Adam' and 'in Christ'. For Bonhoeffer, Paul's characterization of
human being 'in Adam' was both a richly ontological and biblical
way of expressing human sinfulness. Luther's axiom was that we
may only know that we are sinners by faith; Bonhoeffer understood
by this that only though God's revelation can human beings know
they are sinners. Paul's being 'in Adam' was identical with
Luther's cor corvum in se - the heart turned in on itself in sin. Such
sin is not only a violation of God's law; it is a denial of the true
human being in God's image and likeness for which we were made.
This truth disrupts any understanding of sin in terms of particular
sinful acts, of specific sins committed in particular moments. If that
is really all sin means, then becoming sinless would be relatively
easy: one would simply need to stop committing sinful acts. But if
sinful acts arise from sinful being - from being 'in Adam' - only
the Saviour can restore being human to the wholeness of being 'in
Christ'. The greater part of Act and Being was spent clarifying the
questions at the heart of early twentieth-century theology. In the
last few pages Bonhoeffer's writing style changes gear as he begins
to point out directions in which answers to those questions may be
found.

Three further questions answered

How, in ethics, should the relationship between good acts and
being good be conceived? For Bonhoeffer, the answer does not
take the form 'either/or', but 'both and'. What one does makes up
who one is; but likewise, who one is determines what one does:
'Thus, in Adam act is as constitutive for being as being is for act;
both act and being enter into judgement as guilty' (DBW2 146). If
it is the case, 'in Adam', that act and being cannot be uncoupled,
what is the case 'in Christ'? For the Christian, Bonhoeffer
continues, in the Church community the promise of a future new
being in Christ is realized, for '[I]n faith the future is present... the
human being "is" in the future of Christ - that is, never in being
without act, and never in act without being' (DBW2 159), 'always
act, because it is being; always being, because it is act' (DBW 2
161).
There is nothing that an individual can do to realize this new

74
SELF, COMMUNITY AND REVELATION: BUILDING BLOCKS OF ETHICS

being ('What must I do to inherit eternal life?' (Mark 10:17)), for

'[HJuman beings are "there" for and by means of Christ': this is the
mystery and gift of faith. The only thing one may do is to seek
Christ, for nothing may be achieved by seeking to find one's own
new being. In answer to the question 'Who should I be (what kind
of person should I be)?' Bonhoeffer reiterates Jesus' demand that the
disciple should be like a child. To-let-oneself-be-defined by means
of the future is the eschatological possibility of the child. The child
(full of anxiety and bliss) sees itself in the power of what "future
things" will bring, and for that reason it can only live in the present'
(DBW2 159). The theological clue to this is given in the 'problem'
of infant baptism, in which the child, unable consciously to reflect
on itself, is nonetheless graced with the promise of God. The mature
adult who is in Christ is recalled by her baptism into childhood, a
call that can only be understood as an eschatological promise. Infant
baptism constitutes a direct act of God, an actus directus in contrast
to the act of reflection, the actus reflexus\ for the true act of faith can
never be conscious, but only ever a direct act of God. After many
complex twists and turns, Bonhoeffer concludes Act and Being with
great lucidity: 'It is the new creation of those born from out of the
world's confines into the wideness of heaven, becoming what they
were or never were, a creature of God, a child' (DBW 2 161).

Notes
1 The Identity of Christianity, Stephen Sykes, SPCK, 1984, p. 127.
2 What is Christianity, Adolf von Harnack, Williams & Norgate, 1912, pp. 57-8.
3 'Sociology and Ecclesiology', Peter Berger, p. 54 in The Place of Bonhoeffer, ed.
Martin E. Marty, SCM, 1963.
4 Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography, E. Bethge, Fortress, 2000, p. 167.
5 Love Letters from Cell 92, D. Bonhoeffer and M. Wedemeyer, Harper Collins,
1994, pp. 184-5.
6 In this section I am indebted to chapter 10, 'Self and Community', pp. 257-96, in
Politics Theology and History, Raymond Plant, Cambridge University Press,
2001.
7 Margaret Thatcher: The Downing Street Years, Margaret Thatcher, Harper
Collins, 1993, p. 626.
8 A Theory of Justice, John Rawls, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.
9 The Peaceable Kingdom, Stanley Hauerwas, SCM, 1984, pp. 24-5.
10 See Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, Alasdair Maclntyre, Duckworth,
1990.

75
 BONHOEFFER

11 The Nichomachean Ethics, Book II: 1, Aristotle, OUP, 1986, p. 29. This passage is
cited by Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen in Bible and Ethics in the
Christian Life, Augsburg, Minneapolis, 1989, p. 42.
12 Berger, art. cit., p. 59.
13 Bonhoeffer generally uses the word 'Gemeinschaft' for 'community' and
'Gemeinde' to mean the 'church community'. The somewhat ugly conjunction
'church-community' used by the translators of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works is
an attempt to distinguish between these two kinds of community. However, the
German word 'Gemeinde' can be translated as 'church', 'local congregation',
'parish' or 'community', depending on the context, and so can sometimes refer to
worshipping believers, and sometimes to the whole 'community' - those who
practise Christianity and those who do not - within the parish boundary.
14 The claim is rather rash! Bonhoeffer was virtually ignorant about other religious
communities except through what he had read.
15 See note 13 above.
16 The accuracy of Bonhoeffer's portrayal of Earth's views is hotly debated.

76
 5

The Fall: the origin of

Christian ethics

Dietrich Bonhoeffer's 1932/33 lectures on the first three chapters of

Genesis were formative for his theological ethics. This was the
period in which, Bonhoeffer would write in 1936, he discovered the
Bible and became a Christian. Also in 1933 Adolf Hitler became
German Reich Chancellor, changing the course of world history and
with it the direction of Bonhoeffer's life. What connections can be
made between these events — between Bonhoeffer's 'discovery' of
the Bible and his opposition to Nazi misrule? In this chapter I
explore this question in relation to Creation and Fall. In these
lectures Bonhoeffer realizes what has previously been implicit in his
theology: that reading the Bible and following Christ make a real
difference to the way the Christian lives in the world.
In reading Bonhoeffer's lectures I want to raise two sets of
questions. The first set of questions concerns the way that myths in
general, and the myth of the Fall in particular, can function as
commentary on contemporary moral or political concerns. The
seventeenth-century English poet John Milton can help us to open
this question out. Bonhoeffer's exegesis of creation and Fall was
given in Berlin against a vivid political backdrop. Even if he did not
intend the lectures as political commentary, the capacity of the Bible
to address the situation that he and his student audience now faced
can hardly have failed to interest Bonhoeffer. To what extent and in
what ways does Bonhoeffer's telling of the myths of creation and

77
 BONHOEFFER

Fall serve as commentary on the political crisis that developed

around him? By reading Bonhoeffer's exegesis of creation and Fall
alongside his more overtly political writings from this period, I hope
to show something of Bonhoeffer's political theology.
A second set of questions flows from this first and concerns how
Christian ethics is situated in relation to moral and political debate
at the broadest public level. Such questions are stimulatingly
explored by Stanley Hauerwas in his Gifford lectures of 2000/01
(published under the title With the Grain of the Universe)1 which
present a robust argument for the distinctiveness of Christian ethics.
Hauerwas does this in part by means of a dialogue with Reinhold
Niebuhr's social ethics. Bonhoeffer - who had been a less than
slavish student of Niebuhr's in New York - likewise distinguished
Christian ethics from all other ethics, but did so by means of the
story of the Fall. It is through exegesis of Genesis 1-3 that
Bonhoeffer articulates the view that Christian ethics stands apart
from all other ethics and is a critique of all other ethics. A lot is at
stake in this debate: is all ethical conversation a single activity in
which Christians participate and for whom the effectiveness of
Christian participation in society is the measure of its worth, as
Niebuhr maintained? Or are Christian ethics really unique, in which
case Christians are in the world but shaped by values and practices
that distinguish them sharply from prevailing social mores, the only
proper measure of which is not what impact their way of life has but
the extent to which it witnesses faithfully to Christ?

John Milton, poetry, politics and the Fall

The biographical parallels between John Milton and Dietrich

Bonhoeffer are few, but striking. Both lived through periods of
political turmoil and war; both were considerable scholars; both
were patriots committed to sharing the fate of their nation; both were
imprisoned; both were thoroughgoing Protestants, though Milton
was a heterodox Arminian and Bonhoeffer an orthodox Lutheran;
both wrote poetry, though one was better at it than the other; Milton
defended regicide and Bonhoeffer defended tyrannicide. But for my
purposes it is not their biographies, but their respective treatments of
the Fall that justify a comparison.
The struggle between England's King and England's parliament
that took up the better part of John Milton's maturity occasioned the
most vigorous political debate in English history. For a brief period
all political options were open, from the divine right of kings, to the

78
 THE FALL: THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

levelling of all ranks of people; from a society based on the

individual ownership of property to one based on the common
ownership of land and wealth. Some took a radical view of the
Bible: the Digger Gerard Winstanley thought 'it matters not much'
whether the Bible stories were true or not.2 But in much of this
revolutionary debate the Bible in general and the story of the Fall in
particular was used as a vehicle of political conversation. The Bible
was appealed to as justification for contrasting and competing
political points of view. The story of the Fall was, for example, used
to account for the need for private property, for the origins of social
inequality, and for the necessity of the institutions of the state and of
marriage.
In his account of Milton and the English Revolution Christopher
Hill rehearses this context to explain the choice of the Fall as the
subject of John Milton's Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained', but
he also goes one step further. In both poems, Hill hypothesizes,
'Milton is grappling with problems set by the failure of God's cause
in England'.3 It was not simply that the doctrine of the Fall was
integral to contemporary political discussion of private property,
social inequality, of the state and of the family - all topics on which
Milton had written before he began the poem cycles - but that by
mid-1660, when he was under way with Paradise Lost, other
avenues of political activity once open to him had been closed.
Active as a political pamphleteer and as Cromwell's correspondence
secretary, Milton was a steadfast propagandist of the Revolution. So
on the eve of the Restoration in 1660 his previous proximity to
power made overt political writing hazardous. Writing poems about
the Fall allowed Milton to express political views with a chance that
he would escape prosecution. Yet, Hill continues, the story of the
Fall was not merely a convenient vehicle for Milton; it was also
inspirationally appropriate. Milton believed the Bible to be true
both as history and as allegory. The Fall of Adam recorded not only
the origins of humankind, but illuminated the moral defects of the
English in the 1650s. Adam served not only as forerunner of Christ,
but as the prototype for the fallen leaders of the Revolution: the
leaders of the English Commonwealth of 1659-60 were, for Milton,
re-enacting 'as macabre farce the tragedy of the Fall'.4 Adam
expresses Milton's disillusioned viewpoint of English collective
guilt:

Him after all disputes

Forced I absolve: above all my evasions vain

79
 BONHOEFFER

And reasonings, through mazes, lead me still

But to my own conviction: first and last
On me, me only, as the source and spring
Of all corruption, all the blame lights due.
(Paradise Lost X, lines 828-33)

The myth of the Fall proves, in the poetry of John Milton, to be a

highly flexible means of interweaving theology and politics. It was
not only that retelling a biblical story enabled Milton to escape the
censor, but that the qualities in this particular myth seemed so
obviously to account for central features of human sociality.
None of this would surprise Wendy Doniger who in the The
Implied Spider5 explores the relation of politics and theology in
myth. Myth, Doniger believes, is a tool that can be used in a variety
of ways, including both theological and political ways. Myths are
stories, though not all stories are myths, and as story a myth is not
simply 'a lie or a false statement to be contrasted with truth or reality
or fact or history, though this usage is, perhaps, the most common
meaning of myth in casual parlance today'.6 Indeed, it is myth's
capacity for ambiguity that makes it possible for it to be believed in
the teeth of evidence that it is factually untrue. Take the formula
with which Sudanese storytellers typically begin:

'I'm going to tell a story', they announce. 'Right!' their audience

responds. 'It's a lie' they continue, 'Right!' their audience
answers. 'But not everything in it is false!7

Myths draw their power from groups of people that treat them as
sacred stories and find their most important meaning in them. To
describe the way myth functions Doniger employs the metaphor of
the microscope and the telescope. Imagine a continuum of narratives
that use words: at one end of the continuum is the entirely personal,
e.g. a realistic novel or a diary. This end is the microscope: it is
about the individual, it concerns what could or did only happen to
this one person. At the other end of the continuum is the general and
the abstract: this is the telescope, it is the academic treatise, the
mathematical formula; it is concerned with what is true everywhere.
Myth vibrates in the centre of this continuum: 'of all the things made
of words' Doniger proposes, 'myths span the widest range of human
concerns, human paradoxes'. Myth requires of us 'a peculiar kind of
double vision' and as with physically looking through microscopic
and telescopic lenses, looking through myth requires skill. It is this

80
 THE FALL: THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

skill of simultaneous engagement with both ends of the narrative

continuum that makes myth unique. The book of Job furnishes an
example in which the microscope of Job's self-pity is whipped from
his hand and replaced by God's telescope focused on the cosmos.
This is the theological function of myth: to link theology with daily
reality.
This wide-angle, telescopic focus in myth can also function
simultaneously, Doniger maintains, as theology and as politics.
Myth can realize 'the political implications of our own theological
assumptions' and help to 'respect the humanity of political others by
appreciating their theologies'. To be sure, some myths sound an
anti-political note, by suggesting for example that there is another,
higher reality more real than our own. But some myths can help us
to think globally and act locally. When Otto Schindler looks down
upon the liquidation of the Krakow ghetto in Spielberg's film,
Schindler's List, in all the monochrome chaos he sees one little girl
in a red coat, a single red thread through the mystery of genocide. It
is this shift from the telescopic to the microscopic that bears him
from indifference to compassion and from resignation to action.
Milton and Doniger hold out a lens through which to look at
Bonhoeffer's interpretation of Genesis 1-3 against the political
context in which he fashioned it. Of course, Milton and Bonhoeffer
were not using the story of creation and Fall in the same way. Milton
recast the myth with the biblical text in the background, while
Bonhoeffer was offering a direct exposition of the biblical text. But
the qualities of myth teased out by Doniger hold true, I think, for
Bonhoeffer's exposition as much as for Milton's reworking of the
same story. The political events taking place around Bonhoeffer's
lecture theatre exposed fundamental questions of political life: in a
setting where democracy appeared to have failed where was political
authority to derive from? What is the proper nature of power and
what the nature of authority? In a situation of widespread
unemployment what is the place of work in human life? Events also
exposed theological questions: What is the role of the Church in
politics? Is political conflict an inevitable consequence of corrupt
human nature?

Creation and Fall

The first sentences of Creation and Fall express the tension that, in
Bonhoeffer's view, characterizes the relationship between the
Church and the world. This tension arises from a profound

81
 BONHOEFFER

difference in the orientation of the world and the Church: 'The

church of Christ witnesses to the end of all things. It lives from the
end, it thinks from the end, it proclaims its message from the end'
(DBW 3 21). True, the Church lives within the old world; but its
orientation to a new world spells the end for the old and 'the old
world is not happy to let itself be declared dead' (DBW 3 21). How
is it possible for the Church, which exists in time like every other
institution; or the Christian, who lives like every other individual in
the middle of time and history, to speak authoritatively of the
beginning of the universe and of the end point of time to which the
world is travelling? This human impossibility is made possible on
the basis of the witness of Scripture, which knows Christ as the
beginning and the end. This claim - that the Bible is the Church's
book - proves crucial to Bonhoeffer's argument and to his
exegetical method. It is the basis of his claim that these ancient
Jewish texts must be read in the Church in a way that begins and
ends with Jesus Christ; and it forms the presupposition of his method
of'theological exposition' of the Bible.
Bonhoeffer breaks his lectures into 22 sections, each reflecting on
verses or passages in the biblical narrative. No one 'can speak of the
beginning but the one who was in the beginning'. Because of this,
'God alone tells us that God is in the beginning; God testifies of God
by no other means than through his word, which, as the word of a
book, the words of a pious human being, is wholly a word that
comes from the middle and not from the beginning' (DBW 3 30).
The beginning described in Genesis 1 is not to be thought of in
temporal terms; but as something unique, a limit beyond which
human beings cannot go. The character of this beginning,
Bonhoeffer asserts, can only be known in the resurrection, which is,
like God's creation, a creating out of nothing.
In other ancient creation myths a deity creates by imparting
something of its own nature to creation. But in the Bible, God's
being is never mixed in with what God creates. There is, then,
nothing that unites God with creation except God's word (DBW 3
40). God is not bound to creation, God does not enter creation, but
is in the world 'only' in the word. With Martin Luther, Bonhoeffer
distinguished God's role as Creator from God's role as preserver of
creation. This was to counter two erroneous understandings, as he
saw them, of God's relation to what God creates. During the
Enlightenment the Deists proposed that God was the Prime Mover,
the first cause, who created the world but then passively sat back as
creation carried on with no further divine involvement. A second

82
 THE FALL: THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

view, increasingly prevalent in Germany among pro-Nazi

theologians, was that God not only created the world but constantly
intervenes within it in new acts of creation, for example bringing
about the German Volk. Bonhoeffer maintained that God not only
created the world, but is involved daily with it to preserve what God
created. Yet speaking of that involvement as 'creation' risks
implying that there was something imperfect in the original creation
that God must tinker with until God gets it right. God does not
continually wrest creation out of nothingness, but upholds and
affirms creation in itself, even though it is fallen.
In the opening verses of Genesis 1 that which God creates is dead.
Only in verse 11 does God create something living from something
dead, not by a process of evolution, but by divine command. Yet that
which lives does not run of its own accord for if God withdraws
from his work the world sinks back into nothingness. The creation
of life to this point in the narrative was good, but still God did not
recognize God's self in what had been made. Only with the creation
of human beings does God create something that resembles the
Creator? The creation of humanity differs from the creation of other
living things in several ways. God does not simply call humankind
forth out of non-being, as was the case with all God's previous
creative acts; humankind is taken up into God's planning. Human
beings are certainly connected with the animals, but their peculiar
relation to God, which is expressed in terms of image and likeness,
distinguishes them alone. This relationship is not to be thought of as
a likeness of being, an analogia entis, but rather, as an analogia
relationis. 'What this means', Bonhoeffer explains, 'is firstly, that
the relatio [the relationship] too is not a human potential or possi-
bility or a structure of human existence; instead it is a given
relationship, a relation in which human beings are set, a justitia
passival [passive righteousness]' (DBW 3 65). It is a likeness
derived entirely from the one who is the prototype to whom the
likeness points, and is not a quality of human being independent
from its source. The Sabbath marks the blessing and completion of
the first creation narrative.
If the first creation narrative is for Bonhoeffer about humankind
for God thought out from above; then the second is about God for
humankind, thought out from below. The two narratives therefore
complement rather than contradict one another. The anthropomor-
phisms of the Yahwist account of the creation of Adam (in Genesis
l-2:4a) are, Bonhoeffer acknowledges, insupportably childlike.
However, he brushes this off because 'in being distinguished as the

83
 BONHOEFFER

word of God it [the story] is quite simply the source of knowledge

about the origin of humankind' (DBW 3 75-6). It expresses the
physical nearness of the Creator to the creature, but also God's
omnipotence. This is the background to a remark Bonhoeffer now
makes that echoes Wendy Doniger's account of the nature and value
of myth. 'Who can speak of these things', he asks, 'except in
pictures? Pictures after all are not lies; rather they indicate things
and enable the underlying meaning to shine through' (DBW 3 81).
The exposition that follows must therefore 'seek to translate the old
picture language of the magical world into the new picture language
of the technical world' (DBW 3 83).
In the centre of Eden stand two trees: the tree of knowledge of
good and evil, and the tree of life. Bonhoeffer mentions historical
critical analysis of the two trees, but only to dismiss it by reiterating
that 'our concern is the text as it presents itself to the church today'.
The tree of life is at the centre as God is at the centre of Adam's life
in the Garden. 'The distinctive characteristic of Adam's life is
utterly unbroken and unified obedience, that is, Adam's innocence
and ignorance of disobedience' (DBW 3 84). Adam understands the
limit imposed by God's word. It is not because he can distinguish
between good and evil that Adam understands his limit. Rather, the
prohibition to eat the fruit of the tree indicated on the one hand his
freedom, and on the other the limit of his human creatureliness. This
boundary or limit to the human condition is not at the limit of his
capacities, as if it marked the limits of human technology or
ingenuity or capability: it is a limit at the centre of human life. The
limit is God, and the limit is grace.
Adam's loneliness is an anticipation of the loneliness of human
life. Christ is alone because he alone loves the other person; we are
alone, because we have hated others and pushed them away. Eve is
created by God as Adam's partner to share his limits and his life. At
the beginning of chapter 3, after the creation of the first human
community of husband and wife, Bonhoeffer titles his next section
'the pious question'. The serpent is not, for Bonhoeffer, an incar-
nation of the devil, but one of God's creatures who becomes an
instrument of evil. By spelling this out Bonhoeffer sidesteps the
question of how evil came into the world, justifying the evasion on
the basis that the biblical narrative of the Fall does not address the
question either. The serpent is subtle: to begin with he does not
dispute God's word. His question, 'Did God really say?' is appar-
ently innocent. Bonhoeffer describes his exchange with Eve as the
first religious conversation and the first theological debate. But the

84
 THE FALL: THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

question opens up a brave new world of possibilities unsuspected by

Eve in her innocence. 'The decisive point', Bonhoeffer explains,

is that through this question the idea is suggested to the human

being of going behind the word of God and now providing it with
a human basis - a human understanding of the essential nature of
God. Should the word contradict this understanding, then the
human being has clearly misheard. (DBW 3 106)

So what, Bonhoeffer continues, 'is the real evil in this question?':

It is not that a question as such is asked. It is that this question

already contains the wrong answer. It is that with this question the
basic attitude of the creature toward the Creator comes under
attack. It requires humankind to sit in judgement on God's word
instead of simply listening to it and doing it. And this is achieved
by proposing that, on the basis of an idea, a principle, or some
prior knowledge about God, humankind should now pass
judgement on the concrete word of God. (DBW 3 107—8)

When Eve still resists temptation, the serpent takes a more

aggressive line, suggesting to her that God's prohibition of the
tree's fruit is intended to prevent Eve and Adam becoming 'sicut
deus\ like God: eat of the fruit, lies the serpent, and you too can be
like God. Eating the fruit removes a limit, as the serpent suggested
it would, and makes Eve and Adam sicut deus, at the centre, but
alone. Humankind 'now lives out of its own resources, creates its
own life, is its own creator; it no longer needs the Creator, it has
itself become the creator, inasmuch as it creates its own life' (DBW
3 115).
After the Fall, already before their expulsion from the garden,
Eve and Adam experience shame. To Bonhoeffer, shame and
conscience are symptoms of the fallen state of humanity. Shame, he
asserts, is 'an unwilling pointer to revelation, to the limit, to the
other, to God' (DBW3 124). It points to revelation because it draws
attention to the fallen nature of humankind, but, since it is a result of
that fallen nature, it is not itself something good - a common,
flawed, 'moralistic, puritanical' interpretation. The word God
addresses to Eve and Adam as they flee God is a word of both curse
and of promise. It is curse as God's affirmation that paradise is
destroyed and that humanity must now live out of its own resources,
sicut deus. It is promise in that, even though it is a word of anger and

85
 BONHOEFFER

judgement, it is God's word, and accompanies humanity in its new

life. Work falls under the same curse, as it fastens humanity's
separateness from nature in toil. At the same time it is promise, in
that human beings are permitted to go on living alongside the natural
world from which they have separated themselves. Bonhoeffer's
account concludes by reiterating that 'the creator is now the
preserver; the created world is now the fallen but preserved world'
(DBW 3 139). The final verse of chapter 3, announcing Cain's birth,
is for Bonhoeffer intrinsic to the story of the Fall as it marks the
beginning of human community in the fallen world.

What was new in Bonhoeffer's Genesis lectures?

Though it is sensible not to set too much store by student recollec-
tions gathered years after the events they describe, they may help us
to gain an impression of the freshness of Bonhoeffer's theology for
students in the early 1930s. One Berlin student recalled being struck
by Bonhoeffer's way of turning things round, 'away from where
they were stored for everyday use, to the place God had ordained for
them ... in the process the values that had been so familiar and
natural to us were transformed as if by themselves'.8 Another found
his exegesis hard to take, and thought the lectures were 'fairy tales'
lacking in philosophical rigour (DBW 3 3). Similar reactions were
provoked when on 10 October 1934 Bonhoeffer gave a talk at
Richmond Methodist College in London. Bonhoeffer spoke on the
situation in Germany by using again his insights on creation and
Fall. One member of his audience remembered 'that he seemed to
take the Genesis stories as factual history whereas we were all
obsessed with the theory of evolution! We were in a different
thought world. My impression was that he convinced no one because
we were working from different premises.'9 Bonhoeffer's
hermeneutic perturbed another Richmond student for whom this was
his first encounter with Barthianism: 'I recall feeling "here is a man
who respects every word of Scripture, but he treats Scripture in an
allegorical way, a sort of Alexandrine redivivus"'.10 These remarks
underline the extent to which Bonhoeffer's theological exposition of
the Old Testament jarred with prevailing patterns of biblical
exegesis in Germany and in England. Dogmatic theology rarely
engaged in biblical exegesis, and biblical exegesis was in thrall to
the methods of historical criticism.
So what was new in Bonhoeffer's theology? John de Gruchy
(DBW 3 5-12) discerns five ways in which the lectures constitute a

86
 THE FALL: THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

turning point in Bonhoeffer's theological development. Firstly

Bonhoeffer's method of theological exposition of scripture marked
a new turn. Creation and Fall was 'Bonhoeffer's first attempt to do
theology in direct dialogue with the Bible' (DBW3 6). Karl Barm's
commentary on Paul's letter to the Romans might have created
controversy, but theologians all took Paul's theology seriously. The
Genesis myths on the other hand, outside the guild of Old Testament
scholarship, were widely regarded as primitive legends with little
relevance to modern life. Biblical scholars characterized their disci-
pline as scientific', a critical and therefore objective commentary on
the biblical text. Few thought it part of their job to interpret the Bible
theologically for contemporary ecclesial or even political life.
Bonhoeffer tried not to dismiss scholarly insights altogether, but his
concern was with the word of God for the Church, and for the
witness of the Church to the world.
A second way, de Gruchy continues, in which Bonhoeffer's
theological development pivots on these lectures was in his
distinctive use of the Old Testament. In Creation and Fall
Bonhoeffer read the Bible as a book of the Church, believing that 'it
is this in its very essence, or it is nothing' (DBW3 22). The third way
in which the lectures signal something new follows on from this
insight; not only did Bonhoeffer believe that the Bible must be read
as a book of the Church, he believed that the whole of the Bible
should be read within the Church as a book of Christ. The uncom-
promising Christocentrism of Bonhoeffer's reading of the Hebrew
Bible, in the wake of the Holocaust, creates obvious theological
problems; but this should not obfuscate the originality of
Bonhoeffer's commitment to recovering the Old Testament for
Christian theology in a climate in which it was widely dismissed as
irrelevant.
Creation and Fall is, fourthly, a turning point in its emphasis on
human freedom in relation to the freedom of God. For Bonhoeffer,
God gives human beings freedom to rule responsibly over creation.
This means that human freedom is freedom 'for others'. Finally, the
lectures are a turning point in opening up a theology of nature. As a
Lutheran, Bonhoeffer was concerned with the trend in Lutheran
theology, to view the German nation as a divinely instituted 'order
of creation'. Bonhoeffer took from Luther a distinction between
God's creative act and God's ongoing role in preserving or
sustaining what God has created. On this basis Bonhoeffer coins the
term 'orders of preservation'. In his ethics, he would return to this
theme, recasting the 'orders of preservation' as the 'divine

87
 BONHOEFFER

mandates'. With both terms Bonhoeffer attempts to redress an

abandonment of the natural order by Protestant theology.
Bonhoeffer's theology here foreshadows Stanley Hauerwas's recent
insistence that a theology rooted in the witness of Scripture to the
incarnation of Jesus Christ is in conflict with a theology of the
natural, properly understood, but works, in John H. Voder's capti-
vating phrase 'with the grain of the universe'.

Two questions revisited

The Fall, theology and politics
I want now to take up the two lines of questions with which I began
this chapter and to suggest two ways, further to those suggested by
de Gruchy, in which the lectures constitute a turning point in
Bonhoeffer's career.
Bonhoeffer's lectures on Creation and Fall are a turning point, I
suggest, in Bonhoeffer's theological engagement with the political.
Bonhoeffer had a longstanding interest in politics, but it was while he
was lecturing on Genesis that he first makes an explicit attempt to
comment publicly on political matters. It was not simply that he now
had something particular to comment on, but that something about his
reading of Genesis opened up a connection between theology and
politics that had previously been closed. On 1 February 1933, two
days after the Berlin crowds had enthusiastically acclaimed Hitler's
appointment as Reich Chancellor, Bonhoeffer gave a radio broadcast
on 'The Younger Generation's Altered View of the Concept of the
Fiihrer', a topic he had chosen before Hitler assumed power. The
politically controversial nature of the address may be the reason it was
cut off before Bonhoeffer had finished speaking. Bonhoeffer gave a
longer reflection on the same theme in a lecture at Berlin's
Technische Hochschule. The addresses are both theological and
political. Bonhoeffer breaks down the 'younger generation' into
groups who depend for their views on the experiences of their age
group: the oldest is the generation of war veterans; the youngest, those
not affected directly by the experience of war, and who live in the
shadow of their elders. The war marked the bitter triumph of
technology and machines and the failure of political ideologies. It
released the dull power of the masses in politics and emphasized the
insignificance of the individual. Above all, this effected a sea change
in German attitudes towards power and authority. Before the war,
authority figures in Germany derived their authority from the office
they held; as teachers, as lawyers, as Pastors, or parents or as

88
 THE FALL: THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

politicians. And because their authority was that of an office holder,

those in authority accepted that their authority had boundaries and
limits. The Fiihrer, Bonhoeffer argues, does not derive his authority
from an office, but from the loyalty of those who follow him. This has
two dangerous consequences: it makes his authority limitless, in
contrast with that of the office holder, and paradoxically it makes him
dependent on the whim of those who follow him. It was not the loss
of democracy that troubled Bonhoeffer in the collapse of the Weimar
constitution, but the loss of the law, the loss of the limits that constrain
office holders in the exercise of their authority. This characterization
of German politics very nearly implies that a political Fall had taken
place during the period of the Weimar constitution. In the earlier
political era of Empire Bonhoeffer implies that office holders
accepted the limits of their office as Adam accepted the limitation of
God's command not to eat of the tree of knowledge, while after the
Fall of the Weimar constitution the Fiihrer arrogated to himself the
sicut deus of power without the boundary of law. Bonhoeffer's
anxiety is that the Fiihrer is becoming for the younger generation a
verfiihrer, the leader a misleader. The Fiihrer is the serpent, tempting
the young to make themselves like God.11
The connection between Bonhoeffer's political awakening and
his exegesis of Genesis 1-3 is made explicit in the talk he gave at
Richmond Methodist College in October 1934. The only contem-
porary record of Bonhoeffer's address on this occasion is a journal
entry by John Wright, who hosted Bonhoeffer for the evening.
Wright recorded that Bonhoeffer spoke on the situation in Germany
by exploring the issue of authority. Authority, Bonhoeffer argued,
takes three forms. Logical authority 'wrecks itself on human
wisdom' since the incarnation contradicts reason and logic. Under
the heading 'psychological authority' Bonhoeffer contrasted
experience and faith: the German Christians claimed a new revel-
ation in National Socialism. But faith, Bonhoeffer asserted, 'can
only exist where there is no experience'; it is 'trust in defiance of
reason'. In Paradise, therefore, there was no scope for the reasoning
of conscience, since conscience assumes knowledge of good and
evil that Adam did not have before his expulsion from the Garden.
Historical authority assumes that there is a part of the world that is
not fallen, such as the Church, or an infallible Bible. But the only
part of the world that is free from sin, the only ultimate authority, is
Jesus Christ. This is the political explication of the Christocentric
hermeneutics of Creation and Fall that pulls the rug of authority
from beneath the feet of the Nazis and the German Christians.

89
 BONHOEFFER

The distinctiveness of Christian ethics

Bonhoeffer's use of the Genesis myths provides a link to one further
way in which Creation and Fall marks a significant turning point: by
means of this myth Bonhoeffer distinguishes Christian ethics from
all other ethics. 'The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the
aim of all ethical reflection', Bonhoeffer would write in his Ethics,
'The first task of Christian ethics is to invalidate this knowledge'. In
this way 'Christian ethics claims to discuss the origin of the whole
problem of ethics, and thus professes to be a critique of all ethics
simply as ethics' (E 3). Thus, in his full ethical maturity, Bonhoeffer
would repeat the insight developed in Creation and Fall that
'humanity at its origin knows only one thing: God', and thus 'the
knowledge of good and evil shows that he is no longer at one with
this origin'. The knowledge of good and evil is not, therefore,
knowledge of the good and evil of God, but of good and evil against
God. Jesus alone lives not by the knowledge of good and evil but by
the will of God. It is Christ who opens the possibility of a world of
recovered unity, but only for those who are prepared to move, using
Nietzsche's phrase, 'beyond good and evil' in simple obedience to
God.
Bonhoeffer's claim that Christian ethics is distinct from all other
ethics is every bit as emphatic as Stanley Hauerwas's and it raises
similar questions. It was easier for John Milton: when he wrote of
the Fall he was using a story that was used in the Church and in the
extra-ecclesial world of politics, and worked differently but effec-
tively in both spheres. For Bonhoeffer - as for us - connecting
theology and politics makes different demands because the Bible is
no longer both a 'book of the Church' and a source for public ethics
so that the links between Christian ethics and other ethics are no
longer obvious. So how we express the relationship of the Church
and the (secular) world makes a deal of difference. From the
Church's point of view, Bonhoeffer and Hauerwas insist, Christian
ethics is at one with God. And in obedience to God Christians are at
one with the natural, working with the grain of the universe. It is all
other ethics that are fissiparous, all other ethics that are dualistic, all
other ethics that are sectarian; for by claiming the knowledge of
good and evil they live in the wake of the divisive sin of Eve and
Adam. But does this insight - that Christian ethics is distinct from
all other ethics - really enable political action, as Bonhoeffer
believed, or does it separate Christian ethics and public ethics in
such a way as to permit no dialogue between them? Something of an

90
 THE FALL: THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

answer lies in the idea of divine limits to secular authority and of the
relation of human freedom to the freedom of God. If Hauerwas is
right it shouldn't matter that Bonhoeffer failed to prevent the
Confessing Church turning in on itself, or that the conspiracy failed
to remove Hitler: he was a faithful witness, and that is all that
matters. Success, Bonhoeffer wrote, is a temptation. But it is hard to
evade the feeling that if the world can simply go about its business
without paying any attention to the witness of Christian politics and
ethics, whatever its quality before God, something is still not quite
right. Creation and Fall set the parameters of Bonhoeffer's ethical
enquiry: what he needed now was to delineate its content.

Notes

1 With the Grain of the Universe, Stanley Hauerwas, SCM, 2002.

2 Milton and the English Revolution, Christopher Hill, Faber & Faber, 1977, p. 344.
3 Ibid., p. 345.
4 Ibid., p. 344.
5 The Implied Spider, Wendy Doniger, Columbia University Press, 1998.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
7 Ibid.
8 Wolf Dieter Zimmerman in / knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. Wolf Dieter
Zimmerman and Ronald Gregor Smith, Fontana, 1973.
9 Percy Scott, personal communication, 15 March 1989, in 'Uses of the Bible in the
Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer', Stephen Plant, Cambridge University PhD, 1993.
10 Reginald Kissack, personal communication, 18 March 1989, ibid.
11 Bonhoeffer's political views, which included antipathy, for Germany, towards a
liberal democratic political system, and sympathy for some form of legal
oligarchy, are uncomfortable for those formed by the assumptions of liberal
democracy. Among Bonhoeffer scholars the issue is generally avoided.

91
 6

Following Christ

The call of Saint Matthew

Genius does not always keep company with gentility. Michelangelo

Merisi da Caravaggio (1573-1610) was the finest Italian painter of
the seventeenth century, equally brilliant in executing epic subjects
and domestic life.1 He was also a man with an evil temper. At the
height of his career, when in spite of a poor personal reputation he was
attracting the most prestigious commissions in Rome, he killed a man
in a brawl and fled the Papal city in fear of arrest. Four years later his
artistic skill won him a pardon, but a series of misadventures befell
him on his journey to Rome and he died, isolated and desperate,
success draining through his fingers like water through the hands of a
thirsty man. Caravaggio gained his artistic reputation painting scenes
from the Roman backstreets in which he was at home. He painted
musicians and gypsies, cardsharps, glistening fruit, violent scenes and
pretty boys; he celebrated courtly graces and damned the cost. He lit
his paintings as if they were stage sets;2 he painted the bubbles in a
glass of red wine and the bloom of an apple with sublime veracity. But
his use of artistic models from Rome's seamy side gave a subversive
edge to his work. Even the patrons who could afford a Caravaggio
were not at all certain they wanted to be reminded of the faces the
other side of their palazzo walls.
Caravaggio was therefore a risky choice to paint three works for
the Saint Matthew side chapel of San Luigi dei Francesi. Not only

92
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

was he unknown as a painter of religious subjects, it was very likely

he would use the vagabonds, rakes and whores with whom he kept
company as models for his holy subjects. When he came to
Matthew's call, Caravaggio boldly set his painting in a Roman back
street. As some had feared, he used his friends as his models. The
boy in a feathered hat who leans casually on the Saint's shoulder had
last appeared in Caravaggio's painting of a youth conned by a
fortune-teller, and while others in the work are unidentifiable their
freshness suggests they were painted from life. To the left of the
painting Matthew and four companions sit beside a table more
evocative of card playing than counting taxes. One youth carries a
sword; another is lost in contemplation of the coins that lie on the
table. An old man wears spectacles, the better to see the money that
occupies his gaze. The men around the table are dressed in fine
clothes - fur-lined collars and feathered hats. They wear striking
colours: gold and red, black and white, blue and red in silk and
velvet. In every way in contrast to the scene at the table, to the right
of the picture stand two men in drab and simple clothes, Jesus and
Peter. Jesus' arm stretches towards Matthew and his hand, in a
gesture borrowed from the hand of Adam in the Sistine Chapel,
points towards Matthew who, astonished, points at himself to ask if
it really is him whom Jesus calls. The room in which the drama takes
place is as shady as the characters in it, but a shaft of light follows
the line of Jesus' hand and illuminates Matthew's face.
Yet the most astonishing feature of Caravaggio's painting is that
while Jesus and Peter wear simple togas - as the artist imagined they
would in the first century Levant - the men around the table wear
clothes contemporary with the time and place of the painting: Rome
at the turn of the seventeenth century. The painting holds together
two periods of time, the past and the present, and links them solely
by the power of Jesus' call. The effect is to lift the call of Matthew
from the antique world of the first century into the immediacy of the
present. It refocuses attention from Jesus calling Matthew to the call
he makes now to whoever sees the painting with faithful eyes. By
means of the lived-in faces of the friends who modelled for him and
by conveying a sense of the living interrelationship of the past and
the present, Caravaggio bridges the hermeneutical gap between
Jesus' call to Matthew and his call to us, between Scripture and its
readers.
There is no evidence that Bonhoeffer ever saw Caravaggio's
depiction of Matthew's call; in the diary he kept of his stay in Rome
he seems to have favoured Rome's classical to its Renaissance

93
 BONHOEFFER

aspect. In any case it is a pity he did not know it better: Caravaggio's

'The calling of St Matthew' is the perfect frontispiece and illus-
tration for Bonhoeffer's theology of discipleship. Like the painting,
Bonhoeffer's theology is dominated by the presence of Christ. In
both The calling ofSt Matthew and Discipleship, Scripture is lifted
with shocking effect into the present, and in both the effect is to
re focus attention away from historical study towards Jesus' call to
me, here and now. Discipleship is Bonhoeffer's longest book and
Life Together probably his most widely read. Like Caravaggio's
painting, these books created controversy when published because
they attempted to make real a sense of what Jesus wants from us
today. They are rich sources for Christian ethics. It will be the task
of this chapter to give an idea of what his contemporaries found so
shocking in these books and to ask in what ways Bonhoeffer's
theology in them raises ethical questions or offers ethical insight.

Christology

In 1933, in the semester following his lectures on Creation and Fall,

Bonhoeffer's theology took a turn to Jesus Christ from which it
would not thereafter deviate. In his lectures on christology,
Bonhoeffer realized both the centrality of Christ in theology and of
the person of Christ within the Christian life. Attending to them at
this point rather than in the previous chapter may seem arbitrary:
there are three years between the christology lectures and the publi-
cation of Discipleship. But the gestation period of Bonhoeffer's
Discipleship was long and he was already drafting sections of the
book when he took up his London pastorate in 1933. Reading the
christology lectures at this point in any case helps to show how
Bonhoeffer's discovery of Jesus Christ in 1933 was prerequisite to
his theology of discipleship and the common life. The manuscript of
Bonhoeffer's lectures no longer exists and they have been recon-
structed on the basis of notes taken by several students. The third
section of the lectures - the Eternal Christ - was never delivered.
Bonhoeffer's opening gambit is as simple as it is arresting: in so
far as the Church speaks of Christ, he says, it does so first in silence
before the mystery of God's word. To most people, the study of
Christ may seem an academic backwater, but for Bonhoeffer chris-
tology is the academic discipline which makes all others possible.
Scientific study, by which he means not only the natural sciences but
humanities disciplines too, asks two basic questions: 'what is the
cause of X?' and 'what is the meaning of X?' By means of these

94
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

'how' questions the human mind seeks to make sense of the world
by cataloguing and classifying all the knowledge it gathers. But what
happens when a Word (in Greek, 'logos') appears that cannot be
classified by the human mind, but rather puts the human logos in its
place by making it the subject of enquiry. Then, the important
question is not the 'how' of the human being, but the question
'who?' Who are you to challenge me in this way? Are you God?
Only when christology resists the temptation to ask how questions
about Christ - for example 'how is Christ both God and man?' - and
instead lies open to the question 'who is Jesus Christ for us today?'
does it become truly authentic. In christology, reflection upon the
person of Christ always precedes reflection upon what he does, since
our understanding of Christ's person makes every difference to our
understanding of his works.
In the first part of the lectures, Bonhoeffer explores the senses in
which Christ is present 'pro me' - for me in the world. As the
crucified and risen one, Christ's presence is realized in space and
time. Picking up where Sanctorum Communio left off, Bonhoeffer
reiterates that Christ is present in the Church. So significant is this,
that where Christ is not present in preaching and sacrament, chris-
tology is impossible. It is not simply that Christ's influence persists
in the Church as a memory; he is present as a living person. Human
logic finds what is involved in this truth hard to accommodate, for as
a man, Christ is present in time and space, and as God he is eternally
present. Because he is always both a human being and God -
Bonhoeffer uses the term God-Man - we cannot treat the question of
his presence as either his presence as a man or his presence as God,
but only by talking about his whole person. There is simply no point
asking - as Kierkegaard does - how God the eternal can be present
in time, or asking how the historical Jesus can be present now, 2000
years after his death. We can only ask how the God-Man Jesus
Christ is present. Because of this, Christ's presence for me is hidden.
It is not that God is hidden in a human being but rather that as a
whole person the God-Man is hidden in 'the likeness of sinful flesh'
(Romans 8:3). Bonhoeffer refutes here a very common interpret-
ation of the incarnation: that the 'scandal' of Christ lay in God taking
human flesh. Rather, the offence of Jesus is that he took sinful flesh;
that is his humiliation.
For Bonhoeffer, Christ's presence takes three forms. As Word,
Christ takes the living form of God's address to human beings. As
such, he is not an idea, a new truth or a new moral teaching, but
God's appeal to each human person to assume responsibility. Jesus

95
 BONHOEFFER

does not merely speak this word of address; he is the Word. In this
sense the Word is made available in the preaching. This is why the
sermon is not properly conceived as words spoken by a preacher, but
as the Word of God. Christ is present, too, in the sacraments, which
are not only representations of Christ, but in a literal sense, embodi-
ments of the Word. The Church is not a symbol of Christ's body, but
is his body in the world. Christ as Word, sacrament and Church is
therefore at the centre of human existence.
Christ is at the centre of human existence as the judgement and
justification that all people must face. When it comes to speaking of
Christ as the centre of history, Bonhoeffer cautions against trying to
prove that Christianity is somehow the highpoint of human
religions, or arguing that Christ is central because the Church plays
a central role in the life of a nation. Christ is the centre of history
because he mediates between God and humankind, and between
God and history. Finally, Christ stands at the centre between God
and nature. Nature was cursed at the Fall, but it is redeemed by Jesus
Christ who stands between God and nature to bring about their
reconciliation.
In the second part of his christology lectures Bonhoeffer tackles
the question of 'the historical Christ'. A typical manoeuvre in
nineteenth and twentieth-century christology was to distinguish
between the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth, and the Christ of
faith. This method - which von Harnack and others promised would
release the core of faith from its unnecessary outer coating - was
from Bonhoeffer's point of view mistaken both historically and
theologically. Historically, all attempts to discover a 'pure' early life
of Jesus in the gospels had failed conspicuously. Theologically, one
cannot get behind belief in the Lordship of Christ. Because of this
failure, Bonhoeffer asserted bravely in his lecture hall in the
heartland of liberal theology, liberal theology could no longer
sustain the difference between Jesus and Christ and the Bible could
only be interpreted in the Church, where Christ's Lordship is presup-
posed.
As it was commonly taught, the study of christology examined
the development of the orthodox christological statements of the
creeds and subsequently, for Protestants, in the founding
documents of Lutherans and Calvinists. The creeds are official
statements of the Church. A creative, positive christology goes on,
of course, all the time in sermon, liturgy, doxology and theology.
But this positive christology has to be subjected to rigorous
criticism. In this sense the creeds are negative statements placing

96
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

limits on what may be said of Christ. Bonhoeffer diligently takes

his students through the christological heresies of the early Church,
and the founding statements of the Protestant churches. These set
of boundaries against false interpretations of the person of Christ.
He concludes that while no true theology of Christ can transgress
the boundaries set by these negative christologies, neither can
christology be satisfied with them. In the final sections of the extant
lectures, Bonhoeffer deals with the incarnation of Christ, and with
his humiliation and exaltation, in which he hints at themes
developed more fully in his later theology. Significantly, these
include an emphasis on the weakness of Christ. If we are really to
speak of Christ's divinity, we may not look first at Jesus' human
nature and then beyond it, to his divine nature: we must only ever
look at the one man, Jesus Christ who is fully human and fully
God. As a result, it is impossible to identify Jesus' weakness with
his humanity by saying 'as a man Jesus was weak, but as God he
was strong'. It is the whole God-Man who is weak. This insight
would crop up again with decisive effect in Bonhoeffer's prison
letters. In a less obvious way, as Eberhard Bethge points out, chris-
tology 'was to be the basis for ethics and the refutation of the
"orders of creation" concept' (DB 219). For now, the centrality of
Christ spelled out in the lectures paved the way for what would
prove to be the longest writing project of Bonhoeffer's career:
Discipleship.

Following Jesus

Shortly after Discipleship was published Bonhoeffer wrote to the

students he had trained at Zingst and Finkenwalde to let them know
it was out. 'When it appeared', he wrote:

I dedicated it in spirit to you all. I would have done so on the title

page had I not feared to lay the responsibility for my theology and
my ideas on your shoulders ... In any case you all know what's
in it. (DB 452)

Yes, they knew. The bulk of the book was made up of the lectures
Bonhoeffer had given to students in the Confessing Church
Seminary he directed. Bonhoeffer's seminary students were not
dissimilar to those entering Ministerial training today: they came
expecting to brush up their techniques, learn some of the practical-
ities of Ministry, and practise leading worship. But Discipleship

97
 BONHOEFFER

shattered these expectations by knocking down their presuppositions

of preaching, sacramental and pastoral ministry, and seeking to
rebuild them on new foundations. The book falls into two parts. The
first part largely takes the form of exegesis of passages from the
Synoptic gospels. Part two turns to the Church and, though often
referring to the Epistles, takes the form of 'Bible study' rather less.
In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer writes with a new confidence. It is as if
he has found his own voice. The book retains some of the qualities
of the lectures - rhetorical flourishes, some phrases repeated for
emphasis, others with the memorability and force of sound bites -
that keep the reader in touch with the book's key themes. Yet
Discipleship has a disturbing style that draws one into its vocabulary
and perspective to the point that one forgets all other modulations in
and forms of theology. This siren-like quality is the book's strength
and its weakness. In the flow of the book's language and approach
one feels there can be no other way of understanding Christian faith;
but re-enter a context in which faith is foreign and it can be hard to
make the book connect.
At about the same time as Bonhoeffer was writing Discipleship,
his erstwhile ethics teacher, Reinhold Niebuhr, was arguing in An
interpretation of Christian Ethics3 that New Testament ethical
teaching, whether of Jesus or of Paul, was given in anticipation of an
imminent second coming which did not, in fact, materialize. For
Niebuhr this meant that the ethics of Jesus and Paul were only ever
intended for a brief interim period and were therefore unsustainable,
taken literally, as a basis of modern Christian morality. Bonhoeffer
could scarcely have disagreed more with his former teacher. He
believed that the Church Struggle drew out more searching ways of
reading Scripture from readers who do not seek to know what this or
that church leader wants, but rather, 'want to know what Jesus
wants' (DBW 4: 37). Bonhoeffer begins therefore with an assault on
cheap grace:

Cheap grace is the mortal enemy of our church. Our struggle

today is for costly grace.
Cheap grace means grace as bargain-basement goods, cut-rate
forgiveness, cut-rate comfort, cut-rate sacrament; grace as the
church's inexhaustible pantry, from which it is doled out by
careless hands without hesitation or limit. It is grace without a
price, without costs. (DBW4 43)

Cheap grace means justification of sin but not of the sinner. It is:

98
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

[P]reaching forgiveness without repentance; it is baptism without

the discipline of community; it is the Lord's Supper without
confession of sin; it is absolution without personal confession.
Cheap grace is grace without discipleship, grace without the
cross, grace without the living, incarnate Jesus Christ. (DBW 4
44)

In contrast, costly grace is the gospel that costs everything. It is

costly because it condemns sin and grace, because it justifies the
sinner. Above all, grace is costly because God paid its price in the
incarnation and the crucifixion. Original awareness of the cost of
grace within the Church, Bonhoeffer alleges, seeped away as the
world was Christianized and the Church secularized. Luther
reawakened a true sense of the cost of grace in the Reformation, but
this too has been lost: 'A people became Christian, became
Lutheran, but at the cost of discipleship, at an all-too-cheap price'
(DBW 4 53). In preaching to an entire nation, baptizing, confirming
and absolving a people unconditionally, Bonhoeffer glumly
concludes, Lutherans poured out rivers of grace without end but only
rarely accompanied this with the call rigorously to follow Christ.
To explain what the call to discipleship is like Bonhoeffer turns
to the call of Matthew. When Jesus called the tax collector he did not
respond with a confession of faith, but by getting up from his table
and following Jesus. Bonhoeffer can see that there is something
unreasonable in Matthew's response; the sensible thing to do would
have been to think about his decision, weigh the consequences, and
think before acting. He simply obeys. Strikingly, discipleship has no
content other than following Jesus. No 'new law' is involved, no
programme for life: just unreserved commitment to Christ. It is not
a call for which one can 'volunteer', because the call must come
from Jesus. Nothing, not even religious duty, must be allowed to
come between Jesus and the disciple. Neither is following Jesus
something to be lifted off a shelf of life-choices, as if Christian faith
were one human way of life among others. The call of Jesus to the
disciple is unique and decisive. This is Jesus' role in calling the
disciple, but the disciple too has something to contribute. For
Bonhoeffer as a Lutheran theologian, suggesting that the disciple
might make a contribution to faith was hedged about with problems.
Luther's rediscovery of costly grace involved a thorough rejection of
faith by works - the idea that a believer could contribute to her own
salvation by what she did, for example by good deeds or acts of
penance. Lutheranism held up its hands in horror at any suggestion

99
 BONHOEFFER

that discipleship was based on anything other than Jesus' call.

Bonhoeffer accepts this insofar as he agrees that the situation where
faith is possible is only made possible by Christ's call, and can only
come about by faith. Yet he maintains that the potential disciple
must herself take a step towards Jesus, rather as Peter did when he
left the boat and walked on water at Jesus' invitation (Matthew
14:29). The formula Bonhoeffer uses to express the balance between
faith and the step a would-be disciple takes towards it is 'only the
believers obey, and only the obedient believe' (DBW 4 63). It is not
the case, Bonhoeffer believes, that first there is faith, and then there
is obedience, or, indeed, that first there is obedience and then there
is faith, in some invariable chronological sequence. The two sides of
this equation must always be held together. To make this clearer,
Bonhoeffer uses the example of the rich young ruler who asked
Jesus, 'Teacher, what good deed must I do to have eternal life?'
(Matthew 19:16-22).4 The ruler addresses his question to Jesus as
'good master', but Jesus refuses the title since only God is good.
This serves to make clear, Bonhoeffer says, that when Jesus calls,
the call is not from some human teacher or guru, but from God.
When Jesus tells him to obey the commandments, the young man
'retreats from God's clear commandment back to the interesting,
indisputably human situation of "ethical conflict'" (DBW 4 71) by
asking 'which ones?' as if God's commandments were unclear.
Consistent with the views he had expressed in Creation and Fall,
Bonhoeffer asserts that to 'invoke ethical conflict is to terminate
obedience. It is to retreat from God's reality to human possibility,
from faith to doubt' (DBW4 71). Jesus refuses to resolve this ethical
conflict, and answers it in the only way God can: by making a direct
command to the young man. Sadly, the ruler leaves, for he cannot
easily give up his riches as directed.
How does the call to simple obedience made by Jesus to
Matthew, and Peter, and the rich young ruler relate to us? Does Jesus
call us in the same way, and must our response take the same form?
When a modern reader reads Jesus' command to the rich young ruler
to sell all he has and give to the poor, he will find ways of not taking
this literally. He will think 'the command was made to a specific
individual, he cannot possibly mean that I should do the same'; or
'what Jesus really means is that I should not set my heart on posses-
sions, so if I can sit lightly to material wealth then I don't need
literally to sell what I own and give it away'. For Bonhoeffer, such
strategies can add up to a 'deliberate avoidance of simple, literal
obedience' (DBW4 79). To be sure, it is right for Christians to read

100
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

the Bible with discernment and to have what Bonhoeffer calls (after
Kierkegaard) a 'paradoxical understanding of the commandment';
but it is 'necessary always to include a literal understanding of
Jesus' commandment in every paradoxical interpretation'. This
means that at the heart of our justifiably sophisticated ways of
reading Jesus' words, Christians must not lose sight of the possi-
bility that Jesus speaks to us to command simple obedience within
the pages of the Bible. Such obedience, Bonhoeffer reiterates, is
costly, as it will mean not only suffering with Christ but also more
painfully sharing in his rejection.
Jesus' ethic is, for Bonhoeffer, at its most clear and most startling
in the Sermon on the Mount. In the Beatitudes Jesus addresses his
followers and with each word of 'blessing' he spells out the differ-
ences between the disciple and the unbeliever. Disciples are blessed
in their poverty, where it is assumed for the sake of Christ: in this
respect Jesus' blessing is the opposite of 'its caricature in the form
of a political-social program' (DBW 4 103), that is, 'blessing' cannot
be equated with the alleviation of material poverty. They are blessed
in their grief- not as Bonhoeffer understands it their normal human
grief for a lost loved one - but in their grief over the guilt and fate
of the world. The meek are blessed as those who 'renounce all rights
of their own for the sake of Jesus Christ' (DBW 4 105). They endure
violence and abuse without answering back because they leave
justice to God, for whose righteousness alone they thirst. In giving
mercy, the disciples are blessed as women and men who renounce
their own dignity by sharing in the guilt and need of others. They are
pure in heart because, in their simple obedience, they have 'the
simple heart of a child, who does not know about good and evil, the
heart of Adam before the fall, the heart in which the will of Jesus
rules instead of one's own conscience' (DBW 4 107). 'Simple
obedience' is clearly here the link between Bonhoeffer's early
exposition of Genesis 3, and reflection on the world of 'recovered
unity' in his Ethics. The disciples are blessed also in their renunci-
ation of violence and strife - the scriptural warrant for Bonhoeffer's
pacifism - and in being prepared to be persecuted for the sake of a
righteous cause. Where Jesus' followers are blessed in these ways,
the Church community is made visible in the world through their
faithfulness. The Church is light to the world and salt to the earth.
This exposition of Matthew, raises important questions, not least
for Lutherans, concerning the relation of Christ's teaching and that
of the law and the prophets. Jesus was explicit about this, saying,
'Do not think I have come to abolish the law or the prophets; I have

101
 BONHOEFFER

come not to abolish but to fulfil' (Matthew 5:17). But, in the wake
of the Beatitudes, which despise what the world values and value
what the world despises, it can hardly be surprising that the disciples
were left wondering if Jesus' teaching separated them not only from
the world, but from the law. For Bonhoeffer, it is mistaken both to
idolize the law and to legalize God. God is not to be contained by the
law any more than God is by doctrine, or the Church, or Scripture.
Yet Jesus reaffirms that God gives the law, which is fulfilled in
personal fellowship with God. Jesus is not a revolutionary, come to
destroy everything that has gone before;' his 'you have heard it said
... but I say to you' is, Bonhoeffer believes, an expression of Jesus'
unity with the law and the prophets. Take, for example, the
command against adultery. Jesus repeats the command but adds, 'I
say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already
committed adultery with her in his heart' (Matthew 5:28). 'At this
point', Bonhoeffer asks, must

we not decisively face the question of whether Jesus intended his

command to be taken literally or merely figuratively? Must not
our whole life depend on a clear answer to this question? ... If we
were to say that, of course, the command is not meant to be taken
literally, then we would already have dodged the seriousness of
the command. But if we were to say, of course, it should be taken
literally, this would only show that Christian existence is absurd
on principle, and the command would lose its authority. (DBW 4
126)

This is a crucial question for Christian ethics, but particularly for

those like Bonhoeffer, who want to connect the New Testament with
contemporary moral problems. Yet Bonhoeffer refuses to answer the
question, believing that it must be left open because the Bible leaves
it open. The crucial thing is simple obedience. He takes a similarly
paradoxical approach in interpreting Jesus' injunction against taking
oaths ('Jesus rejects lying by prohibiting oaths' DBW4 129); against
taking retribution for injustice ('the evil comes to an end when we
permit it to pass over us, without defense' DBW 4 133); and loving
one's enemy (who 'is more worthy of my love than my foe?' DBW
4 139).
Where these attitudes are lived fully, believers are distinguished
from unbelievers in being 'extraordinary': perfectly pure, truthful,
and non-violent. These qualities are visible, but Jesus also warns
against practising righteousness before others so that our piety might

102
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

be admired, and he tells the disciples to pray and fast in secret.

Believers in this pattern will discover a renewed zest for life, free
from the worry of material acquisition, not because material goods
are to be despised - quite the reverse - but because worry betokens
a lack of trust in God. This way of life inevitably raises the question
of the relation of believers and unbelievers, and Bonhoeffer
concludes that the 'call separates a small group, those who follow,
from the great mass of the people. The disciples are few and will
always be only a few' (DBW 4 175). This is the theological
foundation for Bonhoeffer's controversial claim that in (Protestant)
Germany, there was 'no salvation outside the Confessing Church'. It
is encouragement for the Church to be a minority. It is to counter-
balance this apparently 'sectarian' turn in his Discipleship that
Bonhoeffer concluded part one with a brief exposition of Jesus'
teaching to the disciples concerning their mission in Matthew
chapter 10.

Discipleship and the Church

Part two of Discipleship, like part one, begins with the call of
Matthew, but now the question raised by it is closer to home:

Jesus no longer walks past me in bodily form and calls, 'Follow

me,' as he did to Levi, the tax collector ... What gives me the
right, for example, to hear Jesus' call of the tax collector as being
addressed to me? (DBW 4 201)

It is the question that has been behind the curtain waiting to make its
entrance throughout the whole of part one. But for Bonhoeffer, if
Jesus is not dead, but alive and still speaking through the testimony
of scripture, he is present for us in body and word just as he was for
the first disciples. Today, Christians hear Jesus' call in preaching
and sacrament. Baptism is, like Matthew's first step in following
Jesus, a visible act of obedience to God's call (and like which, it is
something Jesus gives us rather than something we give him). This
means it should only be administered where the reality of salvation
of which the sacrament speaks can have some hope of being remem-
bered, that is, within the community of faith. For Bonhoeffer,
baptizing children of families outside the Church 'betrays reprehen-
sible thoughtlessness' (DBW4 212).
Bonhoeffer is certain that Paul's conviction that the Church is the
body of Christ is not merely a colourful or romantic metaphor, for

103
 BONHOEFFER

the bodily presence and community of Jesus with the first disciples
'does not mean anything different or anything more than what we
have today' (DBW 4 213). Feeding off his doctoral dissertation
Bonhoeffer's exposition of Pauline ecclesiology reasserts that as the
body of Christ the Church is one, but at the same time it is the
plurality and community of its members. The Church takes bodily
form by being visible in preaching and sacrament. This common life
has social implications for Christians, who are not only one at the
communion table, but in all their relations with each other. When
Philemon was baptized, Paul encouraged him to receive his runaway
slave back 'no longer as a slave but ... [as] a beloved brother'
(Philemon 16). In the Church social distinctions between slave and
free, Jew and Greek are abolished (a daring interpretation, though
certainly true, when the Aryan paragraph was willingly being imple-
mented by the 'established' Protestant churches in Germany). Yet,
in keeping with Paul's socially conservative attitude in 1 Corinthians
7:20-4, Bonhoeffer repeats that Christians should be content with
the social position they held when they were called to discipleship,
because Christian freedom is God's gift, irrespective of one's social
or political status. Paul's statements are not, Bonhoeffer clarifies, 'a
justification or a Christian apology for a shadowy social order'
(DBW 4 238); renouncing political rebellion is an expression of
Christian hope, which lies in God, and not in any political solution
that the world can offer. Christians are, as Paul teaches in Romans
13, to obey the governing authorities not in order to gain advantage
for the Church (e.g. security or respectability or influence) but in
obedience to God's order. It is perhaps telling that, when making his
defence to the examining magistrate after his arrest, Bonhoeffer
referred to this passage in Discipleship to help bolster the image he
was attempting to paint of himself as a loyal citizen!
The disciples are not subject to the world, but they live within it.
By this, Bonhoeffer continues, he means that the Church 'is a
territory with an authority of its own, a space set apart' (DBW 4
253). It is important to pause on this phrase, which represents a
concluding moment in the argument of Discipleship. In the mid-
19308, Bonhoeffer committed considerable thought and energy to
carving out a space for the Confessing Church within the 'estab-
lished' Protestant churches in Germany, in relation to the Nazi state,
and, internationally, within the nascent worldwide fellowship of
churches. As it turned out, this proved to be very largely a losing
battle. Partly in consequence of his experiences, but more, I suspect,
as his theological ethics matured, Bonhoeffer began to see

104
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

considerable danger in speaking as if there was either a metaphorical

or a physical space that is 'Church' in relation to an entirely separate
space that is 'world'. In his Ethics he would call this 'thinking in two
spheres'. For our purposes, it provides a stark spatial image of what
has been a strong theme throughout Discipleship'. namely the
distinctiveness or extraordinariness of Christians vis-a-vis
unbelievers. In prison, Bonhoeffer's last word on Discipleship
would be that 'I thought I could acquire faith by trying to live a holy
life, or something like it. I suppose I wrote Discipleship as the end
of that path. Today I can see the dangers of that book, though I still
stand by what I wrote' (LPP 369, tr. amended). Too much can be
read into this passing comment (and indeed has been) but we are
sure that Bonhoeffer came to suspect the theological sense in
expressing the distinctiveness of the disciples spatially. For our
purposes, an equally intriguing question is whether Bonhoeffer had
come to 'see the dangers' of the ethics ofDiscipleship. If Bonhoeffer
lost confidence in the spatial distinctiveness of the Church
community, did his confidence waver in the moral visibility and
distinctiveness of the disciple? There is little evidence that it did.
However, as we have already observed, Bonhoeffer certainly
reappraised elements in Discipleship ethics: he reinterpreted the
command to love one's enemy in the context of the conspiracy. In
Discipleship Bonhoeffer condemns perjury, but in his essay on
telling the truth (which we will touch upon in the next chapter) he
conceives of circumstances in which truthfulness will mean telling
lies, even under oath. And in wartime Germany, Bonhoeffer inter-
preted Paul's teaching that 'there is no authority except from God'
(Romans 13:Ib) by praying and working for the defeat of his
country. Bonhoeffer intentionally left some ethical questions
unanswered in his book (e.g. whether Jesus' commands are to be
understood literally or figuratively). But does he leave other, crucial
questions unanswered or unasked? He argues forcefully that
Christian ethics are distinct: but then, how is the believer to incor-
porate into Christian ethics the values and perspectives she has
gained from without the church community, for example in the
family? He argues that we must leave open the possibility that the
divine command contained in the law and fulfilled in Christ are to be
answered literally, but he did not suggest adulterers be executed
(Leviticus 20:10), he ate pork in literal disobedience of the law
(Leviticus 11:8), and presumably kept his money in an interest
bearing bank account (Deuteronomy 23:19). Bonhoeffer acknowl-
edges that it is because of the 'absurdity' involved in literal

105
 BONHOEFFER

obedience to the law that a 'paradoxical' interpretation of the law is

necessary; but resort to paradox is rarely if ever satisfactory, and it
is no more so here. Bonhoeffer says I must obey simply, and that if
I ask 'yes, but which commandments do I keep and which do I
abandon?' I follow in the disobedient slither marks of the serpent
and the sad footsteps of the rich young ruler. His statement has very
considerable rhetorical and homiletic force; but how does it help me
if, in spite of his insistence that obedience is always simple, I still
cannot see what God wants me to do?

Life Together

If Discipleship is a product of Bonhoeffer's attempt to train clergy

for the Confessing Church, then Life Together is a product of his
'experiments' in community life in the seminary, but more particu-
larly in the Brothers' House that tried to offer a model of community
life for the other students, and for the Church. It is perhaps unfair to
call the patterns of community life developed by Bonhoeffer 'exper-
iments' - both the seminary and the Brothers' House achieved what
Bonhoeffer wanted for them, and their closure was not due to
intrinsic flaws in either community. But while some churches had
practised forms of communal living for generations, living commu-
nally was a new and daring departure for Lutherans, who after all
were named after a man who had left a Christian community to
reform the Church.
Life Together, according to its author, is 'a look at several direc-
tions and principles that the Holy Scriptures give us for life together
under the Word (DBW 5 27). Living the Christian life together with
others is a privilege that is not afforded to every believer. So when
a believer can share his faith daily with others it is a source of
incomparable joy and strength. A Christian needs other Christians
for Jesus' sake and indeed is only able to be joined with them in
community through Christ. Christian community depends on God: it
is chosen and accepted by God in time, and its eternal unity is to be
found in Christ. Bonhoeffer believes that if these insights are taken
seriously it becomes possible to grasp that Christian community is
not an ideal of some kind, but is a 'divine reality', by which, he
explains, it is important to understand that Christian community is a
spiritual rather than a psychic reality. Sooner or later, anyone living
within a Christian community becomes disillusioned with others in
it, with herself or even with God. If Christian community were an
idealized form of human community, such disillusionment would be

106
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

able to kill community off. But because Christian community is a

God-given reality, the faults of others in my congregation or
community (or indeed my own faults) serve to remind me of our
mutual dependence on forgiveness of sin in Jesus Christ. Likewise,
Christian community could not hope to flourish if it were merely
tasked with satisfying the psychic, natural emotional urges, strengths
and weaknesses of the human soul. A surprising number of
Christians think that Christian community serves just these purposes
- to satisfy one's emotional needs in worship and fellowship, or to
give one a sense of belonging. But within a spiritual Christian
community members do not set out with the presumption that
community is there to meet their own needs, but as a place that
affords them the privilege of meeting the needs of others. The
contrast is marked strongly in terms of the love a member of a
Christian community shows:

Self-centered love constructs its own image of other persons,

about what they are and what they should become. It takes the life
of the other person into its own hands. Spiritual love recognizes
the true image of the other person seen from the perspective of
Jesus Christ. It is the image Jesus Christ has formed and wants to
form in all people. (DBW 5 44)

For a Christian community the day begins at dawn in common

worship. Whatever an individual or the whole community may be
worried about in the coming day the first moment of the day ought
to be free from worry because it belongs to God, to whom life
belongs. Worship will include Bible reading, song and prayer. A
psalm will be said. A substantial reading of Scripture should follow
- a chapter from the Old Testament and half a chapter from the New
Testament - from a lectionary that reads the Bible in a consecutive
cycle, so that over time the whole of the Bible is heard by the
community. Reading the Church's Scripture together,
the community is caught up in the biblical stories, and above all into
the life of Jesus, and so participates in these healing events of
baptism, teaching, death and resurrection. Singing is the
community's response to these gifts. Worship concludes in prayer
for the community and the world, and, Bonhoeffer asserts, should be
spoken extempore (rather than from a written prayer) by the 'head'
of the community. Set prayers can certainly help, but they can be an
evasion from real prayer where they are beautiful and profound, but
not genuinely spoken. Only then may the community eat breakfast

107
 BONHOEFFER

together. Eating together is an important symbol of Christian

community: Jesus ate daily meals with his disciples and also shared
with them in his last supper. Today, the Christian community
continues to share in both forms of fellowship and, in the breaking
of bread, its eyes are opened to see Jesus (Luke 24:30-3 la). From
this point of the day, until the community meets again in worship at
dusk, the day belongs to work. It is important to distinguish prayer
and work, so that prayer does not get in the way of work, or work in
the way of prayer.
Community life has its temptations, among the strongest of which
is that people who are incapable of being alone turn to community
as an artificial protection against loneliness. For Bonhoeffer, a corre-
lation exists between one's capacity to be in community and to be
alone, such that 'Whoever cannot be alone should beware of
community ... [and] Whoever cannot stand being in community
should beware of being alone' (DEW 5 82). At significant moments
and in key Christian and human events, every individual stands
alone; we are alone in the decision to follow Jesus; we are alone in
confronting death. Being alone is not, therefore, something to avoid,
but to welcome. But our calling is also always a calling to
community life, and in another sense, even in death and facing
God's judgement, we stand with others in an eternal community of
faith. The mark of life alone is silence, which can be experienced as
terror and isolation, as the perfect setting for self-deception, but also
as the place of simple encounter with the Word of God. To structure
time alone properly, a Christian should make room for a daily time
of meditation in which to read Scripture, pray and intercede in
prayer for others. While the Bible reading together should be
relatively long, there is sense in making the Bible passages one reads
alone short. By 'intercession' Bonhoeffer means 'Christians
bringing one another into the presence of God, seeing each other
under the cross of Jesus as poor human beings and sinners in need
of grace' (DEW 5 90). It is through intercessory prayer that
Christians seek for others that which they themselves are graced
with: the right to stand before Christ and to share in his mercy.
Arguments can destroy community. Yet it is almost inevitable
that any gathering of human beings will hold within it scope for
disagreement. People are extraordinarily varied, in talent, ability,
temperament, need and strength. In the Christian community, the
tongue must be disciplined, and one believer must not speak badly
of another. When an attempt is made to follow this principle, it can
be very liberating, as it means one is not always on the look out for

108
 FOLLOWING CHRIST

fault. Positively, the proper attitude of the Christian community is

one of service. This means listening genuinely and unreservedly to
other members of the community. It means offering help in practical
ways, however 'humble' the act of service may be. And it means
being patient with others in a Christian community, bearing with
them however much someone may grate on us. This will normally
take the form of forgiving the other wordlessly in prayer. These acts
alone create the circumstances in which it may be possible to serve
another by offering God's word. Jesus, Bonhoeffer believes, tied
authority in the community to service, so that only where an
authorized person listens, helps, forbears and proclaims God's Word
is his authority properly established. His abilities and talents are of
no significance in community, and may even poison it by setting
himself rather than Christ at the centre of the community. The
authority of the community's leader therefore rests on the same basis
as the obedience of those with whom he exercises it, in the authority
of the Word.
The last chapter of Life Together culminates in 'confession and
the Lord's Supper', in which Bonhoeffer details the controversial
practice in the seminary and in the Brothers' House of mutual
confession. 'When I go to another believer to confess', Bonhoeffer
states calmly, 'I am going to God. Thus the call within the Christian
community to mutual confession and forgiveness goes out as a call
to the great grace of God in the congregation' (DBW 5 109). Any
Christian believer - not the ordained alone - may hear confession,
Bonhoeffer believes. There is every difference between revealing
oneself in confession to a fellow Christian, and revealing oneself to
a psychologist or analyst. Because sin is different to sickness,
another believer 'views me as I am before the judging and merciful
God in the cross of Jesus Christ' (DBW 5 115). Such confession is,
in the Christian community, an essential preparation for the Lord's
Supper, which is the joy and destination of the Christian community.
Life Together makes a distinctive contribution to our under-
standing of Bonhoeffer's theological ethics: it shows how they are
rooted for the Christian in an individual and communal life of prayer
and worship. The shaping and patterning of a Christian orientation
towards others arises from participation in the common Christian
life, with all its frustrations and hard knocks. The attitudes and
perspectives that give direction to Christian ethics do not, therefore,
come from skilled study or intellectual brilliance: they are gifts of
God made to believers when they pray, read scripture 'spiritually',
confess, and celebrate the Lord's Supper. Nowhere is this significant

109
 BONHOEFFER

note sounded with such clarity as it is here, but it is an unspoken

presupposition of all Bonhoeffer's ethics.

Notes

1 See Caravaggio: A life, Helen Langdon, Chatto & Windus, London, 1998, for
both a biography of the artist and commentary on The call ofSt Matthew.
2 '... [I]t is impossible to write about Caravaggio without using theatrical
metaphors'. Painting the Word, John Drury, Yale University Press, 1999, p. 124.
3 Published in New York by Harper and Brothers, 1935.
4 It is quite possible that Karl Barm's use of this New Testament incident in the
Church Dogmatics II/2, pp. 613-30, owes a debt to Bonhoeffer's exegesis. The
story of the rich young ruler forms the basis too for Pope John Paul II's 1993
Encyclical Veritatis Splendor, which, though it does not mention Barm, can hardly
have been ignorant of his use of the story since they are so similar.
5 Bonhoeffer's repeated insistence that Jesus is not a revolutionary, and his earlier
dismissal of'programmes of social action' should give pause to anyone seeking to
find in Bonhoeffer's theology a prototype for Liberation Theology.

no
 7

The ethics of responsible

action

Ethics in crisis: a stock-take of Bonhoeffer's theology

It seems unnecessary to say that Europe under Nazi rule was in
moral crisis. When Bonhoeffer began work on his Ethics the
German army had invaded Czechoslovakia and Poland and its plans
to invade other countries were ready to be put into action. As he
wrote, the German state initiated a programme of 'euthanasia' aimed
at 'removing the burden' of those with mental illness or mental
disability from the German people. He was still writing as the Final
Solution of the 'Jewish problem' got under way. To say Europe
needed more or better ethics was surely to do no more than state the
obvious. Yet for Bonhoeffer the moral crisis that met the eye so
appallingly in Nazi Germany was an outcrop of a more disturbing
crisis in human ethics. Bonhoeffer's Ethics addresses a crisis that
predates Nazi rule, and even predates the Enlightenment, with which
more recent moral diagnosticians have been concerned.1 The Nazis
had brought Europe's moral calamity to a head; but because it went
deeper than Nazi misrule and criminality it would not dissipate when
the Nazis were consigned to the dustbin of history.
Bonhoeffer's sense of moral crisis had been growing for years. In
Sanctorum Communio he had challenged the prevailing liberal
consensus by emphasizing the ecclesial and community dimension

111
 BONHOEFFER

of life. Liberal theology had forgotten the truth that the Church can
only be fully understood by those within it. Liberal culture had gone
too far in individualizing ethics and the life of faith. All theological
concepts, Bonhoeffer asserted, are social. In particular sin is social,
since it disrupts social relations between people as well as the
relation of human beings with God. Ethics is not simply a matter for
private reflection and decision; it is central to the life of a
community. In Act and Being Bonhoeffer transposed his conviction
that the Church can only be properly understood by its members into
a study of the theory of knowledge. How can we know God? Is God
revealed in discrete acts of revelation alone, or does God somehow
exist, 'haveable' and graspable in the world? An answer to these
questions, he wrote, can only be found amongst those to whom God
has already given Godself. As in his earlier dissertation, though he
did not spell it out ethically, his argument had ethical implications.
For Christians to know what to do depends on them being able truly
to know what God wills; and that depends on the possibility of revel-
ation. Revelation only makes sense, he proposed, if it is both act and
being; both a matter of what God does directly, here and now and of
God's longer term being with us, Emmanuel! Deeds and character
cohere in God, and through faith cohere also in the believer.
In Creation and Fall Bonhoeffer developed in full his under-
standing of the Fall and of the sinfulness of humanity. The Apostle
Paul had written that though he wanted to do good, something in his
human nature prevented him from actually doing the good he willed
to do. In Creation and Fall, Bonhoeffer 'named' the reason for a
human incapacity to act according to good intentions in the rich
biblical imagery of the Fall of Adam. Ethics, Bonhoeffer explained,
derive from the Fall; the knowledge of good and evil at the heart of
ethical debate is a consequence of eating the fruit of the tree of
knowledge of good and evil. Ethics is, therefore, a symptom of loss
at the Fall of humankind's original unity with God. The ethical
question 'what is the right thing to do?' did not exist until the Fall
because Adam and Eve simply knew and obeyed God's will for
them. In his christology lectures Bonhoeffer described the point at
which a recovery of that unity begins: not in speculative theological
debates, or by somehow repristinating impure doctrine; but by
asking 'who is Jesus Christ for me?' Discipleship pressed the
distinctive character of the Christian life to its fullest extent in the
language of costly grace and discipleship, and in both Discipleship
and Life Together, Bonhoeffer gave concrete shape to individual and
communal Christian life. Life Together spelled out for a popular

112
 THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBLE ACTION

readership the commitment to the Church community with which

Bonhoeffer's career began.
In his writings prior to 1939 Bonhoeffer had wrestled with eccle-
siology, epistemology, soteriology and christology. He had
developed an unusual biblical hermeneutic. But though he had raised
ethical issues in each of his earlier writings, prior to 1939 he had not
worked his theology through explicitly in terms of ethics. In this
chapter I want to see what these themes look like when seen from
the perspective of ethics. How is the question of the distinctiveness
of Christian life and knowledge worked through in ethics? How
should we express ethically the 'haveable', graspable presence of
God in both act and being? What concrete practical forms might the
good life take? But before turning to these questions it is necessary
to pause on the textual and hermeneutical problems of Bonhoeffer's
Ethics.

Excursion: difficulties with reading Bonhoeffer's Ethics

Bonhoeffer's Ethics is a difficult text. In his preface to the first

edition of the Ethics in 1949,2 Eberhard Bethge observed that 'This
is not the Ethics which Dietrich Bonhoeffer intended to publish ...
The material has come to us in such a form that there has been no
possibility of working out a clear arrangement of the extant chapters
...' The manuscripts from which Bethge compiled the Ethics have
all the signs of being in draft form: crossings out, new paragraphs
interleaved with older material and rewrites of earlier sections. In
addition there are hundreds of scraps of paper on which Bonhoeffer
wrote notes for his book, including a draft outline, from which he
later departed. Only a letter tentatively suggests a possible title for
the book, 'Preparing the way and entering upon it'.3 In the second
edition (1963), in part using ink and paper types as evidence, Bethge
rearranged the fragments according to a theory that there were four
clear starting points in the essays. He included an appendix of ethical
material written contemporaneously with the ethics, but not intended
as part of it. In the most recent edition (DBWG 7) the editors have
pursued this approach to dating the manuscripts of the Ethics with
even greater rigour and submit, more or less unanimously, a new and
'definitive' chronological ordering of the Ethics. They propose that
there were five periods of time during which Bonhoeffer worked on
his Ethics, for some of which there is surer evidence than others.
Essays written in a particular period often form a clearly recog-
nizable and self-consistent block. In addition to this chronological

113
 BONHOEFFER

ordering of the manuscripts, the editors also suggest a hypothetical

reconstruction of the Ethics fragments as Bonhoeffer might have
ordered them.
It makes sense to suppose that the sequence in which one reads the
essays in Bonhoeffer's Ethics makes a difference to how one under-
stands them. If we try to read them in the sequence Bonhoeffer may
have intended them to be read, we might, for example, have a stronger
sense of a progression in his argument. Or, if we pay heed to the
context of each essay, the sitz im leben of a text, we may be more
aware of the circumstances on Bonhoeffer's mind and the way they
shape what he writes. For example, knowing that the section of the
Ethics on euthanasia was a response to information passed to
Bonhoeffer on the Nazi euthanasia programme helps to account for its
clarity and passion. The hypothetical reconstruction is based on good
evidence and is persuasive though necessarily speculative. Certainly
the textual evidence should be attended to as far as possible. But the
Ethics are still best read as a fragmentary collection of essays and
taken as such at face value. I have sometimes tracked themes drawn
from material found in several essays, but in a later section of this
chapter, headed 'Character and command', I contrast the approach to
ethics of two particularly well-defined periods of writing.

The distinctive nature of Christian ethics

What are Christian ethics? Bonhoeffer begins two separate sections
of the Ethics - 'Christ, reality and the good' and 'The love of God
and the decay of the world' - by considering this question. In
'Christ, reality and the good', probably written between the summer
and the autumn of 1940, Bonhoeffer distinguishes the starting point
of Christian ethics from those of all other secular and religious
ethics.

Whoever wishes to take up the problem of a Christian ethic ...

must from the outset discard as irrelevant the two questions which
alone impel him to concern himself with the problem of ethics,
'How can I be good?' and 'How can I do good?', and instead of
these he must ask the utterly and totally different question, 'What
is the will of God?' (£161)

If ethics truly were a matter of my goodness and of making the world

good through my actions, then I would be the ultimate reality, the
centre of the universe! In the sharpest contrast, Christian ethics sets

114
 THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBLE ACTION

out from the claim that both T and 'my' world are embedded in the
ultimate reality of God, who alone is creator, reconciler and
redeemer. The aim of Christian ethics then becomes 'the realization
of the revelational reality of God in Christ'. The only good that
matters - the only goal to which ethics should aim - is therefore
human participation in the reality of God. Bonhoeffer understood
that this definition of ethics sets Christian ethics in a polemical
relationship to all other ethics. In the opening paragraphs of 'The
love of God and the decay of the world', probably written in the
second half of 1942, he candidly states that:

The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical
reflection. The first task of Christian ethics is to invalidate this
knowledge ... Christian ethics claims to discuss the origin of the
whole problem of ethics, and thus professes to be a critique of all
ethics simply as ethics. (E 3)

Already in the opening paragraphs of these two essays,

Bonhoeffer introduces concepts key to his book. Picking up the
insights of Creation and Fall, he first characterizes ethics as a
recovery of the unity of God and humanity, and the unity between
human beings, disrupted by the Fall. If knowledge of good and evil
comes at the expense of unity with God, then even conscience,
typically regarded by ethicists as an instrument of good, is a sign of
disunity with God. For this reason Bonhoeffer calls for Christian
ethics, in Nietzsche's phrase, to go 'beyond good and evil'. For
Nietzsche, good and evil were part of what he called a 'slave
morality'. His philosophy - he called it 'a prelude to the future' -
envisaged a liberated elite who would live beyond good and evil by
creating their own morality that would be generous and benevolent
towards those who were weaker. Bonhoeffer shared Nietzsche's
wariness of the pettiness of many moral conventions and admired
him for his boldness. But while Nietzsche held that freedom could
be seized by strong individuals, Bonhoeffer believed true freedom
lay in accepting one's creatureliness before God. Only in the New
Testament is the world of recovered unity possible. In contrast with
the Pharisee, who is a man of conscience, and therefore one who
lives life in disunion with his origin, Jesus 'lives and acts not by the
knowledge of good and evil but by the will of God. There is only one
will of God. In it the origin is recovered; in it there is established the
freedom and the simplicity of all action' (E 15). This is the meaning
of Jesus' saying 'judge not, that ye be not judged'.

115
 BONHOEFFER

When the original unity of God's creation was sundered by the

Fall, reality itself, Bonhoeffer continues, was torn apart. Ethics
became a matter of 'thinking in two spheres'. On the one hand was
the holy, the supernatural and Christian; on the other was the
worldly, the profane and the natural. People faced a choice about
which sphere they belonged to: the spiritual or the secular. The result
was that though a small number in monastic communities could
claim to live spiritually, most people were consigned to life in the
secular sphere. Bonhoeffer was sure that this way of conceiving
matters was profoundly unbiblical; that is, in the Bible, thinking of
reality in two spheres was unknown. 'Sharing in Christ', he
explained, 'we stand at once in both the reality of God and the reality
of the world' (E 170). To be sure, the Christian is not identical with
the world, nor the natural with the supernatural; 'but between the
two there is in each case a unity which derives solely from the reality
of Christ' (E 111).
To find a way of speaking faithfully of the unity of reality, and yet
of maintaining a proper sense of the tension between the Christian
and the world, the natural and the supernatural, Bonhoeffer
developed a vocabulary of 'the ultimate and the penultimate'. At
several points in this book we have asked whether Bonhoeffer's
strong convictions about the distinctiveness of Christian theology,
knowledge and ethics, does not make it difficult for Christians to
engage with reality. In his categories of the penultimate and the
ultimate, he offers his strongest explanation yet of how Christians
are in but not of the world. Ultimately, Christians are justified by
grace and faith alone. But how are these ultimate truths realizable in
the messiness of penultimate, everyday life? The best way to show
what is at stake is to take a concrete example. When a Christian
stands by someone in despair, for example someone recently
bereaved, she has available to her ultimate words of comfort - the
promise of salvation, the promise of resurrection. But Bonhoeffer's
experience as a Pastor led him to think that it is often better for a
time simply to keep silence with the grieving person. 'Does one not
in some cases, by remaining deliberately in the penultimate, perhaps
point all the more genuinely to the ultimate, which God will speak
in his own time?' (E 104). Certainly, ultimate gospel truths of hope
and resurrection, faith and love, constitute a judgement on every-
thing in the world that is not at all or not fully in keeping with them.
Yet the judgement of these ultimate truths on the penultimate is
tempered with mercy, for the penultimate reality of the world
belongs to God too. The penultimate world is not annulled by the

116
 THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBLE ACTION

ultimate, indeed 'for the sake of the ultimate the penultimate must be
preserved' (£"111).
In his prison letters Bonhoeffer would write that 'we live in the
last but one and believe the last, don't we? ... But the logical conclu-
sions are far reaching, e.g. for the problem of Catholicism, for the
concept of the ministry, for the use of the Bible, etc., and above all
for ethics' (LPP 157). So what are the consequences for ethics?
Bonhoeffer again uses a simple illustration to make his point. 'If the
hungry man does not attain to faith, then the guilt falls on those who
refused him bread' (E 114). Providing bread to the hungry, justice
for the dispossessed, a roof for the homeless, or fellowship for the
lonely, does not amount to giving the ultimate gifts of justification
and faith: they are penultimate gifts. But these penultimate gifts
prepare the way - an echo of Bonhoeffer's proposed title for his
book - for Christ. It is in this sense of 'preparing the way' that the
penultimate is related to the ultimate. This positive way of speaking
of the penultimate shows that it is a mistake to be satisfied with
penultimate things, as if by contenting ourselves with giving penul-
timate things we have done enough. After all, the way of grace is not
conditional upon the fulfilment of material liberties or rights.
Moreover, a man may spend himself caring for the needy and remain
a sinner. Nevertheless 'it still makes a difference whether the penul-
timate is attended to and taken seriously or not' (E 116). Ultimately,
doing good won't save you - or those to whom good is done - but
God still wills us to do good things because it prepares the way for
grace.

Nature and ethics

The recovery of the penultimate for ethics led Bonhoeffer towards a
reappraisal of the natural. Catholic theology and ethics, Bonhoeffer
believed, had retained a capacity for reflection upon natural life,
nature, and natural theology that Protestant ethics had lost. The
Protestant emphasis on the sinfulness of humanity and creation
virtually reduced Protestant ethics to the condemnation of sin.
Bonhoeffer had never shared the knee-jerk antipathy to Catholicism
of many Lutherans and the section of his Ethics dedicated to 'the
natural', written during a long winter stay at a Catholic monastery in
Ettal, is sympathetically oriented to Catholic moral theology. 'The
concept of the natural must, therefore,' he wrote, 'be recovered on
the basis of the gospel... The natural is that which, after the Fall, is
directed towards the coming of Christ. The unnatural is that which,

117
 BONHOEFFER

after the Fall, closes its doors against the coming of Christ' (E
120—1). The natural corresponds to the penultimate; which means
that the natural life is a preliminary to life with Christ. The natural
life has a certain independence from God, a life of its own that is
guaranteed by God in order that those who live naturally may be led
towards the ultimate life in Christ. On this basis and to this penul-
timate extent, human beings may be said to have natural rights.
These include the right to bodily life. Harming someone's body,
injuring or killing another person, is wrong because it infringes this
right. This rule has exceptions — Bonhoeffer includes punishment of
criminals - but all arbitrary taking of life is wrong, and '[a]ll delib-
erate killing of innocent life is arbitrary' (E 135). Context is
all-important at this point in the Ethics as Bonhoeffer, with the
Nazis' euthanasia programme in mind, makes it axiomatic that 'the
right to life takes precedence over the right to kill' (E 137). To be
sure, a distinction can be made morally between killing, and
allowing a patient to die. But in this case, the patient's interests are
all that matters. The interests of society as a whole, for example the
cost to society of keeping a patient alive indefinitely, cannot be taken
into account, since it is false to assume that the value of life consists
only in its usefulness to society. By and large, the natural right to
bodily life also makes suicide wrong. 'God has reserved to Himself
the right to determine the end of life, because He alone knows the
goal to which it is His will to lead it' (E 143). Yet Bonhoeffer admits
exceptions: if a prisoner takes his life (again it is important to recall
the context) for fear that under torture he might betray his country,
his family, or his friend, condemnation of the deed becomes
impossible. Similarly, Bonhoeffer sets out in relation to the ethics of
reproduction, contraception and abortion with a premiss in favour of
the right to bodily life, but grants that 'scope must... be allowed for
the free action of a conscience which renders account to God' (E
153).4 With a certain unintended symbolism, Bonhoeffer did not
complete his essay on the natural: the task of rendering a satisfactory
account of the natural in the context of Protestant ethics is likewise
incomplete.

Character and command: two 'moods' in which to do ethics

How should we express ethically the 'haveable', graspable presence
of God in both act and being? In Chapter 4 we read Bonhoeffer's
early theology in the light of contemporary discussion of the relative
moral priority of the individual and of society. Sanctorum

118
 THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBLE ACTION

Communio answered that question in terms of 'both/and' rather than

'either/or'. In Act and Being, Bonhoeffer again resisted an artifi-
cially sharp choice, as he saw it, between viewing revelation either
in terms of act or in terms of being. A second contemporary debate,
concerning the relation of doing good and being good, of moral
action versus moral character, provided a context in which to under-
stand what was at stake. In two sections of Bonhoeffer's Ethics, both
debates resurface with renewed vigour and clarity. In 'Ethics as
formation', written in the second half of 1940, and 'The ethical and
the Christian as a theme', written in early 1943, Bonhoeffer presents
us with the ethical equivalents of being-based theology and act-
based theology. The themes explored in these sections can be
expressed as sharp alternatives, just as act and being can be
expressed as sharp alternatives. 'Is ethics all about the conditions
necessary for shaping good character (being); or is it rather simply a
matter of obeying God's commands (acts)?' But the temptation - for
that is what it is — to interpret ethics as formation and ethics as
command as two alternative approaches to ethics is resisted by
Bonhoeffer. Just as Bonhoeffer attempted to reconcile act and being,
so in his Ethics he sets out to reconcile formation and command. It
is a task of considerable contemporary relevance.
To help make this case I want to suggest a metaphor that uses the
word 'mood' in its grammatical sense. In grammar, 'mood' denotes
the form or set of forms of a verb that serves to indicate if it
expresses a fact (the indicative mood); a command (the imperative
mood); a question (the interrogative mood); the conditions for what
is imagined, wished, or possible (the subjunctive mood); a call (the
vocative mood); or a wish (the optative mood). David Ford finds all
these moods in Bonhoeffer's theology, and employs a metaphor
from Bonhoeffer's prison letters to speak of 'the polyphony of
Christian life.5 Two of these 'moods' are extremely helpful as a
means of describing Bonhoeffer's two leading approaches to ethics
as formation and command. Though there are significant themes in
many sections of Bonhoeffer's Ethics, only in these two sections is
there what can be called an explicit method.6
Ethics as formation is ethics conducted in the subjunctive mood.
The subjunctive mood describes the mood of a verb in which the
speaker states a relation she wishes for between the subject and the
predicate (grammatical examples are 'if I were you' and 'God help
you'). In my use of this 'mood metaphor', ethics in the subjunctive
mood is one in which the ethicist wishes for a particular relation
between the ethical subject and the person of Christ. If Bonhoeffer

119
 BONHOEFFER

was interested in the character of ethics, he was also interested in the

ethics of character. 'Gestaltung\ the German word translated as
'formation', normally refers to a spatial form; but it can also mean a
character in a play, and thereby 'character' in the context of
morality. 'Today', Bonhoeffer writes, 'there are once more villains
and saints, and they are not hidden from the public view ...
Shakespeare's characters (Gestalten) walk in our midst' (E 46).
Such characters, Bonhoeffer continues, teach us that ethics is not
simply concerned with individual sins or good deeds, but with
underlying moral character. 'What is worse than doing evil is being
evil. It is worse for a liar to tell the truth than for a lover of truth to
lie. It is worse when a misanthropist practices brotherly love than
when a philanthropist gives way to hatred' (E 46-7). In short, falling
away from being good is far more serious than making a one-off
mistake. Deeds are ethically insignificant besides questions of moral
identity. The character of the Christian must therefore take on the
form, that is the Gestalt, of Jesus Christ who John the Baptist
welcomed with the words 'Ecce homo\ behold the man. In a
beautiful passage, Bonhoeffer offers a character description of the
Christ to whom the Christian is conformed. He is the reconciler; he
is the one who truly loves men and women; he is the true man who
takes on himself the guilt of the world who is sentenced and
executed; he is the Risen man. All this is in contrast with the values
prominent in the German society that Bonhoeffer challenges in
which enemies are despised, success lionized and death idolized.
Bonhoeffer concludes that 'formation comes only by being drawn
into the form of Jesus Christ. It comes only as formation in His
likeness, as conformation with the unique form of him who was
made man, was crucified, and rose again' (E 61). Because Jesus was
incarnate, the purpose of this conformation is not to become divine,
but to learn what it means to be properly human. Because he is the
Crucified, the conformation means bearing with Jesus the suffering
of the world and the judgement of God. Because conformation is to
the Risen One, it means becoming a new creature, life in the midst
of death. Bonhoeffer's 'ethics as formation' predates what
theologians have learned to speak of as 'narrative theology', but his
Ethics at this point is strikingly suggestive of the insight of narrative
theologians that human life is story-formed. Bonhoeffer insists that
for the Christian, ethical life means forming oneself on the 'story-
form' character of Jesus. 'Ethics as formation' is ethics in the
subjunctive mood, ethics conditional upon a formation to Christ's
character. It is an ethical version of 'If I were You ...'.

120
 THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBLE ACTION

In contrast, 'ethics as command' suggests the imperative mood.

'The "ethical" and the Christian as a theme' was the last section of the
Ethics written before Bonhoeffer's arrest. Bonhoeffer rules out any
approach to ethics based on timeless eternally valid moral principles
or rules. Why is it, he asks, that ethics usually crosses our minds when
we face difficult decisions? It is because only where community is
disrupted is the 'you shall' of ethics perceived in its most acute form.
Earlier, he has suggested that moral decisions are most difficult when
they reach us not as simple choices between a right and a wrong, but
in the complex form of a choice between two rights, or two wrongs.
In such instances, where the right course of action is not self-evident,
ethical reflection still serves a useful purpose. Even so, it is easier to
say what an ethic is not than what it is: 'An ethic cannot be a book',
Bonhoeffer writes, 'in which there is set out how everything in the
world actually ought to be but unfortunately is not; and an ethicist
cannot be a person who always knows better than others what is to be
done'. (E 236) [translation amended]
In response, Bonhoeffer introduces the concept of a warrant for
ethical statements. This warrant is an authority to speak ethically. It
is not based on merit, but on the position a warrant holder has in
relation to another. The pastor has a warrant in relation to his
congregation, a parent to his child, a magistrate to his citizens. The
order in their relationship is not arbitrary, but rests for Bonhoeffer,
on the command of God:

The commandment of God is something different from what we

have so far referred to as the ethical. It embraces the whole of life.
It is not only unconditional; it is also total. It does not only forbid
and command; it also permits. It does not only bind; it also sets
free; and it does this by binding. Yet the 'ethical', in a sense
which still has to be explained, is part of it. God's commandment
is the only warrant for ethical discourse. (E 244)

For Bonhoeffer, the divine command is therefore not a concrete set

of timeless moral principles. God's commandment is the speech of
God that, in both its content and in its form, is God's concrete word
to a particular person at a particular moment. Its central feature is
that 'God's commandment leaves man no room for application or
interpretation' (E 245). Bonhoeffer does not mean that the hearer
plays no role in acting on the command, as though she were a puppet
on a string, but that when God commands God leaves room only
for obedience or disobedience. The question 'what does God

121
 BONHOEFFER

command?' is the ethical echo of the serpent's question in Eden 'did

God really say?' If one has to ask the question, one has not heard
God's command. In 1939 Bonhoeffer did not have to ask 'what is
the right thing to do, stay in America or return to Germany?' He
knew God was commanding him to be in Germany. His choice was
simply to obey or disobey.
It is significant that the section of the Ethics concerned with
command was among the last to be written. The text breaks off
suddenly and the manuscript lay on Bonhoeffer's desk the day he
was arrested. Clifford Green observes that it sounds like a fresh start
inspired by Karl Barth. It is not so much a radical departure from the
ideas of the second block as an experiment in the foundations of
Christian ethics based on the distinction and relation of the "ethical"
and the "commandment of God".7 If it had been written first,
because of its similarity of content and tone to Discipleship (in
particular in the prominence given to the idea of simple obedience)
it might have been dismissed as a last remnant of an earlier approach
to ethics, abandoned as Bonhoeffer's thinking matured. Setting
Bonhoeffer's command based ethics alongside his ethics as
formation, enables us to see these ethical 'methods' as two sides of
a dialectic: the one concerned with being in Christ (conformation to
the Gestalt of Jesus), the other concerned to emphasize God's
freedom to command particular things to particular people (God's
freedom to act).
In spite of the balance created by Bonhoeffer's dialectical
method, his theology of command poses problems. Christian history
is littered with people who have claimed direct revelation from God.
The Zwickau prophets challenged Luther's authority by their claim
to have received a revelation from God; Kierkegaard found himself
baffled with Adolph Adler's claim to have heard God speaking
directly to him; Bishop Butler turned up his nose at the early
Methodists whose claim of special revelations he found 'a very
horrid thing'. Are we really to accept that everyone who claims a
divine revelation has actually received one? What are we to make of
Bonhoeffer's view that God commands and that all we must do is
obey or disobey? Bonhoeffer, like Kierkegaard and Luther before
him, understood perfectly that this way of putting things creates a
problem: ethics based on God's commandments raise the very
difficult question of how one distinguishes between the mad and the
holy, between the fanatic and the disciple. The Nazis claimed that
Hitler was a messenger of God for the German Volk; the conspir-
ators heard God's command to kill him. Who is to umpire such

122
 THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBLE ACTION

conflict? In his theology of the divine mandates, Bonhoeffer

attempts a partial, penultimate answer to questions concerning the
concrete form taken by divine command in the day-to-day world.
A divine mandate is a staking out of a 'space' where it is possible
to hear the divine command clearly. In the Ethics Bonhoeffer has
two slightly different attempts at 'naming' divine mandates. In
unpacking his theology of command he names four mandates:
Church, marriage and the family, culture and government. Earlier in
his manuscripts he wrote that four mandates could be gleaned from
the Bible, listing these as 'labour, marriage, government and the
Church'. In prison he wondered if friendship might be a subdivision
of the mandate of culture, or if the brotherhood of the Church, or the
comradeship of labour might be mandates. Bonhoeffer's mandates
theology was a work in progress and the four mandates he names
should be thought of as examples of what he had in mind rather than
an exhaustive list. Even so, Bonhoeffer's essential idea is clear
enough: the mandates exist for both Christian and non-Christian in
society. They provide a system of checks and balances that serves to
afford each individual mandate its proper sphere of influence and
helps to prevent any single mandate (e.g. government) becoming too
dominant over the others (e.g. family). The relationship between the
mandates is thus essential to their health. If the mandates limit each
other's authority, ultimately, God sets further limits. The inner life
of a mandate is bounded by authority, as within each mandate some
are given responsibility to lead and others an obligation to be led.
Bonhoeffer's theology of the divine mandates is one of the
twentieth-century's most striking theological legitimations of
political authority. When Barth reflected on Bonhoeffer's
mandates theology, he wondered if there was not 'just a suggestion
of North German Patriarchalism' in them and asked, 'is the notion
of authority as some over others really more characteristic of the
ethical event than that of the freedom of even the very lowest
before the very highest?'8 Yet in spite of his reservations, Barth
still saw greater merit in Bonhoeffer's reworking of the 'orders of
creation' than in other contemporaneous attempts by Lutheran
theologians to rework Luther's teaching on the 'orders of creation'.
In the best known of these, Emil Brunner proposed 'orders' that
were independent of divine authority. This 'independence' was
theologically intolerable for Bonhoeffer, who wanted to base the
mandates in God's authoritative command (a link made plain in
English by the etymological relationship of 'command' and
'mandate').

123
 BONHOEFFER

In an essay probably written by Bonhoeffer in prison, and

certainly with an eye to his interrogation, we gain an intriguing
insight of what Bonhoeffer's ethics look like when spelled out in
relation to a concrete question. In 'What is meant by "Telling the
Truth"?' Bonhoeffer returns to how being good is worked out within
social relationships — a theme at the heart of his thinking about the
warrant for ethical discourse and his mandates theology. Within a
social relationship, the position and role one has bears strongly on
one's moral responsibility. Take telling the truth: Kant famously
argued that one should always tell the truth in every circumstance,
even if one's questioner is a murderer asking the location of a friend
in order to kill him. For Bonhoeffer, however, '[T]he truthfulness of
a child towards his parents is essentially different from that of the
parents towards their child' (E 326). He understood that 'the more
complex the actual situations of a man's life, the more responsible
and the more difficult will be his task of "telling the truth'" (E 327).
The point surely is that telling the truth can be used for evil
purposes: propaganda does this when it uses accurate facts or
genuine information, but uses it with the ultimate objective of
dissimulation and deception. As an example, Bonhoeffer imagines a
child who is asked by his teacher in front of his class whether it is
true that his father often comes home drunk. Though his father may
indeed frequently come home drunk, Bonhoeffer argues that
because the child has a moral obligation to honour his father, he is
justified in answering the question with a 'no' though this is literally
untrue. Though the child has lied, in Bonhoeffer's view, he has acted
truthfully in a deeper sense. A family (one of Bonhoeffer's divine
mandates) has a right to its secrets. The essay, written during or
shortly before Bonhoeffer's interrogation, develops a moral justifi-
cation for the lies Bonhoeffer was telling in service of the truth of
the anti-Nazi conspiracy. Telling the truth is not always a simple
matter of accurately reporting facts; it demands that we discern the
truth that lies beyond literal accuracy.

Towards an ethics of responsible action

Bonhoeffer rejected the Kantian idea that there are timeless moral
laws that all people must obey. One immediate consequence might
be a feeling of moral vertigo, a sense that without the barrier of
timeless moral laws, there is nothing to stop one falling off the edge
into a downward spin towards moral chaos. But for Bonhoeffer
Christian ethics meant taking responsibility away from the moral

124
 THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBLE ACTION

rule book and giving it back to the believer (who had 'lost' this
responsibility at the Fall). 'The structure of responsible life',
Bonhoeffer wrote, 'is conditioned by two factors; life is bound to
man and to God and a man's own life is free' (E 194). This sentence
could be a summary of this whole book. A responsible ethical life is
neither one slavishly bound up in divine law or command, nor to
ecclesiastical authority, nor to the verbally inspired text of the Bible.
Neither is a responsible ethical life one in which choices are
unlimited, nor the moral life unbounded or untrammelled - in short
'free' in the sense that it has not duties or obligations. True responsi-
bility means freedom, and true freedom means responsibility.
Moral responsibility demands more from the Christian than
unthinking conformation to moral rules. In Bonhoeffer's ethics,
conformation is to a living person through whom God's command
comes fresh to each individual each day. This does not mean that
what God wills changes from day to day, since God is constant in
character and will. In this sense, Bonhoeffer's ethics are not
occasionalistic, that is ad hoc or once off. But it does mean that
Christians take responsibility for discerning the right thing to do, and
also for doing it. It means that though God is responsible for the
world - and takes responsibility visibly in the cross - Christians take
a penultimate responsibility for who they are and what they do.
Ultimately, God judges Christians' actions and if they have acted
wrongly, they trust in the forgiveness of God, not as a right, but as a
promise made by God in Christ. Bonhoeffer welcomed this kind of
moral responsibility as a coming of age.

Notes
1 Alasdair Maclntyre's diagnosis of a Western moral crisis points to the
Enlightenment as the period in which the Western moral consensus fractured. His
After Virtue, 2nd edition, Duckworth, 1985, is essential reading for anyone keen
to understand contemporary ethics.
2 English translation, 1955.
3 Letter to Eberhard Bethge 27 November 1940.
4 It would be misleading to characterize Bonhoeffer's approach here - a premiss in
favour of bodily life, but allowing exceptions - as a form of 'situation ethics'.
Situation ethics in its most popular form (Joseph Fletcher) seeks a third way
between strict adherence to moral laws and complete freedom by considering the
situation and the consequences of moral acts in the light of a few key moral
principles, such as love. The difference between situation ethics and Bonhoeffer's
ethics may be grasped when we recall the force of his rejection of the idea that in
ethics the subject 'works out' the right thing to do for herself. Situation ethics are

125
 BONHOEFFER

precisely the kind of ethics Bonhoeffer imagines arising from the Fall: a human
enquiry into right and wrong.
5 See 'Polyphonic Living: Dietrich Bonhoeffer' in Self and Salvation: Being
Transformed, CUP, 1999, pp. 241-65.
6 See chapter 6 'Method' in Dietrich Bonhoeffer: His Significance for North
Americans, Larry Rasmussen, Fortress, 1990, pp. 89-110.
7 See New Studies in Bonhoeffer's 'Ethics', Ed. William J. Peck, Edwin Mellen
Press, 1987, pp. 59-60.
8 CD HI/4 p. 22.

126
 8
Ethics and the 'world come
of age'

From the window of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's cell in 1944 the world

cannot have seemed very adult. Barred and set high in the brick wall
of his cell, Bonhoeffer's window looked out onto a city crushed
from above by Allied bombs and poisoned from within by a decade
of Nazi misrule. In neighbouring cells he could hear grown men
crying like children. Guards acted like schoolyard bullies. The
innocent died and the guilty went free: a world gone mad, not a
world grown up. Whatever else it was, Bonhoeffer's prison theology
was not a round of applause for the moral maturity of the world.
Neither was it a lamentation. In the first year of his imprisonment,
before evidence emerged linking him to the plot to assassinate
Hitler, Bonhoeffer expended his energy on preparing for his trial,
which he expected would result in his release. When the trial failed
to materialize, and when the assassination plot failed in July 1944,
Bonhoeffer understood the implications for himself and his
relatives, friends and colleagues in the conspiracy. Certainly,
Bonhoeffer believed that God

... knows ten thousand ways

To save us from death's door (LPP 306)

but it seemed very probable that before long evidence would

emerge incriminating him and he knew the wise course was to

127
 BONHOEFFER

prepare for the worst scenario. Many men and women would have
despaired; Bonhoeffer resumed theology in earnest. Bonhoeffer's
smuggled letters to Eberhard Bethge were his last chance to
sketch out his new ideas. From April 1944 until he was taken
from the relative safety of Tegel Military Interrogation Prison to
the Gestapo prison in Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse in October 1944
Bonhoeffer wrote with extraordinary diligence and energy. His
theology was critical, to be sure, but oriented to the future and
characterized by a profound optimism for theology, the Church,
and humanity.
If Bonhoeffer's prison letters mark a new development in his
theology, as is widely assumed, do they also suggest a new devel-
opment in Bonhoeffer's theological ethics? What might ethics be
like in a 'world come of age', in which we live 'as if God were not
given'? What might a non-religious Christian ethic be like? What
might it mean to live out the Gospel as a practice of 'arcane disci-
pline'? The chapter falls into two parts: the first reports the key
theological elements of Bonhoeffer's letters to Eberhard Bethge in
this last and fruitful year1 and the second explores the potential of
Bonhoeffer's insights for his theological ethics.

Bonhoeffer's prison theology

Bonhoeffer's letter to Bethge of 30 April 1944 sets the agenda for

the theological investigation that would occupy him until October.
Reflecting expressly on the Western Christianity of which he was a
product and a representative, Bonhoeffer asks: '[WJhat is bothering
me incessantly is the question what Christianity really is, or indeed
who Christ really is, for us today' (LPP 279). Unrecognized by
many in the Church, a fundamental change has taken place in the
orientation of the Western world. The time when people would
accept what they were told theologically or religiously is past, and
so is the time when people were preoccupied by their own inner life
or by the working of their own conscience. Many generations were
truly dependent on orthodox religion, with its emphasis on piety and
good conscience; but people in the West are now 'moving towards a
completely religionless time' (LPP 279). People cannot and will not
go on practising religion as they have for centuries. For the Church,
this new situation will take some getting used to, because its whole
nineteen hundred year history has presupposed that people are
naturally inclined towards religion; that is the Church's preaching
rests upon an assumption of a religious a priori of humankind.

128
 ETHICS AND THE 'WORLD COME OF AGE'

What, Bonhoeffer asks, if one day soon, it becomes clear that

humankind's religious a priori was a 'historically conditioned and
transient form of human self-expression' (LPP 280) - which was
indeed virtually the case, in Bonhoeffer's view, in 1944 - would the
disappearance of the illusory religious a priori mean that the
foundation on which Christianity had been built had been pulled
away? Should the few Christians who remained in such a cultural
situation be characterized as intellectually dishonest, or as a chosen
remnant? And if religious presuppositions really only ever were an
'outer garment' for Christianity, then what is to follow its disap-
pearance ... a religionless Christianity? But what would a
religionless Christianity be like?
Bonhoeffer believed his theological questions raised the possi-
bility not only of a new departure for his own theology, but of a new
theology that broke the mould of the liberal versus neo-orthodox
debate that was characteristic of his era. Bonhoeffer acknowledged
that Karl Barth had 'started out along this line of thought, but did not
carry it to completion' (LPP 280). According to Bonhoeffer, Barth
had recognized well enough that the religious outer form of Western
Christianity had been slowly peeling away, but instead of embracing
this change he had tried to restore humankind's religious a priori.2
Instead of a 'restoration' of religion, Bonhoeffer sets out the stall of
his theological project with several very practical questions,
including what 'do a church, a community, a sermon, a liturgy, a
Christian life mean in a religionless world? How do we speak of God
- without religion, i.e. without the temporally conditioned presuppo-
sitions of metaphysics, inwardness and so on?' (LPP 280).
Crucially, Bonhoeffer adds, in

what way are we 'religionless-secular' Christians, in what way

are we the ecclesia,3 those who are called forth, not regarding
ourselves from a religious point of view as specially favoured, but
rather as belonging wholly to the world?

More positively, '[d]oes the secret discipline, or alternatively the

difference ... between the penultimate and the ultimate, take on new
importance here?' (LPP 280-1). That is, will Christians need to find
new, arcane ways of being present in the penultimate reality of this
world in which they keep ultimate things to themselves not out of
shame or doubt, but as an act of kindness to the penultimate? Paul
had challenged the 'religious' presuppositions of the Apostles in
Jerusalem by asking whether circumcision really is a condition of

129
 BONHOEFFER

justification. Have the outward trappings of religion the contem-

porary equivalents of Gentile circumcision?
There is a curious personal motivation, Bonhoeffer writes, for his
questions: as a Christian he often feels more drawn to religionless
people than to the religious, not with evangelistic or apologetic
intent, but because he feels more instinctively in fellowship with
them. With the religionless, he feels able calmly and naturally to
speak God's name. But religious people bring God up like a deus ex
machina - a divine theatrical device dropped into the action of a play
to resolve its plot. God functions for them either as a solution of
apparently insoluble problems, or as a means of exploiting moments
of human need and weakness. But, Bonhoeffer concludes, 'I should
like to speak of God not on the boundaries but at the centre, not in
weakness but in strength; and therefore not in death and guilt but in
man's life and goodness' (LPP 282).
On 5 May, Bonhoeffer took up again the theme of his letter from
a few days earlier. Rudolf Bultmann's 1941 essay 'New Testament
and Mythology' had been widely debated since its publication, not
least within the Confessing Church, which was trying to find a
theological identity beyond the neo-orthodoxy of Karl Barth, its
erstwhile leading light. Bultmann had proposed that certain New
Testament concepts, such as miracle and ascension, needed to be
'demythologized', that is stripped of their metaphysical, unhistorical
and unreal outer form. Bonhoeffer admired Bultmann's essay for the
same reason he admired Barth: Bultmann at least recognized that
Christianity faced a credibility problem. But Bultmann was essen-
tially a liberal at heart who, like all theological liberals before him,
tried to make the gospel more palatable by hacking off its sharper
edges. For Bonhoeffer, 'you can't, as Bultmann supposes, separate
God and miracle, but you must be able to interpret and proclaim both
in a "non-religious" sense' (LPP 285). In this respect Bultmann had
not gone too far; he had not gone far enough!
Interpreting Christian faith and theology religiously means to
speak metaphysically and individualistically, neither of which is
particularly biblical. The Old Testament shows no interest at all in the
question of saving one's soul, but keeps focused on this-worldly
righteousness and the Kingdom of God. Even Paul's idea of being
justified by grace — the cornerstone of Reformation theology — is not
chiefly concerned with the salvation of the individual, but with the
extent of God's righteousness. In sum, what Bonhoeffer means is that
what 'is above this world is, in the gospel, intended to exist for this
world' (LPP 286), not in the sense that humanity becomes the centre

130
 ETHICS AND THE 'WORLD COME OF AGE'

of attention, but in the sense that the key doctrines of creation, incar-
nation, crucifixion and resurrection are all this-worldly in orientation.
Earth's approach to these theological challenges amounts,
Bonhoeffer believes, to a 'positivism of revelation' in which
Christian doctrines such as the virgin birth, the Trinity, etc., are all
thought of as equally important, and which must be accepted as a
whole or not at all. The result is that the Church stands where religion
once stood - not altogether a bad thing - but the Church, though
'pure' is isolated from the world, which is left to its own devices.
On 20 May, Bonhoeffer again took up his theological investi-
gation. He now began to air a musical metaphor for the non-religious
Christianity he was reaching towards:

... God wants us to love him eternally with our whole hearts — not
in such a way as to injure or weaken our earthly love, but to
provide a kind ofcantusfirmus [i.e. the central tune around which
a piece of music is built] to which other melodies of life provide
the counterpoint. One of these contrapuntal themes (which have
their own complete independence but are yet related to the cantus
firmus) is earthly affection. (LPP 303)

Good polyphonic music is like a life which has Christ as its central
melody, and in which other themes and harmonies are free from time
to time to come into their own, but which always come back to their
basic task of adding to and complementing the cantus firmus. It was
over a month before Bonhoeffer returns to this insight. Watching his
fellow prisoners, Bonhoeffer is struck by how shallow they are, how
dependent their moods are on the meal before them, or the air raid
they are in. 'By contrast, Christianity puts us into many different
dimensions of life at the same time; we make room in ourselves, to
some extent, for God and the whole world' (LPP 310). By holding
joy and suffering, personal anxiety and broader perspective together,
Christian life is able to remain multidimensional and polyphonic. In
the same letter, Bonhoeffer reports the outcome of recently reading
a book on the world-view of physics. 'It has brought home to me
quite clearly how wrong it is to use God as a stop-gap for the incom-
pleteness of our knowledge' (LPP 311). This is true of the borders
between 'religion' and science, where the more we know about the
natural world the less God is needed as an explanation for natural,
scientific processes and problems. But the same is increasingly true
of other areas of human life, such as death and suffering and guilt,
which people are much more willing to deal with without recourse

131
 BONHOEFFER

to God. If he is right, then God has not been 'pushed out' from
spheres of influence that once belonged to God, God never properly
belonged at the outer edges of human knowledge:

God is no stop-gap; he must be recognized at the centre of life,

not when we are at the end of our resources; it is his will to be
recognized in life, and not only when death comes; in health and
vigour, and not only in our suffering; in our activities, and not
only in sin. (LPP 312)

When did the movement towards the autonomy of humankind

begin - when, that is, did Western culture discover the laws beyond
God's law by which to live scientifically, socially, politically,
aesthetically and ethically? In each of these areas, Bonhoeffer
continued on 8 June (two days after the Allied invasion of
Normandy), beginning in the thirteenth century human beings have
learnt to manage 'without recourse to the "working hypothesis"
called "God" (LPP 325). In science and ethics the assumption that
one can cope without God is so commonplace it is hardly remarked.
But from the middle of the eighteenth century, this has been increas-
ingly true of 'religious' questions. Both Protestants and Catholics
have tended to react to these developments as if they are essentially
anti-Christian. Christian apologetics has tried to prove to the world
that it cannot, after all, live confidently without God, and tried even
more vainly to keep the world from encroaching further into any
remaining religious spheres of influence, such as guilt and death. For
Bonhoeffer, this kind of Christian apologetics is pointless, ignoble
and unchristian. It is pointless 'because it seems to me like an
attempt to put a grown-up man back into adolescence, i.e. to make
him dependent on things on which he is, in fact, no longer
dependent' (LPP 327). It is ignoble because it attempts to exploit
people's weaknesses without their consent. Finally it is unchristian
because it confuses one historical form of the Christian religion with
the way human beings must always be in relation to Christ.
On 27 June, Bonhoeffer reopened the question of the significance
of the Old Testament as the lens through which the New Testament
must be read. The faith of the Old Testament is not, he asserts, a
faith based on the human thirst for redemption - or rather, in the Old
Testament, redemption is conceived in this-worldly rather than
other-worldly terms. The redemption God gives the Israelites is not
the promise of life after death, but liberation from slavery in Egypt
or from exile in Babylon. Redemption is something that takes place

132
 ETHICS AND THE 'WORLD COME OF AGE'

in history. The religion of the Jews was thus in sharp contrast with
other Eastern religions, which tended to contain myths of
redemption beyond the grave. Christianity has always, to be sure,
been a religion of redemption. However, the Church has been
mistaken in abandoning the mis-worldly religion of the Jews in
favour of other-worldly redemption theologies. It is understandable,
and even to an extent appropriate, that this should be so, since
Christianity proclaims the hope of the resurrection, which is
genuinely a promise of redemption. But even this redemption is
misinterpreted if it is thought to mean 'redemption from cares,
distress, fears, and longings, from sin and death, in a better world
beyond the grave ... The Christian, unlike the devotees of the
redemption myths, has no last line of escape available from earthly
tasks and difficulties into the eternal, but, like Christ himself... he
must drink the earthly cup to the dregs' (LPP 336-7).
Three days later Bonhoeffer resumed his line of thought. It is not
only Christianity that has held the world back from its maturity:
existentialism and psychotherapy - which are but secularized
offshoots of Christian religion — feed off human need and despair.
But when one looks at Jesus, he was concerned only with calling
people away from their sin. He did not first require a sinner to dwell
introspectively and guiltily on her sin, but to turn away from it to the
kingdom of God. A few days later Bonhoeffer was aspiring to a
'non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts'. With God pushed
out at the extremes, religious people became increasingly preoc-
cupied by the 'personal', the 'private' and the 'inner': the hunting
ground of modern pastoral workers had contracted to the secret areas
of a person's life known to a man's valet! In this, pastoral workers
resemble nothing so much as tabloid journalists grubbing about in
the dustbins of a man's life in the hope of finding some juicy secret
on which to seize. Of course men and women are sinful. But such
clerical sniffing out of sins mistakenly supposes that someone can be
addressed as a sinner only when his weaknesses have been exposed.
It also erroneously supposes that the private and inner life of a man
or woman is who he or she essentially is. In fact, the inner life is only
one of many things that matter: to put it crudely, was Napoleon
wicked because he committed adultery, or because his hubris
condemned Europe to bitter war for a generation? What Bonhoeffer
wants is therefore:

[T]o start from the premise that God shouldn't be smuggled into
some last secret place, but that we should frankly recognize that

133
 BONHOEFFER

the world, and people, have come of age, that we shouldn't run
man down in his worldliness, but confront him with God at his
strongest point.... (LPP 346)

On 16 July, Bonhoeffer turned again to history. His reading in

prison was heavily weighted towards history and the reading was
paying off. Human autonomy in theology came about with Lord
Herbert of Cherbury's thesis that reason alone (without revelation)
was a sufficient basis for religious knowledge. In ethics, it occurred
when Montaigne and Bodin substituted rules of life for the
commandments. Machiavelli likewise expediently replaced political
morality with 'reasons of state'. Grotius underpinned the autonomy
of human society by setting up natural law as international law,
which is valid 'etsi deus non daretur\ that is, as if there were no
God. Neither is it only human beings that live 'as if there were no
God': the universe too appears self-subsisting. Bonhoeffer
concludes with some drama that:

we cannot be honest unless we recognize that we have to live in

the world etsi deus non daretur. And this is just what we do
recognize - before God! God would have us know that we must
live as men who manage our lives without him. The God who is
with us is the God who forsakes us. (LPP 360)

This is the culmination of the argument and the high water mark of
Bonhoeffer's theology, the moment at which Bonhoeffer's new
thinking concerning the 'world come of age' and 'religionless
Christianity' is brought together with his christology.

Before God and with God we live without God. God lets himself
be pushed out of the world on to the cross. He is weak and
powerless in the world, and that is precisely the way, the only
way, in which he is with us and helps us. Matthew 8:17 [he 'took
our infirmities and bore our diseases'] makes it quite clear that
Christ helps us, not by virtue of his omnipotence, but by virtue of
his weakness and suffering. (LPP 360-1)

This is the decisive difference between true Christians and all other
religious believers: religion looks in human distress to the power of
God in the world, but the 'Bible directs man to God's powerlessness
and suffering; only the suffering God can help' (LPP 361, my
emphasis).

134
 ETHICS AND THE 'WORLD COME OF AGE'

This defining moment in his theology came days before the attempt
on Hitler's life. The day after the attempt, when it was perfectly
obvious the coup had failed, Bonhoeffer was again pursuing his
theme, and writing of his Discipleship as an attempt to live a holy life.
On 28 July Bonhoeffer summarizes what he has said about the differ-
ences between the Old and the New Testaments: in the Old the
blessing includes the cross, and in the New the cross includes the
blessing. Days later he adds that the Church must come out of
stagnation and tackle these questions in open dialogue with the world.
He makes a start at this dialogue in an outline for a short book summa-
rizing the themes he has developed in correspondence with Bethge.
The planned book was to have three chapters. In the first, he intended
to offer a stock-take of Christianity in which he would detail the
'coming of age' of humankind, human religiouslessness, and
the woebegone attempts of Protestantism to defend itself against the
process. He planned a section on public morals as a detailed explo-
ration of his theses, and in particular sexual behaviour. In the second
chapter he planned to offer the positive part of his argument, a
necessary follow on from the critical note of his first chapter. In this,
he would rework his christology, so that Jesus would be visible as 'the
man for others', the Crucified man who lives from the transcendent.
A non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts, such as creation,
atonement, faith and the last things, was to follow. It helps greatly that
the non-religious interpretation was to flow from his realization of
Jesus as the man for others who lives out of the transcendent, for it
affords us a glimpse of how he might have interpreted biblical
concepts in ways that they became available to serve human beings;
deriving them from the transcendent, but transforming their purpose.
In a third chapter he anticipated setting out his conclusions for the
Church, which, in the pattern of the man for others, 'is the church only
when it exists for others' (LPP 382). The Church should sell its
property and make the resources available to those in need. Clergy
should either earn their keep in secular employment or live off free-
will offerings (rather than be paid, then as now for most German
churches, as civil servants with funds gathered through the state tax
system). A revision of Christian apologetics is long overdue, he
writes, as well as reform of training for ministry and the pattern of
clerical life. Bonhoeffer returned only briefly and in passing to his
theological reflections in the surviving correspondence. He wrote
throughout August and September to Bethge, but the letters were lost,
and the correspondence halted when Bonhoeffer was removed from
Tegel prison.

135
 BONHOEFFER

Ethics and the 'world come of age'

Tegel prison was not the best place to think through a new theology,
and wartime Berlin was not the best moment in which to be doing it.
Josef Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, had ordered prison
libraries purged of any book that might subvert the war effort. Even
with his parents on the look-out for books on his behalf, Bonhoeffer
did not have all the reading matter he wanted or needed to develop
his ideas to their fullest potential. And as he wrote winsomely to his
friend, 'it is harder to think without an echo'. Bonhoeffer tried his
utmost not to put any pressure on Bethge, but it was impossible for
him to keep pace. The letters were the main focus of Bonhoeffer's
attention: for Bethge they competed with his new wife, baptismal
preparations, avoiding Allied bombers on journeys to and from his
Wehrmacht unit and the numbing boredom of his day-to-day
soldier's life. Yet Bethge was a capable theologian and in one reply,
he identified an important problem raised by Bonhoeffer's peregri-
nations. Responding to Bonhoeffer's thoughts on the ways a
Christian theology of redemption tends to flee the day-to-day life
into the promise of life after death, Bethge replies, 'It seems to me
unbiblical to regard eschatology as an evasion' (LPP 356). It is a
very acute remark. It is certainly true that the Bible directs us to
God's weakness and suffering. It is equally true that this insight has
been misunderstood, neglected and distorted for the greater part of
Christian history. But it is not true that this is all the Bible directs us
to: the ultimate end-point of the New Testament is a City of Gold. It
is not correct to interpret Bonhoeffer's prison theology as suggesting
that redemption only takes place this side of the grave, simply that
truly grasping what this ultimate otherworldly redemption means
should send the Christian back to this world in renewed commitment
to serving others. He did not doubt the resurrection as some critics
have malignly suggested (as he went to his death he said 'this is the
end - for me the beginning of life'). Yet the senses in which a fuller
realization of a theology of the last things could contribute to
sending his readers back to the world are limited in these letters.
Neither does Bonhoeffer make the mistake, typical of many
theologies of the suffering God, of equating the weakness of Christ
and the powerlessness of God with a divine inability to make any
difference. Bonhoeffer's deep conviction is that it is through
weakness, suffering and power that God is with us and helps us.
Being 'pushed out' onto the cross, God is not reduced to absen-
teeism, but helps us by virtue of his weakness. The silence on the

136
 ETHICS AND THE 'WORLD COME OF AGE'

cross is not craven, hopeless or helpless because through it Christ

'wins power and space in the world by his weakness' (LPP 361).
And what of ethics? If there is a religionless interpretation of
biblical concepts, a religionless Christianity, are there also to be
'religionless ethics'? Bonhoeffer's theological correspondence with
Bethge mentions ethics in passing as one of the historical instances
of a growth in human autonomy. And though in his outline for a
book, Bonhoeffer had hoped to dedicate a section to public sexual
morality as an example of Protestantism's misguided attempt to
defend itself, the references are few and brief. There are two possi-
bilities. The first is that the prison theology follows in the wake of a
religionless ethics already developed by Bonhoeffer in the book he
was writing during the war. If this is right, then the Ethics already
are a 'religionless ethics'. Does Bonhoeffer's Ethics already offer us
a choice between religious ethics (i.e. ethics after the Fall) and non-
religious ethics (i.e. ethics beyond good and evil)?
The second possibility is that in prison Bonhoeffer's theological
ethics take a significant shift in direction. Bonhoeffer does not say
he has become cautious about his Ethics, in the way he does about
Discipleship. There are considerable signs of continuity between the
theology of the prison letters and his earlier theology. Yet in my
view the letters do suggest a significant shift in at least one respect
that concerns ethics.
Very nearly all of Bonhoeffer's ethics prior to April 1944 are
premised on the idea that Christian ethics are distinct from all other
ethics and constitute a critique of all other ethics. 'Very nearly all'
because it is unwise to be categorical; but also because in his
mandates theology, Bonhoeffer was already experimenting (without
complete success) with crediting the world with some kind of moral
autonomy, as well as with the categories of 'ultimate' and 'penul-
timate' that resurface in his 'world come of age'. Nevertheless, it is
certainly true that the greater part of his theological effort in ethics
before April 1944 was dedicated to spelling out the implication of
the Fall, which was that the human ability to decide between right
and wrong, good and evil, resulted from the Fall and marked a
sustained human disobedience of God. In Discipleship Bonhoeffer
attempted, in a manner he did not revoke but came to see the
weakness of, to carve out a space for the Church in the world. In
Ethics he gave up this kind of two-spheres thinking to oscillate,
creatively and dangerously, between reiterating the distinctiveness
of Christian ethics and stating afresh a commitment to the presence
of Christ in the natural and in the mandates.

137
 BONHOEFFER

So far Bonhoeffer had thought through the ethics of the

conspiracy for his friends, but the moment had to come when he
sought to grasp the faith of the church in general in its
relationship to this secular world - a world that his own family
history had made him close to. (DB 857)
The question that the prison theology raises is whether
Bonhoeffer's hope that the Church should resist smuggling God into
the world and instead 'should frankly recognize that the world, and
people, have come of age, that we shouldn't run man down in his
worldliness, but confront him with God at his strongest point ...'
(LPP 346) would require a rethinking of his whole insistence on the
distinctiveness of Christian ethics. If the sharp distinction between
Christian and non-Christian ethics were to be abandoned, would
Bonhoeffer's acute and unflinching critique of contemporary
immorality and weak and lazy ethics be lost with it? Bonhoeffer
gives one indication of a direction in which an answer might be
developed when he asks if religionless Christianity might mean
developing the idea of an arcane discipline - a way of being in the
penultimate 'as if God were not there' without ever losing sight of
Jesus Christ. In his earlier theology Bonhoeffer had worked to
express how Jesus is Lord of the Church. With the phrase 'Jesus the
man for others', he expressed Jesus' Lordship over the religionless
too. Yet finally, the brute truth is that though he was aware of the
question of the ethical implications of his prison theology, and
recognized its importance, he did not work out the implications of
the 'world come of age' for ethics - at least not in writing. But this
is not a tragedy. Bonhoeffer had already done enough to make clear
that a Christian must take responsibility for her own moral views
and actions and not hide behind those of a moral guru. Making sense
of ethics in a world come of age is up to us.

Notes
1 Three books give indispensable guidance for reading Bonhoeffer's prison letters:
Eberhard Bethge's Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography., Fortress, 2000, chapter 13;
Clifford J. Green's Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, revised edition,
Eerdmans, 1999, chapter 6; and Ralph K. Wiistenberg's A Theology of Life:
Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Religionless Christianity, Eerdmans, 1998.
2 This was an accusation Karl Barth rejected, though chiefly and disingenuously
because he thought Bonhoeffer didn't know or understand his theology well
enough.
3 I.e. the Church. In the original Greek, ecclesia invites the word-play Bonhoeffer
now uses.

138
 9
'Are we still of any use?'

Is Dietrich Bonhoeffer an antique figure whose experience and

perspective is so remote that his voice fails to carry from his time to
our own? This is an uncomfortable question to ask. Bonhoeffer was
courageous, intelligent; loyal to friends and family and, in the
darkest moment of German history, he was on the side of the Angels.
Yet these qualities have no necessary bearing on the value of his
politics, theology or ethics today. Any theologian, any thinker from
the past, serves us best when we resist the urge to domesticate them
by our approval and admiration. Outstanding Christian thinkers are
those who retain the capacity to shock us by the truth of their
insights as we read our own dilemmas in the harsh light of their
'otherness'. Bonhoeffer's theology and ethics have this classic
quality but their potential is only realized when we resist the urge to
tame his legacy by assuming that it is easily applied to our own
situation. In this final chapter, I want therefore to pose three critical
questions to Bonhoeffer's legacy.

'After Ten Years'

Shortly before his arrest, Bonhoeffer wrote an essay titled 'After Ten
Years: A Reckoning made at New Year 1943' (LPP 3-17). The
essay was a gift for the handful of co-conspirators closest to him
with whom he had shared a decade of anti-Nazi resistance. The tone
of the essay is one of gratitude for lessons learned in the struggle, but
it confronts hard questions about the moral consequences of

139
 BONHOEFFER

conspiracy. 'The great masquerade of evil has played havoc with all
our ethical concepts', Bonhoeffer writes:

For evil to appear disguised as light, charity, historical necessity,

or social justice is quite bewildering to anyone brought up on our
traditional ethical concepts, while for the Christian who bases his
life on the Bible, it merely confirms the fundamental wickedness
of evil. (LPP4)

For Bonhoeffer, the evils of Nazism had shown up the flaws in six
types of moral character. Reasonable people thought that with a little
reason they could bend the Nazis into a more morally acceptable
position. Moral fanatics thought that by unbending adherence to their
moral principles they could battle the evils of Nazism. Some
contented themselves with a salved rather than a clear conscience
without realizing that a bad conscience may be stronger and more
wholesome than a deluded one. Others obeyed orders, as if doing
one's duty exhausted one's responsibility. Those who asserted their
own freedom were prepared to compromise truth and assent to what
is bad in order to avoid something worse. Finally there were women
and men who treasured their own private virtue who were prepared to
avoid taking responsibility if it means incurring personal guilt, even
if this means turning a blind eye to injustice. The moral types
Bonhoeffer sketches represent recognizable caricatures of philo-
sophical ethics: utilitarians and pragmatists, socialists, Protestants,
Kantians, existentialists, Pharisees. Even if we acknowledge that
these caricatures were drawn before his groundbreaking prison
letters, there is no reason to think Bonhoeffer subsequently demurred
from the powerful and succinct dismissal of non-Christian ethics
expressed at this point. None of these forms of ethics, he asserts, have
proved sufficient to meet the demands that Nazi Germany has made
of them. So who is able to confront the situation? Only the person

whose final standard is not his reason, his principles, his

conscience, his freedom, or his virtue, but who is ready to
sacrifice all this when he is called to obedient and responsible
action in faith and in exclusive allegiance to God — the respon-
sible person, who tries to make his whole life an answer to the
question and call of God. (LPP 5) [translation amended]

Bonhoeffer accepted that the reasons behind collusion of most

Germans in Nazi policy and practice were complex. They had little

140
 'ARE WE STILL OF ANY USE?'

to do with fear - too many Germans fought bravely in the Nazi cause
for that casual explanation to be sustainable. Rather, the explanation
lay in the deep-rooted German tradition of uncritical obedience to
authority. For Bonhoeffer, God's demand for responsible human
'action in a bold venture of faith' is in the sharpest possible contrast
to blind obedience. Obeying God calls for complete obedience, yet
not blind obedience, for it involves both discernment and responsi-
bility. Anyone willing to take such responsibility must be willing to
incur personal guilt and thereby to rely ultimately not on their own
strength or goodness but upon God's forgiveness and consolation.
Bonhoeffer's point is morally shocking: the conspiracy was sinful
and the conspirators were cast upon the mercy of God. Bonhoeffer
seems to suggest that assassinating Hitler and thereby curtailing
Nazi rule is morally reprehensible. If true, would this condemnation
also apply to the Allied servicemen and women engaged in the war?
The question is legitimate: Bonhoeffer had never expressly revoked
his pre-war view that war is wrong and the logic of his position is
that combatants, just like conspirators, are thrust upon God's mercy
since war can never be in keeping with God's purposes. Yet in the
essay Bonhoeffer confines himself specifically to the moral cost of
conspiracy:

We have been silent witnesses of evil deeds; we have been

drenched by many storms; we have learnt the arts of equivocation
and pretence; experience has made us suspicious of others and
kept us from being truthful and open; intolerable conflicts have
worn us down and even made us cynical. (LPP 16)

Most of us will thankfully never face similar moral circumstances.

The conspiracy was, Bonhoeffer understood, an emergency
situation; what we might now more casually call a 'moral grey area'.
In such borderline areas the true nature of human ethics is brought
to light together with the need to re-evaluate and reshape them. In
1933 Bonhoeffer had spoken critically, in his radio address on the
'Fiihrer principle', of the cult of success. Without abandoning his
suspicion of the Nazi cult of success, 'after ten years' Bonhoeffer
now recognized that the moral significance of success could not
easily be ignored:

Although it is certainly not true that success justifies an evil deed

and shady means, it is impossible to regard success as something
that is ethically quite neutral. The fact is that historical success

141
 BONHOEFFER

creates a basis for the continuance of life, and it is still a moot

point whether it is ethically more responsible to take the field like
a Don Quixote against a new age, or to admit one's defeat, accept
the new age, and agree to serve it. In the last resort success makes
history; and the ruler of history repeatedly brings good out of evil
over the heads of the history-makers. Simply to ignore the ethical
significance of success is a short circuit created by dogmatists
who think unhistorically and irresponsibly; and it is good for us
sometimes to be compelled to grapple seriously with the ethical
problem of success. As long as goodness is successful, we can
afford the luxury of regarding it as having no ethical significance;
it is when success is achieved by evil means that the problem
arises. (LPP 6-7)

In 1943, though the Confessing Church had failed, Bonhoeffer still

hoped the conspiracy would succeed. But he recognized that its
success, if it came, would be by evil means: lying, treason and
murder. Could those who had resorted to such means still play a role
in the reconstruction of a post-Nazi Germany? His final question is
therefore not merely rhetorical: 'Are we still of any use? What we
shall need is not geniuses, or cynics, or misanthropes, or clever tacti-
cians, but plain, honest, straightforward men [and women]' (LPP
16-17) [translation amended].
This question - 'are we still of any use?' - can help to form a
structure in which to evaluate Bonhoeffer's politics, theology and
ethics, as well as for reading our own situation in the light of his
legacy.

Are we of political use?

In the 1930s and 1940s the future of democracy was far from certain.
After the First World War political democracies had replaced
autocratic monarchies in many European nations, but in all but a
handful of countries they had proved weak and incapable. During
the second half of Bonhoeffer's life most Europeans lived under
dictatorships of Nazi, Fascist or Communist hue. The 'triumph' of
democracy in twentieth-century Europe is therefore 'a story of
narrow squeaks and unexpected twists, not inevitable victories and
forward marches'.1 To take the view, as Bonhoeffer and his co-
conspirators did, that Germany was not yet suited to democratic
government was not, therefore, unreasonable. For Bonhoeffer,
Nazism was bad because it transgressed the law, ruled barbarously

142
 'ARE WE STILL OF ANY USE?'

and had taken Germany (and Europe) into the chaos of total war. He
was not troubled by the Nazis' lack of a democratic mandate; on the
contrary, he was suspicious of the Fiihrer's popularity; for though
the Leader misled the people the people were willing to be misled.
Bonhoeffer's view of the need for 'legitimate' political authority is
implicit in his lectures on Creation and Fall and spelled out theolog-
ically in his concept of the divine mandates within his Ethics. A
recently uncovered letter makes them plainer still. Writing to Paul
Lehmann in 1941 Bonhoeffer asks himself about the political future
of Germany:

Nothing would be worse than to impose upon her any Anglo-

Saxon form of government - as much as I should like it. It simply
would not work ... As far as I know Germany, it will just be
impossible, for instance, to restore complete freedom of speech,
of press, of association. That sort of thing would throw Germany
right into the same abyss. I think we must try to find a Germany
in which justice, lawfulness, freedom of the churches is being
restored. I hope there will [be] something like an authoritarian
Rechtsstaat as the Germans call it. It will need a long process of
education before the people as a whole will be in a position to
enjoy all the liberties it used to have.2

Bonhoeffer envisaged for Germany a postwar political system not

unlike that depicted in Thomas More's Utopia (1516) in which an
educated elite constituted a ruling class; an aristocracy not of blood-
lines, but of virtue and education, would rule not for their own
benefit, but in the interest of the common good. The theological
basis of Bonhoeffer's politics was grounded in his reworking of the
Lutheran idea that those in authority were mandated with an office,
in which power was bounded by law; jurisdiction by duty and
responsibility. He gives a good example of this in his wedding
sermon for Eberhard Bethge and Renate Bonhoeffer, written from
his prison cell in 1943. Working out from Pauline social teaching he
characterized the relation of men and women within marriage:

Now when the husband is called 'the head of the wife', and it
goes on to say 'as Christ is head of the Church' (Ephesians 5:23),
something of the divine splendour is reflected in our earthly
relationships, and this reflection we should recognize and honour.
The dignity that is here ascribed to the man lies, not in any capac-
ities or qualities of his own, but in the office conferred on him by

143
 BONHOEFFER

his marriage. The wife should see her husband clothed in this
dignity. But for him it is a supreme responsibility. As the head, it
is he who is responsible for his wife, for their marriage, and for
their home. On him falls the care and protection of the family; he
represents it to the outside world; he is its mainstay and comfort;
he is the master of the house, who exhorts, punishes, helps, and
comforts, and stands for it before God. (LPP 45)

There is nothing remarkable about the views in this sermon: most

couples in 1943 accepted that a husband was head of the wife. The
reason it is striking is that such a view of the office and authority of
husband - as of a Pastor, a teacher, a judge or a politician - is now
the exception rather than the rule in Western countries. Turning
again to politics, Bonhoeffer's views still have modern counterparts.
There is no reason why a view common in the past and uncommon
now is necessarily wrong: it is a vanity of the present always to
assume it is an improvement on the past. But the experience of the
past sixty years does make it necessary to question such a view of
social and political authority. Can we so glibly use God to under-
write the rule by an elite (whether an elite based on gender,
education or political purity)? In some contemporary states, such as
Singapore or Burma, national leaders maintain that people have not
yet reached a level of maturity sufficient for democratic politics.
There are, to be sure, hazards in deifying any human political system
(and what else could be meant by pledging allegiance to our nation's
flag?). Christians have only very recently learned to applaud
democracy — some still suspect it.3 Yet just as relations between men
and women have been revolutionized since 1945, so too has our
sense of the nature and value of democracy as a basic condition of
the accountability of political authority. The moral, economic and
political case for asserting that democratic politics constitutes a
fundamental condition of human freedom4 is now overwhelming.
Many commentators pass over Bonhoeffer's political views by
applauding Bonhoeffer for taking politics seriously in the context of
Lutheranism's tendency to separate faith and politics. In this, they
follow Reinhold Niebuhr's eulogy in 1945:

Bonhoeffer, less known than Martin Niemoeller, will become

better known. Not only his martyr's death, but also his actions
and precepts contain within them the hope of a revitalized
Protestant faith in Germany. It will be a faith, religiously more
profound than that of many of his critics; but it will have learned

144
 'ARE WE STILL OF ANY USE?'

to overcome the one fateful error of German Protestantism, the

complete dichotomy between faith and political life.5

To my mind, passing too hastily over Bonhoeffer's political views is

a mistake. Why?
Bonhoeffer's prison letters are generally understood to affirm the
maturity of the world. A closer reading suggests that his affirmation
of 'a world come of age' applies more readily to a small, educated,
Western elite such as his family and co-conspirators: people like
him. It may be true, as he wrote in 'After Ten Years', that we 'have
for once learned to see the great events of world history from below,
from the perspective of the outcast, the suspects, the maltreated, the
powerless, the oppressed, the reviled - in short, from the perspective
of those who suffer' (LPP 17). But in spite of Bonhoeffer's
optimistic faith in benevolent autocracy, that perspective can simply
become a powerful weapon in the armoury of any ruling elite.
Bonhoeffer's failure to see the good inherent in the political freedom
of democratic politics may well be understandable given his
experience of democracy in the Weimar Republic, but this does not
mean it can be passed over. Niebuhr was right: Bonhoeffer did
overcome the dichotomy between faith and political life. Moreover,
against the overwhelmingly trivial character of contemporary
politics, Bonhoeffer's political thinking is serious. But the disturbing
implication of Niebuhr's remark is that if his politics are flawed, his
ethics and theology may be flawed too.

Are we of theological use?

Is there enough in Bonhoeffer's writings with which to rebuff Karl

Barth's suggestion that systematic theology was not his real
strength? Bonhoeffer's most academically thorough theological
works were university dissertations submitted when he was very
young. In the last ten years of his life he devoted at least as much
energy to the Church struggle and opposition to the Nazis as to
theology. Even if he had had the time, libraries and scholarly
community to resource the kind of systematic theology produced by
other twentieth-century German theologians, would he have been
inclined to do so? It is certainly the case that Dietrich Bonhoeffer's
theology does not have the magisterial structure of Barth's Church
Dogmatics - what does? It is also true that his circumstances
foreclosed the opportunities for dialogue with critics of his theology
that would have helped him to sharpen his arguments. Whatever his

145
 BONHOEFFER

situation in life it was in any case his style to make bold statements
— such as 'only a suffering God can help' — that should properly be
held in tension or balance with other theological insights - such as a
fully worked theology of hope and last things. Nevertheless
Bonhoeffer's theology has more consistency and coherence than it is
often credited with and his originality and flare have left a legacy
that remains creative when more careful and thoughtful theologies,
such as that of his teacher Reinhold Seeberg, have been forgotten.
The consistency in Bonhoeffer's theology arises from his attempt
to use the best of liberal theology to critique Karl Barth's dialectical
theology, to use the best of Barth's insights to critique liberal
theology, and to use the mash created by these processes to ferment
a theology that is neither liberal nor neo-orthodox. From 1933, at
least, Bonhoeffer's theology was also consistent in being biblically
oriented and often explicitly biblically based. The 'post-liberal' or
'post-critical' method of Bonhoeffer's biblical hermeneutics was
lifted from Karl Barth, but Bonhoeffer used his borrowed tool with
originality, not least in reflecting more consistently and vigorously
on the Old Testament as a source for theology than was common
then or now. Finally, the christology Bonhoeffer formed in his 1933
lectures constitutes the central light that illuminates many of the
political, theological and ethical subjects he attends to. Christ is at
the centre of the Sanctorum Communion christology is the academic
discipline because with christology alone is the one central question
of human life asked 'Who is Jesus Christ for you today?
Discipleship is following Christ's call; in the Ethics believers are
described as conformed to Christ; and in prison Jesus is the man for
others and the presence of God is made visible in the weakness and
suffering of the cross. Christ is the cantus firmus in the polyphony of
Bonhoeffer's theology. Christology is not the only thread to run
through the weave of Bonhoeffer's theology, but it helps to show
how coherence may be found in his work, even though his style of
writing and choice of subject matter varied so greatly.

Are we of ethical use?

Alasdair Maclntyre hypothesizes that:

in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is

in ... [a] state of grave disorder ... What we possess, if this view
is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which
now lack those contexts from which their significance is derived.

146
 'ARE WE STILL OF ANY USE?'

We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use

many of the key expressions. But we have — very largely, if not
entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical,
of morality.6

In three successive books Maclntyre develops a powerful case for

this thesis. He traces the history of moral concepts such as 'virtue'
and shows that while the understanding of what particular virtues
such as courage, honour or justice have altered from time to time and
place to place, throughout much of the past two and a half millennia
human societies, though they have differed in what they thought was
virtuous, have shared a common sense that virtues mattered.
Beginning roughly with the Enlightenment that shared under-
standing of morality began to fragment. In particular the common
sense on which morality depended for its coherence upon God broke
apart. As belief in God declined, the idea developed that human
beings do not follow moral laws given by a Divinity who acts still
as a moral referee, but that men and women in reality create their
own morality.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (at least until 1944) believed like Maclntyre
that contemporary morality is in a parlous condition. But the chaos
of contemporary ethics was not, for Bonhoeffer, explained as the
loss of a common moral sense - as if until, say the Enlightenment,
human ethics were in good shape. For him, all human attempts to be
good are to be viewed from the biblical story of the Fall in terms of
sin. Today, for anyone outside the Church and even some within it,
the concept of 'sin' is considered by turns irrelevant, intolerant, or
ridiculous. By and large, Christians only have themselves to blame
for this: for decades Christians have trivialized human sin by
reducing moral discourse to smug and niggling criticism of human
weaknesses. Bonhoeffer was not interested in sniffing out personal
sin. His concern was with the ways in which bad deeds arise from
being bad. 'In Adam' sin is a way of being as well as a way of
acting. To put it crudely, Hitler was not a sinner because he kept a
mistress but because he put himself in the place of God. Christian
ethics is therefore distinct from all other ethics in that it alone flows
out of a restored unity with the will of God. In 1944 Bonhoeffer was
possibly moving towards a reconsideration of the relationship of the
Christian and the secular ethically as well as theologically, but there
is little reason to suppose that such a reappraisal would have
involved becoming soft on sin or soft on the causes of sin.
Bonhoeffer's understanding of sin addresses three contrasting

147
 BONHOEFFER

groups of people. It addresses liberal Christians, who have lost

confidence in speaking of sin at all. It addresses evangelicals, who
trivialize talk of sin by squinting exclusively at personal sins. And it
addresses non-believers by confronting their sin not at their weak
points (their sins of weakness) but at their strong points (their sins of
strength). Bonhoeffer's injunction to each of these groups is the
same: be conformed to Christ.
Bonhoeffer's ethics also take responsibility seriously. Bonhoeffer
knew that his decisions and actions could have concrete conse-
quences for himself and for those close to him. In prison he gave up
an escape plan because it would jeopardize his family (DB 826-8).
He was aware too that his involvement with the conspiracy would
compromise the Church; when it comes to treason a Lutheran Pastor
cannot act as a private individual. He could not resign his position in
the Confessing Church during the war without damaging the
conspiracy, but he accepted he would have to resign the Pastorate at
the end of the war rather than implicate the Church in his morally
controversial actions. In this recognition there was no trace of
bitterness or regret towards the Church, the conspiracy, or to the
events in which his life had been caught up:

Now I want to assure you that I haven't for a moment regretted

coming back in 1939 - nor any of the consequences either. I
knew quite well what I was doing, and I acted with a clear
conscience. I've no wish to cross out of my life anything that has
happened since, either to me personally ... or as regards events
in general. And I regard my being kept here [in prison] ... as
being involved in Germany's fate, as I was resolved to be. (LPP
174)

Because of this, and in keeping with the Bonhoeffer family sang-

froid, he resisted casting his imprisonment in a heroic light:

When people suggest ... that I'm 'suffering' here, I reject the
thought. It seems to me a profanation. These things mustn't be
dramatized ... Of course, a great deal here is horrible, but where
isn't? (LPP 231-2)

Despite his wish not to be lionized it is difficult not to admire his

attitude. We inhabit cultures of self-justification, blame and excuses;
a man prepared to accept the consequences of his actions impresses
us.

148
 'ARE WE STILL OF ANY USE?'

Dietrich Bonhoeffer's sense of responsibility and accountability

was finely nuanced. In spite of his early affirmation of the centrality
of the Church for theology and ethics, he did not feel accountable to
the Confessing Church, which was in no position to know in full the
magnitude of Nazi crimes and was therefore incapable of judging his
actions. Neither did he feel accountable to the governing authorities
represented by the court investigating his case, since the court was
complicit in the crimes he resisted. Instead Bonhoeffer felt respon-
sible to those unable to stand up for themselves who would suffer as
the result of his inaction. Above all he felt himself to be responsible
to God, who alone justifies. His prison poem 'Jonah' is surely an
autobiographical echo of both his acceptance of judgement and his
faith in God's power to justify sinners:

... My guilt must bear the wrath of God;

the righteous shall not perish with the sinner! (LPP 399)

The silence of the cross

Christian ethics is lived in the silence of the cross - a silence in which

the believer is given responsibility for her actions. God's silence on
the cross is not a silence of indifference, despair, or bewilderment: it
is a silence of utter involvement and sheer passion. It is not an empty
silence, for it addresses Christians in the Church community, in the
commands of God and in the shaping of human character. Within the
Church and for the world God calls the believer to the costly disci-
pleship of the cross of Jesus Christ which reveals a '... divinity so
odd/ He lets the Adam whom He made/ Perform the Acts of God'.7 In
the silence of the cross God both takes responsibility for the world and
gives responsibility to those prepared to serve it. This twofold event
creates the context for Christian ethics. It also provides the context in
which Bonhoeffer's writings and actions may be evaluated. Only in
the silence of the cross can we make sense of his exercise of moral
responsibility - and of ours.

Notes
1 See Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, Mark Mazower, Penguin, 1998,
p. xii. The whole book is a brilliant analysis of the 'story' of European democracy.
2 Letter to Paul Lehmann, 20 September 1941, cited in Bonhoeffer: A Theology of
Sociality, Clifford J. Green, revised edition, Eerdmans, 1999, p. 346. The postwar
history of Germany reveals just how wrong Bonhoeffer was in this prediction.

149
 BONHOEFFER

3 See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas 'The Church and Liberal Democracy: The
Moral Limits of Secular Policy' in A Community of Character, University of
Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1981, pp. 72-86.
4 See Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen, OUP, 1999, in particular chapter 6.
5 Reinhold Niebuhr, 'The Death of a Martyr', Christianity and Crisis, 25, June
1945.
6 After Virtue: a study in moral theory, Alasdair Maclntyre, 2nd edition,
Duckworth, 1985, p. 2. Maclntyre develops his argument in two subsequent
books: Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Duckworth, 1988; Three Rival
Versions of Moral Enquiry, Duckworth, 1990.
7 For the source of the phrase 'a silence on the cross' and of these lines, see Chapter
1 for my discussion of the poem 'Friday's Child' by W.H. Auden.

150
 Abbreviations and
Bibliography

There is a bewildering quantity of publications by and about

Dietrich Bonhoeffer. This section offers suggestions about where
readers might look in order to explore Bonhoeffer's life and
theology in greater depth. It incorporates abbreviations (abbrevia-
tions are printed in italics within brackets) for books referred to
frequently.

Primary literature
Bonhoeffer's books, articles, lectures, sermons and letters are
collected in their original language in the Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Werke, published in Munich by Christian Kaiser Verlag (DBWG).
There are 16 volumes (e.g. DBWG 7, DBWG 2, etc). A translation
project is under way that will, in time, produce a complete English
language version of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works', the publisher is
Fortress Press, Minneapolis (DBW). The first volume appeared in
1996 and at the time of writing seven volumes of the DBW have
been published:
Sanctorum Communio, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Fortress Press,
Minneapolis, 1998 DBW 1.
Act and Being, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Fortress Press, Minneapolis,
1996, DBW2.
Creation and Fall, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Fortress Press,
Minneapolis, 1997, DBW3.
Discipleship, Dietrich Bonhoeffer [NB, the former English trans-
lation was titled The Cost of Discipleship], Fortress Press,
Minneapolis, 2001, DBW4.

151
 BONHOEFFER

Life Together/Prayerbook of the Bible, Fortress Press,

Minneapolis, 1996, DBW 5.
Fiction from Tegel Prison, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 2000,
DBW7.
The Young Bonhoeffer 1918-1927, Fortress Press, Minneapolis,
2003, DBW9.

The German edition includes a revised text based on a detailed re-

examination of Bonhoeffer's manuscripts; an editor's introduction
and postscript; extensive footnotes and, where a previous edition of
a text exists, marginal references to the earlier edition. The English
edition incorporates all of this, but with a new introduction by the
editors of the English translation. There are additional footnotes
explaining the translation and making any observations helpful to
non-German-speaking readers, as well as marginal references to the
pagination of the German edition to aid cross-referencing. Both the
DBWG and the DBW are of high scholarly quality and will remain
definitive long after this book has been forgotten.

Until the complete edition of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works is

available, the following books are sound editions of Bonhoeffer's
writings:
Christology, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (translated by Edwin
Robertson) London, 1978 (C).
Ethics, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, SCM Press, London, 1963 edition (E).
Letters and Papers from Prison, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, SCM
Press, London, 1984 (LPP).

Three volumes (edited and translated by Edwin Robertson) of

Bonhoeffer's letters and papers are also useful sources, though now
out of print.
No Rusty Swords, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Collins, London,
1977 (NRS).
The Way to Freedom, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Collins, London,
1972.
True Patriotism, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Collins, London, 1973.

A good one volume collection of extracts from Bonhoeffer's

writings is:
A Testament to Freedom: The Essential Writings of Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, eds Geffrey B. Kelly and F. Burton Nelson, Harper
Collins, 1991.

152
 ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nachlass Dietrich Bonhoeffer, eds D. Meyer and E. Bethge, Chr.

Kaiser Verlag, Munich, 1987
Lists Bonhoeffer's manuscripts from his books, to every last
fragmentary note, as well as all the books Bonhoeffer owned that
survive.

Biographical sources

Eberhard Bethge's Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography, Fortress

Press, Minneapolis, 2000 (DB)
This new English translation restores sections omitted from previous
English editions, updates the original text, corrects errors, and
freshens up the earlier translation on which it is based. It is a classic
of twentieth-century theology and the ultimate source of Bonhoeffer
scholarship. Shorter biographies have been published but every
serious student of twentieth-century theology should read Bethge's
original study which takes the reader into the mind of a theologian
and into the heart of theology.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Life in Pictures, E. Bethge, R. Bethge and
C. Gremmels, SCM, London, 1986
A pictorial account of Bonhoeffer's life and of the events in which
his life was set.
I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer, eds W.-D. Zimmermann and R. G.
Smith, Collins, London, 1973
Recollections of Bonhoeffer by some of those who knew him.

Bonhoeffer's theology

At the risk of appearing arrogant, it seems to me there are very few

books on Bonhoeffer's theology that continue to be valuable beyond
their initial print run! Here, I confine myself to books written or
available in English.
The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ernst Feil, tr. Martin
Rumscheidt, Fortress, Philadelphia, 1985
Argues for the continuity in Bonhoeffer's thought against some (e.g.
Hanfried Muller) who suggested that Bonhoeffer's 'radical' later
theology effected a decisive break from his earlier more traditional
outlook.
Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of his theology,
Charles Marsh, Oxford University Press, 1994
Challenges the view that Bonhoeffer was philosophically casual and

153
 BONHOEFFER

intellectually superficial; an important interpretation, particularly of

Bonhoeffer's early thought.

Many monographs on Bonhoeffer explore particular aspects of his

theology, rather than attempting a general overview.
Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, Clifford J. Green (revised
edition), Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1999
Focuses on Bonhoeffer's social theology.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality, Andre Dumas, SCM,
London, 1971
A deep, complex and quirky reading of Bonhoeffer through the lens
of reality.
Karl Barth in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Andreas
Pangritz, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 2000
Pangritz examines one of the crucial relationships of Bonhoeffer's
life.
The Old Testament as the Book of Christ, Martin Kuske,
Westminster, Philadelphia, 1976
A pellucid study of a single aspect of Bonhoeffer's theology that
gives an example of what critical Bonhoeffer scholarship is like at
its best.

Two books relate Bonhoeffer's legacy to contemporary challenges.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer: His Significance for North Americans, Larry
Rasmussen, Fortress, Minneapolis, 1990
A Patriotism for Today: Love of Country in dialogue with the
witness of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Keith W. Clements, Collins,
London, 1986.

Some of the best of Bonhoeffer scholarship has taken the form of essays.
The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, edited by John
W. de Gruchy, Cambridge University Press, 1999
Probably the best single volume on Bonhoeffer.
World Come of Age, edited by Ronald Gregor Smith, Collins,
London, 1967
Contributors include Barth and Bultmann.

Individual essays on Bonhoeffer also appear 'hidden' away in books by

theologians who are not 'Bonhoeffer specialists'; these are frequently
more stimulating than essays by those who are 'expert' in the field.
'Dietrich Bonhoeffer' in Word and Faith, Gerhard Ebeling, SCM,
London, 1963.

154
 ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

'Polyphonic Living: Dietrich Bonhoeffer' in Self and Salvation,

David F. Ford, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Bonhoeffer's ethics

Four studies have been important in helping me to understand

Bonhoeffer's ethics, though I would not want to associate them with
the deficiencies of this book. Shaping the Future: The Ethics of
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, James Burtness, Fortress, Philadelphia, 1985;
Ethical Responsibility: Bonhoeffer's Legacy to the Churches, eds
John Godsey and Geffrey B. Kelly, Edwin Mellen Press, New York,
1981; New Studies in Bonhoeffer's 'Ethics', ed. William J. Peck,
Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, 1987; and Bonhoeffer's Ethics: Old
Europe and New Frontiers, eds G. Carter et al., Kok Pharos,
Kampen, 1991.

The International Bonhoeffer Society (English Language Section)

Newsletter annually updates the bibliography of publications on
Bonhoeffer (details can be downloaded from the World Wide Web)
and is one way to keep up to date with the rush of new books and
articles that are following on the heels of the new edition.

155
 Index
Abraham 47-9 Dohnanyi, Christine von 32
Adam 64, 66-7, 69, 74, 79, 83-5, 89, Dohnanyi, Hans von 29, 32, 34
93, 147, 149 Doniger, Wendy 80-1,84
Adler, Adolf 122
Aquinas, Thomas 7, 59, 61 Eden, Anthony 35
Aristotle 7, 61 Eve 65, 84-5, 90
Auden, W. H. 1,3-4,47
Augustine 3, 7, 46 Fest, Joachim. 35
Fisher, A. F. (Frank) 20
Earth, Karl x, 3, 8-9, 18, 26, 39, 46, Ford, David 119
49, 52, 56, 71-3, 87, 122-3, Francis of Assisi 5
129-31, 145-6 Freud, Sigmund 3, 15
Bell, George 27, 34-5 Fulbrook, Mary 34
Berger, Peter 67
Best, Payne 33-4 Gailus, Manfred 25
Bethge, Eberhard ix, 8, 20, 30, 97, Gandhi, M. K. 5,27
113, 128, 135-7, 143 Goebbels, Josef 31, 136
Bluhm, Heinz 40-1 Goethe 17
Bodelschwingh, Friedrich von 25 Gogarten, Friedrich 56
Bonhoeffer, Emmi 35 Green, Clifford J. 122
Bonhoeffer, Karl 15 Grotius, Hugo 134
Bonhoeffer, Klaus 34-5 Gruchy, John de 86-8
Bonhoeffer, Paula 15
Bonhoeffer, Renate 143 Hase, Paul von 33
Bonhoeffer, Walter 16 Harnack, Adolf von 18,55-6,59,71,96
Brecht, Bertolt 12,36 Hauerwas, Stanley 60-2, 78, 88, 90
Brunner, Emil 56, 123 Hegel, G. W. F. 39, 65
Bullock, Alan 34 Heidegger, Martin 39, 71
Bultmann, Rudolf 3, 56, 130 Heine, Heinrich 45
Bodin, Jean 134 Herbert of Cherbury (Lord) 134
Bonaparte, Napoleon 133 Herder 17
Butler, Joseph 122 Hill, Christopher 79
Hindenburg, Paul von 21 -2
Cain 86 Hitler, Adolf 5, 14, 16, 21-5, 28-9,
Calvin, John 18, 61-2 31,33-4,77,88, 122, 127, 135,
Canaris, Wilhelm 34 141, 147
Caravaggio 92-4 Hobbes, Thomas 13, 65
Chamberlain, Neville 28 Holl, Karl 18,39
Holloway, Richard 7
Delbruck, Justus 35 Holy Spirit 45, 67
Dilthey, Wilhelm 39 Hume, David 42

156
 INDEX

Isaac 47-8 Orwell, George 19

Isherwood, Christopher 19 Oster, Hans 34

Jesus Christ xi, 4, 23-4, 26-7, 33, 41, Paul (the Apostle) 18,40-1,46,66,
45, 52, 55, 62, 64-7, 69, 71, 74, 87, 98, 104-5, 112, 129-30
74-5, 82, 84, 89, 93-103, 106-9, Peter, (the Apostle) 93, 100
112, 116-7, 119-120, 129, Pius XII 24
131-2, 134-5, 137-8, 146, 148 Plato 61
Jung, Carl-Gustav 15 Pol Pot 5

Kant, Immanuel 42-5, 60, 70-1, 73, Rades, Jorg 52

124 Rawls, John 59
Kierkegaard, S0ren 3, 46-9, 101, 122 Reagan, Ronald 59
Klemperer, Victor 12 Remarque, Erich Maria 16, 20
Kokorin 33 Robinson, J. A. T. 3

Lasserre, Jean 20 Sarah 48

Lehmann, Paul 30 Schleicher, Rudiger 34
Leibholz, Gerhard 12-13 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 3, 18
Leibholz, Sabine 12 Schonfeld, Hans 35
Luther, Martin 18,20,39-42,46, Seeberg, Reinhold 18,146
61-2, 74, 82, 87, 99, 122-3 Spender, Stephen 3
Spielberg, Steven 81
Machiavelli, Nicolo 134 Stalin, J. V. 5
Maclntyre, Alasdair 59-60, 62, 146-7 Stauffenberg, C.S.von 35
Matthew (the Apostle) 93-4, 99
Milton, John 77-81,90 Thatcher, Margaret 58-9
Moltke, Helmut von 35 Mother Theresa 5
Montaigne, Michael E. de 134 Troeltsch, Ernst 18
More, Thomas 143
Muller, Ludwig 25-6 Wedemeyer, M. von 32
Murdoch, Iris 62 Wilhelm II, Emperor 15
Winstanley, Gerard 79
Newman, John Henry 3
Newton, Isaac 42 Yoder, John H. 88
Niebuhr, Reinhold 20, 30, 78, 98, 144
Niemoller, Martin 25, 29, 144-5
Nietzsche, Friedrich 46,49-52, 115
Nussbaum, Martha 62

157