Applying Theory of Constraints To The Indian Administrative Services
Applying Theory of Constraints To The Indian Administrative Services
Applying Theory of Constraints To The Indian Administrative Services
Sasmita Palo2
Abstract
This paper attempts to identify constraints faced by Indian Administrative officers using the Theory of
Constraints (ToC). Results show that despite its origins as a manufacturing methodology, Goldratt’s
ToC can be applied to identify constraints in the Indian administrative system, the most likely cause-
and-effect relationships leading to such constraints, and the courses of action that are generally taken
by officers to eliminate them. Three categories of constraints clearly emerged as inhibitors to the effi-
ciency of the system. These are structural, policy and resources related. Lack of adequate training and
insensitivity of officers towards the ground realities of the public are identified as some of the other
constraints. It is observed that most of the respondents offered institutional arguments to characterize
constraints in the system. Institutional arguments are not about assemblage of individual actions, but
higher order factors above the individual level that influence the processes and outcomes and tend to
sire regular patterns or inertia.
Keywords
Theory of constraints, thinking process, Indian Administrative Services
Introduction
The Indian Administrative Services (IAS) has been referred as the steel frame that holds India together
(Brass, 1984). It is regarded as the ‘crème de la crème’ that presides over a colossal administrative
system riddled with myriad complexities. The administration system in India assumes special importance
as it is the tutelary of the nation’s law, economy and development. Limitations in the system have been
talked about by many sections of the society, and it has often been associated with many words such
as inefficient, corrupt, slow, rigid and indifferent. Unlike the private sector or the political executives,
the administrative services or its individual members do not enjoy the freedom of publicly voicing
1
Program Manager, National CSR Hub, Naoroji Campus, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India.
2
Professor, Center for Human Resources Management & Labour Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India.
Corresponding author:
Sasmita Palo, Professor, Center for Human Resources Management & Labour Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences,
V.N. Purav Marg, Mumbai, India.
E-mail: [email protected]
the constraints they face. They are conjugated by a code of conduct; they cannot animadvert in their
capacity as individuals but only as representatives of the state on matters that require the state to
communicate. Thus, there is very little that is known about the ills that blight the system and various
constraints that these officers face in their day-to-day functioning.
There has been a lot of research and innovation in the field of management to remove constraints
that private enterprises face in conducting their business. Likewise, there has been research in public
administration and public policy to understand the features, duties, structures and constraints of this
system. However, it is not very often that public systems are looked at through the lenses developed for
the private concerns. The major reason for this is the difference in the basic nature of the two systems;
one is to make profit while the other is for public good. Therein stems many differences in the intent
and functioning of both the sectors that cannot be bridged or compared. However, there are certain
aspects in which the public systems can be analyzed keeping in mind the theories of management that
are developed for and by the private sector. This research is an attempt to understand the constraints
faced by the IAS officers keeping the Theory of Constraints (ToC) in mind.
Theory of Constraints
ToC is a management concept that helps in identifying and dealing with the constraints faced by a
system. Eliyahu M. Goldratt first discussed the concept in his book titled The Goal (1984).1 ToC usually
deals with business enterprises and its main application has been in the area of manufacturing processes
(Blackstone et al., 1997; Coman et al., 1996; Cox and Spencer, 1998). Research has also been done in
the fields of marketing, sales and information systems (Coman and Ronen, 2000; Goldratt, 1990b, 1994).
ToC has not been widely applied to not-for-profit organizations or amorphous systems such as the
government or administrative services.
Goldratt (1990c), Klein and DeBruine (1995) and Dettmer (1997) state that ToC views an organization
as a chain composed of many links, or as a networks of chains. Viewed as a constrained system, a chain’s
links all contribute to the goal and each link is strongly dependent on the other links. The chain, however,
is only as strong as its weakest link. Goldratt’s ToC states that the overall performance of an organization
is limited by its weakest link. He states that if an organization wants to improve its performance, the first
step must be to identify the system’s weakest link, or the constraint.
In ToC, the constraints necessarily and actively limit the system’s performance. Goldratt defines
a constraint as anything that limits the performance of a system relative to its goal. In common
parlance, constraints are the factors that might cause delay in operations. Thus, constraints are not
viewed negatively but treated as focal points around which the business can be designed or improved
(Blackstone, 2001). Constraints are classified in many ways, Goldratt (1984) classified constraints into
internal and external. External constraints are the factors outside the organization and the organization
can exercise little (if not none) control over them. Internal constraints are the factors within the organi-
zational system; they consist of physical constraints and policy constraints. Physical constraints are
the constraints of equipment and people (that include human resources, modes of thinking, the related
culture, etc.). The policy constraints refer to the coded or uncoded practices or organization-wide atti-
tudes that restrains the system. Generally, physical constraints are the manifestation of the policy con-
straints (Gupta and Kline, 2008).
Ring and Perry (1985) while discussing the difference in the constraints that rise in the public and
private sector plough different contexts and conditions that create constraints in public sector that are
different from the private sector. Using Thompson’s (1967) model, constraints refer to fixed conditions
that tend to exist for a period of time. Constraints can be divided amongst structural and procedural.
Structural constraints are the deficiencies in the basic beliefs, attitudes or design of the system while the
procedural constraints are the constraints related to the flow of goods or information within the system.
Application of ToC depends largely upon the context in which it is viewed.
Constraints Management
A five-step model forms the basis of analyzing the constraints and managing them (Goldratt, 1984;
Goldratt and Cox, 1992). This model was first suggested in the book The Goal and soon became the
most fundamental part of the ToC. The steps are as follows:
This is a systematized approach to managing the constraints; there are many tools and techniques
that are used as a part of this process to identify, exploit, subordinate and elevate the constraints. The
Drum-Buffer-Rope technique of scheduling is one such technique where the process is supposed to fol-
low the beat at which the constraint produces every unit; a buffer of finished products is kept at the end
of the process, so that if the constraint skips a beat the final output does not suffer. Rope is a signalling
mechanism in place, which ensures that inputs are fed as soon as a final product is sold at the end of the
process, thereby maintaining safe levels of buffer stock (Blackstone, 2001). Another wing of tools and
techniques are called the Thinking Processes (TP).2 According to Goldratt (1990a), while dealing with
constraints managers are required to make three generic decisions. These are to decide what to change,
what to change to and how to cause the change. To address these questions, the TP prescribes a set of five
tools in the form of cause-and-effect diagrams, which consists of current reality tree, evaporating cloud,
future reality tree and prerequisite tree.3
not account for the externalities that exist in the system, externalities can be dealt with at the lower levels
but they also require strategic realignment. Boyd and Gupta’s (2004) approach may be apt to understand
the efficiency and throughput in the operational sense. However, it also ignores the cultural and attitude
problems, the softer but more persistent constraints in the functioning of an organization. In this study
we intend to develop a framework for understanding the type of constraints faced by the IAS officers,
identifying the root causes of a constraint and where the constraint manifests itself, and understanding
the managerial styles used to cope with them through the lens of the step-wise process given by Goldratt.
Method
Following van Manen’s (1998) approach, the conversational interview was used to explore and gather
experiential narrative material that served as a resource for developing a richer and deeper understanding
of the experience being studied.
Data Collection
As is the case with the phenomenological tradition, participants must be those who have experienced the
phenomenon. Hence we sought to include only senior level civil servants in our study. With most senior
level IAS officers being unwilling to give interviews for time constraint, we had to resort to snowball
sampling to carry out the interviews. However, the following inclusion criteria were kept in mind while
choosing the samples:
1. The officers were drawn from the same cadre and same state to ensure homogeneity of
respondents. Selecting officers from different states and cadres would have diluted the under-
standing of the system and include too many extremities in the data.
2. The officers of minimum experience level of 10 years were chosen for the interviews as
they were expected to serve at least two to three collector-ships within this period. Officers with
more than 13–14 years of experience served at both district (implementation) and secretariat
(policy making) levels were found to have even richer repository of knowledge and experience.
Thus, they were in a better position to enumerate the constraints faced at both the levels.
Initial appointments were taken for interviews with 28 IAS officers as this was considered to be a
sufficient number of interviews to ensure data sanctity and for eliminating the effect of individual biases.
However, we reached the saturation in terms of any new insights coming from subsequent interviews;
hence, we stopped after 21 interviews. All the interviewees belonged to the Madhya Pradesh cadre of
IAS and three of the senior officials had served varying terms with the central government on deputation.
The average experience of the officers was 21.6 years. Two of the officers interviewed were serving
as District Magistrates (DM) at the time of interview; the other officers were posted in the
secretariat at Joint Secretary or Principle Secretary rank or attached to other corporations. Only two of
the officers were females. Duration of interviews varied from 24 minutes to 75 minutes, depending on
the willingness of the interviewee to speak and the brevity of the answers given by them.
Data Analysis
The purpose of phenomenological reflection is to grasp the essential meaning of a phenomena. To do
human science research is to be involved in the crafting of a text that describes the phenomenon in
terms of themes (van Manen, 1998). In defining themes, van Manen (1998) states that themes touch at
the core of the notion we are trying to understand, helping us to make sense. Thematic analysis refers
to the process of recovering the themes that are embodied or dramatized in the evolving meanings and
imagery of the text. In the present study, the attempt to isolate themes involved the following steps:
1. First transcripts and field notes were read several times in order to gain a sense of the overall
experience of participants.
2. Many of the officers supplemented their view of constraints with anecdotes while some others
used only anecdotes to illustrate the constraints they faced; thus the anecdotes were analyzed
accordingly to understand the main constraint they portrayed.
3. The content of each interview was manually analyzed, then themes and categories were
identified.
4. Related categories were combined into broad themes. The analysis took into account the themes
that were mentioned or supported by a majority of the respondents. Some constraints were
analyzed in the category of ‘Other Constraints’ as they were important constraints but
were mentioned by a lesser number of officers.
5. Data triangulation was done by including themes related to constraint and constraint
management called out from each interviews and verifying the potency of these constraints by
questioning different officers about the same.
Research Findings
During the interviews, officers were encouraged to talk first about the constraints, types and reasons
for their existence; the manner in which they were dealt with surfaced later, through examples. The
initial focus was on identifying constraints because eliciting responses regarding ways of management
of these constraints would be impossible without first anchoring the discussion in the understanding of
the constraints. Respondents were encouraged to talk about how the constraints were managed while
they were describing them. Another reason for choosing this approach of putting the constraint as the
focal point instead of the management technique was that the styles of dealing with constraints can differ
widely from individual to individual. Even the semantics used for describing the management technique
varied a lot, so much so that, the approaches as described by some officers sounded very methodical and
systematic while some others seemed akin to inaction. Hence, we did not attempt to delve deeper into the
management of these constraints, but only touched upon various approaches adopted by officers to
handle constraints.
Constraints Encountered
The respondents were given a chance to gather their ideas and put forth the constraints that they felt were
faced by them. Most of the respondents were very forthcoming in terms of enumerating the constraints.
Very often, the line between constraints faced by the administrator himself/herself and those faced by the
entire public administration system as a whole, was blurred in the minds of the respondents. The attitude
that was prevalent amongst the administrators was that ‘constraints are not external, they are in the
mind’. The statement was repeated in many interviews even after the constraints had been discussed and
explored. As one of the respondents stated,
Personally, I feel constraints exist mostly in our mind. If you look at things and then decide that there are certain
things that you can change and certain things that you cannot; then you don’t feel a sense of constraint.
Such statements talk less about how the constraints were viewed and more about how they were dealt
with. Instead of seeing the constraints as a systemic fault, they were often seen as something to be dealt
with on an individual level. By denying the systemic flaws and circumstances that create the constraint,
the individuals tend to face them independently. As a system, the constraints start being dealt with in an
ad hoc manner rather than in a planned manner. An officer summarized the many strains of thought that
had been found in the other interviews that represented the attitude that the officers have towards the
constraints and the way they managed them. He stated,
We have started taking these constraints as expanding factors and not limiting factors. Constraint help us to
expand the system, the performance, they give us a focus, a precision of execution. The moment we identify them
and we try to address them, our responses lead to the betterment of the performance and the system. Secondly,
constraints are needed also; we are supposed to work in the system. The system, without the constraints can be
very arbitrary, we as administrators can be very arbitrary. So working in the system is to work within constraints.
To that extent, constraints are the necessity of the system.
In many interviews, respondents talked about the first few constraints that came to their mind.
With further probing it was realized that there were many constraints within the system that the
administrators have taken for granted and accepted; these constraints were not seen as limiting factors
but as a part of the existing system that is impossible to change. There is a vast difference between the
constraints being faced and the natural shortcomings of any system. Long exposure to the limiting factors
can actually make them look like the inherent features of the system thus leading the respondents to
ignore their existence completely. The inability to make this distinction vastly changes the attitude
towards the management of these constraints; instead of trying to removing these constraints,
administrators tend to bypass or ignore them. This presents a deeper problem, if a constraint is not being
viewed in its limiting light and is instead seen as an obvious consequence of a process or system, then
the chances that efforts would be made to improve or remove it on a systemic level are considerably
reduced.
During the interviews, some major constraints came through which, in the view of most of the
administrators, were faced by them on a regular and enduring basis. These included constraints of
bureaucratic processes, political interference in administration, quantum of responsibilities, human
resources and policy-related issues. Each of these constraints has many characters and forms that cause
impediments in the working of the executive. Some other constraints that were mentioned by officers
but not echoed by all will also be discussed briefly, such as capacity gaps of administrators and lack of
control mechanisms.
Structural Constraints
Bureaucratic Process as a Constraint
Plethora of rules and regulations
The bureaucratic process here refers to the rules, procedures and processes that need to be followed
before any action can be taken in the government machinery. Rules and procedures govern all the activ-
ities within the government machinery from the making of policies, their implementation, procurement,
service delivery, etc. Some interviewees explained:
There is a plethora of rules and regulations, they are not codified in a way that is easy to follow or understand.
The judgment point of an Officer is not whether the work has been done or no, and how much of the budget has
gone unused. Instead it is whether you stick to the rule or not. This kind of attitude is a big constraint.
The entire administration functions on the principles of distrust. There are a number of procedures in place to
prevent corruption. However, they themselves start hindering progress and smooth working. If you are following
rules and regulations and you cause a loss to the exchequer, there is no penalty for it. But if you break the rules …
these individual violations are cited against you and you will be held guilty. The system places more importance
on sticking to rules instead of the basic objective of serving the people.
The administrators do not have the freedom to deviate from the rules, any action that is taken outside
the purview of the specified powers can attract penalty. For instance, in cases of procurement, the lengthy
procedures of tendering sometimes do not lead to the least costly option being selected; also, these
processes leave no scope for discretion on the qualitative aspect.
Process is more important than the outcome. If there is any failure in the process you are held guilty, irrespec-
tive of the outcome being good. That is the biggest constraint. You are always under the constraint of the rules,
by passing rules invites persecution. The accountability is not there and every small decision is pushed up. The
top man has to process a lot of information and files. The quality of his decisions goes down, there is no quality
time given to decisions.
Hoarding of power
A related complication in terms of bureaucratic processes is the increasing centralization of powers.
A growing tendency in the administrative services is the refusal of junior officers to take responsibility
for decisions; thus, all decisions are passed upwards. Even when junior officers have the authority to take
the decisions, the willingness to take the accountability is absent amongst lower levels due to the penal-
ties that decision making attracts. This problem grows at the district level where the institution of District
Magistrate is involved in too many minor and major administrative decisions. The DM is increasingly
embroiled in the implementation activities when these should be the responsibility of other departments.
As a result of this inaction, the processes, decision making and implementation become even more long
winded and form a constraint in the achievement of the ultimate objectives.
The government should be steering the boat and not running it. It is a natural human tendency that everyone
wants to hoard power, so we need to decentralize. But again, there are also people at lower levels who don’t want
to take decisions. They don’t want to take actions and be held accountable so those who prefer inaction want the
system to remain this way.
… If a rule is hindering your progress, you should be in a position to suggest an improvement; you cannot
be a slave to rules.
We found examples of some officers exploiting these constraints by looking for loopholes in the rules.
For instance, to deal with constraints faced due to long tendering processes and lack of quality control in
the process, some officers preferred to go through external agencies like World Bank or Asian
Development Bank (who are funding the projects with the government), for such peculiar procurements.
Another case of exploiting the bureaucratic processes is cited as follows:
At times, we try to put certain buffers when we know that the policy change or amendment we have asked for
might take too much time to get through the bureaucratic machinery. At times when we refer a proposal to the
government, asking them to reevaluate a scheme or program or component thereof, we cannot keep on waiting
at the same time we cannot take the law in our hands. At that time we try to use a buffer against this constraint.
Innovation can be a buffer. In the name of innovation we try to experiment and we tell the government that this
is an experiment. The government these days is receptive to experiments and a little bit of policy deviation is
allowed if it achieves public good. So the best way available to us is to exploit the constraint, to see what options
are available to us if this particular thing does not get addressed in time by the government. Then we see what
are the flexibilities in the given framework? Can there be creative reinterpretations of the given law? We work
on the flexibilities and the scope available within those constraints. We try to do the maximum so as to pacify that
particular issue so as to give some kind of solace to the people.
Since bureaucratic processes are a systemic problem and no individual action of the officers can
make a sustained change in them, management of these constraints is heavily situation dependent.
Contingency-based management styles are seen in use in such cases.
Encroachment and Interference as a Constraint
The Constitution of India lays down that right of the political executive to make the decision is supreme;
however, it also lays down that the political machinery is separate and independent of the executive.
However, according to many respondents, the political machinery is increasingly encroaching upon the
executives in areas and matters that should be sacrosanct to them. Some interviewees said:
In British times, single line of command really meant single line of command. Back then, the District Magistrate
was everything in the district, the supreme Officer. Now there is a parallel political hierarchy. Everyone wants
to encroach upon the powers of the district executive because that is where the crude power is visible, so whether
it be the politicians, the judiciary, the police or other departments.
The sanctity of the executive has been marred over the years.
The understanding everyone has is that administration is the functional responsibility of the bureaucrats
and legislation is in the domain of politicians. But the roles have reversed now, bureaucrats have a huge role in
policy design and program making and less of a say in postings, transfers, promotions and other administrative
functions. It is a constraint obviously.
The institutions of the Chief Secretary and DM have diluted in their value and sanctity. The absolute
unity of command that existed in British times or even a few decades back has crumbled. The loyalties
of some officers are towards the political bosses and they do not feel answerable to their own administra-
tive heads. The Chief Secretary no longer has the ultimate say in the placement of his officers. At the
district level, too many political entities try to influence the decision making and dilute the authority of
the DM. Corruption is prevalent from Class III officers till the level of senior bureaucrats; thus, the cor-
ruption of the system is internal as well as external. The corruption becomes a constraint for an indi-
vidual officer in more than one way. Firstly, there is increasing pressure to make decisions or take actions
that are not permitted by the rules and regulations. Even if an officer does not succumb to such requests,
the pressure and investment of time in such matters create a major hindrance for the other activities they
are supposed to undertake.
There is a constraint in terms of transfers and postings. There is a policy framework regarding it, and it is
generally followed. But there is always a clash; you may not be at full liberty to change a team member because
there are many other forces playing there.
You need to pick up your team, put right people in right places and motivate them, then you will achieve.
Politicians decide and interfere here, if you don’t have effective control over your team then they will not obey
you, it will be a constraint.
Corruption becomes a major constraint when the administrators are not given the freedom to choose the
human resources that they are supposed to place in various positions under them. Political executives, includ-
ing the holders of critical posts, largely decide the team they work with. In case the person in such a post is
inefficient or unable to work, the whole team and the target achievement suffers. Also, such a person also
demoralizes and disturbs the environment of the team as he considers himself/herself to be above the law as he
is associated with political bosses.
Often when in a district or a departmental post, if the officer is at odds with the political executive and
refuses to toe the line laid out by them, the officer’s tenure is prematurely terminated. Though this
instability in tenure was not perceived as being prevalent in the state of Madhya Pradesh (even though a
few officers did experience it), it is true of the other states such as Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. While
an average tenure lasts from 2.5 to 3 years in stable states, it can reduce to 6–9 months in the unstable
states. This acts as a major constraint for the officers as they are unable to understand and get a grip
over the issues of the particular post; even if they can do this, they are unable to make any long-term
plans for the development. The development and implementation of plans takes on an average from
1 to 2 years; if this time is not spent in the same position, the officers slowly lose motivation to do any
lasting work.
Most officers were belligerent about interference of the political forces in administrative matters, but
some of them were appreciative of the inputs that the political executives provide in decision making.
I am personally not against the political interference. We live in a democratic system and the politicians
improve the democratic system, I believe that if they were not there, the system would be a lot worse. Politicians
pressurize bureaucrats to deliver … it’s a permanent service, no one can touch me; so if there is no check, I will
not be bothered about the people, and I will not even meet them.
In fact, the following view of an officer was very different from the others:
In my opinion, the politicians do give valuable inputs. There are times when they have vested interests in the
recommendations, but many a times they ask the bureaucrats to decide. No one can make us to take wrong
decisions. And if given a chance, the bureaucrats can be even more corrupt than the politicians. Whenever
States have had Governor’s rule, they have been the worst times for the State. There is rampant corruption and
no decisions are taken. The politicians do not necessarily perpetrate the corruption. In my opinion, bureaucrats
can wreck more havoc, the stability of tenure makes them more complacent.
Given all these opinions, it can be said that the bureaucracy has no inherent problem with the existence
of the political machinery as long as either of them do not interfere in the area of operations of the other.
Managing Encroachment and Interference
The executive is duty bound to listen to and agree with the advice of the political executive. In most
matters, the ultimate decision is also of the political executive. Thus, to a large extent, officers have no
way of dealing with any interference that they believe exceeds the authority of the politicians.
Many people who have dealt well with politicians agree that politicians are very amenable to reasoning, they
will agree if you give a good reason for something.
A very common stance of the Officers interviewed was that the wishes of the political bosses are accom-
modated till the extent that they are within the prescribed rules. Many Officers also believe that certain politi-
cians understand the constraints of rules and laws well and they do not force the Officer to make decisions
once they refuse or show their unwillingness. However, if any request persists, the Officer risks displeasing the
politicians and possibly facing a transfer or some other sort of loss of favor.
We have the problem of the multi-headed hydra, so many forces from different angles try to take positions as
per their convenience. But therein lies the skill of the Officer, like Bismark he can always keep two balls in the
hand and three in the air. That jugglery can be done. When I was the District Magistrate in one place, the SDM
with me had executed a land ceiling law that annoyed a political heavyweight. The politician managed to get him
transferred from that place. In that district, there were 5 people with equal power to influence the government,
so I approached the issue through them to get the order canceled. Again, the annoyed politician got the order
changed; I had to make use of a third political heavy weight whose interests were not linked to this matter and
he got the order canceled. So that kind of play with various forces is what the administrative skill is all about.
No one can force you to really do something that you do not want to, whether its politicians or seniors. If you are
not too attached to your job or position, then it is not a problem.
This case illustrates how the officers try to deal with the constraint of interference, by countering it
with forces on their own. It is worth noting that the external forces are only one part of the structure, the
bureaucratic machinery and the power of the executive is of another nature and can be used in many
cases to negate the influences of extraneous agents. This style is akin to Garguilo’s (1993) suggestion
about creation of co-optive relations in organizations to counter possible constraints, loosely like the ‘my
enemy’s enemy is my friend’ principle. Adoption of these management styles depends upon the situation
and largely upon the ethics and the strength of the officer in question.
Quantum of Responsibilities as a Constraint
Another constraint is that the quantum of work is huge, there are many schemes running under different
departments. You have to prioritize and see which ones you can pay attention to. So the time to do the work
is limited.
… Constraint of time, the way DM’s institution is involved in too many activities. There are more than
150 Acts under which DM is required to take an action. DM is involved as either a mission leader or coordinator
or head of committees and is not able to apply himself properly.
There are two factors that contribute to the problem of increasing workload of administrators. First,
the problem of increasing centralization within the services exacerbated by inaction and inefficiencies
in the lower levels. This causes more number of files and decisions to be passed to higher level officers.
This is a major concern as the DM signs on every file from the sanction of provident funds to implemen-
tation of central and state level schemes, crisis management, duties as magistrate and as a revenue
officer. As a result, the quality of time spent on important planning decisions is significantly reduced.
Also, the officers are forced to take up three or four matters on which they intend to focus and the rest
are left up to the rest of the government machinery.
The execution responsibilities are too many. Instead of coordinating and planning the implementation, the
state of the resources is such that the implementation work is also taken by the DM.
Second, the tendency of the government to introduce new policies and schemes without making
adequate provisions for resources that would implement them. Thus, the workload in terms of policies
and rules to be implemented is ever increasing while the efficiency of the already existing lower levels
of bureaucratic machinery is falling. This causes immense pressure for the administrators and becomes
a major constraint for them. Instead of being able to focus on developmental issues, they are forced to
look at many other policies and get involved in their implementation.
Managing Workload
The workload for the DMs is very high and every area cannot be given equal attention. So you have to do an
ABC analysis and see the 4–5 areas that you will pay special attention to.
It’s all about how good you are in managing your time.
The only strains of management techniques that came out regarding the quantum of work were
regarding prioritization and time management. Many officers agreed that it is not possible for an officer
to discharge all the responsibilities that fall to his lot; he has to decide which ones are important and
take care of them. Another management technique suggested by very few officers was delegation of
responsibilities and power. But given that many of them do not trust the quality of the staff below them,
they do not consider delegation as an option. This constraint too cannot be elevated, the best that the
officers can do is to exploit it.
Policy Constraints
The administrators cannot take any actions unless they are guided by an already existent policy or rule.
Every decision taken needs to be supported by an existing mandate and supported by the processes and
procedures laid down for taking the said action. If there is a new branch of decision to be taken, is there
an existing rule for it or the rule must be formulated? Thus, non-existence of policies and policy gaps are
the major constraints in the smooth functioning of the administrators. They are dependent on the rules to
act which invariably slow down the speed of action and progress. If a policy does not exist, then its
formulation and approval by the competent authorities can take from 6 months to a year. Thus, the
progress is stalled for that amount of time.
In government, one of the major constraints is that there is no single line of policy making. There are several
stakeholders and points where decisions are made. It’s a very amorphous organization that has no clear goals.
If you wish to move in a direction and the policy is not there in that direction, then it takes a lot of time to
actually get the policy put it place.
The process of forming a policy is like this … it all starts with an idea that someone, say I as a Secretary, gets
through his experience of what should be done for public welfare. I then share that idea with someone else and
think of implementing it. Then I share it with the minister I work for. After that, I make a full-fledged proposal
for it and go to the Finance department. It may happen that Finance does not approve of my idea as it is. So then
my proposal goes to a committee. Here too, the numerous committees may differ with my idea or proposal. Then
it goes to the Cabinet. Once it is approved at the Cabinet level, I make a plan and subsequently, a policy out of it.
This is how a single piece of public policy is formed. When it comes to bigger policies, discussions at the Vidhan
Sabha level and at the budgetary level are also involved. They are named as public policies but there is hardly
any discussion that involves the public.
The process of policy formulation also has many characteristics that can act as constraints for
the administrators. Firstly, there is the question of policy advocacy. Any policy affects a number of
stakeholders; the responsibility of convincing them about the relevance of the policy falls to the admin-
istrators. The presence of many stakeholders is a natural consequence of democracy and hence not
a constraint as such. However, constraints can arise when any gaps in communication jeopardize the
policy. Also, the interests of the stakeholders are not always aligned with each other; any unfair lobbying
by any stakeholder for an unjustified reason can be a major constraint, especially when such matters
involve political loyalty or vote-bank politics.
The policy formulation process is long and involves the opinions and inputs of many administrators
as well as political executives; as a result, the final shape of the policy is not always the same as was
envisioned by the administrators who formulated it. Neither does the policy serve the same purposes
as was intended. This becomes a constraint because the administrator is still left without any policy
framework for the particular issues he wished to address.
In policy making we have the concept of window of opportunity. So, when the time is right, you push for your
policy. There is a concept of mid-day meals in the government schools. Schools in MP used to give raw food
(1.8 kgs wheat per child) to the family of the students till 2003. When the CM changed, someone suggested to
the new CM that you should give cooked food to students, it will be more effective. The CM liked this idea and
wanted to take it forward. Now, this was the time for all the Officers in the system who wanted some change in
the mid-day meals, they formed a group and pushed for their policies. And because the time was right, they were
readily accepted and implemented.
Some officers suggest that you should know on the right door for your policy to be accepted and
implemented.
You have to keep in mind that any policy that may normally take 2 months to pass will take 6 months in the
government sector to get passed. If you know this, you will not be frustrated.
Most of the officers agreed that they were more prone to adopting the above-mentioned attitude
towards policy constraints. The other activities, processes and plans are made (subordinated) keeping in
mind the time duration it would take the policy to pass and the deviations that might exist from the
proposed policy. There was no evidence of any other managerial techniques being applied to exploit or
elevate the policy constraints in any manner.
Resources Constraint
During the interviews, most of the participants focused on human resources challenges as the
major constraint in the system. Some of the major themes that emerged in this context are discussed
below.
Lack of Competence of Lower Level Bureaucrats
There was a universal disapproval regarding the quality and motivation levels of Class III level officers
such as clerks, ground office force in any department like junior engineers and patwaris.
The junior level bureaucracy, the ones that do not get affected by who comes to power because they are perma-
nent, they are a big dead weight. They do not deliver the output that they should. … There is lack of competence.
The quality of recruitment and training of these people has fallen flat today. Even at the secretariat level, there
are certain clerks and Officers who cannot even read an English letter, forget about disposing or dealing with it.
There is a serious the lack of basic requisite skills such as office management, filing, preparing notations, read-
ing and replying to letters, computer literacy etc in this layer of employees. The capacity gap in this bracket is
very wide. The low quality of the Officers in many such instances was attributed to the faulty or lax recruitment
systems followed; in cases where the recruitment is done by the Village Panchayats there is considerable politi-
cal influence involved. The general decline in the quality of clerical staff from two or three decades back was
constantly brought up.
There are times when there is also a lack of skills in the team that is working for you. Starting of my career, I felt
that we do not focus on HR much, no career path, development, training etc. Few of the people in the Class III
Officers’ category have a sense of apathy or indifference towards their work.
Lack of Motivation
Lack of motivation is another characteristic of Class III level of officers as that they do not get transferred
out of the district or office; there are little or no opportunities of any kind of growth in their careers. Also,
they are permanent government employees whose removal involves long procedures that can be contested
in the court of law. All these factors combined lead to very low levels of motivation to work amongst this
cadre of employees. These low levels of motivation make it difficult for them to willingly acquire new
skills or sharpen already existing ones. Their lack of motivation was also termed as ‘indifference’ by
many of the officers, they mentioned that the non-performance of the system at large does not affect this
stratum of employees and they show no willingness to improve their performance.
Poor Interpersonal Skills of Lower Level Bureaucrats
One more related problem pointed out was that Class III officers define the culture of the organization,
at least for new employees joining at this level and for the public they interact with. They often lack good
interpersonal skills. Many a times the way they behave with the public make them to form the perception
that the whole system is lethargic and prone to procrastination. However, this is an erroneous assumption.
Actually things move faster at higher levels. They are also responsible, to a large extent, of spreading the
same culture of inefficiency and corruption amongst the contract workers that are increasingly being
hired in large numbers by the government.
Inadequate Performance Appraisal System
The administrators have little or no way of appraising the performance of Class III level officers. There
is lack of formal appraisal system. Even if this were to exist, the fact remains that these employees
cannot be removed swiftly for non-performance. Even the IAS officers have very little power in terms of
upbraiding or dismissing employees.
Thus inefficiency of Class III officers is regarded as the major constraint as they are the biggest part
of the machinery through which the administrators work, inefficiencies in this layer add tremendously
to the workload of the administrators and also slow them down. In terms of service delivery and
implementation, they are the primary interface with the public; in policy formation, they are responsible
for basic research; in daily administration, they are the main record keepers and communicators. They
are supposed to form the support machinery that helps administrators at the top make decisions; however,
they have been failing in these duties which either lead to slow decision making or slow service delivery
or wrong decisions and failure in service delivery.
Managing the HR Constraints
The key to understanding the way the human resources constraint is managed is to appreciate the two
different attitudes that the officers have towards the resources that are given to them. There are many
officers who are prone to believing that the resources at hand are imperfect and that whoever is capable
of working must be utilized. Such officers do not rely heavily on the machinery below them and they do
not adopt any special ways of dealing with these constraints. In their case, they are just exploiting the
available constraints to the maximum possible extent. This attitude was observed in most of the officers
interviewed.
Resource problem is always there, in government there will always be certain good people and there will be
many weak people. Your challenge lies in finding the good resource and put him in the right position.
Another type of attitude, which was prevalent amongst the officers, is the strong belief that human
resources can actually be improved. Such officers work systematically towards improving the morale of
the officers who work under them.
According to me, three kinds of people are found in our system; those who are self motivated, those who require
constant guidance and training, and who despite all training do not wish to perform. The first kind, you do not
have to work much with except giving them guidance and a free hand in terms of how they want to do a job.
The second type, they wish to work but do not know how to go about it. These people require training and skill
building, that’s where the Officer’s leadership comes into play. You have to develop such people till they start
delivering. The third category is what is spoiling the organization; they are the constraints in the progress of the
organization. These are the ones, which demotivate other people too. The first step should be taken with these
people is that you counsel them; nobody is born bad or lazy. Find out such people, bring some of them out of this
category to the first or second one. If you cannot make them deliver, then you take punitive action. Unless you
have incentive, disincentive has no meaning. But giving out punishments has to be done very carefully. When it
comes to punitive action, it’s a very long process to dismiss a person. There are corrective measures such as sus-
pensions etc. that can be taken; they do have effect on people. In case you do feel the need to dismiss someone,
then you build a case. Building a fool proof case is a long process but then you do have the right to dismiss them
and be prepared to be questioned about it.
Another officer laid out the detailed process through which he manages to motivate the people with
whom he works.
I’ll try to speak with reference to my current organization that is Madhya Pradesh Rural Roads Development
Authority. This organization basically works on the Prime Minister’s Gram Sadak Yogna, the flagship policy …
we constructs roads for rural connectivity. The whole organization has been divided into project units; each unit
is headed by Executive Engineers (EEs). The progress for these groups for the first two quarters was 65% and
61% respectively. In the third quarter, they have achieved 72% targets. So, what makes the people work hard
and show results?
The entire organization should have clarity of objectives and goals. In this case the Executive Engineers are
very clear that they have to achieve on this particular task. Once the target is clear, it has to be broken down
into constituent parts for every level of the hierarchy. All these must culminate in a wholesome objective. Also,
the targets for each person have to be divided according to the workload assessment, depending on the area, the
person’s capacities etc. Also, it must be ensured that all the resources and capacities for achieving those targets
are available. The superior has to be open to revision of goals and listening to the constraints that the subordinate
faces. If the problems are such that they can be handled by the EE, then he should handle it, otherwise, it is my
responsibility to tackle those problems.
The man on the top should be interacting very closely with the second line (the position just below them). For
instance I know the profile of all the 69 EEs working with me. If your subordinate feels that if the superior has
a casual bond with him, then results are not delivered. But, when the relation is professional (and switches to
informal if there is a need), then the person develops a comfort as well as he knows that professionally he is
required to deliver.
If there are 69 General Managers, the organization is big and everybody’s performance may not be visible. In
this case, 10–12 Officers who are the so called black sheep will try to hide and not come to the forefront with any
comments. They will try to hurry up in the review meetings and in the end the purpose would not be served. So I
tried to pick them out from hiding. They were hidden from mainstream assessment, when they were brought out
and given their due place in the organization, they knew that the superior now had an eye on their work and they
were being monitored. In the next quarter there was a significant improvement in their performance.
An organization has to have buoyancy, a feel good environment. If the morale of the organization is low, the
output is also low, commensurate to the common sentiments. If the motivation is high, even low performers will
jump into the fray to get the work done … In this organization, the buoyancy improves if there is a lot of work.
Also, the organization has built capacities over time that cannot be brought down instantly. So now we have got
sanctions of about 8000 kms from the government. Because we got these sanctions, there is a perceptibly high
level of morale, they know that they are of value and have to achieve a big target. This spirit of the organization,
alive and kicking, can only come if the organization has meaningful work and everyone feels a part of it.
In terms of the quality of Officers and the support staff, there are times when they lack the skills and competen-
cies. So one way of looking at this is that you do not give any important work to such a person and let them
be with the skills they have. The other way is that you guide them quietly and try to build the skills that
they need. This cannot be done in the public; any such help has to be given in private, without embarrassing
the person concerned and without seeming magnanimous. You have to hand-hold him but not in front of
everyone. Then his confidence level improves and his performance improves. You also build a very good
relationship in such a case.
This illustration provides a very good picture of the way officers try to manage the constraints they
have. Even the worst of the human resources available can be elevated to perform better. The key here is
the investment of time and energy by the IAS officials. This may not necessarily be available and all
officers may not have the inclination to invest this time, but when they do, the human resource constraint
can be aptly managed.
Other Constraints
Some other constraints came up during the research, which did not have support from majority of the
officers or at least were not considered major constraints by all. These include the following:
1. The issue of lack of training for the officers when they join the service as well as at higher levels.
There was a division of opinion among the respondents. While all officers agreed that any new
role, even that of a DM in a new district, takes about 3–6 months to settle down, some of the
officers believed that the IAS recruits people who are intelligent enough to grasp the skills
required to do such job without the need of any training. The administrative service is generalist
by nature and there can be no specialization as such which requires separate training. They added
that specialization would take away the charm of the service: the breadth of exposure it provides.
The other respondents were of the opinion that the officers should have some type of orientation
before they join a new role as this would speed up the settling process and increase their efficiency.
Also, many believed that specialization should be encouraged in the services as this would lead
to better policy making and control.
2. Another factor that repeatedly came up during discussions was that the IAS officers, especially
at the policy level, lacked sensitivity towards people. This was not mentioned directly by most
respondents, but most of them commended the politicians on having a much better connect with
the public and understanding their key issues better.
3. Some senior officers even mentioned that the rigour and strength of the field stints (as DMs
or Collectors) has vanished over the years.
Discussion
Constraints identified by the respondents are broadly classified into structural, policy and human
resources related. One of the major structural constraints is the slow pace of decision making caused by
the twin factors of increasing centralization within services and the multiplicity of stakeholders that
are involved in decision making. Rule entropy is an inherent feature of the system. Organizations
with large numbers of stakeholders, and especially diverse stakeholders, are more prone to red tapism.
Diverse stakeholders ensure that the impacts of rules will differ according to stakeholder interests, and
relatedly, that organizations with many stakeholders will tend to have looser control on rules and their
implementation (Bozeman, 2000).
The removal of this constraint requires lean processes and administrative structures. The officers
often try to exploit the bureaucratic processes and rules by finding loopholes in the system or by finding
alternate ways of doing the task. Another structural constraint that is encroachment over the powers of
the executive has arisen mostly because of the political interference in the administration. It manifests
itself in the control that various political entities have over the IAS officers, their transfers and promotions,
and in the increasing interference of politicians in policy implementation. Not only are the laws, budgets
and general aims of different services set by political decisions that are binding on the officers but the
operational aspects of public services are largely run according to their decisions.
The nature of that relationship and the proper role of political leaders and administrators in the
administrative and political process have been the subject of considerable debate. While some argue that
both should remain apart, others argue that the two are indiscreet in nature. To start with in the classic
essay titled ‘The Study of Administration’, Wilson (1887) one of the founders of politics–administration
dichotomy, intended to shield administration from political interference. Wilson was concerned with
both the corrupting and politicizing interference of party organizations in administrative affairs (Stillman,
1973). Though Wilson originally considered politics and administration as independent, later embraced
version of the dichotomy, which assumed that politics and administration interact to improve the organic
state (Martin, 1988). Similarly, Frank Goodnow, in his book Politics and Administration (1900), argued
that the function of administration was to execute the state’s will. It is analytically possible to separate
administration from politics, but practically impossible to integrate the two functions to one branch of
government. There are certain aspects of administration that are harmed by politics and should have
been shielded from it. He argued,
Political control over administrative functions is liable … to produce inefficient administration in that it makes
administrative Officers feel that what is demanded of them is not so much work that will improve their own
department, as compliance with the behests of the political party. (Goodnow, 1900: 83)
Both Wilson and Goodnow, the founders of politics–administration dichotomy, aimed to eliminate the
spoils system by freeing administration from political intervention and establishing a merit system
in its place. Surprisingly enough, most officers in the present study appreciated the inputs given by
politicians in terms of developmental work and in legislative reforms; however, they are not appreciative
of the political executives encroaching upon the executive’s sphere of control. The management of this
constraint is limited to exploiting the constraint, by negotiating with the political executives and clearly
communicating the rules to them. It is also dealt with by playing many political and bureaucratic powers
at the hands of an officer to get a desired result.
The high quantum of administrative responsibilities is another structural constraint caused due to
the interaction of structural and policy anomalies. Key causes for rising workloads are increasing
centralization and the unrestrained introduction of policies without looking at the resources available.
The management style most often been observed that counters this over burdening is prioritizing of
work and delegation of responsibilities. This is also an exploitation of the constraint at best, the more
common thing is to design other activities around the workload (subordination). Elevation of constraint
(addition of resources) is not within the administrative power of the officers.
The absence of policy or the ambiguity in the existing ones is also a constraint for most officers.
More importantly, the constraint of policies not taking up the shape that they should for the betterment
of the public due to involvement of multiple stakeholders in the process and the inaction of many senior
administrative officers. Plethora of rules, regulations, policies and procedures entails the compliance
burden, but often fails to achieve the objective of the organization. Externally imposed and induced
policies provide greater opportunity for diminution. Policy makers make policy and then delegate its
implementation to the officers and hold them accountable. The entropy affecting the communication of
policies, rules and their results limited discretion over policies, rules and procedures, and non-ownership
of these policies often leads to inertia on part of some officers.
Policy constraints are difficult to manage for individual officers, but they can still use concepts of
window of opportunity and policy advocacy to help their cause. Subordination of other processes to the
policy constraint is seen most often.
The quality of human resources particularly at the Class III level came up as a burning concern
through the interviews almost unanimously. Along with skill levels of these officers, motivation levels
as well as the culture of inefficiency came up. These findings point towards myriad causes such as the
structural issue of a lack of a performance management system and career path, corruption from external
agencies and low pays. Thus, this resource constraint actually comes from the interaction of structural
anomalies as well as external influences. The main management techniques that the officers use to
exploit, subordinate and elevate this constraint are those of motivating the employees by setting personal
examples, clear goals, incentives, etc. Some other minor constraints are also mentioned such as lack of
training and insensitivity of officers towards the ground realities of the public. But as Wilson asserted
administrators would directly interpret and respond to public opinion (quoted from Martin, 1988).
It is observed that respondents mostly offered institutional arguments to characterize constraints in
the system. Institutional arguments rely not on aggregations of individual action or on patterned
interaction games between individuals but on ‘institutions that structure action’ (Clemens and Cook,
1999: 442). Institutions are emergent, ‘higher-order’ factors above the individual level, constraining or
constituting the interests and political participation of actors ‘without requiring repeated collective
mobilization or authoritative intervention to achieve these regularities’ (Jepperson, 1991: 145). However,
discussion also hovered around the interaction of exogenous convergence mechanisms with factors that
are intrinsic in the system.
The ToC as applied to the administrative services in India is captured in Figure 1.
some new insights. Further research can be done to assess the impact of gender of the officer on the
constraints faced by them and the management techniques applied. The efficacy of the model of
constraints suggested can be further probed to see if it fits to other public organizations.
Notes
1. Goldratt wrote several other books like ToC (1987), The Haystack Syndrome (1991), Critical Chain (1997) and
Production the TOC Way (2003) that further expounded various aspects of ToC.
2. Historically, the TP was proposed for the first time in the book What Is This Thing Called Theory of Constraints
and How Should It be Implemented (Goldratt, 1990). Later, Goldratt (1994) presents the TP in the book More
Than LUCK …, that is a continuity of the book The Goal.
3. A current reality tree finds the core problem by exploring the cause and effect relationships between all the
undesirable effects. Evaporating cloud is a method to find solutions for the core problem identified. Evaporating
cloud is a method to find solutions for the core problem identified. The future reality tree looks at the possible
after the implementation of solutions; the aim is to find the deficiencies in the solution. Pre-requisite tree lists out
the challenges that present themselves in the implementation process.
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