No.

19A-_______
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPLICANT

v.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

_______________

APPLICATION FOR A STAY PENDING THE FILING AND DISPOSITION

OF A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
AND REQUEST FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE STAY
_______________

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
[email protected]
(202) 514-2217

________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Applicant is the United States Department of Justice.

Respondent is the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States

House of Representatives.
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________

No. 19A-_______

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPLICANT

v.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
_______________

APPLICATION FOR A STAY PENDING THE FILING AND DISPOSITION

OF A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
AND REQUEST FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE STAY
_______________

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All

Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, the Solicitor General, on behalf of

applicant United States Department of Justice (DOJ), respectfully

applies for a stay of the mandate of the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (App., infra, 1a-

75a), pending the timely filing and disposition of the government’s

forthcoming petition for a writ of certiorari and any further

proceedings in this Court. The government also respectfully requests

an administrative stay while the Court considers this application. *

* Counsel for respondent has informed the government that

“the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary opposes
the application for a stay pending certiorari, and intends to file
an opposition. Out of respect for the Court, the Committee does
not oppose an administrative stay of seven days, from May 11,
2020.”
 2

This case presents a straightforward legal question: whether

a Senate impeachment trial is a “judicial proceeding” under Rule

6(e)(3)(E)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, such

that a district court may authorize a breach of grand-jury secrecy

in connection with an impeachment. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

6(e)(3)(E)(i) (“The court may authorize disclosure * * * of a

grand-jury matter: (i) preliminarily to or in connection with a

judicial proceeding.”). The court of appeals answered yes, and

thus affirmed the district court’s order to disclose to respondent,

in connection with a Senate impeachment trial of the President,

all portions of special counsel Robert S. Mueller, III’s report on

possible Russian interference in the 2016 election that were

redacted to protect secret grand-jury matters, along with the

underlying grand-jury transcripts and exhibits. Absent a stay of

the court’s mandate, the government will have to disclose those

materials on May 11, 2020, which would irrevocably lift their

secrecy and possibly frustrate the government’s ability to seek

further review.

As this Court long has recognized, “the proper functioning of

our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury

proceedings.” Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S.

211, 218 (1979). Absent assurances of secrecy, “many prospective

witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily,” and those

who do come forward “would be less likely to testify fully and

 3

frankly.” Id. at 219. For those and other reasons, this Court

has explained that lower courts should not authorize release of

grand-jury materials “[i]n the absence of a clear indication in a

statute or Rule * * * that a breach of [grand-jury] secrecy has

been authorized.” United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463

U.S. 418, 425 (1983).

In authorizing a breach of grand-jury secrecy here, the court

of appeals relied on the exception in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) that

allows courts to authorize disclosure “preliminarily to or in

connection with a judicial proceeding.” But that provision is not

a “clear indication” that grand-jury secrecy may be breached

preliminarily to or in connection with an impeachment proceeding.

The ordinary meaning of “judicial proceeding” is a proceeding

before a court -- not an impeachment trial before elected

legislators. The court of appeals’ interpretation defies that

ordinary meaning, and creates needless contradictions with the

other instances of “judicial proceeding” in Rule 6(e)(3) itself.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(F ) and (G). The court’s expansive

definition also is inconsistent with the limited nature of

historical exceptions to grand-jury secrecy.

Even worse, the court of appeals’ interpretation either

creates substantial constitutional difficulties or, to avoid those

difficulties, requires rewriting or rendering ineffective other

parts of the Rule’s operation, with no basis in the Rule’s text or

 4

this Court’s precedents. For example, the Rule expressly empowers

a court to authorize disclosure of grand-jury matters “at a time,

in a manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E). Yet a federal court likely could

not, consistent with the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. Const. Art.

I, § 6, Cl. 1, impose such conditions on the House or Senate --

much less enforce those conditions by contempt, see Fed. R. Crim.

P. 6(e)(7). The court of appeals’ solution to that problem was to

hold those provisions in Rule 6(e) inapplicable in the context of

an impeachment. See App., infra, 21a-22a.

Likewise, the court of appeals’ interpretation would create

serious constitutional difficulties with the ordinary requirement

that a party seeking disclosure of secret grand-jury materials in

connection with a judicial proceeding demonstrate a particularized

need for the materials. The particularized-need analysis requires

a court to assess the “contours of the” legal theory in the

judicial proceeding and to weigh the claimed need for the grand-

jury information against the strong public interest in grand-jury

secrecy. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 229. Yet in the case of a

request for such information by a House of Congress or one of its

committees in connection with an impeachment trial, that standard

would require courts to scrutinize specific legal theories of

impeachment and second-guess a coordinate Branch’s assessment of

materiality, in likely violation of the House’s “sole Power of

 5

Impeachment” and the Senate’s “sole Power to try all Impeachments,”

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, Cl. 5, and § 3, Cl. 6. Recognizing that

problem, the court of appeals fashioned a lower impeachment-

specific standard that requires a House of Congress merely to show

that the requested materials may be “relevant” to impeachment, see

App., infra, 18a-19a -- in contravention of this Court’s precedents

rejecting a “relevance” standard under Rule 6(e).

Because the court of appeals’ interpretation defies the

ordinary meaning of the term “judicial proceeding,” creates

tension with this Court’s precedents, and rewrites or sets aside

other aspects of the Rule in an attempt to avoid substantial

constitutional concerns, there is a reasonable probability that

this Court will grant certiorari and a fair prospect that it will

reverse the decision below. And absent a stay, the government

would suffer irreparable harm -- for it would have to turn over

the grand-jury records, thereby irrevocably surrendering their

secrecy and possibly frustrating further judicial review of the

merits of this dispute. By contrast, respondent has not identified

any urgent requirement for the requested materials in connection

with an imminent Senate impeachment trial, and so would suffer no

prejudice from a stay.

Accordingly, this Court should stay the mandate of the court

of appeals pending the timely filing and disposition of the

government’s petition for a writ of certiorari and any further

 6

proceedings in this Court. In addition, because the court of

appeals will issue its mandate on May 11, 2020, this Court should

issue an administrative stay while it considers this application.

Respondent has indicated that it “does not oppose an administrative

stay of seven days, from May 11, 2020.” Page 1 n.*, supra.

STATEMENT

1. In May 2017, then-Deputy Attorney General Rod J.

Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller, III as special counsel to

investigate possible Russian interference in the 2016 presidential

election. The special counsel released his report on the

investigation in March 2019. Most of the report is public, but it

contains some redactions, including to protect grand-jury

materials. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), any

“matter occurring before the grand jury” must be kept secret,

except for certain expressly enumerated exceptions in Rule

6(e)(3). Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2). On the day the redacted

Mueller report was made public, DOJ announced that it would

“provide the Chairman and Ranking Members of the House and Senate

Committees on the Judiciary, the members of the ‘Gang of Eight,’

and one designated staff person per member” the ability to review

the report with only the grand-jury information redacted. C.A.

App. 450. DOJ explained that under Rule 6(e), the Attorney General

lacks “discretion to disclose grand-jury information to Congress.”

Id. at 448.
 7

More than four months later, respondent petitioned the

district court for “all portions” of the report that were redacted

under Rule 6(e), including “any underlying [grand jury]

transcripts or exhibits,” as part of its impeachment investigation

into the President. App., infra, 92a (citation omitted). As

relevant here, respondent argued that the district court could

authorize disclosure of those grand-jury materials under the

exception to grand-jury secrecy in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i), which

states that a “court may authorize disclosure -- at a time, in a

manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs -- of

a grand-jury matter: (i) preliminarily to or in connection with

a judicial proceeding.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i). Congress

directly enacted the language of the “judicial proceeding”

exception. See Act of July 30, 1977 (1977 Act), Pub. L. No. 95-

78, § 2(a), 91 Stat. 319-320. Respondent argued that a Senate

impeachment trial is a “judicial proceeding” within the meaning of

the Rule. In the alternative, respondent argued that the district

court had inherent authority to release the requested materials,

even if none of the exceptions to grand-jury secrecy in Rule

6(e)(3) applied.

2. The district court granted the petition in relevant

part. App., infra, 76a-150a. As relevant here, the court

explained that under McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir.

2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020), it lacked inherent

 8

authority to release grand-jury materials outside the enumerated

exceptions in Rule 6(e)(3). App., infra, 94a n.14. But the court

also observed that in Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.

1974) (en banc), the court of appeals denied a writ of mandamus

seeking to prohibit a district court from authorizing disclosure

of grand-jury materials to Congress in connection with the

impeachment of President Nixon. App., infra, 113a-115a. Neither

the Haldeman district court nor the court of appeals clearly

explained the ground for disclosure there. See id. at 114a-115a.

In later holding that district courts lacked inherent authority to

release grand-jury materials outside the exceptions set forth in

Rule 6(e)(3), McKeever distinguished Haldeman on a variety of

grounds, including by stating in a footnote that the court “read

Haldeman * * * as fitting within the Rule 6 exception for

‘judicial proceedings.’ ” McKeever, 920 F.3d at 847 n.3. The

district court here held that under McKeever, Senate impeachment

proceedings therefore qualify as “judicial proceedings” within the

meaning of Rule 6(e). App., infra, 115a.

The district court further explained that respondent, like

any other petitioner seeking disclosure of grand-jury records

under one of the court-authorized exceptions in Rule 6(e)(3)(E),

would have to demonstrate a “particularized need” for the grand-

jury materials. App., infra, 137a. But the court then held that

respondent had demonstrated a particularized need for all of the

 9

material in the Mueller report redacted under Rule 6(e), as well

as the grand-jury materials underlying those redactions, merely

because they were “relevant” to the House’s asserted

investigation. Id. at 140a, 146a; see id. at 139a-149a.

The district court ordered the government to provide to

respondent “all portions of the Mueller Report that were redacted

pursuant to Rule 6(e) and any underlying transcripts or exhibits

referenced in the portions of the Mueller Report that were redacted

pursuant to Rule 6(e).” App., infra, 149a-150a. The court also

invited respondent “to file further requests articulating its

particularized need for additional grand jury information

requested in the initial application.” Id. at 150a. The court

ordered disclosure within five days of its order. See id. at 149a.

3. The district court denied the government’s subsequent

motion for a stay of the order pending appeal. See App., infra,

153a-159a. The court of appeals, however, entered an

administrative stay of the district court’s order, id. at 160a,

and later ordered that administrative stay to “remain in place

pending further order of the court,” id. at 162a.

4. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed. App.,

infra, 1a-75a.

a. As relevant here, the court of appeals held that

impeachment is a “judicial proceeding” under Rule 6(e) based on

its previous decisions in McKeever and Haldeman. See App., infra,

 10

10a-12a. The court explained that the McKeever footnote

“necessarily interpreted Haldeman to involve an application of

Rule 6(e)’s ‘judicial proceeding’ exception,” and the footnote’s

“interpretation of Haldeman was essential to this court’s

reasoning in McKeever.” Id. at 12a.

Independent of circuit precedent, the court of appeals stated

that the “constitutional text confirms that a Senate impeachment

trial is a judicial proceeding” and that the Framers “understood

impeachment to involve the exercise of judicial power.” App.,

infra, 12a. The court of appeals also relied on a purported

“historical practice” of Congress’s having “repeatedly obtained

grand jury material to investigate allegations of election fraud

or misconduct by Members of Congress.” Id. at 13a. The court

recognized that none of those examples involved court-ordered

disclosure in connection with an impeachment, but found them

probative of a more general “common-law tradition, starting as

early as 1811, of providing grand jury materials to Congress to

assist with congressional investigations.” Id. at 14a. Finally,

the court stated that “[s]ince Rule 6(e) was enacted, federal

courts have authorized the disclosure of grand jury materials to

the House for use in impeachment investigations involving two

presidents and three federal judges.” Ibid.

The court of appeals rejected the government’s argument that

“reading Rule 6(e) to encompass impeachment proceedings would

 11

create separation-of-powers problems” because “the particularized

need standard * * * would invite courts to ‘pass judgment on the

legal sufficiency of a particular impeachment theory.’ ” App.,

infra, 15a (brackets and citation omitted). The court dismissed

that concern because “in the impeachment context” the

particularized-need standard requires only that “the requested

grand jury materials [be] relevant to the impeachment

investigation.” Ibid. The court found that respondent had

satisfied that lower “relevance” standard for obtaining the

requested materials here. See id. at 15a-26a. The court

acknowledged that the House already had impeached the President

and the Senate already had tried and acquitted him, but said its

conclusion that the materials are relevant to an impeachment

inquiry “remains unchanged” because “if the grand jury materials

reveal new evidence of impeachable offenses, the Committee may

recommend new articles of impeachment.” Id. at 16a.

b. Judge Rao dissented. In her view, Rule 6(e)(3)(E) allows

a court only to authorize disclosure of grand-jury materials; it

does not allow a court to compel disclosure. App., infra, 38a-

53a. She then concluded that respondent lacked Article III

standing to obtain an order compelling DOJ, which maintains custody

of the grand-jury records, to turn over the records. Id. at 53a-

75a.
 12

Judge Rao agreed with the panel majority, however, that

impeachment is a “judicial proceeding” within the meaning of Rule

6(e) on the ground that impeachment “has always been understood as

an exercise of judicial power.” App., infra, 34a; see id. at 53a

n.10. She also agreed with the panel majority that respondent

could show a particularized need for the materials here under a

lower and more “flexible” standard applicable to impeachment

proceedings. Id. at 35a. Judge Rao nevertheless stated that the

case should be remanded “for the district court to address whether

authorization [of disclosure] is still warranted,” given that the

House already had impeached the President and the Senate already

had tried and acquitted him. Id. at 36a.

c. In a brief concurring opinion, Judge Griffith expressed

his disagreement with the dissent’s “distinction between

authorization and compulsion.” App., infra, 28a.

5. Because the court of appeals’ opinion and judgment did

not contain a “further order” vacating the administrative stay,

App., infra, 162a, that stay will remain in place until the court

issues its mandate. On May 1, 2020, the court denied the

government’s motion to stay its mandate pending the government’s

forthcoming petition for a writ of certiorari, but directed the

clerk “to withhold issuance of the mandate until May 11, 2020, to

permit the Department a reasonable time to seek a stay from the

Supreme Court.” Id. at 163a.

 13

ARGUMENT

The government respectfully requests that this Court grant a

stay of the court of appeals’ mandate pending the timely filing

and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any

further proceedings in this Court. The government also

respectfully requests an administrative stay while the Court

considers this application. Absent an administrative stay, the

court of appeals will issue its mandate on May 11, 2020, which in

turn will force the government to turn over the grand-jury

materials -- thereby lifting their secrecy and rendering this

dispute largely academic. Respondent has indicated that it “does

not oppose an administrative stay of seven days, from May 11,

2020.” Page 1 n.*, supra.

A stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for

a writ of certiorari is appropriate when there is “(1) ‘a

reasonable probability’ that this Court will grant certiorari,

(2) ‘a fair prospect’ that the Court will then reverse the decision

below, and (3) ‘a likelihood that irreparable harm will result

from the denial of a stay.’” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301,

1302 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (brackets and citation

omitted); see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010)

(per curiam). All of those requirements are met here.

 14
I. THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT THIS COURT WILL GRANT
CERTIORARI
At least four Justices are likely to conclude that further

review is warranted of the question whether “judicial proceeding”

in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) includes a Senate impeachment trial. As

explained below, that interpretation not only contravenes the

ordinary meaning of “judicial proceeding,” but would create

serious separation-of-powers concerns with ordinary application of

the Rule’s other provisions to impeachment proceedings. In light

of those serious flaws, the court of appeals’ interpretation of

the Rule presents an “important question of federal law that has

not been, but should be, settled by this Court.” Sup. Ct. R.

10(c).

Although neither this Court nor another court of appeals has

directly addressed whether a “judicial proceeding” includes a

Senate impeachment, cf. United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 479

n.2 (1983), this Court has described “judicial proceeding” in the

Rule as referring to “some identifiable litigation, pending or

anticipated,” id. at 480 (emphasis added), and has emphasized that

“[i]n the absence of a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we

must always be reluctant to conclude that a breach of [grand-jury]

secrecy has been authorized,” United States v. Sells Engineering,

Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983). The court of appeals’ expansive

definition of “judicial proceeding” is in serious tension with

those statements.
 15

To be sure, setting forth the permissible exceptions to grand-

jury secrecy under Rule 6(e) ordinarily is best left to the

Criminal Rules Committee, not this Court. But that course is

inappropriate when, as here, a court reads an exception into the

Rule that either raises substantial separation-of-powers concerns

or, to avoid those concerns, requires rewriting or disregarding

other aspects of the Rule’s text and operation. Under those

circumstances, resolution of the issue is more appropriately

undertaken by this Court, and not left to the Rules Committee.

II. THERE IS AT LEAST A FAIR PROSPECT THAT THE COURT WILL REVERSE
THE DECISION BELOW
The court of appeals’ holding that “judicial proceeding” in

Rule 6(e) includes a Senate impeachment trial contravenes the

ordinary definition of that term, requires the term to carry

different meanings within Rule 6(e) itself, and is in tension with

this Court’s precedents and the history of disclosures under the

judicial-proceeding exception to grand-jury secrecy. More

fundamentally, the court of appeals’ interpretation would raise

serious separation-of-powers concerns because it would mean that

federal courts could impose conditions on Congress’s use of grand-

jury materials in impeachment trials, enjoin and possibly hold in

contempt Members of Congress for violating those conditions, and

scrutinize specific legal theories of impeachment to assess

Congress’s “particularized need” for the materials. That cannot

be right, as the court of appeals itself recognized. Yet instead

 16

of abandoning the interpretation of “judicial proceeding” that

gives rise to those problems, the court fashioned an impeachment-

specific disclosure regime that lacks a basis in the Rule’s text

or this Court’s precedents. There is thus at least a fair prospect

that this Court will reverse the court of appeals’ decision below.

A. A Senate Impeachment Is Not A “Judicial Proceeding”

Under Rule 6(e)
1. As this Court long has recognized, “the proper

functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of

grand jury proceedings.” Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops

Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979). Absent assurances of secrecy,

“many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward

voluntarily,” and those who do come forward “would be less likely

to testify fully and frankly.” Id. at 219. Targets of the

proceeding might “try to influence individual grand jurors.” Ibid.

And “persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury”

could be “held up to public ridicule.” Ibid. “The grand jury as

a public institution serving the community might suffer if those

testifying today knew that the secrecy of their testimony would be

lifted tomorrow.” United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S.

677, 682 (1958). “For all of these reasons, courts have been

reluctant to lift unnecessarily the veil of secrecy from the grand

jury.” Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219.

Accordingly, courts should not authorize release of grand-

jury materials “[i]n the absence of a clear indication in a statute

 17

or Rule * * * that a breach of [grand-jury] secrecy has been

authorized.” Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 425. Rule 6(e), which

“codifies the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy,” ibid.,

enumerates five narrow exceptions under which a court may authorize

disclosure. The only one at issue here concerns disclosure

“preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i). That language, which Congress

directly enacted, see 1977 Act § 2(a), 91 Stat. 319-320, largely

echoes the text of the original Rule, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)

(1946), which itself “codifie[d] the traditional rule of grand

jury secrecy,” Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 425.

The term “judicial proceeding” in Rule 6(e) means a proceeding

taking place before a court. That is -- and always has been --

the ordinary meaning of the term. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1398

(10th ed. 2013) (“[a]ny court proceedings; any proceeding

initiated to procure an order or decree, whether in law or

equity”); Black’s Law Dictionary 669 (2d ed. 1910) (“[a] general

term for proceedings relating to, practiced in, or proceeding from,

a court of justice”). Treating a Senate impeachment trial -- a

proceeding before elected legislators -- as a “judicial

proceeding” departs from that ordinary meaning.

Other textual indicia in Rule 6(e) confirm that “judicial

proceeding” in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) carries its ordinary meaning.

The only other uses of “judicial proceeding” in Rule 6(e)(3)

 18

unambiguously refer to proceedings in a court. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 6(e)(3)(F) and (G). Subparagraph (G) states that “[i]f the

petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in another

district, the petitioned court must transfer the petition to the

other court unless the petitioned court can reasonably determine

whether disclosure is proper.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(G); see

Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E) advisory committee’s note (1983

Amendment) (referring to “the federal district court where the

judicial proceeding giving rise to the petition is pending” and to

“the grand jury court and judicial proceeding court”). And

subparagraph (F ) states that when a court receives a petition to

disclose a grand-jury matter in connection with a judicial

proceeding, “the court must afford a reasonable opportunity to

appear and be heard to * * * the parties to the judicial

proceeding.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(F )(ii).

As even the court of appeals recognized (App., infra, 13a),

those other provisions in Rule 6(e)(3) plainly refer to court

proceedings. Indeed, subparagraphs (F ) and (G) would make little

sense if “judicial proceeding” in those provisions applied to a

Senate impeachment trial. It follows that “judicial proceeding”

also refers only to a court proceeding in subparagraph (E) as well.

See Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574

(2007) (describing the “natural presumption that identical words

used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
 19

same meaning”) (citation omitted). To be sure, as the court of

appeals observed (App., infra, 13a), the presumption that a term

carries the same meaning throughout a single statute may “break[]

down where Congress uses the same [term] in a statute in multiple

conflicting ways.” Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal

Service, 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1865 (2019). But giving “judicial

proceeding” its ordinary meaning throughout Rule 6(e) does not

create any such “conflict[].” Ibid. To the contrary, it is the

court of appeals’ insistence that “judicial proceeding” carry

different meanings within Rule 6(e)(3) that “needlessly produces

a contradiction in the statutory text.” Shapiro v. McManus, 136

S. Ct. 450, 454 (2015).

Other aspects of the Criminal Rules reinforce the ordinary

meaning of the term “judicial proceeding.” The only other instance

in which that term appears in the Rules of Criminal Procedure

indisputably refers to courts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 53 (“Except

as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must

not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during

judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings

from the courtroom.”).

Consistent with the term’s ordinary meaning, this Court

likewise has described “judicial proceeding” in Rule 6(e)(3) as

referring to litigation. In Baggot, supra, the Court held that

disclosure of grand-jury materials was “not appropriate for use in

 20

an IRS audit of civil tax liability” under the judicial-proceeding

exception in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i), in part “because the purpose of

the audit is not to prepare for or conduct litigation.” 463 U.S.

at 480; see ibid. (“the Rule contemplates only uses related fairly

directly to some identifiable litigation, pending or

anticipated”). Although Baggot did not expressly address the

question whether a “judicial proceeding” could include a Senate

impeachment trial, see id. at 479 n.2, the Court’s reasoning in

that case is inconsistent with the court of appeals’ decision here.

An impeachment trial is not aimed at preparing for or conducting

litigation. To the contrary, the Senate’s exercise of its “sole

Power to try all Impeachments,” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 3, Cl. 6,

generally is not subject to judicial review at all. Cf. Walter

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993).

The court of appeals reasoned that “[t]he constitutional text

confirms that a Senate impeachment trial is a judicial proceeding”

because the Framers “understood impeachment to involve the

exercise of judicial power.” App., infra, 12a. There is good

reason to doubt that view. Cf. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 (vesting

all of “the judicial Power of the United States” in the courts);

Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229 (rejecting the contention that a

Senate impeachment trial “must be in the nature of a judicial

trial”). Regardless, the question here is not whether a Senate

impeachment trial shares features with the exercise of judicial

 21

power as a constitutional matter. Rather, the question is whether

a Senate impeachment trial is a “judicial proceeding” as that term

is used in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in Rule

6(e)(3)(E)(i) in particular. The court thus asked and answered

the wrong question.

The court of appeals also mistakenly thought that “judicial

proceeding” in Rule 6(e)(3) should be “interpreted broadly.” App.,

infra, 13a. This Court has made clear that exceptions to grand-

jury secrecy must be interpreted narrowly, not broadly. In Sells

Engineering, for example, this Court held that the authorization

in Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) for disclosure of grand-jury materials to an

“attorney for the Government” does not authorize disclosure to an

attorney in DOJ’s Civil Division, but instead is limited to “those

attorneys who conduct the criminal matters to which the materials

pertain.” 463 U.S. at 427. The Court explained that its narrow

interpretation of the term “attorney for the Government” was

warranted because “[i]n the absence of a clear indication in a

statute or Rule, we must always be reluctant to conclude that a

breach of [grand-jury] secrecy has been authorized.” Id. at 425.

The court of appeals’ expansive reading of “judicial proceeding”

in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) contravenes that principle as well.

2. Historical practice confirms that the term “judicial

proceeding” in Rule 6(e) carries its ordinary meaning. Before the

advent of Rule 6(e), courts authorized the disclosure of secret

 22

grand-jury materials only in relatively limited circumstances, all

of which related to ordinary court proceedings. This Court, for

example, approved the disclosure of grand-jury testimony to

refresh the recollection of witnesses at trial, see United States

v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-234 (1940), and courts

of appeals recognized their authority to pierce grand-jury secrecy

where there was a basis to set aside an indictment because of

misconduct before the grand jury, see, e.g., Schmidt v. United

States, 115 F.2d 394, 395-396 (6th Cir. 1940); Murdick v. United

States, 15 F.2d 965, 968 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S.

752 (1927); Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1908).

When Rule 6(e) “codifie[d] the traditional rule of grand jury

secrecy” in 1946, Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 425, it codified

those limited exceptions, creating an express authorization for

district courts to disclose grand-jury matters “preliminarily to

or in connection with a judicial proceeding or * * * at the

request of a defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for

a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring

before the grand jury.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (1946).

The Advisory Committee notes accompanying the Rule

accordingly explained that Rule 6(e) “continues the traditional

practice of secrecy on the part of members of the grand jury,

except when the court permits a disclosure.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

6(e) advisory committee’s note (1944 Adoption). The only cases

 23

those notes cite as examples of what the Advisory Committee had in

mind involved attempts to lift grand-jury secrecy in connection

with proceedings occurring before courts. See ibid. (citing

Schmidt, supra; Atwell, supra; and United States v. American

Medical Association, 26 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1939)). That

historical practice confirms that the term “judicial proceeding”

refers to a proceeding occurring before a court.

The court of appeals’ reliance (App., infra, 13a) on a history

of Congress’s having “obtained grand jury material to investigate

allegations of election fraud or misconduct by Members of Congress”

was misplaced. As the court itself acknowledged (id. at 14a),

nearly all of the examples that predate the enactment of Rule 6(e)

did not involve impeachment proceedings. Accordingly, they do not

shed light on the question whether the “judicial proceeding”

exception to grand-jury secrecy extends to impeachments. And the

only pre-Rule example the court of appeals identified as involving

an impeachment investigation -- in which the House Judiciary

Committee obtained certain grand-jury materials in connection with

the possible impeachment of two federal judges in 1945 -- did not

involve a “court-ordered disclosure” at all. Id. at 51a (citation

omitted).

The court of appeals’ reliance (App., infra, 14a) on

historical examples postdating the adoption of Rule 6(e) was

similarly misplaced. Those examples are of questionable probative

 24

value because in each instance DOJ supported disclosure of the

requested materials. The government has reconsidered that

position, however, in light of the plain text of Rule 6(e) and the

serious separation-of-powers concerns implicated by the court of

appeals’ contrary interpretation, as described below. And in any

event, if Congress has not authorized courts to disclose grand-

jury materials in connection with impeachment proceedings, no

amount of prior mistaken Executive Branch acquiescence in such

disclosure can overcome that lack of authorization.

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Interpretation Would Create

Substantial Constitutional Difficulties With The
Ordinary Application Of Rule 6(e)
Interpreting the “judicial proceeding” exception to grand-

jury secrecy in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) as including a Senate

impeachment trial also would create substantial constitutional

difficulties. The court of appeals attempted to avoid those

difficulties by adopting an impeachment-specific disclosure regime

that departs from how the Rule ordinarily applies.

1. Rule 6(e) recognizes the importance of grand-jury

secrecy, and reflects Congress’s “judgment that not every

beneficial purpose, or even every valid governmental purpose, is

an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy.” Baggot,

463 U.S. at 479-480. To that end, a critical feature of Rule 6(e)

is that when a district court authorizes disclosure of grand-jury

matters, it generally does so “at a time, in a manner, and subject

 25

to any other conditions that it directs.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

6(e)(3)(E). In Douglas Oil, for example, the district court

authorized a disclosure of grand-jury materials subject to

multiple conditions: that they be available “only to counsel”;

that they be used “solely for the purpose of impeaching” or

“refreshing the recollection” of witnesses; that counsel must not

“further reproduc[e]” the materials; and that counsel must return

the materials to the government “upon completion of the purposes

authorized” by the district court’s order. 441 U.S. at 217. This

Court endorsed that approach, emphasizing that “if disclosure is

ordered, the court may include protective limitations on the use

of the disclosed material.” Id. at 223. The authority to impose

such conditions -- enforceable by contempt, see Fed. R. Crim. P.

6(e)(7) -- is essential for a district court to ensure that grand-

jury secrecy is lifted only “discretely and limitedly,” Procter &

Gamble, 356 U.S. at 683.

A federal court is likely powerless, however, to impose such

conditions on Members of Congress -- much less to enforce them by

contempt. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “the separation of

powers, including the Speech or Debate clause, bars [a] court from

ordering a congressional committee to return, destroy, or refrain

from publishing” information that has come into its possession.

Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations v. Ferrer, 856

F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Accordingly, although this Court
 26

has never decided the question, it is, at a minimum,

constitutionally doubtful whether a federal court could impose on

the Representatives or Senators involved in an impeachment

proceeding any of the “protective limitations on the use of the

disclosed material” that this Court contemplated in Douglas Oil.

441 U.S. at 223. Notably, respondent has never claimed otherwise.

That one of the express tools for protecting grand-jury

secrecy in Rule 6(e)(3)(E) likely would be unconstitutional as

applied to impeachment proceedings is, by itself, a compelling

reason to doubt that such a congressional proceeding is a “judicial

proceeding” as that term is used in the Rule. Cf. Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018) (“When ‘a serious doubt’ is

raised about the constitutionality of an act of Congress, ‘it is

a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether

a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the

question may be avoided.’”); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-

300 (2001). The court of appeals itself acknowledged (App., infra,

21a-22a) that “courts lack authority to restrict the House’s use

of the materials or withdraw them if improvidently issued or

disseminated,” but ignored that its interpretation created rather

than avoided that serious constitutional problem.

2. The court of appeals’ interpretation of “judicial

proceeding” as including a Senate impeachment trial creates yet

another threat to the separation of powers: it requires federal

 27

courts to scrutinize particular theories of impeachment and weigh

the significance of particular evidence under those theories. As

this Court has explained in Procter & Gamble and other cases, even

when Rule 6(e) permits a court to authorize disclosure of grand-

jury matters, only those matters for which the petitioner has

demonstrated a “particularized need” may be disclosed. 356 U.S.

at 683; see Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., 460 U.S. 557,

567 & n.14 (1983). In drafting the relevant text of Rule 6(e) in

1977, see 1977 Act § 2(a), 91 Stat. 319-320, the Senate Judiciary

Committee expressly identified Procter & Gamble as one of the

“prevailing court decisions” setting forth the requirements for

disclosure that it wished to codify. S. Rep. No. 354, 95th Cong.,

1st Sess. 8 & n.13 (1977). The particularized-need requirement

applies to all petitions for disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(E),

including requests for disclosure in connection with a judicial

proceeding under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i). See, e.g., Douglas Oil, 441

U.S. at 222.

To demonstrate a particularized need, parties seeking

disclosure “must show that the material they seek is needed to

avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that

the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued

secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only

material so needed.” Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222; see Procter &

Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682 (petitioning party must show with

 28

“particularity” that “there is a compelling necessity” for the

requested grand-jury records). That requirement is in

considerable tension with the House’s “sole Power of Impeachment”

and the Senate’s “sole Power to try all Impeachments.” U.S. Const.

Art. I, § 2, Cl. 5 and § 3, Cl. 6; see Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. at

235. This Court has explained that the inquiry required by the

particularized-need analysis “cannot even be made without

consideration of the particulars of the judicial proceeding with

respect to which disclosure is sought.” Baggot, 463 U.S. at 480

n.4. Accordingly, district courts facing requests for disclosure

must carefully scrutinize the relationship between the legal

claims in the “judicial proceeding” and the grand-jury materials

sought. In Douglas Oil, for example, the Court explained that the

district court, in assessing particularized need, was required to

assess the “contours of the conspiracy respondents sought to prove

in their civil actions” to weigh the claimed need for the grand-

jury information against the strong public interest in grand-jury

secrecy. 441 U.S. at 229.

By insisting that a Senate impeachment trial qualifies as a

“judicial proceeding” under Rule 6(e), the court of appeals’

interpretation would require federal courts to tread on perilous

ground. Nothing in Rule 6(e) distinguishes between types of

judicial proceedings; a House committee seeking disclosure of

grand-jury materials in connection with a Senate impeachment trial

 29

must therefore demonstrate a particularized need for the materials

no less than would other petitioners seeking disclosure in

connection with “garden-variety civil actions or criminal

prosecutions.” Baggot, 463 U.S. at 479 n.2. Accordingly, the

petitioned court presumably would need to examine the “contours”

of the particular theories of impeachment being considered by the

House or one of its committees, and then make a determination about

the degree of materiality of the grand-jury records -- granting

access to what the House truly needs, but withholding portions

that would be useful only as “general discovery.” Douglas Oil,

441 U.S. at 229. The court would need to undertake the same

analysis if the Senate or one of its committees sought disclosure

of grand-jury records in connection with an ongoing impeachment

trial as well.

It is unclear on what proper basis a federal court could make

those assessments in the context of a proceeding that the

Constitution commits exclusively to the Legislative Branch. Cf.

Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. at 235. Indeed, such assessments would

appear to require courts to pass judgment on the legal sufficiency

of a particular impeachment theory or to second-guess the House or

Senate’s respective assessments of materiality -- just as courts

do when assessing petitions for disclosure of grand-jury matters

in connection with garden-variety civil and criminal proceedings.

The constitutional hazards inherent in such an approach are obvious

 30

-- and are a necessary consequence of the court of appeals’

insistence that “judicial proceeding” in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) must

include a Senate impeachment trial, contrary to that term’s

ordinary meaning. Nor could that consequence be avoided by

transferring the petition to the Senate to decide for itself -- as

Rule 6(e)(3)(G) contemplates when the judicial proceeding occurs

in some “other court” -- precisely because, as noted, that

provision is inapplicable to congressional impeachment trials.

Rather than reconsidering its interpretation of “judicial

proceeding” in the face of the serious constitutional difficulties

its interpretation would create, the court of appeals crafted a

lower particularized-need standard under Rule 6(e) specific to

impeachment. See App., infra, 18a-19a. Under that standard, as

long as a congressional committee represents that it is engaged in

an impeachment inquiry, a district court should “hand off all

relevant materials” without significant further consideration.

Id. at 18a. That approach, the court of appeals concluded, would

“avoid[] the potentially problematic second-guessing of Congress’s

need for evidence that is relevant to its impeachment inquiry.”

Id. at 19a.

The court of appeals’ attempt to avoid those constitutional

problems comes at the expense of this Court’s precedents. This

Court has repeatedly rejected a mere “relevance” standard for

disclosure of grand-jury records -- including when governmental

 31

parties seek disclosure. E.g., Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at

443-444 (stating that the Executive Branch’s “responsibility to

protect the public weal” does not justify a rule making disclosure

“permissible if the grand jury materials are relevant,” as that

would be “a virtual rubber stamp for the Government’s assertion

that it desires disclosure”) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted); Abbott & Associates, 460 U.S. at 568 (holding that

a State could not demonstrate a particularized need for material

“merely by alleging that the materials were relevant to an actual

or potential” action). The court of appeals neither explained how

its diluted “relevance” standard is consistent with this Court’s

precedents nor provided a textual basis in the Rule for an

impeachment-specific standard.

Finally, the court of appeals’ conclusion that the requested

materials were relevant to a House impeachment inquiry -- despite

the House’s already having impeached the President and the Senate’s

already having tried and acquitted him -- was particularly

misguided. See App., infra, 16a. Although the court correctly

observed that “the Committee may recommend new articles of

impeachment,” it did not explain how respondent had met its burden

to show a particularized need for the requested materials in

connection with any potential second impeachment, save for the

circular observation that “if the grand jury materials reveal new

evidence of impeachable offenses,” they would be relevant to those

 32

“new articles of impeachment.” Ibid. That rationale would allow

a district court to authorize breaching grand-jury secrecy

“preliminarily to” a future impeachment proceeding whose

probability of occurring is, as here, far too attenuated to satisfy

Rule 6(e)(3)(E). As this Court explained in Baggot, “the Rule

contemplates only uses [of grand-jury records] related fairly

directly to some identifiable litigation, pending or anticipated.

Thus, it is not enough to show that some litigation may emerge

from the matter in which the material is to be used, or even that

litigation is factually likely to emerge.” 463 U.S. at 480. That

is yet another reason the court of appeals erred in affirming the

district court’s disclosure order here.

* * * * *

This case presents a choice between two readings of Rule 6(e).

Under the first, “judicial proceeding” in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i)

carries its ordinary meaning: a proceeding in court. That

interpretation is consistent with the meaning that the term carries

throughout the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (including

elsewhere in Rule 6(e)(3) itself), and with the operation of the

other parts of Rule 6(e). It also is consistent with the history

of exceptions to grand-jury secrecy predating the Rule’s adoption.

And it is consistent with this Court’s precedents describing

“judicial proceeding” in the Rule as referring to litigation.

 33

By contrast, under the second reading, “judicial proceeding”

in Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) expands to include a proceeding before a

congressional body. That interpretation would create needless

contradictions with the definition and operation of the term

elsewhere in Rule 6(e)(3). It also would be inconsistent with

this Court’s admonishment to read exceptions to grand-jury secrecy

narrowly. And it would create serious separation-of-powers

concerns that could be ameliorated, if at all, only by crafting an

impeachment-specific disclosure regime with no basis in the Rule’s

text or this Court’s case law.

Perhaps because it felt bound by circuit precedent, see App.,

infra, 13a, the court of appeals adopted the second reading. There

is at least a fair prospect that this Court will adopt the first.

III. THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD THAT IRREPARABLE HARM WILL RESULT FROM

THE DENIAL OF A STAY
The government will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay.

Once the government discloses the secret grand-jury records, their

secrecy will irrevocably be lost. See Sells Engineering, 463 U.S.

at 422 n.6 (“We cannot restore the secrecy that has already been

lost.”). That is particularly so when, as here, they are disclosed

to a congressional committee and its staff. Indeed, as respondent

acknowledged below, its own procedures will allow it to release

these grand-jury materials to the public by a simple majority vote

of the committee (not even the full House). See C.A. App. 426.

And because such a vote almost certainly would be “an integral

 34

part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which

Members participate in committee and House proceedings with

respect to” matters “within the jurisdiction of [the] House,” the

Speech or Debate Clause would provide absolute immunity to House

Members for such public disclosure. Gravel v. United States, 408

U.S. 606, 625 (1972).

Moreover, there is a serious question whether this case would

become moot were the grand-jury materials disclosed to respondent.

Sells Engineering suggested that such disclosure would not moot a

case, but the basis for that suggestion was that access to the

materials could be revoked and further disclosure prevented. 463

U.S. at 422 n.6; cf. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506

U.S. 9, 16 n.9 (1992). As explained above, that option is not

viable here: once the materials are disclosed to respondent,

courts likely would lack any authority to dictate how Congress may

use those materials. At a minimum, disclosure of the materials to

respondent would inject a substantial question of mootness into

the case, which could frustrate this Court’s review of the

underlying merits. That is an additional reason the government

would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. See John Doe Agency

v. John Doe Corp., 488 U.S. 1306, 1309 (1989) (Marshall, J., in

chambers); Garrison v. Hudson, 468 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1984) (Burger,

C.J., in chambers); see also Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 178

(2013).
 35

By contrast, respondent would not be prejudiced by a stay.

Respondent has not asserted any time-sensitive need for the

requested materials. Indeed, since the district court proceedings

here, the House has impeached the President, the Senate has

acquitted him, and other than asserting that the House Judiciary

Committee “remains able” to hold hearings and continue its

impeachment investigation, Resp. C.A. Opp. to Mot. to Stay Mandate

11 (Apr. 29, 2020), respondent has provided no indication that the

House urgently needs these materials for any ongoing impeachment

investigation. So even if a Senate impeachment trial were a

“judicial proceeding,” no such proceeding is sufficiently imminent

that respondent should need immediate disclosure of the requested

materials before this Court has had a chance to decide whether to

grant further review and, if so, to conduct that review.

CONCLUSION

This Court should stay the mandate of the court of appeals

pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ

of certiorari and any further proceedings in this Court. The Court

also should issue an administrative stay while it considers this

application.

Respectfully submitted.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General

MAY 2020