Nationalism and Democracy:

Second Thoughts

Wang Shaoguang
Department of Government & Public Administration
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, NT
HONG KONG
Tel: 852-2609-7515
Fax: 852-2603-5229
Email: [email protected]

May 30, 2003

1
 Nationalism and Democracy: Second Thoughts
(Abstract)

The prevailing perception of Chinese nationalism has been negative. Many look
upon nationalism with profound suspicion, considering it intrinsically hostile to
democracy. While not denying that nationalism may be in practice associated with
antidemocratic movements, this article intends to explore the democratic potential of
nationalism. It argues that nationalism is not inherently incompatible with democracy.
On the contrary, democracy can hardly function properly unless some key
components of nationalism are present. Nationalism’s theoretical affinity with
democracy has been examined by other scholars. But they are normally led to
conclude either that only certain types of nationalism can facilitate democracy or that
only under certain conditions can nationalism be conducive to democracy. The
proposition of this article is that all nationalisms share a number of common
components, some of which are indispensable to democracy.

2
 According to Isaiah Berlin (1979), nationalism has been one of the greatest
social and political phenomena of the last two centuries. It is very likely to remain a
permanent feature of our world for the foreseeable future. From historical and
comparative perspectives, therefore, the revival of Chinese nationalism is neither
novel nor surprising. However, the prevailing perception of Chinese nationalism
seems negative. Many see it as a worrying phenomenon and some even view it as a
dangerously aggressive force that may threaten the peace and stability of the region
and the world (Yu 1996; Sautman 1997; Friedman 1997; Chang 1998). Even those
who disagree with the alarmist assessment often look upon nationalism with profound
suspicion, considering it intrinsically hostile to democracy. The rise of nationalism, in
their view, is rather ominous, because it must inevitably endanger China’s democratic
prospects (He & Guo 2000; Xu 2000).
While not denying that nationalism may be in practice associated with
antidemocratic movements, this article intends to explore the democratic potential of
nationalism. It argues that nationalism is not inherently incompatible with democracy.
On the contrary, democracy can hardly function properly unless some key
components of nationalism are present. Nationalism’s theoretical affinity with
democracy has been examined by other scholars. But they are normally led to
conclude either that only certain types of nationalism can facilitate democracy or that
only under certain conditions can nationalism be conducive to democracy (Harris
2002). The proposition of this article is that all nationalisms share a number of
common components, some of which are indispensable to democracy.
The article consists of three sections. The first tries to decompose nationalisms
and pin down their common basic structures. The following section discusses why the
functioning of democracy has to rest upon the presence of some nationalist elements.
The final section examines the characteristics of Chinese nationalism and probes how
the configurations of Chinese nationalism will affect the prospects for the
democratization of Chinese politics.

3
 Nationalism

The concept of nationalism is not easy to define because the subject under study
is not a single undifferentiated phenomenon. Nationalism can take different forms
across space and time. There are perhaps as many different kinds of nationalism as
there are different countries and cultures. To make sense the baffling variety of
nationalisms, most writers are inclined to split them into two fundamentally different
categories, one bad and the other good. The use of binary oppositions can be traced
back at least to the late 1930s, when Hans Kohn published his seminal work (1939).
Since then the literature on nationalism has been replete with distinctions between
Eastern and Western, ethnic and civic, particularist and universalist, illiberal and
liberal, cultural and constitutional, reactionary and progressive, aggressive and
defensive, or malign and benign types of nationalism. Not all of those dichotomies are
necessarily well-matched with one another. As a result, the literature on nationalism
has become a “terminological jungle” (Akzin 1964: 7). The more serious problem of
the dualism is that such dichotomous models could be very misleading. Between the
negative and positive poles of each dichotomy, whatever it is, there are always a
whole range of possible intermediate positions that elude any simplistic either/or
approach. When a dichotomous model is treated as the accurate portrayal of the real
world, it is almost inevitable for the complexity of political and historical reality to be
overlooked (Laborde 2002). Partly due to this dualistic way of thinking, there has
been a tendency to label the type of nationalism one approves with a favorable
adjective while maintaining a hash critical stance towards the type of nationalism one
dislikes. However, the very assumption that there are bad and good forms of
nationalism is problematic. Differences between “really existing nationalisms” are not
as clear, sharp and definite as is often claimed. Apparently diverse forms of
nationalism may resemble one another in certain aspects but diverge in others. In a
sense, all forms of nationalism are “unstable amalgams” (Spencer & Wollman 1998:
270) that combine rambling elements and undergo constant changes. None of them is
absolutely bad or good. Rather, “all nationalism is both healthy and morbid. Both
progress and regress are inscribed in its genetic code from the start” (Nairn 1977: 347-
8). Under certain circumstances, supposedly “good” form of nationalism may turn
“bad”, and vice versa.

4
 As opposed to the quarantine strategy commented above, I adopt a two-step
strategy in conceptualizing nationalism, which first identifies essential nuts and bolts
underlying all forms of nationalism and then examines the nature of each constitutive
part. This strategy allows us at once to grasp the common features of all kinds of
nationalism and appreciate the complexity and infinity variety of nationalist display.
In order to apply this approach, I propose to define nationalism loosely as a mass
sentiment that endows the members of a national population with a sense of distinct
common identity and evokes among them a strong collective allegiance to that
community. This definition suggests that structurally nationalism has four principal
building blocks. The first is a national population, which has been diversely termed
“people”, “nation”, and “nationality”. Composed by a historically constituted, stable
community of people, the nation, however it is defined, is the focal point around
which national identity crystallizes. The essence of national identity is a strong
sentiment that unites a people and at the same time differentiates it from all others.
The national sentiment thus is double-faced. People’s psychological attachment to the
nation constitutes the second building block of nationalism. Based on a sense of
belonging, such emotion is linked to longing for self-esteem, sympathy with national
in-group, affection for homeland, and zeal for its defense. However, the very notion
of identity also presumes the existence of the out-groups or the Others. It is not
possible to define who “we” are without make reference to “them”. Therefore identity
is not merely about inclusion, it is also about exclusion (Spencer & Wollman 2002:
58-9). The third block of nationalism is the people’s attitude toward out-groups. No
matter how benign nationalism is in form, it must delineate where the boundaries of
the nation begins and ends, distinguish who are “insiders” and who are “outsiders”,
and confront the question of what to do about people who are not part of the nation.
The final block of nationalism is people’s loyalty to the national community. Such
loyalty is the result of an erosion of primordial loyalties, such as commitments to
family, kinship, regions, religion, and ethnical group. However, it is still
particularistic in nature, divergent from universalism. Unless a nation can successfully
command a sufficiently strong loyalty from its inhabitants it may not be able to
survive, let alone to meet the competition from other nations.
All forms of modern nationalism rest on these four pillars, but each of them can
be cast with different raw materials. Thus, even although nationalism everywhere
shares a similar structure, its manifestations vary from place to place and from time to

5
time. A brief discussion of the possible contents of each of these four blocks will help
to make this point clear.

The Nature of “Nation”

Everyone agrees that the term “nation” stands for a stable community of people
integrated by a combination of objective and subjective conditions. However, there is
no consensus on what those conditions are. Many attempts have been made to
determine the exact meaning of nation, but none have been successful. There is
something peculiarly elusive about the concept, because the term “nation” has been
used to refer to communities of very different natures. Consequently, there could be
as many different forms of nationalism as there are definitions of what constitutes a
nation (Greenfeld 1992: 7). Broadly speaking, nation has been associated with four
types of entity.
The first is an ethnic group rooted in real or putative common descent. Here the
nation is something people are born into. It is a given and an unchangeable fate. What
determines membership is who your ancestors were, nothing less and nothing more.
Viewing the nation as an organic entity, ethnic nationalism normally seeks to
establish ethnically homogeneous states. Where the ethnic and political units are not
congruent, ethnic nationalism often leads to either forceful assimilation or separatist
movements.
The second is cultural community, which is the product of a unique historical
heritage. Here the essence of nation is its distinctive civilization embodied in common
patterns of language, customs, norms, behavior, myths, and symbols. Compared to
ethnic nationalism, cultural nationalism is more inclusive. Even those with alien
ethnic origins could be incorporated into the community if they are willing to adapt to
its ways of life. Traditional China was a case in point (Harrison 1969)
The third is sovereign state. This conception of the nation insists on the
territorial and legal dimensions. As long as people live in the same territorial-
political-legal unit, they are considered belonging to the same nation even if they are
ethnically, linguistically, or culturally heterogeneous. By promoting fusion rather than
fission, state nationalism “seeks to construct a homogeneity that was not already
there” (Spencer and Wollman 2002: 145). By decoupling nation from shared blood
and shared culture, state nationalism is obviously more inclusive. It must be noted

6
that, however inclusive such a nation is, there normally still is an ethnic core around
which it is built (Smith 1986: 22-30).
The last is a non-exclusive free association of citizens held together by a liberal
political culture. In his 1990 essay on “Citizenship and National Identity”, Habermas
envisages that a liberal democratic constitution, crystallized around a set of “abstract
procedures and principles”, is capable of providing people with an alternative focus of
loyalty. The civic model, while accepting the division of the world in different
political communities, sees a nation as a association of equal citizens brought into
being and sustained by the agreement of its members (Spencer & Wollman 2002:
101). Its membership is open to anyone who subscribes to the nation’s political creed,
regardless of descent, race, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds. The United States is
frequently cited as an example of such a non-national nation.
As a normative vision, ideal of universal and voluntary membership may sound
quite appealing. As a historical claim, however, civic nationalism is nothing but a
fiction. In the real world, few states have ever been as open and “ethno-culturally
neutral” as civic nationalism expects, and none makes citizenship conditional only on
the holding of liberal democratic values by individuals (Smith 1995; Canovan 1996;
Kymlicka 2000; Laborde 2002; Spencer & Wollman 2002). It is doubtful whether
mere shared universal principles and values are strong enough to hold a nation
together (Canovan 2000). Thus, when we talk about “really existing nations”, perhaps
only the first three types of entities identified here are relevant.

The Sources of National Sentiment

According to Greenfeld (1992), “national identity is, fundamentally a matter of
dignity.” National dignity is perceived to be closely bound up with individual dignity,
for it is the nation that provides its citizens and their progeny with “security and safety
as well as status and prestige” (Druckman 1994: 45). The concern over national
dignity is what emotionally attaches people to their nation. Undoubtedly, the feelings
associated with national dignity are complex. In some cases, people exhibit a signal
pride in the achievements of their countries. Those are typically economically
prosperous and internationally powerful countries. A good example is the United
States, which has enjoyed a century of peace and secure accumulation of wealth. In
economically insecure and internationally weak countries, however, people’s concern
over national dignity is usually characterized by intense anxiety about the nation’s

7
health, security, and even viability. Concern over national dignity may also manifest
in a pervasive feeling of humiliation in countries that have historically suffered from
the encroachment of foreign powers. To the extent that humiliation implies a sense of
collective responsibility, the memory of tragic past can help foster national solidarity.
National pride, anxiety, and humiliation are different psychological moods, but
each of them in its own way provides emotional nourishment for attachment to the
nation and sustains the sentiment whenever it falters. Precisely for this reason, all of
them are subject to state manipulation.

The Intensity of National Loyalty

All nations claim the loyalty of their citizens, especially in times of crisis. But
such a claim may conflict with other claims and other values. Variations in the
relative strength of national loyalty may range on a continuum between two extremes.
On one extreme, the national interests are elevated to a position of supremacy and
loyalty to the nation is seen accordingly as the supreme good, overriding all other
political loyalties and public obligations. This is a ‘my country right or wrong’
orientation, which demands, if necessary, supreme sacrifice. Towards the center is a
position that gives nation-centered loyalty precedence over primordial commitments
such as those toward family, regions, religion, and ethnical group, but does not
necessarily treat it as an absolute priority. While loyalty to the nation does come first,
commitments to the rest of humanity, including those who are not the members of
one’s own nation, are not ignored. On the other extreme is cosmopolitanism, which
regards it morally intolerable to assert that the “nation” overrides all other claims on
the individual. It accords national loyalty only prima facie status and directs one’s
primary obligations to all human beings. The problem is that cosmopolitanism
remains merely a moral doctrine. No really existing nationalism has ever unreservedly
embraced it.

Stance toward the Other

The issue of the Other is implied in all forms of nationalism. Without the Other,
national identity simply cannot be constructed. Thus, the study of nationalism has to
examine how the people of a nation perceive and interact with their counterparts in
other nations. One thing is clear: Emotional attachment to a nation needs not entail the

8
derogation of other nations (Druckman 1994, Mummendey & Klink 2001). Instead,
nations may assume one of the following three stances toward others.
Distrust, xenophobia and reactive nationalism Weak and insecure nations tend
to distrust everything foreign. Foreign powers are considered evil-minded and
threatening. The suspicion of foreign intention and the fear of foreign infringement
often lead those nations to reject the outside world and crave for self-sufficiency. Due
to their sense of vulnerability, they are thin-skinned to foreign pressure and insults,
real or perceived. However, the cornered-animal characteristics of such reactive
nationalism are often confused with aggression (Thompson 1998).
Superiority, arrogance, and aggressive nationalism Strong and secure nations
tend to look outward rather than inward. However, contacts with other nations are
likely to arouse in them a sense of superiority, which may under some circumstances
be converted into an arrogant, externally directed impulse. Such impulse frequently
manifest in a zealous missionary complex, eager for exporting, and if necessary,
imposing a nation’s own values and institutions on others. By doing so, those nations
effectively deny the rights of others to pursue their own ways of life. Those strong
nations are often among the first to denounce the “nationalist tendencies” of weak and
insecure nations, but their profound sense of superiority often blinds them to their
own chauvinist, manipulative and aggressive nationalism or imperialism (Thompson
1998; Spencer & Wollman 2002: 97-99).
Pride, confidence, and affirmative nationalism Many nations are neither strong
nor weak. They are proud of their traditional cultures and contemporary
achievements, but have little desire or capability to be intrusive in dealing with other
nations. They attach great importance to independence, but are confident that they can
benefit from interacting with the outside world. Moderate in ambition and mild in
temperament, their nationalism is an affirmative one (Oksenberg 1987; Whiting
1995).

Table 1: Four Dimensions of Nationalism

Nature of “Nation” Ethnocentric Culture Sovereign State

Source of National Sentiment Humiliation Anxiety Pride

Strength of National Loyalty Supreme Balanced Universalism

Stance toward the Others Xenophobia Arrogance Confidence

9
 Table 1 summarizes the above discussion. It is noticeable that a particular
feature along one dimension of nationalism is not necessarily associated with a certain
feature along another. For instance, the feeling humiliation does not always translate
into xenophobia and national pride is not always manifested in national prejudice.
Rather, those features may be blended into myriads of combinations or what we call
“really existing nationalisms”, which can never be squeezed into the straitjacket of
any dualistic model.

Nationalism and Democracy

Historically speaking, nationalism is intimately linked to democracy. The close

relationship can be traced to the French Revolution, which is typically taken to be the
starting point for both modern nationalism and democracy. By proclaiming the
principle of popular sovereignty, the French revolutionaries for the first time vested
political legitimacy in “the people”. For them, the people and the nation were one and
the same. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes (1748-1836), for instance, argued forcefully, “All
public powers without distinction are an emanation of the general will, all come from
the People, that is to say, the Nation. These two terms ought to be synonymous”
(Cited from Spencer & Wollman 2002: 128). Correspondingly, s 3 of the Declaration
of the Rights of Man and Citizen stated: “The source of all sovereignty resides
essentially in the Nation. No group, no individual can exercise any authority which
does not explicitly emanate from it.” The people were no longer the passive subjects
of a king or emperor or dictator. Rather, they had the right to throw off the shackles of
tyrannical regimes and take things into their own hands. To the extent that nationalism
aimed at transferring sovereignty from the rulers to the people, it was fully compatible
with democracy, or the principle of “rule by the people”. Following the French
Revolution, the 19th century witnessed successions of revolutionary movements that
were simultaneously nationalist and democratic, including such notable examples as
Italy, Poland, Germany and Greece (Spencer & Wollman 2002: 122). For this reason,
many political thinkers of the 19th and early 20th centuries assumed a close
relationship between nationalism and democracy. This was evident in John Stuart
Mill’s “Consideration on Representative Government”. Mill was by no means an
emotional nationalist. But he believed that “where the sentiment of nationality exists
in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the same

10
nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart”
([1861] 1991: 428). Thus, as a firm advocate of democracy, “Mill found that he had
no choice but to endorse nationalism” (Nodia 1994: 14), for a shared national identity
was a necessary condition for functioning democratic institutions.
After the First World War, however, many have questioned whether nationalism
and democracy are really compatible to one another. Some assert that the link
between them is more contingent than necessary. Others even argue that the two
principles point in fundamentally opposed directions, because “nationalism tends to
be exclusive whereas democracy is inclusive” (Beetham & Boyle 1995: 25). More
recently, our increasingly global interdependence has prompted still others to contend
that democratic organizations need to be globalized (Young 2000) and advocate
“cosmopolitan democracy” (Couture 1999). Yet, in fact, all really existing
democracies are polities embodied in distinct national communities. No matter how
all-encompassing the idea of democracy may sound, there is simply “no record
anywhere of free, unconnected, and calculating individuals coming together
spontaneously to form a democratic social contract ex nihilo (Nodia 1994: 7).
Nationalism can certainly exist without democracy. The issue is whether stable
democracy can exist outside of the framework of the nation. In the next few pages, I
shall argue that democracy is inconceivable without the idea of national identity.
As mentioned above, at the core of democracy is the principle of popular
sovereignty. Already the notion of “rule by the people” raises three interrelated
questions: Who are the “people”? What motivates the people to care about their
common political destiny? What facilitates democratic citizenship? Nationalism
seems to provide the answers to all of them.

Nation as the Base of Democratic Political Community

A democracy requires a definition of the demos or who are included in the game
and who are not. Wherever the boundaries of the “playing field” are in dispute, vital
democratic institutions (e.g. participation, representation, competition or cooperation)
simply cannot function. It is misleading to characterize democracy simply as an
inclusive system. Democracy is inclusive only for the citizens living in a well-defined
political community. No really existing democratic system has ever intended to cover
the whole of mankind. On the contrary, all democratic governments work with
smaller “peoples”. In a sense, democracy assumes some principle of social closure. Its

11
most fundamental prerequisite is the existence of a close political community, or more
specifically, an established group of people who live within clearly defined
geographical boundaries. The more complicated a democratic system is, the more it
needs precise criteria for its membership (Canovan 1996: 17).
Can the issue of membership and boundaries be settled in accordance with
democratic procedure? The answer is negative, because, before “the people” can vote
in a referendum on who shall be included and where the border shall run by the
majority rule, they have to reach a consensus about who can take part in the voting in
the first place (Dahl 1989). This is a question far deeper than questions about the
regime type of the state or how state power should be exercised. As pointed out by
Whelan, “boundary-drawing, and the determination of political membership, are
perhaps the most fundamental political decisions” (1983: 13). Yet, there is nothing in
democratic procedures per se that can solve this prior issue. This means that the vast
majority of citizens in a social-territorial unit must acquire a prior sense of community
before democracy can flourish there.
What can help a people to generate the sense of identification with their political
community? As early as in the late 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau already found
the answer, which is some form of nationalism (Diamond & Plattner 1994: xi-xii).
Historical experience shows that, whether we like it or not, nationalism has played a
pivotal function in demarcating political communities. That is why Ernest Gellner
(1983) concludes that nationalism creates nations everywhere rather than the other
way around. Nationalism transcends what Geertz (1963) terms the “primordial
sentiments” associated with family, clan, tribe, etc. and fosters a new identification
with “nation”. Under the influence of nationalism, strangers come to consider
themselves as part of one people, even if they live vast distances from one another and
never meet once in their lives.
As remarked before, the “nation” can refer to an aggregation of citizens in the
state or in an ethnic/cultural group. What a democratic system needs is an overarching
collective identity attached to the sovereign state rather than to a particular ethnic
group or culture. This would not be a problem in a state with largely one ethnical
group or one culture but presents a huge challenge to societies that are deeply divided
by ethnic and cultural cleavages. We are not suggesting that democracy is doomed to
failure in multiethnic or multicultural settings. There are institutional arrangements
designed to facilitate democratic governance in such societies. “Ethnic democracy” is

12
one model, which is exemplified by Israel, where a master race dominates and
minorities, while enjoying certain civil and political rights, are “treated as second-
class citizens, feared as a threat, excluded from the national power structure, and
placed under some control” (Smooha 1999: 200). Lijphart's consociational or power-
sharing model is another option (1977). Neither, however, is desirable. For all intents
and purposes, representation in “ethnic democracy” is anything but equal, which
contradicts the very spirit of democracy. Consociational democracy respects
minorities’ collective rights, but it clearly cannot work where large groups of
individuals in the territory want to join other states or to create their own independent
states.
The point to underscore here is that democracy is most likely to flourish in
societies where the state and “nation” coincide or where there is a shared national
identity despite internal ethnic and cultural divides. The construction of such an
identity in ethnically or culturally diverse societies is not easy. While it does not
require the people to eradicate their ethnic/cultural identity, it does necessitate efforts
to forge an overarching identity that corresponds with the boundaries of the state and
encloses all ethnic groups. Nationalism is essential for creating such a cohesive
political community.

National Sentiment as a Motivational Condition of Democracy

In addition to helping define the political units for democratic governance,
nationalism can also bond citizens to a common destiny and, in so doing, provides a
“motivational anchorage” for citizens to take part in democratic life.
Democracy is a noble ideal, which is associated with universal principles, rights,
obligations, and procedures. Unable to use coercion extensively, democracy has to
rely more upon a willing identification with the polis on the part of the citizens than
more repressive forms of polity (Canovan 1996: 21). Many assume that commitment
with a set of abstract normative principles is sufficient to create and maintain a sense
of socio-political identity. Laborde believes, however, that this view substantially
“underestimates the motivational conditions of democratic governance” (2002: 601).
It is indeed doubtful whether shared democratic values in themselves are strong
enough to inspire an enduring sense of belonging and solidarity. As a number of
authors have recently pointed out, universalistic principles can become objects of
identification and loyalty only via an admixture of particularistic compassion. Or put

13
differently, pure principles must be woven into the fabric of passionate attachments to
a concrete historical community (Markell 2000; Laborde 2002). For a democratic
system to function smoothly, over and above commitment to democratic ideal, the
citizens must develop an emotional attachment to their fellow countrymen and to their
nation. As early as 150 years ago, J.S. Mill already came to realize the importance of
fellow-feeling, without which, he asserted “the united public opinion necessary to the
workings of representative institutions cannot exist” (Cited from Moore 1999: 482).
Why must a democratic system anchor its abstract principles to nationalistic
sentiments? There are at least three reasons. First, contemporary democracy involves
vertical dialogue between the representative and the represented. This requires the
representative to be sufficiently aware of and receptive to, the concerns of her/his
constituents, and more importantly, the represented to accept the representative as one
of their kind. Sharing a national identity helps facilitate this kind of dialogue (Moore
1999). Second, unlike pre-modern democracies that existed exclusively in small city
states, modern democracies are often too large to allow citizens to interact with one
another face to face. Nationalism impels people to think in “national” terms and binds
them into an “imagined” national community (Anderson 1983) even if they will never
meet in person. Only after familial, local, and regional allegiances have been
successfully transformed into national ones is it possible for the people to acquire
incentive to participate in national politics, democratic or otherwise. Third,
democracy presumes that the people can make decisions that stick and pass laws that
hold. Thus the nation upon which democracy is built has to be not only a trans-
territorial but also a trans-generational political community. If not, the democratic
system would be on a precarious foothold. It is the magic of nationalism to induce the
people to believe that their nation is an inheritance that has been passed down from
their common ancestors and will be passed on to their offspring. The abiding feelings
of solidarity between all citizens, old and young, makes it possible for them to pursue
long-term collective goals. All in all, the effective working of democracy depends
upon the voluntary consent and compliance of the great bulk of the population.
Diffuse emotional attachment to symbols of the nation can greatly smooth the
governing progress of democracy.

National Identity as a Dispositional Condition of Democracy

14
 A shared national identity may also help to under-gird democratic institutions by
nurturing social trust and thereby facilitating compromise and cooperation.
Democracy does not need high levels of trust in political elites and political
institutions in order to function effectively. On the contrary, it is normal for citizens to
distrust and be wary of politicians and government in a democracy (Hardin 1999).
However, social trust or trust beyond the narrow minimal scope of primordial units
has been found to be a key ingredient in the ethos that has sustained democracy
(Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1997). This is so because
democracy is not just a matter of institutional arrangements for elite politics. People’s
dispositions and attitudes also play a critical role in its functioning and survival.
Social trust is conducive to stable democracy for two reasons.
First, trust lubricates compromise. Conflicting interests are unavoidable in any
human societies, including democratic ones. Democracy does not hold a magic key to
resolve such conflicts in ways entirely satisfactory to all. Instead, it is merely a system
of certain principles and procedures that can at best produce outcomes perceived as
“good enough” by the majority of people. Thus, the citizens of a democracy need to
be disposed to put up with decisions they object and accept outcomes that are not
perfectly satisfactory to them. More importantly, democracy is distinguished from
other forms of political regime by degree to which it allows opposition. It is therefore
essential for the people of a democracy to view their political opponents as a loyal
opposition with whom they are willing to strike compromises. “Compromise is the
procedural heart of democracy” (Cohen 1971: 81).
Second, trust is a foundation of cooperation. Tolerance, compromise and mutual
restraints only prevent people with divergent interests and ideas from harming each
other. Cooperation is also required—between classes, between ethnic groups, between
regions, between political parties, between different branches of government, between
different levels of government, between the government and private groups, and so on
—in order for democracy to perform well. Since complete behavioral rules are
impossible and third-party enforcement are impracticable in such cases, the extent to
which people trust one another in a society becomes a thrust to generate and sustain
cooperation. “The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater the
likelihood of cooperation” (Putnam 1993: 171). In the absence of trust, mutual
suspicion will poison the process of democratic decision.

15
 A shared national identity is uniquely conducive to social trust for obvious
reasons. It is quite natural for people to cherish intimate relations, be it a family, a
religious group, a town, a school, or many others. In the modern time, the nation is
seen as the only political community that can really command people’s allegiance.
People tend to identify themselves with their fellow-citizens first and foremost
because life in the national context is “familiar, understandable and thus predictable”
(Tamir 1993: 84) and fellow-members within the nationality are presumably less
hostile and more benign in their intentions as compared with outsiders. Hence,
national identity can perform “a trust-conferring function bridging political divisions,
anonymity, cultural diversity, and the strangeness of the vast majority of my fellow-
nationals” (Offe 1999: 59). Although national politics is by no means free of conflict
and controversy, but strong attachment to the nation may make people readier to
resolve their conflicts through compromises. Outweighing allegiance to kin, locality,
religion, ethnicity or class, loyalty to the nation may become a powerful force capable
of inducing people to act collectively, share burdens, and even make sacrifices for the
nation’s common good. National identity thus serves as a reservoir of political power
that makes the state less dependent upon force and better able to provide effective
solution to the most fundamental of political problems.
If democracy can operate only if its citizens adopt what Habermas calls the “we-
perspective of active self-determination” (1999: 263), then it is ill advised to condemn
nationalism in a slapdash fashion. No existing democracy is based on pure allegiance
to abstract principles. To be fully legitimate, any democratic system must find a way
to motivate citizens to feel that particular institutions are somehow theirs. Nationalism
is an amazing homogenizing force that provides solidarity among diverse individuals
and groups by constituting a collective political subject, or a "we". Any attempt to
bind citizens through ties other than “natural ones” (e.g. language, culture, history,
and so on) will fall short of the goal of civil-cultural cohesion. Citizens who lack a
sense of shared identity and destiny are prone to “political apathy, social atomization,
and mutual irresponsibility” (Benner 1997: 193), which in turn are likely to
“aggravate the chief symptoms of democratic malaise, namely, cynicism towards
democratic rule, reluctance to share the burden of social justice, resentment towards
aloof and acculturated elites, decline of civic dispositions, and alienation vis-à-vis an
increasingly ‘privatized’ public sphere” (Laborde 2002, 601).

16
 Chinese Nationalism and Democracy

In the above section, I have argued that nationalism (manifested in a well-

defined nation, a shared identity with the nation, and dispositions associated with the
identity) is a necessary condition of well functioning democracy. However, a
necessary condition is not a sufficient condition. I have no intention to suggest that
the presence of nationalism is enough in itself to bring about democracy. There have
been many historical instances in which nationalism was associated with anti-
democratic movements. But it is wrong to deny that nationalism can play a
constructive role in supporting the functioning of democracy. Or, to put conversely,
its absence would make democratic governance rather difficult.
What about Chinese nationalism? The prevailing Western perception of Chinese
nationalism treats it as the product of state propaganda. According to this viewpoint,
in an era when international communism was quickly fading away from the historical
stage, Chinese leaders had no choice except consciously cultivating nationalism as a
tool to legitimate their rule. Just because the patriotic rhetoric of the Chinese
government coincided with the rise of popular nationalism, however, does not mean
the former caused the latter. The Chinese government has launched propaganda
campaigns in myriads of issue areas in the last decade or so, most of which were not
terribly effective. One has to ask what makes its nationalist propaganda so successful.
It is noticeable that nationalism has found the receptive audience among disparate
groups that are not very prone to state propaganda, including college students who
have good education and access to the Internet, intellectuals who once worshiped
things Western, returned students/scholars who spent extended time in the United
States or Europe, Chinese living overseas who rely for their information mainly on
Western media, and even political dissidents who oppose the Communist regime
(Dikotter 1996; Chang 1998). Apparently, official manipulation is insufficient to
account for the upsurge of popular nationalism in China.
Will the popular Chinese nationalism throw obstacles in China’s way toward
democracy or will it help to smooth the transition? Once we ascertain the nature of
each key component of Chinese nationalism the answers to those questions should
become clear.

The Nature of “Nation”

17
 When the concept of modern nationalism was first introduced to China in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, it contained a strong racial strain, refusing to accept
anyone not born into the Han nationality as Chinese. But as soon as the Qing Dynasty
was overthrown in 1911, Chinese political elites rejected Han nationalism and
embraced a more inclusive concept of the Chinese nation, covering all the people
living within the political boundaries of the country irrespective of their racial,
religious, or cultural backgrounds (Townsend 1992; Wang 1996). Since then, the term
“nationalism” (minzu zhuyi) in China has carried a derogatory connotation referring
only to ethnocentric, chauvinist, or racist ideas and actions. Just like their counterparts
in Europe and the United Sates, Chinese people prefer to use the term “patriotism”
(aiguo zhuyi) in labeling their sentimental attachment to the nation (Zhao Suisheng
2000).
Not equating nationhood with ethnicity, the Chinese understanding of
nationhood clearly is a sophisticated one. Although in popular discourse the Han
people has been implicitly and explicitly treated as an ethnic core that provides the
whole nation with necessary historical depth, other ethnic groups, big and small, are
thought to have made great contributions to the formation of a united Chinese
nationality (zhonghua minzhu). Ethnic differences do exist, but it is believed “that the
developments of the various ethnic peoples are inter-related, mutually
complementary, and interdependent, and that each ethnic group has inseparable and
innate relations and common ethnic interests with the whole” (Teng 2001: 76).
There is no doubt that the image of China as an organic entity contains a large
element of myth. Outsider observers may prove to their own satisfaction that the Han
people are biologically and culturally different from some of China’s minority
nationalities. The myth, however, is a source of strength rather than a weakness. As
long as the majority of Chinese accept the myth as a fact, it can melt together the
otherwise heterogeneous people.

The Sources of National Sentiment

Most Chinese are attached to their country with strong emotion. The driving
force behind their national sentiment is a humiliation-pride complex. With a recorded
history of more than 3,000 years, Chinese people have reasons to be pride of their
splendid civilization. But, beginning with the Opium War (1840-42), the country fell
from grace, plundered, pushed around, and carved up by one foreign power after

18
another for more than 100 years. Imperialist invasions, defeats in war, and territorial
losses engendered a deep sense of humiliation and shame among Chinese in much of
the 19th century and the first half of the 20th. Although the days of victimization have
long gone, the traumatic memory of the “hundred years of suffering” remains fresh,
continuing to haunt contemporary Chinese. Common suffering has been found to be a
catalyst to fuel patriotic emotion and foster national solidarity everywhere. As pointed
out by Ernest Renan, “national sorrows are more significant than triumphs because
they impose obligations and demand a common effort” ([1882] 1994: 17). China is no
exception.
The sense of humiliation has spawned a strong desire to right the past wrongs
and to restore China’s national grandeur. This long-cherished wish seems to have
eventually come true. The country’s phenomenal growth record and swelling
international influence in the last 20 plus years have to a large extent brought back a
collective sense of self-confidence. Chinese people’s righteous pride in the country’s
spectacular progress understandably also augments their emotional attachment to the
motherland.

The Intensity of National Loyalty

In Chinese language, patriotism means “loving the nation”. The “nation” here
refers to the sovereign state, its people and its territory, rather than any particular
locality or ethnic group. “Loving the nation” means loyalty to the nation, or more
specifically, readiness to serve it, promote its collective well-being, and defend it
against centrifugal forces and foreign invasion. Although national loyalty is perceived
as citizens’ primary obligation, however, it is hard to find anyone in contemporary
China who takes a “my country right or wrong” position. Even the government calls
“for patriotism among all Chinese coupled with internationalism in their relations
with foreigners” (Townsend 1992: 121).
Since the mid-1990s, quite a few diverse currents of thought China have been
labeled as “nationalist” by Western observers and Chinese liberals (Xu 2000). Among
the most prominent include the Neo-Confucians, the “Say-No Club, and the New
Left. But, none of them projects a blind exclusivist, xenophobic ideology. The Neo-
Confucians, for instance, “purport to make the theorization and implementation of a
democratic politics one of their overriding objectives in an emergent ‘third stage of
Confucianism’” (Guo, 2003). The Say-No Club is famous for its quest for restoring

19
dignity to the Chinese people. What has been overlooked is the fact that there is no
luck of concern for individual dignity in its literature either (Fitzgerald, 1999).
Moreover, the New Left probably cares more about China’s democratic future than
Chinese liberals. Unlike Chinese liberals who are afraid of the demos and condemn
the idea of “popular sovereignty”, the New Left advocates a model of “comprehensive
democracy”, which means popular participation in economic, social, cultural as well
as political decision making, going far beyond the Western model of electoral
democracy. Taken as a whole, what distinguishes Chinese “nationalists” and
“liberals” is not so much about whether national loyalty is absolute and unconditional.
“Rather, it is about China’s directions of modernization in the rapidly changing world
of globalization” (Gao, 2003).

Stance toward the Others

Nowhere does nationalism develop in isolation. Ever since the middle of the 19th
century, the ebb and flow of Chinese nationalist movement has always been related to
real or perceived foreign infringement of China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and
vital national interests. It tends to become strong whenever foreign hostility is present.
The current phase of nationalism is the latest example. It began in the early 1990s
when the Cold War came to an end. This was by no means a coincidence. As soon as
the Soviet Union was disintegrated, the West turned its attention to the world’s last
communist stronghold—China. The upsurge of nationalism was a reaction to the West
that, in Chinese view, was becoming more subversive and threatening. In this sense,
Chinese nationalism is not home grown but externally provoked. The reactive nature
is also evident in the object of so-called “anti-foreign” sentiment. Perhaps, “anti-
America” is a more accurate term here since it is the high-handed United States that
has been the main target of Chinese nationalism. This is so because many Chinese are
convinced that the America is leading a concerted effort to contain China and keep it
down.
“Anti-foreign” is a wrong characterization of contemporary Chinese
nationalism for another reason. There were times in the modern Chinese history when
nationalists blamed the country’s ills solely on the transgressions of the outside world
and sought totally to eradicate external influence. Those days have long gone,
however. Contemporary nationalists are as committed as their predecessors to the
preservation of national independence, the reunification of China, and the attainment

20
of national wealth and power. But, with higher degree of self-confidence, they now
welcome extensive economic, cultural, and even political relations with the outside
world and believe that only by actively participating in international affairs can China
regain its former greatness (Oksenberg 1987).
Is the resurgent Chinese nationalism a threat to the regional and even world
peace and stability? Some outside critics believe so (Friedman 1997; Sautman 1997;
Chang 1998). But they rely mainly on deductive inference rather than hard evidence.
Most observers view Chinese nationalism in more benevolent terms. Yes, China will
guard the country’s vital interests (e.g. national security and territorial integrity) at all
costs, but it does not exhibit the kind of expansionist nationalism that other rising
powers have manifested. Yes, China is longing for a rightful place in the world, but it
does not seek to replace the existing international order with a China-centered one. On
some issues involving minor national interests, China is even willing to make
compromises (Oksenberg 1987; Townsend 1992; Wang 1996; Zheng 1999; Zhao
2000).
In sum, characterized by inward-directed rather than outward-directed
sentiments, contemporary Chinese nationalism is not chauvinistic, xenophobic,
dogmatic, aggressive, and extreme, but inclusive, reactive, pragmatic, defensive, and
moderate. Compared with nationalism manifested in many other countries such as
India, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, or the United States, Chinese nationalism
is not particularly strong. Indeed, a number of seasoned China scholars believe that
nationalism is quite weak in China. Lucian Pye, for instance, notes, “At the very time
when the Chinese state needs the unifying forces of nationalism, there is very little
there that can spiritually mobilized the Chinese people (1993: 133). Pye’s comment
reminds us Margaret Canovan’ observation: the presence of nationalism often
indicates the absence of a united and secure nation (Canovan 1996: 101). Viewed
from this perspective, the resurgence of nationalism in China is a sign that the country
is in the middle of search for a collective identity, national character and purpose in
this swiftly changing world. If my arguments presented in the second section of this
article sounds plausible, then such nationalism does not necessarily clash with
democracy. Instead, it can serve as a positive force to expedite and facilitate the birth
of democracy in the country.

21
 Bibliography

Akzin, Benjamin. 1964. State and Nation. London: Hutchinson.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.
Beetham, D and Boyle, K. 1995. Introducing Democracy: 80 Questions and Answers.
London: Polity.
Benner, Erica. 1997. “Nationality without Nationalism.” Journal of Political
Ideologies, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 190-207.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1979. “Nationalism: Past Neglected and Present Power.” In Against the
Current: Essays in the History of Ideas. London: Hogarth Press.
Canovan, Margaret. 1996. Nationhood and Political Theory. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
-----. 2000. “Patriotism is Not Enough.” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30.
pp. 413-432.
Calhoun, Craig. 1998. Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Malden, Mass.:
Blackwell.
Cardus, Salvador. 2000. “Nationalism, Democracy, and Human Rights.” Human
Rights Review, Oct.-Dec., pp. 104-108.
Chang, Maria Hsia. 1998. “Chinese Irredentist Nationalism: The Magician’s Last
Trick.” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 83-101.
Cohen, Carl. 1971. Democracy. New York: Free Press.
Couture, Jocelyne. 1999. “Cosmopolitan Democracy and Liberal Nationalism.”
Monist, Vol. 82, No. 3, pp. 491-516.
Dahl, Robert N. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, eds. 1994. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and
Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dikotter, Frank. 1996. “Culture, ‘Race’ and Nation: The Formation of National
Identity in Twentieth Century China.” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 49,
No. 2, pp. 590-606.
Druckmam, Daniel. 1994. “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social
Psychological Perspective.” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 38, pp.
43-68.
Fitzgerald, John. 1999. “China and the Quest for Dignity.” The National Interest, No.
55.
Friedman, Edward. 1997. “Chinese Nationalism, Taiwan Autonomy and the Prospects
of a Larger War.” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14, pp. 5-33.
Gao, Mobo C. F. 2003. “A Post-Colonial and Postmodernism Perspective: The Rise
of Neo-Nationalism and the New Left in China.” In Democracy, Nationalism and
National Integration: The People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, eds. by Leong
Liew and Wang Shaoguang. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Geertz, Clifford. 1963. “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil
Politics in the New States.” In Old Societies and New States, ed. by Clifford
Geertz. Chicago: Aldine.
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Gries, Peter Hays. 1999. “A ‘China Threat’: Power and Passion in Chinese ‘Face
Nationalism’”. World Affairs, Vol. 162, No. 2, pp. 63-75.
Guo, Yingjie. 2003. “Barking Up the Wrong Tree: The Liberal-Nationalist Debate on
Democracy and Identity.” In Democracy, Nationalism and National Integration:

22
 The People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, eds. by Leong Liew and Wang
Shaoguang. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Friedman, Edward. 1997. “Chinese Nationalism, Taiwan Autonomy and the Prospects
of a Larger War.” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14, pp. 5-33.
Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Galston, William. 1991. Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the
Liberal State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Habermas, Jurgen. 1999. “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the
Future of Europe.” In Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing Citizenship. New York:
State University of New York Press, pp. 255-68.
Hardin, Russell. 1999. “Do We Want Trust in Government?” In Mark E. Warren, ed.
Democracy and Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 22-41.
Harris, Erika. 2002. Nationalism and Democratization: Politics of Slovakia and
Slovenia. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Harrison, James. 1969. Modern Chinese Nationalism. New York: Hunter College of
the City of New York.
He Baogang & Yingjie Guo. 2000. Nationalism, National Identity and
Democratization in China. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith, eds. 1994. Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic,
and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kohn, Hans. 1939. “The Nature of Nationalism.” American Political Science Review,
Vol. 33, No. 6, pp. 1001-1021)
Kymlicka, Will. 2000. “Nation-Building and Minority Rights: Comparing West and
East.” Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 183-213.
Laborde, Cecile. 2002. “From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism.” British Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 32, pp. 591-612.
Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Linz, J. Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Markell, Patchen. 2000. “Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On ‘Constitutional
Patriotism’”. Political Theory, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 38-63.
Mill, John Stuart. [1861] 1991. On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Moore, Margaret. 1999. “Nationalist Arguments, Ambivalent Conclusions.” Monist,
Vol. 82, No. 3, pp. 469-91.
Mummendey, Amelie and Andreas Klink. 2001. “Nationalism and Patriotism:
National Identification and Out-Group Rejection.” British Journal of Social
Psychology, Vol. 40, pp. 159-172.
Nairn, Tom. 1977. The Break-up of Britain. London: New Left Books.
Nodia, Ghia. 1994. “Nationalism and Democracy” in Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner, eds. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-22.
Offe, Claus. 1999. “How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?” In Mark E. Warren,
Ed. Democracy and Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 42-87.

23
Oksenberg, Michel. 1987. ‘China’s Confident Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65,
pp. 501-523.
Pye, Lucian W. 1993. “How China’s Nationalism was Shanghaied?” The Australian
Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29, pp. 107-133.
Renan, Ernest. ([1882] 1994). “ Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” In John Hutchinson and
Anthony D. Smith, eds., Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17-
8.
Rustow, Dunkwart. 1970. “Transition to Democracy”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 2.
pp. 337-363.
Sandel. Michael J. Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sautman, Barry. 1997. “Racial Nationalism and China’s External Behavior,” World
Affairs, Vol. 160, No. 2, pp. 78-96
Schwarzmantel, J. 1991. Socialism and the Idea of the Nation. Brighton: Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
Smith, Anthony. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell.
-----. 1995. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Smooha, Sammy. 1999. “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype.” Israel Studies,
Vol. 2. No. 2, pp. 198-241.
Spencer, Philip and Howard Wollman. 2002. Nationalism: A Critical Introduction.
London: Sage.
Stradling, Robert, Scott Newton, and David Bates, eds. 1997. Conflict and
Coexistence: Nationalism and Democracy in Modern Europe. Cardiff:
University of Wales Press.
Tamir, Y. 1993. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tend Xing. 2001. “The Idea of Plurality and Unity in the Configuration of the
Chinese Nationality.” Chinese Education & Society, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 75-91.
Thompson, Ewa M. 1998. “Nationalism, Imperialism, Identity: Second Thought.”
Modern Age, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 250-262.
Townsend, James. 1992. “Chinese Nationalism”. Australian Journal of Chinese
Affairs, No. 27, pp. 97-130.
Wang Gungwu. 1996. The Revival of Chinese Nationalism. Leiden: International
Institute for Asian Studies.
Whelan, F.G. 1983. “Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem”, in J.R. Pennock
and J.W. Chapman, eds. Liberal Democracy, Nomos XXV. New York: New
York University Press.
Xu, Ben. 2000. “Chinese Populist Nationalism: Its Intellectual Politics and Moral
Dilemma.” Representation, Vol. 76, pp. 120-40.
Whiting, Allan S. 1995. “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng.” China
Quarterly, Vol. 142, pp. 297-315.
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Yu Ying-shih. 1996. “民主与民族主义之间” [Democracy and Nationalism].
http://www.hornbill.cdc.net.my/e-class/culture/democ01.htm
Zhao, Suisheng. 2000. “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations.”
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 1, pp. 1-33.
Zheng Yongnian. 1999. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization,
Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

24