07.2 Pres ROSATOM VVER Design PDF

STATE ATOMIC ENERGY CORPORATION «ROSATOM»
Safety of the VVER key design features

in compliance with regulatory
requirements of Russian Federation.
Alexander Renev
Chief Technology Officer on VVER
JSC Rusatom Overseas
October, 2016
Pretoria
VVER-1200:
meeting Fukushima requirements
Fundamental safety functions
1 Reactivity control
•
•
Prevention of uncontrolled reactor power increase.
Ensuring fast safe shutdown of the reactor, if necessary.
Removal of decay Cooling of the shut-down reactor.

2
•
heat to the ultimate
heat sink • Cooling of the spent fuel.
3 Confinement of
radioactive materials
• Prevention of considerable radioactive releases in the
environment.
Fukushima lessons learned

1. Fundamental safety functions have to be ensured even in case of:
• loss of power supply and/or;
• loss of ultimate heat sink.
2. The systems providing fundamental safety functions have to be protected from all
possible threats both natural and man induced.
3. Contents of the reactor have to be protected so that to prevent big radioactive leaks
even after core melt.
International consensus is to ensure redundancy and diversity of the safety systems.
The content of this presentation is for discussion purposes only, shall not be considered as an offer and doesn’t lead to any obligations by Rosatom and its affiliated companies. www.rosatom.com 2
Rosatom disclaims all responsibility for any and all mistakes, quality and completeness of the information.
International Acceptance of VVER technology
VVER 1200 Design International Expertise

2009 - feasibility study of Loviisa-3,
2013 - feasibility study of Hanhikivi-1 Reference design for VVER 1200 –
Tianwan NPP (AES-91 design)
had undergone an examination by the
2012 - Baltic NPP has been verified Chinese Nuclear Authority and IAEA
for compliance to EUR requirements. (more then 20 special missions)
2013 - MIR.1200 for Temelin 3&4 AES-91 design AES-92 design

NPP verified for compliance to CEZ a.s.
BIS (EUR based requirements).
2013 - TAEK has approved the «Basic

Report for Akkuyu NPP site», the
«Reference Plant Report» and «Site
Parameters» Report.
2014 - EIA Report approved by the
Ministry of Environment.
VVER-1200 Key Technical Parameters
Parameters Value
Installed nominal output per
1198 *
one power unit, MWe
Aux power consumption, % 7.48 *
Lifetime, years 60
Efficiency, % gross 37.3
Autonomy, hours 72
Availability factor –
>90
EUR methodology, %
Seismicity: maximum
credible earthquake, peak Up to 0.25g *
ground acceleration
* Depending on the project and site conditions.
Active and Passive Safety systems
Active Passive
• Used as priority safety • Used for reliable reactor

systems to handle abnormal shutdown and as diverse
events and design basis systems to provide decay
accidents. heat removal when
• Quick reaction on deviations. respective active systems
have failed.
• Need reliable AC power.
• Do not need AC power.
NP-082-07 “Rules of nuclear safety of reactor installations of nuclear power

plants”, 2.3.1.4:
The Reactor Installation design shall provide for at least two reactor shutdown
systems, each one being capable independently from others of rendering the
reactor to subcritical state and maintaining it in this state considering the single
failure criterion or human error.
Safety systems
Types of safety systems (NP-001-15)

Safety systems and elements are classified
according to their functions:
• Protective • Localizing
• Supporting • Control
The title of NP-001-15 is «General provisions of safety of

nuclear power plants» and it came from previous document
OPB-88. This highlights, the general safety conception is based
on principles established after the Chernobyl disaster. This is a
backbone document from RF codes-n-standards family in the
area of use of nuclear power. Nowadays it is harmonised with
IAEA SSR-2/1 document.
Protective safety systems (1/5)
NP-001-15, 3.5.1:
NPP design shall provide for the protective
safety systems ensuring the reliable emergency
reactor shutdown and confining the reactor in
the subcritical state under operational
occurrences, including design basis accidents.
Reactor protection system (passive)
Emergency boron injection system

(active)
Hydro accumulators (passive)
Emergency core cooling system (active)
Reactor control and protection system
1 All VVER reactors can be shut down by cutting power of

the electromagnets that hold them above the reactor core:
• Gravity force causes the rods to drop into the core.
2 VVER-1200 plant reactor has a unique safety feature

when compared with other pressurized water reactors:
• When control rods are in the core the reactor will stay in
shutdown state down to temperatures below
100°C.
HP injection system
• Filling of loss of the primary circuit coolant and heat removal from the reactor core
at small leaks of pipelines of the primary circuit (rupture of pipes by the diameter
of about 100 mm inclusively).
Emergency Core Cooling System

• Cool-down of the reactor plant down to 70оС after the reactor shut-down, when heat
removal through steam generators becomes ineffective (PI < 1.96 MPa, T < 130оС).
• Heat residuals removal from the fuel in the fuel pool in all modes of unit operation.
• Introduction of agents, for coupling radioactive iodine, into the primary coolant at the
accidents with leak.
Passive decay heat removal system

• Decay heat removal from the reactor core via steam generators at the accidents
with the loss of all alternating electric power supply sources
SG emergency cool-down and blow-down system

• Heat residuals removal from the reactor core and cooling-down of the reactor plant in
emergency situations related to de-energizing or loss of possibility of normal heat
removal through the secondary circuit including leaks of steam pipelines and feed-water
pipelines of SG.
• Heat residuals removal from the reactor core and cooling-down of the reactor plant in
emergency situations related to the primary circuit depressurization including primary
circuit coolant pipeline rupture (through undamaged loops) and the leak form the
primary into the secondary circuit.
Main steam pipeline isolation system

• Fast and reliable isolation of Steam Generators on steam side in the following modes:
a) leaks of steam or feed-water pipelines. The purpose is to exclude abrupt cool-

down of the reactor and to provide operation of emergency heat removal system;
b) leak from the primary into the secondary circuit. The purpose is to localize the
broken-down Steam Generator on steam;
c) failures of normal heat removal through the secondary circuit. The purpose is to
provide operation of SG Emergency Heat Removal System.
Hydraulic accumulators
• Supply the reactor with boric acid solution at any, requiring it
operation, initial event (including leaks causing a dependent failure of
one of system channels) taking into account one single failure,
independent from the initial event, in one of the channels.
• In case of loss of coolant accident supply the reactor with boric acid
solution with concentration no less than 16 g/kg and temperature from
50 to 70°С at pressure in the primary circuit less, than 5,9 Mpa.
• Design of accumulators shall exclude the ingress of nitrogen into

reactor when they run out of water.
• Shall actuate inactively manner under occurrence of emergency

situations which require its actuation.
Localizing safety systems (1/6)
NP-001-15:
3.6.1. The localizing safety systems shall be provided
to confine radioactive substances and ionizing
radiation within the design-specific boundaries in
case of accidents.
3.6.3. The localizing safety systems shall be provided

for each NPP unit and shall perform specified
functions under the design basis and beyond design
basis accidents.
Secondary Containment
• reinforced concrete
Primary Containment
• pre-stressed reinforced concrete
• leak tight metal liner
Hydrogen mitigation system

(passive)
• passive catalytic recombiners
Containment Spray System

(active)
Containment
• Primary (internal) containment is a pre-stressed concrete structure with steel liner and is
intended to retain radioactive substances with the purpose to limit their spreading into
environment under beyond design-basis accidents.
• Secondary (external) containment is intended to protect systems and elements of the
reactor compartment against special and environmental and man-made effects including
aircraft crash.
• The both containments provide biological protection against ionizing irradiations.
Spray System
• Reducing pressure and temperature inside the
containment in case of loss of coolant accident
by injecting boron solution into the containment
air with a concentration of 16 g/kg.
• Pressure decrease time down to atmospheric
pressure < 24 h.
• binding of radioiodine contained in the steam
and air of the sealed volume.
• The system of pre-stressing with

orthogonal arrangement of bundled
reinforcing bars (FREYSSINET
technology) is used for pre-stressing
of inner containment.
• Horizontal type bars in the cylinder -

53 pcs.
• Horizontal type in the dome - 15 pcs.
• Vertical type - 60 pcs.
Containment isolation system Hydrogen mitigation system

• Isolating pipelines passing through • Prevention of explosive mix formation in
the boundary of the hermetic accident localizing area by supporting
containment to prevent release of volumetric hydrogen concentration in the
fission products to the environment. mix below the criteria, set for design basis
accident and beyond design basis accident.
Molten corium localizer
• Placed below the reactor vessel to

protect the containment structures
against impact of molten core
• Retains and cools core melt and solid
fragments of the core, parts of the
vessel and reactor internals resulting
from core damage
• Transfers passively the heat to cooling
water surrounding the “core melt pot”
and thus ensures long term cooling
and solidification of the molten core
Supportingsafety
Localizing safetysystems
systems(6/6)
(1/3)
NP-001-15:
3.7.1. NPP design shall provide the required support
safety systems to supply the safety systems with
working fluid and energy and to create the required
conditions of their operation, including heat transfer to
the ultimate heat sink.
List of supporting safety systems

• Essential component cooling system.
• Cooling water system of the essential users.
• Emergency electric power supply systems.
• Room heating, ventilation and conditioning systems.
• Fire-fighting system.
Supporting safety systems (2/3)
Essential component cooling system

• Removing heat residuals from the equipment located in buildings of
essential users and diesel generator buildings to the system of cooling
water of essential users in all modes of unit operation including the
emergency modes.
Cooling water system of the essential users

• Heat removal from the
component cooling of
essential users of the
reactor compartment and
from stand-by diesel
electric power station.
Supporting safety systems (3/3)
Emergency electric power supply systems
• Power supply of safety systems
consumers in all NPP operational
modes, including the case of power
supply loss from operational and
reserve sources.
Room heating, ventilation and conditioning

• Cooling of air in rooms of safety system equipment within the
allowable limits during the process equipment operation.
• Life supporting of main control room and reserve control room
operators.
• Heat residuals removal and maintaining of specified temperature of
air in rooms of electrical equipment and automated and control
parameter system equipment.
Control safety systems
NP-001-15:
3.4.4.1. Control safety systems shall automatically perform their
functions if the NPP design conditions occur.
Systems (components) intended for initiation of the safety systems
and for monitoring and control of them in the course of
performance of their functions.
3.4.4.2. Control safety systems shall be designed so as to
eliminate the possibility of their disconnection by the operational
personnel during 10-30 min after their automatic actuation, but not
to interfere with correct actions of the operator in emergency
conditions envisaged by the operating regulations, emergency
operating procedures, guideline for management of beyond design
basis accidents.
Spent Fuel Pool retention
Backup system for water supply to spent fuel pool using motor
pump
7th BDBA power supply train
Distillate or boron solution

tank (4x700 m3)
Mobile diesel
generator
Spent Fuel Pool

L=120-150 m
G=60-90
10JNB50 m3/h
AP002
M=800 kg 10FAB50
BB001
Mobile diesel
10JNB50
AP001 S
pump unit
Severe accidents management systems
NP-001-15:
3.1.3. Specific technical tools shall be provided in
the NPP design that ensure management of beyond
design accidents.
List of severe management systems

• Passive heat removal system.
• Hydrogen recombination system.
• Corium retention and cooling system.
Passive heat removal system (1/2)
• Residual heat removal via water

boiling at the atmosphere
pressure.
• Natural recirculation driven with
capacity of up to 2% of the
rated power.
• Four-train system, each channel
having 33% capacity.
• Upper tanks on the roof with
total capacity of 72 hours water
boiling.
Passive heat removal system (2/2)
Passive heat removal system (wet type)
1 Emergency Heat Removal Tanks (EHRT)
outside the containment; heat is removed by
boiling of water in EHRTs at atmospheric
pressure for both PHRS-SG and PHRS-C.
2 Steam lines.
3 Condensate pipelines.
4 PHRS-SG valves.
5 Heat exchangers of containment heat
removal system PHRS-C, it is a separate
system but uses the same EHRTs.
6 Steam generators.
7 Cutoff valves (valve in steam line belongs
to PHRS-SG).
Hydrogen recombination system
• 154 passive catalytic recombiners.

• Maximum hydrogen concentration
in the long term – 0,56%.
• Local peak
hydrogen
concentration at
any time in dry
air condition –
1,8%.
• Eliminates any possibility for

accumulation of potentially blasthazar-
dous concentrations.
Corium retention and cooling system
• Molten core is mixed with neutron

absorbing material placed inside the “core
melt pot” to ensure that no chain reaction
can start in the mixed materials inside the
core catcher.
• In no accident scenario there is water
inside the “core melt pot”. This eliminates
the risk of steam explosion.
• Core catcher decreases significantly the
hydrogen generation (typically by factor 4)
because the hot metal captures oxygen
from the aluminum oxide in the pot and not
from water.
• Crust formed on the top stops release of
radionuclides into the containment.
Conclusions
1 VVER-1200 has a balanced combination of active and passive

safety systems.
2 Such combination ensures both quick (due to active part) and

reliable (due to passive part) mitigation of any accidents that
can occur.
3 Every active system is supplied by a passive one with the same

target.
Each system of one origin is able to mitigate an accident alone
4 (without support of a system of complementary origin).
Unique safety feature – re-criticality temperature is less than
100oC.
THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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STATE ATOMIC ENERGY CORPORATION «ROSATOM»

Safety of the VVER key design features

Removal of decay Cooling of the shut-down reactor.

Fukushima lessons learned

VVER 1200 Design International Expertise

2013 - MIR.1200 for Temelin 3&4 AES-91 design AES-92 design

2013 - TAEK has approved the «Basic

Aux power consumption, % 7.48 *

* Depending on the project and site conditions.

• Used as priority safety • Used for reliable reactor

NP-082-07 “Rules of nuclear safety of reactor installations of nuclear power

Types of safety systems (NP-001-15)

The title of NP-001-15 is «General provisions of safety of

Reactor protection system (passive)

Emergency boron injection system

Hydro accumulators (passive)

Emergency core cooling system (active)

Reactor control and protection system

1 All VVER reactors can be shut down by cutting power of

2 VVER-1200 plant reactor has a unique safety feature

Emergency Core Cooling System

Passive decay heat removal system

SG emergency cool-down and blow-down system

Main steam pipeline isolation system

a) leaks of steam or feed-water pipelines. The purpose is to exclude abrupt cool-

• Design of accumulators shall exclude the ingress of nitrogen into

• Shall actuate inactively manner under occurrence of emergency

3.6.3. The localizing safety systems shall be provided

Hydrogen mitigation system

Containment Spray System

• The system of pre-stressing with

• Horizontal type bars in the cylinder -

• Horizontal type in the dome - 15 pcs.

• Vertical type - 60 pcs.

Containment isolation system Hydrogen mitigation system

Molten corium localizer

• Placed below the reactor vessel to

List of supporting safety systems

Essential component cooling system

Cooling water system of the essential users

Room heating, ventilation and conditioning

Distillate or boron solution

Spent Fuel Pool

List of severe management systems

• Residual heat removal via water

• 154 passive catalytic recombiners.

• Eliminates any possibility for

• Molten core is mixed with neutron

1 VVER-1200 has a balanced combination of active and passive

2 Such combination ensures both quick (due to active part) and

3 Every active system is supplied by a passive one with the same

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