THE JOURNAL OF NAVIGATION (2012), 65, 1–14.

© The Royal Institute of Navigation

doi:10.1017/S0373463311000506

THE JOURNAL OF NAVIGATION

VOL. 65 JANUARY 2012 NO. 1

A Brief History of Global Navigation

Satellite Systems
Air Commodore Norman Bonnor
(E-mail: [email protected])

This paper charts the history of Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS) from the earliest
days of the ‘Space Race’ in the 1960s and 1970s to the latest plans for modernisation of
existing systems and the development of new systems yet to be deployed or become
operational. The paper is based on lectures and presentations given by the author to
postgraduate students at The University of Nottingham, students on the RAF General Duties
Aero-Systems Course at the Air Warfare Centre, RAF Cranwell and to a number of RIN,
RAeS and IEE Branches and to local aviation groups.

KEY WORDS
1. GNSS. 2. GPS/DGPS. 3. GLONASS. 4. Galileo.

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N – G N S S . Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS)

is the generic term for satellite navigation systems that provide autonomous geo-
positioning with global coverage (Figure 1). GNSS-1 is the name given to existing
systems (i.e. Global Positioning System [GPS] and GLObal’nayaNAvigatsiomaya-
SputnikovaSistema [GLONASS]). When GPS is used with corrections from Ground
Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS) or Space Based Augmentation Systems
(SBAS), it is known as Differential GPS (DGPS). GNSS-2 will include additional
second-generation systems (e.g. Galileo, Compass [CNSS], Quasi-Zenith Satellite
System [QZSS] and the Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System [IRNSS] etc.).
1.1. Rapid Growth in Civilian Use. Only twenty years ago, civilian use of GNSS
was mainly limited to merchant ships’ crews and surveyors; today there are millions of
2 NORMAN BONNOR VOL. 65

Figure 1. GNSS Relationships and Terminology.

receivers being used in all forms of transport and commerce as well as a wide variety of
recreation activities. The major breakthrough came with the introduction of Navstar,
more commonly known as GPS; development started in 1973 and the system was
declared operational at the end of 1993. ‘Cold War’ rivalry between the Soviet Union
and the United States of America (USA) led to the ‘Space Race’ and the almost para-
llel development of the Soviet system GLONASS. After initial success, GLONASS
fell behind in the 1980s and 1990s when too few satellites were launched to sustain a
working constellation.
1.2. Augmentation Systems. Increasing civilian use of GPS resulted in the
introduction of Selective Availability (SA), which was designed to deny the full ac-
curacy of the system to civilian users and possible adversaries. Unfortunately for the
US military authorities, this was easily defeated by means of DGPS, and early
commercial services were quickly followed by government funded GBAS (e.g. the US
Coast Guard DGPS Network) and by SBAS (e.g. the US Wide Area Augmentation
Service [WAAS], the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service [EGNOS]
and the Japanese Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System [MSAS]). SBAS all
involve the use of Geo-Stationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites which are placed
36,000 km above the Equator and rotate in synchronism with Earth rotation.
1.3. More Recent Developments. The ease of use and inherent accuracy of GPS
made it very popular with millions of yachtsmen, private pilots and hikers as well as
commercial operators in all domains. GPS had rapidly become a vital utility essential
to transport infrastructure. This worried politicians and industrial leaders in Europe
who were concerned about the increasing reliance on a system controlled and operated
by the military authorities of one nation state. In March 2002, the European Union
(EU) nations agreed to develop Galileo, a GNSS similar in concept to GPS, but
designed primarily for civilian users and including a guaranteed service to meet Safety
of Life (SoL) requirements. More recently, the emerging nations in Asia have also
commenced development of their own GNSS. But how did it begin?

2. T R A N S I T – T H E F I R S T G N S S . On 4 October 1957, the launch of

Sputnik 1 was the start of the Space Age. Listening to the signals from the spacecraft,
scientists at John Hopkins University (Applied Physics Laboratory) noticed a large
Doppler shift on the signals and were able to use this to determine the satellite orbit
NO. 1 G L O B A L N AV I G A T I O N S A T E L L I T E S Y S T E M S 3
from just one ground tracking station. Lateral thinking led them to a concept of
reversing the process, that is, to determine an accurate position on the Earth from
Doppler signals received from a satellite in a known orbit. The project was given
impetus because of the need to position submarines very accurately for the launch of
Polaris missiles. In December 1958, the US Department of Defense (DoD) funded the
project, and development began in 1959 under the title ‘TRANSIT’. There were three
requirements: development and production of a suitable spacecraft, modelling of the
Earth’s gravity for accurate determination of the spacecraft orbit and development of
user equipment. TRANSIT satellites were in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) on a circular
polar orbit at an altitude of about 1,000 kilometres and transmitted on two
frequencies, 149·99 and 399·97 MHz. TRANSIT was declared operational in
January 1964 and was released for civilian use in July 1967. A similar concept was
used by the Soviet Union for ‘PARUS’ (a military system with the first prototype
satellite launched in 1967) and ‘TSIKADA’ (first launch as Cosmos 883 in 1976). The
TRANSIT project demonstrated that spacecraft could be very reliable; some operated
for more than 15 years. The project also enabled major advances in the development
of algorithms for satellite orbit prediction. TRANSIT ceased operations on 31
December 1996 and all transmissions were shut down.

3. G LO B A L P O S I T I O N I N G S Y S T E M ( G P S ) . In 1972, another US
Navy satellite programme called ‘TIMATION’ was orbiting spacecraft containing
precise clocks for time transfer. Just as John Harrison solved the Longitude problem
of the 18th Century with his chronometer H4, so meeting the positioning needs of
modern times would be made possible by very accurate atomic timepieces. However
TIMATION, like TRANSIT, provided only two-dimensional fixes. Meanwhile the
US Air Force (USAF) was studying a 3-dimensional navigation system under ‘Project
621B’ and was demonstrating the possibility of using pseudo-random noise for
ranging. On 17 April 1973, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a Memo-
randum amalgamating the two projects, and the ‘Navstar Global Positioning System
(GPS) Joint Project Office (JPO)’ was formed. Colonel Brad Parkinson was the first
head of the JPO and stayed in post for six years; he continues his involvement with
GPS as co-chairman of the US Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Group.
3.1. The Space Segment. All GNSS have three segments: the Space, Ground and
User Segments. In June 1974, Rockwell International was awarded a contract for a
navigation payload to launch on a US Naval Research Laboratory satellite (NTS-2)
and for three GPS prototype satellites to develop the Space Segment; the contract was
later extended to eleven satellites. These became known as Block I satellites and were
in slightly different orbital planes to the later Block II production satellites (at 63° as
against 55° inclination). Their design life was specified as three years, but several
operated for more than ten, and that very long operational life has, in the end, become
a problem for GPS modernisation because funding for launches is related to the need
to replace failed satellites. In June 1977, the first GPS signal from space was
transmitted by NTS-2; unfortunately the satellite failed after only eight months.
In February 1978, the first GPS Block I satellite (sometimes referred to as NDS) was
launched. By December 1978, four Block I satellites were in orbit for testing
3-dimensional navigation; however, this was only available for limited periods at any
particular location. The RAF GD Aero-Systems Course made use of these satellites
4 NORMAN BONNOR VOL. 65

on the Aries Polar flight in September 1980 when, with careful scheduling using
Bodo and Thule airfields, a GPS fitted to a Britannia aircraft was in use over the
North Pole.
3.2. Ground and User Segments. In October 1974, General Dynamics was
awarded a contract to develop the Ground and User Segments. The Control System of
the Ground Segment for the validation phase with Block I satellites was built at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB) on the California coast. In August 1986, res-
ponsibility for managing the GPS Space Segment was handed over to the USAF using
the Operational Control System installed at Falcon AFB, since renamed Schriever
AFB, in Colorado. General Dynamics sub-contracted development of the first User
Segment receivers to Magnavox. Initial testing of these receivers began in March 1977
at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, using solar-powered ground transmitters to
simulate satellites (the first pseudolites); signals from over-flying satellites were
gradually introduced to these trials as they became available. Because only three
satellites are required for 2-D navigation, receivers for naval use were under test off the
California coast by October 1978. By the late 80s, military user equipments started to
appear in reasonable numbers, but civilian handheld receivers were already in mass
production.
3.3. Civilian Use. In 1983, a Korean Airlines 747 strayed badly off route and was
shot down by a Soviet fighter which mistook it for a US aircraft thought to be spying
in the area. After this incident, President Reagan announced that GPS would be made
available for civilian use. But, the US military insisted on the system accuracy being
deliberately degraded by Selective Availability (SA). Also in 1983, the Radio Tech-
nical Commission for Marine Services (RTCM), Special Committee 104 defined the
data format for a marine beacon DGPS capability based on the US Coast Guard
system, which effectively defeated SA. Marine DGPS was later adopted by the
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) for use by merchant
shipping and yachtsmen. Having failed to find a sensible charging regime, the DoD
announced that the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) of GPS would be broadcast in
the clear on the L1 frequency (1575·42 MHz), without encryption. The Precise
Positioning Service (PPS) would be broadcast on the L2 frequency (1227·60 MHz) and
would be encrypted. In 1988, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
announced that the Future Air Navigation System (FANS) would be based on
satellite navigation systems. Also in 1988, mainly as a result of the introduction of
GPS, the US DoD and the Department of Transport released their first Federal
Radionavigation Plan (FRP) setting out US Government Policy on radio navigation
aids.
3.4. Production Satellites. February 1989 saw the launch of the first Block II
production satellite; after in-depth testing, it was declared operational on 10 August
1989. On 21 June 1989, a contract for Block IIR satellites was awarded to General
Electric (later taken over by Martin Marietta); these satellites were planned to have
enhanced autonomy, including the capability to achieve a degraded range error for
periods up to 180 days without updates from the Ground Segment. This was to be
achieved by cross-link ranging with other Block IIR satellites in the constellation, so
enabling estimation of the parameters required for the Navigation Message should the
Operational Control System be out of action through hostile acts or for other reasons.
Unfortunately, the cross-linking was affected by interference from unrelated ground
signals that largely negated the original aim.
NO. 1 G L O B A L N AV I G A T I O N S A T E L L I T E S Y S T E M S 5
3.5. Military Use. Throughout the 1980s, satellite navigation systems were not
readily accepted by NATO military commanders; they still wanted military systems to
have an autonomous navigation capability and not have to rely on external systems.
But the impetus for widespread military use of GPS came from Operation Desert
Storm during the First Gulf War in 1990, when GPS became a vital tool for
navigation and rendezvous. Hundreds of individual soldiers bought single-channel
civilian receivers by mail-order because military versions were not available in
sufficient numbers. Selective Availability (SA) was turned off throughout the conflict.
3.6. Operational Capability. On 8 December 1993, GPS reached Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) with 24 Block I and II satellites in six orbital planes,
and the SPS was declared available for civil use (still with SA on). Soon afterwards, the
European Council issued a resolution on Europe’s contribution to GNSS; this
specified that the European Global Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) would
provide augmentation for GPS and GLONASS, and stated the need for civilian
control of future GNSS. GPS and GLONASS were developed for military purposes to
design standards acceptable for those requirements; to be acceptable for civilian use,
and particularly for Safety of Life (SoL) operations, they needed augmentation to
provide better accuracy and much faster time-to-alarm integrity. These augmentations
can be based in space using geo-stationary satellites or use ground beacons or other
transmitters and are an integral part of what most people now define as GNSS. GPS
was finally declared Fully Operationally Capable (FOC) on 17 July 1995 with 24
Block II production satellites in 20,200 kilometre Medium Earth Orbits (MEO).
Earlier in May 1995, the 8th Edition of the US FRP 1994 (issued very late) introduced
the concept of GPS for ‘sole-means’ positioning, and the proposal to phase-out
virtually all other radio navigation aids; this caused much consternation both in the
USA and around the world.
3.7. US Presidential Directives and Modernisation. In 1996, an important US
Presidential Decision Directive was issued which stated “The Standard Positioning
Service (SPS) would be free and that Selective Availability (SA) would be discontinued
within a decade with a review annually from the year 2000”. It also initiated the
‘NAVWAR’ program to separate civilian and military signals and provided for the
joint management of GPS with representatives from the Departments of Defense,
Transportation, State and Commerce. But not everything in the GPS programme
worked well; the launch of the first Block IIR on 17 January 1997 was a spectacular
failure but they successfully launched the second one in July. Also in July 1997,
because of delays in some projects such as the Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS), and complaints from many national and international users, the US FRP
1996 (again issued late) extended the phase-out dates of a number of radio navigation
aids. In early 1998, Vice-President Gore announced the decision to introduce a second
civil signal at the L2 frequency (1227·6 MHz), and a few months later a further
announcement said a third civil signal on a frequency to be known as L5
(1176·45 MHz) would be developed; this was the beginning of the GPS modernisation
programme for civilian users. The original modernization plan left the original L1
frequency with only the outdated ‘Coarse Acquisition’ (C/A) signal for civil
applications; however, the more recent addition of the planned L1C signal means
that all three GPS frequencies will eventually provide modernized civil signals. The
52nd GPS satellite and the 41st carried on a Delta 2 rocket was launched on
6 November 2004; it was the 13th and last in the Block 2R series.
6 NORMAN BONNOR VOL. 65

3.8. New US Policy. On 8 December 2004, the US President authorised a new

national policy giving guidance on space-based positioning, navigation and timing
programmes, augmentations and activities. This superseded the Presidential Decision
Directive on GPS of 1996. The new policy provided guidance for:

a. Development, operation and modernisation of GPS and US-developed

augmentations.
b. Development, operation and modernisation of capabilities to protect US and
allied access to GPS for national, homeland and economic security, and denial
to adversaries of access to any space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
services.
c. Cooperation with foreign space-based positioning, navigation and timing
services, including augmentations.

3.9. Modernisation Progress. On 26 September 2005, a Boeing Delta II rocket

carried the first Lockheed Martin GPS IIR-M satellite into orbit from Cape
Canaveral. GPS IIR-M (modernised) satellites have increased power and provide the
new military signals, but of importance for general use is a second civilian signal. Not
only does this make GPS more robust in the face of interference, but it will also
improve accuracy by allowing receivers to compensate for atmospheric effects in real-
time. These new capabilities will not be available until the majority of satellites in orbit
are modernised versions; however, the rate at which they are introduced depends on
the longevity of old satellites. The eight GPS Block IIR(M)s were launched between
25 September 2006 and 17 August 2009; they joined the eleven Block IIA and twelve
IIR satellites still in-orbit within the 31-spacecraft constellation. The US faced a dead-
line for having the L5 signal transmitting from a satellite in orbit by 26 August 2009,
in order to meet an International Telecommunications Union (ITU) requirement to
secure the frequency allocation. The launch of IIR-20(M) met that need, but the sate-
llite suffered other signal anomaly problems and has since been shut down. GPS
launches over the past 20 years relied on Delta 2 rockets for delivery into orbit, but the
latest Block IIF satellites use the larger and more capable Delta 4 and Atlas 5 rockets
that can propel them directly into orbit. The first launch of twelve Block IIF GPS
satellites, also with the second civil frequency, flexible power output and M-codes, but
additionally with the third (L5) civil frequency and a 12-year design life, was sche-
duled for 2006 then 2007, 2008, 2009 and was eventually launched on 28 May 2010.
GPS IIF-1 was the 61st GPS satellite launched; GPS IIF-2 was launched on 16 July
2011.
3.10. Ground Segment Modernisation. While attention is inevitably given to mod-
ernisation of the Space Segment, major work has also been undertaken to improve and
update the Ground Segment and its Operational Control System (OCS). The primary
Master Control Station at Schriever AFB has been modernised with a new mainframe
computer and distributed architecture, and a fully mission capable Alternate Master
Control Station (AMCS) has been established at the Vandenberg tracking station. The
monitor stations have been upgraded with new antennas, digital receivers and com-
puters and a major initiative to improve system accuracy has been completed. Clearly,
the OCS needs to remain responsive to the changing needs of the Space Segment as
new satellites become operational; to that end, a contract was awarded to Raytheon in
February 2010 for the design of the Next Generation Control Systems (OCX).
NO. 1 G L O B A L N AV I G A T I O N S A T E L L I T E S Y S T E M S 7
3.11. GPS Block III. On 21 December 2006, the USAF awarded Lockheed
Martin a $50 million contract to undertake a System Design Review (SDR) for the
‘next generation GPS Segment Programme’ to be known as GPS Block III. Lockheed
Martin Space Systems is also under contract to produce the first two of eight planned
GPS IIIA satellites with full military codes, new L1C signal and enhanced anti-jam
capability. The original plan was for the first launch to occur in 2013 but this slipped to
2014 because the US Congress reduced the funding for GPS III in 2008. The reasons
given were that the DoD started new space programmes too soon when earlier ones
were hardly underway. The example cited was “. . . the contract decision on GPS IIIA
[was made] before the first Block IIF had been launched or had even completed ground
testing!” GPS IIIA should deliver signals three times more accurately than current GPS
spacecraft and provide three-times more power for military users. The Block III
programme is expected to evolve through IIIB and IIIC to achieve the full aims of GPS
modernisation and NAVWAR including spot beams and integrity monitoring.

4. G LO N A S S . The 1980s and 1990s was still the era of the ‘Cold War’ and the
‘Space Race’ between the USA and the USSR. The Soviet Union launched their first
GLONASS satellites on 12 October 1982; between 1982 and 1985, they launched 10
more. GLONASS has a different constellation design to GPS using only three, slightly
lower, orbital planes at 64·8° inclination and, at the moment, uses Frequency Division
Multiple Access (FDMA) rather than the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)
system used by GPS; however, this is planned for change in the Russian Federation’s
modernisation plans. During the Cold War, much effort was devoted to propaganda
and the Kremlin needed to appear to be ahead of the Pentagon in the Space Race; thus
GLONASS was declared to have an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in the
Spring of 1985; this clearly wasn’t true as development of the User Segment was a long
way behind.
4.1. Changes to GLONASS. In 1993, President Yeltsin declared GLONASS
to be fully operational, but again, it clearly wasn’t. Also in 1993, the GLONASS
Geodetic Datum was changed from SGS 85 to PZ90. In 1994, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) identified problems associated with interference
from certain GLONASS frequencies in the 1·6 GHz band on radio astronomy
systems. The Soviet Union had never applied to the ITU for frequency allocations
because GLONASS was a military system. As a result, changes had to be made and
further changes were required in 2003 to reduce the number of frequencies used. On
7 March 1995, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin issued a Decree stating the intention to
achieve a full constellation of 24 GLONASS satellites, which was completed on
18 January 1996 with 24 working satellites in orbit plus 1 spare. On 27 November 1996
and 30 June 1997, GLONASS was taken out of service to re-align the system’s timing
much closer to UTC.
4.2. Satellite Launches and Design Life. Since 1982, over 100 GLONASS
satellites have been launched. On average, the early GLONASS satellites exceeded
their 3-year design life but, while a launch of three GLONASS satellites occurred in
most years, this was insufficient and only just kept the system alive with an average of
less than ten operating satellites between 1998 and 2006. However, funding has im-
proved and the constellation is being re-built; one hope is that the new GLONASS
M and K satellites will at least achieve their designed life of 7 and 10 years respectively
8 NORMAN BONNOR VOL. 65

and so help the Russian Federation rebuild and maintain the constellation at 24
satellites. Following a visit to New Delhi by President Putin, the Indian and Russian
governments reached an agreement on GLONASS. Under the agreement, India may
provide launch vehicles to speed up the recovery of GLONASS minimal operational
status in return for access to the system’s military signals for its armed forces. The
agreement also provided for industrial cooperation on satellite design, end-user
receivers and software packages. Some analysts believe the agreement went ahead
because Indian officials were frustrated by continuing delays in the discussions
between the EC and India on Galileo.
4.3. GLONASS Modernisation. Cosmos-2404/GLONASS-701, the first
GLONASS M satellite was launched on 10 December 2003 and after a very long
period of tests was accepted for service on 12 December 2004; however, it was de-
commissioned in June 2009, so did not achieve its design life of 5 years. Another
launch of three GLONASS satellites occurred on 26 December 2004. One of these was
a GLONASS-M and the other two the older model satellites. This brought the total
number of GLONASS satellites in orbit to 14. This second GLONASS-M was finally
‘set healthy’ on 7 October 2005. A further launch of three GLONASS satellites took
place on 25 December 2005, including two GLONASS-M, and were ‘set healthy’ on
31 August 2006. According to a source from the Committee for Industries, Construc-
tion and High Technologies in the Lower House of the Russian Parliament, Russian
Federal authorities said they would double the financing of work on GLONASS in
2007. The report concluded that: “The Global Navigation System Federal programme
aims to help preserve Russia’s independence from other major providers of space services
in terms of satellite navigation, as well as to ensure safe and efficient functioning of its
transportation systems”. On each of nine dates, 25 December 2006, 26 October 2007,
25 December 2007, 25 September 2008, 25 December 2008, 14 December 2009,
1 March 2010, 2 September 2010 and 5 December 2010, Proton rockets lifted off from
the Baikonur space centre in Kazakhstan, each carrying three GLONASS-M satellites.
These launches were the final part of the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos)
plan to have a full constellation of 24 satellites by the end of 2010, but the latest launch
failed and the three satellites crashed into the Pacific Ocean; the head of the Roscosmos
was dismissed as a consequence. The first launch of a GLONASS-K took place on 26
February 2011; this was the first GLONASS satellite to transmit a CDMA signal.
Roscosmos announced that four GLONASS-M satellites would be launched during
2011; the first was launched on 2 October from Plesetsk Cosmodrome by a Soyuz-2-1B
and three more are planned for launch on 25 October from Baikonur Cosmodrome
using a Proton-M rocket. If these launches are successful, Full Operational Capability
(FOC) for GLONASS should have been declared by the time this paper is published.

5. G A L I L E O . As stated earlier, the European Council issued a resolution on

Europe’s contribution to GNSS in 1993, which specified EGNOS to augment GPS
and GLONASS for civilian use. In the late 1990s, two important documents were
issued by the European Commission (EC); they spelled the beginnings of the Galileo
project. On 21 January 1998, the EC issued a strategy document ‘COM (1998),
Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network: including,
A European Strategy for Global Navigation Satellite Systems’; it was endorsed by
the Council of Ministers on 17 March 1998. On 9 February 1999, they issued a
NO. 1 G L O B A L N AV I G A T I O N S A T E L L I T E S Y S T E M S 9
communication ‘COM (1999) 54, Galileo, Involving Europe in a New Generation of
Satellite Navigation Services’. In November 1999, the EC released four contracts to
industry for Galileo definition. On 8 December 1999, the European Space Agency
(ESA) signed a contract called the ‘Galileo Sat Study’ for the definition phase of
Galileo. On 1st May 2000, somewhat earlier than expected, GPS SA was removed; in
Europe this was cynically perceived as an attempt to undermine the Galileo project.
On 6 December 2000, the EU Summit Meeting expressed support for Galileo but at
the EU Transport Ministers Meeting two weeks later, the Ministers could not agree on
full development; the reasons given were: dissatisfaction with Public/Private finance
proposals, and concerns over the proposed management structure. Only limited
development was approved until these points had been answered; the Ministers asked
for further information to be available at their April 2001 meeting. At that meeting,
they were still not satisfied that their concerns had been answered. Near-term actions
were: to produce a preliminary definition of services, to consolidate cost and benefit
estimates, and to establish an interim management structure.
5.1. Slow Decision Making. In June 2001, the concept of a Galileo Joint
Undertaking (GJU) was proposed to bring together the EC, ESA and any other public
and private funding bodies. The Joint Undertaking was to be set up for an initial
duration of four years and be based in Brussels. Until the new entity could be
established, a Galileo Interim Support Structure was put in place. These actions were
expected to meet the immediate concerns of the Transport Ministers on the Galileo
management structure. On 15 November 2001, the ESA Council committed its share
(E550 million) of the funds required for the Galileo development and validation
phases; however, a positive decision was still needed from the EU Transport Ministers
for release of the equivalent EU funds and agreement to the formation of the GJU.
Their meeting in December 2001 was expected to be a crucial milestone for Galileo;
however, they did not agree to the launch of the development phase or the
establishment of the GJU. The reason they gave was a need for further study of the
economic perspectives; decisions were delayed, with some release of funding (E100
million) to keep the project definition moving. They finally reached agreement on 26
March 2002 and released the remaining E450 million for the development/validation
phases and sanctioned the creation of the GJU to manage these phases. However,
further progress relied on ESA agreement and a new dispute began between Germany
and Italy about who should lead the project. Both nations tried to outbid each other,
which meant the overall project would be over-funded and therefore couldn’t proceed.
The dispute continued until an agreement was at last achieved on 26 May 2003. On 10
December 2004, the EU Transport Council confirmed the technical characteristics of
the Galileo system, particularly regarding the services to be offered. Jacques Barrot,
Commission Vice President for Transport said: “Galileo is without a doubt the most
wonderful European technological project. We are now on the home straight: next year
will see the launch of the first satellites. Galileo will be as much of a technological
revolution as mobile telephony. This venture shows how capable Europe is of making a
united effort in pursuit of a common goal.”
5.2. EU/US Agreement. After much discussion and many delays, an EU/US
agreement for cooperation on GNSS was finally signed on 26 June 2004; this covered:

a. A process allowing optimization, either jointly or individually, of the baseline

signal structures in order to further improve performances.
10 NORMAN BONNOR VOL. 65

b. Adoption of a common baseline signal structure for their respective open

services and confirmation of a suitable baseline signal structure for the Galileo
Public Regulated Service (PRS).
c. Confirmation of interoperable time and geodesy standards to facilitate the joint
use of GPS and Galileo.
d. Non-discrimination in trade in satellite navigation goods and services and a
commitment to preserve national security capabilities.
e. Agreement not to restrict use of or access to respective open services by end-
users.

5.3. Funding Issues. New funding problems emerged with Galileo as additional
calls were made and some nations tried to gain an advantage for their national
industry by withholding funds. Development was expected to run until 2008 at a cost
of E1.5 billion, shared equally between the EC and ESA. The GJU had been
negotiating since June with the Eurely-Inavsat consortium for the deployment and
operational phases, but these negotiations eventually failed in 2007. After much
political wrangling, the Public/Private Partnership funding arrangements were
abandoned and the EU/EC accepted that the deployment of Galileo would be funded
as a public infrastructure project within the existing transport budget.
5.4. First Launches. Two test satellites have been built and launched for Galileo,
one by the Surrey Space Centre and the other by Astrium. Their primary aims were: to
secure the use of the Galileo frequencies allocated by the ITU at the World Radio
Conference 2000, to demonstrate critical technologies for the navigation payloads
of operational satellites and to characterize the radiation environment of the orbits
planned for Galileo. GIOVE-A was launched from the Baikonur cosmodrome in
Kazakhstan on 28 December 2005 and was successful in meeting the ITU frequency
transmission requirements within a few weeks. This allowed the launch of GIOVE-B
to be delayed so that better use could be made of it during the IOV phase. This was
fortunate as GIOVE-B had suffered a number of failures in ground testing and was
not ready for launch anyway. The EC published a deployment date of 2008; the
original (very optimistic) concept was for the system to be fully operational by 2008,
but now that year was planned for the launch of only the first four operational
satellites, but these launches were also delayed. The GIOVE-B satellite was launched
by a Soyuz/Fregat rocket on 27 April 2008. The Fregat upper stage performed a series
of manoeuvres to reach a circular orbit inclined at 56° to the Equator, before safely
delivering the satellite into orbit.
5.5. In-Orbit Validation. The next step in the Galileo programme will be to
validate the basic Galileo space and related ground segment using four In-Orbit
Validation (IOV) satellites. By the publication date of this paper, the first two IOV
satellites, known as Protoflight Model (PFM) and Flight Model 2 (FM2) should
have been launched using a modified Soyuz rocket from the EU’s spaceport in
French Guiana to convey the Galileo satellites into their circular orbits at an altitude
of 23,222 km. The Soyuz ST-B is the most powerful version of the famous Soyuz
launcher, while the Fregat-MT is an upgraded version of the Fregat upper stage which
carries an additional 900 kg of propellants for its double-satellite load. Because
French Guiana is so close to the Equator, each launch will benefit from the Earth’s
spin, increasing the maximum payload to geostationary transfer orbit from 1·7 tonnes
to 3·0 tonnes. These four Galileo IOV satellites are fully representative of those that
NO. 1 G L O B A L N AV I G A T I O N S A T E L L I T E S Y S T E M S 11
will follow them into orbit, carrying the best atomic clock ever flown for navigation,
designed to be accurate to one second in three million years.
5.6. Future Plans. Once the IOV phase is completed, the remaining Galileo
satellites will be launched and deployed to reach the Full Operational Capability
(FOC). The signing of a framework contract in December 2009, with both OHB
System AG and EADS-Astrium GmBH, paved the way for the eventual provision of a
maximum of 32 satellites. On 7 January 2010, the EC announced the award of three of
the six contracts for the procurement of Galileo’s Initial Operational Capability. The
contract for the system support services was awarded to Thales Alenia Space of Italy,
and a contract for a first order of 14 satellites to OHB System AG of Germany at
a value of E566 million. The contract for the launch services was awarded to Ariane
Space of France and covers five Soyuz launches each carrying two satellites at a value
of E397 million. On 25 October 2010, the contract for the Galileo operations was
signed with SpaceOpal GmbH (an Italian-German joint venture) by ESA on behalf of
the EC. On 23 June 2011, the EC announced the final two contracts at a combined
value of E355 million. One contract signed with Thales Alenia Space (FR), for a value
of E281 million, ensures the formatting of navigation information for broadcast by
the satellites. The contract signed with Astrium (UK), for a value of E73.5 million
concerns the ‘housekeeping’ of the satellites including their maintenance and correct
positioning in orbit. The EC is now able to promise better estimates for the provision
of the range of Galileo services: the Open Service, the Public Regulated Service (PRS)
and the Search and Rescue (SAR) Service are planned to be declared in 2014 using
18 satellites. The Safety-of-Life (SoL) Service and the Commercial Service (CS) will be
tested in 2014 and will be provided when Galileo reaches FOC with a constellation of
30 satellites in 2020.

6. CHINA.
6.1. Beidou-1. At a Beijing forum to mark the 50th anniversary of China’s space
industry, the China National Space Administration (CNSA) stated that the Beidou 1
navigation satellite system would be operational by 2010. It had already launched
three test and two production satellites – the test satellites in October and December
2000 and May 2003 – these are GEOs based on a communications satellite design; the
two production satellites were launched on 3 February 2007. The ground systems
include the central control station, ground correction stations, and user terminals
(receivers/transmitters). The system is based on transponder technology working at
2491·75 MHz and is claimed to have a capacity of 540,000 responses per hour. This
provides 2-D positioning data of about 100 metre accuracy. By using ground
correction stations, the accuracy can be improved to 20 metres.
6.2. CNSS – Beidou-2. The Compass Navigation Satellite System (CNSS), or
Beidou 2, is China’s second-generation satellite navigation system capable of pro-
viding continuous, real-time passive 3-D geo-spatial positioning and speed measure-
ment. After launches in 2010, CNSS now has one medium-Earth orbit, three Inclined
Geostationary Satellite Orbit (IGSO), and four GEO satellites operating in orbit.
Speaking at the second Chinese Satellite Navigation Academic Annual Meeting in
Shanghai on May 18, Ran Chengqi, the director of the Chinese Satellite Navigation
Administrative Office, said “. . . the overall testing of the Compass/Beidou satellite
navigation system will be finished by 10th October 2011”. According to RanChengqi,
12 NORMAN BONNOR VOL. 65

a 16-satellite system covering the Asian-Pacific region will be established to provide

high-accuracy positioning services for users in China and its neighbours, covering an
area of about 120 degrees Longitude in the Northern Hemisphere. In addition to the
eight satellites that have already been launched, China will launch another eight CNSS
satellites before the end of 2012. The system will initially provide two types of service.
A free service will be provided for civilian users with positioning accuracy within 10
metres, velocity accuracy within 0·2 m/s and timing accuracy within 50 nanoseconds; a
licensed service will be provided with higher accuracy for authorised and military users
only. The long-term goal is to develop a GNSS similar to the GPS and GLONASS by
extending the system into a global constellation comprising 5 GEO, 3 IGSO and 27
MEO satellites.

7. J A P A N – Q Z S S . As well as the introduction of MSAS, Japan is planning a

Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) using three satellites. The first satellite
‘Michibiki’ was launched on 11 September 2010 and was ‘set usable’ on 24 June
2011. FOC status is expected by 2013. QZSS is targeted at mobile applications, to
provide communications-based services (video, audio, and data) and positioning, for
which it can only provide limited accuracy on its own and is not currently required in
its specifications to work in a stand-alone mode. The highly elliptical orbits allow the
satellite to dwell for more than 12 hours a day with an elevation above 70° (meaning
they appear almost overhead most of the time) and give rise to the term ‘quasi-zenith’
after which the system is named.

8. INDIA.
8.1. GAGAN. India’s system is named GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation
(GAGAN). India’s first GAGAN navigation payload on the GSAT-8 communi-
cations satellite was launched successfully on 21 May 2011. The satellite was carried
by an Ariane-V launch vehicle from the European Union’s spaceport in French
Guiana. This is the first successful launch for India’s satellite-based regional SBAS.
GAGAN is designed to function for 12 years.
8.2. INRSS. The Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS) is an
autonomous regional satellite navigation system being developed by Indian Space
Research Organisation. The plan to build a constellation of seven geo-stationary
satellites to meet the nation’s needs for a navigational system in cars, trains and
aircraft was announced on 4 September 2007; all seven satellites should be built by the
end of 2012.

9. G N S S V U L N E R A B I L I T Y . The vulnerability of GNSS can be considered

under four headings: unintentional interference, intentional interference, human
factors and provider funding. Since the earliest operation of GPS, concerns have been
expressed about its vulnerability, partly because the current civil signal is still limited
to only one frequency L1, and partly because the signals are extremely weak and easily
interfered with or blocked despite the improvement in signal-to-noise ratio achieved by
receivers seeking specific codes amongst the background noise.
9.1. Unintentional Interference. Trials and testing to check the vulnerability of
systems to local jamming has caused loss of signals to other users despite publication
NO. 1 G L O B A L N AV I G A T I O N S A T E L L I T E S Y S T E M S 13
of the intended timing and location of these jamming transmissions. There is also a
well recorded case of an active TV antenna on a houseboat in a US harbour which
jammed all GPS receivers in the harbour for several hours each evening when the
resident returned from work; it took months to detect and pinpoint the cause.
Environmental effects in the Earth’s ionosphere and from the Sun can also affect GPS
reception; the latest sunspot cycle maximum is occurring now and is expected to be
more severe than the last one. Increasing demand on the radio spectrum from
commercial communications operators has threatened GNSS frequencies (e.g. the
recently proposed broadband services bid by LightSquared, which has now been
denied until a plan that completely protects existing GPS navigation devices from this
potential interference is proven).
9.2. Intentional Interference. Intentional interference can result from jamming;
GPS signals are typically specified at around 160 dBW, really only a ‘squeak’ in
background noise and a billion times weaker than the signals used by a typical
broadcast TV set; the power required at a GPS receiver antenna is in the order of a
Picowatt (10− 12 watts). Another form of intentional interference is spoofing; two
forms exist: ‘meaconing’ which is the delay and re-broadcast of the GPS signal, and
‘counterfeit’ signals. The C/A Code is short and well known, signal generators are
widely available and thus both methods are easy to achieve. Finally, there is a prospect
of system damage either through attack on the satellites, which would be very difficult
to achieve, or attack on the ground control system, which would be much easier; both
such attacks could cause long-term GNSS outage.
9.3. Human Factors. The grounding of the vessel ‘Royal Majesty’ to the East of
Nantucket on 10th June 1995 was caused by over-reliance on a single navigation
system, poor maintenance practice and inadequate system integration. Unfortunately,
the ease of using GPS has led to instances of such over-reliance and a general lack of
knowledge of the vulnerability of GNSS.
9.4. Service Provider Funding. GPS, GLONASS and Galileo have all suffered
from under-funding during operations or development. While GPS has not failed to
provide a service since it was declared operational, funding restrictions have affected
the JPO’s ability to upgrade the system, mainly because the satellites have wildly
exceeded their design life (e.g. one Block IIA-11 satellite [SVN 24] reached 20 years in
orbit on 4 July). SVN-24 was the second in the series of GPS IIA satellites to be
launched – with a design life of 7·5 years; not only are these GPS Block IIA satellites
exceeding their design life but they are doubling it and, in the cases of SVN-24 and
SVN-23 their orbit life has nearly tripled. Meanwhile, GLONASS suffered severe
funding limitations that meant the constellation was virtually unusable over more than
a decade from the mid-1990s. Galileo suffered from funding problems even before
development began and is still suffering.
9.5. Dependence on GNSS. Operations in many domains have become more and
more dependent on GPS. For example, in maritime operations: the Automatic
Information System (AIS), the Global Maritime Distress & Safety System (GMDSS)
and the Electronic Chart Display & Information System (ECDIS) are all reliant on or
driven by GPS positioning. In aviation, the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning
System (EGPWS), Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS) and ADS-Broadcast
also rely on GPS, and there is major growth in the use of GPS for Landing Systems.
On the ground, utilities such as power distribution, banking and cellphone provision
rely on GPS for timing synchronisation. And there is increasing use of GPS for
14 NORMAN BONNOR VOL. 65

emergency services, vehicle management systems, road tolling and congestion

charging.
9.6. The Volpe Report. The Volpe Report was a vulnerability assessment of the
US transportation infrastructure because of its increasing reliance on GPS. It
considered all of the above vulnerabilities including the possible impact of GPS
outages on utilities, communications and banking. It was issued the day before the
infamous ‘9/11’ attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, which gave the
findings added influence on political decision making. Its general findings were that:

. GPS is a tempting target and its use as a sole-means of position and timing is
unacceptable.
. Loss of GPS could have a severe impact on safety and risk environmental and
economic damage to the USA.
. Augmentations (WAAS etc.) help but don’t solve the problem of GPS signal loss,
so back-ups are needed.

10. CONCLUSIONS.

. GNSS was originally designed as a military ‘force-multiplier’ for accurate

navigation and positioning, for rendezvous and for precision weapon aiming.
Because of its inherent accuracy and ease of use, it has become a vital utility for
transport infrastructure and a wide range of military and civilian applications in
what is now recognised as the ‘age of information’, for which accurate position
and timing are essential pre-requisites.
. GNSS is vulnerable for a number of reasons including its susceptibility to both
unintentional and intentional interference. But the greater risk stems from the
dramatic growth of dependence and over-reliance on its use without adequate
back-up systems and procedures.
. The history of GNSS is relatively short, particularly that part relating to the
massive expansion of civilian applications in the 1990s and into the 21st Century.
The ‘Gold Standard’ is clearly GPS, against which all other developing systems
must be judged. Apart from Russia’s GLONASS and Europe’s Galileo, many
other systems for regional augmentation or full GNSS capability are in operation
or planned by many nations. Development has been, and continues, at a rapid
pace.

REFERENCES
UKHO (2009). Mariners Handbook (NP 100) 9th Edition, United Kingdom Hydrographic Office.
GPS/GNSS. For news items, opinions and policy on all aspects of GNSS. GPS World and Inside GNSS.
RIN. For news items on GNSS. Royal Institute of Navigation Website, www.rin.org.uk.