Office of The Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530

U.S.
Department of Justice
Office of Legislative Affairs
Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530
April 2, 2020
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Chairman Grassley:
We write in further regard to matters pertaining to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Act and other matters contained in the December 9, 2019 report by Department of Justice
(Department) Inspector General Michael Horowitz.
As we described in our letter of February 10, 2020, the Attorney General has determined
that it is now in the public interest to release to Congress additional documents and information
related to these matters to the extent consistent with national security interests and with the
January 7, 2020 order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Specifically, in
response to your request for the production of unredacted versions of four footnotes in Inspector
General Horowitz’s report, the Department has undertaken a careful review of the underlying
information. Enclosed with this letter are three footnotes with minimal redactions to protect
national security interests. As we have discussed with your staff, disclosure of the fourth and
final footnote presents unique and significant concerns. Specifically, the redacted information
refers to information received by a member of the Crossfire Hurricane team regarding possible
previous attempts by a foreign government to penetrate and research a company or individuals
associated with Christopher Steele. Nevertheless, the Department continues to review and
consider the possibility of further declassification or summary substitution.
We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we
may provide additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.
Sincerely,
Stephen E. Boyd
Assistant Attorney General
Hurricane told us that they were unaware of Steele's connections to Russian
Oligarch 1, who was the subject of a Crossfire Hurricane case, and that they would
have wanted to know about them. 349 Priestap, for example, told us "I don't recall
knowing that there was any connectivity between [Steele] and [Russian Oligarch
1]." Priestap told us that he believed it was "completely fair" to say that the FBI
should have assessed Steele's relationship with Russian Oligarch 1.
(U) Stuart Evans, NSD's Deputy Assistant Attorney General who oversaw OI,
stated that if OI had been aware of the information about Steele's connections to
Russian Oligarch 1, it would have been evaluated by 01. He told us:
"Counterintelligence investigations are complex, and often involve,as I said, you
know, double dealing, and people playing all sides .... I think that [the connection
between Steele and Russian Oligarch 1] would have been yet another thing we
would have wanted to dive into."350
v. (U) The FBI's Efforts to Assess Steele's Election Reporting in 2016

and 2017
(U) The FBI's assessment of the Steele election reporting began in mid-
September 2016 and concluded approximately 1 year later, roughly 3 months after
349 (U) The Supervisory Intel Analyst and SSA 2 told us that they did not recall reviewing
information in Steele's Delta file documenting Steele's frequent contacts with representatives for
multiple Russian oligarchs in 2015. The Supervisory Intel Analyst explained that he did not recall
doing a "deep dive" on Steele's past history as a source and relied in part on Handling Agent 1 for
information about Steele. The first access of Steele's Delta file by a Crossfire Hurricane team member
(the Supervisory Intel Analyst) occurred on November 18, 2016, after Steele had been closed as a
CHS and a month after submission of the first Page FISA application. As described in Chapter Five,
the FISA application relied in part on Steele's reporting. In Chapter Four we noted that Steele's
frequent contacts with Russian oligarchs in 2015 had raised concerns in the FBI Transnational
Organized Crime Intelligence Unit. SSA 1 told us that he was unaware of these concerns, but said he
would have found this information useful and would have wanted to know about it while supervising
the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Handling Agent 1 expressed surprise that the Crossfire
Hurricane team did not access Steele's Delta file earlier. He said that the team should have "turned
the file upside down" looking for information 2 months earlier and that he assumed that some
members of the team had thoroughly reviewed the file.
350 - In addition to the information in Steele's Delta file documenting Steele's
frequent contacts with representatives for multi le Russian oligarchs, we identified reporting the
Crossfire Hurricane team received from in · ating the potential for Russian disinformation
influencing Steele's election reporting. A 2017, report relayed information f r o m -
o u t l i ~ c y in a limited subset of Steele's reporting about the activities of Michael
Cohen. T h ~ s t a t e d that it did not have high confidence in this subset of Steele's
reporting and assessed that the referenced subset was part of a Russian disinformation campaign to
denigrate U.S. foreign relations. A second report from the s a m e - - f i v e days later stated
that a, person named in the limited subset of Steele's reporting h~esentations in the
r e p o r t ~ a s s e s s e d that the person's denials were truthful. A-report
dated--2017, contained information about an individual with reported connections to
Trump and Russia who claimed that the public reporting about the details of Trump's ctivities
in Moscow during a trip in 2013 were false, and thatthey were the product of RIS "infiltrat[ing) a
source into the network" of a - • lwho compiled a dossier of
information on Trump's activities. The oted that it had no information indicating
that the individual had special access to RIS activities or information.
(U)
302. (9l}Nf) According to a document circulated among Crossfire Hurricane team members and
supervisors in early October 2016, Person 1 had historical contact with persons and entities suspected
of being linked to RIS. The document described reporting that Person 1
"was rumored to be a former KGB/SVR officer." In addition, in late December 2016, Department
Attorney Bruce Ohr told SSA 1 that he had met with Glenn Simpson and that Simpson had assessed that
Person 1 was a RIS officer who was central in connecting Trump to Russia.
(U) .
334. (~When interviewed by the FBI, the Primary Sub-source stated that he/she did not view
his/her contacts as a network of sources, · ···· ·· ·· · ··· ··· ·· · · · •N'"' with whom he/she has conversations
about current events and government relations.
Declassified by C28W34B64 on 3/6/2020

This redacted version only.

Office of The Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530

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U.S.

Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Dear Chairman Grassley:

We write in further regard to matters pertaining to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

v. (U) The FBI's Efforts to Assess Steele's Election Reporting in 2016

Declassified by C28W34B64 on 3/6/2020

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