No. 42092 [.

October 28, 1936]

In re Estate of the deceased Andres Reyes. FELISA CAMIA

DE REYES, petitioner and appellant, vs. JUANA REYES
DE ILANO, oppositor and appellee.

1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; COMMITTEE ON

CLAIMS AND APPRAISAL; APPEAL BY A CREDITOR
FROM THE DISALLOWANCE OF HIS CLAIM.—Section
773 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants the creditor of a
deceased person the right to appeal to the competent
Court of First Instance from the disallowance, in whole or
in part, of his claim by the committee on claims and
appraisal, and failure to exercise this right within the
period and in the manner prescribed by section 775 of said
Code makes the committee's resolution final and prevents
the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the matter
(Kette vs. Suarez, 55 Phil., 712).

2. ID.; ID.; IMPUGNATION OF COMMITTEE'S

APPRAISAL.—The committee's appraisal of the estate of
the deceased is not conclusive and the court is not bound
to adopt it. Therefore, the court a quo committed no error
in permitting B. A. I. to testify for the purpose of
impugning the committee's appraisal of the estate of the
deceased A. R.

3. ID.; ID.; CONJUGAL PROPERTY.—According to law and

jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage in order that the same
may be deemed conjugal property. In this case the parties
admit that the parcels of land under consideration were
purchased by the deceased A. R. during his marriage to
his first wife L. F. The mere fact that A. R. appears as
purchaser in the certificates of sale and in the certificates
of title does not change the ganancial nature of said lands.

4. ID.; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; PROJECT

OF PARTITION.—There is nothing in the law imposing
upon the executor or administrator the obligation to
present a project of partition for the distribution of the
estate of a deceased person. Section 753 of the Code of
Civil Procedure authorizes the court to

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630 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

assign "* * * the residue of the estate to the persons

entitled to the same, and in its order the court shall name
the persons and proportions, or parts, to which each is
entitled * * *." According to section 754 of said Code, the
order referred to in the above-cited section shall be issued
"* * * on the application of the executor or administrator,
or of a person interested in the estate; * * *." (See also
article 1052, Civil Code.)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.—It is the Court of First Instance alone that

may make the distribution of his estate and determine the
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is
entitled, and it may require the executrix to present a
project of partition to better inform itself of the condition
of the estate to be distributed and so facilitate the prompt
distribution thereof.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.—The project of partition that the executor or

administrator might have presented would not be
conclusive and the interested parties could oppose the
approval thereof and enter their objections thereto, at the
same time presenting their counter-project of partition
which the court might accept and approve, as it did in this
case. In adopting the project of partition of the oppositor-
appellee J. R. de I., said court acted within its
discretionary power and committed no error of law.

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

Cavite. Buyson Lampa, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Manuel Jose for appellant.
Vicente J. Francisco for appellee.

VlLLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the petitioner Felisa Camia de

Reyes from the resolution of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"In view of the foregoing, the court rejects the project of
partition of the executrix Felisa Camia and approves the
counterproject presented by the heiress, Reyes. The
accounts presented by the executrix are approved with the
above-stated amendments. The balance of P367.11 against
the executrix should be reimbursed by her equally to the
heirs of the deceased. It is ordered that the guardian ad
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Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano
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litem of the minor Bibiano Reyes be paid the sum of P29.40
for services, as such, rendered to said minor, charging; it,
as the pensions given to said minor, to the latters' share. So
ordered."
In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns eleven
alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in its
resolution in question, which will be discussed in the
course of this decision.
The following facts have been established during the
trial of the case:
Andres Reyes and Luciana Farlin were married in the
year 1893, having had six children, three of whom died
without heirs before their parents' death, and two died also
without heirs after the death of their mother Luciana
Farlin, leaving the herein oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes
de Ilano as their only surviving child. About said year 1893,
the parents of Andres Reyes leased certain parcels of land
from the Spanish government. Upon their death during the
Spanish regime, their son Andres Reyes succeeded them in
said lease and the latter afterwards purchased said leased
lands as friar lands from the Insular Government in the
years 1909, 1910 and 1921, it appearing of record that he
was married to Luciana Farlin (Exhibits E, F, G, H, I, J, K,
L, and M, and Exhibits 22, 23 to 23-I and 30). On October
1, 1910, Luciana Farlin also acquired by purchase from the
Insular Government certain parcels of friar land described
in certificates of sale Exhibits A, B, C and D. After the
death of Luciana Farlin on November 12, 1922, her
surviving spouse, Andres Reyes, contracted a second
marriage with the herein applicant-appellant Felisa
Camia. A son named Bibiano Reyes was born of said second
marriage. During her marriage to Andres Reyes, Felisa
Camia also purchased a parcel of friar land (Exhibit N)
from the Government on June 3, 1930, and another on
August 2, 1927, from her husband Andres Reyes, who had
acquired it on May 16, 1927, by purchase from the Insular

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632 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

Government, as part. of the friar lands (Exhibit O). Andres

Reyes died on April 20, 1932, leaving a will (Exhibit A)
which was duly probated on June 21, 1933. He was
survived by his wife, the herein executrix and appellant
Felisa Camia, his only son had with her, named Bibiano
Reyes, and his daughter by his first marriage, the herein
oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano. Felisa Camia
qualified on June 25, 1932, as executrix of the estate left by
the deceased husband Andres Reyes. Severo Abellera and
Luis Gaerlan were appointed commissioners on claims and
appraisal and, after having qualified for their post, they
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presented their final report on May 8, 1933. The herein
appellant Felisa Camia filed her first account, as
administratrix, on May 13, 1933. The appellee Juana Reyes
de Ilano filed her opposition to this account in her
pleadings of June 3 and 12, 1933, claiming that some of the
items of expenses stated therein are unnecessary and
inaccurate. On October 13, 1933, said executrix-appellant
presented the second account of her administration, which
was likewise opposed by the oppositor-appellee Juana
Reyes de Ilano on the ground that, according to her, it is
incomplete and that certain items of expenses and income,
which are enumerated in her pleading of opposition, are
vague, unnecessary and inaccurate. On October 16, 1933,
the executrix-appellant Felisa Camia de Reyes filed a
project of partition, which was also opposed by the
oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano in a pleading of
October 20, 1933, alleging, among other things, that the
valuation of the properties made by the commissioners on
claims and appraisal is inadequate and unjust; that said
project does not contain all the properties that should be
partitioned; that it contains properties belonging to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage; and that said
project is based upon the will, some of the provisions of
which are inofficious and illegal; at the same time
submitting a counterproject of partition with an appraisal
of the properties therein enumerated,
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Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

which appraisal is different from that made by the

commissioners on claims and appraisal. This
counterproject of partition presented by the oppositor-
appellee is the one admitted and approved by the court.
The first legal question to be decided in this appeal,
which is raised in the first assignment of alleged error, is
whether or not the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano
is still entitled to impugn, by means of the testimony of the
witness Benedicto A. Ilano, the valuation or appraisal of
the properties of the deceased Andres Reyes, made by the
commissioners on claims and appraisal and contained in
their report of May 8, 1933.
The executrix-appellant Felisa Camia de Reyes contends
that, as the appellee failed to file her objection to said
report in due time, all evidence presented to impugn it is
untimely after the report in question has been submitted to
the court and declared final and conclusive in an order of
June 19, 1933, which reads as follows;
"The heiress Juana Reyes has filed a motion to the effect
that the administratrix be ordered to present a project of
partition as soon as possible.
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 "At the same time and pursuant to the order of this
court of the 6th instant, counsel for Juana Reyes has
entered a detailed and specific opposition to the accounts
presented by the administratrix, and the committee on
claims and appraisal has likewise submitted a final report,
rejecting, for the reasons stated therein, the claims of
Albino Galeca, Rafaela Dominguez, Raymundo Samson,
Filomena Dominguez and Felisa Camaña, and no appeal
having been duly taken from the resolution of the
committee on claims and appraisal, said report is final and
conclusive.
"Wherefore, the administratrix is ordered to present a
project of partition within the period of ten (10) days, and
as soon as the project in question is filed, the court will set
the final account as well as the said project of partition for
hearing.

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634 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

"The administratrix is ordered to pay to the commissioners

on claims and appraisal their lawful fees and expenses."
It is inferred from the above-quoted order that what was
declared final and conclusive was the report of the
commissioners on claims and appraisal with respect to the
claims of Albino Galeca, Rafaela Dominguez, Raymundo
Samson, Filomena Dominguez and Felisa Camaña, who
took no appeal from the resolution of said commissioners
rejecting the claims in question. Section 773 of the Code of
Civil Procedure grants the creditor of a deceased person the
right to appeal to the competent Court of First Instance
from the disallowance, in whole or in part, of his claim by
the committee on claims and appraisal, and failure to
exercise this right within the period and in the manner
prescribed by section 775 of said Code makes the
committee's resolution final and prevents the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the matter (Kette vs. Suarez, 55
Phil., 712).
In the case of Siy Chong Keng vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue (60 Phil., 493), this court laid down the following
doctrine:
"1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION ; COMMITTEE
ON CLAIMS AND APPRAISALS ; COLLECTOR OF
INTERNAL REVENUE.—There is no provision of law
which makes it the duty of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to take part in the deliberations of the
commissioners on claims and appraisals nor is he required
to take exceptions to the report of such a committee and
appeal to the court for a revision of its appraisals. The
statute provides that the committee, after being sworn to
make a true appraisal, shall appraise the value of the
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estate in money and return their warrants with such
appraisal to the court and shall deliver a copy of the
appraisal to the executor or administrator. (Sec. 670, Code
of Civil Procedure.)
"2. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PURPOSE OF INVENTORY AND
APPRAISAL OF AN ESTATE.—Apparently the statute
does not require approval of the committee's appraisals by
the court; but
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Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

doubtless exceptions thereto might be taken by the

executor or administrator upon whom a copy was served.
The purpose of the inventory and appraisal of the estate of
the decedent is to aid the court in revising the accounts and
determining the liabilities of the executor or administrator
and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition)
of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration
of the estate."
It is very clear, therefore, that the committee's appraisal
of the estate of the deceased is not conclusive and the court
is not bound to adopt it.
Therefore, the court a quo committed no error in
permitting Benedicto A. Ilano to testify for the purpose of
impugning the committee's appraisal of the estate of the
deceased.
The second question to be decided is whether or not the
lower court erred in rejecting certain items contained in the
two accounts of the executrix Felisa Camia de Reyes and
stated in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of
error.
Said items refer to certain expenses for transportation
and subsistence incurred by the executrix, and her mother
and minor child who accompanied her on her trips made f
or the benefit of the estate during the period from the
month of May 1932 to the month of April 1933; for
medicine for the minor Bibiano Reyes; for electricity
consumed in the house of the deceased wherein his widow,
the herein executrix, and her minor child continued to live;
and for the funeral and the novenary, commonly called the
"vigil", f or the soul of the deceased.
The expenses for transportation and subsistence refer to
the trips made by the executrix, accompanied by her
mother and son, to the Court of First Instance of Cavite to
attend the hearings in connection with the testamentary
proceedings; to the hacienda belonging to the estate under
her administration; and to Manila in order to interview her
attorney also in connection with the testamentary
proceedings. All these expenses were necessary for the care
and
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636 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

administration of the estate and should, therefore, be

approved.
To all appearances the company of the mother of the
executrix Felisa Camia de Reyes, surviving spouse of the
deceased whose testamentary estate is under
consideration, and that of her minor son were unnecessary.
Taking into consideration, however, that the executrix is
only 31 years of age and is the widow of a decedent who, in
life, had been of good social standing, Philippine
idiosyncrasy and tradition demand that she be surrounded
by every protection and care needed by a widow of good
reputation, in respect of the memory of her deceased
husband. For these reasons this court is of the opinion that
the company of the mother and son of the executrix during
the trips which she had to make in connection with the
affairs of the estate of which she was the testamentary
executrix, is justified and, consequently, the expenses for
transportation and subsistence incurred by her and by her
companions should be approved.
However, with respect to the items of June 23 and 25,
1932, which consist of transportation expenses to Cavite of
the executrix, her mother and son for the purpose of
looking for a surety, and the sum of P1.50 paid for certified
copies of the assessed value of the property of the sureties,
which expenses amount to P4.20, they should be rejected in
accordance with the doctrine laid down in Sulit vs. Santos
(56 Phil., 626).
As to the sum of P6 which the executrix paid for
medicine used for her minor child, Bibiano Reyes, while it
is true that the sum of P25 a month, chargeable to the
estate, is allotted to said minor for his education and
support, this court is of the opinion that the extra payment
of P6 for medicine is not unwarranted and should,
therefore, be also approved.
In the fifth assignment of alleged error, it is claimed
that the lower court erred in having disapproved the sum of
P58.40 spent for electricity consumed in the house of the
deceased Andres Reyes from April 30, 1932, to the month

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Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

of October, 1933, or during one year and six months

approximately. At the time of the death of Andres Reyes,
he was living with his wife by his second marriage, Felisa
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Camia de Reyes, and his son also by his second marriage,
Bibiano Reyes, and it was natural that she should continue
living with her said son in said house, not only because it is
their home but also to watch over and preserve it, as
testamentary executrix, and an expense of P3.19 a month
for electricity for the preservation of the house under
administration, is not excessive and should be approved.
The item of expenses for the novenary or vigil for the
soul of the deceased Andres Reyes, as well as for the
funeral and religious ceremonies enjoined by the deceased
in his will to be celebrated in accordance with his social
standing, is warranted, taking into consideration the social
standing of the deceased in the Province of Cavite.
Summarizing all that has been stated in connection with
the third, fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error, this
court believes that all the items rejected by the lower court,
which are the subject matter of said assignments of error,
should be approved with the exception of those of June 23
and 25, 1932, referring to the obtainment of the bond for
the executrix and amounting to P4.20. The total amount of
said items which should be approved is P1,057.68.
The lower court found that the total amount of the
disbursements made by the executrix Felisa Camia de
Reyes, after deducting all the expenses rejected by it as
improper, is P2,405.42. Adding the P1,057.68, which this
court found to have been improperly rejected, to said sum,
makes P3,463.10 the total amount of the expenses for
which the executrix should be reimbursed by the estate. If
the sum of P2,772.53, representing the income, is
subtracted from the above-stated amount, there is a
balance of P690.57 which the estate of Andres Reyes should
pay to said executrix. Furthermore said executrix is
entitled to collect P81.94 as commission upon the sum of
P3,463.10 at the rate of 3 per cent upon the first P2,000
and 1½ per cent

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638 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

upon the excess, as provided by section 680 of the Code of

Civil Procedure.
Turning now to the seventh assignment of alleged error,
the question to be decided is whether the parcels of land
designated by the letters e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l and m in the
inventory of the executrix-appellant Felisa Camia de Reyes
are private properties of the deceased Andres Reyes or are
properties of his conjugal partnership with his wife by his
first marriage, Luciana Farlin.
It appears uncontroverted from the oral as well as the
documentary evidence presented at the trial that said
parcels were originally friar lands which the parents of
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Andres Reyes leased from the Government during the
Spanish regime. Andres Reyes succeeded his parents in
said lease and later acquired said leased lands by absolute
purchase from the Insular Government on different dates,
that is, he purchased one parcel on May 9, 1910 (Exhibit J,
transfer certificate of title No. 1817), another parcel on
March 29, 1921 (Exhibit I), and the rest on April 5, 1911
(Exhibits E, F, G, H, K, L and M, and 22, 23 to 23-I and 30,
and transfer certificates of title Nos. 3230, 3228 [Exhibit
26], 3229 [Exhibit 27], 3270 [Exhibit 28], 3231 [Exhibit 29],
4324 [Exhibit 30], and 3232 [Exhibit 31]). All these parcels
were acquired by said Andres Reyes during the existence of
his first marriage to Luciana Farlin, who died on November
12, 1922. It does not appear that a liquidation has been
made of the ganancial property belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Andres Reyes and Luciana Farlin.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"ART. 1407. All the property of the spouses shall be
deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
In the case of Guinguing vs. Abuton and Abuton (48
Phil., 144), this court laid down the following doctrine:
"2. HUSBAND AND WlFE; CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
TlTLE IN NAME OF ONE SPOUSE ONLY.—Property
acquired by the

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Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

spouses during marriage pertains to the conjugal

partnership regardless of the form in which the title is
taken; and the fact that a composition title to the property
has been taken in the name of one of the spouses only,
whether husband or wife, does not change the character of
the property."
In the unpublished case of Espiritu vs. Bernardino (G. R.
No. 36371, promulgated on March 18, 1933 [58 Phil., 902]),
one Adriano Espiritu acquired a lot of the friar lands by
assignment from Antonio Gregorio, with the approval of
the Director of Lands. This acquisition took place during
the existence of Adriano Espiritu's marriage to his wife
Sotera Ramoy. This court held in a decision of a division of
three that said lot had the nature of conjugal partnership
property.
Therefore, according to law and jurisprudence, it is
sufficient to prove that.the property was acquired during
the marriage in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property. In this case the parties admit that the
parcels of land under consideration were purchased by the
deceased Andres Reyes during his marriage to his first wife
Luciana Farlin. The mere fact that Andres Reyes appears
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as purchaser in the certificates of sale and in the
certificates of title does not change the ganancial nature of
said lands. In the unpublished case of Benavides vs.
Tordilla and Reyes (G. R. No. 39497, promulgated on
March 5, 1934 [59 Phil., 918]), the spouses Jose I. Borja
and Sofia Benavides, during their marriage, built a house
on a lot which was the paraphernal property of the wife.
This court, in a division of three, held that the house is
presumed to be conjugal property in the absence of
conclusive evidence showing that the money spent in the
construction thereof belongs privately to any of the
spouses, the testimony of the wife, to the effect that said
money exclusively belonged to her and that the posts
belonged to the old house which she inherited from her
deceased father, not being sufficient to destroy said
presumption.

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Theref ore, the court a quo committed no error in declaring

that the above-stated parcels belong to the conjugal
partnership of the deceased Andres Reyes and his first wife
Luciana Farlin.
With respect to the parcels of land described in Exhibits
O and N, which are the subject matter of the eighth
assignment of alleged error, they appear to have been
purchased by Felisa Camia during her marriage to the
deceased Andres Reyes, or in the years 1927 and 1930,
respectively. Inasmuch as these parcels were acquired
under the same circumstances as those stated in the
seventh assignment of alleged error, all that has been said
in connection with the latter is applicable to them.
Therefore, they are also conjugal property of the spouses
Andres Reyes and Felisa Camia de Reyes. Furthermore, on
page 210 of the file of exhibits of this case, there is a copy of
an affidavit of the deceased Andres Reyes, dated
September 2, 1927, wherein the deponent states that he
was selling lot No. 6327 to his wife Felisa Camia by means
of the certificate of sale, Exhibit O, for the sole purpose of
transferring said lot in his wife's name because he had a
daughter by his first wife and a son by his second wife, and
because he had no time to administer it, but that the first
installment was paid with money belonging to both (Andres
Reyes and Felisa Camia). This sale is, of course, null and
void in accordance with the provisions of article 1458 of the
Civil Code, it not appearing that a separation of property
has been agreed upon; but this nullity does not change the
nature of said lands as conjugal property of the spouses
Andres Reyes and Felisa Camia.
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 As to the ninth assignment of alleged error, the question
whether the land described on page 2, paragraph 2, letter
m, of the will is conjugal property or private property of
Andres Reyes has already been decided upon in discussing
the seventh assignment of alleged error. This land is the
same lot No. 1686 and it has been stated that it is conjugal
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Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano

property of Andres Reyes and his wife by his first marriage,

Luciana Farlin, having been purchased in his name during
his marriage to Luciana Farlin, as shown by certificate of
sale No. 4320 (Exhibits M, 24 and 31).
With respect to the house mentioned on page 3 of the
inventory, its ganancial nature has been established by
Petrona Reyes, younger sister of Andres Reyes, in her
deposition of October 24, 1933. This witness testified that
said house was constructed one year after the death of her
sisterin-law Luciana Farlin with money left by the latter
upon her death, which was deposited with said witness;
that Andres Reyes took from her the money needed by him
for the construction of the house; and that said house cost
P10,000. The executrix-appellant does not question the
ganancial nature of said house of the spouses Andres Reyes
and Luciana Farlin but merely alleges that the above-
stated deposition of Petrona Reyes, which is the only
evidence upon which the lower court bases its opinion that
it is conjugal property, is not admissible as evidence
because when she was notified of the taking thereof, the
only opposition in the case under consideration was that of
the oppositor Juana Reyes de Ilano to the first rendition of
accounts of said executrix, dated May 13, 1933, and
consequently, every deposition taken not referring
exclusively to said account is impertinent and irrelevant.
This question leads us to the discussion of the second
assignment of alleged error. The record shows that the
attorney for the executrix does not deny but, on the
contrary, admits as true the testimony of the attorney f or
the oppositor during the trial of this case that three days
prior to the day set for the taking of the deposition, the
executrix had been notified of the date thereof, and two
days before the date in question she had been served by
mail with a copy of the opposition to the second or final
account, together with a copy of the opposition to the
project of partition and a copy of the counterproject of
partition made by said attorney for the oppositor. On page
10 of the appellee's brief it is stated that the origi-
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nals of said pleadings were mailed to the office of the clerk

of the Court of First Instance of Cavite on October 20, 1933,
it being presumed that they were received by said office on
the following day, October 21, 1933. The deposition in
question took place on the 24th and 25th of said month and
year. Furthermore, said deposition contains the statement
of the attorney for the executrix that he received said
copies of the oppositor's opposition to the second account
and to the project of partition, and her counterproject of
partition at 4:50 p. m. on October 23, 1933, or one day
before the taking of the deposition which, as already stated,
took place on the 24th of said month and year, at 4:30 p. m.
The deposition in question was continued on the following
day, October 25, 1933, and said attorney for the executrix
had opportunity to cross-examine, and in fact he cross-
examined the deponent. In the opinion of this court, these
facts are sufficient to show that the admission of said
deposition as evidence by the lower court did not constitute
an error inasmuch as in the taking thereof there were no
defects or irregularities that might have affected the rights
of any of the parties.
In the case of Lim Cuan Sy vs. Northern Assurance Co.
(55 Phil., 248), this court laid down the following doctrine:
"A deposition taken, under the conditions prescribed by
law, and upon due notice, allowing two full days, exclusive
of Sunday, to the opposite party, should not be suppressed
merely because the attorney for such party may have been
unable to attend at the time fixed for the taking of the
deposition."
In the case of Muñiz vs. Muñiz (