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Report of the Australia India Institute
The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century
The Indian Ocean Region:

Security, Stability and
Sustainability in the 21st Century
Australia India Institute
Task Force on Indian Ocean Security
March 2013
1
The Australia India Institute is funded by the
Australian Government Department of Industry,
Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education
formerly known as the Department of Education,
Employment and Workplace Relations.
Copyright: Australia India Institute 2013
2
ISBN: 978-0-9872398-3-9
The Indian Ocean Region:

Security, Stability and
Sustainability in the 21st Century
Edited by Dennis Rumley
Principal contributors: David Brewster, Sanjay Chaturvedi,

Timothy Doyle, Amitabh Mattoo, Dennis Rumley, Swaran Singh,
Ric Smith and Siddharth Varadarajan
Australia India Institute

Task Force on Indian Ocean Security
March 2013
3
The views, findings and recommendations of this Report are the edited product of the collective
deliberation of an independent group of analysts and policy-makers constituting the Indian
Ocean Task Force at a Roundtable held in Fremantle, Western Australia, on 4th and 5th May 2012.
The Report does not necessarily represent the views of the Australia-India Institute, its Faculty
or its Administration. Nor does it represent the views of any one of the individuals or institutions
with which those involved are affiliated. All statements of fact, expressions of opinion as well as
recommendations contained in the Report are to be read bearing in mind that all contributors do
not necessarily agree on every detail.
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Contents
A Message from the Director 9
I. Executive summary of the report 11
II. The Changing Security Dynamics of the
Indian Ocean Region 16
1. Security as a multidimensional concept 16
The emergence of a new security agenda 17
Constructing security 20
Geopolitically-constructed security threats 20
Threats and legitimate interests 22
2. The changing geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean region 23
The Indian Ocean as a routeway 23
The Indian Ocean as the neglected ocean 24
21st century reassessment of the Indian Ocean region 25
The changing geopolitical environment 26
Current regional security arrangements and forums 27
3. Regional options for Indian Ocean security 29
Competing regional security constructions 29
The Indian Ocean region 30
The Eastern Indian Ocean 32
The Indo-Pacific region 33
The United States and the Indo-Pacific 34
Towards a more inclusive regional security construction 35
Conclusion and implications 35
I11. Security challenges in the Indian Ocean region 36
1. Traditional security and military conflict 36
Traditional military security 36
Regional nuclear proliferation 38
State “success” 40
Contested spaces in the Indian Ocean region 42
2. Human security 44
Freedom and democracy in the Indian Ocean region 45
Democratisation and state stability 46
Displaced persons and asylum seekers in the Indian Ocean region 49
People trafficking 50
3. Economic and resource security 51
The global South 51
Energy security and insecurity in the Indian Ocean region 52
Resources competition and energy security 55
Economic insecurity and civil strife 56
5
4. Maritime security 58
Indian Ocean energy chokepoints 58
The stability of the Indian Ocean region as an energy routeway 60
The Indian Ocean as a nuclear ocean 61
Attacks on energy shipping in the Indian Ocean 62
Maritime jurisdiction and maritime boundary disputes 64
Unresolved maritime and terrestrial boundaries 65
Resolving maritime boundary disputes 65
Approaches to maritime security policy 66
Towards a cooperative maritime security policy framework 68
5. Environmental security 70
Food 72
Water 74
Nuclear waste 76
Climate change 78
Fisheries 79
IV. India and Australia in Indo-Pacific security 82
The shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific 82
Developing the Australia-India security relationship 83
Australia’s challenge in navigating relations with India and China
in the Indo-Pacific 93
The idea of the Indo-Pacific region: its impact on Australia and India 94
Conclusion 97
V. Conclusions: policy and research implications 98
Overview 98
A regional security regime 99
Geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean region 99
Multidimensional nature of security 99
Traditional security and military conflict 99
Human security 102
Economic and resources security 103
Towards a new Indo-Pacific maritime security regime 103
Environmental security 103
Conclusion: a 21st century regional security paradigm for the
Indian Ocean 106
Acknowledgment 107
Appendix – Fremantle roundtable participants 108
Bibliography 109
6
List of Figures
Figure 1 The Indian Ocean regional sub-systems 9
Figure 2 Essential elements of multidimensional security 14
Figure 3 Some contradictory impacts of globalisation on security 16
Figure 4 Indian Ocean regional security arrangements 26
Figure 5 Comparison among three competing regional constructions 28
Figure 6 The 51 states of the Indian Ocean Region 29
Figure 7
The USPACOM 30
Figure 8 Conflicts within and between states 1945-2005 35
Figure 9 Traditional security indicators in the Indian Ocean Region 36
Figure 10 The failed state index: Indian Ocean states 2008 39
Figure 11 Indian Ocean pearls, diamonds and nuggets 41
Figure 12 The freedom rating 2009: the Indian Ocean Region 43
Figure 13 Democracy and stability in Arab Spring states 46
Figure 14 Indian Ocean states: total refugees by country of origin 47
Figure 15 Indian Ocean states: total refugees, returned IDPs, stateless persons and
populations of concern end-2010 48
Figure 16 A simplified systems framework for energy security 51
Figure 17
Energy import-dependent states 2008 52
Figure 18
Energy-niche economies 2008 52
Figure 19
Indian Ocean oil chokepoints 57
Figure 20 Indian Ocean Region: nuclear energy users, uranium suppliers and waste 59
Figure 21 Energy attacks by state 2001-8 60
Figure 22 Number of incidents reported Jan 2007-June 2011 61
Figure 23 Examples of institutional and state Indian Ocean maritime energy security 66
Figure 24 Food insecure states in the Indian Ocean Region 71
Figure 25 Water insecure states in the Indian Ocean Region 73
Figure 26 Possible future US-Australia developments 98
Figure 27 Indian Ocean states of concern 99
Figure 28
Participation and territorial stability 100
Figure 29 States with Indian Ocean maritime energy security interests 102

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A Message from the Director

The Australia India Institute has quickly established itself as Australia’s
preeminent centre for the study of India and as a leading centre of dialogue
and research partnerships between India and Australia. Based at the University
of Melbourne, the Institute hosts a growing range of programmes that are
deepening and enriching the relationship between our two great democracies.
In May 2011, we set up a Task Force on Indian Ocean Security to bring together
experts from Australia and India to debate and report on policy directions that
both states might consider for the future enhancement of regional security. Apart
from regular communication among Task Force members, preliminary meetings
were also held in Melbourne and Kolkata in 2011. This report represents the
edited outcome of the final Task Force meeting held in Fremantle, Western
Australia in May 2012.
The AII Task Force on Indian Ocean Security had four principal aims:
• To discuss the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region (IOR), its changing
significance, the various perspectives of regional states and the IOR’s
relationships with other regions as part of a broad context for an analysis of
security issues.
• To analyse the numerous security challenges of the IOR, including major
non-traditional security issues such as fishing and food security; global
warming and environmental issues, population and migration; access to
undersea energy resources; and differences and similarities in Indian and
Australian perspectives. Furthermore, to discuss issues related to sea lanes of
communication (SLOCs) security along the long Indo-Pacific littoral, with
particular focus on Indian and Australian perspectives on SLOC security
between the Red Sea and the South China Sea.
• To consider the roles of India and Australia in Indo-Pacific security,
including a discussion of Indian and Australian perspectives on their future
roles in Indo-Pacific security.
• To evaluate various policy and research implications and options, including
a consideration of common security interests; alternative regional security
structures for the IOR and/or the Indo-Pacific (for example, expansion of
IOR-ARC, concerts of powers; single issues coalitions etc); and the degree to
which these would fit with Indian and Australian strategic perspectives.
I would like to thank all the members of the Task Force, particularly Prof Dennis
Rumley, for their contribution to this valuable report, which will be of interest
not just to policy makers in Canberra and New Delhi, but also to the wider
academic and policy community.
Amitabh Mattoo
March 2013, Melbourne
9
10
I. Executive summary of the report

While some analysts might quibble over definitions of the IOR, there is little
dispute over the assertion that it is highly diverse from a political, demographic,
economic, environmental and strategic viewpoint. Thus, from a narrow statist
perspective, the IOR is neither a “single strategic entity”1 nor a “clear and
coherent geopolitical system” (Figure 1).
The Indian Ocean regoinal

sub-systems and peripheral
regional systems
Central Asia Indian Ocean
Regoinal sub-systems
Other peripheral regional systems
Persian Gulf
South Asia Asia-Pacific
African South East Asia

Horn of
Union Africa
Eastern
Africa
Southern
South-West
Indian Ocean
Indian Ocean
Africa Islands System South Pacific
(Oceania)
Southern Islands
and EEZ
Figure 1: The Indian Ocean regional sub-systems and peripheral regional systems2
This issue touches on Buzan and Weaver’s regional security complex theory. A
regional security complex represents “a group of states whose primary security
concerns are linked together sufficiently closely that their national securities
cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”. In short, a regional
security complex comprises a group of states united by common security
problems3.
1
Smith, R. (2011), ‘History, geography and security: evolving dialogue in the Indo-
Pacific’, presentation to the University of Western Australia roundtable, November.
2
Bouchard, C. and Crumplin, W. (2010), ‘Neglected no longer: the Indian Ocean at
the forefront of wold geopolitics and global geostrategy’, Journal of the Indian Ocean
Region, Vol. 6 (1), pp. 26-51.
3
Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003), Regions and Powers: The Structure of International
Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11
In the IOR, state-based security relationships have tended to be organised
at a sub-regional system level – for example, Southern Africa, Persian Gulf,
South Asia and Southeast Asia – and it is at this scale that there exists the most
effective level of regional cooperation and economic integration among states4.
Nonetheless, there are many ocean-wide security issues of regional and global
significance deserving of further regional analysis and policy development. This
is especially the case for non-state threats such as piracy and terrorism as well as
other non-traditional or transnational security threats associated with the use of
the ocean, such as maritime security matters, environmental security issues and
the nature of economic exploitation both in and below the ocean itself.
Inevitably there is debate over the nature of any regional security regime or
regimes that might be constructed for the IOR. What is also clear is that
different regional structures can perform different security functions at different
scales and/or in parallel. In a very real sense, there was no need for regional
states to devise a security regime during a period when the Indian Ocean was
dominated by outside powers. The combination of colonialism and the Cold
War ensured that regional states were insufficiently emancipated to collectively
decide their destinies. In any event, internal interaction was relatively weak
and this ensured a weak regionalism. Just as security threats and insecurity are
constructed, so security itself also needs to be constructed. At present, apart
from the role of the United Nations and a few second track groups, ultimately,
much of the responsibility for constructing security in the IOR lies in the hands
of regional states.
There are at least four essential characteristics of this current security
environment. First, there is no region-wide security regime for the Indian
Ocean. Second, sub-regional security regimes are relatively weak. Third, security
arrangements are essentially Western-oriented and are principally orchestrated
by the United States. Fourth, there is an emphasis on stronger bilateral, rather
than multilateral, security relationships in the IOR.
Developments in world affairs over the last 20 years have directed fresh attention
to the Indian Ocean. Salient among these has been the shift in global economic
weight and influence from the North Atlantic to Asia, including in particular
the rise of China and India. This, together with a more urgent focus on energy,
resource and food security issues, has driven new levels of interest in the trade
routes and sea lanes eastwards from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea and north
from Australia. In addition, there has been a renewed interest in Africa and,
potentially, the Indian Ocean seabed as sources of mineral resources as well as
in development issues in Indian Ocean rim countries, arising in part from the
challenges posed by failed or failing states in the region. These developments
have given rise to renewed attempts to delineate and define the IOR, and to
determine more clearly just how important it is in global strategic terms.
4
Region, Vol. 6 (1), pp. 42.
12
The present reality is that the issues relating to the Indian Ocean and its littoral
are best addressed in terms of two overlapping regional systems. The first system
embraces Indian Ocean-centric issues – that is, issues that are specific to the
Indian Ocean and its littoral. These include issues of economic development
and human security, the environment, the seabed and fisheries management,
among others. These issues are best addressed by the countries with direct stakes
in them, and which therefore potentially form the essential reform agenda of
the current pre-eminent regional body, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC).
The second system sees the Indian Ocean as part of a wider Indo-Pacific
‘strategic system’ that embraces the trade routes and sea lanes that cross the
Indian Ocean itself but also extends past the Straits of Malacca and the Sunda
and Lombok Straits into the South China Sea and north to China, Taiwan, Korea
and Japan, and indeed on to the west coast of North America. As trade highways,
these routes are arguably the most important in the world today, and the ‘choke
points’ and contested waterways along the highway attract critical attention of
the ‘hard security’ kind. Given the range of stakeholders, this is an inclusive
framework, and the issues embraced within it are played out at a high political
level. Thus, as conceptualised in this Report, while some discussions of the Indo-
Pacific security system have been exclusive (meaning that China is excluded), we
argue for the concept to be inclusive (meaning that China is included) in order
to maximise long-term regional security. This inclusive concept we refer to as the
“New Indo-Pacific” to clearly differentiate it from the exclusive meaning.
In order to fully develop the argument for both the enlargement of the IOR-
ARC agenda to incorporate an array of non-traditional security issues, and the
incorporation of a new Indo-Pacific concept into higher order security thinking,
this Report is divided into three major sections. The first section considers the
changing security dynamics of the IOR. This section begins by arguing for the
need to consider security as a multidimensional concept in the 21st century. The
report suggests that policy-makers need to incorporate a broader and more
interdependent concept of security than the traditional military concept in order
to maximise long-term regional security. Thus, concepts of human security,
economic and resources security, maritime security and environmental security
are interrelated and critically important to 21st century state and regional
stability. This section of the report also evaluates the narratives surrounding
proponents of different regional security structures. It finds that a new concept
of maritime regionalism can be applied to a range of non-traditional security
concerns in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, while there is need for a new
regional maritime security regime, the old exclusive Indo-Pacific security
concept will not likely guarantee long-term regional stability.
13
The second major section of the report provides a detailed description and
analysis of the various components of the multidimensional security concept as
they apply to all Indian Ocean states. It is concluded that, within the IOR, while
there has been a significant increase in military expenditure among some states,
and while important inter-state conflicts still remain, in reality, most conflicts
actually occur within rather than between states. As a result, at the Indian Ocean
regional level, greater policy attention needs to be given to aspects of human
security, economic and resources security, maritime security and environmental
security.
The third major section of the report considers the roles of India and Australia
in Indo-Pacific security. This section of the report focuses on the development
of the Australia-India strategic relationship and how this can be enhanced to
the benefit of both states in the context of shifts in the balance of power between
the Indian and Pacific oceans and the implications of the emergence of an
Indo-Pacific strategic region. It is argued that there is considerable scope for
increased bilateral cooperation between India and Australia both within the IOR
and beyond. It is suggested that, given the current configuration of IOR-ARC,
both India and Australia can take the lead in increasing regional awareness
and cooperation among Indian Ocean rim states. Furthermore, both India and
Australia can be active participants in the provision of maritime security through
the entire Indo-Pacific littoral. In short, both India and Australia can take the
lead in facilitating the development of security agendas for both the Indian
Ocean and the Indo-Pacific security systems.
The concluding section brings together the main policy and research
implications of the report. In summary, the following 22 conclusions and policy
suggestions are made:
1. There is a need for a new Indo-Pacific maritime security regime that involves
all relevant stakeholders in matters of regional maritime security.
2. The agenda of IOR-ARC needs to be expanded beyond economic matters to
incorporate a range of non-traditional security issues.
3. Due weight should be placed on the increasing geopolitical importance of the
IOR in national and regional security policies.
4. Recognition should be given by all regional states to the multidimensional
nature of security in the development of national and regional security
policies.
5. Most conflicts occur within states. Maximising human development requires
appropriate attention be given to military expenditure compared with other
forms of expenditure.
14
6. Competition for power and influence within the IOR by outside powers is
unlikely to maximise long-term regional stability.
7. Regional security is especially jeopardised by five “states of concern” that are
failed or failing, not free and highly repressive.
8. To ensure long-term national and regional stability, the maximisation of
human security should be a central goal.
9. There is a need to develop cooperative mechanisms for collectively dealing
with displaced persons, refugees and people trafficking.
10. A major regional policy target should be the “vicious circle of economic
security and civil conflict”.
11. ODA targets and outcomes need to be more closely focused and monitored.
12. The “militarisation of energy security” is a regional cause for concern.
13. A new Indo-Pacific Maritime Energy Security (INDOMES) regime is
proposed to incorporate all states that are stakeholders in maximising the
security of energy flows through the Indian Ocean.
14. Integrated land-sea policies are essential to enhance maritime security.
15. Agricultural technology and other ODA need to target regional food-
insecure states.
16. Water sharing, conservation and technological cooperation are essential for
states that are water insecure.
17. There is a need for a regional agreement on the prevention of illegal dumping
of nuclear waste.
18. The potential growth of sustainable fisheries requires a new integrated
regional management framework.
19. Collective action is essential to ameliorate the adverse impacts of human-
induced climate change.
20. The long-term maximisation of regional security requires the adoption and
development of a new collective Indian Ocean maritime regional paradigm.
21. Both India and Australia can take the lead in increasing awareness and
cooperation among Indian Ocean rim states.
22. India and Australia can also enhance their own bilateral security relationship
through greater cooperation in maritime security issues both within the
Indian Ocean and in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
15
II. The changing security dynamics
of the Indian Ocean region
1. Security as a multidimensional concept
In the Brundtland Report, published in the final stages of the Cold War period,
the global implications of the interdependence of society, economy, politics
and environment were explained explicitly for the first time, and the centrality
of a multidimensional post-realist concept of security was affirmed5. Thus, for
example, ecologically sustainable development was seen to be necessary in order
to maintain environmental security. Second, economic participation needed
to be maximised to guarantee economic security. Economic inequalities would
likely lead to social insecurity. Third, representation and participation ought to
be maximised in order to ensure political security.
environment
instability stablility
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ts
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n
ee
lo
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en
politics security economy

t
instability stablility instability stablility instability stablility

y
lit
ua
pa
eq
rti
n
in
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at
ic
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rti
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on
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society
on
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instability stablility
Figure 2: Essential elements of multidimensional security 6

Clearly, while environmental movements can have an impact on political
security, government policies will influence the extent of environmental security.
In sum, the degree of stability and security, and thus peace and conflict among
and within states, is determined by this set of interrelationships (Figure 2).
5
Brundtland, G. H. (1990), Our Common Future, Australian Edition (Melbourne:
OUP).
6
Rumley, D. (1998), ‘Geography, interdependence and security’, Geojournal, vol 45 (1-
2), pp. 110.
16
The emergence of a new security agenda

The post-Cold War concern with a range of “new security challenges” is
associated with a profound debate not only about the meaning of the term
security but also about the nature of national, regional and global security
policy7. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the case has been well put against the
“traditionalists” who want to restrict discussions of security solely to politico-
military issues, compared to the “wideners” who want to extend the concept to
include economic, social and environmental aspects of security8. The present
Report belongs unequivocally to the latter orientation, since in the post-Cold
War period these issues have become increasingly securitised9.
To some degree, since the end of World War II and up until relatively recently,
for different reasons Indian Ocean states have been regionally disengaged or
even isolated in terms of their principal security relationships. The end of the
Cold War and its association with increasing globalisation has necessitated a
new security outlook on the part of regional states in terms of the nature and
types of perceived threats. In addition, these changes have precipitated a new
outward orientation such that threats are no longer conceived solely within a
national frame of reference, but also within a non-state, regional and even global
context10. Thus, both the nature and the scale of threat have changed, while the
question of human security has become increasingly significant11. These changes,
in turn, have been associated with a developing concern on the part of both
states over mutual regional security interests, especially in the IOR and wider
Asia-Pacific region. In short, the IOR has been subject to the emergence of a
“new security agenda” that all states must confront due in part to globalisation12.
7
Stares, P. B., ed. (1998), The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey, Tokyo: Japan
Center for International Exchange.
8
Alagappa, M. (1998), ‘Rethinking security: a critical review and appraisal of the
debate’, in M. Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational
Influences, Stanford University Press, pp. 27-64.
Alagappa, M., ed. (1998), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences,
Stanford University Press.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998), Security: A New Framework for
Analysis, Boulder: Lynne Reinner.
9
Rumley, D. and Chaturvedi, S., eds. (2005), Energy Security and the Indian Ocean
Region, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, p. 3.
10
Thakur, R. and Newman, E., eds. (2004), Broadening Asia’s Security Discourse and
Agenda: Political, Social, and Environmental Perspectives, Tokyo: United Nations
University Press.
11
Commission on Human Security (2003), Human Security Now, New York.
12
Coker, C. (2002), ‘Globalisation and insecurity in the twenty-first century: NATO and
the management of risk’, ISSS, Adelphi Paper, 345, Oxford University Press, p. 8.
17
In particular, three overall trends have contributed to the emergence of this new
agenda. First, the emergence of globalised networks, which have increased state
vulnerability to non-state actors and to a range of transnational threats; second,
technological developments in weaponry have generated new threats and have
brought states closer together; and third, globalised information networks have
contributed to increased demands for action and have had an associated impact
on international law. As a result, solutions to the new threats generally require
regional and even global mechanisms for cooperation and coordination13
However, collectively confronting new security challenges due to globalisation
is never straightforward since the impacts are generally uneven and sometimes
contradictory (Figure 3).
Greater freedom Human rights violations

Creates wealth Creates inequalities
Generates human insecurity Makes some feel more secure
Enabling Disempowering
Certainty Uncertainty
The ‘globalised’ The ‘marginalised’
Figure 3: Some contradictory impacts of globalisation on security14
It has been argued, for example, that the gap between the so-called ‘globalised’
and the ‘marginalised’ or ‘unglobalised’ is the most important of all cultural
divisions, and that this gap will increasingly become a source of conflict during
the present century15 . One influential book differentiates between a globalised
“functioning core” and a “non-integrating gap” and draws an extremely
arbitrary boundary between those states that are seen to be actively integrated
into the global economy – that is, the “functioning core” – and the remainder
that constitute the “non-integrating gap”16. While the core states “adhere to
13
Allison, G. (2000), ‘The impact of globalization on national and international security’,
in Nye, J. S. and Donahue, J. D., eds., Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington
DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 72-85.
14
Rumley, D. and Gopal, D., eds. (2007), Globalisation and Regional Security: India and
Australia. Delhi: Shipra. p. 3.
15
Coker, C. (2002), ‘Globalisation and insecurity in the twenty-first century: NATO and
the management of risk’, ISSS, Adelphi Paper, 345, Oxford University Press, p. 21.
16
Barnett, T. P. M. (2004), The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First
Century, New York: Penguin.
18
globalisation’s emerging security rule set”, the states of the gap apparently do
not17 . The gap states are also characterised as being “poor” and as places where
life is “nasty”, “short”, “brutal” and “solitary”18.
In the IOR, only three states – Australia, India and South Africa – are included
in Barnett’s “functioning core”. In short, if we accept this aspect of Barnett’s
characterisation, all three states will increasingly have mutually significant
security interests due to globalisation during the present century. As has been
pointed out, the transnational economic and geopolitical space that has resulted
from globalisation requires “organized responses”19. Given their regional location
in this space, both India and Australia are in a unique position to take on a
leading role in collaboratively developing and implementing a new regional
security agenda.
On the face of it, some observers may argue that the IOR is inherently insecure.
For example, from a geopolitical perspective, as stated earlier, the region does
not comprise a “true security system”; rather, it comprises a set of highly diverse
sub-systems20. Furthermore, the region has been characterised as being akin
to an “arc of crisis”, since it contains many poor, unstable states which are
beset by bilateral land-based and/or maritime disputes21. This view is similar
to an earlier characterisation by Brzezinski of the region as an “arc of crisis”
through the Middle East into Africa22. It has also been argued that the IOR has
now entered a new geopolitical era which comprises an “Indianoceanic order”
characterised by heterogeneity, fragmentation into sub-regional systems, an
emergent regionalism, subordination to large regional powers and realisation of
the actual importance of the ocean itself both as a highway and environment23. In
this new “order”, many regional states are as much concerned with the problems
of internal stability as they are with Indian Ocean regional issues or questions
related to a security threat from another state.
17
Century, New York: Penguin, pp. 25-6,
18
Century, New York: Penguin, pp. 161-166,
19
Lévy, B. (2002), ‘Globalization, hemispheric economic integration and beyond:
governance and security issues’, in Smith, E. V., ed., New Perspectives on Globalization,
New York: Nova Science, p. 130.
20
Bouchard, C. (2004), “Emergence of a new geopolitical era in the Indian Ocean:
characteristics, issues and limitations of the Indianoceanic order”, in Rumley and
Chaturvedi, op. cit., pp. 84-109.
21
Gordon, S. et al (1996), Security and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Region,
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU.
22
House, J. W. (1984), ‘War, peace and conflict resolution: towards an Indian Ocean
model’, Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 9, p.6.
23
Bouchard, C. (2004), ‘Emergence of a new geopolitical era in the Indian Ocean:
characteristics, issues and limitations of the Indianoceanic order’, in Rumley and
19
Constructing security
It is accepted here that security is a contested, multi-scalar and multidimensional
concept, whose component parts are interdependent. It can thus embody
traditional concerns over military security that are generally evident at the scale
of the state but it also encompasses other aspects of security such as economic
and environmental security. In addition, a broad definition of security would
include other non-state forms of non-traditional security, such as terrorism,
money laundering and drug trafficking. Thus, security threats can take many
forms – from armed conflict to sexual violence against women24. Policies
designed to meet traditional security concerns have generally been enacted at the
state scale, but with increasing globalisation and technological change, policies
associated with economic and environmental security and with all forms of
non-traditional security increasingly necessitate inter-state cooperation. This is a
significant policy concern for most Indian Ocean regional states since the nature
of non-traditional security threats is becoming increasingly more important, and
in a globalised world, states will wish to portray themselves both as being secure
and as being of no threat. In short, constructing Indian Ocean security in the 21st
century in the broadest sense requires regional cooperation.
Geopolitically-constructed security threats

In the 21st century, geopolitically-constructed security threats have been ascribed
by the West to states and regions. Thus, “rogue states” and “failed states” have
been portrayed by the West as being located outside of the civilised world in
a way that echoes the Cold War good-versus-evil rhetoric of the conflict with
the Soviet Union25. However, it is clear that there is a tendency for international
crises to be centred on weak or failing states26. The characterisation of Iran, Iraq
and North Korea as being part of an “axis of evil” was not only based on the
belief that these states were developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but
that they were intending to use these weapons against Western interests.
Geopolitically-constructed security threats are inevitably contested. The term
Cold War, for example, has been interpreted as comprising four different but
related conflicts – USA versus European states, economic centre versus economic
periphery, freedom versus totalitarianism and USA versus USSR27 .
24
Commission on Human Security (2003), Human Security Now, New York, p.49.
25
Rumley, D. (2003), ‘The Asia-Pacific region and the new world order’, Ekistics, Vol 70,
no. 422/423, pp. 321-326.
26
Fukuyama, F. (2004), State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century.
New York: Cornell University Press.
27
Rumley, D., Chiba, T., Takagi, A. and Fukushima, Y., eds. (1996), Global Geopolitical
Change and the Asia-Pacific: A Regional Perspective, Aldershot: Ashgate., p.3
20
Another well known global geopolitical construction, of course, is the clash of

civilizations hypothesis28. For the IOR, this construction predicts an ongoing
set of conflicts among African, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Sinic and Western
‘civilizations’, with permanent ‘fault lines’ located where these six civilizations
connect. Huntington would have us believe that Australia will be in permanent
conflict with most of its Indian Ocean neighbours, including India, since the
primary dimension of conflict is seen as between so-called Western civilization
and the rest. As has been pointed out, not only is Huntington’s concept of
‘civilization’ conceptually and operationally flawed, his analysis seems to ignore
the fact that, in recent years, most violent conflicts have actually occurred within
civilisations and more particularly within states29.
An alternative construction of a primary dimension of conflict that has
implications for the IOR is provided by Tariq Ali. He sees the main source
of global conflict as being a “clash of fundamentalisms”, especially between
Islamic fundamentalism and what he characterises as “the mother of all
fundamentalisms: American imperialism”30. This characterisation has some
important implications for real and perceived security threats within the IOR,
given the locations of the land and sea based presence of the United States.
Most of the West Asian portion of the IOR has been characterised as “the global
zone of percolating violence” and “is likely to be a major battlefield, both for
wars among nation-states and, more likely, for protracted ethnic and religious
violence”31. In addition, most of the northern half of the IOR, including India,
has been incorporated into a “Southern Belt of Strategic Instability” which
stretches from southern Japan in the east to northern Italy in the west32. Not only
do such constructions tend to be self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling, they can also
come to be regarded as rigid and limiting templates for policy-making.
28
Huntington, S. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World
Order, New York: Simon and Schuster.
29
Rumley, D. (1999), The Geopolitics of Australia’s Regional Relations, Dordrecht:
Springer, p27.
30
Ali, T. (2002), The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity,
London: Verso, p281.
31
Brzezinski, Z. (1997), The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic
Imperatives, New York: Basic Books.
32
Flanagan, S. J., Frost, E. L. and Kugler, R. L. (2001), Challenges of the Global Century:
Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security, Washington DC, National
Defense University.
21
Threats and legitimate interests
Most states will pursue legitimate interests in order to maximise their economic
security. However, in situations of competition and resource scarcity, states are
likely to be in conflict with others and these conflicts may well be ‘developmental’
– that is, they are based on a developed state static concept of ‘developmental
order’ that requires less economically developed states to pose no significant
economic challenge. A threat to a developed state’s economic security and
economic dominance may well be portrayed or characterised by it as a threat in
the traditional use of the term. Furthermore, challenges to the ‘developmental
order’ may also be portrayed as challenges to regional hegemony and thus
resisted. From a traditional security perspective, the identification of hegemonic
‘no-go spaces’, such as the Indian Ocean, constructs a security threat both to
the hegemon and to the ‘invading power’ that may well have legitimate regional
interests. As in the Cold War period, the identification of and propagandisation
of such spaces to some degree results in potential competition and uncertainty.
22
2. The changing geopolitical

significance of the Indian
Ocean region
The final decade of the 20th century saw an upsurge in global interest in the IOR
on the part of policy-makers, business people, academics and others associated
with a growing realisation of its enhanced geostrategic importance. The end of
the Cold War, increasing globalisation, India’s “opening up” and its Look East
policy, the end of apartheid in South Africa, Australia’s so-called Look West
policy and the burgeoning concern over an array of non-traditional security
threats, especially in relation to energy security33, placed new emphasis on the
IOR, especially the secure and sustainable use and management of the entire
ocean environment.
The Indian Ocean as a routeway

In terms of international trade, the Indian Ocean now contains the world’s most
important routeways for international maritime long-haul cargo. For example,
the Indian Ocean is now the world’s most important energy routeway. In 2007,
half of global daily oil production was moved by tankers on fixed maritime
routes. Since approximately 36 per cent of the world’s oil imports derive from the
Middle East, secure interregional oil shipments through the Indian Ocean are
vital to world prosperity. Oil import security is especially important for Japan
(80% of oil imports come from the Middle East), China (39%), Europe (21%)
and the United States (16%). Furthermore, in 2006, more than 80% of the world’s
seaborne trade in oil passed through only three Indian Ocean choke points –
Strait of Hormuz (40%), Strait of Malacca (35%) and Bab el-Mandab (8%).
What this means, is that the Northern economic powers and the developing
economic powers of China and India (and each of their respective navies) have
a legitimate interest in the security of SLOCs as well as a special concern for the
stability and geopolitical orientation of states proximate to the entrances and
exits to the ocean.
33
Region, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.
23
In this regard, apart from the troubled Horn of Africa, at least eleven regional
states are critical to the free flow of global sea trade – Australia, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa,
United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Since these states represent more than half
of its membership, the Indian Ocean Region Rim Association for Regional
Cooperation (IOR-ARC), formed in 1997, is potentially an extremely important
regional grouping for the construction of a cooperative security regime in the
IOR. This necessitates the broadening of the agenda of IOR-ARC, not only to
breathe new life into economic cooperation but, more importantly, a wide array
of potentially mutually-beneficial cooperative endeavours34.
The Indian Ocean as the neglected ocean

In global terms, the Indian Ocean has been a relatively neglected ocean and one
that has been seen to be marginal to global centres of power and conflict. The
region and its peoples were perceived by the European powers as being primarily
suitable and freely available for colonisation and exploitation and would thus
likely remain dependent and underdeveloped for the foreseeable future. Thus,
despite the existence of ancient civilisations and a wide array of sophisticated
indigenous peoples, it was thought that since the IOR included no global power,
it would continue to remain peripheral to global geopolitics and geo-economics.
It has been suggested that there are at least five interrelated reasons why Western
observers, in particular, have underestimated the geostrategic importance of the
IOR35. First, since some commentators see the region as primarily comprising
Third World states, it has been accorded a lower level of significance compared
with other oceans, especially the Atlantic and Pacific.
Second, the Northern-centric and primarily English-based system of global
knowledge has contributed to a level of ignorance about the region and regional
states. Northern-Western resources were unlikely to support Indian Ocean
educational programmes when better economic returns were perceived to
exist elsewhere. Some Western scholars have been hesitant about using the
term ‘Indian Ocean’, if only because it implies that India is the centre36. Indeed,
questions have been raised as to whether the term can even be used as a viable
category of inquiry and analysis37.
Third, since the region is a former arena of European colonial competition
and external domination, to some degree, residual core-periphery values of
social, economic and political superiority and security dependency continue
34
Rumley, D. and Chaturvedi, S., eds. (2004), Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism
and Security in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.
35
Chaturvedi, S. (2009), ‘Indian Ocean’, in R. Kitchin and N. Thrift, eds., International
Encyclopaedia of Human Geography, Volume 5. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 344-351.
36
Pearson, M. (2008), The Indian Ocean. London: Routledge, p.13.
37
Pearson, M. (2008), The Indian Ocean. London: Routledge, p. 287.
24
to prevail. Fourth, there is a relative paucity of reliable description and analysis

from students of international affairs on the geostrategic importance of the
IOR and of the geopolitics of regional states. Rather, what literature there is on
the IOR is dominated by Western writers imbued with Western orientations,
understandings and opinions.
Finally, the geopolitical orientation of many Indian Ocean regional states has
tended away from the ocean and has instead been directed either internally for
reasons of social, economic and political stability or towards other states and
regions of perceived greater geo-economic significance.
21st century strategic reassessment of the Indian Ocean
Region: two examples
The 21st century has seen a strategic reassessment of the global geopolitical
significance of the IOR. This is as a result of a changed set of perceptions on
the part of regional and extra-regional states. Two brief examples are worthy of
mention here: Australia and the United States.
(i) Australia
The 2009 Australian Defence White Paper argued that the Indian Ocean will
have a much greater geostrategic significance in the period to 2030 and will
join the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to Australian defence planning
and maritime strategy38. The changing strategic context in the IOR has caused a
former Australian defence minister to suggest that the geopolitical importance of
Australia itself has fundamentally shifted from what he describes as a “strategic
backwater” to a situation where Australia is now at “the southern tier of the focus
of the global political system”39.
(ii) The United States
The United States has a substantial interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean
region as a whole…Ensuring open access to the Indian Ocean will require a
more integrated approach to the region across military and civilian organizations
“according to the US Defense Department.”40
38
Commonwealth of Australia (2009), Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century:
Force 2030, Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence, p. 37.
39
Beazley, K. (2009), ‘Geopolitical power in the Indian Ocean’, radio interview by
Geraldine Doogue with Kim Beazley and Robert Kaplan that can be accessed at:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/saturdayextra/stories
40
US Department of Defense (2010a), Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
Washington DC.
25
The United States has been undergoing a reassessment of the strategic importance
of the IOR in recent years due in part to the growth of a range of non-traditional
threats and since the growing economic and military importance of China and
India challenges US dominance in the region. Indeed, it has been recently asserted
that:
“…the Indian Ocean may be the essential place to contemplate the
future of US power.41 Only by seeking at every opportunity to identify
its struggles with those of the larger Indian Ocean world can American
power finally be preserved”.42
The United States has generally eschewed regionalism and multilateralism in
favour of bilateralism, unless states are territorially contiguous or within its own
hemisphere. However, in the case of the Indian Ocean, the United States now
appears to be more in favour of a regionalism that might facilitate stability and
may allow it to have some influence, especially through its relationships with
Australia and India.
The changing geopolitical environment

In summary, the strategic reassessments and associated changes in perceptions are
the outcome of the interaction of many important factors and considerations that
include:
1. The increasing economic and military capabilities of China and India.
2. The increased competition for resources in the IOR, and especially in Africa
and the Middle East.
3. The challenge of meeting millennium development goals in the IOR.
4. The necessity for ageing Northern economies and rapidly growing Southern
economies to meet energy security requirements.
5. The ability and willingness of regional ‘energy-niche’ states to meet regional
and global energy demands.
6. The regional and global growth in terrorism and piracy.
7. The need to collectively enhance maritime security.
8. Increasing concerns over the exploitation of ocean resources both within and
under the sea.
9. An upsurge in the need to deal cooperatively with a range of environmental
security considerations, including climate change, water, food and ocean
management.
41
Kaplan, R. D. (2010), Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power,
New York: Random House, p. xiv.
42
Kaplan, R. D. (2010), Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power,
New York: Random House, p. 323.
26
10. The gradual emergence of what we call the fifth “new regionalism” phase of
intra-IOR connectivity. This follows earlier pre-colonial, colonial, Cold War and
post-Cold War phases43.
Current regional security arrangements and forums

In the context of this new strategic environment, the precise regional security
configuration of the Indian Ocean for the fifth stage of “new regionalism” has yet
to be determined. As noted earlier, the current arrangements are an overlapping
patchwork of regional, sub-regional and extra-regional first and second track
forums and linkages, none of which explicitly incorporates a concept of
multidimensional security, nor is contained within an agreed regional structure or
one that involves all appropriate stakeholders.
For the sake of the present discussion, it is important to examine the extent to
which some of the current regional and sub-regional arrangements meet these
three ‘tests’ – that is, multidimensionality, agreed regional structure and appropriate
stakeholders – for four key Indian Ocean players – Australia, India, China and the
United States. We include three ocean-wide, seven sub-regional and two ‘external
linkage’ regional groupings in this analysis (Figure 4).
43
Rumley, D. (2012), ‘Refloating IOR-ARC: Australian perspectives’, in V. Sakhuja, ed.,
Reinvigorating IOR-ARC, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, p. 93.
27
A C I USA
Ocean-wide
IOR-ARC* √ DP √ X
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium@ √ X √ X
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission+ √ √ √ X
Sub-regional
ARF^ √ √ √ √
ASEAN# DP DP DP DP
BIMSTEC* X X √ X
GCC* X X X X
ReCAAP@ X CP CP X
SAARC* X X √ X
SADC* X X X X
External linkage
APEC* √ √ X √
EAS^ √ √ √ √
* economic security
@ maritime security
+ environmental security
^ traditional security
# multidimensional security
DP = Dialogue Partner
CP = Contracting Partner
Figure 4: Indian Ocean regional security arrangements: Australia, China, India
and USA linkages
Of the 12 examples listed in Figure 4, membership of all four states occurs in
only two non-ocean regional groupings: ARF and EAS. For the three Ocean-wide
groupings –IOR-ARC, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) – the results for the four states against the three
‘tests’ are mixed. For example, for IOR-ARC, which is ostensibly an economic
cooperation group in search of a broader agenda, both Australia and India are
members and China is a Dialogue Partner, but the United States is currently
excluded. In the context of a broad conception of security and the present regional
interests of ‘external’ states, on the face of it this differentiation between China and
the United States seems rather unusual. Indeed, the United States is excluded from
all three ocean-wide groupings, while only Australia and India have been involved
in IONS. India, on the other hand, does not have a direct association with only
three of the 12 regional groupings (Figure 4).
From a regional security perspective, it seems that in the IOR there is a
mismatch between regional structure and regional function. There is no regional
organisation that can deal with a wide array of environmental security problems,
nor is there a forum within which problems of maritime security, for example, can
be discussed among all relevant stakeholders.
28
3. Regional options for Indian

Ocean security
Competing regional security constructions
In has been argued that, in recent years, the regional security debate and
responses in Australia have primarily reflected three competing security
constructions of the IOR43a. The first is an all-embracing concept of an IOR
comprising up to 51 states at its largest scale to 19 states at the scale of the
IOR-ARC. The second is a scaled-down version of the first into the East Indian
Ocean. The third and largest in area is an Indo-Pacific concept that emphasises
the pre-eminence of regional naval power and ensures that India (along with
Indonesia, Japan and the United States, among others) potentially plays a central
policing role not only within the IOR.
A narrative based on an Indian Ocean regional security construction tends to
be perpetuated by liberal practitioners and commentators concerned primarily
with non-traditional security issues, the cooperative use of diplomacy and smart
power in a regional community context. On the other hand, the dominant
narrative based on an Indo-Pacific region security construction tends to
be propagated by conservative practitioners and commentators concerned
principally with the use of collective traditional security and hard power
directed either overtly or covertly towards individual states, and in particular,
towards China. While there are subservient interpretations of the Indo-Pacific
concept that are inclusive of China, these inclusive maps are not the dominant
geopolitical construction currently espoused (Figure 5).
We argue that there is an overriding narrative at work that de-emphasises an
Indian Ocean regional security construction, while attempting to propagate
a view in favour of a more US-centric/China exclusive Indo-Pacific regional
security construction. We argue here, however, for a more inclusive definition of
the Indo-Pacific, one that includes both China and the United States.
43a
Rumley, D., Doyle, T. and Chaturvedi, S. (2012a), “Securing’ the Indian Ocean?
Competing regional security constructions’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.
8 (2), pp. 1-21.
29
Indian Ocean Region East Indian Ocean Indo-Pacific Region
Diplomacy Limited diplomacy Traditional security
19 states comprise IOR-ARC Tripartite bloc US-India centric/exclusive
Pakistan excludes India; Australia/India/Indonesia Australia-China contested
Iran excludes USA; Japan also a key player
China a Dialogue Partner
Soft power Soft/hard power Hard power
Non-traditional security issues Traditional security
Pan-regionalists Sub-regionalists Nationalists
Foreign Affairs departments/
Foreign Affairs/Defence Defence departments
Consultants
Liberal commentators Liberal/conservative Conservative commentators
commentators
Figure 5: Comparison among three competing regional constructions 43b
The Indian Ocean region

From a formal perspective, the IOR could be defined as comprising those states
that border directly the Indian Ocean. From a functional point of view, we could
define the IOR as comprising those 19 states that belong to the IOR-ARC. The
common formal and functional criterion is a border on, and an interest in, the
ocean itself. In the case of the latter criterion, we could include states associated
with the tributary waters to the Indian Ocean as well as those land-locked states
for which transit to and from the sea is primarily oriented towards the Indian
Ocean (Figure 6). Using this broadest regional construction, we can identify a
total of 51 states, 28 of which are Indian Ocean rim states, plus a further 10 that
are coastal states of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, together with an additional
13 Indian Ocean land-locked states.
43b
Rumley, D., Doyle, T. and Chaturvedi, S. (2012b), ‘Securing’ the Indian Ocean?
Competing regional security constructions’, University of Adelaide, Indo-Pacific
Governance Research Centre, Policy Brief, Issue 3 (summary of 2012a).
30
Indian Ocean rim states Other coastal states Indian Ocean

of the Red Sea and land-locked
the Persian Gulf states
Australia Mozambique Bahrain Afghanistan
Bangladesh Oman Egypt Bhutan
Burma (Myanmar) Pakistan Eritrea Botswana
Comoros Seychelles Iraq Burundi
Djibouti Singapore Israel Ethiopia
France* Somalia Jordan Lesotho
Kenya South Africa Kuwait Malawi
India Sri Lanka Qatar Nepal
Indonesia Tanzania Saudi Arabia Rwanda
Iran Thailand Sudan Swaziland
Madagascar Timor-Leste Uganda
Malaysia United Arab Emir- Zambia
Maldives ates Zimbabwe
Mauritius United Kingdom*
Yemen
(*For France and United Kingdom: because of their island territories)

Figure 6: The 51 states of the Indian Ocean region44
One view of a preferred regional security construction is that it be built around
the IOR. This view argues that strategic reassessments of the IOR and associated
security challenges are contributing to the development of a new collective
Indian Ocean security paradigm built on maritime regionalism. This paradigm
is primarily designed to facilitate confidence building and to deal effectively
with a wide range of so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenges. Significantly,
however, the United States Unified Command Structure divides the IOR between
USAFRICACOM and USPACOM, splitting the Indian Ocean in two (Figure 7).
44
Region, Vol. 6 (1), p. 35.
31
Figure 7: The USPACOM
This division has resulted in a “fragmented” organisational security structure
as far as the US approach to the IOR is concerned45. Often changes in overall
strategic direction fail to transpire simply because bureaucratic and departmental
structures are pre-existing and well-entrenched, rather than because there is an
acceptance or rejection of a new institutional architecture that reflects power
shifts and new regional constellations46.
The East Indian Ocean
A second competing regional security construction centres on the East Indian
Ocean (EIO). We have been reminded recently that “Australia often forgets that
it’s a three-ocean country”. While Australia has had a unified policy framework
for the Pacific Ocean, such an approach is lacking for the Indian Ocean as a
whole47. A full Australian engagement in an Indian Ocean-wide set of security
initiatives is subject to the constraint of “territorial overstretch”; that is, the
challenge of attempting to undertake too much engagement across too great a
span of territory on too many issues48. Since Australia’s “geographical reach is
limited”, a more limited regional security construction might be preferred.
45
Hastings, J. (2011), ‘The fractured geopolitics of the United States in the Indian Ocean
Region’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 7 (2), pp. 183-199.
46
Doyle, T. (2011), ‘Building Indian Ocean regionalisms: an agenda for IORG research’, in
V. Sakhuja, ed., Reinvigorating IOR-ARC, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, pp. 1-17.
47
Bateman, S. and Bergin, A. (2010), Our Western Front: Australia and the Indian Ocean.
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), March, p. 33.
48
Rumley, D. (2012), ‘Refloating IOR-ARC: Australian perspectives’, in V. Sakhuja, ed.,
Reinvigorating IOR-ARC, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, p. 103.
32
While not neglecting the rest of the IOR, Australia, it is argued, should focus on
the geographically closer EIO sub-region to enable practical cooperation and
constructive dialogue49. Importantly for this regional construction, the EIO is
congruent with USPACOM.
The Indo-Pacific region
A third regional security construction is that of the Indo-Pacific region. Some
commentators appear to take it for granted that we have now entered the “Indo-
Pacific century”50. Proponents lead us to believe that its emergence is both
“irresistible”51 and “inevitable”52. We are assured that the Asia-Pacific era “died”
in 2011 and was replaced with the Indo-Pacific era. The conservative Australian
journalist Greg Sheridan, for example, claims that the 60th anniversary
Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) meeting in San
Francisco in September 2011 marked the “pivot point” at which Australia and
the United States began to “redefine their region not as the Asia-Pacific, but as
the Indo-Pacific”53.
Not surprisingly, the Indo-Pacific construction itself is contested. The University
of Adelaide’s Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre defines the Indo-Pacific
as the “region spanning the Western Pacific Ocean to the Western Indian Ocean
along the eastern coast of Africa”. The Indo-Pacific has also been defined as
“the areas of the Indian Ocean and the West Pacific”54. Furthermore, it has been
defined as “an emerging Asian strategic system that encompasses both the Pacific
and Indian Oceans, defined in part by the geographically expanding interests
and reach of China and India, and the continued strategic role and presence of
the United States in both”55.
49
Bateman, S. and Bergin, A. (2010), Our Western Front: Australia and the Indian Ocean.
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), March.
50
Medcalf, R. (2012), ‘Unselfish giants? Understanding China and India as security
providers’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 66 (1), p. 13.
51
Wesley, M. (2011), ‘Irresistible rise of the Indo-Pacific’, The Australian newspaper, 4
May – accessible at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/irresistible-rise-of-
the-indo-pacific/story-e6frg8nf-1226047014015.
52
Raja Mohan, C. (2011a), ‘India and Australia: maritime partners in the Indo-Pacific’,
The Asialink Essays, Vol. 3 (7), November, pp. 1-4.
53
Sheridan, G. (2011), ‘New Australia-US push deals India in to Pacific’, The Australian
newspaper, 17 September and available at: http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/new-australia-us-push-deals-india- in-to-pacific/
story-e6frg76f-1226139302534
54
Curtis, L. et al (2011), Shared Goals, Converging Interests: A Plan for US-Australia-
India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Washington DC: Heritage Foundation,
Department of Defense (2009), p. 1.
55
Medcalf, R., Heinrichs, R. and Jones, J. (2011), Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers
and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia, Sydney: Lowy, p. 56.
33
Furthermore, increasing economic and trade linkages – a process of
regionalisation – necessitates the construction of an Indo-Pacific regionalism.
It appears that one of the practical security aims of the re-introduction of this
regional construction is to shift the centre of gravity of Indian and Australian
security concerns towards the South China Sea as part of a burden-sharing
strategy with the United States. It is thus in part an attempt by the United States
to engage India and Australia (and others) while simultaneously facilitating its
hegemonic transition.
The United States and the Indo-Pacific
It has been argued that the United States does not have a coherent geopolitical
vision of the IOR and that the allocation of political and military resources
makes it difficult for the US to make a credible commitment to the security
of the IOR. To the extent that the US has an alliance structure in the IOR, it
is comprised of the residual relationships from other strategically important
regions, thus decreasing its ability to be turned to the security of the IOR.
While the US Department of Defense rhetorically recognises the geopolitical
importance of the IOR, as noted there is no single US military command
structure dedicated to the IOR. The military forces that are prepositioned in
the region are not insignificant, but are ill-suited for making the necessary
commitments to the region as a whole. This spatial distribution of resources has
implications for the United States’ ability to claim that the IOR as a whole is at
the core of its interests56.
The new imperative of shifting from an Indian Ocean to an Indo-Pacific regional
security construction is driven, in part, by concerns over possible Chinese naval
expansion and concern over the use of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean
and in the South China Sea. From an American perspective, effectively managing
these concerns requires the cooperation not only of India, but also of Australia,
Indonesia, Japan and other states that possess similar concerns. Australia
benefits, it is argued, because it will obtain a US presence in a remote region
that is of national economic significance and a potential subject of future threat.
From an overall regional geopolitical perspective, the coalition will affect closer
monitoring and potential control over the eastern exits and entrances of Indian
Ocean access routes. The end result is clearly of global geopolitical significance.
The renewed interest in an Indo-Pacific construction on the part of the United
States has some clear implications for the long-term future of US-Australia
security relations. The move towards an Indo-Pacific security construction has
reignited the basic trilateral geopolitical tension faced by Australia’s external
linkages. Culturally, Australia identifies primarily with Europe; economically,
56
Hastings, J. (2011), ‘The fractured geopolitics of the United States in the Indian Ocean
Region’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 7 (2), pp. 183-199.
34
Australia’s strongest links are with Asia, and especially China; and, militarily and
politically, Australia is aligned with the United States57. Enhanced engagement
has also been proposed by creating a formal trilateral dialogue among Australia,
India and the United States that would address common security challenges in
the Indo-Pacific Region58.
Towards a more inclusive regional security construction
One of the more important dimensions of contested regionalism is whether
the scale or the type of regionalism includes or excludes certain states, and
whether the type of regionalism is in full accord with, or conflicts in some
way with, state/non-state goals. This dimension of contested regionalism can
be seen to operate in practice from, first, the viewpoint of the state wishing to
be included and, second, from the perspective of the state or states wishing to
implement exclusion. In either case, inclusion in or membership of regional
constructions or organisations can be used as a mechanism for creating or
reconstituting some form of regional identity59. The depiction of the Indo-
Pacific by most commentators and state actors in Australia, India and the United
States, and the way it has been perceived in China, indicates that the current
Indo-Pacific regional construction is exclusive and therefore directed towards
China. The propagation of this concept in its present form may have unintended
negative consequences, which may lead to an increase in regional instability. As
mentioned at the outset, we argue for a model of regionalism that is inclusive of
Indian and Chinese interests and of bilateral relationships with the United States.
Conclusion and implications
The undoubted strength and influence of the Indo-Pacific regional security
construction has some important implications for our other two Indian Ocean
proposals: IOR-ARC and EIO. For example, the prospects for EIO security
cooperation along the lines discussed earlier remain relatively bright, if only
because the EIO is congruent with United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).
However, any potential security function – either traditional or maritime
security cooperation – that IOR-ARC might consider undertaking will likely take
place at other forums, though IOR-ARC will remain an extremely useful regional
governance forum for a whole array of other cooperative ventures.
57
Rumley, D. (2007), ‘Australia’s regional security challenges: a geopolitical perspective’,
in D. Rumley and D. Gopal, eds., Globalisation and Regional Security: India and
Australia, Delhi: Shipra, p. 137.
58
Department of Defense (2009).
59
Rumley, D. (2005a), ‘The geopolitics of Asia-Pacific regionalism in the 21st century’,
The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies, Vol. 31, pp. 3-25.
35
III. Security challenges in the
Indian Ocean region
1. Traditional security and military conflict
The Indian Ocean is potentially an arena for geostrategic rivalry among great
powers reinforced by the “great base race” around the Region. The result is an
“Indian-Oceanic arc of militarisation” stretching from Egypt to Indonesia and
Australia”60. In 2010, the IOR included two of the world’s top military spenders
Saudi Arabia (7th) and India (9th) – with 2.8% (US$45.2B) and 2.5% (US$41.3B)
of global expenditure on arms respectively61.
Attempts to objectively measure security and precisely define security threats
are fraught with difficulty compared with, for example, the measurement of
insecurity outcomes – such as the number of deaths in battle or the number of
piracy attacks. Threat assessment, at best, is an imprecise science and, dependent
on its policy impact, runs the risk of exacerbating insecurity, especially between
states. However, since World War II, most conflicts have occurred within
rather than between states (Figure 8). State violence has generally been directed
internally while non-state violence, such as terrorism, has often been directed
at state apparatus, especially government buildings, the judiciary and various
manifestations of the economy.
Traditional military security
Almost half of Indian Ocean states have armed forces in excess of 100,000 and/
or military expenditure levels in excess of three per cent of GDP (Figure 9).
Six states have armed forces in excess of 400,000 – in order, India, Pakistan,
Vietnam, Iran, Burma and Egypt. However, the size of the armed forces is not a
good indicator of the degree of state militarisation (that is, the size of the armed
forces as a percentage of state population).
60
Chaturvedi, S. (2009), ‘Indian Ocean’, in R. Kitchin and N. Thrift, eds., International
Encyclopaedia of Human Geography, Volume 5. Oxford: Elsevier, p.46.
61
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2011), web site at: http://
www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex
36
Figure 8: Conflicts within and between states 1945-200562

Five other Indian Ocean states have militarisation levels above one per cent
– in order, Brunei, Singapore, Oman, Bahrain and Djibouti (Figure 9). Of all
11 states, six have military expenditures greater than three per cent of GDP –
Pakistan, Brunei, Singapore, Oman, Bahrain and Djibouti. However, four other
regional states have similar military expenditure priorities – Saudi Arabia,
Burundi, Sudan and Kuwait (Figure 9).
In short, on one measure or another, approximately one-third of all Indian
Ocean states place a relatively high, and in some cases increasing, expenditure
priority on traditional military security. Critically evaluating the relevance of this
priority in the context of alternative human developmental and other priorities
aimed at creating peaceful and sustainable regional communities are complex
and challenging research tasks.

62
UN DESA (2008), Overcoming Economic Insecurity: World Economic and Social
Survey 2008, New York.
37
State Size of armed forces Militarisation Military expenditure
2003 (force as % pop) (% GDP 2008)
Bahrain 11,000 1.38 3.4
Bangladesh 126,000 0.08 1.1
Botswana 9,000 0.46 3.0
Brunei 7,000 1.75 3.6
Burma 439,000 0.89 1.3
Burundi 45,000 0.54 4.9
Djibouti 10,000 1.11 4.1
Egypt 423,000 0.51 2.5
Ethiopia 163,000 0.20 2.1
India 1,200,000 0.10 2.5
Indonesia 302,000 0.13 1.2
Iran 440,000 0.59 2.9
Kuwait 16,000 0.53 3.9
Malaysia 104,000 0.41 2.1
Oman 42,000 1.50 10.7
Pakistan 610,000 0.34 3.1
Philippines 106,000 0.12 0.9
Saudi Arabia 106,000 0.41 9.3
Singapore 73,000 1.55 4.1
Sri Lanka 152,000 0.75 2.8
Sudan 105,000 0.25 4.4
Thailand 314,000 0.46 1.3
Vietnam 484,000 0.71 2.1
Yemen 67,000 0.28 5.1
Figure 9: Traditional security indicators in the Indian Ocean region63

Nonetheless, these priorities clearly represent a response to either perceived intra-regional
threat and/or to a desire to assert state territorial control over actual or potential intra-
state conflict. This is important from the perspective of regional stability since in 2008
the IOR included more than half of the world’s major armed conflicts, all of which were
intrastate – so-called “’one sided’ violence against civilians”. Furthermore, most of the
world’s “least peaceful states” were located in the IOR in 200964.
Regional nuclear proliferation

Arguably, the Indian Ocean is becoming a “nuclear ocean” given the increasing
number of regional nuclear weapons on land, as well as the indeterminate
number on and under the ocean at any one time, plus the likely increasing
importance of the regional uranium trade in the future65.
63
Editorial Essay (2010), Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 6 (1), p. 5.
64
Stepanova, E. (2009), ‘2. Trends in armed conflicts: one-sided violence against civilians’,
in SIPRI Yearbook 2009 Summary. Stockholm: SIPRI, pp. 4-5.
65
Doyle, T. (2005), ‘The Indian Ocean as the Nuclear Ocean: environmental security
dimensions of nuclear power’, in Rumley and Chaturvedi, op. cit., pp. 230-252.
38
The extent of regional nuclear proliferation can be seen both as a regional

security threat and a guarantor of peace, depending on one’s perception and
point of view. The standard arguments can be opposed – that is, the “more
will be better” school of Waltz and others versus the “more will be worse”
perspective of Sagan and others. On the one hand, while Waltz has argued that
nuclear proliferation will lead to greater stability through deterrence, Sagan has
argued that proliferation induces greater instability because of the potential for
deliberate or accidental conflict, and thus there is a need to enhance the global
non-proliferation regime66.
Others have argued that the inevitability of nuclear proliferation has resulted in
a fundamental shift in global geopolitics as a result of the onset of the “second
nuclear age”67. While the “first nuclear age” began on 16 July 1945 with the US
testing of the atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert, the “second nuclear age” –
an “Asian nuclear age” – arguably began with Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, with
India’s nuclear test of 1974 the first example of what one American commentator
refers to as an “outlaw bomb”68. Among other things, this characterisation
assumes that some (other) nuclear bombs are ‘legal’ and thus available for
‘legitimate’ use if necessary.
Only one regional state – South Africa – had them but gave them up, while
Iran may have them but say they do not and are not developing them, and
others, like Australia, shelter under a nuclear umbrella. Australia appears to be
comfortable with not having any nuclear weapons of its own on the one hand,
yet it exports substantial quantities of uranium on the other (admittedly under
treaty safeguards). Furthermore, when Australia chastised India when it tested
a nuclear device in 1998, this had a negative impact on the trading relationship
of both states, since the relative importance of inter-state trade declined almost
immediately69.
Many Western commentators find it difficult to conceive of a state like Iran, with
such enormous fossil fuel reserves, taking the pathway to nuclear energy. Among
other things, one interpretation of Iranian nuclear behaviour is that it is in direct
response to that of Israel and, earlier, to an Iraq that did possess WMD, apart
from also being a response to the United States itself.
66
Howlett, D. (2001), ‘Nuclear proliferation’ in Baylis, J. and Smith, S. eds., The
Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, pp. 415-439, pp. 428-9.
67
Bracken, P. (2000), Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second
Nuclear Age, Perennial: New York.
68
Nuclear Age, Perennial: New York. p95-124
69
Rumley, D. (2004), ‘Geopolitics of Australia-India trade’, in Gopal, D. and Rumley, D.,
eds., India and Australia: Issues and Opportunities (Delhi: Authors Press), pp. 1-25.
39
If we were to accept the arguments of Waltz that more is better, then India,
Israel, Pakistan and potentially Iran are not regional nuclear threats. Accepting
the arguments of Sagan, on the other hand, results in the opposite conclusion.
Equality of nuclear security would necessitate that all regional states or that
no regional state should possess nuclear weapons. Inequality of state access to
nuclear weapons is arguably the ‘real’ security threat. On the other hand, “the
existence of nuclear weapons is a guarantee of their proliferation”70 .
State “success”
As already indicated, one of the common characteristics of the IOR is that it has
enjoyed a significant degree of conflict for control of resources and territory from
the European colonial powers, the legacy of which endures to this day. The well
known violence and yet not fully chronicled atrocities against indigenous peoples
and the colonial imposition of centralised states with boundaries incorporating
and/or bisecting nations inevitably created a dislocation with the state. As Sugata
Bose put it so eloquently:
The Indian Ocean realm experienced a sea change in the concept
of sovereignty in the age of high imperialism, which has lingered as
colonialism’s most poisoned legacy.71
It therefore comes as no surprise that the IOR includes close to half the number
of states that fall into the first global quartile of the failed state index. The failed
state index is a composite measure of 12 indicators of state vulnerability –
demographic pressures, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven
development, economic decline, delegitimisation of the state, public services,
human rights, security apparatus, factionalised elites and external intervention.
For 2008, 177 states were rank ordered on the sum of the total scores for each
indicator, with the latter ratings placed on a scale of 0 (most stable) to 10 (least
stable)72. In the IOR, 40 per cent of states (a total of 20 states) were located in the
upper quartile on this index.
On the other hand, only six regional states were in the most stable or ‘successful’
group, five of which are IOR-ARC members – Australia, Mauritius, Oman,
Singapore and UAE (Figure 10).
70
Thakur, R. (2011), ‘Stop moral posture in uranium debate’, The Australian newspaper,
9th December.
71
Bose, S. (2006), A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 26.
72
Foreign Policy (2009), ‘Failed states index 2008’, at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index
40
As has been pointed out, weak states pose a threat to regional and global stability
as they are potential sources of conflict and abuses of human rights and breeding
grounds for terrorism that can have local, regional and international impacts. It
has been argued that the creation of policies designed to strengthen these states
could well be central to future global stability73. Contributing to the design of
such policies is thus potentially of global significance.
Indian Ocean state Failed State Index Global rank

Somalia 114.7 1
Zimbabwe 114.0 2
Sudan 112.4 3
Iraq 108.6 6
Afghanistan 108.2 7
Pakistan 104.1 10
Burma 101.5 13
Kenya* 101.4 14
Ethiopia 98.9 16
Yemen* 98.1 18
Bangladesh* 98.1 19
Uganda 96.9 21
Sri Lanka* 96.7 22
Burundi 95.7 24
Nepal 95.4 25
Malawi 93.8 28
Iran* 90.0 38
Egypt 89.0 43
Laos 89.0 44
Rwanda 89.0 45
-------------------------------global quartile----------------------------
Bhutan 87.3 48
Cambodia 87.3 49
Comoros 86.3 52
Philippines 85.8 53
Zambia 84.2 60
Indonesia* 84.1 62
Swaziland 82.4 65
Lesotho 81.8 67
Madagascar* 81.6 68
Tanzania* 81.1 70
Mozambique* 80.7 72
73
Fukuyama, F. (2004), State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st
Century. New York: Cornell University Press, p. 120.
41
Djibouti 80.6 74
Thailand* 79.2 79
Maldives 78.8 81
India* 77.8 87
Saudi Arabia 77.5 89
------------------------------global quartile-----------------------------
Vietnam 76.9 94
Malaysia* 68.9 115
Botswana 68.8 116
Brunei Darussalam 68.1 118
Seychelles 67.7 120
South Africa* 67.4 122
Kuwait 63.4 125
Bahrain 59.0 133
----------------------------global quartile--------------------------------
Qatar 51.9 138
UAE* 51.8 139
Oman* 47.2 146
Mauritius* 44.7 148
Singapore* 33.8 160
Australia* 25.9 170
* member of IOR-ARC
Figure 10: The failed state index: Indian Ocean states 200874
Contested spaces in the Indian Ocean region

The IOR has had a long history of extra-regional influence and perhaps it could
be argued that some of the many remaining legacies of this, which are evident
around the region, are potential sources of stability. Apart from Indian Ocean
states, all major industrial powers and energy suppliers have an innate interest in
Indian Ocean security and stability75.
An important question is the extent to which any extra-regional security
presence, while aiming to guarantee regional as well as its own security interests,
is also perceived by other states as a source of insecurity. From this perspective,
regional and external states are seen to be in a process of competition for
influence and resources76. However, it should be recognised and accepted
that the United States and China, as well as other extra-regional states, have
legitimate regional security interests.
74
Foreign Policy (2009), ‘Failed states index’, at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
75
76
Brewster, D. (2010a), ‘An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?’, Security
Challenges, Vol. 6 (3), Spring, pp. 1-20.
42
Chinese pearls USA diamonds Indian nuggets

Bangladesh Australia Andaman Islands
Burma Bahrain Mauritius
Pakistan Diego Garcia Maldives
Sri Lanka Djibouti
Egypt
Indonesia
Kenya
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Singapore
UAE
Figure 11: Indian Ocean pearls, diamonds and nuggets77

If we consider the IOR as an overall ‘arena of competing influence’, then it is
instructive to locate a significant United States and Chinese presence and add to
this the regional presence of India. We end up with an interesting geographical
distribution of Chinese ‘pearls’, USA ‘diamonds’ and Indian ‘nuggets’, principally
reflecting concerns over energy security and secure access to SLOCs (Figure 11).
For the sake of the present discussion and putting aside the veracity of arguments
in favour of a ‘string of pearls’ strategy, China has nonetheless some presence in
four northern Indian Ocean rim locations – Chittagong in Bangladesh, Gwadar
in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Sittwe in Burma78. Furthermore,
according to the US Department of Defense Base Structure Report79 , the United
States has some presence in 12 Indian Ocean locations – the centrally-located
Diego Garcia, five in the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and UAE),
three in Africa (Egypt, Djibouti and Kenya) and a further three on the eastern
rim (Australia, Indonesia and Singapore). If we add to these India’s presence in
the Andaman Islands, Mauritius and Maldives80, we are left with a number of
what might be called ‘contested spaces’ – that is, they remain competitive arenas
which have yet to be incorporated into the influence of powerful external states.
These include the failed states of Somalia and Yemen and much of Oceanic
Africa.
77
Brewster, 2009; Kostecka 2011; US Department of Defense 2010
78
Kostecka, D. J. (2011), ‘The Chinese navy’s emerging support network in the Indian
Ocean’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 (1), Winter, pp. 59-78.
79
US Department of Defense (2010b), Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2010 Baseline,
Office of the Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment),
Washington DC.
80
Brewster, D. (2009), ‘India’s string of pearls’, South Asia Masala, at: http://asiapacific.
anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2009/11/26/indias-string-of-pearls/
43
2. Human security
To maximise human security is “to protect the vital core of all human lives
in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human
security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the
essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive
(widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build
on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social,
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give
people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity”81
In the globalised 21st century, what is becoming increasingly clear is that the
traditional realist model of security – principally embodied in the view that threats
emanate from one state, are aimed at another state and are of a military nature –
has increasingly come into question82. Furthermore, the specific nature of these
‘non-traditional’ security threats – for example, people smuggling, drug trafficking,
piracy and terrorism – require ‘non-traditional’ responses by security agencies83. At
the Indian Ocean regional scale, these new security threats essentially require a new
approach to regional security thinking and cooperation at various levels.
The Commission on Human Security has argued that there is a need for a new
paradigm of security in this new context. While the state still remains the central
purveyor of security, it often fails to properly discharge its security obligations and
at times can even be a threat to its own citizens. As a result, attention must now
shift from the security of the state to the security of the people – that is, there is a
need to shift the focus to human security84. This shift will involve greater focus on
human rights to assure the “freedom to live in dignity”85. However, while concern
over human security is due principally to “a loss of faith in the state”, it seems
that it is an agenda promoted by the West, rather than the South86 .One means of
examining this issue is by attempting to differentiate between threats to the state
and threats to people. Two additional principal policy aims of the human security
agenda are the protection of people in violent conflict and supporting the human
security of people on the move. One of the changes consequent upon the end of
the Cold War is that there was an important change of scale and differentiation
in threat reality and threat perception. In the 21st century, while threats to the
81
Commission on Human Security (2003), Human Security Now, New York, p. 4.
82
Commonwealth of Australia (2003), Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign
and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra, DFAT.
83
Dupont, A. (2003), ‘Transformation or stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s defence’,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57 (1), pp. 55-76.
84
Commission on Human Security (2003), Human Security Now, New York, p. 2.
85
Annan, K. (2005), In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights
For All, New York: United Nations, p. 34.
86
Durodié, B. (2010), ‘Human security – a retrospective’, Global Change, Peace and Security,
Vol. 22 (3), pp. 385-390.
44
economy and natural environment of states tend to be global, ‘real’ threats to

people are more likely to be intra-state and even intra-urban. In short, ‘real’
threats to the state are global and ‘real’ threats to people emanate from within the
state. The “democratisation of security” is thus essential to address ‘real’ needs.
Freedom and democracy in the Indian Ocean region
“Maximising freedom” in the IOR is problematic since the existence of
authoritarian regimes is common. Authoritarian regimes not only threaten their
own people, but they also threaten regional and even global resources security
given their general coincidence with the distribution of hydrocarbons.
Rights and freedoms are restricted by the state for many often interrelated
reasons – for example, self-preservation, elite dominance, religious victimisation,
ethnic discrimination, income inequality and corruption, among others.
Rights and freedoms once curtailed are invariably difficult to restore, even in
the medium term. All other things being equal, repressive states within which
human freedoms are limited are more likely to be inherently insecure and thus
subject to internal conflict.
Status State Score

Free Australia 2
(n = 6) Mauritius 3
South Africa 4
Botswana 5
India 5
Indonesia 5
Partly Free Lesotho 6
(n = 24) Seychelles 6
Bangladesh 7
Comoros 7
Malawi 7
Maldives 7
Mozambique 7
Philippines 7
Tanzania 7
Zambia 7
Kenya 8
Kuwait 8
Malaysia 8
Nepal 8
Sri Lanka 8
Bhutan 9
Burundi 9
Pakistan 9
Singapore 9
Thailand 9
45
Uganda 9
Djibouti 10
Ethiopia 10
Madagascar 10
Not Free Bahrain 11
(n = 20) Brunei Darussalam 11
Cambodia 11
Egypt 11
Iraq 11
Oman 11
Qatar 11
Rwanda 11
UAE 11
Yemen 11
Afghanistan 12
Iran 12
Swaziland 12
Vietnam 12
Zimbabwe 12
Laos 13
Saudi Arabia 13
Burma 14
Somalia 14
Sudan 14
Figure 12: The Freedom Rating 2009: The Indian Ocean region87
If we accept this latter proposition, clearly one of the important security
challenges in the IOR is that there are very few states that are currently classified
as being ‘free’ – Australia, Botswana, Mauritius, India, Indonesia and South
Africa88.
Rather, most Indian Ocean states are either ‘partly free’ (24 states) or ‘not free’
(20 states). The most repressive regional states – Burma, Somalia and the former
unified Sudan – represent the greatest threat to regional stability (Figure 12).
The interrelationships among traditional military security indicators, human
development, state ‘success’ and freedom are complex. For example, only one
regional state (Australia) ranks high on human development, state ‘success’ and
freedom, yet is relatively low on traditional security indicators.
Democratisation and state stability
The demand for democratisation and government transparency in the IOR is
invariably associated with economic and social change and changing levels of
economic participation, especially on the part of emergent middle classes and
unemployed youth. One of the most important security challenges that arises
from these processes is the strength of their association with state stability. It
87
Freedom House (2010), Freedom in the World 2010. Washington DC.
88
46
has been hypothesised, for example, that pressures within states for greater
economic and political participation will impact on their territorial stability89.
Authoritarian states enjoying a high degree of territorial control, for example,
are likely to be territorially stable, as are those with highly developed liberal
democracies. However, any process of transition from authoritarian central
control towards democracy (or vice-versa) is likely to be accompanied by an
increase in territorial instability of the state. In short, a transition towards
democracy will probably liberate formerly suppressed regional loyalties, many of
which have some ethnic basis, particularly along state peripheries – for example,
most recently in Sudan. The potential for a “renationalisation” and tribalisation
of post-colonial states in the IOR is potentially an important regional security
challenge.
As the so-called Arab Spring demonstrated, democracy and state stability are not
perfectly correlated. While Switzerland might be used as a benchmark for the
association between state stability and democracy, other states may remain stable
due to the sheer effectiveness of authoritarian control. In the IOR, therefore, the
relationship between state stability and democracy in Oman and Saudi Arabia is
different from the relationship apparent in Bahrain and Yemen (Figure 13).
In addition, apart from the basic problem of the accurate measurement of
freedom and its association with stability among Indian Ocean states, there is
also a problem of scale – that is, freedom that is calculated at the state scale says
little about variations in freedom within the state across income, ethnic and
other categories and by gender. While it is of considerable importance to regional
development and stability to monitor human rights and human rights abuses and
to compare regional state policies in this regard, a fundamental future research
priority is the examination of the intra-state variability of rights and freedoms,
especially the changing nature of women’s security and rights in the IOR. While
a majority of IOR-ARC states have laws against domestic violence, of the 35
Indian Ocean states for which data are available, only half possess laws against
domestic violence and sexual harassment, and only four states – Australia,
Thailand, Timor-Leste and South Africa – also have laws against marital rape90.
89
Rumley, D. (1999), The Geopolitics of Australia’s Regional Relations, Dordrecht:
Springer, p. 31.
90
UN Women (2011), Progress of the World’s Women 2011-2012: In Pursuit of Justice,
New York, pp. 134-137.
47
Figure 13: Democracy and stability in Arab spring states91
91
Fletcher, M. (2011), ‘Good governance still a long way off ’, The Weekend Australian
newspaper, 30 July, p. 21.
48
Civil society demands for greater government transparency and accountability

are also likely to increase with standard of living improvements.
Displaced persons and asylum seekers in the Indian
Ocean Region
States most afflicted by a combination of internal violence, human rights abuses
and natural disasters are most likely to be the largest sources of forcibly displaced
people. Since most forcibly displaced people (about 75%) flee to neighbouring
states, the circle of insecurity is thus widened and developing countries host
approximately 80% of the global refugee population92.
Of the total “global population of concern” to UNHCR of almost 34 million
people, more than 50% live in Indian Ocean states. The world’s three largest
source countries of refugees are Indian Ocean states that rank highly on the
failed state index – Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. An additional seven regional
states are each the source of more than 25,000 refugees (Figure 14).
Afghanistan 3,054,709
Iraq 1,683,579
Somalia 770,154
Burma 415,670
Sudan 387,288
Vietnam 338,698
Sri Lanka 141,074
Rwanda 114,836
Burundi 84,064
Ethiopia 68,848
Iran 68,791
Pakistan 39,982
Figure 14: Indian Ocean states: total refugees by country of origin (>25,000)93
A total of 47 Indian Ocean states for which data are available are the sources of
more than seven million refugees or almost one quarter of the global total. Two
other Indian Ocean states – Pakistan and Iran – are ranked first and second
globally in terms of the number of refugees they host. Other Indian Ocean states,
such as Kenya, Yemen, Sudan and Uganda, are also significant regional refugee
host states (Figure 15).
92
UNHCR (2011), Global Trends 2010: 60 Years and Counting, Geneva, p.11.
93
UNHCR (2011), Global Trends 2010,: 60 Years and Counting Geneva, pp. 42-45
49
Country of asylum Total refugees Returned IDPs Stateless persons Populations of
concern
Afghanistan 6,434 3,366 - 1,318,019
Burma - - 797,388 859,403
Iran 1,073,366 - - 1,075,163
Iraq 34,655 294,770 120,000 1,824,962
Kenya 402,905 - 20,000 751,196
Nepal 89,808 - 800,000 891,319
Pakistan 1,900,621 1,186,889 - 4,041,642
Somalia 1,937 - - 1,489,862
Sri Lanka 223 161,128 - 440,323
Sudan 178,308 143,000 - 1,958,524
Thailand 96,675 - 542,505 649,430
Uganda 135,801 302,991 - 585,253
Yemen 190,092 94,712 - 508,355
Figure 15: Indian Ocean states: total refugees, returned IDPs, stateless persons and
population of concern end-201094
People trafficking
Given the scale of forcibly displaced people in the IOR in terms of source and
host states, there is a considerable international illegal trade in people, which
impacts not only upon immediate neighbours but also upon the security of more
distant Indian Ocean states such as Australia. This type of trade has generally
been referred to in the West as people smuggling. However, there is another
perhaps associated people trade of ’trafficking in persons’ in which people are
commodified in various other ways through forced labour, sex trafficking,
bonded labour, debt bondage among migrant workers, involuntary domestic
servitude, forced child labour, child soldiers and child sex trafficking95.
The United States Department of State has classified all states according to
their apparent level of compliance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA). Tier 1 states are those that totally comply; tier 2 states do not yet fully
comply but are making significant progress; tier 3 states neither fully comply nor
are making significant efforts to do so96.
In the IOR only two states (Australia and Mauritius) are given tier 1 status and
most states (32) fall into tier 2. A total of 10 Indian Ocean states are grouped into
tier 3 – Burma, Eritrea, Iran, Kuwait, Madagascar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan,
Yemen and Zimbabwe97. The use of child soldiers, for example, is seen to be a
particular problem in Burma, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.
94
UNHCR (2011), Global Trends 2010, Geneva, pp. 38-41
95
US Department of State (2011), Trafficking in Persons Report, June, Washington DC,
pp. 7-10.
96
US Department of State (2011), Trafficking in Persons Report, June, Washington DC.
pp. 13-14.
97
US Department of State (2011), Trafficking in Persons Report, June, Washington DC.
p. 52.
50
3. Economic and resources security

The relationship between economic insecurity and political conflict is evident
both among and within states. The potential for conflict among states is also
exacerbated due to the global environment of increasing competition over
diminishing natural resources. The attempt by states to achieve resources
security and maintain energy security is propelling a new geopolitics of resources
and creating new regional tensions. Within states it has been noted that
economic insecurity has become part of a process of deepening social divisions
and increasing political instability. Under conditions of increasing fragility it has
been suggested therefore that the state faces the threat of losing control not only
of its capacity to provide basic services but also of its monopoly over law and
order and its political legitimacy98.
The global south
It has often been said that a post-Cold War global North-South division is
replacing the former East-West division as one of the principal dimensions of
global conflict. In this new paradigm there is a danger of prioritising the security
agenda of the North at the expense of the South. Regional security threats can
arise because of the instability of states with problems of economic, social and
political viability. In addition, resources scarcity and resources competition
constitute threats, especially when they are linked to food and energy insecurity.
Indeed, it has been argued that in the years ahead, “resource wars” will become
“the most distinctive feature of the global security environment”99. Furthermore,
states that ‘fail’ due to basic problems of good governance and corruption, and
are incapable of asserting authority within their own territories, are seen to be
“troubling to world order” since they may become sources of instability, mass
migration and terrorism100. In short, state and regional stability are jeopardised
both by deep economic imbalances among states and deep economic insecurity
within states.
Clearly, economic insecurity is common among many Indian Ocean states. Low
levels of human development and high levels of economic underdevelopment
contribute to significant levels of political instability. The IOR includes only
six states that fall into the global category of very high human development
– Australia, Singapore, Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE - while the majority
of regional states are classified as having medium human development.
Clearly, developmental strategies need to be created for the seven low human
development states, nearly all of which are in Africa101.
98
Survey 2008, New York, p. xvi.
99
Klare, M. T. (2002), Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, New York:
Henry Holt, p. 212.
100
Rotberg, R. I. (2002), ‘Failed states in a world of terror’, Foreign Affairs, vol 81.
101
UNDP (2009), Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming Barriers: Human
Mobility and Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 167-170.
51
Economic insecurity has contributed to the degree of aid dependency in some
Indian Ocean states. Indeed, in 2005, some regional states were “aid dependent” and
contained states with the two highest levels of global aid dependency – for example,
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Afghanistan was 316.9 per cent of
central government expenditure in 2005 and for Cambodia 112.6 per cent of central
government expenditure102.
In addition to the special case of Iraq, five other regional states were the largest
ODA recipients in 2005 – Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sudan and Vietnam.
Furthermore, several African states had high ODA levels per capita and received
ODA in excess of 40 per cent of the total value of imports. Apart from analyses of the
geography of ODA, future research lends itself not only to a detailed inquiry into the
geopolitics of aid but more especially into its effectiveness in improving the standard
of living of the inhabitants of recipient states103. For example, among other states,
China is using ODA as a ‘weapon of influence’ in the IOR, especially in Africa.
Energy security and insecurity in the Indian Ocean region
Since many Indian Ocean states possess significant energy resources, the Indian
Ocean itself is the world’s most important energy highway and most of the world’s
largest economies rely on both, energy security is among the greatest regional and
global security challenges. Energy security can be conceptualised within a broad
systems framework as a set of interactions among four principal components –
the dynamics of energy demand and supply relations, the nature of energy flows,
the environmental outcomes of maximising energy security, and the various state
(increasingly competing) policy responses designed to enhance energy security
(Figure 16).
If we take as an arbitrary cut-off point 50 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) and
examine the pattern of net energy imports, we can identify no less than 15 energy
import-dependent states in 2008 (Figure 17). These are principally the Northern
economies based in the United States, Japan and Europe, with the remainder in
Asia. The most significant Indian Ocean energy import-dependent states – India
and Singapore – are at the opposite ends of the developmental scale. However, the
geopolitics of their dependency gives both states a common stake in the stability of
energy suppliers and in the stability and security of supply routes. Similarly, if we
take an arbitrary cut-off point of more than minus 40 mtoe for net energy imports,
it is possible to identify a further 21 states that could be regarded as energy-niche
economies – that is, economies with significant energy exports that comprise an
important proportion of total state export income (Figure 18).
102
World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators. Washington DC.
103
Editorial Essay (2010), ‘Research agendas for the Indian Ocean Region’, Journal of the Indian
Ocean Region, Vol 6 (1), p. 11.
52
1. Dynamics of energy demand and supply relations
(i) Historical patterns of energy use

Economic growth and demand
The energy consumers
21st century shift towards the developing world and especially towards Asia
Competition for energy – potential for resource conflicts
(ii) Supplies: dependency
Dependency on imports for a significant proportion of energy needs – concept of an energy-dependent state
Dependence on a single state or region for energy supplies
Dependency on a single source of energy
Structural energy dependency
Energy vulnerability and energy mix -> nuclear
(iii) Source: Resource holder
Energy exports and reserves
Concept of an energy-niche economy
The global energy market – the role of energy-producing/consuming groups – for example, OPEC, IEA, MNCs
Strategic significance of resource holders – for example, Iran, Russia
“Oil as a weapon”
Stability of resource holders – for example, Iraq, Saudi Arabia
Resource diplomacy – for example, Australia, Japan, USA
Future resource holders – for example, EEZs – competition for potential sources?
2. Energy Flows
Energy type and transportation prospects – coal by land and sea; gas by pipeline or by liquefaction; oil by tanker; the
uranium trade
The transport holder
Infrastructure bottlenecks – energy extraction facilities
Strategic implications of energy flows/routes
Terrorism, naval interference, congestion and environmental problems
3. Environmental Outcomes
Variations of emissions by energy type
Environmental implications of each energy source
“Hydrocarbon man” and the “hydrocarbon society”
Environmental impacts of energy exploration
Trade off between environmental impact and energy needs?
International agreements to reduce emissions and adherence to these
4. Policy Responses to Enhance Energy Security
(i) Spatial Concept of an energy foreign policy
Hemispheric policies – for example, USA
Access new sources of supply – Atlantic Basin, Caspian, Russian
Far East
Import reduction strategies
Cooperative energy security – energy community concept
Maintain open shipping routes
(ii) Energy Transfer
Global energy scenarios
Diversification – enhances energy security
Greater exploration – capital and technology holder
Stockpiling/reserves
Flexible switching
Alternative renewable energy sources – wind, wave,
hydrogen, etc
(iii) Non-spatial Management of dependency – energy
independence?
Let the market rule
(iv) Environmental Energy efficiency
Sustainable development policies – towards decarbonisation
Figure 16: A simplified systems framework for energy security104
104
Rumley, D. (2005b), ‘The geopolitics of global and Indian Ocean energy security’, in Rumley
and Chaturvedi, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
53
(net imports >50mtoe)
USA 634.5
Japan 418.9
Germany 210.9
South Korea 195.1
China 184.7
India 157.9
Italy 155.6
France 139.3
Spain 123.0
Taiwan 97.5
Turkey 72.5
Ukraine 59.4
UK 57.8
Belgium 56.4
Singapore 55.9
Figure 17: Energy import-dependent states 2008105

(net imports > -40mtoe)
Russia -536.6
Saudi Arabia -412.4
Norway -188.7
Australia -167.0
Nigeria -155.4
Indonesia -147.3
Canada -144.7
Kuwait -124.8
Iran -122.9
Venezuela -115.3
UAE -102.9
Qatar -99.8
Angola -93.7
Libya -85.2
Iraq -83.1
Kazakhstan -77.3
Colombia -60.2
Turkmenistan -49.8
Mexico -47.2
Azerbaijan -44.5
Oman -42.7
Figure 18: Energy-niche economies 2008106
105
International Energy Agency (2010), Key World Energy Statistics, Paris
106
International Energy Agency (2010), Key World Energy Statistics, Paris
54
Almost half of the world’s energy-niche economies are located in the IOR – five
of the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar and Oman) together with
Australia, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq. Clearly, energy-niche economies also possess
a keen interest in the stability and security of energy supply routes. No less than
seven of these states – Australia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Oman, Singapore and
UAE – are members of IOR-ARC.
Resources competition and energy security
It has been argued that we are in the throes of a ”new geopolitics of energy” that
is associated with the emergence of a “new international energy order”. The main
players are Russia – an “energy juggernaut”107– the “rising powers” of China and
India108 and the United States. To Klare, we are seeing the initiation of a global
“black gold war” with the United States and its allies against rising Asia, although
energy conflicts will also take on something of an intra-Asian dimension. In
addition, energy competition will escalate, especially in Third World energy-
producing regions and in potential new areas such as the Arctic.
In the new “order”, the strategic perceptions of the policy-makers of the main
players will become increasingly oriented towards energy-rich states, especially
in the developing world. This is exemplified by the intense competition between
the United States and China for access to oil in central Asia and Africa.
The process of competition for scarce energy resources is invariably
accompanied by new or increased arms supplies – whether China to Africa
or the United States to Saudi Arabia – designed in part to minimise domestic
dissent by energy-niche states in the appropriation of their energy and the
extension of influence by energy-import dependent states. From this perspective,
energy security and human security are invariably inversely related.
While “the scramble for Africa” in the European colonial era was associated with
the plunder and exploitation of high value agricultural and minerals resources,
in the 21st century, competition for Africa’s energy resources is portrayed as a
“global assault” undertaken by the main players and others109. This “assault”,
which has been facilitated by endemic corruption coupled with the inherent
weakness of most African states, involves an “American invasion”110 and strong
competition from China and India. who are both portrayed as “predators”111.
107
Klare, M. T. (2008), Rising Powers, Sinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy.
New York: Metropolitan Books, p. 88.
108
109
New York: Metropolitan Books, pp. 146-176.
110
111
55
Indeed, Klare talks of “the “China threat” in Africa” to US strategic interests112.
Particular African ‘prizes’ in the ‘assault’ would be Algeria, Angola, Libya and
Nigeria113.
As a result, the new international energy order will be associated with an
emerging energy diplomacy that will be exemplified by new relationships and
alliances geared to maximise leverage in relation to energy supply and demand.
For example, one commentator has characterised the links among Russia,
Venezuela and Iran as an “emerging petro-power axis” and an “axis of petro
tyrants”114. The members of this “axis of diesel” are reported to have “extended
their reach abroad, backing separatists in Georgia, Islamists in the Middle East
and leftists around the world”115.
The so-called “militarisation of energy security” will pose a host of new
challenges – for example, those posed by states that use their control over energy
supplies as weapons of influence and coercion; domestic instability, conflict and
insurgency within strategic energy-producing and exporting states; and threats
posed by terrorism and piracy to energy production and transit116.
Economic insecurity and civil strife
As noted above, there has been a steady increase in civil conflicts, especially
since the early 1970s, primarily due to the wider geographical persistence of
existing conflicts. Indeed, since 1945, civil wars have accounted for more than
three times the number of deaths compared to wars between states. The increase
in the number of protracted conflicts has been particularly evident in Africa –
more than two thirds of states in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced some
form of civil war during the past 25 years117. In turn, the impact of civil conflicts
is directly reflected in the numbers of transnational refugees and internally
displaced people.
112
New York: Metropolitan Books, pp. 171-2.
113
Rumley, D. (2008), ‘Australia and the new geopolitics of energy’, a paper delivered to
an international seminar on ‘Critical Areas of Ensuring Energy Security’, Hyderabad,
December.
114
December.
115
December.
116
NIC (National Intelligence Council) (2008), Global Trends 2025: A Transformed
World. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, p. 66.
117
Survey 2008, New York, pp. 111-146.
56
The causes of protracted civil conflicts are generally linked to low income
levels, sluggish economic growth, a weakly diversified economic structure and
a high level of inequality. In addition, the level of state capacity appears to be
associated with the probability of conflict. Thus, conflict risk tends to be lower in
established democracies and autocracies, and higher in periods of transition to
and from democracy. What emerges is a “vicious circle of economic security and
civil conflict” or a “conflict trap”118.
It has been argued that overcoming economic insecurity necessitates an
integrated approach involving a greater role for:
Public goods and stronger regulations in creating and preserving
more secure spaces where individuals, communities and countries can
pursue their activities with a reasonable degree of predictability and
certainty, and with due regard for the customs and interests of others119.
However, especially problematic are those situations in some states where,
due to high political instability and deep social cleavage, such “secure spaces”
have virtually disappeared. In such contexts, rebuilding security, reconciliation
and development through improving state capacity and engaging in state
building are significant challenges. From the viewpoint of donor states, it thus
becomes critically important to closely identify foreign aid objectives and the
conditions under which aid is delivered and implemented due to its considerable
distributional impacts within recipient societies120. This is especially challenging
for the aid dependent states of the IOR.
118
Survey 2008, New York, pp. 111-146.
119
Survey 2008, New York, p. 111.
120
57
4. Maritime security
Maritime security problems and jurisdictional issues in the IOR offer
considerable regional security challenges, especially in the areas of the limits
of maritime jurisdiction, unresolved boundaries, maritime boundary disputes,
sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), non-traditional maritime security threats
as well as the uses of the ocean floor, and the long-term management of seabed
resources. However, there appears to be no commonly accepted definition of
what constitutes maritime security that might be used as a basis for regional
cooperation121 To date, the collective maritime security environment has
tended to be conceptualised as a composite of sea power and the naval arms
build-up, island and maritime boundary issues, navigational regimes, activities
in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ,) competition over resources and the
maintenance of law and order at sea, including the protection of SLOCs122 . To
these essential elements can also be added others associated primarily with the
stability and integrity of ocean littoral states, the insecurity role of non-state
actors and the important question of maritime environmental insecurity.
It goes almost without saying that the security of sea lanes (also referred to as
sea lines) of communication is vital to the functioning of the global economy.
In 2001, 80% of world trade by value and 90% by volume was in the form of
sea trade, and this involved 1.2 million seafarers, 46,000 vessels and 4,000
ports123. Maximising the economic security of sea trade thus necessitates the
maximisation of security within and among all five essential elements in the
maritime trading process – seafarers (for example, background and nationality),
vessels (for example, registration and seaworthiness), cargoes (for example,
nature and destination), ports (for example, location and security of access and
surveillance) and SLOCs. However, any understanding of the security of SLOCs
cannot be fully appreciated in isolation from the overall maritime security
environment.
Indian Ocean energy chokepoints
In terms of international trade, the Indian Ocean is clearly the world’s most
important energy routeway. In 2007, for example, half of global daily oil
production was transported by tankers on fixed maritime routes124. Since
approximately 36 per cent of the world’s oil imports derive from the Middle
121
Banlaoi, R. C. (2005), ‘Maritime security outlook for Southeast Asia’, in J. Ho and C. Z.
Raymond, eds., The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-
Pacific, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, p.59.
122
Paik, J.-H. (2005), ‘Maritime security in East Asia: major issues and regional responses’,
Journal of International and Area Studies, Vol. 12 (2), pp. 15-29.
123
Harrald, J. R. (2005), ‘Sea trade and security: an assessment of the post-9/11 reaction’,
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59 (1), pp. 157-178.
124
EIA (2009), Country Analysis Briefs: World Oil Transit Chokepoints, p. 1, available at
the US Energy Information website at http://www.eia.doe.gov
58
East, secure interregional oil shipments through the Indian Ocean are vital to
world prosperity. Oil import security is especially important for Japan (80% of
oil imports from the Middle East), China (39%), Europe (21%) and the United
States (16%)125 . Furthermore, in 2006, more than 80% of the world’s seaborne
trade in oil passed through only three Indian Ocean choke points (Figure 19).
Choke point 2006 oil flow (mb/d) World seaborne trade (%)

Strait of Hormuz 16.5-17 40
Strait of Malacca 15 35
Bab el-Mandab 3.3 8
Total 35 83
Figure 19: Indian Ocean oil choke points126
The Strait of Hormuz, located between Iran and Oman, is the world’s
most important “oil chokepoint”, with a daily oil flow that is equivalent to
approximately 40% of global seaborne trade. More than 90% of oil exported
from the Persian Gulf is moved by tanker through the Strait, and much of this
is destined for Asia, Western Europe and the United States127. In 2008, 75% of
all of Japan’s oil needs passed through the Strait. Clearly, closure of the Strait
necessitates the use of longer alternative routes thereby increasing shipping
costs128. Iran, Oman and the UAE are crucial to the maintenance of a secure
Strait environment, with the latter two also key US allies129 .
Second, the Straits of Malacca, located between Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore, account for about 35% of global seaborne trade, and is the shortest
sea route between China, Japan and South Korea and Persian Gulf oil suppliers.
If the Straits were blocked, almost half of the world’s fleet would need to reroute
through the Sunda or Lombok Straits130. Alternative pipeline or canal routes
appear to have been shelved for the moment131.
125
BPSRWE (2008), BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008, London: BP, p. 20.
126
US Energy Information Administration (EIA), January 2008 update
127
Lehman Brothers Inc (2008), Global Oil Choke Points. New York, 18 January, p.8,
available at http://www.lehman.com
128
EIA (2009), Country Analysis Briefs: World Oil Transit Chokepoints, p.3, available at
129
Lehman Brothers Inc (2008), Global Oil Choke Points. New York, 18 January, p.8,
130
EIA (2009), Country Analysis Briefs: World Oil Transit Chokepoints, pp. 3-4, available
at the US Energy Information website at http://www.eia.doe.gov
131
Lehman Brothers Inc (2008), Global Oil Choke Points. New York, 18 January, p. 12,
59
Finally, Bab el-Mandab, an oil chokepoint between Djibouti, Eritrea and
Yemen, is a strategic link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean
via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, and accounts for approximately 8% of global
seaborne oil trade132. The continuing instability of Yemen, ranked 21 on the failed
state listing133, is a particular problem for the security of regional shipping134.
Alternative routes via the Cape of Good Hope or through the east-west pipeline
across Saudi Arabia inevitably lead to increased cost.
The stability of the Indian Ocean region as an
energy routeway
From the above, it is clear that the Northern economic powers and the
developing world economic powers of China and India (and each of their
respective navies) possess a legitimate interest in the security of SLOCs as
well as a special concern for the stability and geopolitical orientation of states
proximate to the entrances and exits to the ocean and their naval capacity. In this
regard, apart from the troubled Horn of Africa – for example, Somalia possessed
the world’s highest failed state index in 2008135 – no less than eleven regional
states are critical to the free flow of global sea trade through the Indian Ocean
– Australia, Indonesia, India, Iran, Malaysia, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore,
South Africa, UAE and Yemen. All eleven states are members of IOR-ARC.
It is important to note that these states represent more than half of its
membership, which means that IOR-ARC is potentially an extremely important
regional grouping for the construction of a cooperative maritime security regime
in the IOR. This implies the need to broaden the agenda of IOR-ARC, not only to
breathe new life into economic cooperation but, more importantly, a wide array
of potentially mutually-beneficial cooperative endeavours.
Since it is clear that there is a tendency for international crises to be centred
around weak or failing states and that maritime insecurity is also a function of
territorial stability and control, the east African and north-western Indian Ocean
region, comprising the states of Ethiopia (16), Kenya (26), Malawi (29), Somalia
(1), Sudan (2) and Yemen (21) is potentially one of the most insecure areas on
earth.
As noted earlier, Thomas Barnett differentiates between a globalised “functioning
core” and a “non-integrating gap” and draws an extremely arbitrary boundary
between those states that are seen to be actively integrated into the global
economy – that is, the “functioning core” – and the remainder that constitute the
132
EIA (2009), Country Analysis Briefs: World Oil Transit Chokepoints, p. 6, available at
133
134
Lehman Brothers Inc (2008), Global Oil Choke Points. New York, 18 January, p. 20,
135
60
“non-integrating gap”136. While the core states “adhere to globalisation’s emerging

security rule set”, the states of the gap apparently do not137. The gap states are also
characterised as being “poor”, and as places where life is “nasty”, “short”, “brutal”
and “solitary”138. In the IOR, only three states – Australia, India and South Africa
– are included in Barnett’s “functioning core”. In short, if we accept this aspect
of Barnett’s characterisation, all three states will increasingly have mutually
significant security interests due to globalisation during the present century.
In a region of instability, these three states can provide a firm foundation for
regional maritime security cooperation. However, as we know, a number of
extra-regional states possess a legitimate interest in the stability of Indian Ocean
SLOCs and thus should also be included in any cooperative framework proposal.
The Indian Ocean as a nuclear ocean
As also noted earlier, it has been argued that the Indian Ocean is fast becoming a
nuclear ocean139. What applies for the security of flows of oil also applies to other
energy flows through the Indian Ocean, except that, in the case of uranium,
there are important additional environmental security considerations, especially
in relation to any movement of nuclear materials as well as the illegal dumping of
nuclear waste (Figure 20).
Nuclear energy users
Indian Ocean region Actual - India, Pakistan, South Africa
Potential - Indonesia, Iran
Extra-regional impact China, France, Japan, South Korea, UK
Uranium suppliers
Indian Ocean region Australia, India, Iran, South Africa
Extra-regional impact Namibia
Nuclear waste
Indian Ocean region ‘Dumping’ nuclear waste – Africa
New users
Potential regional depositories
Extra-regional impact Japan-France
Figure 20: Indian Ocean region: nuclear energy users, uranium suppliers and
waste140
136
Century, New York: Penguin.
137
Century, New York: Penguin, pp. 25-6
138
Century, New York: Penguin, pp. 161-166.
139
140
Rumley, D. and Doyle, T. (2008), ‘The uranium trade in the Indian Ocean Region’, in T.
Doyle and M. Risely, eds., Crucible for Survival: Environmental Security and Justice in
the Indian Ocean Region. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, pp. 228-242.
61
Attacks on energy shipping in the Indian Ocean
In recent years, a significant proportion (about one-quarter) of maritime
piracy attacks have occurred on energy vessels, with the vast majority against
oil tankers141. In the last decade in the Indian Ocean, the largest proportion
of attacks on energy vessels has been in Indonesia and the Straits of Malacca.
However, in the past two years, the capacity of pirates in Somalia to operate at
significant distances from shore, together with continued attacks off the coast
of Nigeria, means that there has been an important shift in the geography of
maritime piracy from Asia to Africa (Figure 21).
Figure 21: Energy attacks by state 2001-8142

The international community has since responded via the United Nations and
through collective state action. On 2 June 2008, the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1816, which, with the consent of the
Somali government, authorised foreign military vessels to enter Somalian
territorial waters to combat piracy for a period of six months. On 24 August
2008, 14 states reportedly committed naval vessels to patrol Somali waters and a
“security corridor” was established to offer merchant vessels safe transit. While
the corridor has since remained virtually free from attack, piracy has actually
increased outside corridor boundaries143.
The hijack of the supertanker MV Sirius Star and its international crew of 25 on
15 November 2008 raised new concerns about maritime energy security and the
effectiveness of any joint naval response in the Gulf of Aden. Not only was this
141
Nincic, D. J. (2009), ‘Maritime piracy: implications for maritime energy security’,
Journal Of Energy Security, 19 February. Available at www.ensec.org
142
143
62
the largest energy vessel ever hijacked – it was carrying two million barrels of
crude oil, representing about 25% of Saudi Arabia’s daily output and about the
equivalent of France’s daily consumption – the attack also indicated an escalation
in the goals of the pirates since they would have had to travel up to four days out
to sea to intercept the vessel144.
Figure 22: Number of incidents reported Jan 2007-June 2011145

On 2 December 2008, the UN Security Council Resolution 1846 stated that for
12 months from that date, states and regional organisations in cooperation with
the Somali Transitional Federal Government may enter Somali territorial waters
and use “all necessary means” to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
Somali coast, “in accordance with relevant international law”146. Over the past
three years, there has been an increase in the number of incidents, especially
those occurring at ports and anchorages, and especially in Indonesia (Figure 22).
144
145
ReCAAP (2011), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia, Half-Yearly
Report, Jan-June.
146
IMO (2009), International Maritime Organisation web site, accessed 30 March 2009
at: http://www.imo.org
63
Maritime jurisdiction and maritime boundary disputes
An important Indian Ocean security challenge concerns maritime boundaries
that are either unresolved or in dispute. The conclusion of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) had a profound impact on the scope
of claims to maritime jurisdiction worldwide and this certainly applies in the
Indian Ocean context. The convention has achieved widespread international
recognition and this is also the case in the Indian Ocean where the vast majority
of littoral states are parties to the convention as well as enthusiastic claimants
of the extensive zones of maritime jurisdiction that it sanctifies (although it
is worth noting that there are a few claims that still fail to comply with the
LOSC framework – Somalia’s 200 nautical mile territorial sea claim is a good
example).
It is the case, however, that the ‘package deal’ achieved in the drafting of LOSC
– the delicate balance of rights and responsibilities between coastal and user
states enshrined in the convention – now appears to be under increasing stress
and there is evidence of this alarming trend in the Indian Ocean. Among the
problematic issues arising in relation to maritime jurisdiction in the IOR is the
issue of baselines. For example, rising sea levels will mean that normal baselines
will move inland and potentially enormous areas of presently claimed maritime
zones may be forsaken. This could have dire consequences for the coastal states
of the Indian Ocean and in particular those that have extensive, low-lying
and densely populated areas along their shores, such as Bangladesh and India.
Moreover, the continued existence of the small low-lying island states of the IOR
such as the Maldives and Seychelles may ultimately come under threat from the
inundation of the entirety of their land territory.
Finally, it can be observed that, even though LOSC has delivered enormous
expanses of the Indian Ocean to national maritime jurisdictional claims, the
expected economic dividends from these maritime zones have to a large extent
failed to materialise as anticipated. In large part, this stems from a distinct
lack of capacity among Indian Ocean coastal states in terms of their ability
to realise the opportunities that these ‘additional’ maritime areas offer. In
particular, weaknesses in terms of surveillance and policing of broad maritime
claims means that marine resources, especially fisheries, are under threat from
illegal fishing activities by unscrupulous foreign fishers147. Moreover, there are
large areas of the Indian Ocean that lie beyond national jurisdiction and thus
management and attempts to regulate resource exploitation activities have met
with only limited success. While their expansive maritime claims in the Indian
Ocean offer great potential for the littoral states, they also represent a significant
challenge for governments to manage them sustainably.
147
Rumley, D. (2009), ‘A policy framework for fisheries conflicts in the Indian Ocean’, in
Rumley, D., Chaturvedi, S. and Sakhuja, V., eds. (2009), Fisheries Exploitation in the
Indian Ocean Region: Threats and Opportunities. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 54-71.
64
Unresolved maritime and terrestrial boundaries

Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity
and national identity of all states is the foundation upon which the countries of
the IOR have developed since the late-1960s based on the principles outlined in
a plethora of documents and annual meetings. Some of the many challenges that
countries within this region face include: how to enhance regional cohesiveness
on maritime security without sacrificing national distinctiveness; how to
integrate old and new members at different levels of economic development
and political systems; and how to adapt to globalisation and maximise the
opportunities and potentialities while minimising a decline in economic status.
These are not unique.
In most developed states, international political terrestrial boundaries are
generally well-defined and their jurisdictional rules are recognised and observed.
Some political disputes still exist – for example, India and Pakistan, Bangladesh
and India, and UAE and Iran – but these mainly centre on international political
maritime terrestrial boundary alignments and sovereignty claims to islands,
rocks and reefs. However, in this regional context, whereas the political map
delineating international boundaries may appear to be in order, this impression
can be misleading. Political land boundaries in the IOR were generally defined
by colonial administrators and in many instances were ill-defined and not
demarcated, and sections of many of them were not clearly delineated on maps
and charts. If they were, it was probably drawn using coloured pencils that were
not sharpened, thus portraying a thicker than usual line. Such a line on a small-
scale map could give a false impression of the alignment of the boundary.
It is importatnt to emphasise that, while maritime boundaries have been
delimited along the eastern littoral of the basin, there still remain at least three
notable exceptions in the Bay of Bengal, two in the Arabian Sea, three in the Gulf
of Aden, as many in the Red Sea and off the Horn of Africa and no less than six
in the Mozambique Channel.
Resolving maritime boundary disputes

Where resolution was required over disputed sovereignty, cooperative zones
have been established and special arrangements have been implemented whereby
the resources of the marginal seas and adjacent oceans will be explored and
harvested in a sustainable manner148. Having defined the types of maritime
jurisdictional zones and differentiated between a terrestrial border and a
maritime boundary, it is necessary now to discuss the issues that result from the
boundary delimitations and define the areas of conflict.
Forbes, V. L. (1998), ‘Cooperative approaches to managing marine resources’, in Savage,

148
V.R., Kong, Lily and Neville, Warwick, eds., The Naga Awakens: Growth and Change in
Southeast Asia. Singapore: Times Academic Publication, pp.113-126.
65
Maritime boundary delimitation and associated disputes, however, are a recent
phenomenon. Disputes occur before the boundary is drawn and generally
disappear when a line (or series of lines) is eventually determined and agreed
upon. Examples where a dispute was resolved with the delineation of lines on
a map or chart include the Fisheries Jurisdiction Line between Australia and
Papua New Guinea in the Torres Strait and the maritime boundary in the South
China Sea between Indonesia and Malaysia. However, there are instances where
one party has sought to try and re-negotiate a maritime boundary. For example,
Indonesia has indicated on several occasions its wish for a renegotiation with
Malaysia of the seabed boundary in the Straits of Malacca and with Australia in
the Timor and Arafura Seas. It is not expected that there will be a change in the
alignment of the former boundary but a change in status of the latter has been
effected by the signing of the Treaty in Perth on 14 March 1997149. This treaty and
another between Australia and East Timor signed in May 2002 have yet to be
ratified (as at the time of writing) by the respective signatories.
There are several issues that may be involved in disputing maritime space. These
include disputed sovereignty over offshore islands, the allocation of natural
resources that straddle undefined boundaries, the sustainable development of
biotic and mineral resources, and the recognition of rights – traditional and
historical – to access those resources between places that transcend perceived
national boundaries or frontiers. Thus far, there have been only minor skirmishes
arising from boundary disputes, many involving alien fishers operating in
another state’s national jurisdiction – perceived or defined. Whereas minor
skirmishes have not been a common feature of the evolution of maritime
boundaries, the same cannot be said of terrestrial boundaries.
Approaches to maritime security policy
Up until relatively recently, much of the maritime security debate has
concentrated almost exclusively on its military definition and thus states have
been concerned with the use of so-called “hard power” and the development
of maritime strategies and maritime security policies that ignore or underplay
a wide range of non-military considerations. From a military perspective, for
example, “a modern maritime strategy involves air, sea and land forces operating
jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water
maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control”150.
149
Forbes, V. L. (1997), ‘Lines of allocation for marine resources in Australia’s Northern
Waters’, Indian Ocean Review, Vol. (1), March 1997, pp. 11-14.
150
Australian Government (2009), Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century:
Force 2030. Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence, p. 8.
66
As has been argued, while most strategic thinking in Australia “is locked into
hard power, the oceans offer us great potential to apply soft power and creative
diplomacy”151. “Soft power”, or the “second face of power”, essentially derives
from the ability to shape or change the preferences of others through an appeal
to the sense of attraction or duty of shared values and goals152. The emergence of
US President Obama’s “new engagement” associated with the likely realisation
of a broader conception of power and its use, especially the notion of “smart
power”, is especially significant, not only in dealing with Indian Ocean maritime
energy security threats.
As a result, in addition to the military component, a much more broadly-
based maritime security strategy would incorporate a wide range of economic,
environmental, political and social considerations and thus require greater inter-
organisational collaboration within states and the amelioration of “bureaucratic
sclerosis” for its successful implementation153154.
Furthermore, while ocean littoral states will endeavour to develop their
individual maritime security strategies, in the final analysis, securing the
maritime environment, which among other things involves the building of an
internationally stable maritime regime as well as the implementation of maritime
confidence-building measures, at a minimum will require regional and even
global cooperation in the 21st century155156 . However, balancing maritime energy
security with freedom on the high seas will necessitate a complex and delicate
process of international negotiation157.
151
Bateman, S. and Bergin, A. (2009), Sea Change: Advancing Australia’s Ocean
Interests, A Strategy Paper. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI),
March, p. 4.
152
Nye, J. S. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York:
Public Affairs, pp. 5-7.
153
Roy-Chaudhury, R. (2000), India’s Maritime Security, New Delhi: Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, p.187.
154
Force 2030. Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence, p. 12.
155
Grey, R. W. (1993), ‘A proposal for cooperation in maritime security in Southeast
Asia’, Working Paper, No. 274, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Australian National University.
156
Singh, J., ed. (1993), Maritime Security, New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses.
157
Young, E. and Randerson, J. (2005), ‘Marauders of the high seas’, New Scientist, Vol.
188 (2524), pp. 12-13.
67
Towards a cooperative Indian Ocean maritime security
policy framework
While there exists a compelling need to develop maritime security cooperation
in the IOR, current structures are both fragmentary and incomplete158. For
example, current maritime energy security policy in the Indian Ocean represents
a somewhat fragmented collection of regional and extra-regional cooperative
arrangements and individual regional and extra-regional state initiatives
(Figure 23).
Institutional - Regional - ReCAAP (16 Asian states)
- Extra-regional - EU, NATO
State - Regional - Australia, India
- Extra-regional - China, Japan, US
Figure 23: Examples of institutional and state Indian Ocean maritime energy security
The 16-state Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) initiative, which came into force in
2006, has its Information Sharing Centre (ISC) based in Singapore and aims
to assist in the process of facilitating cooperation, collation and preparation of
relevant data and supporting regional capacity building.
In October 2008, eight EU states led by France announced plans to create an
EU maritime security force to assist in combating Somali piracy. Furthermore,
NATO has also become involved in anti-piracy duties off Somalia159.
Individual state action has involved several regional and extra-regional states.
In the case of Australia, it has been suggested that the country should be
working with the region on maritime security issues and take a leading role
in the promotion of regional cooperation160. Extra-regional states, of course,
have declared their self-interest in Indian Ocean maritime energy security. For
example, on 6 March 2009, the imminent despatch of two Japanese maritime
self-defence destroyers to the Gulf of Aden to guard Japan vessels off Somalia
under the maritime police action provision of the self-defence forces law was
announced161.
158
Cordner, L. (2011), ‘Progressing maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean’,
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 (4), Autumn, pp. 68-88.
159
IISS (2009), The Military Balance 2009, London.
160
March.
161
Hongo, J. (2009), ‘MSDF Somalia dispatch slammed by opponents at rally’, Japan
Times, 6 March, p. 2.
68
While the adoption by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) of a

comprehensive maritime security approach in 2002 provided security assessment
guidelines and risk management strategies for some of the basic elements in
the maritime trading process – seafarers, vessels, cargoes and ports – a more
comprehensive approach is needed, especially in relation to the security of
energy flows through the Indian Ocean, and one that deals not only with the
effects of insecurity, but that also begins to systematically address its causes.
As has been noted, “military authorities are quite clear it is impossible for
them to protect all merchant vessels – even high risk energy vessels – against
all attacks”. Furthermore, if energy vessels engage in varying degrees of self-
protection and arm themselves, there is a real danger of “weapon escalation”.
Nonetheless, apart from increased vessel security, the only other major course
of action from the ‘effects policy perspective’ is to try and avoid the insecure
areas162.
A key cooperative policy initiative has been the creation of the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium (IONS) under India’s leadership. The central vision of IONS
is to bring “regional navies together for the greater collective good; to enhance
safety and security, to share knowledge, and to support disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance”163.

162

163
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 (4), Autumn, p. 69.
69
5. Environmental security
Environmental security can be taken to encompass likely threats to social,
political and economic stability that might arise as a direct or indirect
consequence of the mismanagement of the natural environment, as a result of
resource scarcity, or as an outcome of natural disasters. However, it is clear that
the concept of environmental security is quite diverse in its meaning. It includes
the traditional conflict-based, statist frameworks that view environmental stress
as an additional threat to peace and stability; the securing of the environment by
nation-states; and more innovative interpretations that envision it as a lynchpin
of cooperative models of regional and global security, with the potential to
secure access for all people to fulfill their basic needs for survival – a security to
practice a diverse range of livelihoods164165166.
There is an enormous gap in the literature on environmental security in the
IOR. There have been substantial academic works completed in recent years
on the broad subject of environmental security167168169170171172. Some of these
works move from theory into empirical research, but when this occurs most
of this scholarship is based in and around the Atlantic, Pacific and Southern
Oceans173174175176. Researchers have rarely utilised the concept of environmental
security in the IOR.
164
Barnett, J. (2001), The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and
Policy in the New Security Era. New York: Zed Books.

165
Dalby, S. (2002), Environmental Securit,. University of Minnesota Press.

166
Dodds, F. And T. Pippard, eds. (2005), Human and Environmental Security: An
Agenda for Change. London: Earthscan.

167
Myers, N. (1995), Environmental Exodus. An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena,
United States: Climate Institute.

168
Dabelko, G.D. and Dabelko, D.D. (1995), ‘Environmental security: issues of conflict
and redefinition’, Woodrow Wilson Environmental Change and Security Project
Report, Issue 1, pp. 3-12.

169
Broda-Bahm, K. T. (1999), ‘Finding protection in definitions: the quest for
environment security’, Argumentation and Advocacy, Spring 1999, Vol. 35 (4), p. 159.

170
Lowi, M., R. and Shaw, B., R. (2000), Environment and Security Discourses and
Practices. London: Macmillan Press.

171
Redclift, M. (2000), ‘Addressing the causes of conflict: human security and
environmental responsibilities’, Reciel, Vol. 9 (1), ISSN 0962 8797.

172
Cheremisinoff, N. P. (2002), ‘Environmental security: the need for international
policies’, Pollution Engineering, May.

173
Kakonen, J. (1994), Green Security or Militarized Environment. Aldershot:
Dartmouth Publishing Company.

174
Barnett, J. and Dovers, S. (2001), ‘Environmental Security, Sustainability and Policy’,
Pacifica Review, Volume 13 (2), pp. 21-36.

175
Dokken, K. (2001), ‘Environment, security and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: is
environmental security a useful concept?’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 14 (4), pp. 509-530.

176
Foster, G. D. (2001), ‘Environmental security: the search for strategic legitimacy’,
Armed Forces and Society, Spring, Vol. 27 (13), p. 373.
70
This lack of research literature reflects a broader neglect by the more affluent,
minority world in addressing social science policy issues confronting the
South. There have been some articles addressing a particular environmental
security issue in a specific country, such as water wars in the Jordan Basin177 or
environmental degradation leading to human displacement in South Africa178.
In a search of the electronic version of Expanded Academic Index, only one
reference includes environmental security insights into the IOR as a whole179.
Obviously, establishing an environmental security research and policy agenda
for the IOR is also significant in that it addresses basic survival issues which
affect the inhabitants of the region who represent approximately one third of the
world’s population. Chaturvedi writes:
The Indian Ocean has been rightly described as the ‘Heart of the Third
World’ or the ‘Ocean of the South’, with low per capita income and low
levels of development in the majority of countries. The overwhelming
mass of these peoples struggle to survive under the conditions
characterised by chronic poverty, precarious political systems,
stagnating and struggling economies, fragmented political systems
guided by the considerations of ethnic identities...180.
The concept of environmental security must be brought to life by reference to
some of the most pressing environmental issues confronting the IOR. Particular
environmental security challenges are discussed briefly in the present paper, each
one ecologically interlocking with the other, snowballing in magnitude, creating
desperate realities for billions of people culminating in abject poverty, both
in terms of biodiversity (or lack thereof) and human existence – food, water,
nuclear waste, climate change and fisheries181.
These major environmental security issues should not simply be read as a ‘litany
of woes’. All of these issues are potential security challenges for states in the
IOR. In traditional or ‘hard’ security terms, environmental security issues, if
not addressed, will lead to increases in human conflict and, ultimately, wide-
scale disease, poverty and death. Also, due to these problems of a regionally-
shared nature, they are also policy issues that invite cooperation among nation
states; a shared agenda can emerge, with the potential for promoting a peaceful
and extremely necessary dialogue. The long term positive outcomes of such
multilateral dialogues are immeasurable.
177
Shaheen, M. (2000), ‘Questioning the water-war phenomenon in the Jordan Basin’,
Middle East Policy, Vol. VII (3), June.
178
Singh, M. (1996), ‘Environmental security and displaced people in Southern Africa’,
Social Justice, Winter, Vol. 23 (4), pp. 125-9.
179
Chaturvedi, S. (1998), “Common security”? Geopolitics, development, South Asia
and the Indian Ocean’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19 (4), pp. 701-724.
180
and the Indian Ocean’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19 (4), page 712.
181
Doyle, T. and Riseley, M., eds., (2008), Crucible for Survival: Environmental Security
and Justice in the Indian Ocean Region. Rutgers University Press.
71
Food
In 2011, the UN Food Price Index reached an all-time high, creating a global
food crisis associated with increased food insecurity. Food security is inextricably
linked to biodiversity and is defined by the United Nations as “…the physical and
economic access, for all people at all times, to enough food for an active, healthy
life”182. Significant global conventions such as the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)
and the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996 made commitments to enhancing
biodiversity, and in the case of the latter, to try to halve world hunger by 2015.
However, too little is still being done and hunger has increased every year since the
summit. For example, in 2004, according to the FAO, there were 852 million gravely
undernourished people in the world – up 10 million from the previous year183. In
addition to this, every day more than 17,000 children under the age of five die from
hunger related diseases184. Most of these deaths occur in the IOR.
Numbers of starving people across the IOR are increasing annually, despite the
propaganda of neoliberal economists and international finance organisations. In
Eastern Africa, nowhere is the nexus between food security and traditional security
more obvious. In Kenya, for example, deteriorating standards of living in Nairobi
furnished the backdrop for the abortive coup attempt of August 1982. Somali troops
clashed with civilians in the northern part of the country after a demonstration was
held to protest the ill effects of economic crisis185. Despite this desperate situation,
the efforts and resources spent by the international alliance to alleviate hunger and
poverty remain meager, particularly when compared to the billions of dollars spent
on the ‘war against terror’. The amount of aid provided for famine relief is decreasing
as funds are redirected towards strengthening traditional national security through
growing military resources186. For example, in Ethiopia it has been reported that the
World Food Program reduced daily food rations for the 126,000 refugees from the
Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia living in Ethiopian refugee camps because the aid was
redirected towards the war against terror The legacy of the green revolution is that
twenty species now make up about 90 per cent of our food supply out of thousands
of potential food plants187. Hence, food security for all people in the IOR is being
undermined. For example, in India in the 19th century, about 30,000 native rice
species were cultivated. By the start of the 21st century this had been drastically
reduced to a meager 50 species188 .
182
FAO web site at: http://www.fao.org
183
FAO (2010), The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing Food Insecurity in
Protracted Crises, Rome – available at: http://www.fao.org/publications
184
FAO 2010
185
UN Human Development Report 2005
186
UN Human Development Report 2005
187
Aldridge, S. (1996), The Thread of Life: The Story of Genes and Genetic Engineering,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
188
Bowden, R. (2002), Food Supply: Our Impact on the Planet, London: White-Thomson
Publishing.
72
In addition, chemical industrial agriculture requires intensive irrigation, which

over long periods can raise the water table. The water table in the Indus Valley
in Pakistan, for example, was 30 metres below ground before irrigation was
introduced in the middle of last century, but in the space of several years it rose
to within centimetres of the surface in low lying areas. This, combined with the
increase in fertilizer use, has lead to increased salinity resulting in significant soil
degradation and crop failure. The worst affected countries are India, Pakistan,
Iraq and Egypt. Australia has also been significantly affected.
Current global food insecurity affects more than 33 states, 19 of which are
located in the IOR (Figure 24). There exist a complex combination of interacting
factors that help explain the extent of global food insecurity. As the FAO189 has
put it: ‘This unacceptably high degree of hunger results from many factors,
including armed conflict and natural disasters, often in combination with weak
governance or public administration, scarce resources, unsustainable livelihood
systems and breakdown of local institutions. Faced with so many obstacles, it is
little wonder that protracted crises can become a self-perpetuating vicious cycle.’
State % of population food insecure

Afghanistan 35
Bangladesh 40
Burundi 66
Djibouti 31
Eritrea 15
Ethiopia 15
Kenya 16
Madagascar 25
Malawi 52
Mozambique 29
Nepal 9
Pakistan 18
Rwanda 30
Somalia >50
Sudan n.a.
Tanzania 15
Uganda n.a.
Yemen 22
Zimbabwe 20
Figure 24: Food insecure states in the Indian Ocean region190
189
FAO (2010), The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing Food Insecurity in
Protracted Crises, Rome – available at: http://www.fao.org/publications p4
190
UN Food Security Report 2009, pp. 45-175; FAO 2010
73
While a direct causal linkage between food insecurity and state instability is
contested, the food crisis in 2008 was associated with riots in 25 countries,
including in Mozambique that led to the deaths of 12 people191, and instability
and uncertainty is symptomatic of the current crisis192. Consequently, the
international community and individual states have been developing appropriate
food security strategies193194.
Water
There are many versions of what constitutes water security, including water
availability, water access and water as a human right195. The Millennium
Development Goals for 2015 (set at the UN Summit of 2000) also recognise
the importance of water in achieving sustainability. Out of this recognition, the
United Nations has declared the period from 2005 to 2015 as the ‘International
Decade for Action’ in relation to ‘Water for Life’196. According to the UN, every
individual needs a minimum of 15 litres a day, with half of that needed for
outright survival. The rest is needed for cooking, basic hygiene and sanitation
to help avoid disease. Despite the dependence that all communities have on
water197, and the struggle that many poor communities have just to get enough
water to survive, in wealthier countries such as Australia it has become an almost
invisible aspect of our way of life. Nevertheless, our standard of living requires
immense water resources: it takes around 18 litres of water to produce one litre
of petrol and around 1300 litres of water to produce a microchip198.
From basic survival to maintaining living standards, water also has vital cultural
value. Water is at the source of almost all religious faiths, from Christianity to
Islam and even Buddhism199. It is associated with birth, life, death (through
drought and floods), reproduction and even power. To those who believe in
evolution, the fluid element is the origin of all life on earth. In the origin myths
of many countries, such as Africa for example, water is always present.
191
Vidal, J. (2010), ‘Global food crisis forecast as prices reach record highs’, Guardian
newspaper, 25 October, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment
192
Brown, L. R. (2011), ‘The new geopolitics of food’, Foreign Policy, May-June, pp. 1-11.
193
AusAID (2004), Food Security Strategy, Canberra.
194
UN Food Security Report (2009), High Level Task Force, Progress Report, April
2008-October 2009, November.
195
Allouche, J., Nicol, A. and Mehta, L. (2011), ‘Water security: towards the securitization
of water?’, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. 12
(1), Winter, pp. 153-171.
196
UNESCO (2005), ‘2005-2015: International decade for action – water for life’, accessible
at: www.unesco.org
197
UNEP (2009), Water Security and Ecosystem Services: The Critical Connection,
Nairobi.
198
Bouguerra, M. L. (2006), ‘Water: symbolism and culture’, Institut Veolia Environment
Report, no. 5 – accessible at: www.institut.veolia.org
199
74
Thus in many countries, including India and parts of Africa, water is sacred.
For this reason, rivers that flow through communities are respected and even
worshiped. In some parts of Africa, people still present offerings to lakes
and rivers to show their gratitude for nourishment to crops and to ensure
bountiful harvests in the coming growing seasons. In Africa, many ancient
customs in traditional communities serve to protect water and the water cycle
by recognising the need to respect natural cycles and avoid over-exploitation.
African legends reflect the balance of ecological, economic, social and political
forces being present in the three realms – mineral, vegetable and animal200. In
Kenya for example, the Masai worship Engai, the god of rain, which leads to
respect for every form of life and ecological principles. This has enabled the
Masai to live in an environment where the temperature often reaches 50°C and
rainfall is less than 60cm per year201.
It is clear that there are many water insecure states in the Indian Ocean, many of
which tend to cluster around the west Asian or northwestern part of the region
(Figure 25). Policies designed to meet water needs and minimise state and
regional water insecurity lend themselves to inter-state cooperation.
State Annual renewable Total freshwater
water resources 1997 (km/3/yr) withdrawal 2000 (km/3/yr
Bahrain 0.1 0.30

Kuwait 0.02 0.44
Oman 1.0 1.36
Qatar 0.1 0.29
Saudi Arabia 2.4 17.32
United Arab Emirates 0.2 2.30
Yemen 4.1 6.63
Figure 25: Water insecure states in the Indian Ocean region202

However, ultimately, if solutions are to be pursued successfully, we must move
away from the idea that environmental security only concerns nation states
withstanding threats from the environment, and move to a position that views
environmental security ‘as shifting the focus from state security to societal and
individual well-being’203, advocating the concept of environmental security as
security for the environment (of which humanity is a part).
200
201
202
Pacific Institute (2010), The World’s Water, Data Tables 1and 2
203
Scrivener, D. (2002), ‘Environmental security’, in Barry, J. and Frankland, E. G., eds.,
International Encyclopaedia of Environmental Politics, London: Routledge, p.184.
75
Problems associated with quantity and quality and access at a variety of scales
have contributed to the human securitisation of water204. Indeed, it has been
argued that water is a growing source of conflict and an increasingly important
global security challenge. Concepts such as “water rage”, “water wars” and “water
refugees” have been used to describe various aspects of actual and potential
water conflict. This has caused one commentator to argue for an alternative water
future based on a Blue Covenant developed on principles of water conservation,
water justice and water democracy205.
Nuclear waste
Pressures aimed at maximising energy security have contributed to increased
global demand for nuclear power, notwithstanding the Fukushima catastrophe
in Japan. This in turn has led to a potential increase in environmental insecurity
due to the requirement to attempt to safely dispose of larger volumes of nuclear
waste materials. It is an interesting irony that, on the one hand, apart from South
West Asia and South Asia, the Indian Ocean is surrounded by nuclear weapon
free zones (Antarctic Treaty, Treaty of Bangkok, Treaty of Pelindaha, Treaty
of Rarotonga) while, on the other hand, it is fast becoming a nuclear ocean206.
Apart from the increasing number of regional nuclear weapons on land, as well
as the indeterminate number on and under the ocean itself at any one time, the
increasing global and regional demand for nuclear energy is having a significant
impact on the structure of Indian Ocean uranium trade207. These impacts, in
turn, raise a host of security questions linked to nuclear safety, uranium flows,
the flows and storage of nuclear waste and the security of SLOCs in the IOR, as
noted earlier.
While Africa had the dubious distinction of being first choice for the dumping of
European nuclear waste and persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in the 1980s,
it was the first to respond politically to the threat of “waste colonialism”208. Prior
to the ratification of the Basel Convention, many African states were especially
concerned about the transboundary movement of such hazardous waste into
Africa from industrialised countries and some indeed saw this process as one
of the systematic dumping of nuclear waste into Africa209. At the May 1988
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers 48th Ordinary Session
204
Allouche, J., Nicol, A. and Mehta, L. (2011), ‘Water security: towards the securitization
of water?’, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. 12
(1), Winter, pp. 153-171.
205
Barlow, M. (2008), Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for
the Right of Water, New York: The New Press.
206
207
Rumley, D. and Doyle, T. (2008), ‘The uranium trade in the Indian Ocean Region’, in
T. Doyle and M. Risely, eds., Crucible for Survival: Environmental Security and Justice
in the Indian Ocean Region. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, pp. 228-242.
208
Bernstoff, A. and Stairs, K. (2001), POPs in Africa: Hazardous Waste Trade 1980-
2000, Amsterdam: Greenpeace International.
209
Krummer, K. (1999), International Management of Hazardous Wastes, OUP.
76
in Ethiopia, a resolution condemned the importation into Africa of industrial

and nuclear waste as a “crime against Africa and the African people” and called
upon member states to introduce import bans. The resolution condemned “all
transnational corporations and enterprises involved in the introduction, in any
form, of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa; and demands that they clean up
the areas that have already been contaminated by them”210.
As a consequence of this resolution, work began on an African Convention
under the auspices of the OAU shortly after the adoption of the Basel
Convention, since the latter excluded nuclear waste. There was therefore a
concern that certain needs of African states were not properly taken into
account, and thus, while the Basel Convention was a convention of the north,
there was need for a convention of the south. The resultant Bamako Convention,
which was adopted in Mali in January 1991, entered into force in April 1998.
Of particular international concern are the five states that have neither signed
nor ratified the Bamako Convention as well as a further seven that have signed
but have yet to ratify. It may be that some states have stalled either signing or
ratifying in order to participate in the lucrative trade in hazardous waste211.
This may well be true for the six Indian Ocean littoral states of Djibouti, Kenya,
Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia and South Africa, none of which were in the
original convention signatory group of twelve states. Furthermore, of these six
littoral states, two have neither signed nor ratified Bamako (Seychelles and South
Africa) and a further two (Djibouti and Somalia) have yet to ratify either the
Basel or Bamako conventions.
The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 resulted in the washing up on
Somalian beaches of many containers of nuclear and toxic waste that were
illegally dumped during the early 1990s212. It has been alleged that, in at
least one case, a lucrative financial agreement had been reached between the
interim government headed by Ali Mahdi Muhammed and certain Swiss and
Italian companies to import millions of tonnes of nuclear waste from Italy into
Somalia. These companies were alleged to be under the control of the Italian
mafia, and the Somalian deal was said to be only one part of so-called “eco-
mafia” operations213. For the Europeans, the cost per tonne (US$8) represented
a fraction of the likely cost of up to US$1,000 per tonne of appropriate local
treatment and disposal214.
210
Organisation of African Unity (1988), Secretariat, CM/Res.1147-1176.
211
UNEP (2000), Global Environmental Outlook, Nairobi, Chapter 3: Policy responses-
Africa.
212
Clayton, J. (2005), ‘Somalia’s secret dumps of toxic waste washed ashore by tsunami’,
at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
213
Grosse-Kettler, S. (2004), ‘External actors in stateless Somalia: a war economy and its
promoters’, Paper 39, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), p. 29.
214
Clayton, J. (2005), ‘Somalia’s secret dumps of toxic waste washed ashore by tsunami’,
at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
77
Given Somalia’s strategic location and its current statelessness, such illegal or
unauthorised movements of nuclear waste have potentially very significant
implications not only for the human security of the Somalian population, but for
the Indian Ocean environment, the Indian Ocean routes along which such flows
take place, as well as the lethal prospects of the potential terrorist use of such
nuclear materials. It has been noted that Somalia is a “stateless war economy”,
one of the requirements of which is to engage in international “commercial
complicity” since its local economy is unable to meet military expenditures.
Funding the war economy is achieved in various ways, including via trade
by local conflict groups with international corporations and institutions in
unauthorised commodities, including nuclear waste. Indeed, Somalia currently
functions as a transhipment point and a supply route for a wide variety of illegal
merchandise for the whole of the Horn of Africa and beyond215.
This touches on another fundamentally important security challenge for the IOR.
It has been pointed out that seizures of smuggled radioactive material capable
of making a terrorist “dirty bomb” have doubled in recent years. According to
the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), smugglers, mainly from the
former Eastern bloc, have been caught attempting to traffic such materials on
more than 300 occasions since 2002, with most of the incidents understood to
have taken place in Europe216. IOR-ARC potentially has a very important role as
a pressure group regionally and in international forums to try and eradicate the
smuggling of radioactive materials into the region and to prevent dumping into
the ocean.
Climate change
It has been estimated that Indian Ocean states are responsible for approximately
40% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, the region contains five
states that emitted more than 100 million metric tonnes of carbon in 2006 –
India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Australia – and four states that rank
among the world’s top per capita emitters – Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain and
Australia217.
With the securitisation of the climate change debate, it has been argued that
the current trajectory of climate change will likely contribute to an increase in
a wide range of traditional and non-traditional security threats. As a result, it
is suggested that such threats require a military response218 and that regional
Grosse-Kettler, S. (2004), ‘External actors in stateless Somalia: a war economy and its
215
promoters’, Paper 39, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).

216
Smith, L. (2006), ‘Smuggled nuclear waste cases double’, The Weekend Australian
newspaper, 7-8 October, p.1.
217
Rumley, D. (2010), ‘Ideology, carbon emissions and climate change discourses in the
Indian Ocean Region’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 6 (2), pp. 147-154.
218
MacGregor, S. (2010), ‘Gender and climate change: from impacts to discourses’,
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 6 (2), pp. 223-238.
78
defence forces will inevitably need to plan for various ‘second order’ impacts that
will contribute to instability and conflict. In particular, according to this view,
climate change is likely to lead to an increase in the magnitude and frequency
of regional humanitarian crises that will in turn exacerbate border security
questions due to the emergence of “climate refugees”219 and possible associated
changes in migration patterns220. In addition, rising sea levels due to climate
change are likely to have major impacts on the prospects for some Indian Ocean
states to continue to exist (for example, Maldives) and on all low lying coastal
areas around the region, most of which are major centres of population.
While all of these changes are yet to be fully investigated and are thus only
potentially significant security challenges to regional states, a recent scientific
paper concluded that global climate changes have indeed been responsible for
violent conflict and even the collapse of civilisations221. Using data from 1950-
2004, the authors conclude that the probability of new civil conflicts throughout
the tropics doubles during El Niño years relative to La Nina years. They suggest
that this indicates that the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) has had some
role in 21% of all civil conflicts since the 1950s222.
Fisheries
Since more than 800 million people around the Indian Ocean rim rely on fish
as a major source of protein, the impact of the degradation of fish stocks, either
directly or indirectly, will likely cause very significant regional dislocations. To
enable ecologically sustainable and socially just development and management of
Indian Ocean fisheries requires a paradigm shift in the perceptions and policies
of major stakeholders. A central policy challenge is to identify a collective
regional interest for fisheries and accordingly the development of integrated
management policies that link ecology and society and that incorporate
individuals, communities, agencies, states and regimes into a holistic cooperative
endeavour.
Successful ocean governance therefore requires greater inter-state and inter-
agency consultation and cooperation, an improvement in linking national
initiatives to local action, increased participation of local government and local
communities and the enhancement of local capability. Achieving this overall
goal requires either the enhancement of existing regional institutions or the
creation of a new regional body. There is some recent evidence to suggest that the
achievement of this goal is in progress.
219
Chaturvedi, S. and Doyle, T. (2010), ‘Geopolitics of fear and the emergence of “climate
refugees”: imaginative geographies of global warming and displacements in Bangaldesh’,
220
Bergin, A. (2010), ‘Climate change will drive future agenda’, The Weekend Australian,
Defence Special Report, 29 May, p. 12.
221
Hsiang, S. M., Meng, K. C. and Cane, M. A. (2011), ‘Civil conflicts are associated with
climate change’, Nature, Vol. 476, 25 August, pp. 438-441.
222
Hsiang, S. M., Meng, K. C. and Cane, M. A. (2011), ‘Civil conflicts are associated with
climate change’, Nature, Vol. 476, 25 August, p. 438.
79
Of the 600 marine fish stocks globally monitored by the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO), it is estimated that 76% are fully exploited, overexploited or
depleted, while in the Indian Ocean, stocks of southern bluefin tuna are classified
as “depleted”, the FAO’s worst category. Several other species in the Indian Ocean
– for example, emperor, Indian mackerel and bigeye tuna –- range from being
fully exploited to overexploited223. There are many other species in the Indian
Ocean where the level of exploitation is unknown or is extremely difficult to
determine. It is not known with any degree of certainty, therefore, whether there
are any Indian Ocean species that are, in fact, underexploited.
Seven states – China, Peru, India, Indonesia, USA, Japan and Chile, the so-called
seven “fisher states” – take in nearly two thirds of the world’s total fish capture224.
Furthermore, over the next 15-20 years, two of these states – Japan (60.2
kilograms) and China (35.9 kilograms) and two regions – Southeast Asia (25.8
kilograms) and the EU (23.7 kilograms) – are projected to consume the largest
amount of fish per capita.
Apart from the two Indian Ocean ‘fisher states’ (India and Indonesia), these
other states and regions are increasingly unable to meet the growing demand
within their own national jurisdictions and thus there will likely be greater
pressure on fish stocks in the Indian Ocean. As a result, the Indian Ocean is
potentially becoming a more intense arena for conflict and competition over
extra-regional demands for increasingly scarce fish resources. Unfortunately,
however, the current status of Indian Ocean fish stocks “signal little room for
further expansion, in addition to the possibility that some, if not most, stocks
might already be overexploited”225. The social, environmental, economic and
political outcomes of this dilemma are likely to be far-reaching and thus will
necessitate careful regional and extra-regional management.
In the Indian Ocean, fisheries practices and governance are transacted
within a complex array of environmental, institutional, social, economic and
jurisdictional frameworks. These policy frameworks serve to impose some
degree of regulatory control, dependent to a considerable degree on state and
local adherence and enforcement capacity.
On the other hand, however, these policy frameworks invariably exacerbate
inter- and intra-state conflict, since they are primarily located within an overall
statist and/or corporate context that over-emphasises national security concerns
and company profit maximisation at the expense of the collective regional
interest. As international agencies and states with depleting fishing resources
all know, resolving the multiplicity of interacting and overlapping international
223
FAO (2008), ‘Review of the state of the world marine fisheries resources’, Tables D1-
D17 at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/decrep/fao/007/y5852e/Y5852E23.pdf
224
Halweil, B. (2006), ‘Fish harvest stable but threatened’, in Vital Signs 2006-2007, New
York, WorldWatch Books, pp. 26-7.
225
De Young, C., ed. (2006), ‘Review of the state of the world marine capture fisheries
management: Indian Ocean’, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 488, Rome, p. 13.
80
fishery conflicts and designing ecologically sustainable solutions is a very

significant challenge. The nature of fisheries conflict resolution itself, of course,
can vary along a spectrum from peaceful diplomacy and inter-state cooperation
at one end to open hostility, “gunboat diplomacy” or war at the other226.
Identifying a collective regional interest for fisheries is thus a major policy
opportunity in the Indian Ocean.
A critical regional holistic evaluation of fisheries resource exploitation policies
is essential in order to ensure a sustainable future for Indian Ocean fisheries
as part of a new cooperative regional environmental strategy. This overall cean
management approach will become increasingly necessary as other Indian
Ocean biological and mineral resources are exploited in the future and as a result
of the increasing impact of regional population pressures. Furthermore, in order
to be comprehensive, such an approach will need to take place within a fully
participatory environment incorporating all of the stakeholders that is informed
by a new environmental security paradigm.

Rumley, D. (2009), ‘A policy framework for fisheries conflicts in the Indian Ocean’, in
226
Rumley, D., Chaturvedi, S. and Sakhuja, V., eds. (2009), Fisheries Exploitation in the
Indian Ocean Region: Threats and Opportunities. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 54-71.
81
IV. India and Australia in
Indo-Pacific security
This section of the report discusses the current and future roles of India and
Australia in the Indo-Pacific, particularly from an Australian perspective. India
is widely considered to have an important future role in Australia’s security.
However, there is considerable uncertainty as to how Australia and India
should develop a closer relationship with India, particularly in light of their
relationships with the United States and China. This section explores some of the
convergences and challenges in their growing security relationship with India
with reference to bilateral issues and in the context of other key relationships.
The section also explores the strategic concept of the Indo-Pacific and its
potential impact on the Australia-India security relationship. This section is
divided into the following sub-sections:
1. An outline of shifts in the balance of power in the Indian and Pacific
oceans and its impact on Australia.
2. The developing the Australia-India strategic relationship.
3. Navigating Australia’s relationships with India and China in the Indian
Ocean.
4. The idea of an Indo-Pacific strategic region: potential consequences for
Australia and India.
The shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific
The balance of power in both the Indian and Pacific oceans is undergoing some
fundamental shifts that will have an important impact on the Australia-India
relationship. Broadly, these include:
• The rise of China as a global economic power and a regional military
power in East Asia.
• The simultaneous rise of India as a global economic power and a regional
military power in South Asia and the IOR.
• The expansion of the areas of strategic interest of both China and India
beyond their traditional areas of interest and spheres of influence.
• The emergence of other countries such as Indonesia and South Africa as
growing economic powers with important stakes in the IOR.
• A decline in the relative military power of the United States in the Pacific
and Indian oceans.
For Australia, the consequences of these shifts are potentially profound. Changes
in the alignments of Australia’s economic and security relationships have created
some significant strategic uncertainties for Australia that are only likely to
intensify. For most of its history as an independent country, Australia has had
82
the luxury of having its key economic partnerships aligned with its key security
partnerships. First, Britain was Australia’s strategic guarantor and also its major
economic partner. Then, the United States became Australia’s strategic guarantor
and the United States and its allies such as Japan were Australia’s main economic
partners.
Over the last five years or so China has become Australia’s major trading partner.
India is now Australia’s third or fourth largest export partner. India’s economic
importance to Australia is only likely to grow in coming years, especially with the
finalisation of the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA)
between Australia and India, which is currently under negotiation. However, the
United States is and for decades will likely continue to be Australia’s key security
partner. This potential disjuncture between Australia’s economic and security
alignments is the cause of some discomfort among Australian strategists and has
been the subject of wide public debate in recent years227. So far this debate has
largely focused on how Australia should balance its relationships with the United
States and China, but there is also increasing discussion about how Australia’s
relationship with India should be developed and how this will fit with other key
relationships.
Developing the Australia-India security relationship

One of the greatest strategic challenges facing Australia in the Indian Ocean and
beyond is the need to develop a good security relationship with India. Many
believe that there is an essential congruence in Australian and Indian strategic
interests on many issues, and that in some ways they are natural economic
and security partners. However, there are also likely to be some challenges in
developing the relationship.
Divergent strategic perspectives

For much of their modern histories, Australia and India have not had a close
strategic relationship. Despite a common language and some shared political
traditions, Australia and India’s strategic perspectives were often very different.
During the Cold War, India was a determined advocate of strategic autonomy
and nonalignment, while Australia was a loyal ally of the United States. To some
extent during the Cold War, the India-Australia relationship broadly fitted the
pattern of India’s relations with many Western-aligned or oriented states in the
Asia Pacific – divergent geopolitical perspectives, ideological differences and
weak economic links. However, there were also a number of factors specific
to the Australia-India relationship that have caused each side to neglect the
relationship228229.
227
White, H. (2010), ‘Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing’,
Quarterly Essay 39, September.
228
Gurry, M. (1995), ‘Australian views of India: From Evatt to Evans’, in Major General
Dipankar Banerjee (ed.), Towards an Era of Cooperation: An Indo-Australian Dialogue
(New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995), pp. 381-396
229
Gurry, M (1996), India: Australia’s Neglected Neighbour? 1947 – 1996 Griffith: Centre
83
However, despite holding very different strategic perspectives for most of the
Cold War period, there was little direct friction or interaction between them,
including over Indian Ocean security. In fact, Australia did not figure materially
in New Delhi’s calculations of Indian Ocean security and was often considered as
being merely a client state of the United States230231. For its part, Canberra did not
see India as presenting any threat to Australia, although there were some residual
concerns about the extent and impact of India’s security relationship with
the Soviet Union232. Different perspectives and misunderstandings continued
for some years after the end of the Cold War. In particular, in 1998, Australia
reacted strongly against India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests, motivated by a desire to
safeguard the nuclear non-proliferation system. Australia (along with Japan) led
international condemnation of the tests. Some in India saw Australia’s position as
being somehow directed at India, which was certainly not the case.
Changes in Australian strategic perspectives on India

While the 1998 nuclear tests represented a low point in the bilateral relationship,
they also represented a pivot point for the recognition by Australia of the
strategic importance of India. Since the turn of the century, Australia has made
considerable efforts to develop a comprehensive strategic relationship with India.
This reflected the increasing importance of India as an economic power and
potentially a major economic partner for Australia. There was also recognition
of considerable shared interests with India in promoting regional security and
stability. This recognition was enhanced by the strategic rapprochement between
India and the United States, which removed many political irritations and
opened the prospect for a change in India’s longstanding policies that inhibited
security cooperation between India and Western states. For Australia’s part, as
well as being concerned about the stability of South Asia in which India is the
predominant player, it also saw the expansion of India’s area of strategic interest
into areas that are traditionally of key strategic concern for Australia, especially
Southeast Asia. This was highlighted in Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper,
which commented that, “as India extends its reach and influence into areas of
shared strategic interest, we will need to strengthen our defence relationship and
our understanding of Indian strategic thinking…”233.
for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations.

230
Subrahmanyam, K. (1988), ‘Strategic Developments in the Indian and South Pacific
Ocean regions,” in Robert H. Bruce, Australia and the Indian Ocean: Strategic
Dimensions of Increasing Naval Involvement (Perth: Centre of Indian Ocean Studies),
pp. 79-95.
231
Kumar, M (1995), Super Power India and the Indian Ocean, Allahabad: Chugh.
232
Brewster, D. (2010b), ‘Australia and India: the Indian Ocean and the limits of strategic
convergence,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 5, pp. 549-565.
233
Australian Government (2009), Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force
2030. Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence.
84
Australia’s heightened strategic interest in India also reflects the increasing

strategic importance to Australia of the IOR as a whole, where India plays a
leading role. Australia’s strategic focus has traditionally been towards East Asia
and the Pacific, while the Indian Ocean has often been neglected in its strategic
thinking. Some might argue that Australia’s Indian Ocean strategy has often
largely involved encouraging the continued commitment of its great power
friends to the region – the predominant role of the Royal Navy up until the early
1970s and the US ascendency thereafter. While US strategic predominance in
the Indian Ocean is likely to continue for many years to come, it is increasingly
looking to share the security burden with key regional partners, which includes
both Australia and India.
The relative neglect of the IOR in Australian strategic thinking has to some extent
lagged behind the reality of its military involvement in the region. Since 1973,
the great majority of Australia’s military deployments have been in and around
the Indian Ocean (including Kuwait, Somalia, East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan and
the Gulf of Aden) and not the Asia Pacific. The location of many of Australia’s
resources in Western Australia and off Australia’s northwest coast has now
become a significant factor in Australian defence planning. As the 2009 Defence
White Paper stated, “over the period to 2030, the Indian Ocean will join the
Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and defence
planning”234. The growing recognition of the strategic importance of the IOR to
Australia has resulted in a significant movement of Australia’s defence resources
to the north and west of the country in recent years. Australia began developing
a significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the late 1980s and presently
around one third of the Royal Australian Navy is deployed in the IOR, including
at Fremantle, Western Australia, which is the RAN’s largest base. This shift in
defence resources towards the IOR is only likely to accelerate as a result of the
recent Australian Force Posture Review.
As a result of these developments, Australia now recognises India as a key
partner for Australia in Indian Ocean security and increasingly also as an
important partner in the Pacific. As Australian Defence Minister, Stephen Smith,
commented in 2011:
“India’s rise as a world power is at the forefront of Australia’s foreign
and strategic policy, as is the need to preserve maritime security in the
Indian Ocean. India and Australia, with the two most significant and
advanced navies of the Indian Ocean rim countries, are natural security
partners in the Indo-Pacific region.” 235
234
Australian Government (2009), Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force
2030. Defence White Paper, Canberra: Department of Defence. p37
235
Smith, S. (2011), ‘Australia and India: Building the Strategic Partnership,’ Speech at the
Asia Society, Mumbai, 9 December.
85
The contemporary Australia-India security relationship
Since the turn of this century, Australia has made considerable efforts to develop
a comprehensive strategic relationship with India. There have been numerous
visits to India by Australian prime ministers and senior ministers. This increased
political engagement has led to several bilateral agreements on security-related
matters, including a 2003 agreement on terrorism, a 2006 memorandum of
understanding on defence cooperation, a 2007 defence information sharing
arrangement and 2008 agreements on intelligence dialogue, extradition and
terrorism. In November 2009, Australia and India announced a Joint Declaration
on Security Cooperation, intended to set out shared strategic perspectives and
create a framework for the further development of bilateral security cooperation.
At the same time, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd told an audience in New
Delhi that India and Australia were “natural partners” and should become
“strategic partners”236.
The Australia-India security declaration is a non-binding declaration of
principles and understandings in security matters and establishes a bilateral
framework for further cooperation in security matters. Australia has announced
similar security declarations with Japan (2007) and South Korea (2009).
India also announced a security declaration with Japan in 2008. Some see
these security declarations as a way of linking India with a web of security
relationships with US allies in the Pacific237. Whether this is the case or not,
the 2009 security declaration was a notable step for Australia and India in
establishing a framework for further development of the security relationship,
including the formalisation of regular consultations and dialogues between
senior ministers, senior military and diplomatic representatives and joint
working groups on maritime security operations and counter-terrorism and
immigration. In conjunction with the security declaration, Australia and India
have finalised new cooperation arrangements in intelligence, law enforcement,
border security, terrorist financing and money laundering.
Australia is now coming to see India as an important element in its security,
primarily in the Indian Ocean, but also potentially playing a material role in
East Asia. Most strategic analysts in Australia now see the underlying strategic
interests of Australia and India as “essentially congruent”238239 and believe that
there is significant scope for bilateral security cooperation between Australia
and India in the Indian Ocean and beyond. However, there is a degree of
disappointment in Canberra over New Delhi’s cautious response to developing
236
Rudd, K. (2009), ‘From fitful engagement to strategic partnership,’ Address to the
Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi, 12 November.
237
Brewster, D. (2010c), ‘The Australia-India Security Declaration: the Quadrilateral
redux?’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn), pp.1-9.
238
Gordon, S. (2007), Widening Horizons: Australia’s new relationship with India
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
239
Medcalf, R. and Gill, A. (2009), ‘Unconventional Partners: Australia-India Cooperation
in Reducing Nuclear Dangers’, Lowy Institute Policy Brief, October.
86
the India-Australia relationship over the last decade or so. In New Delhi,
Australia is generally seen as an element of an extended Look East Policy,
although it does not have the priority afforded to India’s relations with, for
example, Japan or Singapore. Some Indian commentators see great potential for
a maritime security partnership between India and Australia that spans the Indo-
Pacific240. Others regard Australia merely as a potentially useful junior partner in
an informal coalition with the United States to balance against China241 .
There have been irritations in recent years that have created political difficulties
for New Delhi in developing the relationship with Australia. A series of assaults
on Indian vocational students studying in Melbourne in 2008-9 was taken up by
the Indian media and became a major source of controversy among the Indian
public. But the greatest irritant in the security relationship has been the uranium
issue. Despite the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement that was reached
in 2007, Australia has been slow to fully accommodate India’s new status as a
nuclear power outside of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The
Australian Labor government, which has been in power since 2007, has until
recently been bound by party policy that banned the export of uranium to any
state that is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This policy
reflected the politically controversial nature of uranium mining and exports
in Australia and Australia’s enthusiasm for supporting international non-
proliferation norms. While India did not have any immediate need for uranium
supplies from Australia, having secured supplies from Russia, Kazakhstan,
Gabon and Canada among others, Australia’s refusal to supply uranium was
taken by New Delhi as indicating a lack of commitment to the relationship and
a refusal to acknowledge India’s great power status, especially when seen in
light of Australian exports of uranium to China. For several years, the policy
significantly reduced any enthusiasm by the Indian government for closer
relations with Australia. The recent visit to New Delhi by the Australian Prime
Minister, Julia Gillard, during which discussions took place on an agreement to
export uranium to India, will likely pave the way for enhanced secruity relations
between India and Australia.
Australia-India security dialogues
As noted above, one of the important features of the 2009 security declaration
was the establishment of regular bilateral security dialogues between Australia
and India at a ministerial, official and military-to-military level. The Australian
and Indian foreign ministers now meet for an annual dialogue, as do the
respective defence ministers (although there are no arrangements for meetings
in a 2+2 format). In recent years, there has also been a considerable increase in
visits and exchanges at the military-to-military level, although this will likely
take time to bear fruit.
240
Raja Mohan, C. (2011b), ‘Indo-Pacific naval partnership open to Delhi and Canberra’,
The Australian, 2 November.
241
Chellaney, B. (2007), ‘Dragon’s Foothold in Gwadar’, Asian Age, 7 April.
87
Of greater controversy than bilateral security dialogues have been attempts
to establish a regular security dialogue that also includes the United States.
This is of considerable practical importance to security cooperation between
Australia and India given Australia’s close security relationship with the United
States and the burgeoning strategic relationship between India and the United
States. The absence of regular and structured interaction among all three states
would likely inhibit the development of a closer security relationship between
Australia and India. An arrangement of this nature has been on the cards for
some years. In early 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed the so-
called “quadrilateral” initiative, under which India would join a formal security
dialogue with Japan, the United States and Australia. Some saw this proposal as
extending the existing ministerial-level US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Security
Dialogue to include India. Despite official denials, this was widely viewed as
part of a policy to balance or contain China and was viewed by some as the
beginnings a four-way alliance between the United States, Japan, India and
Australia. These perceptions were reinforced by the large-scale Malabar 2007
naval exercises that were held later that year in the Bay of Bengal, involving
India, the United States, Australia, Japan and Singapore. However, Abe’s
proposal was never implemented. Chinese official and semi-official sources
reacted very negatively to the quadrilateral initiative and the Malabar 2007
exercises, criticising the initiatives as resurrecting “a cold-war mentality” and
marking “the formation of a small NATO to resist China”242. The Australian
government had considerable misgivings over the proposal, which was seen
by some as undefined and unduly provocative towards China. There were also
misgivings about the proposal in New Delhi, Washington and even Tokyo.
Canberra may also have had concerns that the inclusion of India in the existing
Trilateral Security Dialogue would dilute the effectiveness of that dialogue, and
perhaps also Australia’s role243. Canberra may well have feared for Australia’s
goals in an arrangement in which it would inevitably be only a junior partner.
Whatever the mix of reasons, Australia’s decision in early 2008 to publicly
announce its withdrawal from the initiative while in the presence of the Chinese
foreign minister Yang Jiechi was perceived badly in New Delhi.
However, proposals for security dialogues that include the United States have
been revived. In December 2011, the United States, India and Japan held their
first Trilateral Security Dialogue meeting at an assistant secretary level, an
arrangement that failed to attract the political controversy that surrounded
the 2007 quadrilateral proposal. In December 2011, following the change in
242
Cheng, S. (2008), ‘A Comparative Analysis of Abe’s and Fukuda’s Asia Diplomacy’,
China International Studies, No. 10 (Spring), pp. 58-72.
243
Medcalf, R. (2008), ‘Squaring the Triangle: An Australian Perspective on Asian Security
Minilateralism,’ in William Tow, Michael Auslin, Rory Medcalf, Akihiko Tanaka, Zhu
Feng and Sheldon Simon, Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, NBR Special
Report, December. p27
88
the Australian policy on uranium exports to India, Australia also proposed

that India should join with it and the United States in a separate Trilateral
Security Dialogue. The Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd was reported as
commenting that Australia had received a positive response from India on the
proposal, although this was later denied244. While there have been calls to revive
a quadrilateral security dialogue involving India, Australia, the United States
and Japan245, from the perspective of both Australia and India, separate trilateral
dialogues may currently be the most effective way of focusing on shared security
concerns in the IOR and the Pacific.
India and Australia as natural maritime partners in the Indian
Ocean region?
Much of the initial focus of security cooperation between Australia and India
in coming years is likely to be on maritime security issues. These will include
issues such as piracy and maritime terrorism, illegal fishing and maritime
environmental issues, people trafficking and humanitarian and disaster relief
(HADR). There are many opportunities for expanded cooperation in these areas
on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Australia, India and the United States could,
for example, sponsor the establishment of disaster relief arrangements in the
IOR, modelled on the successful FRANZ trilateral disaster relief arrangements
conducted in the Pacific by France, Australia and New Zealand246. There are also
opportunities for enhanced cooperation in anti-piracy efforts. Australia currently
participates in the US-sponsored Combined Task Forces 150 and 151 to combat
piracy and terrorism in the northeast Indian Ocean. India conducts its own
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and does not formally participate in
coalition counter-terrorism operations. One of the key reasons for this is political
sensitivity in New Delhi over participation in US-led military coalitions. There
may be scope for Australia to find creative ways to bridge this gap, for example,
through promoting bilateral anti-piracy operations involving Australian and
Indian naval vessels.
244
Taylor, R. (2011), ‘Australia backs security pact with U.S., India’, The Australian, 30
November.
245
246
Future Directions International (FDI) (2011), ‘Strategic Objectives of the United
States in the Indian Ocean Region’, Workshop Report, 29 September.
89
Australia has also been pressing for some time to institute regular bilateral
exercises between the Australian and Indian navies, beyond the irregular passage
exercises that currently occur (generally when RAN vessels are on passage
to the Persian Gulf). India has also not participated in the Australian-hosted
multilateral Kakadu naval exercises, probably because of the participation of the
Pakistan Navy. Following Julia Gillard’s recent visit to New Delhi, it is expected
that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs will now give the go-ahead to the
Indian Navy to institute regular bilateral naval exercises with Australia.
Another potential area for cooperation in Indian Ocean maritime security
is in maritime domain awareness. Over the last decade or so India has given
significant focus to improving its maritime domain awareness throughout
the IOR. This has included considerable investment by India in maritime
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, including
enhanced electronic intelligence and signals intelligence capabilities on the
Indian mainland and at other strategic locations in the IOR (including in
India’s Andaman Islands in the northeast Indian Ocean). Australia already
has considerable maritime ISR capabilities throughout the eastern Indian
Ocean in areas that abut or overlap with areas of strategic interest to India. In
coming years, both India and Australia will likely acquire Boeing P-8 maritime
aircraft and possibly Global Hawk UAVs as the backbone of their maritime
ISR capabilities. This will create unprecedented opportunities for information
sharing as well as for cooperation in training and maintenance. It has been
suggested that India and Australia could jointly sponsor a regional maritime
domain partnership, which would involve collaboration with Southeast Asian
states in intelligence sharing, maritime domain awareness and coordinated
patrolling, somewhat along the lines of the Saudi-sponsored Arab Naval Task
Force in the Gulf of Aden247. A regional arrangement co-sponsored by India
and Australia could be a useful way of advancing ISR cooperation while also
satisfying Indian political sensitivities about regional security partnerships that
do not necessarily involve direct reliance on the United States.
India and Australia can also play important political roles in developing regional
awareness and cooperation among Indian Ocean rim states. The lack of an
effective Indian Ocean multilateral economic or security framework may make
Australia’s goal of engaging India in the Indian Ocean more difficult, but can also
provide an opportunity for India and Australia to work together. In the mid-
1990s, India and Australia (together with South Africa) acted as co-sponsors in
the establishment of IOR-ARC with the primary aim of promoting trade and
investment in the region. However, the extreme diversity of states in the Indian
Ocean rim and a lack of political will and funding has meant that IOR-ARC has
had few concrete achievements in progressing regional economic cooperation
or even cultural issues. India and Australia have recently taken a leading role
247
Upadhyaya, S. Commander (2009), ‘India and Australia Relations: Scope for Naval
Cooperation”, National Maritime Foundation, 4 December.
90
in trying to revive IOR-ARC and mould it into an effective regional grouping.

In 2011, India and Australia released a joint paper outlining six priority sectors
for future cooperation within IOR-ARC, including maritime security, trade
and investment, fishing industry, disaster management, tourism and capacity
building. The inclusion of maritime security issues as a priority represents
a significant change in the position of India, which has previously opposed
the grouping discussing security issues. At its establishment in 1997, India
firmly opposed suggestions by Australia that security issues be included on the
organisation’s agenda, most likely from an instinct to avoid addressing security
issues in regional forum and concerns about the potential for members to raise
India-Pakistan issues.
As a result, at the November 2011 Council of Ministers meeting in Bangaluru,
for the first time maritime security issues, specifically the shared threat of piracy,
figured prominently in discussions. Member states agreed – at least in principle
– to use IOR-ARC as a vehicle for sharing information, experience and best
practice in relation to piracy248. Whether this agreement will be translated into
action remains to be seen. Some analysts continue to be sceptical that it can be
revived as an effective organisation for addressing regional concerns.
Opportunities for collaboration beyond the Indian
Ocean region
Australia and India have numerous shared interests beyond the Indian Ocean,
which extend into the Asia Pacific region and to a global level. At a global level,
there may be considerable scope for cooperation on issues such as nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament and control of other weapons of mass
destruction249. Australia and India also have shared interests in ensuring that any
future Asian regional security and economic architecture includes both countries
as core members. Both India and Australia want to see the development of
balanced multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific that are not dominated by
any one country.
Australia and India have shared interests in ensuring safety and freedom
of navigation in key SLOC in the Asia Pacific region such as the Straits of
Malacca and the South China Sea. They also have shared interests in promoting
democracy, political stability and secularism in Southeast Asia, and particularly
in Indonesia. This is an area where there can be considerable strategic
collaboration between India and Australia in the future.
248
IOR-ARC (2011), 11th Meeting of the Council of Ministers IOR-ARC Bengaluru
Communiqué, November 15.
249
Medcalf, R. and Gill, A. (2009), ‘Unconventional Partners: Australia-India Cooperation
in Reducing Nuclear Dangers’, Lowy Institute Policy Brief, October.
91
Underlying these strategic factors is a strong incentive for Australia to see India
as a major investor in its resources sector, which would also have the benefit of
helping to balance the role of other major investors such as China. India also
has good reason to want to develop Australia as a dependable and stable energy
supplier.
Challenges in developing the security relationship

Despite considerable improvement in the India-Australia political relationship
and the many opportunities open for collaboration in security, practical
security cooperation between India and Australia has been slow to develop. In
practice, Australia and India are still a long way from having a close working
security relationship. Some believe that the relationship between Australia
and India will be for many years largely focused on the economic and political
domain – with military and security aspects having less importance. There is
good reason to suggest that Australia and India will develop a close working
security relationship in the long term reflecting the many similarities in their
strategic interests. Nevertheless, there are several challenges ahead in developing
the relationship, many of these reflecting differences between the Indian and
Australian strategic cultures. These include:
• Important differences in perspectives between an activist middle power
and an emerging power with great power aspirations such as India. An
activist middle power such as Australia is neither a major regional power
(for example Japan) that is inherently important to India nor a small and
useful gateway state (for example Singapore). It seems that New Delhi
is yet to be convinced that engagement with a middle power such as
Australia is a high priority relative to other commitments. Australia needs
to much better articulate how it can add to India’s security in practical
terms so that there can be a shared understanding that Australia and
India are important to the other’s security.
• There are also considerable differences in habits of security cooperation
that need to be recognised and addressed. Australia has a deeply
embedded habit of collaboration with security partners, which contrasts
sharply with India’s instinct to oppose multilateral security cooperation
except under the clear banner of the United Nations. While India’s
perspectives on security cooperation may be evolving, they are changing
slowly, and there continues to be significant political sensitivity about
participating in US-led coalitions. There may be value in Australia
moving beyond its comfort zone in participating in US-led coalitions
(such as the Combined Task Forces 150 and 151 in the northeast Indian
Ocean) and considering working in coalition with India and other
countries.
92
• While the India-US strategic rapprochement over the last decade has been
an important factor in Australia’s changing strategic perceptions of India,
Australia needs to better articulate the many other factors that have led to
a congruence of strategic interests between India and Australia that will
form the basis of a strong bilateral relationship. This means that Australia
will need to find a delicate balance between engaging with India alongside
the United States on certain issues while also pursuing opportunities
where Australia and India should act without US involvement. It is
neither in Australia nor India’s interests to allow the bilateral relationship
to be wholly captive to the vagaries of the health of the US-India strategic
partnership.
These and other factors need to be kept in mind in developing the Australia-
India security relationship in coming years. Effective security cooperation
between Australia and India is likely to depend on addressing these strategic
cultural issues just as much as addressing practical issues.
Australia’s challenge in navigating relationships with
India and China in the Indian Ocean
Another major challenge that Australia will need to address in the Indian Ocean
is how to navigate its important relationships with both China and India. China
is now Australia’s leading economic partner and India is also rapidly become
a key economic partner. India and China have a rapidly developing trade
relationship, although they also have a number of bilateral security issues (most
particularly their unresolved border dispute) that sometimes create significant
threat perceptions, particularly on the Indian side.
In engaging with India, Australia needs to be mindful of Indian concerns and
differences in perceptions of China. In the Indian Ocean in particular, there
are some important differences between Australian and Indian perceptions of
China’s security interests. Many Indian strategists are highly sensitive to any
Chinese security presence in the Indian Ocean. Many view Chinese commercial
interests in the region with suspicion and a sizeable number of Indian analysts
believe that China has a long-term strategy of encircling or containing India.
In contrast, Australian analysts generally see any Chinese commercial interests
in the region in relatively benign terms and perceive any Chinese security
presence in the Indian Ocean primarily as an expression of China’s interests in
protecting its key trading routes. Some believe that mutual threat perceptions
of India and China in the IOR could create a security dilemma that could lead
to heightened naval rivalry, not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the Pacific
Ocean. Such an eventuality could have a profoundly adverse effect on Australia’s
interests. As a result, in developing its strategic relationship with India, Australia
is unlikely to place itself in a position where it is forced to choose between
93
China and India in strategic terms, whether in the Indian Ocean or in Southeast
Asia. As the short-lived quadrilateral initiative demonstrated, attempts to frame
Australia’s relationship with India primarily within a China threat theory can
be unproductive. Rather, Australia has a profound interest in promoting good
relationships not only with India and China, but also between China and India.
Australia’s strategy towards China in the IOR will also involve some difficult
balancing of its interests in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Australia, the United
States and others have concerns about China’s increasing military power in
the Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea. However, despite the growing
interrelationship between Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean security, it is not clear
to what extent – or how – these concerns in the Pacific should drive Australia’s
strategic policy in the Indian Ocean.
Some argue that Australia should work with the United States and India to
enhance their collective military capabilities in the Indian Ocean. Such an
approach could sustain or even increase China’s existing strategic vulnerability
in the IOR. However, the consequences of this are not easy to predict. Others
believe that Australia should work with the United States, India and China in the
Indian Ocean to find ways to accommodate the legitimate interests of all powers
in the IOR. It may be in Australia’s interests to facilitate the development of
China’s role as a legitimate and responsible stakeholder in Indian Ocean security.
In short, Australia in coming years may need to choose whether it should work
with its security partners to limit any Chinese naval presence in the Indian
Ocean or facilitate the role of China as a responsible stakeholder in Indian Ocean
security. However, the viability of any long-term understanding with China
in the Indian Ocean may depend on China’s willingness to recognise India’s
legitimate security interests in the Pacific, and for India to recognise China’s
interests in the Indian Ocean. An understanding of this nature may be difficult
to reach. However, it may well be in Australia’s interests if the major powers were
able to reach some sort of modus vivendi in both the Indian and Pacific oceans.
The idea of the “Indo-Pacific” strategic region: its impact
on Australia and India
An important consequence of recent shifts in the balance of power in the Indian
and Pacific oceans is a growing reconceptualisation of those regions in strategic
thinking. Whereas the Indian and Pacific oceans were once considered as
largely separate regions in strategic terms, many now see considerable strategic
interaction between those regions.
There is increasingly discussion within the security communities in Australia,
India and the United States of an integrated, or at least interconnected, Indo-
Pacific strategic region encompassing the entire Asian littoral running from
94
northeast Asia to the Middle East and Africa. This is often viewed primarily in
the maritime security dimension, particularly in connection with the security
of the SLOCs running from the Middle East to northeast Asia, through which
much of the world’s energy supplies are carried. These security concerns cross
the spectrum of state and non-state actors and traditional and non-traditional
security concerns.
More generally, the Indo-Pacific strategic construct reflects the recent expansion
of China’s area of strategic interest from the Western Pacific into the IOR and
a simultaneous expansion of India’s area of strategic interest from the IOR into
the Western Pacific. China is developing economic and security relationships in
the IOR, as well as direct transport links to the Indian Ocean through countries
such as Pakistan and Burma. India is developing important economic and
security relationships in East Asia with countries such as Japan, South Korea and
Vietnam. This means that the Sino-Indian security relationship will increasingly
span the Indian and Pacific oceans.
The Indo-Pacific strategic concept has particular significance for India’s growing
aspirations to play a significant security role in the Asia Pacific region. India has
given much greater attention to security concerns in East Asia since the 1990s.
However, India faces many constraints in playing an expanded role in the Asia
Pacific. India has not traditionally been considered to be geographically a part of
the Asia Pacific. It was not included in Asia Pacific institutions such as APEC and
there have been attempts to portray India as an outsider to East Asian-centred
groupings such as the East Asia Summit. For India, the concept of the Indo-
Pacific is a useful way of grouping itself together with the key economic and
military powers in East Asia. As former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran
commented in 2011250, the use of the term Indo-Pacific in strategic discourse in
India represents a recognition of the inclusion of the Western Pacific within the
range of India’s security interests.
However, significant questions remain as to the practical consequences of this
concept. As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented in 2011, “how we
translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans into an
operational concept is a question that we need to answer if we are to adapt to the
new challenges in the region”251. Some see the Indo-Pacific strategic construct
as a way of bringing India into closer strategic relationships with “liberal
democratic” powers in the Asia Pacific (that is, the United States and some of its
allies such as Japan and Australia), primarily to balance the growing power of
China. According to one report by influential Australian, Indian and US think
tanks:
250
Saran, S. (2011), ‘Mapping the Indo-Pacific’, Indian Express, 29 October.
251
Clinton, H. (2011), ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, November.
95
“Liberal democratic powers in the Indo-Pacific share a strategic
interest in enhancing a web of relationships that promote economic
and political stability, security, continued free and open trade
throughout the region, and democratic governance. U.S.-India-
Australia trilateral cooperation should be a critical element of this
underpinning.252”
However, others see the idea of the Indo-Pacific in more inclusive terms, with
shared security interests of all major powers, including China, in the littoral
running from the Middle East, through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia.
According to this view, the Indo-Pacific as a concept is an opportunity for all
interested powers to be recognised as legitimate stakeholders and cooperate
in providing maritime security throughout the entire littoral. However
this strategic concept evolves, it is likely to become an important driver in
strategic thinking of the United States, India and other major powers. The
concept of the Indo-Pacific could also become a key driver in the Australia-
India relationship and something that both countries could potentially use to
their advantage.
A change in US thinking about the strategic interrelationship of the Indian and
Pacific oceans is likely to have a significant impact on US strategic relationships
with Australia and India, and the Australia-India bilateral relationship. It is
likely that the US will increasingly adopt a strategic posture with respect to
the Indo-Pacific that seeks to address the security challenges facing the Asian
littoral in an integrated manner. Despite reduced security commitments in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the US “pivot” to Asia may involve even greater emphasis
on security in the IOR. Some practical consequences for the US security
engagement in the region are likely to include:
• A gradual shift in US defence resources from the Northwest Pacific
towards the Southwest Pacific area (including Australia, Singapore
and the Philippines). In broad terms, this can be seen in the recent
announcements of the basing of several US littoral combat ships in
Singapore, the stationing of US marines for training in northern Australia
and the drawdown of US marines from Okinawa, Japan.
• A greater reliance of the US on security partners such as Australia
that form a link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, increasing US
capability to respond flexibly to security challenges in both the Pacific and
Indian oceans. This includes increased use of countries such as Australia
and Singapore to “pivot” US defence resources between the Pacific and
Indian oceans.
252
96
• A greater importance of India and Australia as US security partners in

the IOR. The United States would like to see India and Australia taking
greater responsibility for security in the IOR to take the strain off US
resources in the Western Pacific. The United States is also encouraging
a closer working security relationship between India and Australia that
covers both the Indian and Pacific theatres.
As noted above, the Indo-Pacific strategic concept has particular significance for
India’s potential role in the Pacific and its security relations in the region. This
includes:
• Improved political-security links between India and the United States and
its Pacific allies (including with Japan, South Korea and Australia). The
joint security declarations between India and each of Japan and Australia
were manifestations of this as are the institution of trilateral security
dialogues that include the United States.
• India playing a much greater security role in the Pacific Ocean and
forming much closer security relationships with US allies such as
Australia and Japan and others such as Vietnam. India is already
becoming a player of consequence in the South China Sea.
• From India’s perspective there may be increased focus on cooperation
with partners that form gateways between the Indian and Pacific oceans.
These include security partners such as Singapore and Australia and
potentially Indonesia.
Conclusion
Fundamental shifts in the balance of power in the Indian and Pacific oceans
have underlined the need for a much closer security relationship between
Australia and India. Australia can no longer rely on some of the certainties that
have underpinned its strategic posture for many decades. India is also subject
to strategic imperatives that are likely to make Australia an important security
partner in coming years. The primary focus of the future Australia-India security
relationship is likely to be in the IOR, and specifically on maritime security,
where there are many opportunities for mutual benefit. Importantly, a balanced
security relationship will require cooperation with the United States in some
areas, but should also move beyond the United States in other areas. It will also
require a balanced understanding of the regional role of China. The relationship
will also be affected by the growing strategic interrelationship between the Indian
and Pacific oceans. Australia and India need to pay significant attention to this
and how the concept can be best shaped to their mutual benefit.
97
V. Conclusions: Policy and Research
Implications
Overview
Developments in world affairs have come together over the last 20 years to direct
fresh attention to the Indian Ocean. Salient among these has been the shift in
global economic weight and influence from the North Atlantic to Asia, including
in particular the rise of China and India. This, together with a more urgent focus
on energy, resource and food security issues, has driven new levels of interest
in the trade routes and sea lanes eastwards from the Persian Gulf and the Red
Sea and north from Australia. There has also been a renewed interest in Africa
and, potentially, the Indian Ocean seabed as sources of mineral resources, and
in development issues among Indian Ocean rim countries, arising in part from
the challenges posed by failed or failing states in the region. These developments
have given rise to renewed attempts to delineate and define the IOR and to
determine more clearly just how important it is in global strategic terms.
The reality is that the issues relating to the Indian Ocean and its littoral are
best addressed in terms of two overlapping regional systems. The first system
embraces Indian Ocean-centric issues; that is, issues that are specific to the
Indian Ocean and its littoral. These include issues of economic development and
human security, the environment, seabed and fisheries management, among
others. These are issues that are best addressed by the countries that have direct
stakes in them, and which therefore potentially form the essential agenda of the
pre-eminent regional body, the IOR-ARC.
The second system sees the Indian Ocean as part of a wider Indo-Pacific strategic
system, a system that embraces the trade routes and sea lanes that cross the
Indian Ocean itself but extend well past the Straits of Malacca and the Sunda and
Lombok Straits into the South China Sea and north to China, Taiwan, Korea and
Japan, and indeed the west coast of North America. As trade highways, these
routes are arguably the most important in the world today, and the ‘choke points’
and contested waterways along the highway attract critical attention of the ‘hard
security’ kind. Given the range of stakeholders, this is necessarily an inclusive
framework, and the issues embraced within it are played out at the level of ‘high
politics’. Thus, as conceptualised in this report, while some discussions of the
Indo-Pacific system have been exclusive (meaning that China is excluded), we
argue of the necessity for the concept to be inclusive (that is, China is included)
in order to maximise long-term regional security. This inclusive concept we refer
to as the New Indo-Pacific to differentiate it from the exclusive meaning.
98
A regional security regime

We argue that it is essential that there is a clear congruency between regional
structure and regional function. In the IOR, we suggest that it is desirable that
there should be ‘parallel tracks’ separating non-traditional region-based security
issues from those of a ‘higher order’ that include but go beyond this region. At
the latter scale, we therefore recommend the adoption of a New Indo-Pacific
regional security regime concept to involve all relevant stakeholders in dealing
with matters of regional maritime security, especially those related to the flows of
energy through the Indian Ocean (see below).
In parallel, we also recommend that the agenda of the Indian Ocean peak body,
IOR-ARC, be expanded well beyond its current remit on economic cooperation.
It is recommended that this broader agenda incorporate a range of cooperative
mechanisms designed to enhance the human and environmental security of
the Indian Ocean itself. While the agenda of IOR-ARC might be broadened in
various specific ways (see below), it may also be necessary for IOR-ARC to revisit
its membership structure and to involve other Indian Ocean littoral states.
Geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean region
For the foreseeable future, the IOR will become increasingly important globally
from both a geo-economic and geopolitical perspective. Trade flows will
continue to increase and competition for scarce resources will intensify. Due
weight needs to be given to this reality in national and regional security policies
and collective action is necessary in order to maximise regional security.
Multidimensional nature of security
Such policies need to especially recognise the multidimensional nature of
security and the interdependence of state and regional stability with a wide array
of social, military, political economic and environmental factors. The degree of
stability and security (and thus peace and conflict) among Indian Ocean states is
determined by this complex set of interrelationships.
Traditional security and military conflict
For all regional states, questions of development in its widest sense are likely
to come into conflict with the perceived need to maintain, if not enhance, the
traditional security role of the state. Developmental priorities for expenditure
may well be at odds with those of military expenditures for many residents of
developing states. Intra-state conflicts are thus almost unavoidable with those
with strong vested interests in acquiring greater military power. In any event,
fiscal constraints are likely to inhibit the capacity of regional states to sustain or
increase military expenditure.
99
Figure 26 Possible future US-Australia developments253
Cooperative action on security matters is thus increasingly significant to enable

true development. Indian Ocean regionalism and the strengthening of sub-
regionalisms within the Indian Ocean are potentially significant mechanisms
that will facilitate the minimisation of intra-state and intra-regional conflict.
It is highly debatable as to whether an increase in extra-regional military
influence will have the same effect. Clearly, what is in progress is the emergence
in the IOR of a trilateral process of competition for influence and resources
between China, India and the United States. There is debate within India, the
only regional state, as to what its options are in relation to this competitive
process. Other regional states – such as Australia – are conflicted somewhat
between traditional security relations, cultural ties and current and future
economic linkages.
On the one hand, the Australian Defence Force Posture Review, while not
advocating any significant change to the present location of ADF bases, argued
that ADF posture needs to be adjusted to meet current and future needs.253b
253
Washington Post (2012), ‘US, Australia to broaden military ties amid Pentagon pivot to
Southeast Asia’, 27 March, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com
253b
Hawke, A. and Smith, R. (2012), Australian Defence Force Posture Review, Australian
Government – available at: www.defence.gov.au
100
However, it was reported in The Washington Post on 27 March 2012 that

the United States is keen to expand its military ties with Australia even
further (Figure 26). Apart from the already agreed expansion at Darwin,
other developments are possible on the mainland in Western Australia and
Queensland and on Cocos Island. For example, the Washington DC-based
Center for Strategic and International Studies has suggested the need for an
enhanced US defence presence in Australia as one option to increase its Asia-
Pacific regional posture. Among other things, this would involve the basing of a
complete nuclear-powered aircraft carrier force at HMAS Stirling naval base in
southern metropolitan Perth, Western Australia254. According to the Australian
Defence Minister, Stephen Smith, such a proposal is not currently being
contemplated by the Australian Government255.
1. High failed state index
Failed state index Global rank
Somalia 114.7 1
Zimbabwe 114.0 2
Sudan 112.4 3
Iraq 108.6 6
Afghanistan 108.2 7
Pakistan 104.1 10
Burma 101.5 13
Kenya* 101.4 14
Ethiopia 98.9 16
Yemen* 98.1 18
2. States “not free” Score (max 14)

Yemen* 11
Afghanistan 12
Iran* 12
Swaziland 12
Vietnam 12
Zimbabwe 12
Laos 13
Saudi Arabia 13
Burma 14
Somalia 14
Sudan 14
3. USTVPA Tier 3 states

Burma, Eritrea, Iran*, Kuwait, Madagascar*, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen*,
Zimbabwe
* IOR-ARC member states
Figure 27: Indian Ocean states of concern
254
Berteau, D. and Green, M. J. et al (2012), US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific:
An Independent Assessment, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
255
Butterly, N. and Parker, G. (2012), ‘Smith cool on US base in WA’, The West Australian
newspaper, 2 August, page 6.
101
Regional and global concern over stability and security should be especially
aimed at failed or failing states. Particular Australian and Indian policy priorities
need to be especially aimed at five regional “states of concern” – states with a
very high failed state index plus very high freedom score plus appearing on the
USTVPA Tier 3 list – that is, Burma, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe
(Figure 27). India and Australia should also be concerned over gaining influence
and maintaining stability in ‘contested spaces’ in the IOR.
Human security
Maximising human security is a central goal for all Indian Ocean regional states
in order to ensure long-term national and regional stability.
One of the most pressing security challenges in the IOR is the strength of the
association between processes of democratisation and state stability (Figure 28).
regions of control liberal democracies
regions of transition
zone of politcal and
spatial stability
political zone of politcal and

geographical spatial stability
stability
political and economic

participation
Figure 28: Participation and territorial stability256

All other things being equal, repressive states within which human freedoms are
limited are likely to be inherently insecure and thus subject to internal conflict.
There is a need to create and/or strengthen regional cooperative mechanisms for
collectively dealing with displaced persons, refugees and people trafficking.
256
Rumley, D., Chiba, T., Takagi, A. and Fukushima, Y., eds. (1996), Global Geopolitical
Change and the Asia-Pacific: A Regional Perspective, Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 25.
102
Economic and resources security

Low levels of human development and high levels of economic
underdevelopment contribute to significant levels of political instability in the
IOR.
The “vicious circle of economic security and civil conflict” is a central policy
target, especially in relation to African Indian Ocean states. It has been argued
that overcoming economic insecurity necessitates an integrated approach
involving a greater role for:
Public goods and stronger regulations in creating and preserving
more secure spaces where individuals, communities and countries can
pursue their activities with a reasonable degree of predictability and
certainty, and with due regard for the customs and interests of others257.
However, especially problematical are those situations in some states where, due
to high political instability and deep social cleavage, such “secure spaces” have
virtually disappeared. In such contexts, rebuilding security, reconciliation and
development through improving state capacity and engaging in state building are
very considerable challenges.
From the viewpoint of the North, it thus becomes critically important to closely
identify foreign aid objectives and the conditions under which aid is delivered
and implemented due to its not inconsiderable distributional impacts258. This is
especially challenging for the aid dependent states of the IOR.
The security challenges associated with the “militarisation of energy security”
need to be collectively addressed.
Towards a new Indo-Pacific maritime security regime
There is a need for a cooperative maritime security regime for the IOR,
especially for energy flows and the use of the ocean – on, in, under and across –
based on a New Indo-Pacific regional concept.
One of the pre-requisites for more effective regionally-based cooperative action
to minimise energy insecurity is to identify those states with some direct interest
in Indian Ocean maritime security. No less than 23 states can be classified into at
least one maritime energy security interest category – energy-import dependent
state, energy niche economy state and energy security choke point state (Figure
29). Furthermore, all of these states share an interest in the security of energy
flows - especially oil, coal, natural gas and uranium – through the Indian Ocean.
257
Survey 2008, New York, p. 111
258
Survey 2008, New York. p141-2
103
Energy-import Energy niche Energy security
Dependent state economy chokepoint state
Australia*+ X
China**@ X
Egypt**+ X
France**+ X
Germany X
India*@+ X
Indonesia*@+ X X
Iran*+ X X
Iraq X X
Italy X
Japan**@+ X
Kuwait+ X X
Malaysia*@+ X
Oman*+ X
Qatar+ X X
Saudi Arabia+ X X
Singapore*@+ X X
South Africa*+ X
South Korea@ X
UAE*+ X X
UK**
USA X
Yemen*+ X
*IOR-ARC member
** IOR-ARC dialogue partner
@ ReCAAP cooperation group
+ IONS participant
Figure 29: States with Indian Ocean maritime energy security interests
The list is not completely inclusive, however, since it omits other states that have
an interest in energy security choke points – for example, Djibouti and Eritrea.
Nonetheless, such a group of states might well form the basis of a new Indo-
Pacific Maritime Energy Security (INDOMES) Forum built on IOR-ARC and in
collaboration with the International Maritime Organisation. Many of these states
were participants in the recent Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) meeting
in South Africa.
We suggest that such a INDOMES be co-chaired by India and Australia and be
headquartered in Chennai, India, but also have an operational office in Fremantle,
Western Australia. It would be inclusive, aimed primarily at confidence-building,
act as a holistic forum to overcome current fragmentation and be concerned with
issues of SLOC security and more general issues of the global commons.
104
In this context, it is worth re-emphasising the obvious, and that is that

threats to maritime energy security emanate from bases on land and hence a
comprehensive cooperative approach also requires policies designed to deal with
the causes of the threats from a land-based as well as a sea-based perspective.
Security on sea cannot be guaranteed without security on land – that is, from
where maritime security threats might emanate. Integrated sea-land policies are
thus essential to enable the maximisation of regional stability.
Environmental security
Food
Agricultural, technological and other aid needs to target regional food insecure
states.
Water
Collective action on water sharing, conservation and technology is necessary for
regional states that are water insecure.
Nuclear waste
Regional nuclear safety issues need to be collectively addressed, especially
uranium flows and the storage of nuclear waste. In particular, there needs to be a
regional agreement on the prevention of the illegal dumping of nuclear waste.
Fisheries
For regional fisheries policies to achieve a sustainable oceanic future necessitates
a strong role for regional states, and there is a requirement for partnerships
among states as well as with non-state actors. In addition, the limitations of neo-
liberal natural resource management models need to be fully recognised.
In the final analysis, future fisheries policies designed to maximise marine
biodiversity necessitate a more comprehensive and integrated framework to
replace the traditional sectoral approach to ocean management. Successful ocean
governance requires the incorporation of ecological and market factors, greater
inter-state and inter-agency consultation and cooperation, an improvement
in linking national initiatives to local action, increased participation of local
government and local communities and the enhancement of local capacity.
Climate change
Collective action is necessary on the prevention, amelioration and potential
impacts of climate change around the IOR. Apart from national abatement
strategies, this could involve collaboration on technology transfer, developments
in regional energy markets as well as on regional protective measures.
105
Conclusion: a 21st century regional
security paradigm for the Indian
Ocean
Strategic reassessments of the IOR and associated security challenges are
contributing to the development of a new collective Indian Ocean security
paradigm built on maritime regionalism.
There are at least five key interrelated elements of this paradigm that should be
reiterated here:
1. It is ocean-based – the ocean is central. Issues associated with the use of
the ocean are critical considerations – around the edge, across, on, in and
under.
2. It is a holistic security paradigm that takes into consideration the notion
that security is a multidimensional concept comprising military, economic,
environmental, human and political factors.
3. It is less contrived and more natural in that it is based around an ecological
concept of the Indian Ocean and its various interactions.
4. It is a concept that is much more people-centred that ensures that the
voices of Indian Ocean peoples and communities have more of a say in
their human security.
5. It is a concept that implies a much greater degree of regional cooperation
to collectively solve common problems rather than a concept that is solely
state-based and grounded primarily in competition.
There is considerable scope to construct security regimes around areas of
common interest and concern – for example, the ocean environment, SLOCs,
piracy and so on – the majority of which are non-traditional (and perhaps less
threatening) security concerns. Minimising insecurity requires greater mutual
knowledge, education and understanding among Indian Ocean governments and
peoples. IOR-ARC also has a potentially significant educational role in the region.
Regional opportunities currently exist around the Indian Ocean for ‘second track’
actors to make an important contribution to regional security. Other areas of
concern, such as environmental security and many other non-traditional security
threats such as those noted above, might well form the basis of an increasingly
strong civil relationship among people living around the IOR in the future.
106
In the final analysis, creating freedom from fear in the IOR requires all regional
states to:
Commit themselves to implementing a new security consensus based
on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development,
security and human rights are mutually interdependent, that no state
can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all states need an
equitable, efficient collective security system; and therefore commit
themselves to agreeing on, and implementing, comprehensive
strategies for confronting the whole range of threats, from
international war through weapons of mass destruction, terrorism,
state collapse and civil conflict to deadly infectious disease, extreme
poverty and the destruction of the environment259 .
Overall, increasing interdependence due to globalisation implies greater inter-
state cooperation. It also implies the increasing importance of non-traditional
security threats. The logical outcome of the interaction of these processes is a
decline in regional inter-state conflict.
Key Indian Ocean regional states such as Australia and India are in an
important position both to strengthen their own bilateral security relationship
in various ways and facilitate broader outcomes by initiating a new regional
multidimensional security agenda along the lines conceptualised above.
Acknowledgement
This report draws upon the preliminary research of a much larger three year
project Building an Indian Ocean Region, which is funded by the Australian
Research Council (ARC) Discovery Projects Scheme for funding 2012-2015.
259
Annan, K. (2005), In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights For All, New York: United Nations, p. 57.
107
Appendix –
Fremantle roundtable participants
Professor Navnita Chadna Behera,
Department of Political Science, University of Delhi
Dr David Brewster,
Visiting Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, Australian National
University. David Brewster is the principal author of Section V on ‘India and
Australia in Indo-Pacific security’.
Associate Professor Shibashis Chatterjee,
Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University
Professor Sanjay Chaturvedi,
Department of Political Science, Panjab University
Professor Timothy Doyle,
School of Politics and International Studies, University of Adelaide. Timothy
Doyle is the principal author of the section on ‘Regional options for Indian Ocean
security’.
Professor Nalini Kant Jha,
Department of Politics and International Relations, Pondicherry (Central)
University
Professor Amitabh Mattoo,
Director, Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne
Professor Dennis Rumley,
Inaugural Professor of Indian Ocean Studies, University of Western Australia.
Dennis Rumley is the editor and principal author of this Report.
Professor Swaran Singh,
School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Mr Ric Smith AO,
former Australian Ambassador to China (1996-2000) and former Secretary of the
Australian Department of Defence (2002-2006). Ric Smith is one of the principal
authors of the Executive Summary of this Report.
Professor Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya,
Department of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University
Mr Siddharth Varadarajan,
Editor, The Hindu newspaper
Professor John Webb,
Distinguished Fellow, Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne
108
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Report of the Australia India Institute

The Indian Ocean Region:

The Indian Ocean Region:

Edited by Dennis Rumley

Principal contributors: David Brewster, Sanjay Chaturvedi,

Australia India Institute

A Message from the Director

I. Executive summary of the report

The Indian Ocean regoinal

African South East Asia

politics security economy

instability stablility instability stablility instability stablility

Figure 2: Essential elements of multidimensional security 6

The emergence of a new security agenda

Greater freedom Human rights violations

Figure 3: Some contradictory impacts of globalisation on security14

Geopolitically-constructed security threats

Another well known global geopolitical construction, of course, is the clash of

2. The changing geopolitical

The Indian Ocean as a routeway

The Indian Ocean as the neglected ocean

to prevail. Fourth, there is a relative paucity of reliable description and analysis

The changing geopolitical environment

Current regional security arrangements and forums

3. Regional options for Indian

Figure 5: Comparison among three competing regional constructions 43b

The Indian Ocean region

Indian Ocean rim states Other coastal states Indian Ocean

(*For France and United Kingdom: because of their island territories)

Figure 8: Conflicts within and between states 1945-200562

Figure 9: Traditional security indicators in the Indian Ocean region63

Regional nuclear proliferation

The extent of regional nuclear proliferation can be seen both as a regional

Indian Ocean state Failed State Index Global rank

Contested spaces in the Indian Ocean region

Chinese pearls USA diamonds Indian nuggets

Figure 11: Indian Ocean pearls, diamonds and nuggets77

economy and natural environment of states tend to be global, ‘real’ threats to

Status State Score

Civil society demands for greater government transparency and accountability

3. Economic and resources security

1. Dynamics of energy demand and supply relations

(i) Historical patterns of energy use

Figure 16: A simplified systems framework for energy security104

Figure 17: Energy import-dependent states 2008105

“non-integrating gap”136. While the core states “adhere to globalisation’s emerging

Figure 21: Energy attacks by state 2001-8142

Figure 22: Number of incidents reported Jan 2007-June 2011145

Unresolved maritime and terrestrial boundaries

Resolving maritime boundary disputes

Forbes, V. L. (1998), ‘Cooperative approaches to managing marine resources’, in Savage,

While the adoption by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) of a

In addition, chemical industrial agriculture requires intensive irrigation, which

State % of population food insecure

Bahrain 0.1 0.30

Figure 25: Water insecure states in the Indian Ocean region202

in Ethiopia, a resolution condemned the importation into Africa of industrial

promoters’, Paper 39, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).

fishery conflicts and designing ecologically sustainable solutions is a very