This case analyzed whether the right of appeal in respect of a pending action can be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant. The Supreme Court held that (1) Article 133 must be construed as exhaustive of the law regarding appeals from High Court judgments, decrees or orders in civil proceedings; (2) Article 133 implicitly negates appeals that do not meet its valuation requirements; and (3) treating appeals differently based on when/where proceedings were instituted would result in discrimination. Therefore, the petitioner's appeal was not competent under Article 133 for failing to meet its valuation threshold, and Article 135 did not apply instead.
This case analyzed whether the right of appeal in respect of a pending action can be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant. The Supreme Court held that (1) Article 133 must be construed as exhaustive of the law regarding appeals from High Court judgments, decrees or orders in civil proceedings; (2) Article 133 implicitly negates appeals that do not meet its valuation requirements; and (3) treating appeals differently based on when/where proceedings were instituted would result in discrimination. Therefore, the petitioner's appeal was not competent under Article 133 for failing to meet its valuation threshold, and Article 135 did not apply instead.
This case analyzed whether the right of appeal in respect of a pending action can be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant. The Supreme Court held that (1) Article 133 must be construed as exhaustive of the law regarding appeals from High Court judgments, decrees or orders in civil proceedings; (2) Article 133 implicitly negates appeals that do not meet its valuation requirements; and (3) treating appeals differently based on when/where proceedings were instituted would result in discrimination. Therefore, the petitioner's appeal was not competent under Article 133 for failing to meet its valuation threshold, and Article 135 did not apply instead.
This case analyzed whether the right of appeal in respect of a pending action can be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant. The Supreme Court held that (1) Article 133 must be construed as exhaustive of the law regarding appeals from High Court judgments, decrees or orders in civil proceedings; (2) Article 133 implicitly negates appeals that do not meet its valuation requirements; and (3) treating appeals differently based on when/where proceedings were instituted would result in discrimination. Therefore, the petitioner's appeal was not competent under Article 133 for failing to meet its valuation threshold, and Article 135 did not apply instead.
1. To declare that the right of appeal in respect of a pending action can be treated as a substantive right vesting in litigant on commencement of action. According to s. 177 of the Act, an appeal shall lie to district judge from decree of an asst. collector of first class or of a collector in any of suits included in group A of Fourth Schedule. Principle must involve that an admixture of different systems is not to be applied to a single case. It is quite true that suitor cannot enter Court C without going through Court B, but neither can he enter Court B till Court A has given its decision. Right must be a right to take matter to Court C in due course of existing law. 2. To declare that it is necessary part of intendment of Letters Patent that they should operate upon appeals. In spite of wide language of amended cl. 15 of Letters Patent, namely, that an appeal shall lie from judgment of Single judge only where judge who passed judgment declared that case was a fit one for appeal. Special Bench found nothing in that language to indicate that it applied to a decree passed after amendment came into force or that it took away vested right. FACTS OF THE CASE: -
This is an application for special leave to appeal from the judgment passed on by the High Court of Andhra. The suit out of which this application arises was instituted on in the sub-court of Bapatla, which was then within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. The judgment of the trial court was passed, dismissing the suit. The plaintiff appealed. The appeal stood transferred to the High Court of Andhra under the provisions of s. 38 of The Andhra State Act, 1953. On March 4, 1955, the High Court of Andhra accepted the appeal, reversed the decree of the trial court and decreed the suit. The application for leave to appeal to this Court was dismissed on the ground, inter alia, that the value of the property was only Rs. 11,400 and did not come up to the amount of Rs. 20,000. In this application the petitioner contends that the judgment being one of reversal and the value being above Rs. 10,000, he was entitled, as a matter of right, to come up to this Court on appeal and as that right has been denied to him by the High Court, and this Court should, in exercise of its discretion, grant him special leave to appeal to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
PLEA OF THE DEFENDANT:
The two Articles which bear on the question are Arts. 133 and 135. According to the petitioner, it is Art. 135 that applies, and he has a right to appeal to this Court thereunder. Art. 135 is as follows:
" Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to which the provisions of art. 133 or art. 134 do not apply if jurisdiction and powers in, relation to that matter were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing law."
The defendant then pleaded that the plaintiff has no right to appeal under article 135 to the federal court and the plaintiff’s case should be dismissed.
ISSUES: -
1. Whether a right of appeal in respect of a pending action can be treated as a
substantive right vesting in litigant on commencement of action? 2. Whether it is any necessary part of intendment of Letters Patent that they should operate upon appeals?
ARGUMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF:
According to the petitioner, he has a right under article 135 to the federal court in this case, the leading case on the subject relied on by the petitioner is
Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v.Irving, [1905] A.C. 369.
In that case the Collector of Customs acting under an Act called the Excise Tariff Act, 1902 required the appellants to pay pound 20,100 excise duty on 6,700 tons of sugar. The appellants disputed the claim. So they deposited the 'money with the Collector and then brought an action in the Supreme Court of Queensland against the Collector for recovering the sum so deposited. The writ in the action was issued on October 25, 1902. At the date of the institution of the action the Order in Council of June 30, 1860, gave a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from the judgment of the Supreme Court. A special case having been stated for the opinion of the Full Court, that Court on September 4, 1903, gave judgment for the Collector. In the meantime, the Judiciary Act, 1903 had been passed and it received the royal assent on August 25, 1903, that is to say about 10 days before the judgment was delivered by the Supreme court.
ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT:
As per the plea of the plaintiff, article 135 should be applied and he has a right to appeal. For this art. to apply, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) The matter should be one which does not fall within the purview of Art. 133; and (2) it should be a matter in respect of which jurisdiction was exercisable by the Federal Court before the commencement of the Constitution under any existing law. Whether the present appeal is competent under Art. 135 will depend on whether it satisfies both these conditions.
Taking the first condition, it is the contention of the respondent that the present matter falls within the purview of Art. 133, and that therefore Art. 135 is excluded. Article 133, in so far as it is material for the present purpose, runs as follows: " An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final, order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies-
(a)that the amount or value of the subject matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; or
(b)that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or
(c)that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; and where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the court immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub clause (c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law."
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
TRIAL COURT JUDGEMENT: -
The suit out of which this application arises was instituted on April 22, 1949, in the sub-court of Bapatla, which was then within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. The judgment of the trial court was passed on November 14, 1950, dismissing the suit.
HIGH COURT JUDGEMENT: -
The plaintiff appealed in High Court of Andhra Pradesh. In October 1, 1953, the Andhra State was formed and a new High Court was established under a. 28 of The Andhra State Act, 1953 and apparently the appeal stood transferred to the High Court of Andhra under the provisions of s. 38 of the same Act. On March 4, 1955, the High Court of Andhra accepted the appeal, reversed the decree of the trial court and decreed the suit. The application for leave to appeal to this Court was dismissed on the ground, inter alia, that the value of the property was only Rs. 11,400 and did not come up to the amount of Rs. 20,000.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CASE BY SUPREME COURT: -
The correct interpretation to be put on Art. 133 therefore is that it applies to all appeals against judgments, decrees and -final orders of- the High Courts in the territory of India made after the commencement of the Constitution in civil proceedings, irrespective of whether those proceedings were instituted before or after the Constitution. Such an interpretation would furnish a simple, clear and uniform law for the whole of India, and that would also avoid discrimination between suitors who instituted actions prior to the Constitution and those who instituted them after, and between those who have instituted proceedings in Part A States and those who have instituted proceedings in Part B States.
In this view, the present petition falls within Art. 133, and the. appeal must be held to be incompetent for failure to satisfy the requirements of Art. 133 (1) (a).
FINAL JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT: -
Supreme Court finally, after hearing the arguments of both sides held that,
(1) The contention of the petitioner that appeals against judgments, decrees or final orders which would otherwise fall within the ambit of Art. 133 must be held to fall outside that Article for the reason that they have not the requisite valuation prescribed therein, and that, in consequence, they will be governed by Art. 135, is untenable, firstly because Art. 133 must be construed as exhaustive of the law in respect of appeals when they are directed against judgments,- decrees or final orders in civil proceedings; secondly because, by implication that Article must be interpreted as negativing any appeal which does not satisfy the requirements as to valuation prescribed therein; and thirdly because, that would result in this discrimination that while appeals will be competent against judgments, decrees or final orders made in proceedings instituted before the Constitution when made by High Courts in Part A States, no appeal will lie against judgments in like suits instituted in Part B States, though some of them at least had a provision for an appeal to an authority functioning as the Privy Council.
Hence the supreme court stated that,
“In accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Court, Special Leave to Appeal to this Court is granted on usual terms. The Petitioner will have the costs of this application from Respondents Nos. I and 2. There will be stay as prayed for in Civil Miscellaneous Petition until the determination of this appeal.”
Special leave granted. Appeal disposed of.
REFERRED CASES:
1) Garikapatti Veeraya v N. Subbiah Choudhury (1957 Indlaw SC 160, AIR
1957 SC 540, 1957 SCJ 439, [1957] 1 S.C.R. 488) 2) Tajammul Husain v Qaisar Jahan Begam and Others (1956 Indlaw ALL 169, AIR 1956 ALL 638) 3) ndira Sohanlal v Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi and Others (1955 Indlaw SC 36, AIR 1956 SC 77, 1956 SCJ 171, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1117) 4) Ram Sahai and Another v Ram Sewak (1955 Indlaw ALL 59, AIR 1956 ALL 321) 5) Dajisaheb Mane And Others v Shankar Rao Vithal Rao Maneand Another(1955 Indlaw SC 37, AIR 1956 SC 29, 1956 SCJ 70, [1955] 2 S.C.R.872) 6) Sawaldas Madhavdas v Arati Cotton Mills Limited (1954 Indlaw MUM 78, AIR 1955 BOM 332) 7) Nathoo Lal v Durga Prasad (1954 Indlaw SC 147, AIR 1954 SC 355, 1954 SCJ 557, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 51) 8) R. M. Seshadri v Province of Madras, Represented By Chief Secretary To Government of Madras (1953 Indlaw MAD 205, AIR 1954 MAD 543, 1954 (1) MLJ 206) 9) Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited v State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (1953 Indlaw SC 2, AIR 1953 SC 221, 1983 (13) E.L.T. 1277, 1953 SCJ 276, [1953] S.C.R. 987, 1953 (4) STC 114) 10) Ganpat Rai Hiralal and Another Murari Lal Hari Ram v Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Limited Marwar (1952 Indlaw SC 40, AIR 1952 SC 409, 1952 SCJ 564, [1953] 4 S.C.R. 752) 11) State of Seraikella v Union of India and Another (1951 Indlaw SC 30, AIR 1951 SC 253, 1951 SCJ 425, [1951] S.C.R. 474) 12) Janardan Reddy and Others v State of Hyderabad and Others (1951 Indlaw SC 68, AIR 1951 SC 217, 1951 CRLJ 736, 1951 SCJ 320, [1951] S.C.R. 344) 13) Keshavan Madhava Menon v State of Bombay (1951 Indlaw SC 1, AIR 1951 SC 128, 1951 (53) BomLR 458, 1951 CRLJ 860, 1951 (1) MLJ(SC) 370, 1951 SCJ 182, [1951] S.C.R. 228) 14) Janardan Reddy and Others v State (1950 Indlaw SC 16, AIR 1951 SC 124, 1951 CRLJ 391, 1951 SCJ 98, [1950] S.C.R. 940)
