G.R. No.

202202               March 19, 2013

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-
GOMEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
March 22, 2012 Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case
No. 10-031 (QW) which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez’s
substitution as the Liberal Party’s replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative
(Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.

The Facts

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy 2 (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the
Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December
6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified
Petition,3 alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San
Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng,
Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus
should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that
Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled. 5

On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution 6 granting Juntilla’s
petition without any qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to

GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O.
JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a
candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc
through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010. 7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard
accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the
necessary documents for substitution."8

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC 9 together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance 10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official
substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to
various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department), the
COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 8890 11 on
May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the
substitution of private respondent. The recommendation reads:

STUDY AND OBSERVATION

On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru
his counsel, opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for
Mr. Richard I. Gomez.

The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because
there is no candidate to substitute for.

It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059
speaks for disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy:

‘Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed x x x against RICHARD I.
GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of
Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.’

The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.

The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy,
especially when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to
substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute
is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.

Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification of a candidate
to run in the public office.

The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13
of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:

xxxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE

FOR RICHARD GOMEZ: (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration12 (May 9, 2010 Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution

Pending resolution of Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted
as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the
ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein
petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. 13 In view of the
aforementioned substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a
result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010
Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890.14 The said motion, however, remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust
private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one
(1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the
transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan 16 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only
applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio;
and (3) private respondent’s CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial
requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing
officer.17

In her Verified Answer,18 private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations and claimed that she
validly substituted her husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she personally known
to the notary public who notarized her CoC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not
required to have presented any competent proof of identity during the notarization of the said
document. Lastly, she asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in
Metro Manila, she continued to maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place where she
was born and raised.

During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated
September 2, 2010, the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:

1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;

2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;
3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to file the
necessary petition for disqualification with the COMELEC;
4. Whether or not respondent’s COC was duly subscribed; and
5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth
District of Leyte for lack of residency requirement. 19

Ruling of the HRET

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision 20 which dismissed
the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the
position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District). It observed that the resolution denying
Richard’s candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of
disqualification and not of CoC cancellation. Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent
in lieu of Richard was legal and valid.21 Also, it upheld the validity of private respondent’s CoC due to
petitioner’s failure to controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who
notarized her CoC.22 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been admitted that private respondent
resides in Colgate Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the fact was she
continued to retain her domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only temporary.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues Before the Court

The crux of the present controversy is whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in
finding that Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte
Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the former’s failure to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

It is petitioner’s submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of
private respondent’s substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is
impermissible where the substituted candidate’s CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as
in the case of Richard. On the other hand, respondents maintain that Richard’s CoC was not denied
due course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was
properly substituted by private respondent.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a
certificate of candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for
public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for
disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; 24 or (b) his or her commission of
certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election
offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1)
giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy;
(3) spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4)
soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of
the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc,
sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any
candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the
same, if he or she had already been elected. 35

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to
have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the
candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age,
residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election
offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section
78 of the OEC36 is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant
qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC. 37 The
nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC, 38 where the Court
illumined:

Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a
material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one’s
intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an
express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence
in the determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. 39 What remains
material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the
basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification. 40

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied
due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The
reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.41 In Talaga v. COMELEC42 (Talaga), the Court ruled that: