Roved. O: Ocatedby
Roved. O: Ocatedby
Roved. O: Ocatedby
.,y:..(.. .:
...... ':.'. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
.~. FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
· "., )
,..... :
· ..". ':." CITIZENS AGAINST UNIDENTIFIED )
· .~ '.' .'. FLYING OBJECTS SECRECY )
: '; ... ;
........ )
"
--..
,' '~
Plaintiff )
::~«".:
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. .....
) BO-1562
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY )
)
_Defendant )
----------------)
AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE F. YEATES
State Of Maryland )
) SSe
County Of Anne Arundel)
roved. f o
'\ I .- \
~ ; <t":
. -.~~~ ~:.: ... ~ .,
··.i~_·.;' .~
" ;fo
11
..
d
'i, THE REI. EVANT DOCUMENTS .: ~}~~~ :i;~
....... ''''l'~. .•.~
.~ .-; ..':1~: -.~;;;
I 3. This Agency received four separate referrals (described '; .:.3
'.: ;",.;: v. !.... .~.
below') from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning'NSA~'~
• -f" i'~ ·:f~".
. . .....! -'.,;~." :.~.~
documents located by that Agency when 1t was engaged an FOIA ",~~~~ ,-;,;;t
. '. . .S;:t.-;~;'::1 _..~
.1 litigation concerning information pertaining to UFOs. (Ground :.'/: .i·'C~:
II
.;:. • 'I '.-
• r. :." y .•~(~
Saucer Watch v. CIA, D.D.C'- 17B-859.) The first was on Noven;b~'r:':~ ..",
I
'. . '. ':'..; ~! <:....
I 9, 1~7B when this Agency received copies of· fifteen Agency documen
I
• I .' .. ~~ .•.
located by CIA. The NSA also received two other referrals from
I . :~t~='~j'~~
CIA on December 4, 197B which provided three additional NSA . ,. -c , ~
\ I
I documents. Subsequently by
"
~i
name on December 22, -1978 •. In a letter dated 'January 9, '1979; - -.
l'" . . .
11.) are classified in their entirety, and exempt from release under
·
,
5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(3) because they are exempt from release
its entirety and therefore exempt from release under 5 U.S.C.· ~-5i' ,
~;
f:"~'f")
5 552(b)(1) and that the information is exempt from release unde~ ~'.'.
5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(3) for the reason that other statutes prevent , "'.' i,;,.. ,;;- '.:", 'le"', ,
.
its disclosure, to wit: 18 U.S.C. § 798, 50 U.S.C. S 403(d)<'3}·. F,;i."
"":"'.
and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36. (A copy of this letter is ~" . . . . ,"
Sft:., ,
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit E.
is also attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 3.)
A true 'and correct copy
docum~nts, ':'~\
I
by counsel, filed an rcrx request with NSA for all
in possession or under the control of NSA relating to UFOs :';"~':':',/::':.'~ .';.~.~ I~{
.",-. r. -;
and the UFO phenomena. (A copy of this letter is attached ,to '::";","'"
,,:~ . ~"' t4 ~/
:..: ~!;:
.
':.
"
, ...:.:.:..:~. ,:';':':,I,L
the Complaint as Exhibit F. A copy is also attached hereto and --:' :;5~ f(i;
I:
Ii
themwas prohibited by 18 U"S'C~ 5798, 50 U.S.C. 5 403(d)(.3~;>·~'~':J.:.i ~l1 ..
Publl.c Law 86-36; exempt from d a s c Lo su r e under 5 U.S.C. 5·':·,.'~;;'~';-!:i.; ,:~,~ ~~
•.''. '~~j.:':",~. ~~~-:::. ff~'
1\ 552 (b) (5) because they are intra agency memoranda, or letters ~ .•.> ::;~ ff;;.
iI
which would not be available by law to a party other than ~'~:~':"::i~;J .~ m.
, ,'~'" ,t
~: "
-.h , ....,
I
Ii agency in Ii tiga tion wi th this Agency; ·or exempt under 5 U. S:';~:~~i /~~ ~ . '.
§ SS2(b) (6) because they are to personnel or similar files the ',0: ~".
I -£ ;:':f;~: ::t~:i~
e ,.:-.
Q~~~ . -.
unwarrante~...,.:::~\,~~:~ "~1 ~~':' >.',:;' ':.::,
I
II
I invasinn nf personal privacy. (A copy of this 1eter is ~tt;;;~e;. . ". ~. '.' . . . .
t
\: to the Complaint as Exhibit G. A true and correct copy is :"~~'>:;j. r~"~;; I,'" , ":.:, ,_,
I;
I'
I',I
II
I'
also attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 5.)
letter also advised the plaintiff that certain l.nformatl.on,
.The Jan~a~Y;{:.f..:if~ ,~\:i
::.".'': ,....
g..
pot::
3:;f~N;~
I;
"
I.
I'
1I
i:
.
I·
Ii
I:
.~. :':~:l: ~~i:~
:.:,r:',
1.:?
&'.'
~
~.'
,
.•••.
II
..
. ",
'
.: :
the CIA on July 27, 1979. (The fourth and final CIA referral.)
I
8. Finally, a portion of a document which is respon:ive . I
I to the plaintiff's request was rece~tly declassified and released
I
to counsel for the plaintiff by letter dated September 15, 1980.
(A true and correct copy of this letter less the enclosure ·.:·I~~'.:-
.. ' ..
Ii is attached as ~xhibit 8.)
I!.,
II THE STATUS AND MISSION OF NSA
Ii
".i.;:~~~ ~l~
..
"
COMIN~ reports and will be addressed separ~tely. All of the '':;:-;~2 -:~:
. ,...;. :~·~·jk;)· .~:.~~
remaining records sought in this civil action are the product (~,~.~
.;. "1~~ L,.... .01'
:~
";.~~./.~!:ff~.i:!il :;72.
10. These COMINT activi ties include the. targeting of .~~:;~:~7t~I?::
.,:'r I' :~:';: ...-..'~ ~ ~.l
,-:::' . ;:.
", f;.
foreign governments' communications both within their borders. :--:?~ ~
,-~: .: .~: "'~:~ /':·:f,~. ~ J;:
. . :-:
... : ",
..... 11. It is common knowledge that the total volume of radio 'l~~
'." ". ..... : ..": .';'~.~: ·J.;~I ].",~
.. signals transmitted on a given day is vast. It is also gen~r~UX .;.;.'~~
'" .
· ..': :; ~~~;.~~! ./~
known that radio transmissions can be received by anyone". :'~~:::-~:r,{..~ :.~~
.: "': ..
...
~ -
5
':.~~~.~
.-. • '. : :r".. ~ -.,;ftr
:. ' '.:' :·~·~:;;~f;~i~~ /~:~£.'
.: ·:·~\.:?~t~~~
.. \ .
~
.. ;...
". '
... ~.:
... -. ....
. .:~~~.
"
:~ ". '
.~'
I
. -: tti ...
f~' ~:"~.'.
.'!"
~ ..
." .
.~.';-'"
"
.1
foreign offici.'s that such .interception of radio communica.~~.~.~;J"t~ .I.;.,_. ;.: :.·
is a prima~y mission of the NSA. ':'.;: ~H~., :fi~
·.'J.: .;-.· ••
". '.
Foreign officials may be
expected to know, ~lso, that NSA cannot possibly intercept eV~~:~f';,:; &'~ ':.
;.'.J.'.:
.:.".::'-;
~. ". ~~ ~:f: .:- ."
a significant percentage of all such communications, espeCiaIIY.·~·:~:~
:.~ ..
."
'.
".
taking account of the fact that NSA's activities involve: .:<~:~~~.::~; :\~
":".1
worldwide communications, not solely those having a United .'.:::;)). ,j~
States terminal. The number is simply too vast to be handled" ;;S :'~j!
." "_:.f. ~ . ~~.;:~ ~',~~
with any reasonable amount of personnel and equipment. Moreover~ :'::~
...... ; .a:.; .....':', ~ ...:: ~:i:
.-....
i
·
.:
II
the cost and effort of such interception would be disproportiori~1:~~
,.
t,
......
pO:. presumably know well' -- NSA must focus its interception ac·tivi-.;,~~ .,:,-::~
. -' '. - ...': :-. ;...",~-I·~;;~' ;~;~
.ties on those particular communications lines,- channels, links '.J~' .;~1
. .' '::'.~~ .j:.i. ...··4,:;
",
,-'I
-. or systems which yield the highest proportion of useful foreigri··:~ ~·:~t
. '-. '.;..~' :.~:~, -...,~~
.-.'
intelligence information. What foreign government official~ }:.;~.:.;-=:t~
not know, however, is which of the vast numbe~ of radio commun.~:~·I"(::
cations NSA attempts to intercept, which are intercepted, and, ','
I~ .. ~,.':". : ~.:
I! of those that are intercepted, which yield. to NSA procesSing.:-, <~.::. )
.1 methods and techniques. It is the protection of this critical ,.~: .:';':••
I: ..': . ~~~:! .~:.;~
· ..
· ......
.' .
~
.. ·.1
;,[r "information that is at the heart of the instant ~ase • . ,·:,:.);;~t~::i1
-..
.~. ..-. " li! 13. The continued efficacy of NSA' s vi tal ~ntell~g~~C~,;·./:t$3:'~i~{
.,,:
j activities requires that the lines, channels, links and systems -; ~'i':';
~~iden·tified.jf a gO~:~'~i;~i~ij
'.
......
" ~
II actually monitored remain foreign
· . .' ~ \1 obtains suffic"fe'nt reason to suspect that NSA is able to' <~'.t~~i§: :~~
intercept and process that government's radio communications,' '.::~~•. ~.:
'.~. :.:: ' ..~ .: ...
that "government would be expected to take immediate steps to '~)"',7: ',''';~
. :~'.::: :.".".:- .~ .!.
defeat that capability. This can be accomplished in a number. iJ;~~':':d
. .,.~·.i~~Y~~~.: ;7~·
of ways. A foreign government might shift to communications .:·:·;rr· .:;.:
1. : ..:. <:~:(l~~:~~: "~:
I'
.~i;,~~ .~
6
=.'--
.' Ii;~
"
... .~.
~:
r:
'I ". . " -~ ... ~.....'1 '1 ~.,
. <S;,~~~·~
I
..... : i
I
., I
.!.'.~
I .',
I
~:. .
I
~
links the U.S. cannot intercept. It may also choose to use
alternate methods of communications. The foreign governments Tori
may possess the technical capability to either upgrade or .;: : -". ,"
~!
\ i~ equivalent intercept. The risk involved is great. The infor-
;,
j:
I'. mation produced by NSA includes political, economic, scientific . .... :: .
:\
r:
I. and military data which is of im~easurable value to the Presiden~
I
i!,.
"I, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and other
t • f
policymakers. Obviously, if a ~OMINT source used by the Agency
I:I'
,.
r:
becomes unavailable, policymakets must operate without the .
I: . ."
i,r : lost permanently. Those losses are not only extremely harmful I
i
,". to the national security but also impose a heavy burden on the I
!
"
r:
!
limited resources of NSA which must attempt to recover the old
I,
I' source or establish an equivalent source of information.
I!
"
': 15. Even after targeting only a small proportion of
i,
:t
II , .
all available electromagnetic communications for interception, .
the number of n~ssages intercepted is extremely large. NSA
Ii
"I
thus is faced with a considerable task in selecting out those
\
messages that will be reviewed for pos~ible intelligence.
I
I' interest. The manner in which NSA does this selection and the
nII
~ I degree of reliability and success its methods enjoy are SUbjects
P
l: about which virtually no authoritative information has ever
Ii
;, been released to the pUblic. Information about these subjects
I
i,
would enable foreign observers to further assess, and thus take
7
"/-.
I!
o·
I:
t,
~i~·
,- :
.~~ li~ ,
"
16. The COMINT reports being withheld from the plaintiff ",~
~'
If
disclosure of these records would identify the communications
:
I<lit
II could be segregated and released Without~entifYing the ~,:: . "
I ,~ ~:
I~~
..
t:~,
-I ~...r.i
~
11 channels, links, and sys~ems targeted and intercepted and NSA's lor,
.
I
J,
~~
.....
11 tions. These communications targets and the processing techniques! ~¥: ..
1!r are, current intelligence sources and methods. __ Disclosing . . "
I~~~.
C,r,of.
. ;:;.:~
•• :0'
i~
11 them would' permit foreign intelligen~e officials to draw ~~
f·":'
l! inferences and
I collection make assessments about this nation's COMINT ~}1'
I
and processing activities that would enable them to
r·'
;r~
I r~
,~,
I capabilities
take counter-measures, as described above, to defeat the
I?:
classification to information, the unauthorized disclosure of ~~'
.~~
which could res~lt in exceptionally grave damage to the nation, ~ "
~"-
-'!.-
such as ,the ·compromise of ••• intelligence operations ••• ~~~: .
~~ .
tiiiJ :
~.,
vi tal 'to the national defense.· Other documents were properly .",..
~~, :
f' ,
~1; " "
f.'~
r.- ~
I
6',
I
'.'t
tI
'I serious damage to the nation, such as by "compromising •••
ji
d information revealing important intelligence operations." The
Ii,- rest, which were originated after June 1, 1972, were properly
,II'
il
classified TOp Secret pursuant to Executive Order 11652, Section
.. : .
I,'I
I,
lCA), providing for the application of that classification to
.. ", '.;;:
....'e,
I'
'I
Ii information, the disclosure of which could resuI~ in exceptionally
"
I'fl
I:II
IJ
I"!
I!
\ \I
.. '~'.' :".;
il'J 11652,' Section I(B), providing for the application of that
_~i .; .
"
:: ~""~~l ".I~
! sucfi ~s the revelation of significant intelligence operations.
I
I Each
I
COMINT record was appropriately marked
thereof remains
. -' .. :,
" ~',
Ii
dproperly so classified. These cOMINT records meet the criteria
I'(I
for classification in Section 1-3 of Executive Order 12065, and
II, they are properly classified 'dthin the categories provided-'-
II in Section 1-1 of the Order. I have reviewed all of the COM IN; . I
I
I,
records being withheld from the plaintiff for possible declassi-
I
I fication or downgrading according to the provisions of Sections
I
. ..
-, ~ . !I 3-1 and 3-3 of Executive Order 12065 and I find each portion of
:.. . " . • _:v ;·;~··'l
,~
r-
I from declassification or downgrading. In conducting this ':~:~~~.';:.~
\ .
review, I weighed the significant ne~d for openness in governmen~
. ,"; :.:~I·~~~"~·':.:!
.. ~'--'.:";~
against the likelihood of damage to our national security at .~·cf'f:i(.'
··:~.~··. !JJ.~."':··:t/
this time and determined that the records should continue to be,,':..;.;
. ..~.-:;:~ ~~~ ~\
classified because of the damage their unauthorized disclos~re...
•.~ \. ~.': !:=.' !Ii
in~elli~,~ ,~
".:' .:
would reasonably be expected to cause to communications
l!
. ~\.::.,t..-::,::. .~.~
;~?~~
..
.... .
..; . are properly classified und:r Executive Order 12065. the
, .
~
-.',
..','
.
:··~~~~~rt%.;t! .~
:. ;~." " -
:
.:.~:
{'," ~~r
r..~ J
..
., records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C.§552(b) (1)'.:
I·
I' 18. ~ele~se of the COMINT records being withheld from
.",
.~.:,,=--
1
"1 the plaintiff or any portion of any of them would disclose
-.
II
information about the nature of NSA's activities including
I'
.": ... I'
I! its functions and thereby jeopardize the intelligence collection
t~ :~.:'.: ~,':\
.-:- .
mission of the Agency. (See paragraphs 11 through 15 above.) W·:····,·
.i : I! d~«
:;r.. II This mission of the NSA is singular and unique.
II
I of that singular mission would reveal certain functions and
";;!:
~.<>,
Ii'I
activities of the NSA which are protected from disclosure by
.• '
II
l!
II
Section 6 of Public Law 86-36, 50 U.S.C. S 402 (note).
-infor~ "I;';
matiun about them would reveal information protected by 18 U.S.C.
~,
I
I
.\1 S 798 prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of classified I
i
~. :.:.
II
·Ii info rrna tion concernin·g. the communications intelligence act'ivi ties' ! ~;~ o
nr of the United States. The disclosure. of these records or any por- ~....
il
, : .. :
~~ .: .. ';
~
!l tion of them would also compromise classified information per-
'~ .~ ..::'.
II taining to intelligence sources and methods protected from .~,
,:;,
O{. ..
I
the National Security Act of 1947. ~!. .' .. ~ ~
..... .
19. It should be noted that the classification of these ~
of • • • • •
'.
. I COMINT .--_ ... ~" ".:
': , .'
'
1
~.,:::)::
I exemptions (b) (1) and (b)(3) are not based only on the subs tan-
I •• o
i I~{>-·
:
i
';
I~ 10
.. ij
:
-.
~r-: .'.: .
..';':
- ~ j.:.:..
\'
. ".
..
'"
".
I
.,
'j seeks. That is, all of the COMINT reports at issue here (with
i-
J
:1
one exception)' are based on messages which were intercepted from
11
file where it had been retained for historical reference
..
" ..
,
I'
applicable ~tatute in this instance is Section 6 of Public Law
~'. -,
'.
-:
..
.
';
-'.
",
i:
86-36 which specif~cally exempts from disclosure the names and
;:
i.
"
titles of NSA employees.
':
o!:
b. The second non-COMINT document is a memorandum
12
I,
I,
i
Ii
II
. : .~. .
·:.r
.!{
.'
.,' .
.~.- to the mission of the Agency. This deletion is non-factual and
, .'.'
~'•..... :"
~ .
Ii portions of the record contain no reference relating to UFOs or .:' '. :~ ..:...
!: ....'
-.~ .
.'"
I,
I
UFO 'phenomena and are, therefore, not responsive to plaintiff's
I;i: request.
p
I:
'I
I,
.;
I'
"
, .
.~ ~
13
.....
I
:: '... ,
.,.t:'
;!
"
-. --... ':~.'-' .
i
~.::~/ .: ".
J; i !
.......
.'? . '.'
...,.,: -. "",
:::'. ,.
'.
'.' .
I'
:,
I'
I:
. "'~.. ~'.-:-- !~
",
- .... \!
"~\
r
;1
Ii
1\
i
I
I
il
. '.~
'.'
)
11
..,: .
',.
, "
' .. ':.'
:.'.:. .. ~
." -:
".:, !: ..... : ...
!: .. . :~:.~.. :.'
. ,~ .~
.. ' .. "
. :'. -.'
Ii