Tan VS Benolirao

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DELFIN TAN vs.

ERLINDA BENOLIRAO
G.R. no. 153820, October 16, 2009

FACTS:

A 689 sq.m. parcel of land in Tagaytay City with TCT №. 26432, co-owned by respondent spouses
Lamberto and Erlinda Benolirao and spouses Reynaldo and Norma Taningco, was the subject of a Deed
of Conditional Sale in favor of petitioner Delfin Tan for P 1,378,000. Pursuant to the deed, petitioner
paid the P 200,000 downpayment. Then, Lamberto Benolirao died and an extrajudicial settlement of his
estate was executed which caused the issuance of a new certificate of title over the property (TCT №.
27355) with a corresponding annotation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Despite a second extension, petitioner failed to comply with his obligation to pay the remaining balance
due. In response to the demand letter subsequently sent by the vendors, petitioner demanded the
return of his downpayment, contending that the annotation on the title was an encumberance on the
property that would prevent the vendors from delivering a clear title to him. When the vendors refused,
petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on the title. Respondents filed a motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and was
granted. The lower court, after due proceedings, ruled that the forfeiture was proper while the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

whether an annotation made pursuant to Section 3, Rule 74 of the ROC on a Certificate of title
conveying real property considered an encumberance on the property.

HELD:

YES.

The litigation subject of a notice of lis pendens must directly involve a specific property which is
necessarily affected by the judgment. While the deed does have real property for its object, petitioner’s
complaint is an in personam action since it asks the court to compel the respondent to do something —
either to rescind or reform the contract — and enforces his personal rights against the respondent, not
against the property subject of the deed.

The contract between the parties was merely a contract to sell where the vendor retained title and
ownership to the property until petitioner has fully paid the purchase price. Since he had no claim of
ownership or title yet, he had no right to ask for the annotation of a lis pendens notice on the title of the
property.

Jurisprudence has established that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon
the completion by the buyer of the payment of the price, contract is only a contract to sell.

An annotation is placed on new certificates of title issued pursuant to the distribution and partition of a
decedent’s real properties to warn third persons on the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid
creditors in these properties. The annotation, therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real
property in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the real property despite
the annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be subject to the rights of
excluded parties.

The remedy of rescission under Art. 1191 cannot apply to mere contracts to sell. In a contract to sell, the
vendor remains the owner for as long as the vendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying
the purchase price. If the vendor should eject vendee for failure to meet the condition precedent, he is
enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. (Termination is the proper remedy.)

Unless time is of the essence to the contract, slight delay is not a ground for rescission.

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