3/5/2020 [ G.R. No.

192300, November 24, 2014 ]

747 Phil. 744

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 192300, November 24, 2014 ]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF NAVOTAS, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
OF NAVOTAS AND MANUEL T. ENRIQUEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF NAVOTAS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated March 1, 2010 and Resolution[2] dated May 6,
2010 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in E.B. No. 461.

The facts, as found by the CTA En Banc, are as follows:

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned and

controlled corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6395, as amended, with principal office address at NPC Office
Building Complex, corner Quezon Avenue and BIR Road, East Triangle,
Diliman, Quezon City.

Respondent Municipal Government of Navotas, is a local government unit, hosting

petitioner’s Navotas Power Stations I and II located in the Municipality of Navotas. It may
be served with summons and court processes through the Municipal Mayor, at the Municipal
Hall Building, Navotas, Metro Manila.

Respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Navotas is a legislative body being sued for the purpose
of enjoining it from performing any and all acts geared toward the collection of the assailed
taxes and/or sale of petitioner’s properties during the pendency of the instant petition. It may
be served with summons and other court processes through the Vice Mayor, as the presiding
officer, at the Municipal Hall Building, Navotas, Metro Manila.

Respondent Manuel T. Enriquez is being sued in his official capacity as the Municipal
Treasurer of Navotas and may be served with summons and other court processes at the
Municipal Hall Building, Navotas, Metro Manila.

On the respective dates of November 16, 1988 and June 29, 1992, petitioner entered into a
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Project Agreements (BOTs) with Mirant Navotas I Corporation
(MNC-I), formerly known as Hopewell Energy Philippines Corporation, and Mirant Navotas
II Corporation (MNC-II), formerly known as Hopewell Tileman (Philippines) Corporation.
The BOTs are for the construction, operation and eventual transfer to petitioner of MNC-I’s
200-MW and MNC-II’s 100-MW gas turbine power stations. During the period of the
agreement, the operation of the power stations shall be under the actual and direct control
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and supervision of petitioner. Consequently, petitioner has the obligation to pay for all taxes,
except business taxes, relative to the implementation of the agreements.

For the 1st quarter of 2003, petitioner paid respondent Municipality, real property taxes in the
amounts of P3,382,715.88 and P4,973,869.83 for the MNC-I and MNC-II power stations,
respectively. After the said quarter, petitioner stopped paying the real property taxes,
claiming exemption from payment thereon pursuant to Section 234(c) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991.

In a letter dated March 30, 2004, petitioner informed the Municipal Assessor of Navotas
(Municipal Assessor) of their position on the exemption from real property tax of the subject
properties, pertaining to machineries and equipment which are in the name of Hopewell
Tileman (Phils.) Corporation.

Pursuant to the BOTs, MNC-I and MNC-II eventually transferred to petitioner all their
rights, title and interests in and to the fixtures, fittings, plant and equipment, and
improvements comprising the power stations on March 24, 2003 and August 1, 2005,
respectively.

On May 25, 2005, MNC-II received four notices from respondent Municipal Treasurer
informing MNC-I and MNC-II of their real property tax delinquencies for the 2nd, 3rd, and
4th quarters of calendar year 2003 and for the calendar years 2004 and 2005. Details are as
follows:

First and Second Notices, addressed

P59,505,580.10
to Hopewell Energy (Phils.) Corp.
First and Second Notices, addressed
88,792,759.05
to Hopewell Tileman Phil. Corp.
Total P148,298,339.15

In a letter dated July 26, 2005, petitioner reiterated to the Municipal Assessor of Navotas
their position that the subject properties are exempt from real property tax.

On November 21, 2005, a Warrant of Levy was received from respondent Municipal
Treasurer. MNC-II also received two Notices of Sale of Delinquent Real Property,
scheduling the public auction of the subject properties on December 21, 2005.

On December 16, 2005, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon
City, a Petition for Declaratory Relief, Annulment of Notice of Delinquency, Warrant of Levy,
and Notice of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

Petitioner’s application for the issuance of a TRO was denied by the RTC. Respondents
proceeded with the scheduled public auction. Considering that there were no bidders for the
purchase of the subject properties, the same were forfeited in favor of respondent
Municipality.

Petitioner filed an amended petition before the RTC seeking to declare as null and void the
public auction and the forfeiture of the subject properties in favor of respondent Municipality
on the ground that these actions are patently illegal because the subject properties are exempt
from real property tax.
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The RTC denied the petition on May 23, 2007. It ruled that although Section 234 of the LGC
exempts petitioner from payment of real property tax due on the subject properties located at
MNC-I and MNC-II, failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies resulted in the
finality of the assessment; thus, the eventual collection was in order. The RTC explained that
petitioner should have appealed the assessments to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
(LBAA), pursuant to Section 226 of the LGC, within 60 days from the date of receipt of the
written notice of assessment. If not satisfied with the decision of the LBAA, petitioner
should appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA), pursuant to Section 229
of the same code. The RTC further went on in saying that before initiating any protest to the
assessment, the tax due must first be paid.

After an extension of 30 days was granted, a Petition for Review with application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Order of Suspension of Collection and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was seasonably filed with this Court though registered mail on July
27, 2007 and received on August 2, 2007. The Petition was raffled to the Second Division of
this Court.

Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition through registered mail on October 15, 2007
and which was received by this Court on October 30, 2007.

In a Resolution dated December 17, 2007, the Second Division treated petitioner’s
application for TRO and/or Order of Suspension of Collection and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction as a “Motion to Suspend the Collection of Taxes,” considering that the ownership
of the auctioned properties was not yet consolidated in the name of respondents; thus, the
collection of payment of the alleged deficiency taxes was not yet consummated. The
application was granted on equitable considerations, to preserve the status quo during the
pendency of the appeal, and in order not to render ineffectual and nugatory the judgment that
will be rendered. Respondents were enjoined from consolidating the ownership of the
subject properties, from confiscating them, from taking possession thereof and from doing
any and all acts relative thereto during the pendency of petitioner’s appeal, until further
ordered.

In a Resolution dated March 6, 2008, the case was considered submitted for Decision after
petitioner manifested to adopt its Petition for Review as its Memorandum and after
respondents failed to file their Memorandum.

In a Decision promulgated on July 18, 2008, the Second Division dismissed the Petition and
sustained the RTC’s Decision dated May 23, 2007. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
filed on August 6, 2008 was likewise denied in a Resolution dated January 9, 2009.[3]

Resultantly, petitioner filed a petition before the CTA En Banc.

In a Decision dated March 1, 2010, the CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second Division’s
decision and held as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed Decision promulgated

on July 18, 2008 and the Resolution dated January 9, 2009, the instant Petition
for Review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[4]
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Unfazed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated May 6, 2010.

Accordingly, petitioner lodged the present petition praying as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Decision dated March 1, 2010

and Resolution dated May 6, 2010 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc be
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; a new one be rendered declaring:

that the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
1)
case;
petitioner as exempt from paying real property taxes over the properties
2)
subject of the present case; and
the assailed Notices of Delinquency, Warrant of Levy and Notice of Sale and
3)
the Auction Sale and Forfeiture as null and void.

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.[5]

Thus, petitioner assigns the following errors for this Court’s resolution:

THE COURT OT TAX APPEALS EN BANC ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS SECOND DIVISION
WHICH HELD THAT:

1) IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION.

2) APPEALS TO THE LBAA AND CBAA ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE
PETITION DATED DECEMBER 12, 2005 (AS AMENDED ON
JANUARY 5, 2006) FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF FILED BY
PETITIONER BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT MAY BE
GIVEN DUE COURSE.[6]

In essence, the issue is whether or not the CTA Second Division has jurisdiction to review
the decision of the RTC which concerns a petition for declaratory relief involving real
property taxes.

We rule in the affirmative.

First, Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282[7] explicitly enumerates the scope of the
CTA’s jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases, to wit:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. – The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving

disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue;

2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving

disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
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charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the

National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a
specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a
denial;

3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax

cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction;

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for

customs duties, fees, or other monetary charges, seizure, detention or
release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Laws or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs;

5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property originally decided by the provincial or city board assessment
appeals;

6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him

automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and
Customs Code;

7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of

nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of
Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302,
respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under
Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to
impose or not to impose said duties;

x x x[8]

Such authority is echoed in Section 3, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, which
enumerates the jurisdiction of the CTA, sitting as a Division, to wit:

Section 3. Cases Within the Jurisdiction of the Court In Division. – The Court
Division shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:

xxxx

(3) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original jurisdiction;

x x x[9]

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Indeed, the CTA, sitting as Division, has jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions,
rulings and resolutions of the RTC over local tax cases, which includes real property taxes.
This is evident from a perusal of the Local Government Code (LGC) which includes the
matter of Real Property Taxation under one of its main chapters. Indubitably, the power to
impose real property tax is in line with the power vested in the local governments to create
their own revenue sources, within the limitations set forth by law. As such, the collection of
real property taxes is conferred with the local treasurer rather than the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.

We, therefore, disagree with the conclusion of the CTA En Banc that real property taxes have
always been treated by our laws separately from local taxes. The fact that a separate chapter
is devoted to the treatment of real property taxes, and a distinct appeal procedure is provided
therefor does not justify an inference that Section 7(a)(3) of R.A. 9282 pertains only to local
taxes other than real property taxes. Rather, the term “local taxes” in the aforementioned
provision should be considered in its general and comprehensive sense, which embraces real
property tax assessments, in line with the precept Generalia verba sunt generaliter
inteligencia—what is generally spoken shall be generally understood.[10] Between the
restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was
clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.[11] In the words of the Court in
Marcos v. Chief of Staff:[12]

Where words are used which have both, a restricted and a general meaning, the
general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of
the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended.[13]

Here, the context in which the word “local taxes” is employed does not clearly indicate that
the limited or restricted view was intended by the legislature. In addition, the specification of
real property tax assessment under Paragraph (a)(5) of Section 7 of R.A. 9282, in relation to
the decisions of the CBAA, is only proper given that the CBAA has no jurisdiction, either
original or appellate, over cases involving local taxes other than real property taxes.

Based on the foregoing, the general meaning of “local taxes” should be adopted in relation to
Paragraph (a)(3) of Section 7 of R.A. 9282, which necessarily includes real property taxes.

Second, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, when the legality or validity of the assessment
is in question, and not its reasonableness or correctness, appeals to the LBAA, and
subsequently to the CBAA, pursuant to Sections 226[14] and 229[15] of the LGC, are not
necessary.

Stated differently, in the event that the taxpayer questions the authority and power of the
assessor to impose the assessment, and of the treasurer to collect the real property tax, resort
to judicial action may prosper. This is in consonance with the ruling in Ty v. Trampe.[16]
Here, a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction was filed to declare null and void the new tax assessments and enjoin the
collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies and non-payment of the real property tax, the Court gave due
course to the case on the ground that the controversy did not involve questions of fact but
only of law. Thus:

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Respondents argue that this case is premature because petitioners neither

appealed the questioned assessments on their properties to the Board of
Assessment Appeal, pursuant to Sec. 226, nor paid the taxes under protest, per
Sec. 252.

We do not agree. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be

exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled
exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but
only of law. In the present case, the parties, even during the proceedings in the
lower court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are
legal", and thus, no evidence was presented in said court.

In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A. 7160
provides in Sec. 229 (b) that "(t)he proceedings of the Board shall be conducted
solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts . . . ." It follows that appeals to
this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are involved. Again, the
protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is needed where there is a
question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer
disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is
required to "first pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal
treasurer will not act on his protest. In the case at bench, however, the
petitioners are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting
solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to
collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in
the tax but attacks on the very validity of any increase.[17]

Accordingly, if the only issue is the legality or validity of the assessment – a question of law
– direct recourse to the RTC is warranted.

In the case at bar, the claim of petitioner essentially questions the very authority and power
of the Municipal Assessor to impose the assessment and of the Municipal Treasurer to
collect the real property tax with respect to the machineries and equipment located in the
Navotas I and II power plants. Certainly, it does not pertain to the correctness of the amounts
assessed but attacks the validity of the assessment of the taxes itself.

The well-established rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought determine the nature of an action.[18] Here, it is not disputed that the
machineries and equipment are being used for power generation. The primordial issue,
however, is whether these machineries and equipment are actually, directly and exclusively
used by petitioner within the purview of Section 234[19] of the LGC, which exempts it from
payment of real property taxes, to wit:

Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The following are exempted
from payment of the real property tax:

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and

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improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable

or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively
used by local water districts and government owned or controlled
corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or
generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for
under R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental
protection.

Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax
previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the issue is clearly legal given that it involves an
interpretation of the contract between the parties vis-à-vis the applicable laws, i.e., which
entity actually, directly and exclusively uses the subject machineries and equipment. The
answer to such question would then determine whether petitioner is indeed exempt from
payment of real property taxes. Since the issue is a question of law, the jurisdiction was
correctly lodged with the RTC.

On this score, it is worthy to note that in its Decision dated March 23, 2007, the RTC already
declared that petitioner is exempt from payment of real property taxes on its machineries
located at MNC-I & MNC-II, the pertinent portion of which reads:

There is no dispute that Section 234 of the Local Government Code exempts
petitioner from payment of real property tax due on its machineries located at
MNC-1 and MNC-2 power stations.[20]

The foregoing was not disputed by respondents.

Despite this, the RTC still dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for
failure of petitioner to appeal the assailed assessment to the LBAA and the CBAA.

More, we find it obscure that the CTA En Banc, while finding that the issue obtaining in the
present case pertains to a question of fact, held that Ty is applicable to the present case with
respect to the requirement for payment under protest, to wit:

If the legality of the real property tax assessment is at issue, the well pronounced
ruling and ratiocination made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ty vs. Trampe
is applicable. There, the Supreme Court notes:

Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is

needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the
amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of
an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay
the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will
not act on his protest. In the case at bench however, the petitioners are
questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely
and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to
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collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the
increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity of any increase.

In a similar way, as there has been an apparent admission by petitioner that it

is not questioning the excessiveness or reasonableness of the real property tax
assessment, but the legality thereof; there is no need for petitioner to pay the
real property tax assessment before initiating a protest.

At this point, although we agree with petitioner on it stance that payment under
protest is not necessary, we still maintain the view that exhausting the available
remedies of lodging an appeal before the LBAA and CBAA before availing
judicial intervention is still mandatory.[21]

We find the reasoning of the CTA En Banc quite illogical. For one, it held that unlike Ty, the
resolution of the question of law submitted by petitioner requires proof of facts;[22] hence,
resort to the LBAA is necessary. However, instead of sustaining the requirement of payment
under protest under Section 252[23] of the LGC, the CTA En Banc found the payment of
protest no longer necessary given the availing circumstances of the case. If indeed the Court
a quo finds the present case to fall under the jurisdiction of the LBAA, and then the CBAA
on appeal, the dispensation with the requirement of payment under protest would be devoid
of merit and contrary to law and jurisprudence.

It is for the foregoing reasons that we deem the reversal of the ruling of the CTA En Banc in
order. At the risk of repetition, what is being questioned in the present case is the authority of
the Municipal Assessor to impose the assessment and of the Municipal Treasurer to collect
the real property taxes. Accordingly, resort to the LBAA and the CBAA is no longer
necessary for the same reason that what is being questioned is the legality or validity of the
tax assessment, not the reasonableness or correctness of the assessment. Certainly, it would
be unjust to require the realty owner to first pay the tax, the validity of which he precisely
questions, before he can lodge a complaint to the court.

In fine, if a taxpayer is not satisfied with the decision of the CBAA or the RTC, as the case
may be, the taxpayer may file, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assailed decision, a
petition for review with the CTA pursuant to Section 7(a) of R.A. 9282. In cases where the
question involves the amount of the tax or the correctness thereof, the appeal will be
pursuant to Section 7(a)(5) of R.A. 9282. When the appeal comes from a judicial remedy
which questions the authority of the local government to impose the tax, Section 7(a)(3) of
R.A. 9282 applies. Thereafter, such decision, ruling or resolution may be further reviewed by
the CTA En Banc pursuant to Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, to wit:

Section 2. Cases Within the Jurisdiction of the Court En Banc. – The Court En
Banc shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the
following:

(a) Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the

Court in Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(2) Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction;

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x x x[24]

Thus, the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing the petition for review en banc, and affirming
the CTA Second Division’s position that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the instant case for
failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the
assessment.

Anent the matter on the validity of the Notices of Delinquency issued by the Municipal
Treasurer, as well as the Warrant of Levy, the same involves questions of fact. Thus, the
remand of this case to the RTC is warranted for the proper verification and determination of
the factual basis and merits of this case, and in order that the ends of substantial justice and
fair play may be served.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
March 1, 2010 and Resolution dated May 6, 2010 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in
E.B. No. 461. Moreover, this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for
determination of petitioner's claims for annulment of Notice of Delinquency, Warrant of
Levy, and Notice of Sale.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Villarama, Jr., Mendoza*, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

*Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special
Order No. 1878 dated November 21, 2014.

[1]Penned by Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, with Associate Justices Juanito C.

Castañeda, Jr., Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Esperanza R. Fabon-
Victorino, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, and Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, concurring; Olga
Palanca-Enriquez, dissenting; rollo, pp. 50-75.

[2] Id. at 76-79.

[3] Id. at 51-56.

[4] Id. at 74. (Emphasis in the original)

[5] Id. at 43-44.

[6] Id. at 23.

[7]AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS

(CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH
SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
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[8] Emphasis supplied.

[9] Emphasis supplied.

[10]Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459,

February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198, 244.

[11] Id.

[12] 89 Phil. 246 (1951).

[13] Marcos v. Chief of Staff, supra, at 248.

[14] Section 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. - Any owner or person having legal
interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or
municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment
Appeals of the provincial or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the
purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents
submitted in support of the appeal.

[15] Section 229. Action by the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. -

(a) The Board shall decide the appeal within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of
receipt of such appeal. The Board, after hearing, shall render its decision based on
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence on record as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support the conclusion.

(b) In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Board shall have the power to summon
witnesses, administer oaths, conduct ocular inspection, take depositions, and issue subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum. The proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the
purpose of ascertaining the facts without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in
judicial proceedings.

(c) The secretary of the Board shall furnish the owner of the property or the person having
legal interest therein and the provincial or city assessor with a copy of the decision of the
Board. In case the provincial or city assessor concurs in the revision or the assessment, it
shall be his duty to notify the owner of the property or the person having legal interest
therein of such fact using the form prescribed for the purpose. The owner of the property or
the person having legal interest therein or the assessor who is not satisfied with the decision
of the Board, may, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision of said Board, appeal
to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, as herein provided. The decision of the Central
Board shall be final and executory.

[16] 321 Phil. 81 (1995).

[17] Ty v. Trampe, supra, at 101-102. (Emphasis supplied)

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[18] Olivares v. Marquez, 482 Phil. 183, 191 (2004).

[19] Emphasis supplied.

[20] Records, p. 41.

[21] Id. at 73-74. (Emphasis ours)

[22] Id. at 75.

[23] Section 252. Payment Under Protest. -

(a) No protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays the tax. There shall be
annotated on the tax receipts the words "paid under protest". The protest in writing must be
filed within thirty (30) days from payment of the tax to the provincial, city treasurer or
municipal treasurer, in the case of a municipality within Metropolitan Manila Area, who
shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from receipt.

(b) The tax or a portion thereof paid under protest, shall be held in trust by the treasurer
concerned.

(c) In the event that the protest is finally decided in favor of the taxpayer, the amount or
portion of the tax protested shall be refunded to the protestant, or applied as tax credit
against his existing or future tax liability.

(d) In the event that the protest is denied or upon the lapse of the sixty day period prescribed
in subparagraph (a), the taxpayer may avail of the remedies as provided for in Chapter 3,
Title II, Book II of this Code.

[24] Emphasis supplied.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: October 19, 2017

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