REPUBLIC OF THE unappealable.

The Solicitor General appealed to this

PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Court.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES Issue: whether the appeal of the State from the trial
PRUDENCIO MAXINO and TARCIANA court's 1970 order of denial was seasonably made.
MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES, ROGELIO The Appellate Court held that the service of the
AQUINO, Minor represented by his father, order on Dispo, as special attorney, was binding on
Manuel Aquino, and ALEJANDRO, the Solicitor General's Office. Consequently, the
SOCORRO, MERCEDES, CONCHITA, record on appeal, which was filed after thirty days
REMEDIOS and FLORA, all surnamed from the service of the order upon Dispo, was filed
CONSOLACION, respondents. out of time.

This case is about the validity of the registration of SC: The reglementary thirty-day period for appeal
885 hectares of public forestall land located in should be reckoned from the time the Solicitor
Mulanay, Quezon. General's Office was apprised (told) of the 1970
order of denial and not from the time the special
In Land Registration Case CFI Gumaca, Quezon, counsel or the fiscal was served with that order.
Judge Vicente del Rosario in 1961 rendered a These representatives of the Solicitor General had
decision, ordering the registration of Lot 1, allegedly no power to decide whether an appeal should be
located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in made. They should have referred the matter to the
the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Solicitor General.
Tarciana Morales, less 200 hectares which should be
registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo In the designation of Dispo as special counsel by
Consolacion ( Solicitor General Barredo, approved by Secretary of
Justice Teehankee, it was specified that he should
The decision became final and executory. A decree consult the Solicitor General on all questions, legal
and an original certificate of title were issued. and factual, regarding the case. The question of
whether an appeal should be made could only be
More than eight years later, in 1969, the Republic of decided by the Solicitor General's Office.
the Philippines filed with the Gumaca court an
amended petition to annul the decision, decree and The 1969 petition to annul the decision, decree and
title on the ground that they are void because the titles was filed by Solicitor General Felix V.
land in question was still a part of the unclassified Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
public forest. Moreover, the possessory information Torres and Solicitor Alicia Sempio-Diy.
title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only Consequently, the Solicitor General's Office should
29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was be served with the final order disposing of the
verified by the Acting Director of Forestry. petition and should not be bound by the service on
his surrogates, the special counsel and the fiscal
The Maxinos opposed the petition. After a hearing (Republic vs. Polo, L-49247, March 13, 1979, 89
on the merits, Judge Agana denied the petition in his SCRA 33; Republic vs. Mendoza, L-49891, October
order of September 8, 1970. 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539).

A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on
the OSG only on September 2, 1971 or nearly one year time, the Solicitor General's Office was late in filing
from the issuance of the order. Twenty-two days the amendments to it is of no moment. In
thereafter or on September 24 the Solicitor General exceptional cases, like the instant case, the interest of
appealed from that order and filed a motion for justice may warrant waiver of the rules (Republic vs.
extension of time within which to submit a record Court of Appeals, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83
on appeal. The appeal was given due course. SCRA 453).

Appellate Court dismissed the petition because the In this case, where it is contended that the
1970 order had allegedly long become final and registration is void allegedly because public
forestal land was registered and the State sought

1
to declare the decision void, the Government Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. He was survived
should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors by his two children Maria and Lucila. On September
of its agents. 24, 1935 the two heirs, without executing an
extrajudicial settlement of Prudencio's estate and
It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to themselves,
area registered by the Maxinos, is within the executed an " absolute sale" of the land in favor of
public forest, not alienable and disposable nor Tarciana Morales-Maxino the wife of applicant
susceptible of private appropriation. Its Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son and the
inclusion in the public forest was certified by grandson of Prudencio Tesalona.
Director of Forestry.
That curious document is not a sale at all. It is a "quit-
The certification was reiterated by the Director of claim". It is stated therein that in consideration
Forestry on May 20, 1948 as per Land Classification of P200 the Tesalona sisters "releases and forever
Map No. 1516, No. 16-E of Mulanay, Quezon, quitclaim unto the said Vendee" the 29-hectare land
Exhibit 1-A-Director of Forestry, and as shown in described in the composition title
paragraph 6 of the report of Forester Emerson B.
Abraham who recommended that the opposition to The Maxinos contend that
the registration entered by the Director be sustained. Tesalona's gratuitous adjustment or composition title
(as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title)
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish should prevail in determining the Identity of the
title, Exhibit G, a gratuitous composition title or disputed land. This assertion is untenable in the light
adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio of the notorious discrepancy between the area of 29
Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December hectares stated in the title and the 970 hectares now
26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de claimed as the real area (885 hectares for Lot 1 and
animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and 84 hectares for Lot 2 which is not involved in this
Campalacio Creeks. * case).

There is a monstrous and bewildering discrepancy The most that can be said for Tesalona is that his
between the area of 29 hectares and the actual area of gratuitous adjustment title granted him possessory
the land bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio rights over pasture land with an area of 29 hectares but not
Creeks which is 970 hectares as surveyed in 1959 ownership over 970 hectares of grazing land. As to the
(Exh. D). We have no hesitation in saying that the requirements for an adjustment proceeding under
composition title erred in stating the boundaries. the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, where the
The trial court grievously erred in applying to area in hectares, not the boundaries, is important.
this case the rule that the area comprised in the
boundaries should prevail over that stated in the The Maxinos have the burden of proving that
moniments of title. the title justified the considerable increase in
area. They have not shown that a title for 29
Tria averred in his report and testimony that the hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares.
Yamay and Campalacio Creeks mentioned in the The boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax
composition title really refer to the Banguian and declarations reveal that a different land was covered.
Mamba creeks. This would mean that the actual The title states that the 29-hectare land was located
area claimed by Maxino was only 371 hectares, in Barrio Yamay. In his tax declarations it is stated
not 970 that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga, now
Anonang.
That would also explain why in the document,
Exhibit H, presented by the Maxinos, mention is His 1906 tax declaration is for a parcel of land
made of "paligawang 'Manba' ". The unreliability or whose boundaries are not the Yamay and
dubiousness of the composition title is evident from Campalacio Creeks but it was bounded by the
the sale executed by the heirs of Prudencio Tesalona Yamay Creek and the lands of Maximo
in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino. Tesalona, Emiterio Tesalona and Felix Aguilles,
with an area of 120 hectares. On the other hand, his
1919 and 1921 tax declarations are for land with the

2
same boundaries but with an area of 36 hectares only
(Exh. I-2 and I-3).

The 1948, 1958 and 1961 tax declarations use the 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY MAY INTRODUCE
boundaries Campalacio and Yamay Creeks but EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP TO PROVE
the area of the pasture land is 100 hectares only, CHARACTER OF POSSESSION AND
a far cry from the 970 hectares as surveyed AMOUNT OF DAMAGES FOR UNJUST
DEPRIVATION THEREOF. — The fact that the
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not petitioners themselves adduced evidence of
registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the ownership over the property in question did not, as
title be issued during the Spanish regime or claimed, have the effect of divesting the municipal
under the Torrens system, nullifies the title court of its jurisdiction. As permitted in the above-
cited Section 88 of R.A. No. 296, the plaintiff in an
ejectment case may introduce such evidence for the
Possession of public forestal lands, however long,
purpose of proving the character of his possession
cannot ripen into private ownership and the amount of damages he is claiming for unjust
deprivation of such possession. The petitioners were
Spanish titles are not indefeasible . The instant only trying to prove their right to possession and
case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de damages by establishing their right of ownership.
Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where
an adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be
void because it was fraudulent and it covered public DECISION
forestal land not subject to registration. As to void
composition or patent issued in 1898, see Testagorda
vs. Commanding General, 6 Phil. 573. CRUZ, J.:

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential

Decree No. 892 effective February 16, 1976 This petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings. The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for
ejectment that the private respondents had forced
WHEREFORE, the order of Judge Agana, the their way into the disputed premises without any
decision of the Appellate Court and the decision of right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same
Judge Del Rosario dated March 21, 1961 are despite repeated demands.
reversed and set aside. The application for
registration of Lot 1, Psu-175880 is dismissed. No These demands were based on the petitioners’ claim
costs. that they were the owners of the said property,
having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The
SO ORDERED. private respondents, in their answer, had challenged
the claimed sale, arguing that the property belonged
to them by right of inheritance. At any rate, they had
argued, as the basic question was one of ownership
FIRST DIVISION
and not of mere possession, the municipal court had
no jurisdiction and should dismiss the
[G.R. No. L-56449. August 31, 1987.]
complaint.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
JOSE CHING and CARIDAD
The municipal court, * affirming its jurisdiction,
CHING, Petitioners, v. HON. ANTONIO Q.
proceeded to trial and thereafter rendered judgment
MALAYA, as Presiding Judge of the CFI of
ordering the private respondents to vacate the
Laguna, Branch IV, Hon. MAXIMIANO C.
disputed property. It also required them to pay the
ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge of the CFI of
petitioners back and current rentals at P1,000.00 a
Laguna Branch II, and Spouses CESAR
month until actual under of the premises, as well as a
ALVARADO and ARACELI
P3,000.00 attorney’s fee plus the costs of the suit.
ALVARADO, Respondents.
On appeal, this decision was set aside by the

3
respondent judge, who held that the municipal court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to
had no competence to resolve the case as it involved rule on the question of who had the prior
a question of ownership. physical possession."

ISSUE: whether or not the adverse assertions of "Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible
ownership over the property in issue, the municipal entry alleges title to the property in his answer, it is
court had the authority to try and decide the same in declared in a great number of cases that the Justice
the first instance. This may be raised on certiorari. of the Peace or the Court of First Instance on appeal
will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such
Ruling: As the original complaint was filed on allegations alone."
January 6, 1979, the question before us should be
examined under the provisions of R.A. No. 296, as There is one exception, however, and that is where it
amended, which was the law then in force. That law appears during the trial that, by the nature of the
allowed the municipal court to receive evidence evidence presented, the issue of possession
upon the question of ownership in ejectment cases, cannot be decided without deciding the issue of
but only whenever it was necessary to do so for the ownership. In such a case, the jurisdiction of the
purpose of determining the character and extent of municipal court is lost and the action should be
possession and damages for detention. dismissed.
An illustration is the case of Teodoro v. Balatbat,
The pertinent provisions of that law read as where the defendant claimed possession by virtue of
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph a deed of sale allegedly executed by the plaintiff, who
in turn denied its authenticity. As there was no
"Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. -In indication that the defendant’s claim was unfounded,
forcible entry and detainer proceedings, the justice of the municipal court could not continue with the case
the peace or judge of the municipal court shall have because it had lost the competence to decide it.
original jurisdiction, but the said justice or judge may
receive evidence upon the question of title therein, After examining the facts of this present case, the
whatever may be the value of the property, solely for Court finds that it does not come under the
the purpose of determining the character and extent exception to the rule.
of possession and damages for detention."cralaw
virtua1aw library The property in question consists of a residential
house and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126 and
Accordingly, the present case being one for forcible registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the
entry, it should normally come under the jurisdiction Registry of Deeds of Laguna. The basis of the
of the municipal court, before which it was in fact registration is a deed of sale executed in his favor by
filed. There was a complication, however, as in their Felix Carpio, the former owner. The record does
respective primary pleadings, the parties both not show that such registration has been
injected the issue of ownership to support their challenged since the issuance in 1978 of the said
adversary claims to the possession of the property. certificate of title, which in the absence of evidence
This issue of ownership, in view of the respondent to the contrary should be presumed valid. There is
court, had removed the case from the jurisdiction of no encumbrance on the land, and there is no adverse
the municipal court. claim or notice of lis pendens annotated in the
certificate. Such registration, it may be added, is
It is settled that the mere assertion of ownership binding against the whole world unless annulled for
by the defendant in an ejectment case will not cause in proper cases.
oust the municipal court of its summary
jurisdiction. This has to be so, for "were the It is true that petitioner Cesar Alvarado had filed a
principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be complaint in the court of first instance of Laguna
frustrated by making the efficacy of this kind of against the petitioners and several others for the
actions depend upon the defendant in all cases. annulment of the deed of sale invoked by the
petitioners. However, that fact alone could not
"The mere circumstance that proof of title, or divest the municipal court of jurisdiction to continue
evidence of ownership, had been introduced trying the question of possession, more so since the
during the trial before the Municipal Court question of ownership was appropriately being

4
litigated in the annulment suit. Significantly, the deed Natalio Enanoria was the owner of Lot No. 5280
of sale being challenged in that action was different located in the mountain of Barrio Valencia, Carcar,
from the contract involved in the exception just Cebu. His title is OCT No. 10933 issued in 1922. He
cited. died in 1924. In 1963 his heirs asked a surveyor to
relocate the lot. They discovered that its 500-square-
Without preempting any decision in that annulment meter portion was occupied by Placido Alecha, the
case, we make the observation that even if the owner of the adjoining Lot No. 5281 which is its
private respondents should succeed therein, he southeastern boundary .
would not thereby necessarily acquire full ownership
of the property in question. Assuming the validity of Alecha refused to vacate the disputed portion. He
the holographic will be invoke, he would be entitled removed the concrete monuments The heirs sued
to only an indefinite portion of the testator’s estate Alecha. Another relocation made by a surveyor from
as long as no partition thereof shall have been the Bureau of Lands appointed by the trial court
effected. For this reason alone, the respondent’s confirmed the usurpation of 500 square meters.
claim of ownership over the particular house and
lots in question could be dismissed as untimely and The trial court ordered Alecha and his wife to vacate
untenable. the said 500-square-meter portion. The Appellate
Court reversed that decision and dismissed the
Finally, the fact that the petitioners themselves complaint of the Enanoria heirs. They appealed to
adduced evidence of ownership over the property in this Court. Alecha did not file any appellee's brief.
question did not, as claimed, have the effect of
divesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction. As
ISSUE: WON the action to recover the land has
permitted in the above-cited Section 88 of R.A. No.
prescribed
296, the plaintiff in an ejectment case may introduce
such evidence for the purpose of proving the
character of his possession and the amount of We hold that the action of the heirs of Enanoria to
damages he is claiming for unjust deprivation of recover the 500 square meters portion of their
such possession. registered land does not prescribe and cannot be
barred by laches. Nor can Alecha, the adjacent
The petitioners were only trying to prove their right owner, acquire that 500-square-meter area by
to possession and damages by establishing their right prescription because it is covered by a Torrens
of ownership. title.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Section 46 of the Land Registration Law, now
section 47 of the Property Registration Decree (PD
No. 1529 effective June 11, 1978), provides that "no
title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by
G.R. No. L-67284 March 18, 1985 prescription or adverse possession"

TEOFISTO, FELICISIMO and MAXIMO, all Prescription is unavailing not only against the
surnamed UMBAY and FILOMENA, registered owner but also against his hereditary
FRANCISCO, SUSANA, CELERINA and successors because the latter merely step into
JOSEFA, all surnamed ENANORIA, petitioners the shoes of the decedent by operation of law
vs. and are merely the continuation of the
PLACIDO ALECHA, NICOLASA LABAJO and personality of their predecessor-in-interest.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.: The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet
title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
This case is about the right of the heirs of the legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may
registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
2,265 square meters to recover a portion thereof the portals of the court, or sitting in the 'mirador
with an area of 500 square meters allegedly usurped de sucasa', to avoid the possibility of losing his
by the adjoining owner. land."

5
Thus, a registered owner of land who lost possession 2. In 1966, a real estate mortgage was
thereof in 1925, when it was taken by the executed and registered on December 19,
municipality of Pasay for road purposes, is not 1966 with the Register of Deeds of
barred from recovering compensation for said land Alaminos, Pangasinan.
in 1958 or 33 years later. The reason is that
registered land are not subject to prescription. It was 3. In 1967 an amendment of mortgage was
an error to dismiss the landowner's complaint on the executed in favor of the petitioner and
ground of laches and prescription registered on September 15, 1967 with the
Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
Adverse, notorious and continuous possession The corresponding annotations were made
under a claim of ownership for the period fixed on the aforesaid Transfer Certificates of
by law is ineffective against a Torrens title Title Nos. 49020 and 49021 as entry No.
282423 therein.
Title to land can no longer be acquired by
prescription after a Torrens title has been issued 4. 1n 1968, another real estate mortgage
for it was executed and registered on August 2,
1968 with the Register of Deeds of
The right to recover possession of registered Alaminos, Pangasinan.
land is imprescriptible because possession is a
mere consequence of ownership 5. On October 31, 1968, a real estate
mortgage was executed in favor of the
In this case, the petitioners' action to recover the 500 petitioner and registered on November 4,
square meters cannot be barred by the equitable 1968 with the Register of Deeds of
defense of laches or delay because they became Alaminos, Pangasinan. The corresponding
aware of the encroachment only after they hired annotations were made on the Original
a surveyor in 1963 to ascertain the true area and Certificates of Title with numbers as
boundaries of Lot No. 5280. enumerated in the immediately preceding
paragraph as entry No. 306445 therein.2
Laches presupposes waiver of one's right. There
was no waiver in this case. The petitioners, poor, Annotated subsequent to the foregoing memoranda
ignorant rustics, never intended to renounce of the mortgage lien of petitioner on the above-
their right to the 500 square meters. mentioned properties is a "Notice of Levy re Civil
Case No. 69035, CFI-Manila, Continental Bank vs.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay Balingit" for a
Court is reversed and set aside. That of the trial total sum of P96,636.10.
court is affirmed. No costs.
For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their
loan obligation with petitioner, the latter
extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as
amended, the sixteen (16) parcels of land
G.R. No. 86679 July 23, 1991
covered by the real estate mortgages executed
by the said spouses in favor of petitioner.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs. The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered on
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK and April 3, 1972 with the Register of Deeds, with a
COURT OF APPEALS, * respondents. memorandum thereof duly annotated at the back of
the aforesaid certificates of title of the foreclosed
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of properties.
Alaminos, Pangasinan, a petition for the cancellation
of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon Upon the expiration of the one-year legal
its sixteen (16) transfer certificates of title. As a redemption period, petitioner consolidated in its
backdrop, petitioner alleged that spouses name the ownership of all the foregoing mortgaged
Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay executed in its properties for which new transfer certificates of title
favor the following real estate mortgages, to wit:

6
were issued in its name. However, the annotation of ALL LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES. THE
the notice of levy in favor of private respondent was ACTION OF REGISTER OF DEEDS IN
carried over to and now appears as the sole CARRYING THE ANNOTATION OF THE
annotated encumbrance in the new titles of NOTICES OF LEVY OVER TO THE NEW
petitioner, that is, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. TITLE CERTIFICATES ISSUED IN
1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1236, 1237, 1238, PURCHASER'S FAVOR IS VOID AND
1239, 1240, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1216, 1217 and 1218.4 ILLEGAL.

On May 1986, private respondent International RULING: We find the foregoing contentions
Corporate Bank, as successor in interest of the meritorious.
defunct Continental Bank, filed an opposition to
the petition contending that, since it was not The rule that was adopted by respondent Court of
informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure Appeals in its decision to the effect that a regional
proceedings, the new and consolidated titles trial court sitting as a land registration court has
over the foreclosed properties issued in favor of limited jurisdiction and has no authority to resolve
herein petitioner are null and void.5 controversial issues, which should accordingly be
litigated in a court of general jurisdiction, no longer
On August 28, 1986, the lower court rendered a holds.
decision, denying the petition for lack of jurisdiction,
the pertinent part whereof reads: We have held that under Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration
Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. Decree) which took effect on June 11, 1979,
1529 (Section 112 of Act 496) under which regional trial courts acting as land registration
the petitioner seeks remedy has been courts now have exclusive jurisdiction not only
interpreted by the Supreme Court that the over applications for original registration of title
relief therein can only be granted if there is to lands, including improvements and interests
no adverse claim or serious objection on the therein, but also over petitions filed after
part of any party in interest otherwise the original registration of title, with power to hear
case becomes controversial and should be and determine all questions arising upon such
threshed out in an ordinary case or in the applications or petitions.
case where the incident properly belongs.
That definitive ruling was precisely to correct the
Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals, position taken therein by the Court of Appeals that
asserting that the lower court erred in ruling that (1) the court a quo has limited jurisdiction and has no
there is an adverse claim or serious objection on the authority to resolve controversial issues which
part of oppositor rendering the case controversial should be litigated before a court of general
and therefore should be threshed out in an ordinary jurisdiction.
case; (2) it has no jurisdiction to entertain and act on
the contested petition. In the same case, the Court further noted that even
under Act 496 (Land Registration Act), specifically
CA affirmed lower court. Section 110 thereof, the court of first instance,
sitting as a land registration court, has the authority
ISSUE: Whether or not REGIONAL TRIAL to conduct a hearing, receive evidence, and decide
COURTS (RTC's) HAVE JURISDICTION TO controversial matters with a view to determining
ACT UPON PETITIONS FILED UNDER SEC. whether or not the filed notice of adverse claim is
108 OF "THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION valid.
DECREE" (P.D. 1529), WHETHER THEY ARE
ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT The said doctrine was a reiteration of our earlier
OR A COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION. ruling in Averia, Jr. vs. Caguioa, etc., et al.,11 as
follows:
WON REAL PROPERTY AT AN
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALE In Section 2 of the Id P.D. No. 1529, it is
ACQUIRES SUCH PROPERTY FREE FROM clearly provided that:

7
 Sec. 2. Nature of registration No. A-229, Record No. N-33399 initiated therein by
proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. — petitioner.
Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout However, considering that the issue of whether the
the Philippines shall be in rem and adverse claim of private respondent should be
shall be based on the generally cancelled or allowed to remain as annotations on the
accepted principles underlying the certificates of title involved can be resolved by us in
Torrens system. the present recourse, we agree that the remand of
the case to the court of origin is no longer necessary.
Courts of First Instance shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over We have time and again laid down the rule that the
all applications for original remand of the case to the lower court for further
registration of titles to lands, reception of evidence is no longer necessary where
including improvements and this Court is in a position to resolve the dispute
interest therein, and over an based on the records before it. In a number of cases,
petitions filed after original the Court, in the public interest and for the
registration of title, with power expeditious administration of justice, has
to hear and determine all resolved actions on the merits instead of
questions arising upon such remanding them to the trial court for further
applications or petitions . . . proceedings, such as where the ends of justice
would not be subserved by the remand of the
The above provision has eliminated the case.12
distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the In the case at bar, the right of petitioner to the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the relief prayed for is clear.1âwphi1 The facto before
former law when acting merely as a us sufficiently show that the cancellation of the
cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding disputed annotation from the certificates of title of
multiplicity of suits, the change has petitioner is justified in law.
simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the regional trial courts the It is undisputed that private respondent is a
authority to act not only on applications for subsequent lien holder whose rights over the
"original registration" but also "over all mortgaged property are inferior to that of
petitions filed after original registration petitioner as a mortgagee. Being a subsequent
of title, with power to hear and lien holder, private respondent acquires only the
determine all questions arising upon right of redemption vested in the mortgagor,
such applications or petitions." and his rights are strictly subordinate to the
superior lien of the anterior mortgagee.
Consequently, and specifically with
reference to Section 112 of the Land After the foreclosure sale, the remedy of the
Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. second mortgagee is limited to the right to
No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by redeem by paying off the debt secured by the
its former limited jurisdiction which enabled first mortgage.14
it to grant relief only in cases where there
was "unanimity among the parties" or none
of them raised any "adverse claim or serious The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a
objection." Under the amended law, the prior mortgage, all liens subordinate to the
court is now authorized to hear and decide mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the
not only such non-controversial case but purchaser at public auction held pursuant
thereto acquires title free from the subordinate
even the contentious and substantial issues,
liens.
such as the question at bar, which were
beyond its competence before.
Ordinarily, thereafter the Register of Deeds is
The court below (RTC) has ample jurisdiction to authorized to issue the new titles without
decide the controversy raised by the petition in LRC

8
carrying over the annotation of subordinate without being duly implemented. Properties levied
liens.15 upon by execution must be sold at public auction
within the period of ten (10) years during which the
In a case with similar features, we had earlier held judgment can be enforced by action.19
that the failure of the subsequent attaching creditor
to redeem, within the time allowed by Section 6 of WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court
Act 3136, the land which was sold extrajudicially of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Instead, another
to satisfy the first mortgage, gives the purchaser judgment is hereby rendered ordering that the
a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the annotations of the notice of levy in favor of
annotation of said creditor's attachment lien on Continental Bank, now substituted by private
the certificates of title of said land. respondent, on petitioner's Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 1216, 1217, 1218, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231,
It has likewise been declared in Bank of the Philippine 1232, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1242, 1243 and
Islands, etc., et al. vs. Noblejas, etc., et al.,17 that "(a)ny 1244 should be, as they are hereby, CANCELLED.
subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at
the back of the certificates of title cannot in any SO ORDERED
way prejudice the mortgage previously
registered, and the lots subject thereto pass to
the purchaser at the public auction sale free
from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the
value of the mortgage could be easily destroyed by a G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987
subsequent record of an adverse claim, for no one
would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
posterior claim. . . . This alone is sufficient
vs.
justification for the dropping of the adverse claim
from the new certificates of title to be issued to her, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO
as directed by respondent Commissioner in his
opinion subject of this appeal." VITUG, respondents.

The contention of private respondent in its Does the presumption of conjugality of properties
acquired by the spouses during coverture provided
opposition that the extrajudicial foreclosure is
null and void for failure of petitioner to inform for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to property
covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name
them of the said foreclosure and the pertinent
of the widow? This is the issue posed in this petition
dates of redemption so that it can exercise its
prerogatives under the law18 is untenable. to review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 60903 which is an action
for reconveyance and damages. *
There being obviously no contractual stipulation
therefor, personal notice is not necessary and
what governs is the general rule in Section 3 of Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M.
Act 3135, as amended, which directs the posting Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank
of notices of the sale in at least three (3) public (PNB) several parcels of land covered by Transfer
places of the municipality where the property is Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2289 — Pampanga to
situated, and the publication thereof in a guarantee the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador
newspaper of general circulation in said Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in the amount of
municipality. P40,900.00 which was duly registered in the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. 1
Finally, the levy in favor of private respondent's
predecessor in interest arising from the judgment in On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also
Civil Case No. 69035 of the Court of First Instance mortgaged in favor of PNB certain properties
of Manila, appearing at the back of petitioner's covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888-Pampanga to
certificates of titles, is already without force and guarantee the payment of the loan account of her
effect consider that the same has been annotated in son Salvador Vitug in the amount of P35,200.00,
which mortgage was duly registered in the Register
the certificates of title for more than ten (10) years
of Deeds of Pampanga.

9
The above-mentioned Transfer Certificates of Titles Pampanga wherein Donata Montemayor was the
covering said properties were all in the name of Administratrix. 7
Donata Montemayor, of legal age, Filipino, widow
and a resident of Lubao, Pampanga at the time they Meanwhile, on May 12,1958, Donata Montemayor
were mortgaged to PNB and were free from all hens executed a contract of lease of Lot No. 24, which is
and encumbrances. 4 covered by TCT No. 2887-R in favor of her children
Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This
Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the bank lease was extended on August 31, 1963. By virtue of
foreclosed the mortgaged properties covered by a general power of attorney executed by Donata
TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888. They were sold at public Montemayor on Sept. 19, 1966 in favor of
auction on May 20, 1968 in which the PNB was the Pragmacio Vitug, the latter executed a contract of
highest bidder. The titles thereto were thereafter lease on Sept. 19, 1967 of the said lot in favor of
consolidated in the name of PNB. Maximo Vitug. 8

Likewise, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani failed On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo
to settle their accounts with the PNB so the latter Vitug filed an action for partition and reconveyance
foreclosed the properties covered by TCT No. 2889 with damages in the Court of First Instance of
which were sold at public auction and likewise PNB Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special
was the buyer thereof. On August 30, 1968, a administrator of the intestate estate of Donata
certificate of sale was issued by the Register of Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr.,
Deeds covering said properties in favor of the PNB. Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia, Anunciacion, all
When the title of the PNB was consolidated a new surnamed Vitug, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro,
title was issued in its name. Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus
and Luz, all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.
On September 2, 1969, the PNB sold the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888 — Pampanga The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land
to Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion V. de Guzman, which they claim to be the conjugal property of
Prudencia V. Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo
Gutierrez in those names the corresponding titles Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2
were issued. 6 thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB
and the public auction of the properties as null
During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs.
two times. His first wife was Gervacia Flores with Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct.
whom he had 3 children, namely, Victor, Lucina and 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and
Julio all surnamed Vitug. Victor now dead is liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the
survived by his 5 children: Leonardo, Juan, Candida properties were found to be conjugal in nature.
Francisco and Donaciano, an surnamed Vitug. Juan
Vitug is also dead and is survived by his only In 1975, lower court dismissed the complaint with
daughter Florencia Vitug. costs against the plaintiffs and ordered them to pay
attorney's fees of P5,000.00 to the defendant's
The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata counsel. Plaintiffs then interposed an appeal to the
Montemayor with whom he had 8 children, namely, Court of Appeals, wherein in due course a decision
Pragmacio, Maximo, Jesus, Salvador, Prudencio and was rendered on May 20, 1981, the dispositive part
Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, the late Enrique of which reads as follows:
Vitug represented by his wife Natalia Laquian, and
the late Francisco Vitug who is survived by 11 ISSUE:
children, namely, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro,
Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
and Luz. ERRED IN APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR
THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20, 1929 so SUPREME COURT IN FLORENCIA VITUG VS.
his estate was settled and distributed in Special DONATA MONTEMAYOR, ET AL., 91 PHIL.
Proceeding No. 422 in the Court of First Instance of 286 (1953) BECAUSE:

10
A. BETWEEN A PROVISION OF A SPECIAL The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a
LAW AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION person dealing with a registered land has a right
AND/OR APPLICATION OF A PROVISION to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of
OF A GENERAL LAW, THE FORMER title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
PREVAILS. further, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
D. SIMILARLY, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND that would impel a reasonably cautious man
MAXIMO VITUG WERE NOT PARTIES IN make such inquiry. 9
SAID CASE.
A torrens title concludes all controversy over
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ownership of the land covered by a final degree of
ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE registration. 10 Once the title is registered the owner
CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE CERTIFICATE, may rest assured without the necessity of stepping
OF TITLE, AS PROVIDED IN ACT 496, AS into the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador
AMENDED (THE LAND REGISTRATION). de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

IIITHE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
ERRED IN IGNORING THE
CONCLUSIVENESS OF OWNERSHIP OF Art. 160. All property of the
DONATA MONTEMAYOR OVER THE marriage is presumed to belong to
PROPERTIES WHICH WERE REGISTERED the conjugal partnership, unless it
EXCLUSIVELY IN HER NAME WHEN be proved that it pertains
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (PRAGMACIO exclusively to the husband or to
VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG), AS LESSEES, the wife.
ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT OF LEASE
WITH DONATA MONTEMAYOR AS THE The presumption applies to property acquired
OWNER-LESSOR. during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In
this case, it appears on the face of the title that
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS the properties were acquired by Donata
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PNB WAS A Montemayor when she was already a widow.
MORTGAGEE IN BAD FAITH. When the property is registered in the name of a
spouse only and there is no showing as to when the
RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. property was acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to
When the subject properties were mortgaged to said spouse. 12 And this presumption under Article
the PNB they were registered in the name of 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is
Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
torrens certificate of title covering said innocent third parties are involved. 13
properties the mortgage loan applications of
Donata were granted by the PNB and the The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on
mortgages were duly constituted and registered the certificates of title of the properties mortgaged.
in the office of the Register of Deeds. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in
goodfaith for at the time the mortgages covering
In processing the loan applications of Donata said properties were constituted the PNB was
Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on not aware to any flaw of the title of the
what appears in the certificates of title and no mortgagor
more. On its face the properties are owned by
Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no True it is that in the earlier cases decided by this
reason to doubt nor question the status of said Court, namely Vitug VS. Montemayor decided on
registered owner and her ownership thereof. May 15, 1952, which is an action for recovery of
Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances possession of a share in said parcels of land, and in
covering the same. the subsequent action for partition between the same
parties decided on Oct. 20, 1953, 16 this court found

11
the 30 parcels of land in question to be conjugal in their mother to the PNB and thereafter were sold at
nature and awarded the corresponding share to the public auction, but they did not do anything. 22 It is
property of Florencia Vitug, an heir of the late only after 17 years that they remembered to assert
Clodualdo Vitug from the first marriage. In said their rights. Certainly, they are guilty of laches.
cases this Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court. In the dispositive part of the decision of the Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court.
trial court it made the observation that "but from the Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug as occupants and
conduct of Clodualdo Vitug and Donata lessees of the property in question cannot now
Montemayor during the existence of their marital dispute the ownership of their mother over the same
life, the inference is clear that Clodualdo had the who was their lessor. 24
unequivocal intention of transmitting the full
ownership of the 30 parcels of land to his wife WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the
Donata Montemayor, thus considering the 1/2 of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
the funds of the conjugal property so advanced for and set aside and another decision is hereby
the purchase of said parcels of land as reimbursible rendered DISMISSING the complaint and ordering
to the estate of Clodualdo Vitug on his death. That private respondents to pay attomey's fees and
must be the reason why the property was registered expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the
in the name of Donata Montemayor as widow after amount of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
the death of Clodualdo Vitug.
SO ORDERED.
At any rate, although actions for recovery of real
property and for partition are real actions,
however, they are actions in personam that bind
only the particular individuals who are parties
thereto. The PNB not being a party in said cases G.R. No. 75336 October 18, 1988
is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it
appear that the PNB was aware of the said decisions SPOUSES ANTONIO BORNALES and
when it extended the above describe mortgage loans. FLORENDA DIAZ BORNALES, petitioners,
Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature vs.
of said properties it would not have approved THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
the mortgage applications covering said APPELLATE COURT and ISABEL
properties of Donata Montemayor without MARQUEZ DUMOLONG, respondents.
requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-
owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties CORTES, J.:
were sold at public auction, the PNB was a
purchaser for value in good faith. So its right The subject matter of this controversy is a parcel of
thereto is beyond question. 20 land (Lot 1318) situated in Barrio Indayagan
Pontevedra (Maayon), Capiz with an area of 74,397
Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped square meters. The land was originally awarded by
from questioning the title of Donata Decree No. 29015 dated September 21, 1927 in the
Montemayor to the said properties. They never name of Sixto Dumolong, married to Isabel
raised the conjugal nature of the property nor Marquez, to whom Original Certificate of Title No.
took issue as to the ownership of their mother, 6161 was issued.
Donata Montemayor, over the same. Indeed
private respondents were among the defendants Sixto and Isabel whose marriage was not blessed
in said two cases wherein in their answers to the with any child lived separately since 1920.
complaint they asserted that the properties in Subsequently, Sixto cohabited extramaritally with
question are paraphernal properties belonging Placida Dumolong with whom he had a son by the
exclusively to Donata Montemayor and are not name of Renito Dumolong and other children.
conjugal in nature. 21 Thus they leased the
properties from their mother Donata Montemayor
Sometime in November, 1977, representing herself
for many years knowing her to be the owner. They
as having hereditary interest in Lot 1318, Placida
were in possession of the property for a long time
filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a
and they knew that the same were mortgaged by
petition for reconstitution of title over said lot.

12
Reconstitution was granted in a decision dated The spouses Bornales appealed but the appellate
November 18, 1977 and Original Certificate of Title court affirmed the appealed decision in favor of
No. RO-6161 was issued in the name of "Sixto private respondent and against the petitioners but
Dumolong married to Isabel Marquez". with modifications for the appellate court found that
the land was the exclusive property of S Dumolong
On March 15, 1978, a "Deed of Extrajudicial who had other illegitimate children surviving with
Adjudication and Sale of Real Property", which was Renito Dumolong. The dispositive portion of the
purportedly a settlement of the conjugal estate of decision reads:
Sixto Dumolong and Isabel Marquez Dumolong,
involving Lot 1318, and the sale of said lot for declared Isabel Marquez Dumolong the true and
P6,000.00 to spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda lawful owner of pro-indiviso one-half of the land
Dumolong and to spouses Bernardo Decrepito and described in said titles as her intestate inheritance
Loreta Dumolong, was executed by Renito from Sixto Dumolong;
Dumolong (Son of Sixto) and by Isabel Marquez
Dumolong whose supposed thumbmark appeared in declaring the other half of said titles as the intestate
the document. inherit instance of the illegitimate children of Sixto
Dumolong to be divided by them in equal shares;
The deed was registered on November 10, 1978, and
pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- (8) order cross-defendants Carlito Patanao, Minda
15856 was issued the abovenamed spouses on the Dumolong, Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta
same date. Dumolong, jointly and severally, to reimburse to the
appellants the sum of P40,000.00 with its interests of
About three months later, or on February 21, 1979, 14% per annum from May 8, 1980, the date of the
the spouses sold Lot 1318 for P40,000.00 to filing of the answer with cross-claim, until full
petitioner-spouses Antonio Bornales and Florenda payment and the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Diaz Bornales through a Deed of Absolute Sale
Petitioners eventually secured Transfer Certificate of ISSUE: WON petitioners are purchasers in bad
Title No. 15596 for Lot 1318 in their names. faith grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjecture; and
Alleging forgery of the "Deed of Extrajudicial
Adjudication and Sale of Real Property", private The petitioners assail the finding of the respondent
respondent Isabel Marquez filed on March 11, appellate court that they are purchasers in bad faith
1980 an action for reconveyance and damages on the ground that such is based on a
against Placida Dumolong, Renito Dumolong, misapprehension of facts.
spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong,
spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreto The chain of events starting from the reconstitution
Dumolong, and spouses Antonio Bornales and of the original certificates of title to the execution of
Florenda Diaz. The case was docketed as Civil Case the deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners
No. V-4366 in the Court of First Instance of Capiz. reveals a clear scheme to dispossess the private
Only the spouses Bornales answered; the other respondent of her share in the property subject of
defendants were declared in default. this controversy.

Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff The finding of the Court of Appeals that the land
and against all the defendants including the was sold barely three (3) months after the execution
petitioners who were expressly declared purchasers of the deed of extra-judicial settlement and the deed
in bad faith. The subject land was held to be the of sale is supported by evidence on record. The date
conjugal property of Sixto Dumolong and plaintiff appearing on the deed of sale (March 15, 1978)
Isabel Marquez and that the Deed of Extrajudicial indicates a time span of eight (8) months to the
Adjudication and Sale of Real Property was a forgery subsequent execution of the deed of absolute sale in
through the machinations of the defaulted favor of the petitioners. However, when the time is
defendants. reckoned from the date of registration of the deed
with the Register of Deeds, it appears that only three
(3) months had lapsed when the sale of the subject

13
land to the petitioners took place. The land was procured title thereto by means of fraud,
registered in the names of the spouses Carlito petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a
Patanao and Minda Dumolong and spouses certificate of title against the private respondent
Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta Dumolong on to the extent of her interest therein.
November 10, 1978 [See Annex "B", Petition; Rollo,
p. 14.] Three (3) months later or on February 21, The Torrens system of land registration should
1979, the spouses sold the land to the petitioners not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud
[See Annex "C", Petition; Rollo, p. 15.] against the rightful owner of real property.
Registration, to be effective, must be made in
Petitioners also deny having knowledge of the good faith. [Palanca v. Director of Lands, 43 Phil.
abnormal increase in the consideration of the sale 149 (1922).] Thus, it is a settled rule that the defense
from P6,000.00 to P40,000.00. They claim that of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not
contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of the
transfer certificate of title which their lawyer flaws in his transferor's title. If at all, the petitioners
examined contained no annotation of the P6,000.00 only acquire the right which their vendors then had.
purchase price. The fact, however, that petitioners [Ramos, et al, v. Dueno, et al., 50 Phil. 786 (1927).]
have been the tenants/lessees of the land even
during Sixto Dumolong's lifetime belies any alleged SO ORDERED.
lack of knowledge. Having been the cultivators of
the land, it is unimaginable that the petitioners would
have been unaware of the transactions affecting the
land. It appears that petitioners were aware that the
private respondent was the legal wife of Sixto
Dumolong and was a rightful heir to the properties G.R. No. 77294 December 12, 1988
of the latter. In fact, the trial court conclusively
found that the petitioners themselves went to see the ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO
private respondent sometime in 1980 to secure her VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,
signature and conformity to the Extra-Judicial vs.
Adjudication and Sale of Real Property. COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P.
LADRIDO, LOURDES LADRIDO IGNACIO,
Thus, even without the circumstances enumerated EUGENIO P. LADRIDO and L P.
LADRIDO, defendants-appellees.
by the Court of Appeals to demonstrate the
petitioners' lack of good faith, the fact alone that
they purchased the property with full knowledge of FACTS: The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido and
the flaws and defect in the title of their vendors is Leonor P. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. 7511
enough proof of their bad faith. In the case of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan, Iloilo. This lot
of Gatioan v. Gaffud [G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, contained an area of 154,267 square meters and was
1979, 27 SCRA 706] this Court held that one who registered in the names of the spouses under
purchases real property with knowledge of a defect Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21940 of the
in the title of his vendor cannot claim that he Register of Deeds of Iloilo.
acquired title thereto in good faith as against the
owner or of an interest therein. Spouses Rosendo H. Te and Ana Te were also the
registered owners of a parcel of land described in
The petitioners claim that they were not aware their title as Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of
of any defect in the title of their vendors because Pototan.
the certificate of title in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest which their lawyer In 1973, Rosendo H. Te, with the conformity of Ana
examined contained nothing to put them on Te, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F.
guard. The fact however remains that the Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in
petitioners knew and were parties to the fraud the names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.
committed against the private respondent.
Later, Angelica F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated
Having bought the land registered under the and found out that the property was in the
Torrens system from their vendors who

14
possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she current of the
demanded its return but Ladrido refused. waters.

In 1974, Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar The presumption is that the
instituted a civil action for recovery of possession change in the course of the river
and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido at CFI was gradual and caused by
Iloilo. accretion and erosion. the lower
court correctly found that the
The complaint was amended to implead Rosendo H. evidence introduced by the
Te as another defendant. Plaintiffs sought the plaintiff to show that the change in
annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the course of the Suague River was
the purchase price with interest in the event the sudden or that it occurred through
possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. avulsion is not clear and
convincing.
Plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No.
7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. The established facts indicate that
Viajar. For this reason, plaintiff Angelica F. Viajar the eastern boundary of Lot No.
now appears to be the sole registered owner of this 7511 was the Suague River based
lot. on the cadastral plan. For a period
of more than 40 years (before 1940
Defendant Ladrido died. He was substituted in the to 1980) the Suague River
civil action by his wife and children. overflowed its banks yearly and the
property of the defendant gradually
received deposits of soil from the
ISSUE: Whether the change in the course of the
effects of the current of the river.
Suague River was sudden as claimed by the plaintiffs The consequent increase in the
or gradual as contended by the defendants;
area of Lot No. 7511 due to
alluvion or accretion was possessed
2. Assuming arguendo it was gradual, whether or not by the defendants whose tenants
the plaintiffs are still entitled to Lot "B' appearing in plowed and planted the same with
Exhibit "4" and to one-half (½) of Lot "A," also coin and tobacco.
indicated in Exhibit "4;" and
The quondam river bed had been
Lower court: Dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs filled by accretion through the
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar with costs years. The land is already plain and
against them; there is no indication on the
ground of any abandoned river
Declaring defendants Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes bed. The river bed is definitely no
Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. longer discernible now.
Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land
What used to be the old river bed
CA: affirmed Lower court Article 457 of the New (Lot A) is in level with Lot No.
Civil Code provides that: 7511. So are the two other areas to
the East. (Lots B and C) Lots A, B
Art. 457. To the and C are still being cultivated.
owners of lands
adjoining the Under the law, accretion which the
banks of rivers banks or rivers may gradually
belong the receive from the effects of the
accretion which current of the waters becomes the
they gradually property of the owners of the lands
receive from the adjoining the banks. (Art. 366, Old
effects of the Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil

15
 Code which took effect on August Art. 457. To the owners of the
30, 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 lands adjoining the banks of rivers
Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion belong the accretion which they
to Lot No. 7511 which consists of gradually receive from the effects
Lots A and B (see Exhs. 'C' and '4') of the current of the waters.
belongs to the defendants (pp. 34-
35, Record on Appeal). Petitioners contend that this article must be read
together with Sections 45 an 46 of Act No. 496
ISSUE: Whether lower courts and CA erred in which provides:
declaring the ownership belongs to the defendant
RULING: SEC. 45. 1 The obtaining of a
decree of registration and the entry
The petition is without merit. of a certificate of title shall be
regarded as an agreement running
The petitioners contend that the first issue raised with the land, and binding upon
during the trial of the case on the merits in the Court the applicant and all successors in
of First Instance, that is, "whether the change in the title that the land shall be and
course of the Suague River was sudden as claimed by always remain registered land, and
the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the subject to the provisions of this
defendants," was abandoned and never raised by Act and all Acts amendatory
them in their appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, thereof.
the Court of Appeals, in holding that the appeal is
without merit, because of the change of the Suague SEC. 46. 2 No title to registered
River was gradual and not sudden, disposed of the land in derogation to that of the
appeal on an issue that was never raised and, registered owner shall be acquired
accordingly, its decision is void. In support of its by prescription or adverse
contention, petitioners cite the following authorities: possession.

It is a well-known principle in As a result, petitioners contend, Article 457 of the

procedure that courts of justice New Civil Code must be construed to limit the
have no jurisdiction or power to accretion mentioned therein as accretion of
decide a question not in issue (Lim unregistered land to the riparian owner, and should
Toco vs. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166). not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in
question having remained the registered land of the
A judgment going outside the petitioners, then the private respondents cannot
issues and purporting to adjudicate acquire title there in derogation to that of the
something upon which the parties petitioners, by accretion, for that will defeat the
were not heard, is not merely indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
irregular, but extra-judicial and
invalid ( Salvante vs. Cruz, 88 Phil. The rule that registration under the Torrens
236-244; Lazo vs. Republic Surety System does not protect the riparian owner
& Insurance Co., Inc., 31 SCRA against the diminution of the area of his
329, 334). registered land through gradual changes in the
course of an adjoining stream is well settled.
The trial court found that the change in the course In Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil.
of the Suague River was gradual and this finding was 55, We ruled:
affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. We do
not find any valid reason to disturb this finding of The controversy in the present cases seems
fact. to be due to the erroneous conception that
Art. 366 of the Civil Code does not apply to
Article 457 of the New Civil Code (reproduced from Torrens registered land. That article
Article 366 of the Old), the law applied by the provides that "any accretions which the
courts a quo provides: banks of rivers may gradually receive from

16
 the effects of the current belong to the G.R. No. 70191 October 29, 1987
owners of the estates bordering thereon."
Accretions of that character are natural RODOLFO L. CORONEL, petitioner,
incidents to land bordering on running vs.
streams and are not affected by the HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
registration laws. It follows that registration APPELLATE COURT and ELIAS MERLAN,
does not protect the riparian owner against BRIGIDO MERLAN, JOSE MERLAN,
diminution of the area of his land through TEODORICO NOSTRATIS, SEVERO
gradual changes in the course of the JECIEL SANTIAGO FERNAN and
adjoining stream. FORTUNATO OCAMPO, respondents.

In C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, We also

ruled: This is a petition to review the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of
It clearly appearing that the land in Appeals, which affirmed the decision and order of
question has become part of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite in Civil
defendant's estate as a result of Case No. 651. The dispositive portion of the trial
accretion, it follows that said land court's decision reads:
now belongs to him. The fact that
the accretion to his land used to Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for
pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is recovery of possession of a parcel of land registered
covered by a Torrens Certificate of under his name in Naic, Cavite of 12, 189 sq meters.
Title, cannot preclude him
(defendant) from being the owner Coronel alleged in his complaint that at the time he
thereof. Registration does not purchased the subject parcel of land, the defendants
protect the riparian owner against were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants
the diminution of the area of his at will" and that despite demands to vacate the
land through gradual changes in premises, the defendants failed and refused to move
the course of the adjoining stream. out from the land.
Accretions which the banks of
rivers may gradually receive from
The defendants denied that Coronel was the owner
the effect of the current become
the property of the owners of the of the whole parcel of land and alleged that the lots
occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided
banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil
Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such share of brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan
which they inherited from their deceased father
accretions are natural incidents to
Gabriel Merlan, one of the three heirs of Bernabela
land bordering on running streams
and the provisions of the Civil Lontoc, the original owner of Lot No. 1950-A of the
Code in that respect are not Naic Estate; that the Merlan brothers together with
their two brothers and a sister never sold their
affected by the Registration Act.
undivided 1/3 share of the lot to anybody; that it
was actually their other co-heirs who sold their
As the private respondents are the owners of the undivided portions
premises in question, no damages are recoverable
from them.
Defendants said that plaintiff's claim of ownership
of the whole parcel of land, if ever it has basis, is
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for fraudulent, void, and without effect; that the Merlans
lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. have always been in open and peaceful possession of
their undivided share of the lot throughout the years
from the first sale by their co-heirs of Lot No. 1950-
A in 1950; and that the other defendants were
legitimate tenants.

17
They prayed that the plaintiff respect their rights Gutierrez and Eligia Mangahas with a calculated
over 1/3 (4,063 square meters) of Lot No. 1950-A of portion of 2/8; spouses Jose Perea and Celestia
the Naic Estate, Naces with a calculated portion of 3/8; Josefa
Nazareno with a calculated portion of 1/8 and
Third-Party Defendants Marcelo Novelo, Paz Anuat Bernabela Lontoc with a calculated portion of 2/8.
Daniel Anuat and Rosario Cailao the defendants' co- In dispute in the instant case is the 2/8 share of
owners of Lot No. 1950-A denied that they had Bernabela Lontoc which is equivalent to 12,189
something to do with the fraudulent acts or illegal square meters.
machinations which deprived the defendants of their
share in the subject parcel of land, and that what When Lontoc died in 1945, she was survived by
they sold was only their 2/3 undivided shares in said three sets of heirs: 1) Bernardino Merlan, a grandson
parcel. by her son Enrique Merlan who died in 1918; and
others
They also filed a cross-claim against their co-
defendant Mariano Manalo whom they charged In 1950, Bernardino Merlan, Daniel Anuat and Paz
might have connived with others Including the Anuat sold their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to
plaintiff to deprive the defendants and their co-heirs spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo.
of their share in the subject parcel of land.
In 1960, Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-3116)
Lower court ruled in favor of the defendants and on RT-5010 was cancelled by Transfer Certificate of
appeal, the lower court's decision was affirmed with Title No. T-1444 but carried the same afore-
the following modification by the then Intermediate specified registered co-owners with an annotation
Appellate Court: carried from the former Transfer Certificate of Title,
to wit:
l) Declaring defendants as the
absolute owners of the remaining 1 In 1968, Lot No. 1950 of the Naic Estate was
1/3 of the 2/8 portion pertaining subdivided according to a Sketch Plan (Exh. A). The
to the late Bernabela Lontoc, sketch plan was approved by the Commission on
nameIy, Lot 1950-A of the Naic Land Registration on August 15, 1969. Bernabela
Estate pursuant to Art. 845 of the Lontoc's 2/8 portion of Lot No. 1950 became Lot
New Civil Code. (At p. 29.) No. 1950-A with an area of 12,189 square meters.

ISSUE: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT Sometime in 1970, Ignacio Manalo sold his interest
HAS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING in Lot 1950-A to Mariano Manalo. The pertinent
PETITIONER AS A PURCHASER IN GOOD portions of the deed of sale executed by spouses
FAITH AND FOR VALUABLE Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo in favor of
CONSIDERATION OF THE LAND IN spouses Mariano Manalo and Jorga Manalo states:
QUESTION.
The deed of sale was registered in the Registry of
THAT THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE Deeds in Cavite. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of
APPELLATE COURT HAS ERRED IN Title No. T-1444 was cancelled and Transfer
DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID Certificate of Title No. T-41175 was issued for Lot
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T- No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate in the name of
75543 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF Mariano Manalo married to Jorga Lagos of Naic,
CAVITE WHICH IS ALREADY PACEL IN THE Cavite. The certificate of title issued in the name of
NAME OF PETITIONER. (at pp.1-2 Brief for the spouses Mariano Manalo and Jorga Lagos covered
Petitioners) the whole Lot No. 1950-A without any mention of
the 1/3 share of the private respondents in the
RULING: The records show that the 12,189 square parcel of land which was not sold to them.
meter lot was part of a 48,755 square meter lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3116 Considering these facts, it is evident that the private
(RT-5010) of the Naic Estate located at Muzon, respondents never sold their 1/3 share over Lot
Naic, Cavite in the names of the spouses Valentin No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that what their

18
co-owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 The facts of the case show that the private
share of the same lot; and that Ignacio Manalo respondents have always been in peaceful possession
sold only the 2/3 share to third-party defendant of the 1/3 portion of the subject lot, exercising
Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of ownership thereto for more than 25 years disrupted
petitioner Rodolfo Coronel. only in 1975 when the petitioner tried to remove
them by virtue of his torrens title covering the entire
Consequently, there was a mistake when Transfer Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate. It was only at this
Certificate of Title No. 41175 was issued to point that private respondents knew about the
Mariano Manalo covering the whole area of Lot supposed sale of their 1/3 portion of Lot 1950-A of
No. 1950-A. Unfortunately, Mariano Manalo who the Naic Estate and they immediately resisted.
was included as third-party defendant as well as the
subject of a cross- claim filed by the other third- The petitioner, however, insists that he is a
party defendants, and who could have shed light on purchaser in good faith. Whether or not there was
this controversy was at the time residing abroad and fraud or just a mistake or oversight of an employee
was not served with the third-party complaint. of the Register of Deeds of Cavite is not clear from
the records. The point is that the 1/3 undivided
Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan portion of the private respondents over Lot No.
and Jose Merlan were in open, peaceful and 1950-A was mistakenly included in the transfer
adverse possession of their 1/3 share over the lot certificate of title of Mariano Manalo.
even after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took
place. The first time they knew about Coronel's We apply equitable considerations:
claim over the whole lot was when they were
served a copy of his complaint in 1975. . The simple possession of a
certificate of title, under the
The counterclaim of the private respondents which Torrens System, does not
was in effect a reconveyance to them of their 1/3 necessarily make the possessor a
undivided share over lot No. 1950-A has not true owner of all the property
prescribed. described therein. If a person
obtains a title, under the Torrens
As lawful possessors and owners of the lot in system, which includes by mistake
question their cause of action falls within the or oversight land which cannot be
settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title registered under the Torrens
to property-in one's possession is systems, he does not, by virtue of
imprescriptible, Their undisturbed possession said certificate alone, become the
over a period of more than 25 years gave them a owner of the lands illegally
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of included. (
equity to determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and the effect of his own WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
title. DISMISSED. The questioned decision is
AFFIRMED but with a modification to the effect
In the same manner, there is no bar based on that the statement "Hereby declaring null and void,
laches to assert their right over 1/3 of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75543 of the
disputed property. "Laches has been defined as same registry" is deleted. Instead, the Registrar of
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and Deeds of Cavite is ordered to segregate the 1/3
unexplained length of time, to do that which by portion of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate (4,063
exercising due diligence could or should have square meters) from the entire portion embraced in
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75543 and issue a
assert a right within a reasonable time, new certificate of title in favor of the heirs of Gabriel
warranting a presumption that the party entitled Merlan over the disputed one-third portion and
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to another new certificate of title over the remaining
assert it." two-thirds portion of the land in favor of petitioner
Rodolfo Coronel after cancelling Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-75543. The questioned order is also
AFFIRMED. No costs.

19
 overlappings are due to the defect in the survey on
petitioner's land since it did not duly conform with
G.R. No. L-47491 May 4, 1989 the previously approved survey of Lot 1, 11-3218
under OCT 8565 (No. 25, lbid). He ended his report
GALICANO GOLLOY, petitioner, by submitting that private respondents' land, TCT
vs. No. 8565, prevails over petitioner's land, TCT No.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE 45764, since the former was surveyed and titled
VALDEZ, JR., CONSOLACION VALDEZ, ahead.
LOURDES VALDEZ, SOLEDAD VALDEZ
and BENNY MADRIAGA, respondents. Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. The
respondents. respondents. . decretal portion of the decision, reads: .

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the CA: Affirmed.

September 29, 1977 Decision ** of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. L-43359R, entitled, ISSUE::The sole issue in this case is who between
Galicano Golloy vs. Jose J. Valdez Jr., et. al., the two title holders is entitled to the land in dispute?
affirming the judgment of the then Court of First
Instance of Tarlac; and the November 29,1977 RULING: The instant petition is impressed with
Resolution of the same court denying the motion for merit. .
reconsideration. .
It must be stated that private respondents and
Herein petitioner, for more than twenty (20) years, their predecessor or predecessors never
has been the registered owner and in possession of a possessed, much less, claimed the overlapped
41,545-square meter parcel of land. The Southwest portions.
portion of this land is bounded by herein private
respondents' land which is covered by Certificate of Petitioner has been always in possession of the
Title No. 8565. Sometime in February, 1966, private same in the concept of an owner, and his
respondents subdivided their land among possession was disturbed only in February, 1966,
themselves. In the course of the subdivision, private when the private respondents caused to be
respondents caused to be placed two (2) monuments placed two (2) monuments inside his land.
inside the Southwest, portion of petitioner's land.
Hence, petitioner filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, an action to quiet title. It will be recalled that, as per report of Surveyor
Jovino B. Dauz (Record on Appeal, pp. 21-28),
private respondents' land (TCT-8565 is Lot No. 1,
Private respondents alleged that they never 11- 8218) was surveyed on March 11, 1913 and
encroached upon the landholding of petitioner and originally titled and registered on March 1, 1918 in
nothing has been placed on his land which would the name of Dominga Balanga. On the other hand,
create any cloud; and that the truth of the matter was petitioner's land was surveyed on March 18, 1918
that they merely subdivided their own land according and subsequently titled and registered in the name of
to their title and therefore there was nothing for Agustin Golloy. The said lands, having been
petitioner to quiet or remove cloud on his title. . surveyed and thereafter registered, it follows that
monuments were placed therein to indicate their
In the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only issue respective boundaries.
in dispute referred ultimately to the question of the
boundaries of their respective lots, the same might It is hardly persuasive that private respondents'
be resolved by appointing a public surveyor of the predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing that
Bureau of Lands to relocate the disputed area with she has a rightful claim to the overlapped
the end in view of determining the true and correct portions, did not make any move to question the
boundaries of their parcels.. placement of the monuments. She could have
easily objected to the placement and pointed out
Report of surveyor shows that that there are that the placement of the monuments excluded
overlappings on the boundaries of the two (2) lands the overlapped portions from her property.
(Nos. 226, 27, 28 and 29, Ibid.); and that the However, no such objection was made. These facts

20
could only be construed to mean that private respondent's failure to assert her claims and
respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga, never ownership for thirty two (32) years. .
believed that she has a right and legal claim to the
overlapped portion. There appears to be no evidence There are precedents for this ruling. In the following
to support claims of repeated demands against cases, we upheld the equitable defense of laches and
petitioner to refrain from cultivating the contested ruled that the long inaction and delay of the title
portion, much less an action filed in court to enforce holder in assertings right over the disputed lot bars
such demands. . him from recovering the same. .

Besides, considering that petitioner and his PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the
predecessor or predecessors have been in Court of Appeals under review is REVERSED and
continuous possession in the concept of an SET ASIDE and a new one rendered ordering,
owner, for almost fifty (50) years (from August private respondents to cause the segregation of the
15, 1919, when the property was registered, up to disputed portion presently occupied by the petitioner
February, 1966, when the private respondents caused Galicano Golloy and reconvey the same to the latter
the placement of two (2) monuments inside his and after the segregation to order the Register of
land), the latter if they have any right at all to the Deeds of Tarlac to issue a new certificate of title
overlapped portion, are guilty of laches. covering said portion in favor of the petitioner. .

Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the G.R. No. L-34463 September 27, 1977
evidence, that for twenty (20) years from the date of
registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when this suit ROSALINA TONGSON, applicant-appellee,
for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET
deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in AL., oppositors-appellants, MACARIO
1951, nor his successors-in-interest, had taken steps BERMEJO, ETC., oppositor.
to possess or lay adverse claim to the disputed
portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of
laches as would effectively derail their cause of The sole appellant in this application for registration
of title for Lot 855 of the cadastral survey of Pilar is
action. Administrator ESTRADA took interest in
recovering the said portion only when he noticed the the Director of Forestry, one of the oppositors. It
discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and smiled the lower court decision in favor of another
oppositor, Macario Bermejo. 1 The question raised is
in the title. .
one of law, whether or not a parcel of land, in the
possession of the predecessors- in-interest and the
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak oppositor Bermejo as far back as 1905, asserted to
havoc on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. For, have originally been mangrove swamps, thereafter
mere possession of certificate of title under the converted into a fishpond, may still be considered as
Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's part of the timber domain which is not disposable.
true ownership of all the property described therein As the sole issue is one of law, the Court of Appeals,
for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone where the matter was first elevated, certified the case
become the owner of the land illegally included. In a to this Tribunal. the decision must be affirmed, the
more recent case, the case of Lola vs. Court of facts as found by the lower court being entitled to
Appeals (145 SCRA 439, 449 [1986]), this Court respect. As noted in the decision: "After examining
ruled: . very closely the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by Macario Bermejo in his
We also agree with the petitioners that laches capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of the
effectively bars the respondent from recovering the late Santiago M. Bermejo, the Court arrives at the
lot in dispute. . conclusions that the claims of possession and
ownership of the heirs of said Santiago M. Bermejo
Although the defense of prescription is unavailing to are clearly supported by the evidence." 2 chanrobles
the petitioners because, admittedly, the title to Lot virtual law library
No. 5517 is still registered in the name of
respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to FACTS: "The testimonial evidence shows that as
it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to early as the year 1905 the parcel of land which later

21
became Lot 855 of the cadastral survey of Pilar, was Somes is in actual possession of Lot 855 by virtue of
under the exclusive possession of Francisco Boria said lease contract (Exhibit Bermejo) ... The
who cut trees therefrom and converted them into possession of Francisco Borja Antero Borja,
firewood. Deogracias Gayacao, and Santiago Bermejo was
peaceful, continuous, open, and adverse under claim
He also established a salt factory and that he sold of ownership. The possession of the children of the
the firewood and the salt without having been late Santiago M. Bermejo, represented by judicial
disturbed by anybody. After the death of Francisco. administrator Macario Bermejo, started after the
Boria, his son Arturo Borja took possession of the death of Santiago Bermejo on April 1951. Nobody
land, continued to cut trees and converted them into molested them. Consequently, the possession of the
firewood without giving share of the products to heirs of Santiago M. Bermejo together with that of
anybody, up to the year 1910. their predecessors-in-interest was likewise peaceful,
continuous, open, adverse and in concept of owners
On May 1, 1917 Antero Borja sold the land to for a period of not less than fifty years." 4chanrobles
Deogracias Gayacao as evidenced by a private virtual law library
document over thirty years of age. The English
translation is marked Bermejo Deogracias Gayacao It is admitted in the brief of appellant Director of
took possession of the land and made use of the Forestry that the lower court, in its decision, relied
trees and the improvements on Montano v. Insular Government, It is contended,
however, that after the Administrative Code of 1917
. On January 4, 1940, Deogracias Gayacao sold five took effect, mangrove swamps were included in the
parcels of land to Santiago M. Bermejo and one of category of public forest. 8 The Administrative Code
the parcels. During his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo became effective on October 1, 1917. Jocson v.
possessed said parcel of land, cut trees for the Director of Forestry was decided in 1919 'agricultural
firewood purposes and also had a salt factory. Upon lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those public
the death of Santiago M. Bermejo in 1951, his lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
children took possession of this parcel of land and mineral lands
when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial
administrator by the Court of First Instance of . Whatever may have been the meaning of the term
Capiz, in Special Proceedings No. V689, this lot 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress
appeared in the Revised Inventory of the estate of of July Ist 1902, classifies the public lands in the
the late Santiago M. Bermejo. Paragraph 21 of said Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
Inventory (Exhibit '13-A- Bermejo') is Lot 855. lands, and all public lands that are not timber or
During his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo declared mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
this land for taxation purposes as shown by tax whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglare,
declaration No. 10190, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of
forestry as including manglares found in the
During the cadastral survey of the land in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights
municipality of Pilar, Santiago M. Bermejo claimed which vested prior to its enactment,"
Lot 855, and presented a cadastral survey of the land
in the municipality of Pilar, Santiago M. Bermejo What is even more persuasive as to the correctness
claimed Lot 855, and presented a cadastral answer, a of the decision reached by the lower court is that in
copy of which is marked Exhibit '29-Bermejo.' This the Garchitorena decision, this Court, through
cadastral answer was subscribed on March 6, Justice Ostrand who was famed for his authoritative
1951. When Macario Bermejo took possession of opinions on public land controversies, promulgated
the land in 1953 he converted it into a fishpond and in 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity
started to construct fishpond dikes. However, due to of the revised Administrative Code, was equally
lack of funds, the construction of the fishpond was explicit: 'The opposition rests mainly upon the
not completed. On May 30, 1956, Macario Bermejo, proposition that in the land covered by the
in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the application there are mangrove lands , but we think
late Santiago M. Bermejo, leased the land to this opposition of the Director of Forestry is
Leopoldo L. Somes with the approval of the Court untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided
of First Instance of Capiz. Said lease contract is that mangrove lands are not forests lands in the
marked Exhibit Bermejo At present Leopoldo L. sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of

22
Congress ... 10 It could be said, therefore, that even respondent filed a complaint for recovery of
on the assumptions that the parcel of land in possession and damages (Civil Case No. 670) in the
question could be characterized as mangrove Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
swamps, the conclusion reached by the lower court of Davao against twenty-one (21)
is not without support in the applicable defendants.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarhanrobles virtual
law library The Director of Lands intervened, asserting the
property subject matter of Civil Case No. 670 to be
Actually, it cannot be said with certainty that there "public agricultural land, owned by the Government
was a finding in the appealed decision that to of the Republic of the Philippines." The court
the disputed lot was originally mangrove granted the motion to intervene and admitted the
swamps. As stated therein: "Mangrove swamsp answer in intervention. Thereafter, the Director of
where only trees of mangrove species grow, where Lands was directed by the court to institute
the trees are small and sparse fit only for compulsory registration proceedings in view of
firewood purposes and the trees growing are not private respondent’s allegation that the area claimed
of commercial value as lumber, do not convert by him was covered by pending pre-war cadastral
the land into public land. Such lands are not proceedings, the records of which were destroyed
forest in character. They do not form part of the and had not as yet been reconstituted (cf. p. 3, id.).
public domain." 11 Based on such a finding which In compliance therewith, the Director of Lands filed
must be accorded due weight and is control the sole a petition for compulsory registration.
question raised on appeal is one of law, the decision
arrived at by the lower court is not open to any valid The Municipality of Bansalan, on its part, filed an
objection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles opposition to the petition on the ground that the
virtual law nine (9) parcels of land included in the petition for
registration were reserved for townsite of, and
RESOLUTION actually occupied by, the Municipality of Bansalan.

Evidence was introduced to the effect that about

VITUG, J.: 10,000 people inhabited the poblacion of Bansalan
and that approximately 500 buildings, private and
[G.R. Nos. 46800-01. April 29, 1994.] government-owned, as well as schools, markets,
religious, commercial and residential structures, and
other constructions, including municipal roads and
Respondent Salvador Zartiga claimed ownership other infrastructures, already stood in place within
over nine (9) lots which a total area of 289.9920 the disputed area.
hectares, more or less, so delineated as the Bansalan
Public Lands Subdivision Case No. 6, Cadastral No. Lower court: "(a) — Under Civil Case No. 670,
275 (ig- 1013), and divided into lots 2305, 2319, adjudging in favor of plaintiff; ordering defendants
2325, 2326, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2416 and 2417. to vacate therefrom and restitute to plaintiff’s
He averred that he had been the absolute owner and possession of the respective portion occupied by
possessor of said parcels of land, having bought the them, with the exception of those mentioned
same from Datu Julian Bagobo under a deed above.cralawnad
executed in 1927, but that petitioners had occupied
certain portions of the nine (9) lots, about forty-nine "The claim for damages, not having been duly
(49) hectares of the 285 hectares, without his established and proven is hereby denied.
knowledge and consent.
"Under the Registration Case, granting and
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied private confirming Zartiga’s title to the litigated portion of
respondent’s ownership and alleged that the land in the Lot, with the exception of those mentioned
question is public land; that neither private above in the decision.
respondent nor his predecessor-in-interest had
occupied the property. "(b) — Ordering the cancellation of whatever title
that have been granted by the Land Department to
The instant litigation started when private the claimants, with the exception of those mentioned

23
in the decision, with costs against defendants. "The picture becomes clear enough. Respondent
Zartiga knew that he could not directly acquire
From the judgment, Salvador Zartiga, the the lots since they were part of the public
Municipality of Bansalan and nineteen (19) domain. So, he had to get access to the land
defendants, excluding Atanacio Florentino and indirectly. He also realized that the indirect way
Cristobal Gutierrez whose title to their lots were was Datu Julian Bagobo who claimed
upheld by the trial court, appealed to the Court of possession over the area. He had to clothe the
Appeals.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad datu with a color of ownership so that the latter
could subsequently transfer the land to him.
respondent Court of Appeals: with modification, the Respondent accomplished this in a haphazard
decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 670 manner — by railroading the issuance of a tax
and Cadastral Case N-8, LRC Record No. N-95, declaration to the uneducated datu and manipulating
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph the alleged sale within the same day. This explains
why there could not be sufficient and concrete
Lot No. 2326 is awarded in plaintiff- appellant evidence of the alleged deed of sale, why the
Salvador Zartiga’s favor, along with Lots No. 2325, contested lots could never be accurately identified
2342, 2343, 2344 and 2416, the judgment appealed (boundaries were not uniformly identified) and why
from is in all other respects affirmed, with cost private respondent never raised a hand when the
against defendants-appellants. townsite of Bansalan was being developed (per TSN
dated November 27, 1957, pp. 90-91).
ISSUE: Whether or not by virtue of the alleged deed
of sale respondent Zartiga was able to establish SC hereby declared that the lands in question are
ownership or lawful acquisition over the parcels of public lands subject to the rights of herein
land in question.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary petitioners under the public land law, with the
exception of lots 2305 and 2317 which had been
"(2) Whether or not there is possession by private titled in the name of Atanacio Florentino and
respondent and if there is any, could it ripen to Cristobal Gutierrez; and private respondent’s
ownership? reinvindicatory action is hereby dismissed. Costs
against the heirs of Salvador Zartiga."cralaw
"(3) Whether or not respondent Zartiga was able to virtua1aw library
identify the land in question so that there may be a
valid sale."cralaw virtua1aw library WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to
REITERATE its decision, dated 30 September 1982,
RULING: "Evidently, the litigated area was forestal in G.R. Nos. L-46068-69, L-46247-48 and L-47353
land. in the cases, entitled "
The fact that Datu Julian Bagobo and the other
occupants had to make kaingin in order to clear the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
lots is certainly indicative of the forestal nature of Appellant, v. AYALA Y CIA and/or
the same. HACIENDA CALATAGAN, ET AL.,
Datu Julian Bagobo and his predecessors who defendants-appellants; MIGUEL
claimed possession over the area did not and could TOLENTINO, ET AL., Intervenors-Appellants.
not have acquired ownership over the said land
considering that the same was then inalienable and
non-disposable. It remained so for many years. In In an amended complaint dated May 12, 1960 filed
fact, it was only on February 4, 1956 when the in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Civil Case
contested portions of the public domain were No. 373) against Ayala y Cia., Alfonso Zobel,
declared and classified as alienable and Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Ruben Dizon,
disposable per Forestry Administrative Order Adelaida D. Reyes, Consolacion D. Degollacion,
No. 4-480 issued on aforecited date by the then Artemio Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, the plaintiff
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Republic of the Philippines sought the annulment of
(Exhibit ‘32,’ p. 112, CFI rec.).chanrobles virtual titles allegedly obtained by the defendants over
lawlibrary portions of the territorial waters of the public
domain.

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It was alleged that the Ayala company caused the establish with particularity the lots allegedly covered
survey and preparation of a composite plan of by their respective permits or to name the present
Hacienda Calatagan, increasing its area from possessors or occupants thereof, and as Ayala y Cia.,
9,652.5833 hectares to 12,000 hectares, by taking or Alfonso Zobel, and the Dizons were the only ones
including therein lands of public dominion. Thus, impleaded as parties-defendants, the judgment was
plaintiff also prayed for recovery of possession of made effective exclusively against them. Thus, Lot
such areas in excess of those covered by TCT No. No. 360, included in TCT No. T-9550 in the name
722, and for which fishpond permits were already of the Dizons, and proved by intervenor Miguel
issued in favor of bona fide applicants; for damages Tolentino to be the portion covered by the fishpond
in the sum of P500,000.00, and for a restraining permit issued to him, was ordered by the court
order to enjoin defendants from exercising further delivered to said intervenor.
acts of ownership. As a consequence of this decision, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, to place the
Miguel Tolentino and 22 others alleged holders of plaintiff and intervenor in possession of the disputed
fishpond permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries properties, was issued by the court.
over the areas supposedly outside the boundaries of
Hacienda Calatagan, were allowed to intervene in the The motion for reconsideration of this order was
case and make demand for recovery of possession of denied on October 5, 1962, for the reason, among
said areas, and claim for damages for the deprivation others, that as defendants have always been in
of possession thereof allegedly by the illegal acts of possession of the areas in question, to order delivery
defendants. of such possession to the other parties at this stage
of the proceeding will result in injuries and promote
Ayala, while admitting that there really existed a confusion. Both parties appealed directly to this
difference between the area (of the Hacienda) as Court: the plaintiff and intervenors claiming that the
appearing in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by court erred in not awarding damages to the plaintiff
the commissioned private surveyor for the company, State; in holding that the areas claimed by the
contend that the excess (of area) was insignificant in intervenors other than Miguel Tolentino were not
nature and attributable to the inaccuracy of the duly identified; and in suspending the writ of
magnetic survey that was used in the preparation of preliminary mandatory injunction which had been
the plan upon which TCT No. 20 (and later, TCT executed and served by the Provincial Sheriff.
722) was based.
ISSUE: Whether trial court was in error in finding
After trial, during which the parties presented that Lots 360, 362, 363, and 182 of Psd-40891 are
documentary and testimonial evidence, the court outside the boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan, as
rendered judgment annulling TCT No. T- 9550 of delimited in TCT 722, and in ordering for their
the Register of Deeds of Batangas, issued to reversion to the public dominion;
defendants Dizons covering Lots 360, 362, 363 and
182, as well as other subdivision titles issued to Ayala RULING: We have gone over the evidence
y Cia. and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas presented in this case and found no reason to disturb
outside its private property covered by TCT No. the factual findings of the trial court. It has been
722, and ordering defendants Dizons to vacate Lot established that certain areas originally portions
No. 360 in favor of intervenor Miguel Tolentino, of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the
and all the defendants to pay said intervenor, jointly bay were converted into fishponds or sold by
and severally compensatory damages in the sum of defendant company to third persons. There is
P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360, until he is also no controversy as to the fact that the said
placed in possession thereof. defendant was able to effect these sales after it has
obtained a certificate of title (TCT No. 722) and
Defendants were also restrained from exercising acts prepared a "composite plan" wherein the
of ownership over said Lots 360, 362, 363, and 182 aforesaid foreshore areas appeared to be parts of
of Psd-40891. This ruling was based upon the Hacienda Calatagan. Defendants-appellants do
finding that the disputed areas form part of the not deny that there is an excess in area between
navigable water, or are portions of the sea, beach those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda in
and foreshores of the bay. However, as the TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by its
intervenors, other than Miguel Tolentino, failed to surveyor. This, however, was justified by claiming

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that it could have been caused by the system
(magnetic survey) used in the preparation of the
original titles, and anyway, the excess in area
(526 hectares, according to defendants) is within
the allowable margin given to a magnetic
survey.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that this

contention is correct, the fact remains that the areas
in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the
Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of
the foreshore, beach, or of the navigable water
itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law
that said areas not being capable of registration,
their inclusion in a certificate of title does not
convert the same into properties of private
ownership or confer title on the registrant.
In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No.
T-9550 issued in the names of defendants Dizons
(and which were purchased by the latter from
defendants Ayala y Cia., and/or Alfonso Zobel) were
found to be portions of the foreshore or of the
territorial waters, the lower court committed no
error in rendering judgment against said defendants
and ordering the reversion of said properties to the
public dominion.

However, as we have ruled in the case of Dizon, Et.

Al. v. Rodriguez, etc., Et. Al. 2 there being no
showing that defendants Dizons are not purchasers
in good faith and for value, they have a right to
retention of the property until they are reimbursed
of the necessary expenses made on the land, which
must properly be established and determined. It also
follows that as such possessors in good faith, the
defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for
damages allegedly suffered by other parties on
account of their possession of the property.

In view of the foregoing, the revocation of the writ

of preliminary mandatory injunction previously
issued by the lower court, and the suspension of the
delivery of possession of the properties to plaintiff
and intervenor Tolentino, were in order.

WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the

lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed. No
costs. So ordered.

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