CIR V PAL
CIR V PAL
CIR V PAL
Taxation; The Court already settled that the “basic corporate income
tax,” under Section 13(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1590, relates to the
general rate of 35% (reduced to 32% by the year 2000) as stipulated in
Section 27(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997.—
Section 13(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1590 refers to “basic corporate
income tax.” In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines,
Inc. (504 SCRA 90 [2006]), the Court already settled that the “basic
corporate income tax,” under Section 13(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1590,
relates to the general rate of 35% (reduced to 32% by the year 2000) as
stipulated in Section 27(A) of the NIRC of 1997.
Same; Income Taxation; Taxable income is defined under Section 31 of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 as the pertinent items
of gross income specified in the said Code, less the deductions and/or
personal and additional exemptions, if any, authorized for such types of
income by the same Code or other special laws.—Taxable income is defined
under Section 31 of the NIRC of 1997 as the pertinent items of gross
income specified in the said Code, less the deductions and/or personal
and additional exemptions, if any, authorized for such types of income
by the same Code or other special laws. The gross income, referred to in
Section 31, is described in Section 32 of the NIRC of 1997 as income from
whatever source, including compensation for services; the conduct of trade
or business or the exercise of profession; dealings in property; interests;
rents; royalties; dividends; annuities; prizes and winnings; pensions; and a
partner’s distributive share in the net income of a general professional
partnership.
Same; Same; Gross income of a domestic corporation engaged in the
sale of service means gross receipts, less sales returns, allowances,
discounts and cost of services.—According to the last paragraph of Section
27(E)(4) of the NIRC of 1997, gross income of a
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* THIRD DIVISION.
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income tax, then MCIT is included in “all other taxes” from which PAL is
exempted.
Same; Public Utilities; A public utility is granted special tax treatment
(including tax exceptions/exemptions) under its franchise, as an inducement
for the acceptance of the franchise and the rendition of public service by the
said public utility.—Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1520 is not
unusual. A public utility is granted special tax treatment (including tax
exceptions/exemptions) under its franchise, as an inducement for the
acceptance of the franchise and the rendition of public service by the said
public utility. In this case, in addition to being a public utility providing air-
transport service, PAL is also the official flag carrier of the country.
Same; Republic Act No. 9337, which took effect on 1 July 2005, cannot
be applied retroactively and any amendment introduced by said statute
affecting the taxation of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), is immaterial in the
present case.—The CIR seems to lose sight of the fact that the Petition at
bar involves the liability of PAL for MCIT for the fiscal year ending 31
March 2001. Republic Act No. 9337, which took effect on 1 July 2005,
cannot be applied retroactively and any amendment introduced by said
statute affecting the taxation of PAL is immaterial in the present case.
Same; Even though Republic Act No. 8424 amended the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) by introducing the Minimum Corporate
Income Tax (MCIT), in what is now Section 27(E) of the said Code, this
amendment is actually irrelevant and should not affect the taxation of
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), since the MCIT is clearly distinct from the
basic corporate income tax referred to in Section 13(a) of Presidential
Decree No. 1590, and from which Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) is
consequently exempt under the “in lieu of all other taxes” clause of its
charter.—The alternative argument of the CIR—that the imposition of the
MCIT is pursuant to the amendment of the NIRC, and not of Presidential
Decree No. 1590—is just as specious. As has already been settled by this
Court, the basic corporate income tax under Section 13(a) of Presidential
Decree No. 1590 relates to the general tax rate under Section 27(A) of the
NIRC of 1997, which is 32% by the year 2000, imposed on taxable income.
Thus, only provisions of the NIRC of 1997 necessary for the computation of
the basic corporate income tax apply to PAL. And
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even though Republic Act No. 8424 amended the NIRC by introducing the
MCIT, in what is now Section 27(E) of the said Code, this amendment is
actually irrelevant and should not affect the taxation of PAL, since the
MCIT is clearly distinct from the basic corporate income tax referred to in
Section 13(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1590, and from which PAL is
consequently exempt under the “in lieu of all other taxes” clause of its
charter.
Administrative Law; It should be understandable that when an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more
than what the law itself has already prescribed.—Despite the claims of the
CIR that RMC No. 66-2003 is just a clarificatory and internal issuance, the
Court observes that RMC No. 66-2003 does more than just clarify a
previous regulation and goes beyond mere internal administration. It
effectively increases the tax burden of PAL and other taxpayers who are
similarly situated, making them liable for a tax for which they were not
liable before. Therefore, RMC No. 66-2003 cannot be given effect without
previous notice or publication to those who will be affected thereby. In
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (261 SCRA 236, 247
[1996]), the Court ratiocinated that: It should be understandable that when
an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability
needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence
more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
Taxation; Tax Exemptions; Petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first
applying the well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the imposition of
taxes.—As to the assertions of the CIR that exemption from tax is not
presumed, and the one claiming it must be able to show that it indubitably
exists, the Court recalls its pronouncements in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals (271 SCRA
241
242
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the Decision1 dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution2
dated 11 October 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) en banc
in CTA E.B. No. 246. The CTA en banc affirmed the Decision3
dated 31 July 2006 of the CTA Second Division in C.T.A. Case No.
7010, ordering the cancellation and withdrawal of Preliminary
Assessment Notice (PAN) No. INC FY-3-31-01-000094 dated 3
September 2003 and Formal Letter of Demand dated 12 January
2004, issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) against
respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), for the payment of
Minimum Corporate Income Tax (MCIT) in the amount of
P272,421,886.58.
There is no dispute as to the antecedent facts of this case.
PAL is a domestic corporation organized under the corporate
laws of the Republic of the Philippines; declared the national flag
carrier of the country; and the grantee under
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243
244
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8 Should be P8,947,154,040.00.
9 Rollo, p. 105.
245
Sales/Revenues from P
Operation 38,798,721,685.00
Less: Cost of Services
Direct Costs - P
30,749,761,017.00
Less: Non-deductible
interest expense 433,082,004.00 30,316,679,013.00
Gross Income from Operation P
8,482,042,672.00
Add: Non-operating Income
465,111,368.00
Total Gross Income for MCIT purposes P
9,947,154,040.00
MCIT tax due P
178,943,080.80
Interest – 20% per annum –
7/16/01 to 02/15/04 92,453,805.78
Compromise Penalty
25,000.00
Total MCIT due and demandable P
271,421,886.5810
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10 Id., at p. 114.
246
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11 Id., at p. 89.
12 Id., at p. 55.
247
There is only one vital issue that the Court must resolve in the
Petition at bar, i.e., whether PAL is liable for deficiency MCIT for
FY 2000-2001.
The Court answers in the negative.
Presidential Decree No. 1590, the franchise of PAL, contains
provisions specifically governing the taxation of said corporation, to
wit:
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249
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In its income tax return for FY 2000-2001, filed with the BIR,
PAL reported no net taxable income for the period, resulting in zero
basic corporate income tax, which would necessarily be lower than
any franchise tax due from PAL for the same period.
The CIR, though, assessed PAL for MCIT for FY 2000-2001. It
is the position of the CIR that the MCIT is income tax for which
PAL is liable. The CIR reasons that Section 13(a) of Presidential
Decree No. 1590 provides that the corporate income tax of PAL
shall be computed in accordance with the NIRC. And, since the
NIRC of 1997 imposes MCIT, and PAL has not applied for relief
from the said tax, then PAL is subject to the same.
The Court is not persuaded. The arguments of the CIR are
contrary to the plain meaning and obvious intent of Presidential
Decree No. 1590, the franchise of PAL.
Income tax on domestic corporations is covered by Section 27 of
the NIRC of 1997,16 pertinent provisions of which are reproduced
below for easy reference:
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16 Prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 9337, which was signed into law on 24 May
2005 and took effect on 1 July 2005.
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253
VOL. 5923, JULY 7, 2009 253
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
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18 Section 34 of the NIRC of 1997 enumerates the allowable deductions, while
Section 35 identifies the personal and additional exemptions.
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Third, even if the basic corporate income tax and the MCIT are
both income taxes under Section 27 of the NIRC of 1997, and one is
paid in place of the other, the two are distinct and separate taxes.
The Court again cites Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc.,20 wherein it held that income tax on the
passive income21 of a domestic corporation, under Section 27(D) of
the NIRC of 1997, is different from the basic corporate income tax
on the taxable income of a domestic corporation, imposed by
Section 27(A), also of the NIRC of 1997. Section 13 of Presidential
Decree No. 1590 gives PAL the option to pay basic corporate
income tax or franchise tax, whichever is lower; and the tax so paid
shall be in lieu of all other taxes, except real property tax. The
income tax on the passive income of PAL falls within the category
of “all other taxes” from which PAL is exempted, and which, if
already collected, should be refunded to PAL.
The Court herein treats MCIT in much the same way. Although
both are income taxes, the MCIT is different from the basic
corporate income tax, not just in the rates, but also in the bases for
their computation. Not being covered by Section 13(a) of
Presidential Decree No. 1590, which makes PAL liable only for
basic corporate income tax, then MCIT is included in “all other
taxes” from which PAL is exempted.
That, under general circumstances, the MCIT is paid in place of
the basic corporate income tax, when the former is
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higher than the latter, does not mean that these two income taxes are
one and the same. The said taxes are merely paid in the alternative,
giving the Government the opportunity to collect the higher amount
between the two. The situation is not much different from Section 13
of Presidential Decree No. 1590, which reversely allows PAL to pay,
whichever is lower of the basic corporate income tax or the
franchise tax. It does not make the basic corporate income tax
indistinguishable from the franchise tax.
Given the fundamental differences between the basic corporate
income tax and the MCIT, presented in the preceding discussion, it
is not baseless for this Court to rule that, pursuant to the franchise of
PAL, said corporation is subject to the first tax, yet exempted from
the second.
Fourth, the evident intent of Section 13 of Presidential Decree
No. 1520 is to extend to PAL tax concessions not ordinarily
available to other domestic corporations. Section 13 of Presidential
Decree No. 1520 permits PAL to pay whichever is lower of the
basic corporate income tax or the franchise tax; and the tax so paid
shall be in lieu of all other taxes, except only real property tax.
Hence, under its franchise, PAL is to pay the least amount of tax
possible.
Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1520 is not unusual. A
public utility is granted special tax treatment (including tax
exceptions/exemptions) under its franchise, as an inducement for the
acceptance of the franchise and the rendition of public service by the
said public utility.22 In this case, in addition to being a public utility
providing air-transport service, PAL is also the official flag carrier of
the country.
The imposition of MCIT on PAL, as the CIR insists, would result
in a situation that contravenes the objective of Section 13 of
Presidential Decree No. 1590. In effect, PAL would not just have
two, but three tax alternatives, namely, the basic
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22 See Carcar Electric and Ice Plant Co., Inc. v. Collector of Internal Revenue,
100 Phil. 50, 54 (1956).
257
“Substitution Theory”
of the CIR Untenable
A careful reading of Section 13 rebuts the argument of the CIR that
the “in lieu of all other taxes” proviso is a mere incentive that applies
only when PAL actually pays something. It is clear that PD 1590 intended
to give respondent the option to avail itself of Subsection (a) or (b) as
consideration for its franchise. Either option excludes the payment of other
taxes and dues imposed or collected by the national or the local government.
PAL has the option to choose the alternative that results in lower taxes. It is
not the fact of tax payment that exempts it, but the exercise of its
option.
Under Subsection (a), the basis for the tax rate is respondent’s annual net
taxable income, which (as earlier discussed) is computed by subtracting
allowable deductions and exemptions from gross income. By basing the tax
rate on the annual net taxable income, PD 1590 necessarily recognized the
situation in which taxable income may result in a negative amount and thus
translate into a zero tax liability.
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Notably, PAL was owned and operated by the government at the time the
franchise was last amended. It can reasonably be contemplated that PD 1590
sought to assist the finances of the government corporation in the form of
lower taxes. When respondent operates at a loss (as in the instant case), no
taxes are due; in this instances, it has a lower tax liability than that provided
by Subsection (b).
The fallacy of the CIR’s argument is evident from the fact that the
payment of a measly sum of one peso would suffice to exempt PAL from
other taxes, whereas a zero liability arising from its losses would not.
There is no substantial distinction between a zero tax and a one-peso
tax liability.” (Emphasis ours.)
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24 Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that “Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.”
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260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
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26 http://www.philippineairlines.com/about_pal/milestones/milestones.jsp
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The CIR attempts to sway this Court to adopt RMC No. 66-2003
since the “[c]onstruction by an executive branch of government of a
particular law although not binding upon the courts must be given
weight as the construction comes from the branch of the government
called upon to implement the law.”27
But the Court is unconvinced.
It is significant to note that RMC No. 66-2003 was issued only on
14 October 2003, more than two years after FY 2000-2001 of PAL
ended on 31 March 2001. This violates the well-entrenched principle
that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is
manifest by express terms or by necessary implication.28
Moreover, despite the claims of the CIR that RMC No. 66-2003
is just a clarificatory and internal issuance, the Court observes that
RMC No. 66-2003 does more than just clarify a previous regulation
and goes beyond mere internal administration. It effectively
increases the tax burden of PAL and other taxpayers who are
similarly situated, making them liable for a tax for which they were
not liable before. Therefore, RMC No. 66-2003 cannot be given
effect without previous notice or publication to those who will be
affected thereby. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals,29 the Court ratiocinated that:
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266
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
prior notice to PAL before RMC No. 66-2003 could have become
effective. Only after RMC No. 66-2003 was issued on 14 October
2003 could PAL have been given notice of said circular, and only
following such notice to PAL would RMC No. 66-2003 have taken
effect. Given this sequence, it is not possible to say that RMC No.
66-2003 was already in effect and should have been strictly
complied with by PAL for its fiscal year which ended on 31 March
2001.
Even conceding that the construction of a statute by the CIR is to
be given great weight, the courts, which include the CTA, are not
bound thereby if such construction is erroneous or is clearly shown
to be in conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution or
other laws. “It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when
necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in
the context of the interactions of the three branches of the
government.”30 It is furthermore the rule of long standing that this
Court will not set aside lightly the conclusions reached by the CTA
which, by the very nature of its functions, is dedicated exclusively to
the resolution of tax problems and has, accordingly, developed an
expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or
improvident exercise of authority.31 In the Petition at bar, the CTA
en banc and in division both adjudged that PAL is not liable for
MCIT under Presidential Decree No. 1590, and this Court has no
sufficient basis to reverse them.
As to the assertions of the CIR that exemption from tax is not
presumed, and the one claiming it must be able to show that it
indubitably exists, the Court recalls its pronounce-
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The MCIT was a new tax introduced by Republic Act No. 8424.
Under the doctrine of strict interpretation, the burden is upon the
CIR to primarily prove that the new MCIT provisions of the NIRC
of 1997, clearly, expressly, and unambiguously extend and apply to
PAL, despite the latter’s existing tax exemption. To do this, the CIR
must convince the Court that the MCIT is a basic corporate income
tax,33 and is not covered by the “in lieu of all other taxes” clause of
Presidential Decree No. 1590. Since the CIR failed in this regard,
the Court is left with no choice but to consider the MCIT as one of
“all other taxes,” from which PAL is exempt under the explicit
provisions of its charter.
Not being liable for MCIT in FY 2000-2001, it necessarily
follows that PAL need not apply for relief from said tax as the CIR
maintains.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Review is hereby DENIED, and the Decision dated 9 August 2007
and Resolution dated 11 October 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals
en banc in CTA E.B. No. 246 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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33 Since it is readily apparent that the MCIT does not constitute the alternative
franchise tax.