1. G.R. No. 48066. January 31, 1989.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner-appellee, vs. KALAHI INVESTMENTS, INC.,

claimant-appellant.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Pampanga, denying the application of Kalahi Investments, Inc. (Kalahi, for short) for
registration of Lot No. 1851-B of the Floridablan caCadastre.

“Kalahi abandoned
abandoned its former claim over the entire area of Lot No. 1851-B, covering an
area of 886,021,588 square meters (Psd2387-D). It limited its present claim to 1,730 hectares,
known as Lot No. 1 of Plan Sgs-3690, a portion of Lot 2210, FloridablancaCadastre, formerly a
 part of Lot No. 1851-B. It is in this Lot No. 1 of Plan Sgs-3690, with an area of 1.284.2340
hectares, and in Lot No. 2, with an area of 446.0870 hectares, giving a total of 1,720 hectares
where the alleged 123 lode mining claims are said to be existing and where the alleged 500,000
coffee plants were planted.”

Kalahi presented evidence to support perfected mining rights over the 123 mineral
claims. These were, however, not considered by the court a quo as basis sufficient in law and in
fact for the registration of title under act 496.

ISSUES:

a. Do mining claims, acquired, registered, perfected, and patentable under the Old
Mining Law, mature to private ownership which would entitle the claimant-applicant
to the ownership thereof?

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  b. Which agency has the authority to examine, process, and find out whether or not the
requirements of the Act of Congress of 1902 have been complied with, by the
applicant — 
 — the
the courts or the Bureau of Mines?

RULING:

 NO. The right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right, “this right is not
absolute”. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the located
claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other
would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found
therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain
rights over a located mining claim.

Bureau of Mines is qualified to rule on whether there has been full and faithful
compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902 as amended.

2. No. L-49109. December 1, 1987.*

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MINISTER OF

NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO
C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a mining corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress
dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902).

On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of
subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree.
Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but "under protest," on 13 October 1978,
with a reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not waiving its rights over its
mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by
this Court.

ISSUE:

Is Presidential Decree No. 1214 unconstitutional?

RULING:

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 Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. It is a valid exercise of the
sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's
mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits
are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all
mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their
locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the
renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral
Development Resources Decree of 1974.

Constitutional mandate of PD 1214 is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution,
which declares: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control an d supervision of the State….

3. No. L-58867. June 22, 1984.*

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO
VDA. DE LA CRUZ, LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA
ROSA, respondents.

FACTS:

In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents
(Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for
 partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within
any forest zone or military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in
their names.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within
the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and
that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of
the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.

After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the
Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court.

ISSUE:

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 Whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land.

RULING:

 NO. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive

Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the
land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with
the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
 patrimony.

Decision reversed and the application for registration is dismissed.

4. G.R. No. 31688. December 17, 1990.*

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Abra, Second Judicial District and ABRA INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
respondents.

FACTS:

The center of controversy in the instant petition for review on certiorari is a limestone-
rich 70-hectare land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectares of which are, according to petitioners, within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.

Private respondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for brevity), a duly registered
corporation established for the purpose of setting up a cement factory, claims on the other hand,
to be the owner in fee simple of the whole 70-hectare area indicated in survey plans PSU-
217518, PSU-217519 and PSU-217520 with a total assessed value of P6,724.48. Thus, on
September 23, 1965, it filed in the then Court of First Instance of Abra an application for
registration in its name of said parcels of land under the Land Registration Act or, in the
alternative, under Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 1411 as amended by Republic Act No.
1942 inasmuch as its predecessors-in-interest had allegedly been in possession thereof since July
26, 1894.

ISSUE:

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 Whether or not lower court erred in granting the application for registration of the parcels
of land notwithstanding petitioners finding that they are within the forest zone.

RULING:
YES. Forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private properties. This ruling is premised on
the regalian doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but also in the 1987
Constitution Article XIII.

The lower court closed its eyes to a basic doctrine in land registration cases that the
inclusion in a title of a part of the public domain nullifies the title. Its decision to order the
registration of an inalienable land in favor of AIC under the misconception that it is imperative
for the Director of Forestry to object to its exclusion from the forest reserve even in the face of
its finding that indeed a sizable portion of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve is involved,
cannot be allowed to stay unreversed. It betrays an inherent infirmity which must be corrected.

5. G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989.*

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner, vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL,

respondent.

FACTS:

The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. RupertoVillareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than
forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry
then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation.

Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.

ISSUE:

What is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are

commonly known? Part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution
or are they considered public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private ownership.

RULING:

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 However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an
action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs
assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring
ownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land.
Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Sup reme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines.

RULING:

The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire
 private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese
citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private

domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case,
however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of
Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.”

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of
reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and
dismisses the petition, without prejudice.

16. No. L-33048. April 16, 1982.*

EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLER, petitioners, vs.

VICTORIANO T. CUENCO, respondent.

FACTS:

The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining
 parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now
Camiguin province), with an area of 29,150 square meters, more or less.The entire land was
owned previously by a certain LeocadiaBalisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio
Barsobia (now deceased) and EpifaniaSarsosa, one of the petitioners herein. They are Filipino
citizens.

On September 5, 1936, EpifaniaSarsosa, then a widow, sold the land to a Chinese, Ong
King Po, for the sum of P1, 050.00, who took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits thereof.

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 Respondent filed a Forcible Entry case against Epifania before the Municipal Court of
Sagay, Camiguin. The case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since, as the laws then stood,
the question of possession could not be properly determined without first settling that of
ownership.

17. 267 SCRA 408 (1997)

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS

FACTS:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
 pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of RenongBerhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by

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 RenongBerhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened
 by respondent GSIS and consummated with RenongBerhad, petitioner came to this Court on
 prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to RenongBerhad is violative of the

Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and v oid

RULING:

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be
sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
 protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of
 petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

18. GR NO. 127872 JANUARY 27, 2004

LA BUGAL- B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSN., vs. DENR 

FACTS:

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-
owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which,
upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
 proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to
"govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources."
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations
issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

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 paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the
drafters' choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x xx involving either technical or
financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The
drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or
technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be
very clear and no further debate would ensue. In contrast, the use of the word "involving"
signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do
with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word
"involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the
sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring,"
"implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising." Plainly,
none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving,"
when understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance,
necessarily implies that there are activities other than those that are being included. In other
words, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such
assistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.
Thus, the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign corporations
are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very
apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against
"agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a
verbalegis approach.

Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to
financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been so
unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone's mind about their true
intent. For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely
 prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures or
words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields negative results. Thus, there
was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an
intent not to use the expression "agreements x xx involving either technical or financial
assistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner.

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