In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of

proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on

the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered
by their opponent.

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate

evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Chua v.
Westmont Bank, G.R. No. 182650, February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 56, 68,
citing Eulogio v. Apeles, G.R. No. 167884, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 561,
571-572.

Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs
that of the adverse party.[39] Summa Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175, 185,
February 5, 1996; New Testament Church of God vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 266, 269, July 14,
1995; Sapu-an vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701, 706, October 19, 1992; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, ibid.

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. [18] The petitions filed
by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners records of birth were intended to
establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the
prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latters children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood
relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners. [19]

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Trinidad v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118904, 20 April 1998, 289 SCRA 188, 210

On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a
final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.
 ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[27]
lthough a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other
means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled
in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:[31] 201 SCRA 675, 684, September 24, 1991, per Cruz, J.; and
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 684, 689, October 26, 1989.

The legitimacy and filiation of a child cannot be contested by way of defense or as collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose. They can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonally filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack. This is confirmed by
Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code which refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.”
Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. 175080, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 79

Furthermore, the proscription against collateral attacks similarly applies to

matters involving the civil status of persons. Thus, we have held that collateral
attacks against the legitimacy and filiation of children, Geronimo v. Santos, G.R.
No. 197099, September 28, 2015, 771 SCRA 508; Reyes v. Mauricio, G.R. No.
175080, November 24, 20 10, 636 SCRA 79; Sayson v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, 205 SCRA 321

Adoption Reyes v. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA
520; Austria v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754.

and the validity of marriages (except void marriages) Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, G.R. No. 181174, December 4,
2009, 607 SCRA 638; De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, G.R. No. 160172,
February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 162. are not allowed

The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate
is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by
evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child under Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC
considered the following overt acts of the deceased spouses as acts of
recognition that respondent is their legitimate child: they sent her to school and
paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made respondent a beneficiary of her burial
benefits from the Government Service Insurance System; and, Caridad filed a
petition for guardianship of respondent after the death of her husband Rufino.
Lastly, the trial court held that to be allowed to impugn the filiation and status of
respondent, petitioner should have brought an action for the purpose under
Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code. Since petitioner failed to file such
action, the trial court ruled that respondent alone is entitled to the ownership and
possession of the subject land owned by Rufino. The extrajudicial settlement
executed by petitioner and his brother was therefore declared not valid and
 binding as respondent is Rufino’s only compulsory heir. Geronimo v.
Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, 771 SCRA 508 The legitimacy
of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue
in another action for a different purpose

Tison v. Court of Appeals, viz.: 19

x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.

The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:

"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil

status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by
law.

The impugning of the identity of Villamil as not the legitimate son of Luis is akin to collateral attack.

ibid.

ˈibid/
adverb
1. in the same source (used to save space in textual references to a quoted work
that has been mentioned in a previous reference).
2.
TSN, July 30, 1981, p. 6.

Id. (masculine and neuter) and ead. (feminine) (Latin, short for
idem and eadem, "the same") denote the previously cited
source (compare ibid.). Id. is particularly used inlegal citations.
They are also used in academic citations replacing the name of
a repeated author

A ‘rollo’ is a kind of court record in the Philippines. I know this because I

saw it all over the footnotes in Philippines court decisions.
I even found a Philippine “Manual of Judicial Writing” that tells you
exactly how to write your rollo citations. Here is what it says:
2.2.3. ROLLO & OTHER COURT RECORDS
A. Rollo
1. Capitalize the word “rollo” only at the beginning of a citation or a
sentence.
2. Cite the rollo in the footnote as follows: the word “rollo” when
referring to the Supreme Court rollo, or “CA rollo” for the Court of
Appeals rollo , “Sandiganbayan rollo” for the Sandiganbayan rollo, and
“CTA rollo” for the Court of Tax Appeals rollo; followed by the page
number. Examples:
 Rollo, p. 21.
CA rollo, pp. 109-122.
Sandiganbayan rollo, p. 9.
CTA rollo, p. 10.
3. If there are two or more rollo volumes, and the subsequent volumes do
not continue the pagination of the previous volume, include the volume
number after the word “rollo.” Example:
 Rollo, Vol. 3, p. 21.

[G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000]

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA MENDOZA

LIRIO, petitioners, vs. HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent. J lexj

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or

possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property, they may become the basis of a
claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of
owner -- public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted -- may be converted to
ownership. On the other hand, mere possession and occupation of land
cannot ripen into ownership. CEQUENA et.,al vs. BOLANTE [G.R. No.
137944. April 6, 2000]

Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit was not the best evidence
of their father's ownership of the disputed land, because the "affiant was not
placed on the witness stand." They contend that it was unnecessary to
present a witness to establish the authenticity of the affidavit because it was a
declaration against respondent's interest and was an ancient document. As a
declaration against interest, it was an exception to the hearsay rule. As a
necessary and trustworthy document, it was admissible in evidence. And
because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was a self-authenticating
ancient document. Chief

We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's ruling: [7]

"While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed

before a notary public, the general rule is that affidavits are
classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the
witness stand (People's Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas,
207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if
affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals,
163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the affidavit was not
sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that
the document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals
[were] not presented. There was no expert testimony or
competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the
questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the
genuineness of her signature and that of her mother xxx.
[Respondent] testified that her mother was an illiterate and as far
as she knew her mother could not write because she had not
attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her testimony was corroborated by
Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent's] mother was
illiterate."

The petitioners allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered

as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved first. And before a document is admitted as an exception to
[8]

the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that
the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration
concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the
declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his
interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any
motive to falsify. Esmsc [9]

In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive
and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration
against interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a
witness. Such declarant should be confronted with the statement against
[10]

interest as a prior inconsistent statement.

The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient

document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper
custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion. It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein
[11]

failed, however, to explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado

could have been affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the witness,
she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal schooling. This
circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.

Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication.
Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just
because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does
not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from
Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode
of acquiring ownership.

Second Issue: Preference of PossessionEsmmis

The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article
538 of the Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and
continuous possession of the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute this ruling.
They contend that she came into possession through force and violence,
contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.

We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not
lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force
or violence. To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically
[12]

ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove
[13]

prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession. [14]

However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the
respondent. Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the
latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners father
and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in
adverse possession of the land. Es-mso

Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the
respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father
(Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso
[15]

died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his
son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her mother continued residing
on the lot.

When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years
1932-1948. Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and
[16] [17]

paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. When he died, Miguel continued
[18]

cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the respondent and her mother were
living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was
physically ousted by the respondent. [19]

Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred
possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject
lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the
other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952. Ms-esm

Third Issue: Possession of Better Right

Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical
coupled with the exclusive and continuous possession [by respondent] of the
land since 1985" proved her ownership of the disputed land. The respondent
argues that she was legally presumed to possess the subject land with a just
title since she possessed it in the concept of owner. Under Article 541 of the
Code, she could not be obliged to show or prove such title.

The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 of

the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven.
That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision,
[20]

be restored thereto by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only
[21]

the question of possession, and possession is different from ownership.

Ownership in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by
law. E-xsm

To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the

claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.[22]
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent
[23]

showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for
more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued
to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband
engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood. [24]

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners'
father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the
concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had already
[25]

ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise,
declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription. Ky-le [26]

In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land,
did not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by
mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true
[27]

owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription
[28]

or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their

possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and
brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription
because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), this [29]

supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be
limited to the portion that they actually farmed.

We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the

disputed land was established before the trial court through the series of tax
declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such
documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside
from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the
holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested parties. Ky-calr [30]

However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of

ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or
[31]

possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of
[32]

actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of
[33]

ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis. . CEQUENA et.,al vs.
BOLANTE [G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000]
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,

vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail
the September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
1

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124 which dismissed,
2

after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.

From the records of the case are gathered the following

material allegations  claims of the parties which they sought to prove
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:

On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. 3

On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. 4

On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she
named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner. 5

On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, later baptized as Leonila
6

Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent. 7

On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano
8

Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. In the deed, Portugal’s

9

siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m.
parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor. 10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in
the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo." 11

On February 18, 1984, Paz died.

On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.

On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by

Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person" adjudicating to herself the Caloocan
12

parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 in Portugal’s name was subsequently

13

cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813 was issued by the Registry of
14

Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent,

"Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."

Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988
transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name,
petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
15

executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.

In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related

whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.

Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and

the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent’s name and to issue in
its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses be awarded
to them.

Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:

a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.

Portugal Sr., is valid?

b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.

Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs.

d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the

complaint. (Underscoring supplied)
16

After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, after giving an
17

account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their
documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial,
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate
(sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario. 18

In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:

The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at
bar.

xxx

In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of

Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as
heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to
the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the
establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied
through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not
an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The
operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter, it is "to
enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not
having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of
action.

The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on
plaintiffs’ cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have
the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2,
Rule 2, supra). (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
19

Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial

court’s ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this
Court’s following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño, viz:
20
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993])
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such
cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to
that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court
found Cariño to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:

To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago
Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two
women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan Yee Cariño)
both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cariño
contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the
only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The
award of the death benefits of the deceased Cariño was thus, merely
an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the
other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title toproperty. The only undisputed fact in this case is
that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here
come two contending parties, — herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-
appellee, — both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x.
The status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been
definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such
questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an
appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that
purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what
the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To
permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action,
not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to
impinge upon this axiom. x x x (Emphasis in the original, underscoring
21

supplied).

The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, thus affirmed the
22

trial court’s dismissal of the case.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, faulting the appellate
23

court to have erred when

I.

. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed

to state a cause of action.

II.

. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite
the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the
Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the
evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .
24
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Petitioners thus prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that

the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in
accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the
above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
pronouncements in Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to the
court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is
valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and
Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the
name of Leonila.

Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for. (Underscoring supplied).
25

Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits
which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows;
that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the
determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling,
they had established their status as compulsory heirs.

In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to
institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they
can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication
and of the TCT issued in her name.

In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the therein
26

petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the

estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of
the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that
a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn
sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein
petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein
respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners
to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:

But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it—
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchays—that they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . (Italics in the original;
27

underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition
was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v.
Rivera and Solivio v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "the declaration of
28 29

heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners

here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."

In the above-cited case of Litam, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special

30

proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of

First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael
Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his
therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his
marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent
contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera;
and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse
of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of
administration to, on Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.

While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported
siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael
Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed
guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings
substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during
the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.

Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved
incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court,
following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the
decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.

On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for
determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.

This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia
Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of
appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially correct" the trial court’s findings
of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy
Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the
persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said
certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the
preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other documentary evidence
presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the
alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their]
alleged status . . . as children of said decedent."

This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not
have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of
the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within
the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."

In Solivio, also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was
31

a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who
was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch
23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent’s
maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the
decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the court’s
order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming
that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of
tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil
case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26
of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by
Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.

On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among
other issues, "whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s
share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were
still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this Court held that "[i]n the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with
[estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court," citing Guilas v. CFI
Judge of Pampanga. 32

This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate

proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-
Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in
said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter,
33

the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father
was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estateof the
decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the
records of the case be archived.

Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul
the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud,
and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots
allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in
the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among
other things, the same two lots allotted to her.

After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’
agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until
after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.

Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for
trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed,
she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was
seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order
setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial
question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her
of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27,
1966, denied the motion.

Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.

The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the
records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held
that the testate estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as
Juanita’s share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
Explained this Court:

As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
(Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his
share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs.
Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the
same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or
Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r]
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742;
Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil.,
455, 460-461). (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
34

This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court
setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to
continue because it "involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or
if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself
declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its
re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir
in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the
deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the
sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned
35

Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of

the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that
36

when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and

the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
did, he failed to name an executor therein. 37

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or

intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it,
38

under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be

long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs
is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and
had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no

compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to
39

evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear
repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.

Portugal, is valid;

2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is
the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. 40

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24,

2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated
issues defined during the pre-trial.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1
Rollo at 49-56.
2
Records at 212-230.
3
Exh. "3," Folder of Exhibits.
4
Exh. "A," Folder of Exhibits.
5
Exh. "B," Folder of Exhibits.
6
Exh. "4," Folder of Exhibits.
7
Exh. "5," Folder of Exhibits.
8
Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits.
12
Exh. "E," Folder of Exhibits.
13
Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits
14
Exh. "D," Folder of Exhibits.
15
Records at 1-5.
16
Id. at 78-80.
17
Id. at 212-230.
18
304 SCRA 18 (1999).
19
Records at 228-230.
20
351 SCRA 127 (2001).
21
CA Decision, Rollo at 49, 52-54.
22
Id. at 49-56.
23
Id. at 3-46.
24
Id. at 14.
25
Id. at 43-44.
26
Supra, note 18.
27
Id. at 22.
28
100 Phil. 364 (1956).
29
182 SCRA 119 (1990).
30
Supra, note 28.
31
Supra, note 29.
32
43 SCRA 111 (1972).
33
Ibid.

Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, supra at

34

117 (1972).
35
Exh. "E," Folder of Exhibits.

SEC. 1 Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the

36

decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds.
The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument
or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall
file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the
public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the
affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned
and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed
under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left
no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within
two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be

published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied).

Herrera, Remedial Law III-A, p. 31 (2005), citing Utulo v. Leona Pasion

37

Vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302 (1938).

Vide Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of

38

[Portugal], supra, note 12.

Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 (1989); Intestate

39

Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 (1955).

40
Supra, note 16.