PART 1

1. What is 'distance diagnosis' as it relates to foreign political leaders?

‘Distance diagnosis’ refers to the study of the personalities and unique emotional traits of foreign political
leaders, and how these factors predisposition them towards certain types of political action. By studying the
public statements, writings and actions of political leaders – that is, by studying from a distance – one may be
able to “diagnose” certain personality traits that may be linked to specific foreign policy behaviours. This is
relevant to foreign policy analysis, as it may provide an explanatory and predictive model for a leader’s future
foreign policy behaviour, based on the influence of these fundamental traits and predispositions. For example,
Hermann’s work found that leaders who held distrust for others; believe that they have control over international
events and who crave power are more likely and more willing to violate international norms in their foreign
policies.

2. In terms of forecasting, what is an ‘equivalence class’?

The ‘equivalence class’ is a tool used in forecasting to improve the accuracy of a prediction, based on
comparing the current case to similar cases in the past. It is a form of taking the “outside view” in
superforecasting: taking the current case as merely one in a wider set of phenomena; comparing it to previous
events that display similar characteristics; and using these previous events to predict the outcome of the current
case based on these similarities. If the current case displays many similarities to the ‘equivalence classes’ – that
is, comparable cases in the past – then it may be more likely that the outcome of the current case will resemble
those previous to it. This is relevant to foreign policy analysis as it may increase the accuracy of predictions of
foreign state behaviour, which may then inform our foreign policy response. For example, if one were to look at
the likelihood of a nuclear clash between India and Pakistan within the next week, an ‘equivalence class’ would
be any nuclear clash they have had in the past. Taking this outside view, one can see that Pakistan has only
threatened nuclear warfare in the past to bluff their opponent states. Thus, given the similarities of the current
case to the ‘equivalence class’, it could be predicted that the possibility of actual nuclear warfare between India
and Pakistan is low.

3. What is the ‘pretty prudent public’ model?

The ‘pretty prudent public model’ is a theory posited by Jentleson et al which explains how the public responds
to their state going to war. While it is widely accepted that the public is generally casualty-adverse and will
increasingly voice opposition to war as their own casualties mount, the ‘pretty prudent public model’ argues that
in some cases, the public may accept casualties if they believe the benefits of foreign conflict outweigh the
costs. In other words, when their state engages in foreign conflict, the public makes a rough cost-benefit analysis
of war, to the extent that the chances of success and the goals of the conflict may actually counteract the
‘casualty cringe’ experienced by the public. This concept is relevant to foreign policy analysis as it explains how
in some cases, a state may not be constrained by public opinion in their decision to go to war – even if they have
suffered great casualties already. For instance, Charles’ research finds while Australia may be particularly
casualty-sensitive after the tragedy of Gallipoli, prospects and potential benefits of success are still considered
by the public when considering Australia’s role in foreign conflict.

4. What is ‘theory theory’?

‘Theory theory’ is a tool that may be used to analyse the foreign policy behaviour of enemy states, without
falling into the heuristic traps of our psychology. That is, we have a tendency to view our enemies much in the
same way that we view ourselves: putting ourselves into their shoes, and predicting their behaviour based on
what we would do in the same situation. This pattern of thinking – otherwise known as “simulation theory” -
may have grave consequences, as the adversary may have very different personality traits and motivations from
ourselves, and thus we may miscalculate their actions because we assume that they will act like us. In contrast,
‘theory theory’ suggests that we should develop a model of what motivates our enemies – not what motivates us
– and use this model to thus predict their behaviour. This theory is important in foreign policy analysis as it
reduces the risk of miscalculating our enemy state’s behaviour, and thus may improve our foreign policy
response.
5. What is ‘red teaming’?

‘Red teaming’ is a social science thinking tool used in intelligence analysis that reduces the risk of intelligence
failure, through the mitigation of ‘confirmation bias’. When assessing evidence, one of the main difficulties of
interpretation is the influence that heuristics play in our cognition. In particular, we have a psychological
tendency to solely seek evidence that supports our hypothesis when assessing information, otherwise known as
‘confirmation bias’. One of the ways we can combat this is through ‘red teaming’: having somebody else (or
ourselves) play the adversary to our hypothesis; seek out evidence that is directly contrary to our argument; and
probe weaknesses in it. Through the use of ‘red teaming’, our tendency to fall to ‘confirmation bias’ is
mitigated, as evidence that opposes our argument is considered as strongly as the evidence which confirms our
argument. For example, if we were considering the likelihood of Brexit occurring within the next week and
believed that it would, ‘red teaming’ may be used to consider the evidence that suggests that it would not occur
and probe the weaknesses in our reasoning for why it would. This tool is relevant to foreign policy analysis as it
may improve the accuracy of our predictions of foreign policy decisions, through consideration of both sides of
evidence.

PART 2

1. Some political leaders are characterized as ‘irrational’. To what extent do you believe that this
characterization is useful for understanding their decision making?

Rationality, as understood within the ‘rational actor model’, refers to the human decision-making process where
the decisions which maximise and grant the largest payoff to the decision-maker are preferenced over all other
alternative choices. In this sense, within foreign policy analysis, the general majority of state leaders are
considered to be rational: making foreign policy choices which maximise the national interest of their state.

This essay contends that this characterization of foreign political leaders as irrational is largely unhelpful, and
provides little use to understanding their decision-making.

This argument is made on three points: first, that foreign political leaders may value other things to one’s own
state and thus may be acting consistently with their own preferences; second, that foreign state behaviour is an
amalgamation of many different bureaucracies and thus a leader’s public decisions may not reflect their own
individual decision-making ability; third, that the foreign political leader may simply be acting under limited
information and thus is acting rationally within the context of the situation.

Ultimately, this essay concludes the dismissal of certain political leaders as ‘irrational’ as misleading and
unhelpful.

Firstly, it may be that foreign political leaders simply value alternative preferences to one’s own state and thus
are acting rationally according to their own available choices. While rational state behaviour in foreign policy
analysis tends to sway towards the belief that state leader’s value material concerns such as security and wealth
above all, this ‘thick rationality’ may not be true in all cases, and the content of a leader’s preferences may not
always be predicted reliably. For instance, some state leaders are deeply religious, and thus hold specific areas
close to their religion as deeply important and thus within the national interest to one’s state. For state leaders
who do not hold the same deep beliefs however, the actions taken by foreign leaders to protect these areas may
seem fundamentally irrational, as their preferences are not the same. Thus, while it may appear irrational to
other state leaders to go to such extreme lengths to protect these areas, if the content of the foreign leader’s
preferences is not assumed, this understanding of ‘thin rationality’ may support the notion that a foreign leader’s
decision-making is consistent and transitive with their own preferences. For this reason, the simple dismissal of
a foreign leader as ‘irrational’ may simply overlook the fact that their preferences are different from one’s own.
Secondly, a foreign political leader’s decisions may not always reflect their own personal decision-making, as
foreign state behaviour is often the result of the interactions and decisions of many groups. One such model that
supports this notion – the bureaucratic politics model – explains that a state’s decision-making and observable
behaviour is the end result of the influence of many agencies, groups and bureaus that exist within the state
apparatus. The implication of this is that a state’s observable behaviour – often expressed as the decisions of a
sole political leader, acting as the state’s representative – may not necessarily represent the leader’s own
personal decision-making, which may very well be rational. In this sense, the characterisation of political
leader’s as ‘irrational’ does little to assist in the understanding of their decision-making, as it ignores the
influence that state bureaucratic politics play in their observable actions and decisions.

Finally, the characterisation of political leaders as ‘irrational’ may mask the relevant of information and context
in decision-making. While from the outside, a state leader’s decisions may seem ‘irrational’ and
incomprehensible, this assumption may ignore the fact that the foreign leader lacks the same information that
other states do, and thus is not aware of the possible consequences of their actions. In other words, given that
foreign policy interactions between states is always made within a context of limited information, the actions of
a foreign state leader may well be rational if one was to consider that they may be acting under little, vague, or
even false information. If this is so, while their actions may appear irrational to outsider states, the internal logic
of the decision-maker may very well be ‘boundedly rational’: that is, rational within limits. This problem is
particularly salient in situations of warfare, where states have incentive to hide information and create
intelligence asymmetries relative to other states in order to gain a military advantage. In these situations, while it
may appear that a foreign state leader is irrational in their decision-making, they may simply be choosing the
‘best of the worst’ choices that they have available to them.

This essay has demonstrated that the characterisation of certain state leader’s as ‘irrational’ is largely unhelpful,
and in some cases, even counterproductive, to understanding their decision-making. While in some cases, a state
leader may very well suffer from rational decision-making barriers such as a mental illness or excessive reliance
on heuristics, these should be considered fringe cases, and greater efforts should be made to attempt to
understand the decision-making processes of those certain leaders, who at first instance, may appear to be
fundamentally ‘irrational’ in nature.