1. Origins of Judicial Review: PHIL. CONST., art. VIII Marbury v. Madison, l Crunch 5 U.S.

137 Francisco
v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 Nov. 10, 2003
Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under
the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for
other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Source: http://casedigest.asialighttravel.com/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives/

2. Political Question Tañada v. Cuenco , G.R. No. L-10520 Feb. 28, 1957

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party.
The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other
hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But
prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9
members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators
from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come
from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal
because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party
will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the
Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to
choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political
Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon
the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the
SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which
does not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come
from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in
the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority
members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own
rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
3. Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty
Corporation G.R. Nos. 203754-204418, June 16, 2015

The Case

Once again, We are called upon to resolve a clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature and the
constitutionally-delegated power to tax of local governments in these consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision dated September 25, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 5 in Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-35601, entitled Colon Heritage Realty Corp., represented by
Isidoro Canizares v. Film Development Council of the Philippines, and Decision dated October 24, 2012 of the RTC,
Branch 14 in Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-35529, entitled City of Cebu v. Film Development Council of the Philippines,
collectively declaring Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9167 invalid and unconstitutional.

The Facts

The facts are simple and undisputed.

Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, in its exercise of its power to impose amusement taxes under Section 140 of
the Local Government Code[2] (LGC)anchored on the constitutional policy on local autonomy,[3] passed City Ordinance
No. LXIX otherwise known as the “Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu (tax ordinance).” Central to the
case at bar are Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to
thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City.

The Court’s Ruling

We find no reason to disturb the assailed rulings. Local fiscal autonomy and the constitutionally-delegated power to tax.

The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belongs, as a matter of right, to every
independent government, and needs no express conferment by the people before it can be exercised. It is purely
legislative and, thus, cannot be delegated to the executive and judicial branches of government without running afoul to
the theory of separation of powers. It, however, can be delegated to municipal corporations, consistent with the
principle that legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern.[19] The
authority of provinces, cities, and municipalities to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, therefore, is
not inherent and may be exercised only to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic
law or by statute.[20]

Under the regime of the 1935 Constitution, there was no constitutional provision on the delegation of the power to tax
to municipal corporations. They only derived such under a limited statutory authority, outside of which, it was deemed
withheld.[21] Local governments, thus, had very restricted taxing powers which they derive from numerous tax laws.
This highly-centralized government structure was later seen to have arrested the growth and efficient operations of
LGUs, paving the way for the adoption of a more decentralized system which granted LGUs local autonomy, both
administrative and fiscal autonomy.[22]

Material to the case at bar is the concept and scope of local fiscal autonomy. In Pimentel v. Aguirre,[23] fiscal autonomy
was defined as “the power [of LGUs] to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the
national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with
their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof.”

With the adoption of the 1973 Constitution,[24] and later the 1987 Constitution, municipal corporations were granted
fiscal autonomy via a general delegation of the power to tax.[25] Section 5, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution gave LGUs
the “power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.” This authority was further strengthened in the 1987 Constitution, through the inclusion in Section 5, Article X
thereof of the condition that “[s]uch taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to local governments.”[26]
Accordingly, under the present Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power of
municipal corporations must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines.[27]
The basic rationale for the current rule on local fiscal autonomy is the strengthening of LGUs and the safeguarding of
their viability and self-sufficiency through a direct grant of general and broad tax powers.Nevertheless, the fundamental
law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional. The legislature must still see to it that (a) the
taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each LGU will have its fair
share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local
taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.[28]

In conformity to the dictate of the fundamental law for the legislature to “enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization,”[29] consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, Congress enacted the LGC, Book II of which
governs local taxation and fiscal matters and sets forth the guidelines and limitations for the exercise of this power. In
Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. The Province of Benguet,[30] the Court alluded to the fundamental principles governing
the taxing powers of LGUs as laid out in Section 130 of the LGC, to wit:
1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.

2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

a. be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's ability to pay;

b. be levied and collected only for public purposes;

c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;

d. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the restraint of trade.

3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private person.

4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the
disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by the LGC.

5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.

It is in the application of the adverted fourth rule, that is––all revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC
shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or other
imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by the LGC––upon which the present controversy grew.

Source: http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/ced08
4. Grave Abuse of Discretion: Ocampo v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973, Nov. 8, 2016

FACTS: On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a memorandumto the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regardingthe interment of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB), incompliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
fulfill his election campaign promise to thateffect.On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the
corresponding directivesto the Philippine Army Commanding General.Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance,
variousparties filed several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, essentially arguing that the decision to
have the remains of former President Marcos interred at the LNMB violated various laws; that Marcos is not entitled to
be interred at the LNMB; and that the Marcos family has already waived such burial.

ISSUES:
1. Did the issuance of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws?
2. Have historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the decisions
of the Court on the Marcos regime nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to internment at the
LNMB?
3. Has the Marcos family waived the burial of former President Marcos at the LNMB by virtue of their agreement with
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as regards the return and internment of his remains in the
Philippines?

HELD: It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents.

It is the President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can enact a
law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority of the AFP and the Commander-in-Chief
of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's discretion to allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the LNMB.

The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence,
anyone buried therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth emulating or who is
an inspiration to the youth.

RULINGS: 1. NO, the assailed memorandum and directive, being the President’s decision, to bury Marcos at the
LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, domestic and international laws.

CONCLUSION: In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override
an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly, the President's discretion is not totally unfettered.
"Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying.
In its classic formulation, 'discretion is not unconfined and vagrant' but 'canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing."' At bar, President Duterte, through Enriquez, et al., acted within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny
Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the framers of our Constitution intend that full respect for human
rights is available at any stage of a person's development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or
she leaves this earth. There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge. The Court could
only do so much in accordance with the clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for the
people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require the better perspective that the passage of time
provides. In the meantime, the country must move on and let this issue rest.

Source: https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2017/05/ocampo-v-enriquez-gr-no-225973-november.html &

http://ustlawreview.org/images/Case_Digests/2016/ocampo%20v.%20enriquez%20marcos%20burial%20case.pdf
4.2 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016

FACTS: The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and
PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges
were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte
and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto
xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and
Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring
and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or
acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or
less, [by raiding the public treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to evidence
asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were denied by the
Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the
respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed
their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUES:

Procedural:
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence.
Substantive:
Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;
Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder: (a) Was there evidence of
amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?

RULING:

Re procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court
because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to
this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did
not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of
their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed,
it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so “x x x
would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not
wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the
ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the
sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave
abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA,
Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit
plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement.
It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement,
or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538,
556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1)
with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by
allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would
know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the
allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under
R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary
because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the
accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring
the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably
prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the
offense charged.

Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily
condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific
allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping
generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State against
the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

Re second substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was adduced against
GMA and Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than
Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at
least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that
matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial
or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence
Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury (under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying words:
misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular
word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the
company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a
statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or
restricted by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own; to
misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege, or
right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and malversation occurs when “any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public
officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms
that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the
property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering
constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the
public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas
had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’
respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention
of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

Source: https://dianbautista82.wordpress.com/2016/07/27/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-et-al-vs-people-of-the-philippines-
and-the-sandiganbayan-g-r-no-220598-19-july-2016/

1. Qualifications PHIL. CONST. art VIII Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, JBC-009, Rule 2, Oct. 18, 2000, Kilosbayan
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007

FACTS: Respondent announced an appointment in favor of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to
fill up the vacancy created by the of Associate Justice R. J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese
citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship.
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is
patently unconstitutional and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Is Sandiganbayan Justice Ong a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING: No. It is clear from the records of the Court that respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final
decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and,
under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various
births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so
as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok
Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-
line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would
be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

Source: http://www.pinayjurist.com/kilosbayan-vs-ermita-ong-g-r-no-177721-july-3-2007-citizenship-naturalization/
a. Independence, In Re: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC

The Case: This resolves a contempt charge1 against respondent Amado A.P. Macasaet (Macasaet), a newspaper
columnist, for authoring publications imputing bribery to a member of this Court.

The Facts: Macasaet writes a daily column, "Business Circuit," in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation. In the 18-21
September 2007 issues of Malaya, Macasaet ran a story, based on information obtained from confidential sources, of an
alleged bribery in the Court committed as follows: on separate occasions in the second week of September 2007,2 five3
boxes containing cash worth P10 million were delivered to the Court and received by a certain "Cecilia," a staff of an
unnamed lady Justice, who opened one of the boxes and saw its contents. Forthwith, the Justice terminated "Cecilia’s"
employment. The payoff was made allegedly in connection with a decision rendered by the Justice "acquitting" a Filipino-
Chinese businessman. Macasaet’s story, which carried commentaries on the state of the judiciary and reputation of
judges,4 exhorted "Cecilia" to divulge everything she knows about the alleged bribery and the Court to investigate the
matter.

Subsequently, Newsbreak, an online magazine, posted on its website5 a news report that the Court is investigating a
bribery incident based on facts substantially similar6 to what Macasaet wrote. Written by Marites Danguilan Vitug
(Vitug), Newsbreak editor, and Aries Rufo (Rufo), Newsbreak reporter, the news report named Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago as the member of the Court involved in the alleged bribery and one Cecilia Delis (Delis)7 as her staff whose
employment she terminated.

On 24 September 2007, Justice Santiago issued a statement denying the "accusations and insinuations" published in
Malaya and Newsbreak. Justice Santiago also asked the Court to investigate the matter.

In a Resolution dated 25 September 2007, the Court en banc required Macasaet to explain "why no sanction should be
impose[d] on him for indirect contempt of court" under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8 After
Macasaet submitted his compliance and Delis her affidavit, the Court, in the Resolution of 16 October 2007, created a
Committee, composed of former members of the Court,9 to "receive evidence from all parties concerned" and submit its
report and recommendation within 30 days from the start of its hearing. Macasaet, Vitug, Rufo, Delis and other Court
employees10 appeared and testified before the Committee.

Macasaet, Vitug and Rufo uniformly testified that they obtained the information on the alleged bribery from their
respective confidential sources. Delis denied having received or opened any box containing cash intended for Justice
Santiago. While admitting that she was a staff of Justice Santiago, Delis denied having been fired from service and
claimed that she resigned effective 15 March 2007. Danilo Pablo of the Court’s Security Division testified that while
visitors to the Court are listed in the logbook at the Court’s gate, the security personnel, as a matter of policy, do not
open gifts or boxes intended for members of the Court.

It was determined during the hearings conducted by the Committee that the case referred to in Macasaet and
Newsbreak’s11 publications is G.R. No. 172602 (Henry T. Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan). The petition in G.R.
No. 172602 sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling denying quashal of the Information filed against
petitioner Henry T. Go (Go) for violation of Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). In a
Decision dated 13 April 2007, penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Third Division, by a divided vote,12 dismissed
the petition in G.R. No. 172602. Go sought reconsideration and while his motion was pending, Justice Callejo retired
from the Court. In the Resolution dated 3 September 2007, penned by Justice Santiago, a Special Third Division, again by
a divided vote,13 granted Go’s motion, reversed the Decision of 13 April 2007, and dismissed the Information filed
against Go. The respondent sought reconsideration which awaits resolution.

In its Report and Recommendation dated 10 March 2008 (Report), the Committee found that "there exist valid grounds x
x x to cite x x x Macasaet for indirect contempt x x x." The Report found that (1) Macasaet’s publications were false,
baseless,14 unbelievable,15 and malicious16 and (2) Macasaet was negligent in failing to ascertain the veracity of his
story.17 The Committee concluded that Macasaet’s publications generated public distrust in the administration of justice
and thus, contumacious. The majority finds the Report’s findings and conclusion well-taken and accordingly imposes a
punitive fine on Macasaet.
I agree with the majority that Macasaet failed to substantiate his story. However, I disagree with the majority’s
conclusion that this suffices to hold Macasaet guilty of contempt of court.

Source: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/am_07-09-13-sc-ac_2008.html

b. Integrity: Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460

PER CURIAM:

On 31 March 2006, the Court En Banc promulgated its Decision in the above-entitled case, the dispositive of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13
charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;

2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City
and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit
to discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately;

3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
corresponding to three (3) years;

4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and

5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for
MOOTNESS.
Subsequent thereto, on three separate dates,[1] Judge Floro filed three Partial Motions for Reconsideration as well as
supplements thereto.

In a signed Resolution dated 11 August 2006 by the Court En Banc, the foregoing motions and supplements were denied
for lack of merit. It was also stated therein that from then on, no other pleadings will be entertained by the Court.[2]

In obvious disregard of the aforementioned directive, Judge Floro filed several more pleadings, i.e., "Verified
Letter/Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit and Grant the (a) Second Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
Court's Decision dated 31 March 2006 and (b) Conjunctive Omnibus Motion; Verified Complaint/Letter-Affidavit with
Memorandum of Law/Authorities, and Urgent Prayer for Immediate Docketing and Early Resolution dated 25 August
2006;" and "Verified Another/Supplemental Complaint/Letter-Affidavi with Memorandum of Law/Authorities, and
Urgent Prayer for Immediate Docketing and Early Resolution dated 1 September 2006."

In a Resolution dated 26 September 2006, the Court En Banc resolved to treat the Verified Complain/Letter Affidavit and
Verified Another/Supplemental Complaint/Letter-Affidavit as separate matters from the subject case.

In another Resolution, this time an extended one, dated 10 October 2007, the Court En Banc resolved to NOTE WITHOUT
ACTION the aforequoted Verified Letter/Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit and Grant the (a) Second Motion
for Partial Reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated 31 March 2006 and (b)Conjunctive Omnibus Motion filed by
Judge Floro. In the same resolution, the Court further considered the present case closed and terminated and
accordingly ordered the issuance of an entry of judgment in due course.[3]

Yet again, in obvious disdain of the Court's prior Resolutions, Judge Floro incessantly filed pleading after pleading, viz:
MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO ADMIT AND GRANT a) this Third Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of par. 2], page
74, of the Decision (in this case) to Reinstate Judge Floro [under Sonia vs. Villegas, allowing 2nd/3rd Motions for
Reconsideration of Dismissal of Judges, 11-18, 2004 A.M. No. RTJ-3-1812); and b) Alternative Motion to Expunge from
the Rollo this Pleading/Paper if Judge Floro will not be reinstated, and to mail the expunged copy to Judge Floro in
accordance with Truth and his religion Prayer and Imprecation-Psalm 109;[4]
VERIFIED MOTIONS/LETTER WITH ALTERNATIVE OMNIBUS MOTION TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO a) The
August 11, 2006 and March 31, 2006 Decision and Resolution (in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460) Separating Judge Floro from
Service; b) The December 12, 2006 JBC published Announcement (P.D. Inquirer, 12-14-2006), opening Branch 73, RTC,
Malabon for Application; and c) To Re-Open, Re-Investigate it and Reinstate Judge Floro with Motion for Leave of Court
to Admit/Grant these Extraordinary, Omnibus Motions;[5]

LETTER asking the Court to reinstate him based on Soria vs. Villegas, November 2004 Chief Justice Davide decision
permitting 3 or more appeals, and stating that he is willing to be detailed as Judge and to work under the Offices of
Justice Gutierrez, Justice Nazario and/or the Office of the Chief Justice, by way of reconciliation;[6]

2nd MOTION/LETTER WITH LEAVE OF COURT [For Reconsideration of the Denial Resolution Dated December 11, 2006]
with alternative Omnibus Motions;[7] and Omnibus Motion/Letter praying to declare null and void ab initio the
December 12, 2006 JBC published Announcement (P.D. Inquirer 12-14-2006) opening Branch 73, RTC, Malabon for
application;[8]
which the Court En Banc, in essence, expunged[9] from the records of the case at bar in view of its signed Resolution
dated 11 August 2006 wherein it already resolved to deny with finality Judge Floro's Partial Motions for Reconsideration
as well as the Supplements thereto, for lack of merits.

Despite the resolute denunciation of his attempts to evade the interdictions issued by the Court En Banc, Judge Floro
once more filed the following:
ORIGINAL PETITION/LETTER WITH LEAVE OF COURT [For Re-Opening of Judge Floro's Separation Case based on "G.R. No.
72670 September 12, 1986-Saturnina Galman vs. Sandiganbayan] with Conjunctive Omnibus Motions;[10]

VERIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE ORIGINAL PETITION/LETTER, WITH LEAVE OF COURT [For Re-Opening of Judge Floro's
Separation case based on G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986 Saturnina Galman vs. Sandiganbayan] with Alternative
Urgent Petition to assign i) a New Docket Number to this Original Petition, and ii) to Designate Acting Chief Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing or S.C. Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, as New Ponente of this New Case.[11]
The Court had already thoroughly studied the present case. Likewise, it had meticulously reviewed each and every
evidence on record when it rendered its 31 March 2006 Decision and 11 August 2006 Resolution. Seeing that Judge Floro
failed to present, and continuously fails to present, any meritorious argument or substantial evidence in support of the
various pleadings he has filed thereafter, We were constrained to deny them.

In this Resolution, We wish to remind Judge Floro that the Court cannot be swayed to modify or reverse its Decision and
various Resolutions by inundating the ponente with numerous pleadings avowing ungodly reprisal as well as personal
letters/telephone calls seeking audience with the latter, if, as in this case, they are only in furtherance of repeating issues
and arguments already passed upon by the Court En Banc's earlier Decision and Resolution. Otherwise stated, only
meritorious arguments and substantial evidence can convince Us to modify or reverse our previous ruling.

Basic is the rule in our judicial system that litigations must end and terminate at some point, and in the oft-quoted case
of Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez,[12] this Court had explained that
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Judge Velasco,[13] this Court expounded on the interpretation of the
following phrases, used by the courts in their judgments or resolutions, and explicitly found in this Court's Resolution,
dated 11 August 2006 concerning respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
Denial "With Finality"

While the denial of a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order is normally accompanied by the modifier,
"final," or "with finality," there may be a denial not so qualified. That is of no consequence. By no means may it be taken
as indicating any uncertainty or indecisiveness on the part of the Court regarding its denial of reconsideration, or an
encouragement or expectation of a second motion for reconsideration. The modifier serves simply to emphasize the
import and effect of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, i.e., that the Court will entertain and consider no
further arguments or submissions from the parties respecting its correctness; that in the Court's considered view,
nothing more is left to be discussed, clarified or done in the case, all issues raised having been passed upon and
definitely resolved, and any other which could have been raised having been waived and no longer being available as
ground for a second motion. A denial with finality stresses that the case is considered closed.

Prohibition to File Further Pleadings

Apart from the original directive in its Resolution of March 1, 1995, the Court twice reiterated the admonition that no
further pleadings, motions or papers should be filed in these cases, except only as regards issues directly involved in the
"Motion for Reconsideration" (Re: Dismissal of Respondent Judge). This it did in its Resolutions dated July 24 and
October 25, 1995, respectively.

Evidently, an order of this character is directed to parties who obstinately refuse to accept the Court's final verdict and
who, despite such verdict and in defiance of established procedural rules, mulishly persist in still arguing the merits of
their cause. They continue to take up the time of the Court needlessly, by filing unauthorized, forbidden, even worthless
pleadings, motions and papers, serving no real purpose other than to delay termination of the case.

Evidently, too, the directive against the filing of any further pleadings, motions or papers is one that exacts observance
by all parties concerned, such that willful and unjustifiable disregard or disobedience thereof constitutes constructive
contempt under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. x x x.[14]
Judge Floro should be guided accordingly by the aforequoted jurisprudence.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby Resolved, Judge Floro's "ORIGINAL PETITION/LETTER WITH LEAVE OF
COURT [For Re-Opening of Judge Floro's Separation Case based on "G.R. No. 72670, 12 September 1986 - Saturnina
Galman v. Sandiganbayan] with Conjunctive Omnibus Motions"[15] and his "VERIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE ORIGINAL
PETITION/LETTER, WITH LEAVE OF COURT [For Re-Opening of Judge Floro's Separation case based on G.R. No. 72670, 12
September 1986, Saturnina Galman v. Sandiganbayan] with Alternative Urgent Petition to assign i) a New Docket
Number to this Original Petition, and ii) to Designate Acting Chief Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing or S.C. Associate
Justice Gregory S. Ong, as New Ponente of this New Case,"[16] are hereby NOTED WITHOUT ACTION and are ordered
EXPUNGED from the records. It is hereby firmly reiterated that NO FURTHER PLEADING/S WILL BE ENTERTAINED in this
case. Judge Floro is hereby given a WARNING that he can be held liable for indirect contempt should he persist in
disregarding lawful orders of this Court and committing acts which tend to abuse, obstruct, impede, and degrade the
administration of justice.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

Source: http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cac32
c. Impartiality: People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118882, Sep. 26, 1996

Before us is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order which
seeks to: (a) annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31733 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it denied the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S.
Espina of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 9301-39, respectively,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al." and "People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and b) enjoin
respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases.

Acting on the said petition, the Court on April 3, 1995 resolved to require respondents all of whom are the accused in the
aforesaid criminal cases, to comment thereon within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary restraining order
prayed for, and to enjoin respondent judge from taking further action in Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39 until
further orders from the Court.

It appearing that private respondents Cristeta Reyes & Rogen Doctora, Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro & Jane C. Go failed
to file their respective comments within the period which expired on April 17, 1995 and April 18, 1995, respectively, the
Court on June 26, 1995 resolved to require said private respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplinary
dealt with for such failure, and to file the required comments, both within ten (10) days from notice.

As to respondents Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro (prisoners at the Tacloban City Jail), copies of the resolution requiring
them to file comment were returned unserved with the postmaster's notation "unknown in said address". The Court, on
October 11, 1995 directed the Solicitor General to serve the same on said respondents and to inform the Court of such
service, both within ten (10) days from notice.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Compliance stating that the required copies were sent to private respondents
Santos & Alegro through ordinary mail on December 26, 1995.

To date, all the respondents have not yet filed their comments, for verily, delay in the submission of the same would
appear to benefit respondents, and sanction against them may not really amount to much, considering that most of
them are under detention. Thus, so as not to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39,
we now resolve to dispense with respondent's comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.

One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial
court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus, every litigant, including
the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge which was explained in Javier vs. Commission of Elections
(144 SCRA 194 [1986]), in the following words:

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to
no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for
the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court
already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denoucement according to a
prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, can not be considered to
adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the
prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined
the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against herein respondent Jane Go, the
principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go.

Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to
seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina
to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET
ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region
stationed in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified from taking cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-
39. It is further ordered that these criminal cases be re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ, concur.

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/sept1996/118882.htm

d. Propriety: In Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on September 26,
2013 against Associate Justice Gregpry S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

PER CURIAM:

The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.

- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced
during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.1

Factual Antecedents

In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus
foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance
Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions
all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals
were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs.
Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or
attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong,
herein respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention
charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs.
Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach
out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and
distributing the money.

Source: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/am_sb-14-21-j_2014.html
e. Competence and Diligence, Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua, A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, April 23, 2010

PER CURIAM:
These consolidated cases[1] stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge Evelyn S.
Arcaya-Chua. A decision has been rendered in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, entitled Sylvia Santos v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-
Chua, from which the respondent sought reconsideration. The immediately preceding case was consolidated with the
subsequent administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge in a Resolution dated April 14, 2009 of the Court en
banc.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ

In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), Francisco P. Ocampo charged respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with
harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In his letter-complaint dated April 24, 2007 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Francisco Ocampo stated that
he was the respondent in Special Proceedings (SP) No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo,
which was pending before the sala of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.

On November 27, 2006, Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo, filed a petition claiming the sole custody of their
minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P. Ocampo (Francesca), born on June 1, 1994, and Ma. Fatima Patricia A.
Ocampo (Fatima), born on October 13, 1995. Summons was served upon Francisco Ocampo on December 12, 2006 and
the case was set for hearing the following day, December 13, 2006.

During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge issued an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from
taking their minor daughters out of the country without the court's permission and directing him to allow his wife, Milan,
visitation rights over their minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Since then, Milan exercised
visitation rights over the minors and communicated with them through their cellular phones. Francisco Ocampo filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that he and Milan were residents and registered voters of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. He then served written interrogatories to his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove that his wife was not really a resident of Makati City.

In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo questioned the
dismissal of his motion since Milan never presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which he submitted in
support of his motion to dismiss.

Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007. On even date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO), requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from
his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts
that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor
daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of
expenses for medication and education.

Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing the TPO as the period to file his answer had not yet
expired when respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support of P50,000.00
to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the absence of
any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. In directing the payment of
support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of his
wife and the pendency of the legal separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment.

Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of
life and death. When her branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to implement
the Order. Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a Maundy Thursday, the sheriff dispatched by respondent Judge barged
into the home of Francisco Ocampos parents in Baguio City and woke up all the occupants therein. At that time,
Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters and family were having their Holy Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the
house and opened the rooms against the will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy. When the sheriff
learned that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused from their sleep, even as
Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor daughters to his wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco
Ocampo pay the support of P50,000.00 right there and then, although he was told by Francisco that he did not have such
amount of money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco
Ocampo told them to go with him.

Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgent ex parte motion to recall or rectify the Order
dated April 3, 2007, but both motions were denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated April 13, 2007.

The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as follows: (1) she denied the motion to dismiss filed
by Francisco Ocampo, respondent therein, despite overwhelming evidence submitted that therein petitioner was not a
resident of Makati City; (2) she scheduled the hearing of the case immediately a day after the summons was served on
therein respondent; (3) she issued a TPO despite the fact that therein respondent's period to file an Answer had not yet
lapsed; (4) she ordered the payment of support without sufficient basis; and (5) she caused the implementation of the
TPO over-zealously, even designating a special sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday. These, coupled
with complainant Ocampo's account that respondent Judge demanded money from his wife, constitute the first set of
charges filed against her.

In her Comment,[2] respondent Judge explained that the order setting SP No. M-6375 for hearing on the petitioner's
application for a TPO and Hold Departure Order was issued on December 8, 2006, a Friday, and was received for service
by the Process Server on the same day. Based on the officer's return, the Order was attempted to be served twice by the
Process Server on December 11, 2006, a Monday, at complainant Francisco Ocampo's house, but nobody was there. On
December 12, 2006, substituted service was resorted to by the Process Server.

Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have been set earlier since the court calendar was full, nor later,
because December 13, 2006 was the last hearing date, before the court went on Christmas recess, for cases requiring
the presence of the public prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed by the suddenness of the court
hearing, respondent Judge professed that she did not have such intention. The nature of therein petitioner's prayers
required immediate action by the court and the December 8, 2006 Order could have been served on him on December
11, 2006, but, as previously mentioned, was unsuccessful.

Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant Ocampo really felt harassed by the suddenness of the hearing, he
could have complained during the hearing of December 13, 2006. Nonetheless, he never brought such issue to the
attention of the court, until the filing of the administrative complaint, or four (4) months after the fact. At any rate, the
scheduled hearing on December 13, 2006 did not push through because Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on
the same day. Francisco Ocampo himself set the hearing of his motion for reconsideration of the Order dated March 22,
2007 Order (which denied the Motion to Dismiss) on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday. For utter lack of merit,
reconsideration was denied and the TPO was issued on the same day.

Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was anchored on the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262. The Court also took into account the provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which deal with the
right of the mother to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children and her right to keep them in her company.
Moreover, Francisco Ocampos contention in his Answer that he was not contesting his wifes claim that the subject
minors were not his children bolstered the propriety of the award of custody over the subject minors to his wife, Milan.

Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous in causing the implementation of the TPO, as the law itself
mandates that the court order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent. The Order that directed
the implementation of the TPO was dated April 4, 2007, and it was received by Milan's counsel on the same day. Sheriff
Manuel Q. Tangangco was deputized to serve it since the Branch Sheriff was not available. Milan Ocampo herself and her
counsel coordinated with the sheriff regarding its service, also on the same day. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
explained that had she opted to defer action on Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO as well as its implementation, it
would have been Milan who would have charged her administratively, considering that the Petition was filed as early as
November 23, 2006, but the proceedings on the merits were delayed due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of a Motion
to Dismiss. In fact, therein petitioner, Milan Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007 an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve
Petitioner's Application for a Permanent Protection Order, etc.), claiming that Francisco Ocampo's motion to dismiss was
purely dilatory. As regards the date, time and manner the TPO was served by the sheriff, respondent Judge maintained
that she was not privy to it, since the said TPO would have been served on April 4, 2007, pursuant to the Order bearing
the same date. The sheriff's arrogance, if any, was his personal accountability.

Respondent Judge noted that the Sheriffs Report and handwritten notation on the lower portion of the Order dated April
3, 2007, which was also signed by Kagawad Artemio S. Zaparita of Baguio City and SP04 Arthur A. Curno of the Baguio
City Police, stated that respondent Francisco Ocampo voluntarily turned over the custody of subject minors to the
petitioner. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, the subject minors themselves belied the claims of Francisco Ocampo
regarding the alleged arbitrary manner the TPO was served by the sheriff. Respondent Judge also pointed out that the
court did not receive any complaint from Francisco Ocampo or anyone concerned about the manner the TPO was served.
It was only in the present administrative complaint that the same was raised, leading to the inference that Francisco
Ocampos claims were concocted.

Respondent Judge maintained that it was irrelevant that the subject minors may not have been in danger, but were safe
in the custody of complainant Francisco Ocampo. The court arrived at a preliminary determination that Milan, being the
biological mother and the subject minors being her illegitimate children, was entitled to custody over them. Moreover,
Milan may have been granted and was exercising visitation rights over subject minors, yet the duration thereof, as stated
in the Order dated December 13, 2006, was only until the court resolved complainant Ocampo's Motion to Dismiss,
which was resolved with finality on April 3, 2007. Further, there is a whale of a difference between exercise of visitation
rights and custody. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, subject minors, who were over seven years old, declared that
they preferred to stay with their mother, Milan Ocampo, and likewise confirmed the physical violence committed by
complainant Francisco Ocampo against Milan Ocampo.

According to respondent Judge, Milan Ocampos prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a Permanent Protection Order
(PPO) was anchored mainly on R.A. No. 9262. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9262 is explicit that the TPO should be issued by the
court on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. Milan's
prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO, based on R.A. No. 9262, was incorporated in the Petition that was filed as
early as November 23, 2006. Thus, it was not necessary for the court to await the filing of complainant Ocampo's Answer
or the expiry of the period within which to file it before issuing the TPO. Respondent Judge explained that the award of
support was in favor of Milan alone as the legal wife of complainant Ocampo. This was clarified in an Order dated April
16, 2007. Among Milan's prayers in her Petition was for an award of monthly support of not less than P150,000.00, but
the court awarded only P50,000.00, as that was the amount found reasonable by it. At any rate, the support granted by
the court was only temporary. Likewise, although complainant Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the
directive to give support as alleged by Milan, the court did not impose a sanction against him precisely because the court
was then completing the hearing for the issuance of a TPO. Moreover, Francisco Ocampo had really no reason to
complain about the award of support, because the directive to provide monthly support was already held in abeyance in
the Order dated May 2, 2007.

Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's allegations regarding Milan's adulterous relationships and the legal
separation case do not have any bearing on SP No. M-6375. She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the
records, the courses of action taken by the counsel of complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to normal rules of
procedure. One, on April 10, 2007, he filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, but two days later, or on April 12, 2007, he
still filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007. Two, on April 24, 2007, he filed the
instant administrative complaint, but two days later, or on April 26, 2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's
Motion dated April 23, 2007 with Ex Parte Motion for Examination of the Minors, and a day later, on April 24, 2007, filed
a Second Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua asseverated that from all appearances, the administrative
complaint was filed for the sole objective of compelling her to inhibit herself from handling SP No. M-6375. Three, on
May 11, 2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not
really have any genuine administrative cause of action against her. As things turned out, all that complainant Ocampo
wanted to hear from the subject minors was their declaration that they preferred to stay with their mother.

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/07-2630-RTJ%20.htm