CHAPTER-5

TORTS AFFECTING REPUTATION OF

MOVEABLE AND IMMOVABLE
PROPERTY
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 SLANDER OF TITLE may be defined as “a false and malicious statement in

writing, printing or by words, injurious to any person’s title to property,
whether movable or immovable, and causing damage to such person”.

 ILLUSTRATIONS:
o ‘A’ owns a house and wants to sell it. ‘B’ falsely represents to the people
intending to purchase the house that ‘A’ has no title to the house or has an
infirm title over it. ‘A’ suffers loss. ‘B’ is liable for damages.

o ‘A’ makes a false statement that B’s house which he is intending to sell was
haunted. It is actionable as a case of slander of title. [Barrett v. Associated
Newspapers, (1907) 23 TLR 666]
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 If lands or chattels are about to be sold by an auction and a man declares in

the auction room, or elsewhere, that the vendor’s title is defective, that the
lands are mortgaged, or that the chattels are stolen property and so deters
people from buying, or causes the property to be sold for a less price than it
would otherwise have realized.

 This gives prima facie claim for compensation for damages.

 SLANDER OF TITLE

 The Confusion Between the Torts of Disparagement and Defamation.

 Disparagement actions protect property interests while defamation actions
protect only reputation.
 Both torts have always required a derogatory publication and have had
substantially the same common law privileges.
 While the falsity of a defamatory publication traditionally was presumed, the
disparagement claimant has always been required to prove falsity to establish
a prima facie case.
 Although the defamation defendant's intent was irrelevant at common law, a
showing of an intent to injure has always been required in disparagement
actions.
 Courts have always required proof of actual damage to sustain a suit for
disparagement unlike in cases of defamation.
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 In order to sustain an action for slander of title, the plaintiff must prove the
following essentials:

a) The statement or representation was false.

b) The statement was published; (The false statement must be published to

some person other than the plaintiff) (The statement may be oral or
written or even conduct conveying a false impression may be sufficient)

c) The statement was made maliciously i.e. with the intent to injure the
plaintiff or with some dishonest or improper motive;

d) The plaintiff suffered damage as a consequence .

 SLANDER OF TITLE

STATEMENT IS FALSE
 The plaintiff has the burden to establish that the disparaging statement was
false and untrue.
 If the statement is true; if there is really an infirmity in the title as is
suggested or if there is advancement of one’s legitimate interests, no action
will lie.
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 Malice implies an “INDIRECT, DISHONEST OR IMPROPER MOTIVE” or an “INTENTION TO

INJURE THE PLAINTIFF”
or “WANT OF BONA FIDES OR THE PRESENCE OF MALA FIDES” or
“KNOWLEDGE OF THE FALSITY OF THE STATEMENT”.

 The false statement must be such as is calculated to cause harm to the

plaintiff.

 A bona fide assertion of the defendant’s title to property, however mistaken,

if made for the protection of one’s own interest or some other right purpose
is not malicious.

 No action will lie in a case where there is no malice.

 The plaintiff must prove that the false statement resulted in actual pecuniary
loss and damage to one’s economic interests.
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 Hargovind v. Kikabhai, AIR 1938 Nag 84; ILR 1938 Nag 348

 A person who goes to the intending tenants of a certain building and

dissuades them from taking the building on rent by making false statements
as regards its habitability and safety is liable in tort if he is actuated by
malice.

 The tort is analogous to slander of title falling within the broad description of
injurious falsehood.
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 Phillips v. Glazer, 94 Cal. App. 2d 673, 211 P.2d 37 (1949).

 The defendant, upon learning that the plaintiff was trying to sell his home,
placed a large sign on adjoining land which read in part: "Notice. Anyone
buying No. 20 Malibu is buying [a] law suit." As a result, the plaintiff was
unable to sell the house
 The defendant was held liable for slander of title.
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 Garrard v. Dickenson, 78 Eng. Rep. 452

 If lands or chattels are about to be sold by auction and a person declares in

the auction room, or elsewhere, that the vendor’s title is defective, that the
lands are mortgaged, or that the chattels are stolen property, and so deters
people from buying, or causes the property to be sold for a price lesser than it
would otherwise have realized, this is a slander upon the title of the owner,
and gives him prima facie claim for compensation in damages.
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 Joyce v. Motor Surveys Ltd., [1948] Ch. 252

 The plaintiff became the tenant of one of the defendants’ lock-up garages in
order to have a premises where he could be registered as a tyre-dealer.
Subsequently, the defendants wanted to evict the plaintiff in order to sell off
the entire property with vacant possession. They, therefore, told the post-
office not to forward any more mails to the plaintiff at that address and
informed the tyre manufacturers’ association that the plaintiff was no longer
trading there.

 The conduct of the defendants was held to constitute malicious falsehood.

 SLANDER OF TITLE

 Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 QB 524

 The plaintiff had for many years carried on the business of an engineer and
boiler maker under the name ‘Ratcliffe and Sons’. The defendant was the
proprietor of the ‘County Herald’, a Welsh newspaper. The defendant in his
newspaper, published falsely and maliciously, that the plaintiff had ceased to
carry on his business and that the firm ‘Ratcliffe and Sons’ no longer existed.

 It was held that the defendant was liable in damages as his statement
adversely affected the plaintiff’s business and led to loss of custom. The
evidence of general loss of business was sufficient to support the action.
 SLANDER OF TITLE

 Remedy: The remedies of injunction and declaratory judgment are more

appropriate than an action for damages.

 Damage: Special damage sustained must be proved, and that will, in part, be
the measure of damages. Special damage may consist in the property having,
on sale, realized a price lesser than it otherwise would; or in the owner being
put to other unnecessary expenses in consequence.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 It may be defined as “a false statement, whether by word of mouth or in

writing, disparaging a man’s goods, published maliciously and causing him
special damage”.

 Illustration
o A makes a false statement that B’s goods are an infringement of C’s trade
mark and warns B’s customers not to buy them. A is liable to B in an action for
slander of goods.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 In India, the tort of disparagement has been embodied under Section

36A(1)(x), Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969
which stated that whoever gives false or misleading facts disparaging the
goods, services or trade of another person would be engaging in an unfair
trade practice.

 Section 2(1) (r) (1) (x), Consumer Protection Act, 1986

 SLANDER OF GOODS

 To maintain an action for SLANDER OF GOODS, it is necessary to prove the

following essentials:

1. The defendant disparaged the goods of the plaintiff;

2. The disparagement was false;

3. The disparagement was made maliciously;

4. The disparagement was published, orally or in writing, to some person

other than the plaintiff;

5. The disparagement resulted in special damage

 SLANDER OF GOODS

 White v. Mellin, [1895] AC 154

 The plaintiff manufactured and sold food products under the name “Mellin’s
Infants’ Food”. The defendant, a chemist, sold the plaintiff’s food at his
premises. He purchased tins of baby food manufactured by the plaintiff to
which he affixed a label, on the outside of the packet, stating that “Dr. Vance’s
Prepared food for Infants was the most healthful and nutritious for infants
and invalids than any preparation that has been offered to the public”.
 Dr. Vance’s Prepared Food for Infants was infact the defendant’s own brand in
which he had a proprietary interest.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 The defendant’s conduct did not amount to trade libel or slander of goods.
 It was held that his statement would not support a cause of action since it
was merely a piece of puffery, intended more to promote the sale of the
defendant’s products than to disparage the plaintiff’s food. The statements
were too general to found an action.

 Lord Watson held that:

 “In order to constitute disparagement…it must be shown that the

defendant’s representations were made of and concerning the plaintiff’s
goods; that they were in disparagement of his goods and untrue; and that
they have occasioned special damage to the plaintiff.”
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 Director General (Investigation and Registration) v. Shakti Publications Pvt.

Ltd., 1999 CTJ 357
 The plaintiff was printing and publishing a magazine “Chitralekha” and the
defendant’s publication was titled “Abhiyan”.
 The defendant published a circular claiming that their publication was more
beneficial for advertisers as it would give better value for money as against
the plaintiff’s magazine. They based their claim on the fact that though the
two magazines had comparable circulation and readership figures, their
magazine had the advantage of cheaper advertising rates.

 The plaintiff sued the defendant for disparaging their publication by false,
misleading and deceptive representations.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 The plaintiffs were able to prove that their magazine had larger circulation
and a higher readership than the magazine of the defendants and therefore,
the claim of the defendant was patently false.

 It was held that the circular not only gave a misleading impression regarding
the circulation and readership of “Chitralekha” but also suggested that
advertising in the plaintiff’s magazine was less beneficial and did not give
advertisers value for money.

 It was held to be a clear case of disparagement and the defendants were

guilty of indulging in unfair trade practices.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 Lyne v. Nicholls, (1906) 23 TLR 86

 The plaintiff and defendant were the owners of newspapers circulating in the
same locality. The defendant published a statement that “the circulation of”
his newspaper was “20 to 1 of any other weekly paper in the district” [there
being only one such newspaper i.e. the plaintiff’s] and “where others count
by the dozen, we count by the hundred”. This was untrue and was found to
denigrate rivals in potentially causing advertisers to switch away from other
papers to that of the defendant. The statement was held to be actionable.
 It was held that those statements were not a mere puff but amounted to
disparagement of the plaintiff’s newspaper and were actionable on proof of
actual damage.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v. Asda Stores Ltd., (2010) EWCA Civ 609;
(2011) QB 497
 The plaintiff was a leading manufacturer and supplier of ASPARTAME, a sugar
substitute, an artificial sweetener.
 It brought a claim for MALICIOUS FALSEHOOD against the defendant supermarket
chain in respect of certain statements on the packaging of the defendant’s
own in-house brand “Good for You” range of health foods. Some of these
were marketed in packaging bearing the statements “No hidden nasties” and
“No artificial colours or flavours and no aspartame”.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 Ajinomoto brought proceedings for malicious falsehood, contending that

consumers would understand these statements as having one of the three
meanings :
a) aspartame is harmful or unhealthy;
b) there is a risk that aspartame is harmful or unhealthy; or
c) aspartame is to be avoided.
However, the defendant contended that the words meant neither (a), nor
(b), nor (c) but rather meant the following:
d) these foods were for customers who found aspartame objectionable.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 On the trial of a preliminary issue as to the meaning of the statements, the

judge held that in claims for malicious falsehood, the “single-meaning” rule
was applicable i.e. a publication is deemed to have one single “right” meaning
as understood by the (hypothetical) ordinary and reasonable reader.

 It was held that although a number of consumers would understand the

statement to refer to meaning (b), however as per the single-meaning rule,
the correct meaning was (d) as asserted by ASDA. Accordingly, the judge
dismissed the claim by the plaintiffs.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 The plaintiff appealed against the order. It argued that the judge had been wrong to
apply the single-meaning rule to malicious falsehood. It was argued that it was
sufficient for a claim in malicious falsehood that a substantial number of reasonable
consumers would have understood the words complained of in the manner as
contended by the plaintiff (appellant) i.e. as being damaging to the plaintiff’s business.
The Court of Appeal accepted the argument and allowed the appeal. It held that:

 “If the case were allowed to go to trial and the claimant were able to prove that such
meaning was false, uttered with malice and calculated to damage it, why should it
not be entitled to damages for the injury which the falsehood will have caused it?”
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 De Beers Abrasive Products Ltd. v. International General Electric Co. of New York Ltd.,
[1975] 2 All ER 599

 The plaintiffs and the defendants manufactured and distributed abrasives (grinding
instruments) made from diamonds. The abrasives of the plaintiffs were made from
natural diamonds, whereas those of the defendants were made from synthetic
diamonds.

 The defendants published a brochure wherein it was stated that the abrasive “MBS-
70” manufactured by them was found, through scientific laboratory testing, to be
more effective in cutting concrete than the plaintiffs’ rival product “Debdust”. The
brochure showed the results of comparative scientific tests on the products of the
plaintiffs and defendants.

 The plaintiffs brought an action for slander of goods alleging that the statement was
false and disparaged the goods of the plaintiff as being of poor quality.
 SLANDER OF GOODS

 The defendants contended that the pamphlet was a mere idle puff and the
claim of the plaintiffs should be struck out.
 The court made it clear that a trader is entitled to “puff” his goods. By that
reasoning, it is permissible to claim that one’s goods are “the best in the
world”. But it is not permissible to denigrate a rival’s goods by making untrue
claims that a reasonable person would take seriously.
 The court held that the claims contained potential for liability and the report
published was intended to be taken seriously and could not be dismissed as
mere puffery.
 Since the pamphlet contained statements disparaging the plaintiffs’ goods,
the defendants would be liable if, on investigation, the statements prove to
be false and the plaintiffs can show malice.
 Maintenance & Champerty

 If a person agrees to maintain a suit in which he has no interest, the

proceeding is known as “MAINTENANCE”; if he bargains for a share of the result
to be ultimately decreed in a suit in consideration of assisting in its
maintenance, it is known as “CHAMPERTY”.

 Maintenance has been described as “the promotion or support of

contentious legal proceedings by a stranger, who has no direct concern in
them…a wrong actionable at the suit of the other party, in the absence of
justifying circumstances”- Fleming, Torts (1977)
 Maintenance & Champerty

 Maintenance is the officious assistance by money or otherwise offered by a

third person to either party to a suit, in which he himself has no legal
interest, to enable them to prosecute or defend the claim.

 Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. (1919) AC 368

 The essence of the offence is intermeddling with litigation in which the

intermeddler has no concern. It is against public policy that litigation should
be promoted and supported by those who have no concern in it.
 Maintenance & Champerty

 The law of maintenance is confined to cases where a man improperly and for
the purpose of stirring up litigation and strife encourages others to bring
actions or to make defences which they have no right to make.

 Prosser v. Edmonds, [1835] 11 QBD 1

 No encouragement should be given to litigation by the introduction of parties

to enforce those rights which others are not disposed to enforce.

 Camdex International Ltd. v. Bank of Zambia, [1998] Q.B. 22

 What was objectionable was trafficking in litigation where the party
ultimately litigating could show no legitimate interest in the action.
 Maintenance & Champerty

 Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. (1919) AC 368

 The issue was whether it was necessary to show specific loss, in order to
recover damages for the tort of maintenance. It was held that an action for
damages for maintenance will not lie in the absence of proof of special
damage. The success of the litigation maintained, whether an action or a
defence, is not a bar to the right of action for maintenance. It is no defence to
say that the maintained proceedings were successful and thus, justifiable.
 Maintenance & Champerty

 Bradlaugh v. Newdegate, [1883] 11 QBD 1

 The plaintiff was elected as the Member of Parliament. He took his seat and
voted on a motion without having taken the oath as prescribed by a statute. A
penalty was provided by the statute for cases where a person participated in
proceedings without taking the oath.
 The defendant assisted and instigated another person ‘C’ to file a suit against
the plaintiff to recover the statutory penalty. After commencement of the
action, the defendant gave to ‘C’ a Bond of Indemnity against all costs and
expenses he might incur in consequence of the action.
 The plaintiff thereafter, filed an action for maintenance against the
defendant. It was held that the defendant had no common interest with ‘C’ in
the result of the action for penalty. The conduct of the defendant amounted
to maintenance and thus, he was liable to reimburse the plaintiff for the costs
incurred by him in the first action.
 Maintenance & Champerty

 Champerty is a particular form of maintenance which exists when the person

maintaining the litigation is to be rewarded a share or portion out of its
proceeds.

 Thus, maintenance + agreement to share in the proceeds = Champerty

 EVERY CHAMPERTY IS MAINTENANCE, BUT EVERY MAINTENANCE IS NOT CHAMPERTY, FOR

CHAMPERTY IS BUT A SPECIES OF MAINTENANCE, WHICH IS THE GENUS.
 Maintenance & Champerty

 There are two cases in which the maintenance of a suit is lawful.

1. Where the person maintaining has a COMMON INTEREST, in the subject

matter of the action, with the party maintained
 Illustration: Master for a servant or servant for a master, an heir, a brother,
a son-in-law, a brother-in-law, a landlord defending his tenant in a suit for
title.
 But in all these cases, the interest spoken of is an actual valuable interest in
the result of the suit itself, either present, or contingent, or future, or the
interest which consanguinity or affinity to the suitor gives to the man who
aids him, or the interest arising from the connection of the parties.
 ‘Common interest’ should be legally recognizable interest.
 Maintenance & Champerty

2. Where the maintainer assisted the third person from charitable motives,
believing bona fide that the person maintained was a poor man oppressed
by a rich man or from religious sympathy.

 The doctrine of maintenance is not applicable to criminal proceedings and is

confined to interference with civil proceedings only.

 It is not maintenance to interfere officiously in criminal proceedings, although

it may possibly amount to malicious prosecution. Every member of the public
may set the criminal law in motion, and he is not liable unless the prosecution
is malicious.
 Maintenance & Champerty

 The English law of Maintenance and Champerty is not in force as a specific law
in India.

 A fair agreement to supply funds to carry on a suit, in consideration of the

lender having a share of the property sued for, if recovered, is not to be
regarded as being per se, opposed to public policy, or merely on this ground,
void.

 In some cases it would be in furtherance of justice as well as necessary to resist

oppression that a suitor who has a just title to property and no means except the
property itself, should be assisted in this manner.
 Maintenance & Champerty

 But in agreements of this kind the questions are:-

 Whether the agreement is extortionate and unconscionable, so as to be

inequitable against the borrower; or

 Whether the agreement has been made, not with the bona fide object of
assisting a claim, believed to be just, and of obtaining reasonable
compensation therefore, but for improper objects, as for the purpose of
gambling in litigation, or injuring others, so as to be, for these reasons,
contrary to public policy.

IN EITHER OF THESE CASES, EFFECT IS NOT TO BE GIVEN TO THE AGREEMENT.